Realism vs. Idealism
George Dance
> "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote innews:1170818298.5...@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com:
>
> >> Then you are trapped in solipsism. To escape it, you posit an external
> >> reality (though not an "objective reality") to provide a cause for
> >> phenomena.
> >
> > "An external reality (though not an "objective reality")" sounds
> > contradictory.
>
> Only if you take those two expressions to be equivalent, extensionally or
> intensionally.
>
No (though I think this question becomes irrelevant in light of what
follows) - there is a contradiction on the assumption that externality
implies objectivity - that the facts of the external world are
objective facts. No assumption that objective implies externality is
required; which is the assumption you'd deny.
> For Kantians, "external reality" would denote the noumena, i.e., a realm of
> existence which is indeed mind-independent, and which is the causal agent of
> experienced phenomena.
>
Noted.
> "Objective reality," on the other hand, is used by realists to denote
> external *objects* which are also mind-independent and which are the causes
> of experienced phenomena.
>
As I'm speaking for the 'realist' worldview here, I'd like to clarify
exactly what that is. I'm in full agreement with Simon Blackburn's
description as follows:
"Realism. Facts are facts. The world is largely independent of us
and the way we are; it has its things, facts, properties, events, and
states of affairs that have their own objective nature; our responses
are explained by the world and are intended to match the world; our
judgements are supposed to reflect, or depict, or mirror, or
correspond to the way the world is; success in judgement is a matter
of getting the way of the world right, or successfully describing how
things stand."
[Hales, ed. /Metaphysics/, Wadsworth 1999, 48]
> For Kantians, however, the process of analyzing phenomena into objects ---
> for creating an ontology from phenomena --- is an internal process. The
> noumena delivers the phenomena, but assembling it into objects is a
> constructive and creative (synthetic) cognitive process.
>
This Kantian view of the phenomenal world sounds remarkably close to
the contrasting view that Blackburn calls Idealism. Let me give that
as well:
"Idealism. There is no such thing as a view without a viewer. We
perceive the world with a very specific set of sensory and
interpretative mechanisms, including cultural lenses such as language,
or the categories of our place and time. The world as it is for us,
which means the world insofar as we can ever know about it or
understand it, is shaped by those mechanisms; there is an important
sense in which we ourselves are the authors of the world as it is for
us."
[Hales 1999, 48]
> > A fact is either under the control of your mind,
> > subject to your will (in the same way as your beliefs and values, eg)
> > or it is not. If it is, then it is not existentially external. If it
> > is not, then it is ontologically objective.
>
> The entire noumenal realm is independent of the mind. That is the fact the
> prompts us to posit the noumena in the first place --- that many experienced
> phenomena are outside of our willful control, and thus require an external
> cause (unless they are to remain uncaused). So we build that fact into the
> ontology that we construct.
As I understand it, then, the Kantian position is that there is an
mind-independent or objective aspect to the world - the 'noumenal'
world - of which, however, we know nothing. What we do know is the
'phenomenal' aspect of reality - what we can sense and experience -
which is, and can only be, a construct shaped by our sensory
mechanisms, cultural lenses, and mental categories. I think it's fair
to describe that position as Phenomenal Idealism, and contrast it with
my own Phenomenal Realism - and on that basis move to arguing over
specific cases.
> A stone is constructed as a mind-independent
> object, a "physical thing."
>
That's a first point of difference. While I'd consider a stone to be
something that is in the world independently of what my mind does,
you'd consider one to be a mental construct. Yet the idea of mentally
constructing a stone sounds no less dubious, to me, than the idea of
literally creating stones does to you:
<quote>
"What leads you to think we may be able to
create stones, etc.? I certainly cannot recall having created any of
the
stones I've encountered. I may have created my concept of them, but
the sense
impressions, the "raw materials" of that concept, just seem to appear
on
their own, with no intention or forewarning on my part." </q>
I see a stone. So I pick it up; it feels like a stone. I bang it on
something else; it sounds like a stone does. Then I throw it through
a perceived window; it smashes the glass. It looks clear to me that
there's something outside my mind giving me all those impressions (for
the same reason as it is to you, that they're unaffected by my will);
but it looks as clear to me that at least some of what I'm seeing is
what that something is. I can accept, for example, that it's also a
collection of atoms (though not that, because it's a collection of
atoms it is not a stone); and also that, atomic theory being possibly
wrong, it could be something completely unknown instead of a
collection of atoms. But still; those atoms or somethings would be in
the same location as where I was looking; they'd be the same size as
the stone I can see; that I actually picked them or it up; that it or
them flew through the air to the window; and that they broke the
window.
Even more so, all of this is consistent with my past experience of
stones; not just with my concept, but the memories based on it. So,
even granting that what I'm seeing might not be a stone (but an
identified x); it's reasonable to think that the similarity of
impressions is caused by a similarity of x's; that my sensing the same
type of stone
in different cases is caused, in each, by my being in the presence of
the same type of x.
> The stone is *physically* objective, and there are certainly some mind-
> independent phenomena involved in it. But it is not "ontologically
> objective," because ontology itself (ontology being theories of what exists),
> and every ontological theory, is itself a cognitive construct. "Reality" is
> whatever our best theories at the moment say is real. And our best theories
> are those which have the most predictive power.
Well, yes, but physics is just as theoretical, and by the same token
just as much a cognitive construct. So whence the difference? The
key, I would say, is the greater 'predictive power' of physics; that
its theories can be tested independently. That, though, is what I did
through my whole experience with the stone - the impression of one
sense sebsem sight, was tested against others, touch and hearing;
predictions were generated about how it would move in the air, where
it would hit, and what effect it would have when it hit; and those
predictions were in turn tested. Each stage of my experience was in
fact a test of my stone-impression against the x; had it failed any of
those tests - had my hand gone through it, or had it simply
disappeared in the air with a POP! halfway to the window - I would
have stopped believing that it was a stone forthwith. On the
assumption that each sense possibly gave me some information on the x,
doing all of them successfully would have to vastly increase the
possibility that I had such knowledge.
> We have no idea whether the noumena contains stones, or anything remotely
> resembling them. We do know that it delivers phenomena we can synthesize into
> stones, and that synthesis is a useful one.
On the assumption that the noumena which gave me the stone-impression
- the x - is completely unknown, then: none of my separate tests of
it could give me any information about x, and therefore all of them
together gave me no information about x. I know just as much about x
afterward than if I had completely overlooked it in the first place.
I don't like to use the word 'intuitive', as I don't consider personal
intuition to be proof of any kind. However, it is the most fitting
word here. I find the whole non-realist account completely counter-
intuitive.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>I don't like to use the word 'intuitive', as I don't consider personal
>intuition to be proof of any kind.
Hehe, what a dick. Neither does Kant "like" the word "intuition" or
"intuitive" offered up as proof. That is why the Aesthetic, which
concerns intuition, is not offered as proof, it is an Exposition on
Space and an Exposition on Time. The "proof" you want is always
right in front of your eyes; in other words, you don't need to prove
it, it is intuitive.
George Dance
> On 13 Feb 2007 20:39:39 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca>
> wrote:
>
> >I don't like to use the word 'intuitive', as I don't consider personal
> >intuition to be proof of any kind.
>
> Hehe, what a dick. Neither does Kant "like" the word "intuition" or
> "intuitive" offered up as proof.
Check out the logical implications of that:
1. George does not consider personal intuition to be proof.
2. That makes George a dick.
3. Immanuel does not consider personal intuition to be proof, either.
4. So that makes Immanuel a ____.
The reader can fill in the blank for herself.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Feb 14, 1:38 am, Malrassic Park <Malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
Typical George logic, always Dancing around.
U...@here.world
>"Realism. Facts are facts. The world is largely independent of us
>and the way we are; it has its things, facts, properties, events, and
>states of affairs that have their own objective nature; our responses
>are explained by the world and are intended to match the world; our
>judgements are supposed to reflect, or depict, or mirror, or
>correspond to the way the world is; success in judgement is a matter
>of getting the way of the world right, or successfully describing how
>things stand."
>[Hales, ed. /Metaphysics/, Wadsworth 1999, 48]
>"Idealism. There is no such thing as a view without a viewer. We
>perceive the world with a very specific set of sensory and
>interpretative mechanisms, including cultural lenses such as language,
>or the categories of our place and time. The world as it is for us,
>which means the world insofar as we can ever know about it or
>understand it, is shaped by those mechanisms; there is an important
>sense in which we ourselves are the authors of the world as it is for
>us."
>[Hales 1999, 48]
Introduce frame of reference. Concept of world made into short-term
reality, step inside reality and close door. Now in real world.
Reality expires, back in outer frame of reference. Concept of world
changed by experience. Create new short-term reality, step inside,
close door. Repeat. While inside "reality" it is real, realism
applies.
--
Ug!
galathaea
philosophy is so strange
the way it shifts definitions around
to create controversy and conflict
for the amusement of its spectators
its like hollywood
except for the ability to numb minds
and the excite consumerism
maybe we need team jerseys and a colloseum...
~~~~~~~~~..
phenomenalism
at least the forms the forms that conform
to what i am about to write
takes a slightly different view
from traditional realism
and traditional idealism
it does not necessarily posit
any control over the input we receive
though it does not deny that there may be some
experience shows that any such control is strongly constrained
however
from the input we may abstract
form categories of perception
and begin to see relationships in the symbols
models are the phenomenalists realism
models provide an ontology of cause
that we can use to predict perception
some of the ontology of models are direct experience
and some may be intensionally defined
in relation to direct experience
the intensionally defined
would be the noumena of the model
..~~~~~~~~~~
phenomenalism agrees to a large extent with realism
when the translation to models is made
however one important area where it differs
is that it does not necessarily assume
there is a model that will predict everything
it doesn't assume that our ability to symbolise
will comprehend the control of our input
realists
of course
do not assume this either _in_this_form_
and would probably object to a phenomenalist suggesting such
but they do assume that there is _a_ reality
and the symbolic form "reality"
to a phenomenalist
is meaningless without a model
***************oo************
similarly idealism was defeated by phenomenalism
in the legendary Ideal Wars
that lasted many centuries and took many lives
the humiliating defeat of the idealists
need not be recounted in this post
as a sign of respect for the dead
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
Publius
news:1171427979.4...@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com:
>> "Objective reality," on the other hand, is used by realists to denote
>> external *objects* which are also mind-independent and which are the
>> causes of experienced phenomena.
> As I'm speaking for the 'realist' worldview here, I'd like to clarify
> exactly what that is. I'm in full agreement with Simon Blackburn's
> description as follows:
>
> "Realism. Facts are facts. The world is largely independent of us
> and the way we are; it has its things, facts, properties, events, and
> states of affairs that have their own objective nature; our responses
> are explained by the world and are intended to match the world; our
> judgements are supposed to reflect, or depict, or mirror, or
> correspond to the way the world is; success in judgement is a matter
> of getting the way of the world right, or successfully describing how
> things stand."
> [Hales, ed. /Metaphysics/, Wadsworth 1999, 48]
Yes. That definition of "realism" is as good as any. I believe it is
equivalent to my short one.
>> For Kantians, however, the process of analyzing phenomena into objects
>> --- for creating an ontology from phenomena --- is an internal process.
>> The noumena delivers the phenomena, but assembling it into objects is a
>> constructive and creative (synthetic) cognitive process.
> This Kantian view of the phenomenal world sounds remarkably close to
> the contrasting view that Blackburn calls Idealism. Let me give that
> as well:
> "Idealism. There is no such thing as a view without a viewer. We
> perceive the world with a very specific set of sensory and
> interpretative mechanisms, including cultural lenses such as language,
> or the categories of our place and time. The world as it is for us,
> which means the world insofar as we can ever know about it or
> understand it, is shaped by those mechanisms; there is an important
> sense in which we ourselves are the authors of the world as it is for
> us."
> [Hales 1999, 48]
That is a fair definition of Kantian idealism, though not of Platonic
idealism. Note the hedge in the last sentence: "There is an important sense
in which we ourselves are the authors of the world . . ." I.e., we have an
important role, but we do not create the world *ex nihilo*. The world
delivers the raw materials, so to speak. We must then put them together in a
way that makes that world comprehensible to us. It is a creative process. And
while we have great latitude in that endeavor, there are some constraints
imposed by the design of our own construction machinery.
> As I understand it, then, the Kantian position is that there is an
> mind-independent or objective aspect to the world - the 'noumenal'
> world - of which, however, we know nothing. What we do know is the
> 'phenomenal' aspect of reality - what we can sense and experience -
> which is, and can only be, a construct shaped by our sensory
> mechanisms, cultural lenses, and mental categories. I think it's fair
> to describe that position as Phenomenal Idealism, and contrast it with
> my own Phenomenal Realism - and on that basis move to arguing over
> specific cases.
OK. I'd minimize the role of "cultural lenses," though --- those can be
overcome or bypassed fairly easily. The constraints imposed by the design of
our nervous system cannot be, at least in real-time.
Let's start with your first sentence above: "I see a stone. So I pick it up;
it feels like a stone. I bang it on something else; it sounds like a stone
does."
What are the raw materials there? Certain visual sensations, certain tactile
sensations, certain auditory sensations --- all "phenomena." All events
experienced in and by the mind, though independent of the mind (in the sense
of not being subject to willful control). All those phenomena appear in your
mind without any intention or willful intervention on your part; hence you
fairly conclude you did not invent them. Furthermore, those particular
sensations, or others like them, tend to appear simultaneously, or at least
in a predictable relationship. There is a pattern to them. On other occasions
you encounter other patterns you recognize as similar. So you abstract from
those patterns the elements they have in common, and construct an idealized
version of that pattern, just as we construct the ideal object "circle" from
our encounters with hundreds of more-or-less round things. That idealized
pattern then becomes the concept "stone," to which we assign a name.
The idealized versions of stones and circles have a great advantage, from an
information-processing point of view --- they are highly compressed data
structures. They are algorithmized. They can be stored using very few bits,
and can be manipulated virtually. That allows us to "run scenarios" --- to
manipulate these different token objects and anticipate future encounters
with them, and the possible outcomes of those encounters. They also allow us
to quickly recognize patterns of that class when we encounter them --- we
overlay our idealized pattern on some current real (phenomenal, experienced)
pattern, and if if they coincide, we say, "Ah, a stone."
The conceptual stone is an object of thought, a construct. The sensory
phenomena from which that concept is synthesized is independent of thought
(though not "outside the mind."). Yet we must assume that those phenomena are
provoked in us by something that *is* outside the mind, since there is
nothing in the mind that would appear to account for them. But the phenomena
represent all the information we have about that hypothesized external world.
Saying it is a "real stone" that causes our impressions of stones is the best
we can do. But there is an obvious problem with that analysis: our concept of
a stone is not of a thing whose "raw materials" are various sense impressions
or mental states. But we know that it is.
I made this comment in a post last nite in the "collective subjectivity"
thread. Don't know if you saw that, so I'll repeat here:
"BTW, we may not assume that the phenomena we experience are *per se*
generated by the noumena. The forms in which our phenomena manifest
themselves to us are determined by our own nature, not by the signal
delivered by the noumena. Imagine a stone cast against different surfaces:
against a pane of glass, into a pool of water, against a brass sheet. If we
are pools of water, we will see the noumenal "stone", or signal, as a
pattern of ripples. If we are a brass sheet, some vibrations or perhaps a
"gong" sound, etc. We will not detect the stone (signal) itself. We detect
only our response to it. Hence the thrust of the "categories" --- we are
constrained in the interpretations we can place on those signals by the
design of our own detection apparatus."
The phenomena we exerience are the *result* of some signal from the noumena.
The ripples produced when the stone falls into the pool are not properties of
the stone (the signal). We have to be careful not to export the properties of
our response to a signal to the signal itself.
>> The stone is *physically* objective, and there are certainly some mind-
>> independent phenomena involved in it. But it is not "ontologically
>> objective," because ontology itself (ontology being theories of what
>> exists), and every ontological theory, is itself a cognitive construct.
>> "Reality" is whatever our best theories at the moment say is real. And
>> our best theories are those which have the most predictive power.
> Well, yes, but physics is just as theoretical, and by the same token
> just as much a cognitive construct. So whence the difference? The
> key, I would say, is the greater 'predictive power' of physics; that
> its theories can be tested independently. That, though, is what I did
> through my whole experience with the stone - the impression of one
> sense sebsem sight, was tested against others, touch and hearing;
> predictions were generated about how it would move in the air, where
> it would hit, and what effect it would have when it hit; and those
> predictions were in turn tested. Each stage of my experience was in
> fact a test of my stone-impression against the x; had it failed any of
> those tests - had my hand gone through it, or had it simply
> disappeared in the air with a POP! halfway to the window - I would
> have stopped believing that it was a stone forthwith. On the
> assumption that each sense possibly gave me some information on the x,
> doing all of them successfully would have to vastly increase the
> possibility that I had such knowledge.
All those experiments, and their successful outcomes, tells you your concept
of the stone is well-wrought and has predictive value. They don't tell you
anything about the noumena.
This point somewhat overlaps a discussion currently underway with Galathaea
("Decoding the Martian tablets"). She thinks a signal uniquely encodes some
real, true meaning (she wouldn't like those terms!) which can be deduced from
the structure of the signal alone. I.e., that if you can come up with a
consistent interpretation of a signal, then you have isolated the intrinsic
information it carries, from which you can reconstruct the transmitter (or in
the case of the Martian tablets, the set of referents for the morphemes of
the text). But any signal can represent (almost) any set of referents, and do
so consistently. Just depends upon the choice of a mapping algorithm.
>> We have no idea whether the noumena contains stones, or anything
>> remotely resembling them. We do know that it delivers phenomena we can
>> synthesize into stones, and that synthesis is a useful one.
> On the assumption that the noumena which gave me the stone-impression
> - the x - is completely unknown, then: none of my separate tests of
> it could give me any information about x, and therefore all of them
> together gave me no information about x. I know just as much about x
> afterward than if I had completely overlooked it in the first place.
Is x there your stone-impression, or the noumena? Those tests do indeed give
you much information about your stone-impression. They tell you it is a
workable concept with predictive power. They don't tell you anything about
the causal agent which provokes the stone-impression. And you don't need to
know anything about that to deal properly with stones.
> I don't like to use the word 'intuitive', as I don't consider personal
> intuition to be proof of any kind. However, it is the most fitting
> word here. I find the whole non-realist account completely counter-
> intuitive.
The realist world view is *supposed* to be intuitive! It is our model of the
world we live in, and the only thing upon which we can rely in our daily
dealings with it. It is a "transparent model," i.e., one which is not seen as
a model, but as what is "real." (Metzinger).
Publius
news:1171485226....@j27g2000cwj.googlegroups.com:
> similarly idealism was defeated by phenomenalism
> in the legendary Ideal Wars
> that lasted many centuries and took many lives
>
> the humiliating defeat of the idealists
> need not be recounted in this post
> as a sign of respect for the dead
:-)
Craig Franck
> "George Dance" wrote
>> I don't like to use the word 'intuitive', as I don't consider personal
>> intuition to be proof of any kind. However, it is the most fitting
>> word here. I find the whole non-realist account completely counter-
>> intuitive.
>
> The realist world view is *supposed* to be intuitive! It is our model of
> the
> world we live in, and the only thing upon which we can rely in our daily
> dealings with it. It is a "transparent model," i.e., one which is not seen
> as
> a model, but as what is "real." (Metzinger).
The problem here is there are two distinct kinds of intuition. We
intuit an external world that is revealed to our senses since it is
simply given by "animal intuition." Then we often have intuitions
about things so given.
So I intuit a person is standing in front of me because I perceive
them, but then I also have the intuition they like me.
Intuition in Realism is about the first kind of intuition.
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
Publius
news:mFNAh.4626$H77.1980@trndny08:
> The problem here is there are two distinct kinds of intuition. We
> intuit an external world that is revealed to our senses since it is
> simply given by "animal intuition." Then we often have intuitions
> about things so given.
>
> So I intuit a person is standing in front of me because I perceive
> them, but then I also have the intuition they like me.
>
> Intuition in Realism is about the first kind of intuition.
I agree. Intuition, like most terms, has a number of (somewhat) related
meanings.
Immortalist
>
> "Realism. Facts are facts. The world is largely independent of us
> and the way we are; it has its things, facts, properties, events, and
> states of affairs that have their own objective nature; our responses
> are explained by the world and are intended to match the world; our
> judgements are supposed to reflect, or depict, or mirror, or
> correspond to the way the world is; success in judgement is a matter
> of getting the way of the world right, or successfully describing how
> things stand."
> [Hales, ed. /Metaphysics/, Wadsworth 1999, 48]
>
Facts are the best theories we can come up with by reasoning and
experimenting. It most likely that the world is largely independent
of us and the way we are; it seems to have its things, facts,
properties, events, and states of affairs that have their own
objective nature; our responses probably are explained by the world
and are likely evolved to match the world; one of our best theories is
that our judgements are supposed to reflect, or depict, or mirror, or
correspond to the way the world is; success in judgement is a matter
of getting our percieved way of the world right, or successfully
describing how things appear-to-stand. - [Hales-Reanimated]
George Dance
> On 14 Feb 2007 04:22:22 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca>
You must enjoy the dancing; otherwise you wouldn't be cutting in so
often. 8)
George Dance
That's not exactly the 'realist' position rephrased; we'd have to call
it something else, possibly 'Immortalism'. I notice one seeming
incoherence - since it seems to the 'Immortalist' that facts have an
objective nature, and he considers it most likely that they are
'independent of us,' why does he insist that those facts are
'theories' that we 'come up with'?
George Dance
> On Feb 13, 8:39 pm, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
>
> > "Realism. Facts are facts. The world is largely independent of us
> > and the way we are; it has its things, facts, properties, events, and
> > states of affairs that have their own objective nature; our responses
> > are explained by the world and are intended to match the world; our
> > judgements are supposed to reflect, or depict, or mirror, or
> > correspond to the way the world is; success in judgement is a matter
> > of getting the way of the world right, or successfully describing how
> > things stand."
> > [Hales, ed. /Metaphysics/, Wadsworth 1999, 48]
>
> > perceive the world with a very specific set of sensory and
> > interpretative mechanisms, including cultural lenses such as language,
> > or the categories of our place and time. The world as it is for us,
> > which means the world insofar as we can ever know about it or
> > understand it, is shaped by those mechanisms; there is an important
> > sense in which we ourselves are the authors of the world as it is for
> > us."
> > [Hales 1999, 48]
>
> > > > A fact is either under the control of your mind,
> > > > subject to your will (in the same way as your beliefs and values, eg)
> > > > or it is not. If it is, then it is not existentially external. If it
> > > > is not, then it is ontologically objective.
>
>
> > intuition to be proof of any kind. However, it is the most fitting
> > word here. I find the whole non-realist account completely counter-
> > intuitive.
>
>
> philosophy is so strange
> the way it shifts definitions around
> to create controversy and conflict
> for the amusement of its spectators
>
> its like hollywood
> except for the ability to numb minds
> and the excite consumerism
>
> maybe we need team jerseys and a colloseum...
>
It's probably true that if philosophy were more like hollywood or
sports (or some combination of the two, like pro wrestling), it would
have more spectators. More spectators would mean more people thinking
about and understanding (to some extent) the topics and issues
involved. I'd argue that those are real issues, in that how one
judges them has real implications.
>
> phenomenalism
> at least the forms the forms that conform
> to what i am about to write
> takes a slightly different view
> from traditional realism
> and traditional idealism
>
> it does not necessarily posit
> any control over the input we receive
> though it does not deny that there may be some
>
I don't want to misunderstand the position, so I'm going to paste in a
definition, just as I did for the other positions, and let you
criticize it as needed:
<quote>
We now come to the final theory of perception, that of Phenomenalism.
Like Idealism, Phenomenalism argues that our knowledge about the world
comes through our senses. Furthermore, it also shifts knowledge about
the world away from any talk of "the object itself" and replaces it
with our experiences of it. This is a little bit more difficult to
grasp than the previous theories, mainly because it is a theory of
truth and not just an account of perception.[...] The Phenomenalist
view argues that when we talk about a thing - such as a tree - we are
actually talking about our perceptions of it. So, instead of saying,
"The leaves on the tree are green," I say, "I have a perception of a
tree with green leaves." This might seem to be a trifling difference,
but notice that by doing so we are not saying anything about the tree,
only our perception of it. </q>
http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/tok/perception8.htm
That strikes me as compatible with Blackburn's generic definition of
Idealism (though of course not the same as any specific view that
calls itself "Idealist.") The difference seems to be how Blackburn's
phrase 'in an important sense' gets interpreted; a phenomenalist
doesn't rule out the possibility that one's mind creates everything;
she simply takes the position that that's not a question that could be
answered.
> experience shows that any such control is strongly constrained
>
I take it that 'control' means 'determined to some extent by a
(hypothetical) external world', while 'constrained' means 'determined
to some extent by one's mind and body.' That's a distinction that
could prove important later in the discussion.
> however
> from the input we may abstract
> form categories of perception
> and begin to see relationships in the symbols
>
I think we all agree up to that point: The mind receives information,
and creates a picture, model, or map of a reality other than
itself.
> models are the phenomenalists realism
>
This point, OTOH, seems to be the point of difference; whether there
is anything besides the model, to which the model is
'supposed' (Blackburn's word) to conform.
> models provide an ontology of cause
> that we can use to predict perception
Some models accurately predict, and some fail to do so. Which is the
first question that, as I see it, a phenomenalist has to explain. The
realist has an explanation: that there is an outside world to which
the model either corresponds or not; model failure is due to lack of
correspondence. But a phenomenalist makes no such assumption, by
definition.
Take Descartes' bent stick. I have a visual model of a stick half out
of the water, and half in, bent at the waterline. The model tells me
that the bottom of the stick is in a certain place relative to my
body; from which I can predict that, if I put my hand in that place,
I'll feel the bottom. So I do, and then I don't; the model fails.
Why?
> some of the ontology of models are direct experience
> and some may be intensionally defined
> in relation to direct experience
>
> the intensionally defined
> would be the noumena of the model
>
I'm not sure, but the 'intensionally defined' sounds like one's
concepts or beliefs. I'd prefer that that term be reserved for the
hypothetical external 'control', and that you use another term -
perhaps that the concepts and beliefs are the 'reality' which
determines what gets modelled and what doesn't.
> ..~~~~~~~~~~
>
>
> phenomenalism agrees to a large extent with realism
> when the translation to models is made
>
> however one important area where it differs
> is that it does not necessarily assume
> there is a model that will predict everything
>
I don't think that a realist has to assume that anyone has a model
that predicts everything, or even that it's possible for anyone to
ever have one. What he has to assume, just by the fact of finding
errors in his own models, is that some models are more or less
accurate than others - and that where two models disagree, one is more
accurate than the other. (And he explains that accuracy in terms of
correspondence with an external world.) From which it follows, but
only as a logical possibility, that there could be models which would
generate only accurate predictions.
> it doesn't assume that our ability to symbolise
> will comprehend the control of our input
>
> realists
> of course
> do not assume this either _in_this_form_
> and would probably object to a phenomenalist suggesting such
>
I'd object, if the suggestion were that 'comprehend' meant comprehend
everything about the control; but I'd agree if all that means is to
comprehend some facts about the control. For instance, I'd claim that
my model of the door on my room does tell me something about the
external 'control' that causes me to perceive a door on my room; that
the best explanation for my perceiving a door there is that there is a
door there that is causing the perception.
> but they do assume that there is _a_ reality
>
Yes. A single reality. For instance, it could be that there is a
door, of exactly the same size and shape, with the handle in the same
place, hinged so that it moves in the same way, as I perceive it to;
that's one alternative. Or it could be that there is no such thing
there, but something else; that's a countless number of alternatives.
To say that the door is real, that it's really that size etc., is to
say that that only a model of the door that incorporates that one set
of beliefs about it is accurate, in a way that all of the countless
other models I could have are not; that it's more accurate than any of
them.
> and the symbolic form "reality"
> to a phenomenalist
> is meaningless without a model
>
Wel, I'd agree with that as well, I think. To say that one believes
in "Reality" is a meaningless tautology; that claim becomes meaningful
only when combined with at least one assertion about what is true of
that reality, and what isn't. OTOH, I'd argue that the model cannot
be the only reality: Since the model is composed of beliefs, then
everything one believes of the model is true of the model by
definition; so if the model were the only reality, then everything in
the model would also be true by definition; an inaccurate model would
be impossible. Since inaccurate models are possible, it follows there
is a reality external to the model.
> ***************oo************
>
> similarly idealism was defeated by phenomenalism
> in the legendary Ideal Wars
> that lasted many centuries and took many lives
>
> the humiliating defeat of the idealists
> need not be recounted in this post
> as a sign of respect for the dead
>
RIP. 8)
George Dance
[an error that has to be corrected; I left out a word which completely
distorts the meaning of this paragraph (which I've highlighted by
putting in CAPS).
> On Feb 14, 3:33 pm, "galathaea" <galath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> > some of the ontology of models are direct experience
> > and some may be intensionally defined
> > in relation to direct experience
>
> > the intensionally defined
> > would be the noumena of the model
>
> I'm not sure, but the 'intensionally defined' sounds like one's
> concepts or beliefs. I'd prefer that that term "NOUMENA" be reserved for the
> hypothetical external 'control', and that you use another term -
> perhaps that the concepts and beliefs are the 'reality' which
> determines what gets modelled and what doesn't.
>
(IOW, 'intensionally designed' works just fine for the conceptual
framework. It's calling that framework "noumena", even
metaphorically, that I was objecting to.)
> RIP. 8)- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
mikeg...@xtra.co.nz
Fuck knows, hey dopey, I asked you, because you said there was no such
thing as a random chance, so I asked you, why was it not correct to
say that there is 1 in 100 random chance, that your red mable will be
plucked from a rotating barrel containing 99 other coloured marbles,
by someone blindfolded using a spoon?
You replied, because your marble got pulled 500 times in a row, but
dopey, I didn't say anything about 500 opportunities, I am still
waiting for you to explain WHY it is not correct to say that there is
a random chance that a red marble will be plucked from 99 others.
Why are you running away from defending your ideas?
Michael Gordge
> Introduce frame of reference. Concept of world made into short-term
> reality, step inside reality and close door. Now in real world.
> Reality expires, back in outer frame of reference. Concept of world
> changed by experience. Create new short-term reality, step inside,
> close door. Repeat. While inside "reality" it is real, realism
> applies.
>
> --
> Ug!- Hide quoted text -
George Dance
> "Publius" wrote
>
> > "George Dance" wrote
> >> I don't like to use the word 'intuitive', as I don't consider personal
> >> intuition to be proof of any kind. However, it is the most fitting
> >> word here. I find the whole non-realist account completely counter-
> >> intuitive.
>
> > The realist world view is *supposed* to be intuitive! It is our model of
> > the
> > world we live in, and the only thing upon which we can rely in our daily
> > dealings with it. It is a "transparent model," i.e., one which is not seen
> > as
> > a model, but as what is "real." (Metzinger).
>
> The problem here is there are two distinct kinds of intuition. We
> intuit an external world that is revealed to our senses since it is
> simply given by "animal intuition." Then we often have intuitions
> about things so given.
True. There is the 'sensuous intuition', which is somewhat the same
as a perception. (Though perception refers more to the process, while
intuition means the content.) There's the 'pure intuition,' which is
simply a thought that occurs in one's head. Finally, there's the
'moral intuition,' which can be either; some say it's a thought, some
say it's the product of a different sense entirely.
Advocates of each type of intuition usually consider them as properly
basic beliefs, meaning that they're true as given - as soon as one
receives the knowledge, one knows it.
I'm skeptical about both types of intuition. I'm willing to accept
that some perceptual intuitions are properly basic, though that could
apply only on the level of sensation; even integrating sensations into
percepts seems to involve the use of reason. While 'pure intuitions'
are indistinguishable from subconscious reasoning, buried memories,
cultural biases, or even personal prejudices. To the extent that
reason etc. is involved, an intuitive belief seems as criticizeable as
any other.
> So I intuit a person is standing in front of me because I perceive
> them, but then I also have the intuition they like me.
>
> Intuition in Realism is about the first kind of intuition.
>
> --
> Craig Franck
> craig.fra...@verizon.net
> Cortland, NY
George Dance
> "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote innews:1171427979.4...@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com:
>
[I've snipped some backthread to make this shorter, not all that
successfully]
> >> "Objective reality," on the other hand, is used by realists to denote
> >> external *objects* which are also mind-independent and which are the
> >> causes of experienced phenomena.
> >>
[snip]
> > "Realism. Facts are facts. The world is largely independent of us
> > and the way we are; it has its things, facts, properties, events, and
> > states of affairs that have their own objective nature; our responses
> > are explained by the world and are intended to match the world; our
> > judgements are supposed to reflect, or depict, or mirror, or
> > correspond to the way the world is; success in judgement is a matter
> > of getting the way of the world right, or successfully describing how
> > things stand."
> > [Hales, ed. /Metaphysics/, Wadsworth 1999, 48]
>
> Yes. That definition of "realism" is as good as any. I believe it is
> equivalent to my short one.
>
[snip]
> > "Idealism. There is no such thing as a view without a viewer. We
> > perceive the world with a very specific set of sensory and
> > interpretative mechanisms, including cultural lenses such as language,
> > or the categories of our place and time. The world as it is for us,
> > which means the world insofar as we can ever know about it or
> > understand it, is shaped by those mechanisms; there is an important
> > sense in which we ourselves are the authors of the world as it is for
> > us."
> > [Hales 1999, 48]
>
> That is a fair definition of Kantian idealism, though not of Platonic
> idealism. Note the hedge in the last sentence: "There is an important sense
> in which we ourselves are the authors of the world . . ." I.e., we have an
> important role, but we do not create the world *ex nihilo*. The world
> delivers the raw materials, so to speak. We must then put them together in a
> way that makes that world comprehensible to us. It is a creative process. And
> while we have great latitude in that endeavor, there are some constraints
> imposed by the design of our own construction machinery.
>
> OK. I'd minimize the role of "cultural lenses," though --- those can be
> overcome or bypassed fairly easily. The constraints imposed by the design of
> our nervous system cannot be, at least in real-time.
>
[snip]
> > I see a stone. So I pick it up; it feels like a stone. I bang it on
> > something else; it sounds like a stone does. Then I throw it through
> > a perceived window; it smashes the glass.[...]
> > Well, yes, but physics is just as theoretical, and by the same token
> > just as much a cognitive construct. So whence the difference? The
> > key, I would say, is the greater 'predictive power' of physics; that
> > its theories can be tested independently. That, though, is what I did
> > through my whole experience with the stone - the impression of one
> > sense sebsem sight, was tested against others, touch and hearing;
> > predictions were generated about how it would move in the air, where
> > it would hit, and what effect it would have when it hit; and those
> > predictions were in turn tested. Each stage of my experience was in
> > fact a test of my stone-impression against the x; had it failed any of
> > those tests - had my hand gone through it, or had it simply
> > disappeared in the air with a POP! halfway to the window - I would
> > have stopped believing that it was a stone forthwith. On the
> > assumption that each sense possibly gave me some information on the x,
> > doing all of them successfully would have to vastly increase the
> > possibility that I had such knowledge.
>
I moved this question of yours, as it's helpful in keeping the
discussion straight:
> Is x there your stone-impression, or the noumena?
By x I mean the noumena; the hypothetical 'external object' that you
referred to, and not the stone-impression. I guess we'll have to give
the latter some name as well: I'll call it <stone>, meaning: my
'sensuous intuition' of x, or my seeing x as a stone.
> All those experiments, and their successful outcomes, tells you your concept
> of the stone is well-wrought and has predictive value. They don't tell you
> anything about the noumena.
>
> This point somewhat overlaps a discussion currently underway with Galathaea
> ("Decoding the Martian tablets"). She thinks a signal uniquely encodes some
> real, true meaning (she wouldn't like those terms!) which can be deduced from
> the structure of the signal alone. I.e., that if you can come up with a
> consistent interpretation of a signal, then you have isolated the intrinsic
> information it carries, from which you can reconstruct the transmitter (or in
> the case of the Martian tablets, the set of referents for the morphemes of
> the text). But any signal can represent (almost) any set of referents, and do
> so consistently. Just depends upon the choice of a mapping algorithm.
>
Well, tht's true; it's logically possible that x is no different than
<stone>, that there are some differences between x and <stone>, or
that x and <stone> really have nothing to do with each other; that x
could be an infinitnumber of things other than <stone>.
> >> We have no idea whether the noumena contains stones, or anything
> >> remotely resembling them. We do know that it delivers phenomena we can
> >> synthesize into stones, and that synthesis is a useful one.
> > On the assumption that the noumena which gave me the stone-impression
> > - the x - is completely unknown, then: none of my separate tests of
> > it could give me any information about x, and therefore all of them
> > together gave me no information about x. I know just as much about x
> > afterward than if I had completely overlooked it in the first place.
>
> Those tests do indeed give
> you much information about your stone-impression. They tell you it is a
> workable concept with predictive power. They don't tell you anything about
> the causal agent which provokes the stone-impression. And you don't need to
> know anything about that to deal properly with stones.
>
Indeed; the tests give me information about <stone>. But it does not
follow that they did not, thereby, give me any information about x.
For one thing, there's the broken window; I saw the stone break it.
Of course, one can say that I saw nothing of the kind; what I did was
perceive <stone> breaking <window>, because of a synthetic a priori
judgement of mine that <stone> always breaks <window>. But, then,
consider a different outcome: the window was bulletproof glass, and
the stone simply glanced off. That can't be explained by an a priori
judgement that <stone> breaks <window>; because it didn't. Nor can it
be explained by an a priori judgement that <stone> does not break
<bullet-proof-glass window>, becaue I wasn't even aware of <bullet-
proof-glass window> at the time.
Or let's continue the original scenario: After I throw the stone and
break the window (thoughtless vandal that I am here), I simply turn,
walk away, and forget the whole thing. Meanwhile, the owner of the
place whose window I just broke, runs after me with the stone in his
hand, throws it at me, and conks me in the back of the head. I feel
pain (or feel <pain>, since my intuition of my pain is the same thing
as my pain), look down, and see <stone> again.
An idealist or phenomenalist might offer me the following
explanation: I saw <stone>, and have an a priori belief that <stone>
+ <my head> equals <pain>; therefore I felt <pain>. But that cannot
be: because I felt <pain> before I saw <stone>; at one point, <pain>
was present to my mind and <stone> was not. Therefore, <stone> could
not have produed <pain>.
So what did produce <pain>? It would have to be something that
existed prior to <pain>. And that can only be x (the noumena that
corresponds to <stone>) and y (the noumenon that corresponds to <my
head>). Therefore, I'd conjecture, <pain> was not produced by
<stone> hitting <my head>, but by x hitting y. And therefore, I'd
conclude, my knowledge of <pain> gave me information, not about
<stone> and <my head>, but about x and y. Therefore I know something
about x and y; thereforee, while I don't know everything about x and
y, I do know something about them. .
> I don't like to use the word 'intuitive', as I don't consider personal
> > intuition to be proof of any kind. However, it is the most fitting
> > word here. I find the whole non-realist account completely counter-
> > intuitive.
>
> The realist world view is *supposed* to be intuitive! It is our model of the
> world we live in, and the only thing upon which we can rely in our daily
> dealings with it. It is a "transparent model," i.e., one which is not seen as
> a model, but as what is "real." (Metzinger).
But (as I've told galathaea), the model fails, repeatedly, at the
margins. (The above scenario is not the only example; I'm sure you or
I can think of many others; it's what the error in 'trial and error'
means.) And those failures cannot be explained by anything within the
model. Which means that (1) something external to the model exists
(which you're not challenging) that determines the model's failure;
and that (2) every time we witness a case of model failure, we are
witnessing, not just the model, but what is external to the model.
That's the strongest argument I've found so far for realism; I hope
you won't give it short shrift, as it does look to me like a
completely original argument. While it's mainly inspired by Popper;
to name it I'd prefer to steal a phrase from Mackie, and call it the
Error Theory of Realism.
galathaea
> On Feb 14, 3:33 pm, "galathaea" <galath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Feb 13, 8:39 pm, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> > > "Realism. Facts are facts. The world is largely independent of us
> > > and the way we are; it has its things, facts, properties, events, and
> > > states of affairs that have their own objective nature; our responses
> > > are explained by the world and are intended to match the world; our
> > > judgements are supposed to reflect, or depict, or mirror, or
> > > correspond to the way the world is; success in judgement is a matter
> > > of getting the way of the world right, or successfully describing how
> > > things stand."
> > > [Hales, ed. /Metaphysics/, Wadsworth 1999, 48]
>
> > > "Idealism. There is no such thing as a view without a viewer. We
> > > perceive the world with a very specific set of sensory and
> > > interpretative mechanisms, including cultural lenses such as language,
> > > or the categories of our place and time. The world as it is for us,
> > > which means the world insofar as we can ever know about it or
> > > understand it, is shaped by those mechanisms; there is an important
> > > sense in which we ourselves are the authors of the world as it is for
> > > us."
> > > [Hales 1999, 48]
> > phenomenalism
> > at least the forms that conform
creation in such a sense is unknowably meaningless
notice the important distinction made by the quote:
" mainly because it is a theory of truth
and not just an account of perception. "
in models we can speak of
truth in a given interpretation
or correlation to an experience
this is very distinct from the idealist understanding
of the meaning of "1 + 1 = 2"
which is a universal ideal of reason
whose truth is absolute
> > experience shows that any such control is strongly constrained
>
> I take it that 'control' means 'determined to some extent by a
> (hypothetical) external world', while 'constrained' means 'determined
> to some extent by one's mind and body.' That's a distinction that
> could prove important later in the discussion.
it is the mathematical sense i refer
in control theory
controllability is measured
in terms of the state space that is reachable
through manipulation of our available control variables
our available control variables
are our action schemas
i can control my vision field
by doing "this" or "that"
where such actions might correspond to
moving my head
or closing my eyes
i can affect motor responses
but there are limits to what this accomplishes
a system is completely controllable
if every part of state space is reachable in finite time
> > however
> > from the input we may abstract
> > form categories of perception
> > and begin to see relationships in the symbols
>
> I think we all agree up to that point: The mind receives information,
> and creates a picture, model, or map of a reality other than
> itself.
but not only are these percepts the substance of models
they are the substance of all language
everything we talk about
is constructed from these symbols
it is _what_ we are talking with
and _what_ we are talking about
> > models are the phenomenalists realism
>
> This point, OTOH, seems to be the point of difference; whether there
> is anything besides the model, to which the model is
> 'supposed' (Blackburn's word) to conform.
to a phenomenalist
models conform to input
it is not meaningful to speak of anything else
> > models provide an ontology of cause
> > that we can use to predict perception
>
> Some models accurately predict, and some fail to do so. Which is the
> first question that, as I see it, a phenomenalist has to explain. The
> realist has an explanation: that there is an outside world to which
> the model either corresponds or not; model failure is due to lack of
> correspondence. But a phenomenalist makes no such assumption, by
> definition.
the capability of model bisimulation
is already well modelled
correlation and correspondence
arise in many likely models of computational learning
but i think there is an important point here
models are like realism
they say: _if_ this ontology
_then_ this prediction
and the ontological assumption is distinctively realist
theories are often called "realist"
with ontological assumptions
but the acceptance of model learning from input
does not require that one commit to _a_ reality
it only need explain that if there is information
learning is possible
every fundamental particle
could live in its own fractured input space
whose learnable models differs
from every other fundamental particle
learning and communication are still possible
in essence
phenomenalism takes an easier path
by declaring monovalence essentially meaningless
and unnecessary
> Take Descartes' bent stick. I have a visual model of a stick half out
> of the water, and half in, bent at the waterline. The model tells me
> that the bottom of the stick is in a certain place relative to my
> body; from which I can predict that, if I put my hand in that place,
> I'll feel the bottom. So I do, and then I don't; the model fails.
> Why?
because we have more information to learn
models evolve
that is a distinction with idealism
if we do not have complete controllability of input
and we do not have complete predictability of input
then we need to understand how learning is possible
idealism assumes truth
and merely posits methods of its "discovery"
phenomenalism describes how learning is possible
whether or not any meaningless truth is met along the way
[...]
the meaninglessness of the term
makes the discussion of accuracy also meaningless
one can measure accuracy of prediction
versus observed input
but one cannot measure the accuracy of prediction beyond that
to things not observed
interactionism is a fundamental structure of science
models to predict input
describe input as an interaction with existents in the ontology
that is universal to predictive symbologies
but the phenomenalist would take causality
as a property of a model
not as an assumption of being
the point of the distinction
is that to talk about anything
it must be something that can meaningfully correlated
between the two communicating
we can correlate symbols of our input
and realists say there is a _reason_ for this
but phenomenalists say reasons come from descriptions in models
so realists are either talking about one "true" model
or they are discussing something beyond meaning
Publius
>> > Well, yes, but physics is just as theoretical, and by the same token
>> > just as much a cognitive construct. So whence the difference? The
>> > key, I would say, is the greater 'predictive power' of physics; that
>> > its theories can be tested independently. That, though, is what I
>> > did through my whole experience with the stone - the impression of
>> > one sense sebsem sight, was tested against others, touch and hearing;
>> > predictions were generated about how it would move in the air, where
>> > it would hit, and what effect it would have when it hit; and those
>> > predictions were in turn tested. Each stage of my experience was in
>> > fact a test of my stone-impression against the x; had it failed any
>> > of those tests - had my hand gone through it, or had it simply
>> > disappeared in the air with a POP! halfway to the window - I would
>> > have stopped believing that it was a stone forthwith. On the
>> > assumption that each sense possibly gave me some information on the
>> > x, doing all of them successfully would have to vastly increase the
>> > possibility that I had such knowledge.
> I moved this question of yours, as it's helpful in keeping the
> discussion straight:
>> Is x there your stone-impression, or the noumena?
> By x I mean the noumena; the hypothetical 'external object' that you
> referred to, and not the stone-impression. I guess we'll have to give
> the latter some name as well: I'll call it <stone>, meaning: my
> 'sensuous intuition' of x, or my seeing x as a stone.
It might be less prejudicial to say "My seeing some aspect or feature of x
as a stone."
>> All those experiments, and their successful outcomes, tells you your
>> concept of the stone is well-wrought and has predictive value. They
>> don't tell you anything about the noumena.
>>
>> This point somewhat overlaps a discussion currently underway with
>> Galathaea ("Decoding the Martian tablets"). She thinks a signal
>> uniquely encodes some real, true meaning (she wouldn't like those
>> terms!) which can be deduced from the structure of the signal alone.
>> I.e., that if you can come up with a consistent interpretation of a
>> signal, then you have isolated the intrinsic information it carries,
>> from which you can reconstruct the transmitter (or in the case of the
>> Martian tablets, the set of referents for the morphemes of the text).
>> But any signal can represent (almost) any set of referents, and do so
>> consistently. Just depends upon the choice of a mapping algorithm.
> Well, tht's true; it's logically possible that x is no different than
> <stone>, that there are some differences between x and <stone>, or
> that x and <stone> really have nothing to do with each other; that x
> could be an infinitnumber of things other than <stone>.
Well, not the second (that x and <stone> have nothing to do with each
other). We have, after all, posited x to account for <stone>. So there is
some sort of relationship, by hypothesis.
>> Those tests do indeed give
>> you much information about your stone-impression. They tell you it is a
>> workable concept with predictive power. They don't tell you anything
>> about the causal agent which provokes the stone-impression. And you
>> don't need to know anything about that to deal properly with stones.
> Indeed; the tests give me information about <stone>. But it does not
> follow that they did not, thereby, give me any information about x.
No more than you had *a priori*. You assume *a priori* that x is (somehow)
responsible for <stone>. What empirical testing does is merely confirm that
your concept <stone> is consistent and has predictive value, i.e., that it
can predict some properties of future phenomena subsumable under that
concept. But the testing gives you no more knowledge of x than you had
prior to the experiments.
Now there is some additional knowledge of x that we presume: Kant does seem
to accept, or assume, the principle of the "uniformity of Nature." I.e.,
that the noumena has a certain coherence and permanence. We do not confront
an entirely new noumenon every instant, which may effect us in entirely
unpredictable ways. The noumenon, though perhaps dynamic, is "law-
governed." Like its existence, that principle must be assumed for there to
be any possibility of knowledge.
> For one thing, there's the broken window; I saw the stone break it.
> Of course, one can say that I saw nothing of the kind; what I did was
> perceive <stone> breaking <window>, because of a synthetic a priori
> judgement of mine that <stone> always breaks <window>. But, then,
> consider a different outcome: the window was bulletproof glass, and
> the stone simply glanced off. That can't be explained by an a priori
> judgement that <stone> breaks <window>; because it didn't. Nor can it
> be explained by an a priori judgement that <stone> does not break
> <bullet-proof-glass window>, becaue I wasn't even aware of <bullet-
> proof-glass window> at the time.
Well, no. Observing <stone> breaking <window> is not a synthetic *a priori*
judgment. It is entirely *a posteriori*. Why would you take that knowledge
as *a priori*?
> Or let's continue the original scenario: After I throw the stone and
> break the window (thoughtless vandal that I am here), I simply turn,
> walk away, and forget the whole thing. Meanwhile, the owner of the
> place whose window I just broke, runs after me with the stone in his
> hand, throws it at me, and conks me in the back of the head. I feel
> pain (or feel <pain>, since my intuition of my pain is the same thing
> as my pain), look down, and see <stone> again.
>
>
> An idealist or phenomenalist might offer me the following
> explanation: I saw <stone>, and have an a priori belief that <stone>
> + <my head> equals <pain>; therefore I felt <pain>. But that cannot
> be: because I felt <pain> before I saw <stone>; at one point, <pain>
> was present to my mind and <stone> was not. Therefore, <stone> could
> not have produed <pain>.
>
> So what did produce <pain>? It would have to be something that
> existed prior to <pain>. And that can only be x (the noumena that
> corresponds to <stone>) and y (the noumenon that corresponds to <my
> head>). Therefore, I'd conjecture, <pain> was not produced by
> <stone> hitting <my head>, but by x hitting y. And therefore, I'd
> conclude, my knowledge of <pain> gave me information, not about
> <stone> and <my head>, but about x and y. Therefore I know something
> about x and y; thereforee, while I don't know everything about x and
> y, I do know something about them.
Not sure why you are characterizing all those relationships as *a priori*.
Phenomena are all *a posteriori*. They do exhibit patterns, however, which
we can extract through experience. If we do that successfully, then we can
predict some phenomena given other phenomena.
And we can't characterize the noumenon as "an x and a y." It is only an x
(unknown) which can give rise to the impressions we synthesize into
<stone>, <head>, <window>, etc. We do assume this x has some coherence and
permanence, and that the phenomenal patterns it produces will persist from
moment to moment (though they may deform over longer intervals). So we can
discover, *a posteriori*, that there is a relationship between <stone>,
<head>, and <pain>. We may also assume that the noumena will continue to
provoke those phenomena in that relationship, at least for a time.
>> The realist world view is *supposed* to be intuitive! It is our model
>> of the world we live in, and the only thing upon which we can rely in
>> our daily dealings with it. It is a "transparent model," i.e., one
>> which is not seen as a model, but as what is "real." (Metzinger).
>
>
> But (as I've told galathaea), the model fails, repeatedly, at the
> margins. (The above scenario is not the only example; I'm sure you or
> I can think of many others; it's what the error in 'trial and error'
> means.) And those failures cannot be explained by anything within the
> model.
They can be explained by the inadequacy, or the limits, of the model. That
is what drives us to construct better models.
> Which means that (1) something external to the model exists
> (which you're not challenging) that determines the model's failure;
> and that (2) every time we witness a case of model failure, we are
> witnessing, not just the model, but what is external to the model.
But not external to phenomena. We are witnessing phenomena not included in
the model, but it is still only phenomena. So we contrive a new model (if
possible) which incorporates that phenomenon. You can't get from phenomena,
anticipated or unanticipated, to the noumena, except as an unobservable
cause of both.
Immortalist
>
>
That position is called "Fallible Realism"
http://groups.google.com/group/sci.physics.relativity/msg/a04294320633159d
As for theories and facts, I like the theory that facts have an
objective nature, but since its not determinable whether they are or
not, at this time in history, I say its a theory, even a dam good one.
Its the all or nothing thinking on your part that allows such
distortions and confusions about the difference between sufficiency
and necessity; If I like the theory that facts are objective, that
doesn't necessarily mean that I believe the opposite theory has been
refuted, contradicted or is wrong, but I think the objective existence
is a better theory than the others, with cooberating evidence that
increases the likelihood.