Scientific Realism
Derek Potter
I have a problem concerning science and realism. It started in another
NG. I am rather ignorant fo "real philosophy", my opponent is
well-read. I cannot understand his PoV on one key point though I seem
to be able to follow everything else, so I wonder if anyone here can
help out - either to show me where I'm wrong (or just stoopid) or else
to confirm what I think. Please, though, no pomo relativism, nor
arm-waving "opinions" - the context is modern, not postmodern
philosophy with an anlaytic slant...
My contention is that science is inherently realist. My opponent does
not agree.
The simplistic argument is thst science attempts to explain the real
world. Naturally this is in itself question begging since science may
not mention the reality of the world at all.
Or is this so? We have disposed of the "science is whatever we define
it as" and thr "sceince is what scientists do" dead-ends, by agreeing
that science proceeds by something like the h-d (or d-n) model. And we
have agreed that for h-d to work, it is necessary for observations to
occur. Beyond that, we part company. I believe that this entails that
scientific statements must refer to things as real. Which I think
makes science realist. My opponent believes that h-d does not require
an ontolology of the enties referred to in science - their reality or
otherwise is a metaphysical assertion not entailed by h-d.
I should add that for the purposes of this argument, "realism" need
not mean "absolute" realism. There is never any guarantee from science
that what we study is absolutely real: even if we sort all of physics
out, it could just be a projection from a higher world. We could all
be brains in a vat. I do not think that reservation precludes realism.
For example, I believe there is a world out there which exists whether
absolutely or as a consistent virtual reality. But that is my opinion
which I am pleased to call realism. I believe that science
*necessarily* makes statements which are underpinned by this kind of
realism, and that such statements necessarily refer to real objects or
they are not science.
My reasoning is this. The h-d model assumes that there are
observations about which hypotheses may be formed. For this to be
true, the observations must be consistent, otherwise there is no way
of producing a covering law. As far as I can tell, my opponent
believes that this only entails the existence of observations. To me
it says something about the thing observed. We may go further and say
that the consistency of the universe is constantly be confirmed by
science, but again, to me the obvious question is "so what?". If you
make predictions using Newton's law of gravity and they are constantly
proved right, this says nothing whatsoever about whether the law will
apply tomorrow *unless* there is another law saying that laws
themselves, once discovered, will continue to hold. We can even repeat
the process: "The principle that laws can be discovered and will then
make good predictions has itself been tested time and again", but the
same answer comes back "So what?". There is no guarantee that it will
happen next time unless there is a meta-law saying that the law of
consistent laws is itself inviolate. And so ad infinitum.
Thus it seems to me that thr h-d model entails a meta-law of
consistency in addition to the recognition that observations are made
and that laws are deduced.
At this point we tend to go round in circles. H-d itself does not
mention why such a law should exist, thus, my opponent claims, it is
metaphysically neutral. this extends to ontology: science can be done
without commitment to any theory of reality. I however, consider that
it does entail a meta-law, as I called it, of consistency, which
(since I exclude mystical claims to be able to penetrate to absolute
reality) in turn entails that *something* exists pulling the strings
of our observations. Note that I do not say that science tells us
anything about the thing that exists. Nor do I say that every entity
in a particular theory must exist. Nether am I *pleading* that "surely
science must be talking about real things" I am saying that the
standard idea of what science is, entails that science does talk about
real things and that *therefore* scientific statements are realist.
The fact that a scientist may think otherwise and still do his job
well is irrelevant.
Am I talking crud?
ParaMind Brainstorming Software
post-moderns is really only akin to the same force that forces us to compete in
a modern world, the competition of ideas, and nothing of a very much higher
reasoning. In a way, it is like Zen philosophy trying to get a foothold into
academic science, where it really doesn't necessarily belong.
A real Zen monk would probably admit this as well.
Science basically gets along fine without it being deconstructed. For some
with some kind of esotericist bent, you might say that it's true that
scientists can always do something from a new angle and get different results.
However, that is likely to take a long time. Real scientists who are in the
tops in their fields are highly trained people who don't usually care about
such concepts like you are talking about. One has to remember that authors and
publishers are always trying to publish books that will be thought of as great,
will make a lot of money, etc. I'm afraid ideas like you discuss really only
nibble at the greater questions and are mostly just piddle for real scientists.
I take your opinion to be more correct.
--
ParaMind Brainstorming Software -- We make an easy to use,
totally-customizable brainstorming software with a small learning curve.
http://www.paramind.net
Derek Potter
>I think the deconstruction of what "science" means by people inspired by
>post-moderns is really only akin to the same force that forces us to compete in
>a modern world, the competition of ideas, and nothing of a very much higher
>reasoning. In a way, it is like Zen philosophy trying to get a foothold into
>academic science, where it really doesn't necessarily belong.
>A real Zen monk would probably admit this as well.
>
>Science basically gets along fine without it being deconstructed. For some
>with some kind of esotericist bent, you might say that it's true that
>scientists can always do something from a new angle and get different results.
>However, that is likely to take a long time. Real scientists who are in the
>tops in their fields are highly trained people who don't usually care about
>such concepts like you are talking about. One has to remember that authors and
>publishers are always trying to publish books that will be thought of as great,
>will make a lot of money, etc. I'm afraid ideas like you discuss really only
>nibble at the greater questions and are mostly just piddle for real scientists.
It wasn't intended to be anything that "real scientists" would be
interested in. The question was when they say "those cells are
thriving in the new medium" the statement itself (regardless of the
scientist's personal thoughts) means something about real cells or
whether it is a report about something in a model which contains
entities called "cells" and "medium".
Chzwmn
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>From: Derek Potter m...@privacy.net
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Science provides reliability but only scratches the surface of reality. Reality
is about experience. Existence preceeds all. Science can provide a structure
but NO explanations ONLY descriptions of the most simple aspects of our existence.
Immortalist
"Chzwmn" <chz...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20040428143342...@mb-m05.aol.com...
When you say NO are you using it inductively or analytically?
Derek Potter
'scuse the confrontational-sounding reply but..
Proof? This appears to be your own theory. Why should I accept? Still
more, how does a bald unsupported assertion about layers of reality
asner my question which was whether scientific statements *of
necessity* assume the reality (even if only *probable* reality) of
what they describe?
>Reality is about experience.
You mean things that haven't been experienced are not real? How
strange! How on earth can you justify such a sweeping statement?
>Existence preceeds all.
Preceeds in what sense? Logically? causally?
And what has thios to do with the ontology of scientific statements?
>Science can provide a structure
>but NO explanations ONLY descriptions of the most simple aspects of our existence.
Oh come now. You mean the idea that germs cause disease is a
*description* not an *explanation*?
Or are you hinting that you have some esoteric knowledge about less
"simple" aspects of our existence? Maybe something that explains
*significance*? Which is all very nice but nothing to do with science.
Sorry but I really hate cryptic replies to straightforward questions.
Nothing personal. I too have been called "guru".
Luke Sineath
> >Science can provide a structure
> >but NO explanations ONLY descriptions of the most simple aspects of our
existence.
>
> Oh come now. You mean the idea that germs cause disease is a
> *description* not an *explanation*?
>
> Or are you hinting that you have some esoteric knowledge about less
> "simple" aspects of our existence? Maybe something that explains
> *significance*? Which is all very nice but nothing to do with science.
You guys are talking at cross-puposes. Be careful, Chzwmn means something
different than you when he says, "explanation." He's referring to something
ultimate. I discussed this with him a few months ago:
Derek Potter
Ah.
I was confused as to whether Chzwmn insists on a teleological meaning
to "explanation" or whether he is being so analytic that he leaves no
meaning at all to the word - except in the case where a conclusion is
explained by exhibiting a syllogism and its premises.
I'm not really interested in teleological interpretations of the word
"explain". It's not what I asked about.
The fact that apples fall off trees suggests a law of gravity but it
doesn't prove it. But the law of gravity explains why apples fall. It
isn't just a summary of all apple-falling incidents. That's the whole
point of h-d, it justified induction.
JethroUK©
all posts about philosophy eventually dissolve into the defining of a
[single] word - at the moment yours should [still] be "realism"
you have you own definition - your oppo has a different one - reading your
post you have already wandered well beyond that without really
establishing/agreeing what "realism" means - this has to be common area (a
platform) before you can continue (venture further out) - ergo - the area
you are now in is totally grey & for all intense and purpose the subject of
dreams from both parties
John Jones
You said-
> My contention is that science is inherently realist. My opponent does
> not agree.
Realism is a particular model, the model of science. To say 'science is
inherently realist' presupposes that model as a reality.
jJ
Derek Potter <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
news:evsu805cgrs2mmn32...@4ax.com...
andy-k
news:c6rk27$epq$7...@hercules.btinternet.com...
> Your problem is quickly solved.
> You said-
>
> > My contention is that science is inherently realist. My opponent does
> > not agree.
>
> Realism is a particular model, the model of science. To say 'science is
> inherently realist' presupposes that model as a reality.
Isn't realism a metaphysical postulate that is adopted by most scientists,
rather than a metaphysical axiom of science?
I know that idealism (as contrasted with realism) is out of vogue these
days, but it certainly contended with realism during the period of the
logical positivists. I'm not sure if there was any better explanation than
prejudice for the demise of idealism.
Luke Sineath
> I should add that for the purposes of this argument, "realism" need
> not mean "absolute" realism. There is never any guarantee from science
> that what we study is absolutely real: even if we sort all of physics
> out, it could just be a projection from a higher world. We could all
> be brains in a vat. I do not think that reservation precludes realism.
> For example, I believe there is a world out there which exists whether
> absolutely or as a consistent virtual reality. But that is my opinion
> which I am pleased to call realism. I believe that science
> *necessarily* makes statements which are underpinned by this kind of
> realism, and that such statements necessarily refer to real objects or
> they are not science.
Question: what about scientific theories that turn out to be false? What
were they referring to? The fact that theories can turn out to be false,
and that entities recognized by a theory can turn out to not exist, seems to
be a problem for your view. Because if the reality of certain entities were
entailed by the definition of science, then scientific theories couldn't be
false. Or rather, they couldn't be *radically false*, to the degree that
their entire ontological inventory was incorrect. They can only be mistaken
in their descriptions about real things.
I get the impression that you have an answer to this, though, based on
statements you make elsewhere in your post.
--
Luke Sineath
Derek Potter
I do not agree. I started this thread, I therefore have Humpty Dumpy's
rights - Words mean whatever I want them to mean. In particular I am
not even asking what sort of realism is entailed by sceince but
whether any is at all. My opponent reagrds all statements such as "x
exists" as superfluous in science. He doesn't say it's unreasonable,
indeed he agrees that belief in reality is warrented. But, he claims,
science itself does not entail any ontology of the objects to which it
refers, other than the presupposition that it's possible to make
observations. This, I believe is an unambiguous position, not
requiring further definitions of realism - for our purposes is just
means ascribing exsistence to the entities referred to by science -
with all the ifs and buts that scientists obviously hedge their bets
with. Do they necessarily mean "there is something real out there"
when they quote a law like "apples fall off trees"?
Derek Potter
>"John Jones" <jivers...@btopenworld.com> wrote in message
>news:c6rk27$epq$7...@hercules.btinternet.com...
>> Your problem is quickly solved.
>> You said-
>>
>> > My contention is that science is inherently realist. My opponent does
>> > not agree.
>>
>> Realism is a particular model, the model of science. To say 'science is
>> inherently realist' presupposes that model as a reality.
>
>Isn't realism a metaphysical postulate that is adopted by most scientists,
>rather than a metaphysical axiom of science?
I don't know. I suggest that the fact that one can make repeatable
observations implies *something* about the thing observed. You can't
just say "we've always found nature to be repeatable" because that in
itself does not make it repeatable in future. Repeatability has to be
guaranteed repeatable. My contention is that this *necessary*
assumption carries over to the statements that science makes - such
statements are not statements about abstractions in a model, they are
necessarily about real objects directly or indirectly.
>I know that idealism (as contrasted with realism) is out of vogue these
>days, but it certainly contended with realism during the period of the
>logical positivists. I'm not sure if there was any better explanation than
>prejudice for the demise of idealism.
Even ff science cannot judge between those two, does it still (in
effect) insist that one of them must be right, or does it say nothing
whatsoever about the subject, not even (as I contended above) that
"there must be *something* real corresponding to our models"?
Derek Potter
>
>> I should add that for the purposes of this argument, "realism" need
>> not mean "absolute" realism. There is never any guarantee from science
>> that what we study is absolutely real: even if we sort all of physics
>> out, it could just be a projection from a higher world. We could all
>> be brains in a vat. I do not think that reservation precludes realism.
>> For example, I believe there is a world out there which exists whether
>> absolutely or as a consistent virtual reality. But that is my opinion
>> which I am pleased to call realism. I believe that science
>> *necessarily* makes statements which are underpinned by this kind of
>> realism, and that such statements necessarily refer to real objects or
>> they are not science.
>
>Question: what about scientific theories that turn out to be false? What
>were they referring to? The fact that theories can turn out to be false,
>and that entities recognized by a theory can turn out to not exist, seems to
>be a problem for your view. Because if the reality of certain entities were
>entailed by the definition of science, then scientific theories couldn't be
>false. Or rather, they couldn't be *radically false*, to the degree that
>their entire ontological inventory was incorrect. They can only be mistaken
>in their descriptions about real things.
>
>I get the impression that you have an answer to this, though, based on
>statements you make elsewhere in your post.
Your impression is right! I agree with you.
I don't think you need look any further than common sense. Any
scientific statement is subject to revision, so any theory is only
*probably* true. What were scientists referring to when they spoke of
"The Life Force"? It was just a mistaken idea.
This kind of probability can be brought closer and closer to certainty
through testing - if it fails we start again. That seems to
distinguish it from an ontological uncertainty where no matter how
well science works we still can't tell whether we are studying reality
or are just brains in a vat.
It is, of course, the latter type of "radical" ontology which I am
asking about. I believe that science is necessarily realistic in some
way, otherwise it cannot be said to be studying nature. I also believe
- and this is where it gets a bit harder - that the expectation that
nature can be studied at all entails that there is a reality causing
the observations.
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >scientists, rather than a metaphysical axiom of science?
>
> I don't know. I suggest that the fact that one can make repeatable
> observations implies *something* about the thing observed. You can't
> just say "we've always found nature to be repeatable" because that in
> itself does not make it repeatable in future. Repeatability has to be
> guaranteed repeatable. My contention is that this *necessary*
> assumption carries over to the statements that science makes - such
> statements are not statements about abstractions in a model, they are
> necessarily about real objects directly or indirectly.
How do you guarantee repeatability? If the answer is that you can't (I
believe this is known as 'the problem of induction') then the statements
that science makes aren't necessarily about 'real objects' that have an
essential existence independent of any observer.
> >I know that idealism (as contrasted with realism) is out of vogue these
> >days, but it certainly contended with realism during the period of the
> >logical positivists. I'm not sure if there was any better explanation
> >than prejudice for the demise of idealism.
>
> Even ff science cannot judge between those two, does it still (in
> effect) insist that one of them must be right, or does it say nothing
> whatsoever about the subject, not even (as I contended above) that
> "there must be *something* real corresponding to our models"?
I can't see why there is a requirement for *science* to have a preference
here, even though *scientists* often do. Why do you feel so strongly that
it should?
jillar...@webtv.net
Derek Potter wrote;
> My contention is that science is inherently realist. My opponent does
not agree.
and,
> ... the standard idea of what science is, entails that science does
talk about real things and that 'therefore' scientific statements are
realist.
Derek. It is not a 'standard' of the philosophy of science to talk about
real things without discarding a conventional presumption that things
are real, i.e., that they are known as they are.The standard idea starts
with asking how intelligible is the world of objects in the senses? Make
this your starting point. It precedes the application of conventional
realism because the necessary question to ask is, can the objects of
sensation be known as they are- yes or no? Look up mechanism,
naturalism, and positivism. They line up in response to this question as
yes, yes, and no, respectively.
Jillar
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:4r0590h3oermg2gsg...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >Isn't realism a metaphysical postulate that is adopted by most
>> >scientists, rather than a metaphysical axiom of science?
>>
>> I don't know. I suggest that the fact that one can make repeatable
>> observations implies *something* about the thing observed. You can't
>> just say "we've always found nature to be repeatable" because that in
>> itself does not make it repeatable in future. Repeatability has to be
>> guaranteed repeatable. My contention is that this *necessary*
>> assumption carries over to the statements that science makes - such
>> statements are not statements about abstractions in a model, they are
>> necessarily about real objects directly or indirectly.
>
>How do you guarantee repeatability? If the answer is that you can't (I
>believe this is known as 'the problem of induction') then the statements
>that science makes aren't necessarily about 'real objects' that have an
>essential existence independent of any observer.
I wasn't asking about justifying absolute realism, I was only asking
whether science's *claims* must be about a real world - as it appears
to us - as opposed to merely being statements of covering laws...
>> >I know that idealism (as contrasted with realism) is out of vogue these
>> >days, but it certainly contended with realism during the period of the
>> >logical positivists. I'm not sure if there was any better explanation
>> >than prejudice for the demise of idealism.
>>
>> Even ff science cannot judge between those two, does it still (in
>> effect) insist that one of them must be right, or does it say nothing
>> whatsoever about the subject, not even (as I contended above) that
>> "there must be *something* real corresponding to our models"?
>
>I can't see why there is a requirement for *science* to have a preference
>here, even though *scientists* often do. Why do you feel so strongly that
>it should?
I have never indicated anything of the kind. It was you who contrasted
realism and idealism, not me. I am asking for help in understanding
whether science has any *commitment* to realism - a question which is
two steps away from asking science to choose one theory over another.
Derek Potter
I think I understand that, but then there is a two step problem. Is
"science" sufficiently unambiguous for us to be able to say it
discards (por can discard) conventional realism? To give the problem
the benefit of the doubt, let's say it does, despite the obvious fact
that scientists think their test tubes and meters are real. The second
problem then arises, how can science proceed unless its observations
are consistent? Of course, I am assuming here that science works and
that it is the nature of science to expect itself to work. Doesn't a
committment to observational consistency entail a commitment to some
sort of reality constraining those observations? I would agree that it
doesn't say much about what the nature of that reality is other than
that it causes the observations, but surely it cannot be separated
from assume something exists?
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >> >Isn't realism a metaphysical postulate that is adopted by most
> >> >scientists, rather than a metaphysical axiom of science?
> >>
> >> I don't know. I suggest that the fact that one can make repeatable
> >> observations implies *something* about the thing observed. You can't
> >> just say "we've always found nature to be repeatable" because that in
> >> itself does not make it repeatable in future. Repeatability has to be
> >> guaranteed repeatable. My contention is that this *necessary*
> >> assumption carries over to the statements that science makes - such
> >> statements are not statements about abstractions in a model, they are
> >> necessarily about real objects directly or indirectly.
> >
> >How do you guarantee repeatability? If the answer is that you can't (I
> >believe this is known as 'the problem of induction') then the statements
> >that science makes aren't necessarily about 'real objects' that have an
> >essential existence independent of any observer.
>
> I wasn't asking about justifying absolute realism, I was only asking
> whether science's *claims* must be about a real world - as it appears
> to us - as opposed to merely being statements of covering laws...
I don't see why it matters whether science's claims are about a real world
given that the existence of such a world is not a scientific claim but a
metaphysical postulate.
> >> >I know that idealism (as contrasted with realism) is out of vogue
> >> >these days, but it certainly contended with realism during the period
> >> >of the logical positivists. I'm not sure if there was any better
> >> >explanation than prejudice for the demise of idealism.
> >>
> >> Even ff science cannot judge between those two, does it still (in
> >> effect) insist that one of them must be right, or does it say nothing
> >> whatsoever about the subject, not even (as I contended above) that
> >> "there must be *something* real corresponding to our models"?
> >
> >I can't see why there is a requirement for *science* to have a
> >preference here, even though *scientists* often do. Why do you feel so
> >strongly that it should?
>
> I have never indicated anything of the kind. It was you who contrasted
> realism and idealism, not me. I am asking for help in understanding
> whether science has any *commitment* to realism - a question which is
> two steps away from asking science to choose one theory over another.
You say in your reply to Jillar:
> Doesn't a
> committment to observational consistency entail a commitment to some
> sort of reality constraining those observations? I would agree that it
> doesn't say much about what the nature of that reality is other than
> that it causes the observations, but surely it cannot be separated
> from assume something exists?
This would have been a more appropriate answer to my question above.
The data of experience exhibits order. What justification is there for
saying anything more than this?
Luke Sineath
"Realistic in some way" is too broad, though. And, "there is a reality
causing the observatons." Given these two ideas, we can still have science
while we are brains in a vat. Because all of our observations will be
caused by some external reality, namely, wires attached to our brains. But
all of our scientific theories will turn out be be completely false, because
none of them will posit that we are brains in vats.
There is another philosophical viewpoint that is compatible with the two
ideas expressed above. Idealism. Idealism does not rule out causation,
and, hence, an idealist can formulate laws and explanations.
"Real," "Realism," etc., are broad, vague terms, that need to be spelled out
in detail.
I also get the impression that you and your original opponent might be
talking at cross-purposes:
"I believe that this entails that scientific statements must refer to things
as real. Which I think makes science realist. My opponent believes that h-d
does not require an ontolology of the enties referred to in science - their
reality or otherwise is a metaphysical assertion not entailed by h-d."
Based on this statement, in your original post, you claim that science
presumes that there is an external reality. Your opponent claims that no
particular entities are entailed by scientific method. These are not
contrary claims. However, if you wish to argue that the scientific method
assumes that there are some particular entities, e.g., if you think that any
scientific theory assumes from the outset that there are frogs (for
example), then you are in conflict with your opponent. For you opponent
denies that the existence of frogs is entailed by your agreed-upon
characterisation of science.
--
Luke Sineath
jillar...@webtv.net
Derek. The first point you make, and I'm addressing your points in
reverse order, is that talking about the intelligibility of an object
(what the question of science is asking) sets aside the philosophical
problem of existence. So equating realism with existence is an aside
point. I also see that Andy has responded to you with a question about
the justification for the existential metaphysical postulate in the
context of science. So you should probably respond to him about this and
I will look for your answer there.
The second point is that consistency with measurements does not
necessarily mean realism because there is a surrogate chain of 'tokens'
created by the scientific instruments. And if these tokens are
consistent mathematically then it can claim as does Mechanism, that
objects can be known not through realism but a formalism or a type of
Platonic ideal.
Jillar
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:a7n5909e058euoq69...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >> >Isn't realism a metaphysical postulate that is adopted by most
>> >> >scientists, rather than a metaphysical axiom of science?
>> >>
>> >> I don't know. I suggest that the fact that one can make repeatable
>> >> observations implies *something* about the thing observed. You can't
>> >> just say "we've always found nature to be repeatable" because that in
>> >> itself does not make it repeatable in future. Repeatability has to be
>> >> guaranteed repeatable. My contention is that this *necessary*
>> >> assumption carries over to the statements that science makes - such
>> >> statements are not statements about abstractions in a model, they are
>> >> necessarily about real objects directly or indirectly.
>> >
>> >How do you guarantee repeatability? If the answer is that you can't (I
>> >believe this is known as 'the problem of induction') then the statements
>> >that science makes aren't necessarily about 'real objects' that have an
>> >essential existence independent of any observer.
>>
>> I wasn't asking about justifying absolute realism, I was only asking
>> whether science's *claims* must be about a real world - as it appears
>> to us - as opposed to merely being statements of covering laws...
>
>I don't see why it matters whether science's claims are about a real world
>given that the existence of such a world is not a scientific claim but a
>metaphysical postulate.
>
It's what I was asking about.
Justification depends on your starting presuppositions. Science seems
to talk about things as if they are real.
Derek Potter
The theories can be about the reality that is available to us.
>There is another philosophical viewpoint that is compatible with the two
>ideas expressed above. Idealism. Idealism does not rule out causation,
>and, hence, an idealist can formulate laws and explanations.
>
>"Real," "Realism," etc., are broad, vague terms, that need to be spelled out
>in detail.
>
>I also get the impression that you and your original opponent might be
>talking at cross-purposes:
110%
>"I believe that this entails that scientific statements must refer to things
>as real. Which I think makes science realist. My opponent believes that h-d
>does not require an ontolology of the enties referred to in science - their
>reality or otherwise is a metaphysical assertion not entailed by h-d."
>Based on this statement, in your original post, you claim that science
>presumes that there is an external reality. Your opponent claims that no
>particular entities are entailed by scientific method. These are not
>contrary claims. However, if you wish to argue that the scientific method
>assumes that there are some particular entities, e.g., if you think that any
>scientific theory assumes from the outset that there are frogs (for
>example), then you are in conflict with your opponent. For you opponent
>denies that the existence of frogs is entailed by your agreed-upon
>characterisation of science.
Yes, Ok. That, of course, assumes that we *had* an agreement on what
sceince is. Which of course was not the case :)
Derek Potter
>
>Derek. The first point you make, and I'm addressing your points in
>reverse order, is that talking about the intelligibility of an object
>(what the question of science is asking) sets aside the philosophical
>problem of existence. So equating realism with existence is an aside
>point. I also see that Andy has responded to you with a question about
>the justification for the existential metaphysical postulate in the
>context of science. So you should probably respond to him about this and
>I will look for your answer there.
I don't think I understood Andy's question in that case. How the hell
should I know what justification there is? I'm not being polemical
about it, I just don't see how the existence of a model, h-d or d-n,
justfies consigning realism in science to the "superfluous
metaphysics" bin.
>The second point is that consistency with measurements does not
>necessarily mean realism because there is a surrogate chain of 'tokens'
>created by the scientific instruments. And if these tokens are
>consistent mathematically then it can claim as does Mechanism, that
>objects can be known not through realism but a formalism or a type of
>Platonic ideal.
This is another point I baulk at for the reasons I have explained two
or three times. Never mind, I'll forget the subject, real science is
much more interesting :) Thanks though.
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >world given that the existence of such a world is not a scientific claim
> >but a metaphysical postulate.
>
> It's what I was asking about.
It's what I was answering about.
> >The data of experience exhibits order. What justification is there for
> >saying anything more than this?
>
> Justification depends on your starting presuppositions. Science seems
> to talk about things as if they are real.
The idea is to eradicate unjustified starting presuppositions (prejudices).
Science is a tool that has a very impressive track record -- done well it
is awe-inspiring. Scientists may well talk about things *as if* they are
real -- it's a lot more convenient than having to couch every statement in
defensive ontology-neutral disclaimers -- but I think it's a mistake to
take the convenience of language to heart, and through that, inadvertently
adopt unexamined assumptions. The existence of a model, h-d or d-n, doesn't
justify consigning realism in science to the "superfluous metaphysics" bin,
but neither does it justify consigning idealism in science to the
"superfluous metaphysics" bin. We have no right to make any such
assumption.
It seems that you won't be happy until you get the answer you want to hear.
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:6ij890lobjsts3f46...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >I don't see why it matters whether science's claims are about a real
>> >world given that the existence of such a world is not a scientific claim
>> >but a metaphysical postulate.
>>
>> It's what I was asking about.
>
>It's what I was answering about.
We are at cross-purposes. You said, you don't see why it matters. I
say it matters *to me*, that's why I am asking. If that doesn't answer
you then I don't understand what you are saying - you must, I presume,
mean that it it doesn't matter to xyz. But I can't see what xyz might
be other than what I've tried to argue.
>> >The data of experience exhibits order. What justification is there for
>> >saying anything more than this?
>>
>> Justification depends on your starting presuppositions. Science seems
>> to talk about things as if they are real.
>
>The idea is to eradicate unjustified starting presuppositions (prejudices).
Is it? Science doesn't state any such aims. Philosophers of science
might, but in that case they are faced with the fact that science
*seems* to be talking about real objects (whatever that may be) not
about "data".
>Science is a tool that has a very impressive track record -- done well it
>is awe-inspiring. Scientists may well talk about things *as if* they are
>real -- it's a lot more convenient than having to couch every statement in
>defensive ontology-neutral disclaimers -- but I think it's a mistake to
>take the convenience of language to heart, and through that, inadvertently
>adopt unexamined assumptions.
So which is "True Science" - science as expressed by scientists and
understood by their hearers, or science as defined by non-scientific
philosophers with the ontology purged away? Or if that's a false
dichotomy, what is it? I don't expect a definitive answer of course,
as we are straight into Humpty Dumpty territory and can make the word
mean whatever we like. A philosopher could define it as "the religion
which has dominated Europe since the 3rd century" if it's totally up
for grabs. But if we allow that it's what it seems to be - an attempt
to describe a real world - then the defensive ontologically neutral
disclaimers would, to my mind, actually be false.
The "unexamined assumption" is not that the things spoken about are
real but that science speaks of them as real. Even so, if we try to
force science (our concept of it) into the straightjacket of
ontological neutrality, the sloppy ontology of Real Science (tm)
refuses to be constrained - in partcular the astounding success of
science is actually assumed by, say d-n. Imagine a world in which no
laws could be devised to cover observations - like one of those dreams
where things keep changing whenever you return to them for the simple
reason they don't really exist, they are just dreams. In such a world,
d-n would not work. Thus d-n simply assumes that the world is
consistent - it assumes that laws *can* be found. Unless you view it
as a purely descriptive model in which case it doesn't assume it but
describes it. "Scientists concoct covering laws" means that they
really do so, not that imaginary scientists in an imaginary world
might do so. Thus it entails a lawful world. That to me seems to be a
metaphysical claim - even if you hedge it about by saying that the
only world we really know about is the data. Putting laws into such a
world gives it a nature of its own independent of the d-ner.
>The existence of a model, h-d or d-n, doesn't
>justify consigning realism in science to the "superfluous metaphysics" bin,
>but neither does it justify consigning idealism in science to the
>"superfluous metaphysics" bin. We have no right to make any such
>assumption.
Sorry, you've lost me. Do you mean no right to assume we should
discard the metaphysics or no right to adopt one?
>It seems that you won't be happy until you get the answer you want to hear.
The answer I want to hear is one that I understand :) Don't get me
wrong, I'm not really arguing one way or another, just trying to
understand the issue.
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >> >I don't see why it matters whether science's claims are about a real
> >> >world given that the existence of such a world is not a scientific
> >> >claim but a metaphysical postulate.
> >>
> >> It's what I was asking about.
> >
> >It's what I was answering about.
>
> We are at cross-purposes. You said, you don't see why it matters. I
> say it matters *to me*, that's why I am asking. If that doesn't answer
> you then I don't understand what you are saying - you must, I presume,
> mean that it it doesn't matter to xyz. But I can't see what xyz might
> be other than what I've tried to argue.
The interesting question is why it matters *to you*. The effective pursuit
of science is unaffected by the scientist's ontological prejudice.
> >> >The data of experience exhibits order. What justification is there
> >> >for saying anything more than this?
> >>
> >> Justification depends on your starting presuppositions. Science seems
> >> to talk about things as if they are real.
> >
> >The idea is to eradicate unjustified starting presuppositions
> >(prejudices).
>
> Is it? Science doesn't state any such aims.
It doesn't need to since they don't impact upon it. If I understood your
original post correctly, you were somewhat incredulous that anyone could
decline to adopt a realist interpretation of science. My answer above was a
statement that a realist interpretation of science is nothing more than a
prejudice, and so it is perfectly legitimate to decline to adopt it.
> Philosophers of science
> might, but in that case they are faced with the fact that science
> *seems* to be talking about real objects (whatever that may be) not
> about "data".
Science is the study of the order that is prevalent in the data of
experience in an attempt to encapsulate that order in empirical laws. It
matters not one jot whether or not the order that is prevalent in the data
of experience reflects some kind of unexperienced order, whatever it might
*seem* like.
> >Science is a tool that has a very impressive track record -- done well
> >it is awe-inspiring. Scientists may well talk about things *as if* they
> >are real -- it's a lot more convenient than having to couch every
> >statement in defensive ontology-neutral disclaimers -- but I think it's
> >a mistake to take the convenience of language to heart, and through
> >that, inadvertently adopt unexamined assumptions.
>
> So which is "True Science" - science as expressed by scientists and
> understood by their hearers, or science as defined by non-scientific
> philosophers with the ontology purged away? Or if that's a false
> dichotomy, what is it? I don't expect a definitive answer of course,
> as we are straight into Humpty Dumpty territory and can make the word
> mean whatever we like. A philosopher could define it as "the religion
> which has dominated Europe since the 3rd century" if it's totally up
> for grabs. But if we allow that it's what it seems to be - an attempt
> to describe a real world - then the defensive ontologically neutral
> disclaimers would, to my mind, actually be false.
As I understand it, science entails the making of observations, the
creation of predictive explanatory hypotheses, and the return to
observation in order to test the validity of those predictions. Notice that
science begins and ends in observation -- i.e. the data of experience. Why
do we need to add anything to this description in order to confer the
adjective "true" upon it?
> The "unexamined assumption" is not that the things spoken about are
> real but that science speaks of them as real.
Speaking of a thing as though it were real doesn't make it real. A realist
interpretation of science claims that the things are real, not that they
are merely spoken of as though they were real.
> Even so, if we try to
> force science (our concept of it) into the straightjacket of
> ontological neutrality, the sloppy ontology of Real Science (tm)
> refuses to be constrained - in partcular the astounding success of
> science is actually assumed by, say d-n.
Ontological neutrality is not a straightjacket -- it places no constraints
upon science. The astounding success of science contributes nothing to the
debate about its ontological underpinnings.
> Imagine a world in which no
> laws could be devised to cover observations - like one of those dreams
> where things keep changing whenever you return to them for the simple
> reason they don't really exist, they are just dreams. In such a world,
> d-n would not work. Thus d-n simply assumes that the world is
> consistent - it assumes that laws *can* be found. Unless you view it
> as a purely descriptive model in which case it doesn't assume it but
> describes it. "Scientists concoct covering laws" means that they
> really do so, not that imaginary scientists in an imaginary world
> might do so. Thus it entails a lawful world. That to me seems to be a
> metaphysical claim - even if you hedge it about by saying that the
> only world we really know about is the data.
I'm not disputing the existence of order. The world is lawful -- that is an
observation, not a metaphysical postulate.
> Putting laws into such a world gives it a nature of its own independent
> of the d-ner.
Could you elaborate a little on this remarkable claim?
> >The existence of a model, h-d or d-n, doesn't
> >justify consigning realism in science to the "superfluous metaphysics"
> >bin, but neither does it justify consigning idealism in science to the
> >"superfluous metaphysics" bin. We have no right to make any such
> >assumption.
>
> Sorry, you've lost me. Do you mean no right to assume we should
> discard the metaphysics or no right to adopt one?
To discard an ontology, or to adopt one, reflects only a prejudice. As for
metaphysics in general, a non-philosophical scientist may discard the
issue, and a philosophical one may contemplate the issue, without affecting
the science that they do.
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:sbo9905mnmm7f0kft...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >> >I don't see why it matters whether science's claims are about a real
>> >> >world given that the existence of such a world is not a scientific
>> >> >claim but a metaphysical postulate.
>> >>
>> >> It's what I was asking about.
>> >
>> >It's what I was answering about.
>>
>> We are at cross-purposes. You said, you don't see why it matters. I
>> say it matters *to me*, that's why I am asking. If that doesn't answer
>> you then I don't understand what you are saying - you must, I presume,
>> mean that it it doesn't matter to xyz. But I can't see what xyz might
>> be other than what I've tried to argue.
>
>The interesting question is why it matters *to you*. The effective pursuit
>of science is unaffected by the scientist's ontological prejudice.
Those two statements appear to have nothing to do with each other.
>
>> >> >The data of experience exhibits order. What justification is there
>> >> >for saying anything more than this?
>> >>
>> >> Justification depends on your starting presuppositions. Science seems
>> >> to talk about things as if they are real.
>> >
>> >The idea is to eradicate unjustified starting presuppositions
>> >(prejudices).
>>
>> Is it? Science doesn't state any such aims.
>
>It doesn't need to since they don't impact upon it. If I understood your
>original post correctly, you were somewhat incredulous that anyone could
>decline to adopt a realist interpretation of science. My answer above was a
>statement that a realist interpretation of science is nothing more than a
>prejudice, and so it is perfectly legitimate to decline to adopt it.
>> Philosophers of science
>> might, but in that case they are faced with the fact that science
>> *seems* to be talking about real objects (whatever that may be) not
>> about "data".
>
>Science is the study of the order that is prevalent in the data of
>experience in an attempt to encapsulate that order in empirical laws. It
>matters not one jot whether or not the order that is prevalent in the data
>of experience reflects some kind of unexperienced order, whatever it might
>*seem* like.
That is a philosopher's definition, which does not reflect that of
many scientists. OK, I haven't done a major survey, but it doesn't
reflect the view of the scientists I do know.
>> >Science is a tool that has a very impressive track record -- done well
>> >it is awe-inspiring. Scientists may well talk about things *as if* they
>> >are real -- it's a lot more convenient than having to couch every
>> >statement in defensive ontology-neutral disclaimers -- but I think it's
>> >a mistake to take the convenience of language to heart, and through
>> >that, inadvertently adopt unexamined assumptions.
>>
>> So which is "True Science" - science as expressed by scientists and
>> understood by their hearers, or science as defined by non-scientific
>> philosophers with the ontology purged away? Or if that's a false
>> dichotomy, what is it? I don't expect a definitive answer of course,
>> as we are straight into Humpty Dumpty territory and can make the word
>> mean whatever we like. A philosopher could define it as "the religion
>> which has dominated Europe since the 3rd century" if it's totally up
>> for grabs. But if we allow that it's what it seems to be - an attempt
>> to describe a real world - then the defensive ontologically neutral
>> disclaimers would, to my mind, actually be false.
>
>As I understand it, science entails the making of observations, the
>creation of predictive explanatory hypotheses, and the return to
>observation in order to test the validity of those predictions. Notice that
>science begins and ends in observation -- i.e. the data of experience. Why
>do we need to add anything to this description in order to confer the
>adjective "true" upon it?
I would say you have been unduly influenced by Popper and Hempel.
What you have described is a *model* of science not a definition or
description.
>> The "unexamined assumption" is not that the things spoken about are
>> real but that science speaks of them as real.
>
>Speaking of a thing as though it were real doesn't make it real. A realist
>interpretation of science claims that the things are real, not that they
>are merely spoken of as though they were real.
Agreed. Hence the neccessity to address, within the description of
science, the rather surprising fact that laws *can* be formulated
successfully.
>
>
>> Even so, if we try to
>> force science (our concept of it) into the straightjacket of
>> ontological neutrality, the sloppy ontology of Real Science (tm)
>> refuses to be constrained - in partcular the astounding success of
>> science is actually assumed by, say d-n.
>
>Ontological neutrality is not a straightjacket -- it places no constraints
>upon science.
>The astounding success of science contributes nothing to the
>debate about its ontological underpinnings.
see next
>> Imagine a world in which no
>> laws could be devised to cover observations - like one of those dreams
>> where things keep changing whenever you return to them for the simple
>> reason they don't really exist, they are just dreams. In such a world,
>> d-n would not work. Thus d-n simply assumes that the world is
>> consistent - it assumes that laws *can* be found. Unless you view it
>> as a purely descriptive model in which case it doesn't assume it but
>> describes it. "Scientists concoct covering laws" means that they
>> really do so, not that imaginary scientists in an imaginary world
>> might do so. Thus it entails a lawful world. That to me seems to be a
>> metaphysical claim - even if you hedge it about by saying that the
>> only world we really know about is the data.
>
>I'm not disputing the existence of order. The world is lawful -- that is an
>observation, not a metaphysical postulate.
The world is not observed to be orderly. Order is presupposed. Of
course, if you try to investigate whether the world is orderly you do
immediately find data that looks orderly to our innately realist eyes.
But, to quantify whether the data supports the hypothesis that the
world is orderly, you have to apply the methods such as probability
theory which already assume the world is orderly.
>> Putting laws into such a world gives it a nature of its own independent
>> of the d-ner.
>
>Could you elaborate a little on this remarkable claim?
If the world is orderly then it has an orderly nature. The statement
"The world is orderly" strikes me as supremely metaphysical, yet you
cannot do probability theory without it. Thus science cannot observe
order without assuming that particular metaphysics.
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >> say it matters *to me*, that's why I am asking. If that doesn't answer
> >> you then I don't understand what you are saying - you must, I presume,
> >> mean that it it doesn't matter to xyz. But I can't see what xyz might
> >> be other than what I've tried to argue.
> >
> >The interesting question is why it matters *to you*. The effective
> >pursuit of science is unaffected by the scientist's ontological
> >prejudice.
>
> Those two statements appear to have nothing to do with each other.
Okay I'll spell it out for you then. I take it you're a scientist, in which
case you can do your job perfectly well without delving into the
metaphysics. Since the metaphysics is irrelevant, why are you concerned
about it?
> >> Philosophers of science
> >> might, but in that case they are faced with the fact that science
> >> *seems* to be talking about real objects (whatever that may be) not
> >> about "data".
> >
> >Science is the study of the order that is prevalent in the data of
> >experience in an attempt to encapsulate that order in empirical laws. It
> >matters not one jot whether or not the order that is prevalent in the
> >data of experience reflects some kind of unexperienced order, whatever
> >it might *seem* like.
>
> That is a philosopher's definition, which does not reflect that of
> many scientists.
This is alt.philosophy.
> OK, I haven't done a major survey, but it doesn't
> reflect the view of the scientists I do know.
Scientists may have opinions on the subject, but how would they go about
conferring respectability on those opinions without resorting to
hand-waving arguments like "it just seems that way"?
> >As I understand it, science entails the making of observations, the
> >creation of predictive explanatory hypotheses, and the return to
> >observation in order to test the validity of those predictions. Notice
> >that science begins and ends in observation -- i.e. the data of
> >experience. Why do we need to add anything to this description in order
> >to confer the adjective "true" upon it?
>
> I would say you have been unduly influenced by Popper and Hempel.
> What you have described is a *model* of science not a definition or
> description.
Then provide your definition or description and explain your use of the
adjective "true" without recourse to prejudice.
> >> The "unexamined assumption" is not that the things spoken about are
> >> real but that science speaks of them as real.
> >
> >Speaking of a thing as though it were real doesn't make it real. A
> >realist interpretation of science claims that the things are real, not
> >that they are merely spoken of as though they were real.
>
> Agreed. Hence the neccessity to address, within the description of
> science, the rather surprising fact that laws *can* be formulated
> successfully.
You seem to be extending the task of science beyond its remit by
incorporating metaphysics into it. Your hypothesis is that there are real
objects beyond our experiences that are responsible for the lawful nature
of our experiences. What predictions does this hypothesis admit of? How may
they be tested?
> >I'm not disputing the existence of order. The world is lawful -- that is
> >an observation, not a metaphysical postulate.
>
> The world is not observed to be orderly. Order is presupposed. Of
> course, if you try to investigate whether the world is orderly you do
> immediately find data that looks orderly to our innately realist eyes.
> But, to quantify whether the data supports the hypothesis that the
> world is orderly, you have to apply the methods such as probability
> theory which already assume the world is orderly.
See below.
> >> Putting laws into such a world gives it a nature of its own
> >> independent of the d-ner.
> >
> >Could you elaborate a little on this remarkable claim?
>
> If the world is orderly then it has an orderly nature. The statement
> "The world is orderly" strikes me as supremely metaphysical, yet you
> cannot do probability theory without it. Thus science cannot observe
> order without assuming that particular metaphysics.
Science doesn't observe order -- observers observe order, and *there could
be no observers in the absence of order*. If we insist on an account of the
presence of this order then we step over from science into ontology -- a
step that is superfluous to the pursuit of science. Why don't you just do
the science and stop worrying about all this
metaphysical crap?
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:jnna90la3040p8ba1...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >> We are at cross-purposes. You said, you don't see why it matters. I
>> >> say it matters *to me*, that's why I am asking. If that doesn't answer
>> >> you then I don't understand what you are saying - you must, I presume,
>> >> mean that it it doesn't matter to xyz. But I can't see what xyz might
>> >> be other than what I've tried to argue.
>> >
>> >The interesting question is why it matters *to you*. The effective
>> >pursuit of science is unaffected by the scientist's ontological
>> >prejudice.
>>
>> Those two statements appear to have nothing to do with each other.
>
>Okay I'll spell it out for you then. I take it you're a scientist, in which
No I'm not.
>case you can do your job perfectly well without delving into the
>metaphysics. Since the metaphysics is irrelevant, why are you concerned
>about it?
WTF ????
Have it your way then. You're right. I have no business asking such
questions. Sorry.
>> >> Philosophers of science
>> >> might, but in that case they are faced with the fact that science
>> >> *seems* to be talking about real objects (whatever that may be) not
>> >> about "data".
>> >
>> >Science is the study of the order that is prevalent in the data of
>> >experience in an attempt to encapsulate that order in empirical laws. It
>> >matters not one jot whether or not the order that is prevalent in the
>> >data of experience reflects some kind of unexperienced order, whatever
>> >it might *seem* like.
>>
>> That is a philosopher's definition, which does not reflect that of
>> many scientists.
>
>This is alt.philosophy.
Oh yes indeed. And what a nice little closed shop it is. Sorry to
waste your time.
>> OK, I haven't done a major survey, but it doesn't
>> reflect the view of the scientists I do know.
>
>Scientists may have opinions on the subject, but how would they go about
>conferring respectability on those opinions without resorting to
>hand-waving arguments like "it just seems that way"?
Again, you're right. A question about the reality they think they
study should never cross their minds. Sorry I raised the possibility.
>> >As I understand it, science entails the making of observations, the
>> >creation of predictive explanatory hypotheses, and the return to
>> >observation in order to test the validity of those predictions. Notice
>> >that science begins and ends in observation -- i.e. the data of
>> >experience. Why do we need to add anything to this description in order
>> >to confer the adjective "true" upon it?
>>
>> I would say you have been unduly influenced by Popper and Hempel.
>> What you have described is a *model* of science not a definition or
>> description.
>
>Then provide your definition or description and explain your use of the
>adjective "true" without recourse to prejudice.
Did I use the word "true"? Can't see where. Sorry.
>> >> The "unexamined assumption" is not that the things spoken about are
>> >> real but that science speaks of them as real.
>> >
>> >Speaking of a thing as though it were real doesn't make it real. A
>> >realist interpretation of science claims that the things are real, not
>> >that they are merely spoken of as though they were real.
>>
>> Agreed. Hence the neccessity to address, within the description of
>> science, the rather surprising fact that laws *can* be formulated
>> successfully.
>
>You seem to be extending the task of science beyond its remit by
>incorporating metaphysics into it. Your hypothesis is that there are real
>objects beyond our experiences that are responsible for the lawful nature
>of our experiences. What predictions does this hypothesis admit of? How may
>they be tested?
I do not hypothesise any such thing. I note that *because* we
presuppose order in the data we find it and that therefore the data
has persistant attributes all on its own. I have of course failed to
understand you. Sorry.
>> >I'm not disputing the existence of order. The world is lawful -- that is
>> >an observation, not a metaphysical postulate.
>>
>> The world is not observed to be orderly. Order is presupposed. Of
>> course, if you try to investigate whether the world is orderly you do
>> immediately find data that looks orderly to our innately realist eyes.
>> But, to quantify whether the data supports the hypothesis that the
>> world is orderly, you have to apply the methods such as probability
>> theory which already assume the world is orderly.
>
>See below.
>
>
>
>> >> Putting laws into such a world gives it a nature of its own
>> >> independent of the d-ner.
>> >
>> >Could you elaborate a little on this remarkable claim?
>>
>> If the world is orderly then it has an orderly nature. The statement
>> "The world is orderly" strikes me as supremely metaphysical, yet you
>> cannot do probability theory without it. Thus science cannot observe
>> order without assuming that particular metaphysics.
>
>Science doesn't observe order -- observers observe order, and *there could
>be no observers in the absence of order*.
I never did understand the anthropic principle in philosophy. I just
don't see why observers existing entails anything about order in the
things observed. Still, I'm not trained in this double-think stuff, so
what would I know? Sorry to be so slow.
>If we insist on an account of the
>presence of this order then we step over from science into ontology -- a
>step that is superfluous to the pursuit of science.
Says the philosopher who must not be questioned. Sorry to doubt you,
oh great one.
>Why don't you just do the science and stop worrying about all this
>metaphysical crap?
Sorry I trespassed.
Luke Sineath
Now "reality" is pretty much meaningless. You need to place some
restrictions on this. Because, again, this is perfectly compatible with
anti-realism. The anti-realist can argue that the "reality that is
available to us" is just our immediate perceptions. Therefore, science is
just about our immediate experience, not real objects-in-the-world.
Well, I thought you guys had some sort of an agreement. What is the
original thread this discussion comes out of, anyway?
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >> >pursuit of science is unaffected by the scientist's ontological
> >> >prejudice.
> >>
> >> Those two statements appear to have nothing to do with each other.
> >
> >Okay I'll spell it out for you then. I take it you're a scientist, in
> >which
>
> No I'm not.
>
> >case you can do your job perfectly well without delving into the
> >metaphysics. Since the metaphysics is irrelevant, why are you concerned
> >about it?
>
> WTF ????
>
> Have it your way then. You're right. I have no business asking such
> questions. Sorry.
The question was sincere, not rhetorical. The question is why it matters
*to you* -- why won't you answer this question?
> >> >Science is the study of the order that is prevalent in the data of
> >> >experience in an attempt to encapsulate that order in empirical laws.
> >> >It matters not one jot whether or not the order that is prevalent in
> >> >the data of experience reflects some kind of unexperienced order,
> >> >whatever it might *seem* like.
> >>
> >> That is a philosopher's definition, which does not reflect that of
> >> many scientists.
> >
> >This is alt.philosophy.
>
> Oh yes indeed. And what a nice little closed shop it is. Sorry to
> waste your time.
If you hang around here long enough you'll find out that a closed shop is
the last thing it is. And no need to apologize -- my time is never wasted.
> >> OK, I haven't done a major survey, but it doesn't
> >> reflect the view of the scientists I do know.
> >
> >Scientists may have opinions on the subject, but how would they go about
> >conferring respectability on those opinions without resorting to
> >hand-waving arguments like "it just seems that way"?
>
> Again, you're right. A question about the reality they think they
> study should never cross their minds. Sorry I raised the possibility.
Philosophically inclined people can't help but think about such things, and
that includes philosophically inclined scientists, so there's no need for
an apology -- you're in good company here whether or not the group, or
particular participants in it, are to your liking.
> >> I would say you have been unduly influenced by Popper and Hempel.
> >> What you have described is a *model* of science not a definition or
> >> description.
> >
> >Then provide your definition or description and explain your use of the
> >adjective "true" without recourse to prejudice.
>
> Did I use the word "true"? Can't see where. Sorry.
You asked the question "So which is "True Science" - science as expressed
by scientists and understood by their hearers, or science as defined by
non-scientific philosophers with the ontology purged away? Or if that's a
false dichotomy, what is it?" I seem to recall you even trade-marked it in
a later post.
> >> >Speaking of a thing as though it were real doesn't make it real. A
> >> >realist interpretation of science claims that the things are real,
> >> >not that they are merely spoken of as though they were real.
> >>
> >> Agreed. Hence the neccessity to address, within the description of
> >> science, the rather surprising fact that laws *can* be formulated
> >> successfully.
> >
> >You seem to be extending the task of science beyond its remit by
> >incorporating metaphysics into it. Your hypothesis is that there are
> >real objects beyond our experiences that are responsible for the lawful
> >nature of our experiences. What predictions does this hypothesis admit
> >of? How may they be tested?
>
> I do not hypothesise any such thing. I note that *because* we
> presuppose order in the data we find it and that therefore the data
> has persistant attributes all on its own. I have of course failed to
> understand you. Sorry.
If the world were entirely random then there would be nothing to presuppose
order in that world and therefore nothing to find it.
> >> If the world is orderly then it has an orderly nature. The statement
> >> "The world is orderly" strikes me as supremely metaphysical, yet you
> >> cannot do probability theory without it. Thus science cannot observe
> >> order without assuming that particular metaphysics.
> >
> >Science doesn't observe order -- observers observe order, and *there
> >could be no observers in the absence of order*.
>
> I never did understand the anthropic principle in philosophy. I just
> don't see why observers existing entails anything about order in the
> things observed. Still, I'm not trained in this double-think stuff, so
> what would I know? Sorry to be so slow.
Does it require some special kind of training to understand that an
entirely random world would be devoid of observers?
> >If we insist on an account of the
> >presence of this order then we step over from science into ontology -- a
> >step that is superfluous to the pursuit of science.
>
> Says the philosopher who must not be questioned. Sorry to doubt you,
> oh great one.
Your sarcasm is neither helpful nor productive.
> >Why don't you just do the science and stop worrying about all this
> >metaphysical crap?
>
> Sorry I trespassed.
There are no trespassers in this group -- all are welcome. Now how about
addressing the core question here: why is this realism thing such an issue
for you?
Luke Sineath
> > >This is alt.philosophy.
> >
> > Oh yes indeed. And what a nice little closed shop it is. Sorry to
> > waste your time.
>
> If you hang around here long enough you'll find out that a closed shop is
> the last thing it is. And no need to apologize -- my time is never wasted.
> Philosophically inclined people can't help but think about such things,
and
> that includes philosophically inclined scientists, so there's no need for
> an apology -- you're in good company here whether or not the group, or
> particular participants in it, are to your liking.
> > Sorry I trespassed.
>
> There are no trespassers in this group -- all are welcome.
Just want to add a brief comment on this particular point: alt.philosophy is
composed of only those who post, and that composition changes over time.
The nature of the discussions can also change as this composition changes.
This isn't a closed shop at all; people can come and go as they like. There
is a very small group of people who have posted consistently for an
extremely long time (Sir F., JJ, andy-k, Immortalist, maybe others, I've
only been reading this ng for 2 yrs.).
Feel free to post here, Derek. It's always good to have a new perspective.
The topic you've brought up is interesting, and you've gotten plenty of
replies. Don't take disagreement as a sign that your comments are
unwelcome.
--
Luke Sineath
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:nf9c90hojur6oca99...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >> >The interesting question is why it matters *to you*. The effective
>> >> >pursuit of science is unaffected by the scientist's ontological
>> >> >prejudice.
>> >>
>> >> Those two statements appear to have nothing to do with each other.
>> >
>> >Okay I'll spell it out for you then. I take it you're a scientist, in
>> >which
>>
>> No I'm not.
>>
>> >case you can do your job perfectly well without delving into the
>> >metaphysics. Since the metaphysics is irrelevant, why are you concerned
>> >about it?
>>
>> WTF ????
>>
>> Have it your way then. You're right. I have no business asking such
>> questions. Sorry.
>
>The question was sincere, not rhetorical. The question is why it matters
>*to you* -- why won't you answer this question?
Why does my answer matter so much *to you*?
>> >> >Science is the study of the order that is prevalent in the data of
>> >> >experience in an attempt to encapsulate that order in empirical laws.
>> >> >It matters not one jot whether or not the order that is prevalent in
>> >> >the data of experience reflects some kind of unexperienced order,
>> >> >whatever it might *seem* like.
>> >>
>> >> That is a philosopher's definition, which does not reflect that of
>> >> many scientists.
>> >
>> >This is alt.philosophy.
>>
>> Oh yes indeed. And what a nice little closed shop it is. Sorry to
>> waste your time.
>
>If you hang around here long enough you'll find out that a closed shop is
>the last thing it is. And no need to apologize -- my time is never wasted.
I've found it a helpful place in the past. I am not used to being told
to shut up and not ask interesting questions. Nor to being
cross-examined as to why I want to know.
>> >> OK, I haven't done a major survey, but it doesn't
>> >> reflect the view of the scientists I do know.
>> >
>> >Scientists may have opinions on the subject, but how would they go about
>> >conferring respectability on those opinions without resorting to
>> >hand-waving arguments like "it just seems that way"?
>>
>> Again, you're right. A question about the reality they think they
>> study should never cross their minds. Sorry I raised the possibility.
>
>Philosophically inclined people can't help but think about such things, and
>that includes philosophically inclined scientists, so there's no need for
>an apology -- you're in good company here whether or not the group, or
>particular participants in it, are to your liking.
<shrug> That's your interpretation. I don't know you from Adam, you
may the model citizen and the sort of dude who buys the beers.
Perhaps.
>> >> I would say you have been unduly influenced by Popper and Hempel.
>> >> What you have described is a *model* of science not a definition or
>> >> description.
>> >
>> >Then provide your definition or description and explain your use of the
>> >adjective "true" without recourse to prejudice.
>>
>> Did I use the word "true"? Can't see where. Sorry.
>
>You asked the question "So which is "True Science" - science as expressed
>by scientists and understood by their hearers, or science as defined by
>non-scientific philosophers with the ontology purged away? Or if that's a
>false dichotomy, what is it?"
OK, I do recall writing that but I couldn't find it.
> I seem to recall you even trade-marked it in a later post.
For a good reason. To make you aware that I know that the definitions
game ends in an impasse. Frankly I don't know of a definition that
would satisfy both of us.
>> >> >Speaking of a thing as though it were real doesn't make it real. A
>> >> >realist interpretation of science claims that the things are real,
>> >> >not that they are merely spoken of as though they were real.
>> >>
>> >> Agreed. Hence the neccessity to address, within the description of
>> >> science, the rather surprising fact that laws *can* be formulated
>> >> successfully.
>> >
>> >You seem to be extending the task of science beyond its remit by
>> >incorporating metaphysics into it. Your hypothesis is that there are
>> >real objects beyond our experiences that are responsible for the lawful
>> >nature of our experiences. What predictions does this hypothesis admit
>> >of? How may they be tested?
>>
>> I do not hypothesise any such thing. I note that *because* we
>> presuppose order in the data we find it and that therefore the data
>> has persistant attributes all on its own. I have of course failed to
>> understand you. Sorry.
>
>If the world were entirely random then there would be nothing to presuppose
>order in that world and therefore nothing to find it.
But we are not talking about the whole world being random. We are
talking about order in the data.
>> >> If the world is orderly then it has an orderly nature. The statement
>> >> "The world is orderly" strikes me as supremely metaphysical, yet you
>> >> cannot do probability theory without it. Thus science cannot observe
>> >> order without assuming that particular metaphysics.
>> >
>> >Science doesn't observe order -- observers observe order, and *there
>> >could be no observers in the absence of order*.
>>
>> I never did understand the anthropic principle in philosophy. I just
>> don't see why observers existing entails anything about order in the
>> things observed. Still, I'm not trained in this double-think stuff, so
>> what would I know? Sorry to be so slow.
>
>Does it require some special kind of training to understand that an
>entirely random world would be devoid of observers?
No, but it seems to require a special sort of training to fail to
understand that the existence of orderly observers does not entail the
existence of order in the observations. You have to presuppose some
sort of order covering the data and the observer.
I repeat the point - if you are going to jettison the "ordinary
sceintist's" metaphysics, you have to build your -d-n model on a
*presupposition* that order (sometimes) exists in the data. The binary
string 01010101010101010101 is orderly but I can only know that
because I can spot the repetition by eye and/or quantify if as an
auto-correlation function and then apply probability theory. The
chances of such a sequence being derived from randomness is small.
That's the way we recognize order - it presupposes probability theory.
Thus it is superbly successful in an orderly world or in a system
which assumes order, but it cannot possibly justify the inclusion of
probability theory a priori. In that respect, d-n is as metaphysical
as any other fairy story.
>> >If we insist on an account of the
>> >presence of this order then we step over from science into ontology -- a
>> >step that is superfluous to the pursuit of science.
>>
>> Says the philosopher who must not be questioned. Sorry to doubt you,
>> oh great one.
>
>Your sarcasm is neither helpful nor productive.
I find your demands to justfy my curiousity equally unhelpful and they
preceded and are causal to my response. Be a little less personal and
you won't have anything to whinge about.
>> >Why don't you just do the science and stop worrying about all this
>> >metaphysical crap?
>>
>> Sorry I trespassed.
>
>There are no trespassers in this group -- all are welcome. Now how about
>addressing the core question here: why is this realism thing such an issue
>for you?
I explained why in my first post. When you've re-read it, tell me what
bearing this has on my enquiry.
Derek Potter
Yes but its self-consistency is impressive. There is, by definition,
no way we could ever be sure we were studying the true nature ot
things, but that does not mean we only study perceptions. It seems
that we are presented with a self-consistent, persistent world whether
we are part of it and simply "see" it more-or-less as it is or whether
w are brains in a vat experiencing only a virtual world. I don't know
what that sort of realism is called, but it seems to require some
metaphysics of order (as I am trying to convey to andy-k) quite apart
from any metaphysics of ultimate reality.
A thread in talk.origins. The resident philosopher of science there
and I got locked in a furious battle in a thread that was entitled
"Epistemological Pluralism". It was originally about a book in which
Wilber talks of different and independent sources of knowledge: the
senses, the spirit, pure reason. Sow to the wind reap the whirlwind :)
darth_versive
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
<snip>
> >Science is the study of the order that is prevalent in the data of
> >experience in an attempt to encapsulate that order in empirical laws. It
> >matters not one jot whether or not the order that is prevalent in the data
> >of experience reflects some kind of unexperienced order, whatever it might
> >*seem* like.
>
> That is a philosopher's definition, which does not reflect that of
> many scientists. OK, I haven't done a major survey, but it doesn't
> reflect the view of the scientists I do know.
It matters to most scientists I know too. And it also matters to me.
And my own philosophical definition of science *does* involve realist
ontological presuppositions.
So, you *can* have a philosopher's definition of science in which it
matters whether science is dealing with an ontologically real world or
not (since I'm just as much a philosopher as anyone else dealing with
such questions). Andy-k's philosophical definition of science, as he
states it above, just reflects his own philosophical views, not
"philosophers" in general. And, like you said, it doesn't seem to
reflect the philosophical views of many practicing scientists.
So there! ;)
DV
andy-k
news:8e0e3045.04050...@posting.google.com...
<snip>
> Andy-k's philosophical definition of science, as he
> states it above, just reflects his own philosophical views, not
> "philosophers" in general. And, like you said, it doesn't seem to
> reflect the philosophical views of many practicing scientists.
>
> So there! ;)
>
> DV
Absolutely right, but I'd still like to know why we feel the need to answer
this question. Perhaps you will be a little more forthcoming with a reply
Darth.
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >*to you* -- why won't you answer this question?
>
> Why does my answer matter so much *to you*?
Because you may have spotted something that I've overlooked.
> >> >This is alt.philosophy.
> >>
> >> Oh yes indeed. And what a nice little closed shop it is. Sorry to
> >> waste your time.
> >
> >If you hang around here long enough you'll find out that a closed shop
> >is the last thing it is. And no need to apologize -- my time is never
> >wasted.
>
> I've found it a helpful place in the past. I am not used to being told
> to shut up and not ask interesting questions. Nor to being
> cross-examined as to why I want to know.
Anybody that tells you to shut up and not ask interesting questions
deserves to get their ass kicked, but I certainly haven't. As for the
accusation of cross-examination, I was at every stage giving an admission
of my ignorance and my desire to find an answer to this interesting
question -- *why does it matter*?
> >> >You seem to be extending the task of science beyond its remit by
> >> >incorporating metaphysics into it. Your hypothesis is that there are
> >> >real objects beyond our experiences that are responsible for the
> >> >lawful nature of our experiences. What predictions does this
> >> >hypothesis admit of? How may they be tested?
> >>
> >> I do not hypothesise any such thing. I note that *because* we
> >> presuppose order in the data we find it and that therefore the data
> >> has persistant attributes all on its own. I have of course failed to
> >> understand you. Sorry.
> >
> >If the world were entirely random then there would be nothing to
> >presuppose order in that world and therefore nothing to find it.
>
> But we are not talking about the whole world being random. We are
> talking about order in the data.
I was addressing your claim that "*because* we presuppose order in the data
we find it". We don't find order simply because we presuppose it -- we find
it because it's already there, and if it were not already there then we
wouldn't be here to look for it.
> >> >Science doesn't observe order -- observers observe order, and *there
> >> >could be no observers in the absence of order*.
> >>
> >> I never did understand the anthropic principle in philosophy. I just
> >> don't see why observers existing entails anything about order in the
> >> things observed. Still, I'm not trained in this double-think stuff, so
> >> what would I know? Sorry to be so slow.
> >
> >Does it require some special kind of training to understand that an
> >entirely random world would be devoid of observers?
>
> No, but it seems to require a special sort of training to fail to
> understand that the existence of orderly observers does not entail the
> existence of order in the observations. You have to presuppose some
> sort of order covering the data and the observer.
Observer and observed cannot be separated.
> I repeat the point - if you are going to jettison the "ordinary
> sceintist's" metaphysics, you have to build your -d-n model on a
> *presupposition* that order (sometimes) exists in the data.
If the only thing being jettisoned is an unsupportable prejudice then
that's just a tidy-up job as far as I'm concerned. The existence of order
is not a prejudice but an observed fact, and so cannot be jettisoned.
> The binary
> string 01010101010101010101 is orderly but I can only know that
> because I can spot the repetition by eye and/or quantify if as an
> auto-correlation function and then apply probability theory. The
> chances of such a sequence being derived from randomness is small.
> That's the way we recognize order - it presupposes probability theory.
> Thus it is superbly successful in an orderly world or in a system
> which assumes order, but it cannot possibly justify the inclusion of
> probability theory a priori. In that respect, d-n is as metaphysical
> as any other fairy story.
You know that the binary string is orderly because you are an ordered
system yourself.
> >Your sarcasm is neither helpful nor productive.
>
> I find your demands to justfy my curiousity equally unhelpful and they
> preceded and are causal to my response. Be a little less personal and
> you won't have anything to whinge about.
I'm here to share my thoughts so that any errors can be eradicated -- it
doesn't get any more personal than that. If you're here for some other
reason then we've been talking at cross purposes.
> >There are no trespassers in this group -- all are welcome. Now how about
> >addressing the core question here: why is this realism thing such an
> >issue for you?
>
> I explained why in my first post. When you've re-read it, tell me what
> bearing this has on my enquiry.
The initial poster in a thread does not own the thread, and is not in a
position to demand that the follow-up posters stick to the subject. Threads
go where they will. My first reply in this thread was to JJ, whereupon you
invited me into debate. I'm in this thread to pursue my own questions, as
well as to take an interest in yours.
John Wilkins
alt.philosophy is therefore a ship of Theseus. If you take old posters
and get them in a room, which would be the True a.p?
Derek has an issue with philosophically trained, or at least educated,
people assuming knowledge in order to discuss things. But he does take
an interesting position (so far as I can tell, it's a kind of
neo-Platonic hermeneutics), and it is fun to debate with him sometimes.
--
Dr John S. Wilkins, www.wilkins.id.au
"I never meet anyone who is not perplexed what to do with their
children" --Charles Darwin to Syms Covington, February 22, 1857
John Wilkins
But we know that as philosophers, scientists make great scientists (and
this is not sarcasm - scientists will steal, beg or borrow anything that
helsp their research programs). They are, in effect, the worst sources,
taken individually, for a philosophy of science. Most scientists I know
would be, if you asked them, naive scientific realists. That doesn't
make scientific realism a necessary commitment to do good science.
andy-k is, so far as I can tell from a reading of the literature, the
history, and personal contact, absolutely correct.
John Wilkins
Derek Potter
Ah, ladies and gentlemen - all who have wondered where this thread
started - meet the man himself, my honorable opponent: John Wilkins.
I was wondering if you'd turn up, John ;p
Anyway, I do not have a problem with philosophically educated people,
or I would not have aired this issue in this <cough> erudite company.
> But he does take
>an interesting position (so far as I can tell, it's a kind of
>neo-Platonic hermeneutics),
You learn something new every day. Previous person I argued with said
I was a pomo. (For the benefit of readers who use a small font, that's
P O M O, not P O R N O. I might be a porno instead, but I don't think
so.) Person before that said I was a heretic, person before that told
me I was sending computer viruses. People do get some very funny
ideas.
> and it is fun to debate with him sometimes.
Ha! You've only had *one* debate with me.
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:i2uc901660r0t594a...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >The question was sincere, not rhetorical. The question is why it matters
>> >*to you* -- why won't you answer this question?
>>
>> Why does my answer matter so much *to you*?
>
>Because you may have spotted something that I've overlooked.
A worthy hypothesis, but the putative issue should be tackled on its
own merits without psychoanalysis of the author. (Me anti-post-modern,
OK?)
>> >> >This is alt.philosophy.
>> >>
>> >> Oh yes indeed. And what a nice little closed shop it is. Sorry to
>> >> waste your time.
>> >
>> >If you hang around here long enough you'll find out that a closed shop
>> >is the last thing it is. And no need to apologize -- my time is never
>> >wasted.
>>
>> I've found it a helpful place in the past. I am not used to being told
>> to shut up and not ask interesting questions. Nor to being
>> cross-examined as to why I want to know.
>
>Anybody that tells you to shut up and not ask interesting questions
>deserves to get their ass kicked, but I certainly haven't. As for the
>accusation of cross-examination, I was at every stage giving an admission
>of my ignorance and my desire to find an answer to this interesting
>question -- *why does it matter*?
As in "Why don't you just do the science and stop worrying about all
this metaphysical crap?" ?
>> >> >You seem to be extending the task of science beyond its remit by
>> >> >incorporating metaphysics into it. Your hypothesis is that there are
>> >> >real objects beyond our experiences that are responsible for the
>> >> >lawful nature of our experiences. What predictions does this
>> >> >hypothesis admit of? How may they be tested?
>> >>
>> >> I do not hypothesise any such thing. I note that *because* we
>> >> presuppose order in the data we find it and that therefore the data
>> >> has persistant attributes all on its own. I have of course failed to
>> >> understand you. Sorry.
>> >
>> >If the world were entirely random then there would be nothing to
>> >presuppose order in that world and therefore nothing to find it.
>>
>> But we are not talking about the whole world being random. We are
>> talking about order in the data.
>
>I was addressing your claim that "*because* we presuppose order in the data
>we find it". We don't find order simply because we presuppose it -- we find
>it because it's already there, and if it were not already there then we
>wouldn't be here to look for it.
Presupposing order is necessary, obviously it is not sufficient. What
I'm saying is a lot simpler if you consider the alternative: could you
discover order without presupposing it? Hence my example.
>> >> >Science doesn't observe order -- observers observe order, and *there
>> >> >could be no observers in the absence of order*.
>> >>
>> >> I never did understand the anthropic principle in philosophy. I just
>> >> don't see why observers existing entails anything about order in the
>> >> things observed. Still, I'm not trained in this double-think stuff, so
>> >> what would I know? Sorry to be so slow.
>> >
>> >Does it require some special kind of training to understand that an
>> >entirely random world would be devoid of observers?
>>
>> No, but it seems to require a special sort of training to fail to
>> understand that the existence of orderly observers does not entail the
>> existence of order in the observations. You have to presuppose some
>> sort of order covering the data and the observer.
>
>Observer and observed cannot be separated.
Says one class of metaphysics's (what's the plural?) But the
assumption that observer and observed are part of a single orderly
whole is *MASSIVELY GOTHICALLY HUMUNGOUSLY * metaphysical, innit?
>> I repeat the point - if you are going to jettison the "ordinary
>> sceintist's" metaphysics, you have to build your -d-n model on a
>> *presupposition* that order (sometimes) exists in the data.
>
>If the only thing being jettisoned is an unsupportable prejudice then
>that's just a tidy-up job as far as I'm concerned. The existence of order
>is not a prejudice but an observed fact, and so cannot be jettisoned.
I repeat. General order is not observed, it is assumed. Order in
specific cases is observed but only by applying methods which
presuppose general order.
>
>
>> The binary
>> string 01010101010101010101 is orderly but I can only know that
>> because I can spot the repetition by eye and/or quantify if as an
>> auto-correlation function and then apply probability theory. The
>> chances of such a sequence being derived from randomness is small.
>> That's the way we recognize order - it presupposes probability theory.
>> Thus it is superbly successful in an orderly world or in a system
>> which assumes order, but it cannot possibly justify the inclusion of
>> probability theory a priori. In that respect, d-n is as metaphysical
>> as any other fairy story.
>
>You know that the binary string is orderly because you are an ordered
>system yourself.
I said "I can spot the repetition by eye". No doubt about that. BUT -
to go from noticing the pattern to imputing order to it is to say it's
unlikely to have arisen by chance. Which requires probability theory,
which assumes an orderly world. Thus the order I can see does not
justify the assumption of general order, no matter how often it is
seen.
>> >Your sarcasm is neither helpful nor productive.
>>
>> I find your demands to justfy my curiousity equally unhelpful and they
>> preceded and are causal to my response. Be a little less personal and
>> you won't have anything to whinge about.
>
>I'm here to share my thoughts so that any errors can be eradicated -- it
>doesn't get any more personal than that. If you're here for some other
>reason then we've been talking at cross purposes.
>
>
>
>> >There are no trespassers in this group -- all are welcome. Now how about
>> >addressing the core question here: why is this realism thing such an
>> >issue for you?
>>
>> I explained why in my first post. When you've re-read it, tell me what
>> bearing this has on my enquiry.
>
>The initial poster in a thread does not own the thread, and is not in a
>position to demand that the follow-up posters stick to the subject. Threads
>go where they will. My first reply in this thread was to JJ, whereupon you
>invited me into debate. I'm in this thread to pursue my own questions, as
>well as to take an interest in yours.
Don't be silly. I'm not saying "stick to the subject", I'm saying that
the answer to your question can be found in my very first post.
Luke Sineath
"John Wilkins" <john...@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gd9646.qumo7f1j2kov2N%john...@wilkins.id.au...
Ah, it's Dr. John now. Congratulations!
John Wilkins
<bows>
>
> I was wondering if you'd turn up, John ;p
Turn up? I am Always Here.
>
> Anyway, I do not have a problem with philosophically educated people,
> or I would not have aired this issue in this <cough> erudite company.
I said issue, not problem :-)
>
> > But he does take
> >an interesting position (so far as I can tell, it's a kind of
> >neo-Platonic hermeneutics),
>
> You learn something new every day. Previous person I argued with said
> I was a pomo. (For the benefit of readers who use a small font, that's
> P O M O, not P O R N O. I might be a porno instead, but I don't think
> so.) Person before that said I was a heretic, person before that told
> me I was sending computer viruses. People do get some very funny
> ideas.
They can all be true.
>
> > and it is fun to debate with him sometimes.
>
> Ha! You've only had *one* debate with me.
QL doesn't distinguish "Some" from "one", although I gather there are
versions with an "Exactly-one" scope operator.
John Wilkins
> > Dr John S. Wilkins, www.wilkins.id.au
> > "I never meet anyone who is not perplexed what to do with their
> > children" --Charles Darwin to Syms Covington, February 22, 1857
>
> Ah, it's Dr. John now. Congratulations!
Yep. Newly minted. I have been doctored, but not doffed yet. Thingy has
been finished and now we are trying to turn that sow's ear into a silk
purse (sorry, book).
Derek Potter
>Luke Sineath <l.v.sine...@att.net> wrote:
>
>> > Dr John S. Wilkins, www.wilkins.id.au
>> > "I never meet anyone who is not perplexed what to do with their
>> > children" --Charles Darwin to Syms Covington, February 22, 1857
>>
>> Ah, it's Dr. John now. Congratulations!
>
>Yep. Newly minted. I have been doctored, but not doffed yet. Thingy has
>been finished and now we are trying to turn that sow's ear into a silk
>purse (sorry, book).
<boggle>
Limited edition of course.
Derek Potter
>> > But he does take
>> >an interesting position (so far as I can tell, it's a kind of
>> >neo-Platonic hermeneutics),
>>
>> You learn something new every day. Previous person I argued with said
>> I was a pomo. (For the benefit of readers who use a small font, that's
>> P O M O, not P O R N O. I might be a porno instead, but I don't think
>> so.) Person before that said I was a heretic, person before that told
>> me I was sending computer viruses.
>>People do get some very funny ideas.
>They can all be true.
Logically, not actually.
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >
> >Because you may have spotted something that I've overlooked.
>
> A worthy hypothesis, but the putative issue should be tackled on its
> own merits without psychoanalysis of the author. (Me anti-post-modern,
> OK?)
No psychoanalysis going on here -- just an honest search for the limits to
reason. Reason is a form of behavior that has evolved for its utility in
helping us negotiate our environment, and I suspect that it oversteps its
remit when applied to this sort of question. I'm interested in arguments to
the contrary.
> >Anybody that tells you to shut up and not ask interesting questions
> >deserves to get their ass kicked, but I certainly haven't. As for the
> >accusation of cross-examination, I was at every stage giving an
> >admission of my ignorance and my desire to find an answer to this
> >interesting question -- *why does it matter*?
>
> As in "Why don't you just do the science and stop worrying about all
> this metaphysical crap?" ?
Don't be silly. My colorful use of language in this question doesn't reduce
to "shut up and don't ask interesting questions" unless the hearer has a
particular problem with sensitivity. And before you turn the point around
and accuse me of insensitivity, there is no shortage of insensitive posters
here even by my standards, so get used to it or don't stick around here too
long unless you enjoy that sort of thing.
> >I was addressing your claim that "*because* we presuppose order in the
> >data we find it". We don't find order simply because we presuppose it --
> >we find it because it's already there, and if it were not already there
> >then we wouldn't be here to look for it.
>
> Presupposing order is necessary, obviously it is not sufficient. What
> I'm saying is a lot simpler if you consider the alternative: could you
> discover order without presupposing it? Hence my example.
I'm arguing that we can conclude that order exists *deductively*, from our
own existence as observers, without recourse to any presuppositions.
> >> >Does it require some special kind of training to understand that an
> >> >entirely random world would be devoid of observers?
> >>
> >> No, but it seems to require a special sort of training to fail to
> >> understand that the existence of orderly observers does not entail the
> >> existence of order in the observations. You have to presuppose some
> >> sort of order covering the data and the observer.
> >
> >Observer and observed cannot be separated.
>
> Says one class of metaphysics's (what's the plural?) But the
> assumption that observer and observed are part of a single orderly
> whole is *MASSIVELY GOTHICALLY HUMUNGOUSLY * metaphysical, innit?
I don't think so -- unless I've misunderstood, it seems that it is forced
upon us by quantum mechanics. However, my argument has little to do with
that, and more to do with the definitions of these words -- there can be no
observations without observers, and no observers without observations.
There must be sufficient order for this *pairing* to arise.
> >> I repeat the point - if you are going to jettison the "ordinary
> >> sceintist's" metaphysics, you have to build your -d-n model on a
> >> *presupposition* that order (sometimes) exists in the data.
> >
> >If the only thing being jettisoned is an unsupportable prejudice then
> >that's just a tidy-up job as far as I'm concerned. The existence of
> >order is not a prejudice but an observed fact, and so cannot be
> >jettisoned.
>
> I repeat. General order is not observed, it is assumed. Order in
> specific cases is observed but only by applying methods which
> presuppose general order.
Repetition does not confer veracity.
> >> The binary
> >> string 01010101010101010101 is orderly but I can only know that
> >> because I can spot the repetition by eye and/or quantify if as an
> >> auto-correlation function and then apply probability theory. The
> >> chances of such a sequence being derived from randomness is small.
> >> That's the way we recognize order - it presupposes probability theory.
> >> Thus it is superbly successful in an orderly world or in a system
> >> which assumes order, but it cannot possibly justify the inclusion of
> >> probability theory a priori. In that respect, d-n is as metaphysical
> >> as any other fairy story.
> >
> >You know that the binary string is orderly because you are an ordered
> >system yourself.
>
> I said "I can spot the repetition by eye". No doubt about that. BUT -
> to go from noticing the pattern to imputing order to it is to say it's
> unlikely to have arisen by chance. Which requires probability theory,
> which assumes an orderly world. Thus the order I can see does not
> justify the assumption of general order, no matter how often it is
> seen.
You seem to consistently leave yourself out of the picture --
*you, the 'imputer', must be an ordered system*.
There can be no probability theory without a theorizer.
You may be right that the order you see cannot justify the assumption of
general order, but the order that you *are* certainly does.
To move the conversation on a stage, we at least agree (I think) that order
does exist and that this is perplexing in itself. Your contention seems to
be that it demands a realistic interpretation, mine that this state of
perplexity is merely a consequence of a natural mode of behavior (i.e.
reason) that has evolved to a point wherein it is out of place. The only
way to know for sure is to experience that reality itself. Plato seems to
have had such an experience, leading him to propose the existence of a
world of immutable Forms, but even if we take Plato's word it still leaves
us with the question of why the Formal realm is ordered -- do we need
recourse to a meta-realism? Plotinus, who regarded Plato as the master,
also seems to have had such an experience and, for the greater part,
accepted Plato's contention that the Formal realm is immutable. However, in
Ennead V.4.8 he seems to deviate somewhat (Armstrong footnotes: "This
passage is one of the most difficult in the Enneads to reconcile with the
imposing descriptions of the changeless eternity of Intellect which we find
elsewhere, notably in [III.7.1-6]. Plotinus here seems to be speaking
directly from his own experience, without considering the metaphysical
implications.") If the Formal realm is mutable then would we need to put
yet another sticking-plaster in place?
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:t3qd909bkd02tv3db...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >> Why does my answer matter so much *to you*?
>> >
>> >Because you may have spotted something that I've overlooked.
>>
>> A worthy hypothesis, but the putative issue should be tackled on its
>> own merits without psychoanalysis of the author. (Me anti-post-modern,
>> OK?)
>
>No psychoanalysis going on here -- just an honest search for the limits to
>reason. Reason is a form of behavior that has evolved for its utility in
>helping us negotiate our environment, and I suspect that it oversteps its
>remit when applied to this sort of question. I'm interested in arguments to
>the contrary.
Reason, as human behaviour, is highly abstracted - in particular it
has discovered logic. All *intelligible* discussion is predicated on
logic being absolute although there is much relativist crap that
passes for propositions but in fact is random semi-grammatical
concatonations of parts of speech. I doubt whether logical argument
has a limited remit, even if our brains get out of their depth. Logic
is essentially a virtual machine to do what our common-sense reason
baulks at.
>> >Anybody that tells you to shut up and not ask interesting questions
>> >deserves to get their ass kicked, but I certainly haven't. As for the
>> >accusation of cross-examination, I was at every stage giving an
>> >admission of my ignorance and my desire to find an answer to this
>> >interesting question -- *why does it matter*?
>>
>> As in "Why don't you just do the science and stop worrying about all
>> this metaphysical crap?" ?
>
>Don't be silly. My colorful use of language in this question doesn't reduce
>to "shut up and don't ask interesting questions" unless the hearer has a
>particular problem with sensitivity. And before you turn the point around
>and accuse me of insensitivity, there is no shortage of insensitive posters
>here even by my standards, so get used to it or don't stick around here too
>long unless you enjoy that sort of thing.
Sigh. One of my side shows on Usenet got me a second place in the
alt.flame yearly awards. I regard insensitivity as an art form. But
it's got to be done properly.
>> >I was addressing your claim that "*because* we presuppose order in the
>> >data we find it". We don't find order simply because we presuppose it --
>> >we find it because it's already there, and if it were not already there
>> >then we wouldn't be here to look for it.
>>
>> Presupposing order is necessary, obviously it is not sufficient. What
>> I'm saying is a lot simpler if you consider the alternative: could you
>> discover order without presupposing it? Hence my example.
>
>I'm arguing that we can conclude that order exists *deductively*, from our
>own existence as observers, without recourse to any presuppositions.
Deduction presupposes order. You need to distinguish between overall
order and specific order in a given sceintific investigation.
Deduction - on the scientific data - works perfectly well. But it
relies on the assumption of order in the data. One's own existence
a) may not be orderly
b) does not entail order in other things
>> >> >Does it require some special kind of training to understand that an
>> >> >entirely random world would be devoid of observers?
>> >>
>> >> No, but it seems to require a special sort of training to fail to
>> >> understand that the existence of orderly observers does not entail the
>> >> existence of order in the observations. You have to presuppose some
>> >> sort of order covering the data and the observer.
>> >
>> >Observer and observed cannot be separated.
>>
>> Says one class of metaphysics's (what's the plural?) But the
>> assumption that observer and observed are part of a single orderly
>> whole is *MASSIVELY GOTHICALLY HUMUNGOUSLY * metaphysical, innit?
>
>I don't think so -- unless I've misunderstood, it seems that it is forced
>upon us by quantum mechanics.
I have also had *that* argument before. Bohr and Co concocted an
interpretation of QM which, in one version, requires an observer in
order to make an observation. According to what I have read, this has
been experimentally disproved by using machines to do the observation.
Quantum mysticism became orthodoxy because the leading scientists were
anti-realist: or at any rate their interpretation of a physical entity
as simultaneously diffuse and compact is self-contradictory - which,
of course, entails that I am the Pope and you are William the
Conquerer.
>However, my argument has little to do with
>that, and more to do with the definitions of these words -- there can be no
>observations without observers, and no observers without observations.
>There must be sufficient order for this *pairing* to arise.
That pairing is a logical consequence of your definitions. Not
negotiable. However, the order we are discussing is an order within
the collection of observations itself:
Apples fell off trees yesterday
And the day before
And the day before that.
Can be deduce that they will fall tomorrow? Nope. But we can posit a
law that apples fall and retrodict yesterday's observations from the
previous two days'. So we adopt this law and *by induction* predict
that they will fall tomorrow. That's common sense n-d. But the order
we have discovered and applied relies on there being a general rule of
nature, not merely of logic and definitions, that "what seemed to be a
law in the past will continue to be a law in the future". That law
cannot be deduced and the only way to confirm it, even by induction,
is to start all over again and see whether law-defining (as described
by d-n) is a successful method. So we find:
Law 1 was posited and it works
Law 2 was posited and it works
Law 3 was posited and it works
From which we can, as usual, deduce nothing though we can use
induction to predict that the next law discovered by competent
scientists will probably work. Only this induction requires a meta-law
governing "laws". We need to introduce an unjustified bit of magic
which assures us that "Empirical law-governing rules which worked
yesterday will continue to work in future". That's *not* the same
thing as saying that the laws themselves are permanent, it's saying
that the rules which govern that permanency are permanent.
It's only neccessary to create this heirarchy of laws and laws that
govern laws because of the silly philosophical game which claims to
remove such metaphysics from the model of science. Given a working
metaphysics, like naive realism, there's no problem, but if we suspend
all metaphysics, we find the infinite regress appears - and at no step
is there any justification for assuming that inductive law/theory
creation is going to work.
>> >> I repeat the point - if you are going to jettison the "ordinary
>> >> sceintist's" metaphysics, you have to build your -d-n model on a
>> >> *presupposition* that order (sometimes) exists in the data.
>> >
>> >If the only thing being jettisoned is an unsupportable prejudice then
>> >that's just a tidy-up job as far as I'm concerned. The existence of
>> >order is not a prejudice but an observed fact, and so cannot be
>> >jettisoned.
>>
>> I repeat. General order is not observed, it is assumed. Order in
>> specific cases is observed but only by applying methods which
>> presuppose general order.
>
>Repetition does not confer veracity.
No, but sometimes it helps when one's opponent has missed the point.
>> >> The binary
>> >> string 01010101010101010101 is orderly but I can only know that
>> >> because I can spot the repetition by eye and/or quantify if as an
>> >> auto-correlation function and then apply probability theory. The
>> >> chances of such a sequence being derived from randomness is small.
>> >> That's the way we recognize order - it presupposes probability theory.
>> >> Thus it is superbly successful in an orderly world or in a system
>> >> which assumes order, but it cannot possibly justify the inclusion of
>> >> probability theory a priori. In that respect, d-n is as metaphysical
>> >> as any other fairy story.
>> >
>> >You know that the binary string is orderly because you are an ordered
>> >system yourself.
>>
>> I said "I can spot the repetition by eye". No doubt about that. BUT -
>> to go from noticing the pattern to imputing order to it is to say it's
>> unlikely to have arisen by chance. Which requires probability theory,
>> which assumes an orderly world. Thus the order I can see does not
>> justify the assumption of general order, no matter how often it is
>> seen.
>
>You seem to consistently leave yourself out of the picture --
>*you, the 'imputer', must be an ordered system*.
>There can be no probability theory without a theorizer.
>You may be right that the order you see cannot justify the assumption of
>general order, but the order that you *are* certainly does.
I do not agree. I can only know that I am orderly by objectifying
myself and observing the order as I step back. Which is again to drag
in a metaphysical assumption that my own orderliness is cast in stone.
Or that the fact I have been orderly in the past entails that I will
continue to be so. It's the same infinte regress.
>To move the conversation on a stage, we at least agree (I think) that order
>does exist and that this is perplexing in itself.
I wouldn't say "perplexing", The word "reassurring" comes to mind :)
>Your contention seems to
>be that it demands a realistic interpretation, mine that this state of
>perplexity is merely a consequence of a natural mode of behavior (i.e.
>reason) that has evolved to a point wherein it is out of place. The only
>way to know for sure is to experience that reality itself. Plato seems to
>have had such an experience, leading him to propose the existence of a
>world of immutable Forms, but even if we take Plato's word it still leaves
>us with the question of why the Formal realm is ordered -- do we need
>recourse to a meta-realism?
Yes! But only because we have taken Plato's word for it. Otherwise we
may as well stick with common or garden realism. :)
>Plotinus, who regarded Plato as the master,
>also seems to have had such an experience and, for the greater part,
>accepted Plato's contention that the Formal realm is immutable. However, in
>Ennead V.4.8 he seems to deviate somewhat (Armstrong footnotes: "This
>passage is one of the most difficult in the Enneads to reconcile with the
>imposing descriptions of the changeless eternity of Intellect which we find
>elsewhere, notably in [III.7.1-6]. Plotinus here seems to be speaking
>directly from his own experience, without considering the metaphysical
>implications.") If the Formal realm is mutable then would we need to put
>yet another sticking-plaster in place?
No idea. Don't believe Wilkins when he says I'm a neo-Platonist. I'm
dead ignorant, just dabbling in this scientific realism thing, no good
quoting ancient parchments at me :) I can't attach a lot of meaning
to terms like "realm". Things either exist or they don't.
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >to reason. Reason is a form of behavior that has evolved for its utility
> >in helping us negotiate our environment, and I suspect that it oversteps
> >its remit when applied to this sort of question. I'm interested in
> >arguments to the contrary.
>
> Reason, as human behaviour, is highly abstracted - in particular it
> has discovered logic. All *intelligible* discussion is predicated on
> logic being absolute although there is much relativist crap that
> passes for propositions but in fact is random semi-grammatical
> concatonations of parts of speech. I doubt whether logical argument
> has a limited remit, even if our brains get out of their depth. Logic
> is essentially a virtual machine to do what our common-sense reason
> baulks at.
The logically possible is a much wider domain than the physically
possible, and only prejudice can exploit the extra elbow-room it allows.
Realism is a logical possibility, but so is idealism.
> >I'm arguing that we can conclude that order exists *deductively*, from
> >our own existence as observers, without recourse to any presuppositions.
>
> Deduction presupposes order. You need to distinguish between overall
> order and specific order in a given sceintific investigation.
So we can deduce from our own existence as observers that *overall order*
exist, but not that specific order in a given scientific investigation
exists? No problem -- if we are investigating white noise generated by a
Zener diode then we won't find any order in it. This seems to be a trivial
comment though.
> Deduction - on the scientific data - works perfectly well. But it
> relies on the assumption of order in the data.
So if we make no assumptions about order in the data then we will never
discover any? Order in a set of data often jumps out at you even when
you're not looking for it.
> One's own existence
> a) may not be orderly
> b) does not entail order in other things
Are you claiming that ones own existence would still be possible in the
absence of sufficient order to be an observer?
> >> >Observer and observed cannot be separated.
> >>
> >> Says one class of metaphysics's (what's the plural?) But the
> >> assumption that observer and observed are part of a single orderly
> >> whole is *MASSIVELY GOTHICALLY HUMUNGOUSLY * metaphysical, innit?
> >
> >I don't think so -- unless I've misunderstood, it seems that it is
> >forced upon us by quantum mechanics.
>
> I have also had *that* argument before. Bohr and Co concocted an
> interpretation of QM which, in one version, requires an observer in
> order to make an observation. According to what I have read, this has
> been experimentally disproved by using machines to do the observation.
> Quantum mysticism became orthodoxy because the leading scientists were
> anti-realist: or at any rate their interpretation of a physical entity
> as simultaneously diffuse and compact is self-contradictory - which,
> of course, entails that I am the Pope and you are William the
> Conquerer.
I was referring to EPR and to Bell's inequality, tested by Alain Aspect
confirming that hidden variables cannot operate locally.
There's only an infinite regress if you insist on absolute certainty
somewhere in the model. My claim is that this demand for certainty is a
biological trait that is out of place in the realm of the logically
possible, and should confine itself to the realm of the physically
possible. Naive realism certainly satisfies that need and restores the
peace, but only at the cost of prejudice.
> >You seem to consistently leave yourself out of the picture --
> >*you, the 'imputer', must be an ordered system*.
> >There can be no probability theory without a theorizer.
> >You may be right that the order you see cannot justify the assumption of
> >general order, but the order that you *are* certainly does.
>
> I do not agree. I can only know that I am orderly by objectifying
> myself and observing the order as I step back.
If there were no order in the data of experience then they would not
support a model within which the concept of an observer may arise (this
"stepping back" you speak of). Order can be deduced from the fact that
there is something capable of stepping back.
> Which is again to drag
> in a metaphysical assumption that my own orderliness is cast in stone.
> Or that the fact I have been orderly in the past entails that I will
> continue to be so. It's the same infinte regress.
If I need reassurance that I will continue to exist, and worry that
induction cannot provide that reassurance, and quite rightly wish to avoid
an infinite regress, then I may take refuge in prejudice to assuage that
need, but I suspect that the problem lies at the very start -- i.e. with
the need for certainty.
> >To move the conversation on a stage, we at least agree (I think) that
> >order does exist and that this is perplexing in itself.
>
> I wouldn't say "perplexing", The word "reassurring" comes to mind :)
I find it both perplexing and reassuring.
> >Your contention seems to
> >be that it demands a realistic interpretation, mine that this state of
> >perplexity is merely a consequence of a natural mode of behavior (i.e.
> >reason) that has evolved to a point wherein it is out of place. The only
> >way to know for sure is to experience that reality itself. Plato seems
> >to have had such an experience, leading him to propose the existence of
> >a world of immutable Forms, but even if we take Plato's word it still
> >leaves us with the question of why the Formal realm is ordered -- do we
> >need recourse to a meta-realism?
>
> Yes! But only because we have taken Plato's word for it. Otherwise we
> may as well stick with common or garden realism. :)
Which, without experiential verification, is just another prejudice.
> >Plotinus, who regarded Plato as the master,
> >also seems to have had such an experience and, for the greater part,
> >accepted Plato's contention that the Formal realm is immutable. However,
> >in Ennead V.4.8 he seems to deviate somewhat (Armstrong footnotes: "This
> >passage is one of the most difficult in the Enneads to reconcile with
> >the imposing descriptions of the changeless eternity of Intellect which
> >we find elsewhere, notably in [III.7.1-6]. Plotinus here seems to be
> >speaking directly from his own experience, without considering the
> >metaphysical implications.") If the Formal realm is mutable then would
> >we need to put yet another sticking-plaster in place?
>
> No idea. Don't believe Wilkins when he says I'm a neo-Platonist. I'm
> dead ignorant, just dabbling in this scientific realism thing, no good
> quoting ancient parchments at me :) I can't attach a lot of meaning
> to terms like "realm". Things either exist or they don't.
I wonder how much meaning can be attached to terms like "real".
Derek Potter
>No idea. Don't believe Wilkins when he says I'm a neo-Platonist. I'm
>dead ignorant, just dabbling in this scientific realism thing, no good
>quoting ancient parchments at me :) I can't attach a lot of meaning
>to terms like "realm". Things either exist or they don't.
Of course, "realm" could be regarded as non-ontological expression of
realism.
It is, after all, "realism" with the "is" removed.
darth_versive
The short answer, I think, is that it's human nature to feel such a
need (or to find a way to overcome such a need). The long answer
would require more research into the cognitive process, regarding the
nature of subjectivity (which I've been advocating for a long time
now).
DV
Keynes
Physical reality is basically a mental construct as shown by the
changing 'verities' of scientific hypothesis. The primitive view is
that physics is reality itself, and all human experience must be
linked to physical causes, no matter how bizarre and labyrinthine
the process may become. But there definitely is a linkage between
mind and (physical) matter. (As well as significant disconnects.)
External physical reality is not different from the mind. Neuroscience
finds link after link in physical brain structure, reducing mind to a
convoluted chemical process, even though we don't experience it
as such. Yet all minds are nothing if not reflections of physical reality.
There is nothing in a mind but sensations of the 'otherness' of physical
reality. We can all see the same things, and these serve as the universal
mind-store. Even private individual thoughts, emotions, and desires are
entirely about this external mind-store. External reality is internalized
and called the 'mind'. Since we are fascinated by the features of
physical reality in space-time, we make a distinction between inside
and outside, and limit the private internal mind to the rigid parameters
of physical time and space. This can't be logically justified, but it is
the common consensus of natural social minds. (If they looked
directly into their minds rather than believing what they are told, they
might find the laws of physics to be limited primitive approximations.)
I think science is fascinating but that it's claims to ultimate truth are
completely unsupportable. Science is descriptive of processes but
it can make no claims as to what the processes actually may be,
and it carefully ignores the question of what the processes may Mean
For Us, preferring a cautious meaninglessness that has seeped into
the public social mind with demoralizing effects. Physics is basically like
discovering the rules of chess, an absorbing game with thrills and chills.
It's a way to pass the time more constructively than with drink or drugs,
but misleading in it's direction, taking everyone's eye off the ball.
The only real human aim is happiness, and no number of computers
and cell phones will ever accomplish that. When the streets are all
made of gold, we'll wheel and deal for troy ounces of dirt. We all
look 'outside' in physical reality for the satisfactions that can only exist
'inside' in the mind. Why not work on the 'inside'?
Where else can our treaure ever be?
Derek Potter
I sthis a trap being set by Andy? Surely the only sensible way to
answer his question is to put our needs into the context of answering
interesting philosophical questions - thus squeezing human nature out
of the answer, rather than putting it centre stage.
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:gd6f90dua1r35qm9l...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >No psychoanalysis going on here -- just an honest search for the limits
>> >to reason. Reason is a form of behavior that has evolved for its utility
>> >in helping us negotiate our environment, and I suspect that it oversteps
>> >its remit when applied to this sort of question. I'm interested in
>> >arguments to the contrary.
>>
>> Reason, as human behaviour, is highly abstracted - in particular it
>> has discovered logic. All *intelligible* discussion is predicated on
>> logic being absolute although there is much relativist crap that
>> passes for propositions but in fact is random semi-grammatical
>> concatonations of parts of speech. I doubt whether logical argument
>> has a limited remit, even if our brains get out of their depth. Logic
>> is essentially a virtual machine to do what our common-sense reason
>> baulks at.
>
>The logically possible is a much wider domain than the physically
>possible, and only prejudice can exploit the extra elbow-room it allows.
>Realism is a logical possibility, but so is idealism.
Yes?
>> >I'm arguing that we can conclude that order exists *deductively*, from
>> >our own existence as observers, without recourse to any presuppositions.
>>
>> Deduction presupposes order. You need to distinguish between overall
>> order and specific order in a given sceintific investigation.
>
>So we can deduce from our own existence as observers that *overall order*
>exist, but not that specific order in a given scientific investigation
>exists? No problem -- if we are investigating white noise generated by a
>Zener diode then we won't find any order in it. This seems to be a trivial
>comment though.
No, I said the opposite. We cannot deduce either. Induction tells us
that specific order exists.
The noise in a Zener diode is stochastic and as such shows order. We
would be very surprised if a bog-standard noise diode consistently
sang The Red River Valley. The fact it only does so very rarely can be
explained inductively - zener noise is understood quite well and the
mechanisms have proved reliable in the past. It can also be deduced if
you accept probability theory as axiomatic. Unfortunately probability
theory imputes order to nature, or consistency to observations of
nature, either of which I take to be metaphysical - thus induction is
incorrigibly metaphysical. I am, incidentally, quite hoping you will
convince me that it isn't then we can all go home, but I fear you will
not do so.
>> Deduction - on the scientific data - works perfectly well. But it
>> relies on the assumption of order in the data.
>
>So if we make no assumptions about order in the data then we will never
>discover any? Order in a set of data often jumps out at you even when
>you're not looking for it.
Because you are an order-spotting machine whose abilities are caused
by an orderly evolutionary past. To set your ability on a rational
basis, you need to justify trusting your instinct. That is why I
suggested the simple binary string: it is easy to spot the order
mathematically by applying an auto-correlation function.
>> One's own existence
>> a) may not be orderly
>> b) does not entail order in other things
>
>Are you claiming that ones own existence would still be possible in the
>absence of sufficient order to be an observer?
Physically of course not. Logically, though, yes - I could be a random
experience in the void.
>> >> >Observer and observed cannot be separated.
>> >>
>> >> Says one class of metaphysics's (what's the plural?) But the
>> >> assumption that observer and observed are part of a single orderly
>> >> whole is *MASSIVELY GOTHICALLY HUMUNGOUSLY * metaphysical, innit?
>> >
>> >I don't think so -- unless I've misunderstood, it seems that it is
>> >forced upon us by quantum mechanics.
>>
>> I have also had *that* argument before. Bohr and Co concocted an
>> interpretation of QM which, in one version, requires an observer in
>> order to make an observation. According to what I have read, this has
>> been experimentally disproved by using machines to do the observation.
>> Quantum mysticism became orthodoxy because the leading scientists were
>> anti-realist: or at any rate their interpretation of a physical entity
>> as simultaneously diffuse and compact is self-contradictory - which,
>> of course, entails that I am the Pope and you are William the
>> Conquerer.
>
>I was referring to EPR and to Bell's inequality, tested by Alain Aspect
>confirming that hidden variables cannot operate locally.
Which is counter-intuitive but not self-contradictory. "Things"
(quantum systems) are non-local. Interpreting this fact as meaning
that nature contradicts itself is way ott.
Which is a more polite way of saying "Don't ask too many questions" :)
Why should asking for justification of a theory be out of place? It is
a universal presupposition for discussion that one can continue until
one reaches axioms.
>> >You seem to consistently leave yourself out of the picture --
>> >*you, the 'imputer', must be an ordered system*.
>> >There can be no probability theory without a theorizer.
>> >You may be right that the order you see cannot justify the assumption of
>> >general order, but the order that you *are* certainly does.
>>
>> I do not agree. I can only know that I am orderly by objectifying
>> myself and observing the order as I step back.
>
>If there were no order in the data of experience then they would not
>support a model within which the concept of an observer may arise (this
>"stepping back" you speak of). Order can be deduced from the fact that
>there is something capable of stepping back.
Only by introducing a metaphysical axiom that auto-observers have to
be orderly.
>> Which is again to drag
>> in a metaphysical assumption that my own orderliness is cast in stone.
>> Or that the fact I have been orderly in the past entails that I will
>> continue to be so. It's the same infinte regress.
>
>If I need reassurance that I will continue to exist, and worry that
>induction cannot provide that reassurance, and quite rightly wish to avoid
>an infinite regress, then I may take refuge in prejudice to assuage that
>need, but I suspect that the problem lies at the very start -- i.e. with
>the need for certainty.
I happen to be allergic to post-modern arguments which answer logical
points by referring to psychological needs. Ignoring the "needs" crap,
your point is left simply asserting that infinite regresses are an
acceptable explanation in logic.
>> >To move the conversation on a stage, we at least agree (I think) that
>> >order does exist and that this is perplexing in itself.
>>
>> I wouldn't say "perplexing", The word "reassurring" comes to mind :)
>
>I find it both perplexing and reassuring.
>
>> >Your contention seems to
>> >be that it demands a realistic interpretation, mine that this state of
>> >perplexity is merely a consequence of a natural mode of behavior (i.e.
>> >reason) that has evolved to a point wherein it is out of place. The only
>> >way to know for sure is to experience that reality itself. Plato seems
>> >to have had such an experience, leading him to propose the existence of
>> >a world of immutable Forms, but even if we take Plato's word it still
>> >leaves us with the question of why the Formal realm is ordered -- do we
>> >need recourse to a meta-realism?
>>
>> Yes! But only because we have taken Plato's word for it. Otherwise we
>> may as well stick with common or garden realism. :)
>
>Which, without experiential verification, is just another prejudice.
Exactly.
>> >Plotinus, who regarded Plato as the master,
>> >also seems to have had such an experience and, for the greater part,
>> >accepted Plato's contention that the Formal realm is immutable. However,
>> >in Ennead V.4.8 he seems to deviate somewhat (Armstrong footnotes: "This
>> >passage is one of the most difficult in the Enneads to reconcile with
>> >the imposing descriptions of the changeless eternity of Intellect which
>> >we find elsewhere, notably in [III.7.1-6]. Plotinus here seems to be
>> >speaking directly from his own experience, without considering the
>> >metaphysical implications.") If the Formal realm is mutable then would
>> >we need to put yet another sticking-plaster in place?
>>
>> No idea. Don't believe Wilkins when he says I'm a neo-Platonist. I'm
>> dead ignorant, just dabbling in this scientific realism thing, no good
>> quoting ancient parchments at me :) I can't attach a lot of meaning
>> to terms like "realm". Things either exist or they don't.
>
>I wonder how much meaning can be attached to terms like "real".
That could be a productive question. I think there may be a case for a
taxonomy of ontologies. Naive realism and "we could be brains in a
vat" realism are very close.
However, the problem with the word "real" is that it has no clear
opposite. Anti-real? Un-real? Non-real? Real-neutral?
I suspect the word, when used by philosophers, is just a mask to hide
a common, instinctive belief that there is something "out there" of
which we are part. Theories that generate significantly different
emotional responses, like saying "there's a world of perfect forms",
or "it's all in your mind" get different labels.
Derek Potter
God.
darth_versive
Your opinion is noted.
DV
jillar...@webtv.net
Derek. Two additional considerations with the consistency problem in
scientific observation. Inconsistency may also be real. And theoretical
entities may be real based on limited observations of the object.
Science, I think, wants in on these issues and that means putting aside
the constrictions of naive realism:
First, science has found new inconsistent data in the cosmos. There is
an estimation that we do not have a clue to about 70% of the matter in
the cosmos under our current science due to its lack of consistency. Its
possible that we could run out of observations of consistency in the
universe. But then should that stop science from taking on the challenge
inconsistency? Can we not think that the cosmos might not be 100%
congruent or consistent and have a science deal with it? How then should
science deal with 'real' inconsistency?
Second, the assumption of the 'real' in observations for science is a
problem with very distant signals coming from light sources. Most
notably are observations of light sources we call distant stars. It is a
problem because it is light, which is a problem itself in near field
observation, and its highly theoretical when applied to very distant
observations. Because of this it seems to me we must allow for the
possibilities of theoretical entities to be a study of science. They are
limited as observations. Nonetheless, they are real. They are not
entirely observed as real in a sense because they are also founded on a
theory. The term theoretical entity is one I would say is contrary to
what you say that science should study. But there is this grey area that
should be open for challenge in science.
And maybe this two-sided constriction of the real versus the theoretical
debate is more about what challenge science should be up to in dealing
with the basic question. The universe is one tough nut to crack. Why not
mount an allied attack? One or the other camp alone will end up in a
corner with only a portion of the answers.
Jillar
Derek Potter
>
>Derek. Two additional considerations with the consistency problem in
>scientific observation. Inconsistency may also be real. And theoretical
>entities may be real based on limited observations of the object.
>Science, I think, wants in on these issues and that means putting aside
>the constrictions of naive realism:
>
>First, science has found new inconsistent data in the cosmos. There is
>an estimation that we do not have a clue to about 70% of the matter in
>the cosmos under our current science due to its lack of consistency.
Not sure what you mean by lack of consistency. If anything it's highly
consistent - it turns up in the rotation of galaxies, it turns up in
gravitational lensing, it turns up in the rate of expansion. Of course
we don't know what it is - and we can't be sure our present
understanding is sufficient. But how is that relevant to the fact that
unrelated phenomena keep being observed that point to dark matter?
> Its
>possible that we could run out of observations of consistency in the
>universe. But then should that stop science from taking on the challenge
>inconsistency? Can we not think that the cosmos might not be 100%
>congruent or consistent and have a science deal with it? How then should
>science deal with 'real' inconsistency?
Well if, say, it turned out that a) electrons must have a integral
charge b) they all have one unit of charge c) they all have two units
of charge *then* we have a self-contradiction. Thus the proposition
"electrons have unity charge" would simultaneously be true and not
true. From which any and every proposition follows.
Since I am not the Pope, nor can I fly to the moon, I am inclined to
think that nature does not contradict itself!
So the only way we could run out of observations of consistency would
be if we simply ran out of new stuff to yield better theories. We
could still get plenty of new observations that require no new laws,
but merely confirm (with the usual caveats) what we already know. We
could not observe inconsistency.
>Second, the assumption of the 'real' in observations for science is a
>problem with very distant signals coming from light sources. Most
>notably are observations of light sources we call distant stars. It is a
>problem because it is light, which is a problem itself in near field
>observation, and its highly theoretical when applied to very distant
>observations. Because of this it seems to me we must allow for the
>possibilities of theoretical entities to be a study of science. They are
>limited as observations. Nonetheless, they are real. They are not
>entirely observed as real in a sense because they are also founded on a
>theory. The term theoretical entity is one I would say is contrary to
>what you say that science should study. But there is this grey area that
>should be open for challenge in science.
You have lost me completely. What are these theoretical entities and
where have I said science shouldn't study them?
>And maybe this two-sided constriction of the real versus the theoretical
>debate is more about what challenge science should be up to in dealing
>with the basic question. The universe is one tough nut to crack. Why not
>mount an allied attack? One or the other camp alone will end up in a
>corner with only a portion of the answers.
Again, I haven't the faintest idea what these two camps are.
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >> has discovered logic. All *intelligible* discussion is predicated on
> >> logic being absolute although there is much relativist crap that
> >> passes for propositions but in fact is random semi-grammatical
> >> concatonations of parts of speech. I doubt whether logical argument
> >> has a limited remit, even if our brains get out of their depth. Logic
> >> is essentially a virtual machine to do what our common-sense reason
> >> baulks at.
> >
> >The logically possible is a much wider domain than the physically
> >possible, and only prejudice can exploit the extra elbow-room it allows.
> >Realism is a logical possibility, but so is idealism.
>
> Yes?
"Yes" is an answer in the affirmative. What does the question mark signify
in this case?
> >> >I'm arguing that we can conclude that order exists *deductively*,
> >> >from our own existence as observers, without recourse to any
> >> >presuppositions.
> >>
> >> Deduction presupposes order. You need to distinguish between overall
> >> order and specific order in a given sceintific investigation.
> >
> >So we can deduce from our own existence as observers that *overall
> >order* exist, but not that specific order in a given scientific
> >investigation exists? No problem -- if we are investigating white noise
> >generated by a Zener diode then we won't find any order in it. This
> >seems to be a trivial comment though.
>
> No, I said the opposite. We cannot deduce either. Induction tells us
> that specific order exists.
We couldn't induce our own existence if we didn't already exist to make
that induction.
> The noise in a Zener diode is stochastic and as such shows order. We
> would be very surprised if a bog-standard noise diode consistently
> sang The Red River Valley. The fact it only does so very rarely can be
> explained inductively - zener noise is understood quite well and the
> mechanisms have proved reliable in the past. It can also be deduced if
> you accept probability theory as axiomatic.
Bad example then. The point is lost anyway if it resulted from a
misunderstanding of your comment.
> Unfortunately probability
> theory imputes order to nature, or consistency to observations of
> nature, either of which I take to be metaphysical - thus induction is
> incorrigibly metaphysical. I am, incidentally, quite hoping you will
> convince me that it isn't then we can all go home, but I fear you will
> not do so.
By stipulating a definition of metaphysics such that it includes the brute
fact of order in nature you have ensured that we can't avoid metaphysics by
your definition, and on that basis I wouldn't even attempt to argue that we
can. My claim is that the presence of order is simply an observation, and
that metaphysics only begins when we attempt to account for that order.
> >> Deduction - on the scientific data - works perfectly well. But it
> >> relies on the assumption of order in the data.
> >
> >So if we make no assumptions about order in the data then we will never
> >discover any? Order in a set of data often jumps out at you even when
> >you're not looking for it.
>
> Because you are an order-spotting machine whose abilities are caused
> by an orderly evolutionary past.
Right.
> To set your ability on a rational basis, you need to justify trusting
> your instinct.
Species and their environments operate dynamically upon each other in a
manner that maintains a good match until some kind of catastrophe
intervenes.
> >Are you claiming that ones own existence would still be possible in the
> >absence of sufficient order to be an observer?
>
> Physically of course not. Logically, though, yes - I could be a random
> experience in the void.
To be capable of abstracting the concept of a self one must be more than
just a random experience in the void.
> >I was referring to EPR and to Bell's inequality, tested by Alain Aspect
> >confirming that hidden variables cannot operate locally.
>
> Which is counter-intuitive but not self-contradictory.
Are you switching sides here? I thought you were arguing *against* quantum
wholeness.
> "Things" (quantum systems) are non-local. Interpreting this fact as
> meaning that nature contradicts itself is way ott.
How can one infer from quantum non-locality that nature contradicts itself?
> >There's only an infinite regress if you insist on absolute certainty
> >somewhere in the model. My claim is that this demand for certainty is a
> >biological trait that is out of place in the realm of the logically
> >possible, and should confine itself to the realm of the physically
> >possible. Naive realism certainly satisfies that need and restores the
> >peace, but only at the cost of prejudice.
>
> Which is a more polite way of saying "Don't ask too many questions" :)
Not at all -- it's a way of saying that we should choose our questions
carefully because reason and language are capable of leading us up right
the garden path. As a leisure activity or a source of self-entertainment
such questions are harmless enough, but I'm very wary of any claim that
this is a path to some kind of "truth".
> Why should asking for justification of a theory be out of place? It is
> a universal presupposition for discussion that one can continue until
> one reaches axioms.
Axiom: There is order.
> >If there were no order in the data of experience then they would not
> >support a model within which the concept of an observer may arise (this
> >"stepping back" you speak of). Order can be deduced from the fact that
> >there is something capable of stepping back.
>
> Only by introducing a metaphysical axiom that auto-observers have to
> be orderly.
To be capable of abstracting the concept of a self one must be more than
just a random experience in the void.
> >If I need reassurance that I will continue to exist, and worry that
> >induction cannot provide that reassurance, and quite rightly wish to
> >avoid an infinite regress, then I may take refuge in prejudice to
> >assuage that need, but I suspect that the problem lies at the very
> >start -- i.e. with the need for certainty.
>
> I happen to be allergic to post-modern arguments which answer logical
> points by referring to psychological needs. Ignoring the "needs" crap,
> your point is left simply asserting that infinite regresses are an
> acceptable explanation in logic.
I dislike an infinite regress as much as you do. My claim is that we don't
even get as far as the need to avoid an infinite regress if we recognize
that reason has overstepped its remit in addressing this issue.
> >> Yes! But only because we have taken Plato's word for it. Otherwise we
> >> may as well stick with common or garden realism. :)
> >
> >Which, without experiential verification, is just another prejudice.
>
> Exactly.
Well there's an end to it then :-)
> >I wonder how much meaning can be attached to terms like "real".
>
> That could be a productive question. I think there may be a case for a
> taxonomy of ontologies. Naive realism and "we could be brains in a
> vat" realism are very close.
>
> However, the problem with the word "real" is that it has no clear
> opposite. Anti-real? Un-real? Non-real? Real-neutral?
Artificial? :-)
> I suspect the word, when used by philosophers, is just a mask to hide
> a common, instinctive belief that there is something "out there" of
> which we are part. Theories that generate significantly different
> emotional responses, like saying "there's a world of perfect forms",
> or "it's all in your mind" get different labels.
Different logical possibilities are given different names. It only becomes
prejudice when we reject one or more without justification.
"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
news:d4jf901df2vc5281p...@4ax.com...
>
> >No idea. Don't believe Wilkins when he says I'm a neo-Platonist. I'm
> >dead ignorant, just dabbling in this scientific realism thing, no good
> >quoting ancient parchments at me :) I can't attach a lot of meaning
> >to terms like "realm". Things either exist or they don't.
>
> Of course, "realm" could be regarded as non-ontological expression of
> realism.
>
> It is, after all, "realism" with the "is" removed.
Plato was a realist of a kind (in contrast to nominalism).
"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
news:a1mf90h0t2pb40q7a...@4ax.com...
> darth_versive gets an answer from me...
<snip>
> >The short answer, I think, is that it's human nature to feel such a
> >need (or to find a way to overcome such a need). The long answer
> >would require more research into the cognitive process, regarding the
> >nature of subjectivity (which I've been advocating for a long time
> >now).
>
> I sthis a trap being set by Andy?
No.
> Surely the only sensible way to
> answer his question is to put our needs into the context of answering
> interesting philosophical questions - thus squeezing human nature out
> of the answer, rather than putting it centre stage.
In his book "Mind and Matter" Erwin Schrodinger criticized that position
calling it "objectivation".
John Wilkins
Gosh, I hope not. I want it spread far and wide. At least 1500 copies
sold :-)
--
John Wilkins
Do you disagree? Have I made an error of fact, or of interpretation?
darth_versive
Well, you said that, from your point of view, andy-k is "absolutely
correct." So I just put you down as agreeing with him. And since I
already stated my objections to what he had to say, I didn't feel the
need to comment further.
I'm not really that much into argument, in an academic, philosophical
sense. I usually prefer to just state my position and listen to
others state theirs. After enough discussion with certain
individuals, it often becomes clear to me what those positions are,
and I don't feel a compelling need to try make other people agree with
me.
Instead, I'm more into trying to understand various points of view as
themselves being natural phenomena to be studied and understood
scientifically (according to my own philosophical definition of
science, that is). I feel that such philosophical arguments for their
own sake, or for the sake of trying to convince people to see things
my way, are a distraction from my main priority.
Therefore, though I may disagree with your and andy-k's position in
this matter, I see it as an entirely legitimate position to take. If
it makes sense to you, I have no problem with your holding to it. It
just doesn't coincide with my own philosophical position.
And that's really all I have to say about it at this point. I'll keep
watching and thinking about the various statements being made here and
there, and if there's something I want to say, for one reason or
another, I'll say it.
DV
andy-k
<snip>
> Instead, I'm more into trying to understand various points of view as
> themselves being natural phenomena to be studied and understood
> scientifically (according to my own philosophical definition of
> science, that is).
Do you understand Derek's point of view? Could you explain it to me?
Derek Potter
>Derek Potter <m...@privacy.net> wrote:
>
>> John Wilkins gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >Luke Sineath <l.v.sine...@att.net> wrote:
>> >
>> >> > Dr John S. Wilkins, www.wilkins.id.au
>> >> > "I never meet anyone who is not perplexed what to do with their
>> >> > children" --Charles Darwin to Syms Covington, February 22, 1857
>> >>
>> >> Ah, it's Dr. John now. Congratulations!
>> >
>> >Yep. Newly minted. I have been doctored, but not doffed yet. Thingy has
>> >been finished and now we are trying to turn that sow's ear into a silk
>> >purse (sorry, book).
>>
>> <boggle>
>> Limited edition of course.
>>
>>
>
>Gosh, I hope not. I want it spread far and wide. At least 1500 copies
>sold :-)
You'll need me to plug it then. I assume it has a snappy title?
Derek Potter
>"Derek Potter" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:9fjf90phs5i8ilu81...@4ax.com...
>> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >> Reason, as human behaviour, is highly abstracted - in particular it
>> >> has discovered logic. All *intelligible* discussion is predicated on
>> >> logic being absolute although there is much relativist crap that
>> >> passes for propositions but in fact is random semi-grammatical
>> >> concatonations of parts of speech. I doubt whether logical argument
>> >> has a limited remit, even if our brains get out of their depth. Logic
>> >> is essentially a virtual machine to do what our common-sense reason
>> >> baulks at.
>> >
>> >The logically possible is a much wider domain than the physically
>> >possible, and only prejudice can exploit the extra elbow-room it allows.
>> >Realism is a logical possibility, but so is idealism.
>>
>> Yes?
>
>"Yes" is an answer in the affirmative. What does the question mark signify
>in this case?
"Yes, but so what?"
>> >> >I'm arguing that we can conclude that order exists *deductively*,
>> >> >from our own existence as observers, without recourse to any
>> >> >presuppositions.
>> >>
>> >> Deduction presupposes order. You need to distinguish between overall
>> >> order and specific order in a given sceintific investigation.
>> >
>> >So we can deduce from our own existence as observers that *overall
>> >order* exist, but not that specific order in a given scientific
>> >investigation exists? No problem -- if we are investigating white noise
>> >generated by a Zener diode then we won't find any order in it. This
>> >seems to be a trivial comment though.
>>
>> No, I said the opposite. We cannot deduce either. Induction tells us
>> that specific order exists.
>
>We couldn't induce our own existence if we didn't already exist to make
>that induction.
We are not talking about existence but about order.
>> The noise in a Zener diode is stochastic and as such shows order. We
>> would be very surprised if a bog-standard noise diode consistently
>> sang The Red River Valley. The fact it only does so very rarely can be
>> explained inductively - zener noise is understood quite well and the
>> mechanisms have proved reliable in the past. It can also be deduced if
>> you accept probability theory as axiomatic.
>
>Bad example then. The point is lost anyway if it resulted from a
>misunderstanding of your comment.
>
>> Unfortunately probability
>> theory imputes order to nature, or consistency to observations of
>> nature, either of which I take to be metaphysical - thus induction is
>> incorrigibly metaphysical. I am, incidentally, quite hoping you will
>> convince me that it isn't then we can all go home, but I fear you will
>> not do so.
>
>By stipulating a definition of metaphysics such that it includes the brute
>fact of order in nature you have ensured that we can't avoid metaphysics by
>your definition, and on that basis I wouldn't even attempt to argue that we
>can. My claim is that the presence of order is simply an observation, and
>that metaphysics only begins when we attempt to account for that order.
That's where we disagree - my claim is that we do not observe order,
we observe data. We then impute order to it by invoking metaphysics.
After that we try to account for the order. Then we might start asking
whether our account says anything metaphysical. But the first step is
to see the order in the data - something you claim, correctly, comes
naturally to us because we evolved that way, but which I point out
needs to be rationalized by using statistics which in turn involves
metaphysical assumptions.
>> >> Deduction - on the scientific data - works perfectly well. But it
>> >> relies on the assumption of order in the data.
>> >
>> >So if we make no assumptions about order in the data then we will never
>> >discover any? Order in a set of data often jumps out at you even when
>> >you're not looking for it.
>>
>> Because you are an order-spotting machine whose abilities are caused
>> by an orderly evolutionary past.
>
>Right.
>
>
>
>> To set your ability on a rational basis, you need to justify trusting
>> your instinct.
>
>Species and their environments operate dynamically upon each other in a
>manner that maintains a good match until some kind of catastrophe
>intervenes.
Sure, but that model is a fairy story, right?
No? Oh well, wheel on all the *inductive* science - and thus beg the
question.
>> >Are you claiming that ones own existence would still be possible in the
>> >absence of sufficient order to be an observer?
>>
>> Physically of course not. Logically, though, yes - I could be a random
>> experience in the void.
>
>To be capable of abstracting the concept of a self one must be more than
>just a random experience in the void.
Why? I am not an expert on random experiences in the void but why
should a random experience not be capable of abstraction? Is there an
a priori reason for this or is it a metaphysical assumption? Remember
- you cannot invoke "it's highly improbable" as a reason because we
are testing the theory that my existence justifies belief in
probability.
>> >I was referring to EPR and to Bell's inequality, tested by Alain Aspect
>> >confirming that hidden variables cannot operate locally.
>>
>> Which is counter-intuitive but not self-contradictory.
>
>Are you switching sides here? I thought you were arguing *against* quantum
>wholeness.
Not sure what "wholeness" means. I am certainly a naive realist in
science. And proud of it. But if you mean dream-weaving statements
about cosmic quantum holism, my opinion is that Terrence McKenna
arguing with a mushroom is more convincing.
>> "Things" (quantum systems) are non-local. Interpreting this fact as
>> meaning that nature contradicts itself is way ott.
>
>How can one infer from quantum non-locality that nature contradicts itself?
>
That is a mystery to me too, but physics was dogged for 70-odd years
by an interpretation of non-locality which imputed dualism to
electrons and photons. They were called "wavicles" meaning that they
were both wave and particle - located at a single place and diffused
over all space. Which is self-contradictory.
>> >There's only an infinite regress if you insist on absolute certainty
>> >somewhere in the model. My claim is that this demand for certainty is a
>> >biological trait that is out of place in the realm of the logically
>> >possible, and should confine itself to the realm of the physically
>> >possible. Naive realism certainly satisfies that need and restores the
>> >peace, but only at the cost of prejudice.
>>
>> Which is a more polite way of saying "Don't ask too many questions" :)
>
>Not at all -- it's a way of saying that we should choose our questions
>carefully because reason and language are capable of leading us up right
>the garden path. As a leisure activity or a source of self-entertainment
>such questions are harmless enough, but I'm very wary of any claim that
>this is a path to some kind of "truth".
>
>> Why should asking for justification of a theory be out of place? It is
>> a universal presupposition for discussion that one can continue until
>> one reaches axioms.
>
>Axiom: There is order.
An ad-hoc metaphysical axiom. Nasty.
>> >If there were no order in the data of experience then they would not
>> >support a model within which the concept of an observer may arise (this
>> >"stepping back" you speak of). Order can be deduced from the fact that
>> >there is something capable of stepping back.
>>
>> Only by introducing a metaphysical axiom that auto-observers have to
>> be orderly.
>
>To be capable of abstracting the concept of a self one must be more than
>just a random experience in the void.
see above
>> >If I need reassurance that I will continue to exist, and worry that
>> >induction cannot provide that reassurance, and quite rightly wish to
>> >avoid an infinite regress, then I may take refuge in prejudice to
>> >assuage that need, but I suspect that the problem lies at the very
>> >start -- i.e. with the need for certainty.
>>
>> I happen to be allergic to post-modern arguments which answer logical
>> points by referring to psychological needs. Ignoring the "needs" crap,
>> your point is left simply asserting that infinite regresses are an
>> acceptable explanation in logic.
>
>I dislike an infinite regress as much as you do. My claim is that we don't
>even get as far as the need to avoid an infinite regress if we recognize
>that reason has overstepped its remit in addressing this issue.
Another ad-hoc axiom?
Derek Potter
>"darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
And after that could you dumb it down for me too?
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >> >> Reason, as human behaviour, is highly abstracted - in particular it
> >> >> has discovered logic. All *intelligible* discussion is predicated
> >> >> on logic being absolute although there is much relativist crap that
> >> >> passes for propositions but in fact is random semi-grammatical
> >> >> concatonations of parts of speech. I doubt whether logical argument
> >> >> has a limited remit, even if our brains get out of their depth.
> >> >> Logic is essentially a virtual machine to do what our common-sense
> >> >> reason baulks at.
> >> >
> >> >The logically possible is a much wider domain than the physically
> >> >possible, and only prejudice can exploit the extra elbow-room it
> >> >allows. Realism is a logical possibility, but so is idealism.
>
So valid logical arguments can still be made in cases where reason and
language have led us up the garden path.
> >> Unfortunately probability
> >> theory imputes order to nature, or consistency to observations of
> >> nature, either of which I take to be metaphysical - thus induction is
> >> incorrigibly metaphysical. I am, incidentally, quite hoping you will
> >> convince me that it isn't then we can all go home, but I fear you will
> >> not do so.
> >
> >By stipulating a definition of metaphysics such that it includes the
> >brute fact of order in nature you have ensured that we can't avoid
> >metaphysics by your definition, and on that basis I wouldn't even
> >attempt to argue that we can. My claim is that the presence of order is
> >simply an observation, and that metaphysics only begins when we attempt
> >to account for that order.
>
> That's where we disagree - my claim is that we do not observe order,
> we observe data. We then impute order to it by invoking metaphysics.
> After that we try to account for the order. Then we might start asking
> whether our account says anything metaphysical. But the first step is
> to see the order in the data - something you claim, correctly, comes
> naturally to us because we evolved that way, but which I point out
> needs to be rationalized by using statistics which in turn involves
> metaphysical assumptions.
We seem to be going around in circles here, and that is usually a sign that
there's no more mileage in the debate.
> >> To set your ability on a rational basis, you need to justify trusting
> >> your instinct.
> >
> >Species and their environments operate dynamically upon each other in a
> >manner that maintains a good match until some kind of catastrophe
> >intervenes.
>
> Sure, but that model is a fairy story, right?
>
> No? Oh well, wheel on all the *inductive* science - and thus beg the
> question.
The need for certainty can become pathological.
> >> >Are you claiming that ones own existence would still be possible in
> >> >the absence of sufficient order to be an observer?
> >>
> >> Physically of course not. Logically, though, yes - I could be a random
> >> experience in the void.
> >
> >To be capable of abstracting the concept of a self one must be more than
> >just a random experience in the void.
>
> Why? I am not an expert on random experiences in the void but why
> should a random experience not be capable of abstraction? Is there an
> a priori reason for this or is it a metaphysical assumption? Remember
> - you cannot invoke "it's highly improbable" as a reason because we
> are testing the theory that my existence justifies belief in
> probability.
I may have misunderstood your use of the term random -- I took you mean
that the experience in the void exhibits no order, but I can see that an
ordered sequence of ordered experiences may arise as part of a wider random
sequence. But if that's all I am then this brief window of order that is my
life is all I know. Of course I can speculate on whether my life is a brief
sequence of order in an ocean of disorder, or whether naive realism is the
case, but that's just self-entertainment rather than a path to "truth".
> >> >I was referring to EPR and to Bell's inequality, tested by Alain
> >> >Aspect confirming that hidden variables cannot operate locally.
> >>
> >> Which is counter-intuitive but not self-contradictory.
> >
> >Are you switching sides here? I thought you were arguing *against*
> >quantum wholeness.
>
> Not sure what "wholeness" means.
Quantum entanglement (see below).
> I am certainly a naive realist in
> science. And proud of it. But if you mean dream-weaving statements
> about cosmic quantum holism, my opinion is that Terrence McKenna
> arguing with a mushroom is more convincing.
Well that's a whole different debate.
> >> "Things" (quantum systems) are non-local. Interpreting this fact as
> >> meaning that nature contradicts itself is way ott.
> >
> >How can one infer from quantum non-locality that nature contradicts
> >itself?
>
> That is a mystery to me too, but physics was dogged for 70-odd years
> by an interpretation of non-locality which imputed dualism to
> electrons and photons.
I'm not a physicist, but I wonder whether we're using the term
'non-locality' in different ways. As I understand the term, it refers to
the fact that if we have two quantum objects that have interacted in the
past, the observation of one of these objects impacts immediately upon the
possible states that the other may be in, regardless of the strictures of
Special Relativity.
> They were called "wavicles" meaning that they
> were both wave and particle - located at a single place and diffused
> over all space. Which is self-contradictory.
You've solved the riddle of the wavicle? How?
> >> Why should asking for justification of a theory be out of place? It is
> >> a universal presupposition for discussion that one can continue until
> >> one reaches axioms.
> >
> >Axiom: There is order.
>
> An ad-hoc metaphysical axiom. Nasty.
Prejudice. Nasty.
> >> >If I need reassurance that I will continue to exist, and worry that
> >> >induction cannot provide that reassurance, and quite rightly wish to
> >> >avoid an infinite regress, then I may take refuge in prejudice to
> >> >assuage that need, but I suspect that the problem lies at the very
> >> >start -- i.e. with the need for certainty.
> >>
> >> I happen to be allergic to post-modern arguments which answer logical
> >> points by referring to psychological needs. Ignoring the "needs" crap,
> >> your point is left simply asserting that infinite regresses are an
> >> acceptable explanation in logic.
> >
> >I dislike an infinite regress as much as you do. My claim is that we
> >don't even get as far as the need to avoid an infinite regress if we
> >recognize that reason has overstepped its remit in addressing this
> >issue.
>
> Another ad-hoc axiom?
No, just a workable alternative to indulging in all this ontological
claptrap.
Derek Potter
Much snipping to try to tidy this up a bit....
...
>We seem to be going around in circles here, and that is usually a sign that
>there's no more mileage in the debate.
I knew there was a reason why people talk of "philosophical circles".
I'm getting a bit tired of it too, but I'm glad to have clarified a
few thoughts en route.
...
>> >> >Are you claiming that ones own existence would still be possible in
>> >> >the absence of sufficient order to be an observer?
>> >>
>> >> Physically of course not. Logically, though, yes - I could be a random
>> >> experience in the void.
>> >
>> >To be capable of abstracting the concept of a self one must be more than
>> >just a random experience in the void.
>>
>> Why? I am not an expert on random experiences in the void but why
>> should a random experience not be capable of abstraction? Is there an
>> a priori reason for this or is it a metaphysical assumption? Remember
>> - you cannot invoke "it's highly improbable" as a reason because we
>> are testing the theory that my existence justifies belief in
>> probability.
>
>I may have misunderstood your use of the term random -- I took you mean
>that the experience in the void exhibits no order, but I can see that an
>ordered sequence of ordered experiences may arise as part of a wider random
>sequence. But if that's all I am then this brief window of order that is my
>life is all I know. Of course I can speculate on whether my life is a brief
>sequence of order in an ocean of disorder, or whether naive realism is the
>case, but that's just self-entertainment rather than a path to "truth".
Actually what I meant was a bit stronger than that - the appearence of
order could be a random thing too. It is, obviously, highly unlikely -
assuming that probability theory applies to experiences in the void.
But that is the very assumption that we are trying to justify by
invoking observers and thus order and thus probability.
...
>> I am certainly a naive realist in
>> science. And proud of it. But if you mean dream-weaving statements
>> about cosmic quantum holism, my opinion is that Terrence McKenna
>> arguing with a mushroom is more convincing.
>
>Well that's a whole different debate.
I find it hard to tell the difference.
...
>> >> "Things" (quantum systems) are non-local. Interpreting this fact as
>> >> meaning that nature contradicts itself is way ott.
>> >
>> >How can one infer from quantum non-locality that nature contradicts
>> >itself?
>>
>> That is a mystery to me too, but physics was dogged for 70-odd years
>> by an interpretation of non-locality which imputed dualism to
>> electrons and photons.
>
>I'm not a physicist, but I wonder whether we're using the term
>'non-locality' in different ways. As I understand the term, it refers to
>the fact that if we have two quantum objects that have interacted in the
>past, the observation of one of these objects impacts immediately upon the
>possible states that the other may be in, regardless of the strictures of
>Special Relativity.
Yes. Although SR does not forbid *hidden* communication.
...
>> They were called "wavicles" meaning that they
>> were both wave and particle - located at a single place and diffused
>> over all space. Which is self-contradictory.
>
>You've solved the riddle of the wavicle? How?
Ditched the silly idea in favour of non-locality.
...
>> >> Why should asking for justification of a theory be out of place? It is
>> >> a universal presupposition for discussion that one can continue until
>> >> one reaches axioms.
>> >
>> >Axiom: There is order.
>>
>> An ad-hoc metaphysical axiom. Nasty.
>
>Prejudice. Nasty.
Against ad-hoc axioms?
...
>> Another ad-hoc axiom?
>
>No, just a workable alternative to indulging in all this ontological
>claptrap.
Just because you haven't understood it... :p
andy-k
I'm sure you're right ;-)
Thanks for the conversation Derek.
Derek Potter
>Thanks for the conversation Derek.
Return match next week ?
andy-k
> andy-k gets an answer from me...
>
> >Thanks for the conversation Derek.
>
> Return match next week ?
You keep posting interesting stuff here and I'll keep throwing my two
penneth in :-)
darth_versive
No, I think I'll let each of you speak for yourselves, and I'll just
read what you have to say, and ponder over it. ;)
DV
jillar...@webtv.net
Derek. Returning to your first question in your response on 5/1 to my
post on 4/30 you asked if "science" was sufficiently unambiguous to to
say it discards conventional realism. This concern is not a hindrance
but a rootedness for science. But it sheds naive realism not by
consistency alone but by its criticalness in observation with lab and
instrumentation and its creation of a new horizon that excludes naive
realism as the last resort for judgement. The scientific horizon is laid
out in the revealing of the interrelatedness of "things" among
themselves in the noetic-noematic structure of experience. However, this
noemata of science is not the same existential presentation that we know
due to time and space. The noemata of science when entrenched in its
data and instrumentation undergoes a loss of 'presence' which is key in
the problem of existence. In exchange for presence it gains its claim to
authority as "science" as a critical discipline. In evaluating data on
the scientific horizon there are introductions of competing structures
of order necessary for explaining what science explains in this horizon.
This is the horizon where theoretical entities are introduced and doing
so alters common sense realism and critical realism. My point here is
that science starts out inherently realist but widens this horizon
beyond realism. Theoretical entities are removed from proximal
experience and are not inherently realist positions. Nor is the
acceptance of theoretical entities in the noemata of science inherently
realist. The problem is theoretical entities loose a proximal experience
that a naive realist wants us to accept. But nothing in science itself
maintains that this is science's position.
Jillar
Derek Potter
>
Do they? Please give an example and explain exactly why naive realism
cannot distinguish between classes of entity in a model.
> But nothing in science itself
>maintains that this is science's position.
We have already established that you can define science any way you
want to to suit your own philosophical agenda. Common-sense suggests
that science tries to bring all entities to the same ontological
status. But if a philosophically-minded person chooses to take the
position that science isn't interested in talking about its entities
as real then that is their choice and no-one can really argue.
However, the "common-sense" position is imported practically unchanged
into d-n by its seruptitious assumption of order in observations
(necessary in order to justify induction). This may not be "naive
realism" but it does the same metaphysical job.
John Wilkins
Derek Potter <m...@privacy.net> wrote:
The Origin of Species Concepts. But I fear that will not survive the
editor...
--
John Wilkins
john...@wilkins.id.au www.wilkins.id.au
Non scholae, sed vitae discimus
[We learn for life, not for school] Seneca, epistolae morales 106,12
Derek Potter
>In article <qk8h901psuoc98a00...@4ax.com>,
> Derek Potter <m...@privacy.net> wrote:
>
>> John Wilkins gets an answer from me...
>>
>> >Derek Potter <m...@privacy.net> wrote:
>> >
>> >> John Wilkins gets an answer from me...
>> >>
>> >> >Luke Sineath <l.v.sine...@att.net> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >> > Dr John S. Wilkins, www.wilkins.id.au
>> >> >> > "I never meet anyone who is not perplexed what to do with their
>> >> >> > children" --Charles Darwin to Syms Covington, February 22, 1857
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Ah, it's Dr. John now. Congratulations!
>> >> >
>> >> >Yep. Newly minted. I have been doctored, but not doffed yet. Thingy has
>> >> >been finished and now we are trying to turn that sow's ear into a silk
>> >> >purse (sorry, book).
>> >>
>> >> <boggle>
>> >> Limited edition of course.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> >Gosh, I hope not. I want it spread far and wide. At least 1500 copies
>> >sold :-)
>>
>> You'll need me to plug it then. I assume it has a snappy title?
>
>The Origin of Species Concepts. But I fear that will not survive the
>editor...
Try _Homo and Pongo: Synapomorphy in Action_
jillar...@webtv.net
Derek Potter wrote:
> Please give an example and explain exactly why naive realism cannot
distinguish between classes of entities in a model.
Derek. The sun is a star, and stars are suns without planets. The sun is
an obvious entity, but a star is a theoretical one in the broader
definition of a constrained hard "critical realism". But note that I'm
not making the claim. A critical realists like Patrick Heelan is a far
better source to seek out examples for this. I keep my use of naive
realism in my back pocket. However, I occasionally use it in this NG.
There are some issues that require only a naive realism, but there are
also other issues that would exclude essential material if such a
constriction applied. BTW, thanks for your input to this NG. I'm new
here myself.
Jillar
Derek Potter
>
>Derek Potter wrote:
>
>> Please give an example and explain exactly why naive realism cannot
>distinguish between classes of entities in a model.
>
>Derek. The sun is a star, and stars are suns without planets. The sun is
>an obvious entity, but a star is a theoretical one in the broader
>definition of a constrained hard "critical realism". But note that I'm
>not making the claim. A critical realists like Patrick Heelan is a far
>better source to seek out examples for this. I keep my use of naive
>realism in my back pocket. However, I occasionally use it in this NG.
Then I don't see what you are getting at. What is the difference
between "a theoretical entity" and "an entity within a model"? And
what is the difference between "an obvious entity" and "an entity
within whatever it is that our senses perceive"? It seems to me that
in everyday life we cope quite happily with the two things -
especially in my line of work (electronics) where a resistor on
circuit diagram is "a theoretical entity" but the thing that overheats
on my PCB is "an obvious entity". I don't see how that has any bearing
whatsoever on whether science thinks it's dealing with a real world.
>>There are some issues that require only a naive realism, but there are
>>also other issues that would exclude essential material if such a
>>constriction applied.
There is a correspondence between the "obvious entities" and the
"theoretical entities". Science copes with incomplete knowledge by
saying that these theoretical entities *may* actually exist (that's
the way the transistion from model to reality is expressed). It's
simply that more empirical information is needed to decide *whether*
they exist, the question of what *sort* of existence they have is
never asked because there's no such thing as different types of
existence. Of course that may be a personal view, but it seems to me
to be a gothic extraganza to suggest different modes of existence.
What's the point? What essential material is confined to the world of
theoretical entities such that there *can* be no corresponding obvious
entity? The star doesn't seem to be a very good example. Is there any
respectable science that has such things?
>BTW, thanks for your input to this NG. I'm new here myself.
Puzzled - I've seen you around somewhere else though - talk.origins,
alt.atheism?
John Wilkins
No, not really. But I *have* published a Synapomorphic Species Concept
:-)
--
jillar...@webtv.net
Derek. Sorry or not defining it the first time you asked. Theoretical
entities are atoms, molecules, wave functions, etc. Naive realism
assigns these properties a physical reality. Not all theoretical
physicists see it that way, that is, that a theoretical function is a
critical proof of a physical reality. Critical realists assign realism
in a terminal object investigation based on theoretical entities. So a
critical realist would not support the naive realist's position of what
is real from the start. When your response a few days ago centered on
the issue of exacting the unambiguous in science, it pointed more in the
direction of a critical realism. That means the jump back to naive
realism is cutoff for theoretical entities even if the critical realist
does not produce the terminal object. But I think science does more than
just go about finding terminal objects. Scientists are motivated to
explain things unapproachable, rightly or wrongly.
Regarding a star as a terminal object, empirical information on a
distant star may never come to our point of critical observation due to
time constraints. Right, that is very POV stuff, but critical
nonetheless. And finally, I was only in talk.origins one time- I recall
that the thread was nominated for their monthly best, but I had little
to do with that. I was never in alt.atheism. I've been in this NG for
about a year.
Jillar
Derek Potter
>
>Derek. Sorry or not defining it the first time you asked. Theoretical
>entities are atoms, molecules, wave functions, etc. Naive realism
>assigns these properties a physical reality. Not all theoretical
>physicists see it that way, that is, that a theoretical function is a
>critical proof of a physical reality. Critical realists assign realism
>in a terminal object investigation based on theoretical entities. So a
>critical realist would not support the naive realist's position of what
>is real from the start. When your response a few days ago centered on
>the issue of exacting the unambiguous in science, it pointed more in the
>direction of a critical realism.
OK, you win. I've been forced to google "critical realism". One,
presumably definitive, site tells me
>Bhaskar distinguishes theoretical and practical explanations
>(SRHE 68, 107-8; DPF 109-110; PE 24-25, 27-28). Theoretical
>explanation involves the detection of real, underlying structures
>and mechanisms which generate observable phenomena in a
>three-tiered process with a Humean level pertaining to the
>recognition of regularities, a Lockean level pertaining to the
>conceptualization of causal structure, and a Leibnizian level
>pertaining to the empirical detection of real structure. Practical
>explanation involves examining a complex conjuncture and
>analyzing it into component structures and mechanisms
>(already detected by theoretical explanation).
I note the similarities to the querulous, but incoherent, voices in
one's head when half-asleep and sickening for a viral infection.
I also found this:
>The International Association for Critical Realism was established in
>1997 with the basic objective of serving as a networking or otherwise
>facilitating resource for anyone broadly sympathetic to, or concerned
>with, realist philosophy and social theory. Given the current crises in the
>social sciences and philosophy, it was widely felt that such a resource
>is urgently needed.
You will appreciate I am not attempting to put words into your mouth
but I haven't the faintest idea what you are talking about and the
first few hits in Google seem to obfuscate the matter even further.
> That means the jump back to naive
>realism is cutoff for theoretical entities even if the critical realist
>does not produce the terminal object. But I think science does more than
>just go about finding terminal objects. Scientists are motivated to
>explain things unapproachable, rightly or wrongly.
>Regarding a star as a terminal object, empirical information on a
>distant star may never come to our point of critical observation due to
>time constraints. Right, that is very POV stuff, but critical
>nonetheless.
I still haven't a clue what you are talking about, let alone why it
should have any bearing on my query.
Derek Potter
You definitely *must* do something about those titles. Can't you work
Harry Potter into it somewhere?
John Wilkins
Got it! Harry Potter and the Species Problem!
I'm gonna be *rich*!
--
Derek Potter
My invoice is in the post :)
Derek Potter
>Your problem is quickly solved.
>You said-
>
>> My contention is that science is inherently realist. My opponent does
>> not agree.
>
>Realism is a particular model, the model of science. To say 'science is
>inherently realist' presupposes that model as a reality.
Realism isn't a model of science, it's a belief that objects of
perception exist independently of the observer. Models of science
which incorporate induction have to assume that induction works. Which
seems to me to entail realism for the reasons I have given (whch you
haven't addressed. I am not committed to the word "realism" - I have
no objection to using a different term for the metaphysics if need be.
I nearly missed your reply as you don't seem to be using Reply or
Followup.
>
>jJ
>
>
>Derek Potter <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
>news:evsu805cgrs2mmn32...@4ax.com...
>> Hi everyone.
>>
>> I have a problem concerning science and realism. It started in another
>> NG. I am rather ignorant fo "real philosophy", my opponent is
>> well-read. I cannot understand his PoV on one key point though I seem
>> to be able to follow everything else, so I wonder if anyone here can
>> help out - either to show me where I'm wrong (or just stoopid) or else
>> to confirm what I think. Please, though, no pomo relativism, nor
>> arm-waving "opinions" - the context is modern, not postmodern
>> philosophy with an anlaytic slant...
>>
>> My contention is that science is inherently realist. My opponent does
>> not agree.
>>
>> The simplistic argument is thst science attempts to explain the real
>> world. Naturally this is in itself question begging since science may
>> not mention the reality of the world at all.
>>
>> Or is this so? We have disposed of the "science is whatever we define
>> it as" and thr "sceince is what scientists do" dead-ends, by agreeing
>> that science proceeds by something like the h-d (or d-n) model. And we
>> have agreed that for h-d to work, it is necessary for observations to
>> occur. Beyond that, we part company. I believe that this entails that
>> scientific statements must refer to things as real. Which I think
>> makes science realist. My opponent believes that h-d does not require
>> an ontolology of the enties referred to in science - their reality or
>> otherwise is a metaphysical assertion not entailed by h-d.
>>
>> I should add that for the purposes of this argument, "realism" need
>> not mean "absolute" realism. There is never any guarantee from science
>> that what we study is absolutely real: even if we sort all of physics
>> out, it could just be a projection from a higher world. We could all
>> be brains in a vat. I do not think that reservation precludes realism.
>> For example, I believe there is a world out there which exists whether
>> absolutely or as a consistent virtual reality. But that is my opinion
>> which I am pleased to call realism. I believe that science
>> *necessarily* makes statements which are underpinned by this kind of
>> realism, and that such statements necessarily refer to real objects or
>> they are not science.
>>
>> My reasoning is this. The h-d model assumes that there are
>> observations about which hypotheses may be formed. For this to be
>> true, the observations must be consistent, otherwise there is no way
>> of producing a covering law. As far as I can tell, my opponent
>> believes that this only entails the existence of observations. To me
>> it says something about the thing observed. We may go further and say
>> that the consistency of the universe is constantly be confirmed by
>> science, but again, to me the obvious question is "so what?". If you
>> make predictions using Newton's law of gravity and they are constantly
>> proved right, this says nothing whatsoever about whether the law will
>> apply tomorrow *unless* there is another law saying that laws
>> themselves, once discovered, will continue to hold. We can even repeat
>> the process: "The principle that laws can be discovered and will then
>> make good predictions has itself been tested time and again", but the
>> same answer comes back "So what?". There is no guarantee that it will
>> happen next time unless there is a meta-law saying that the law of
>> consistent laws is itself inviolate. And so ad infinitum.
>>
>> Thus it seems to me that thr h-d model entails a meta-law of
>> consistency in addition to the recognition that observations are made
>> and that laws are deduced.
>>
>> At this point we tend to go round in circles. H-d itself does not
>> mention why such a law should exist, thus, my opponent claims, it is
>> metaphysically neutral. this extends to ontology: science can be done
>> without commitment to any theory of reality. I however, consider that
>> it does entail a meta-law, as I called it, of consistency, which
>> (since I exclude mystical claims to be able to penetrate to absolute
>> reality) in turn entails that *something* exists pulling the strings
>> of our observations. Note that I do not say that science tells us
>> anything about the thing that exists. Nor do I say that every entity
>> in a particular theory must exist. Nether am I *pleading* that "surely
>> science must be talking about real things" I am saying that the
>> standard idea of what science is, entails that science does talk about
>> real things and that *therefore* scientific statements are realist.
>> The fact that a scientist may think otherwise and still do his job
>> well is irrelevant.
>>
>> Am I talking crud?
>>
>
Derek Potter
>I don't know. I suggest that the fact that one can make repeatable
>observations implies *something* about the thing observed. You can't
>just say "we've always found nature to be repeatable" because that in
>itself does not make it repeatable in future. Repeatability has to be
>guaranteed repeatable.
Apparently this is spelled out by David Hume in _A Treatise on Human
Nature_ iirc. I must get out more.
John Wilkins
Often discussed under the rubric "the principle of uniformity [of
causes]"...
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