"In itself": Worst. Argument. Ever.
1Z
Immortalist
On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
> http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.html
That link was entertaining! But it seemed more like a rant or cheer
for one of two sports teams with no real refutations of "in itself."
Perhaps we start at the beginning. It seemed like a bumper sticker
mentality, "blank slate plasiticity, or die." Or what counter theory
way he trying to defend?
Thing in itself - Things in themselves (ding an sich in German) are
the ultimate constituents of reality. However, we can never perceive
things in themselves directly. We only perceive their appearances with
our senses and mental faculties. Nonetheless, we can infer these
appearances have a cause, and we can infer that things in themselves
are this cause even though we can know nothing about them.
http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/prolegomena/terms/char_11.html
The noumenon (plural: noumena) or thing in itself (German: Ding an
sich) is defined, in contrast with observable phenomena, as that which
cannot possibly be an object of the senses.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon
Unobservables are entities whose existence, nature, properties,
qualities or relations are not observable. In the philosophy of
science typical examples of "unobservables" are atomic particles, the
force of gravity, causation and beliefs or desires. However, some
philosophers also characterize all objects-trees, tables, other minds,
microbiological things and so on to which humans ascribe as the thing
causing their perception-as unobservable.
"Unobservables" is a reference similar to Immanuel Kant's distinction
between noumena (things-in-themselves, the objects being perceived)
and phenomena (characteristics which humans perceive). According to
Kant humans can never know noumena; all that humans know is the
phenomena which they perceive. Kant's distinction is similar to John
Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Secondary
qualities are what humans perceive such as redness, chirping, heat,
mustiness or sweetness. Primary qualities are the actual qualities of
the things themselves which give rise to the secondary qualities which
humans perceive.
The ontological nature and epistemological issues concerning
unobservables is a central topic in the philosophy of science. The
notion that unobservables exist is referred to as scientific realism
in contrast to instrumentalism which posits that unobservables like
atoms are useful models but does not affirm or deny their actuall
existence.
Wanker
On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
> >http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.htmlThat link was entertaining! But it seemed more like a rant or cheer
> for one of two sports teams with no real refutations of "in itself."
> Perhaps we start at the beginning. It seemed like a bumper sticker
> mentality, "blank slate plasiticity, or die." Or what counter theory
> way he trying to defend?
> Thing in itself - Things in themselves (ding an sich in German) are
> the ultimate constituents of reality.
> However, we can never perceive things in themselves directly.
This is a misuse of the word 'direct' in relation to the word
'perceive'. In particular it implies that any perception which is
mediated (by a sense organ, or some other means of perception) is an
indirect perception, yet it provides no alternative model which would
enable us to identify what a direct perception would be. A direct
perception on this view, would be something that doesn't involve being
a perception at all.
> We only perceive their appearances with our senses and mental faculties.
Grammatical rule for the use of the word 'perceive'.
> Nonetheless, we can infer these
> appearances have a cause, and we can infer that things in themselves
> are this cause even though we can know nothing about them.
Ah yes, the thing in itself that can only ever be perceived and never
grasped directly.
George Dance
> On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
> > for one of two sports teams with no real refutations of "in itself."
> > Perhaps we start at the beginning. It seemed like a bumper sticker
> > mentality, "blank slate plasiticity, or die." Or what counter theory
> > way he trying to defend?
> > Thing in itself - Things in themselves (ding an sich in German) are
> > the ultimate constituents of reality.
> > However, we can never perceive things in themselves directly.
> This is a misuse of the word 'direct' in relation to the word
> 'perceive'. In particular it implies that any perception which is
> mediated (by a sense organ, or some other means of perception) is an
> indirect perception, yet it provides no alternative model which would
> enable us to identify what a direct perception would be. A direct
> perception on this view, would be something that doesn't involve being
> a perception at all.
>
> > We only perceive their appearances with our senses and mental faculties.
>Grammatical rule for the use of the word 'perceive'.
>
I can see how it looks that way, from the way that sentence was
written. But 'direct perception' (and the ontological theory that
follows from it, 'direct realism') does have a non-strawman meaning in
philosophy; not that we can sense things without using our senses, but
that in sensing our mind is experiencing the things themselves,
rather than mental images or representations ('representatonal
realism'). It's one attempt to answer the knowledge problem posed by
r.r. (the Kantian dictum that we don't know anything about the things
"in themselves" being another); the other horn of that dilemma, with
its own problems.
Here's a link to the wiki page, with some information on its first
advocate, Thomas Reid. Notice how Reid predicts the skeptical
outcome, of which the original post gives several examples, that
follows from the other horn of that dilemma:
<quote>
Examples of the direct realist approach
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid lived at the same time as David Hume.
Reid argued strenuously against the notion that ideas, or sense-data,
are the immediate objects of perception at all - he rejected
representationalism.
One of Reid's arguments was very simple, and went like this: If
representationalism is correct, then we are forced to either
skepticism or phenomenalism. But skepticism and phenomenalism are both
absurd; there surely is an external world, and we surely do have
knowledge of it. So, by reductio ad absurdum, we must reject any
theory that would force us to accept either skepticism or
phenomenalism. So, we must reject representationalism.
What would it mean to reject representationalism? It would mean
accepting that we do not perceive sense data at all. When I look at my
hand, I do not immediately perceive a bundle or series of hand sense
data which represent my actual hand. No, I immediately perceive my
hand. I do not perceive any hand sense-data at all. So the view up for
consideration now is that we immediately, directly perceive the
external world. </q>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_realism
Residential
My actual hand or a distant star in direct realism's *external world*
wouldn't be in my head when I perceive it. Information about them
would be relayed to my brain via a mediator and then turned into an
image experience with other mediating processes. Direct realism, like
so many other doctrines or arguments, only makes sense if the reader
ceases to pursue the crazy reality that its consequences lead to.
My television set doesn't fold into a solipsist because it represents
a Paris street on its screen rather than the orignal --
representationalism is possible. The word "Moon" can symbolize the
phenomenon of Moon in language without resembling the phenomenon.
Indirect realism is possible.
^v^v^v^v^v
Immortalist
On Jan 30, 10:29 am, "Residential" <drksn_b...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> George Dance wrote:
> > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
> > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
> > > > >http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.htmlThatlinkwas entertaining! But it seemed more like a rant or cheer
> ^v^v^v^v^v-
Pretty good answer, but we must remind ourselves that the necessities
that seem apparent for concepts and perceptions, are analytic and
valid, but still, whether we represent the world correctly or not is
an empirical theory. We must tease appart the seeming necessities from
our theories about them and theor context. This Moon of yours for
instance, when it intrudes willy nilly into consciousness does it come
with our theories about what it is, or were you just talking about
this odd image that seems to differ from the rest of the sky? Woops,
can't even tell the difference from the rest of the sky with
perceptions, we need to add concepts before it does what you say it
does automatically.
George Dance
> George Dance wrote:
> > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
> > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
I'm no expert on Reid, but what I've read doesn't contradict that.
It's compatible with the physics - that light hits from the object
hits your eye, which then sends a nerve impuls to your brain. What it
denies is the non-physical part of the explanation, that involving the
'imaging experience'. Nothing at all about hands and stars inside
your skull.
> Direct realism, like
> so many other doctrines or arguments, only makes sense if the reader
> ceases to pursue the crazy reality that its consequences lead to.
>
>
That's why the knowledge problem is an ongoing problem; all views have
some crazy consequences, and partisans of other views are quite
willing to find them.
> My television set doesn't fold into a solipsist because it represents
> a Paris street on its screen rather than the orignal --
> representationalism is possible.
Certainly; but Direct Realism doesn't deny that film and video are
representations, any more than paintings. What it denies is the
existence of purely mental representations.
> The word "Moon" can symbolize the
> phenomenon of Moon in language without resembling the phenomenon.
That's the strongest of your arguments, I think; because when I (at
least) hear or think the word "Moon", I can close my eyes and
visualize a picture of the moon. So that's evidence that minds do
think in terms of representations (which of course is the mainstream
theory).
> Indirect realism is possible.
True; but that theory leads to its problems of its own. As witness,
take the argument I'm having in the thread "objectivity is collective
subjectivity", with an antagonist who has concluded, simply on the
basis of the theory of indirect realism, that knowledge of an external
world is impossible.
Immortalist
> On Jan 30, 1:29 pm, "Residential" <drksn_b...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > George Dance wrote:
> > > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
> > > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
That theory may be salvagable iff representations are never static,
but ongoing, never an object, but a distribution of relationships,
ongoing, and necessarily changing to seem unchanging. But the "epi-
phenomena" would have a dualistic interactions, since we can change
what we are seeing by what we are looking for.
......In a sparse distributed network - memory is a type of
perception.....The act of remembering and the act of perceiving both
detect a pattern in a vary large choice of possible patterns....When
we remember we recreate the act of the original perception - that is
we relocate the pattern by a process similar to the one we used to
perceive the pattern originally.
Kevin Kelly......oUt Of cOnTrOl......page 18---
http://www.kk.org/outofcontrol/ch2-d.html
> > Direct realism, like
> > so many other doctrines or arguments, only makes sense if the reader
> > ceases to pursue the crazy reality that its consequences lead to.
>
> That's why the knowledge problem is an ongoing problem; all views have
> some crazy consequences, and partisans of other views are quite
> willing to find them.
>
> > My television set doesn't fold into a solipsist because it represents
> > a Paris street on its screen rather than the orignal --
> > representationalism is possible.
>
> Certainly; but Direct Realism doesn't deny that film and video are
> representations, any more than paintings. What it denies is the
> existence of purely mental representations.
>
> > The word "Moon" can symbolize the
> > phenomenon of Moon in language without resembling the phenomenon.
>
> That's the strongest of your arguments, I think; because when I (at
> least) hear or think the word "Moon", I can close my eyes and
> visualize a picture of the moon. So that's evidence that minds do
> think in terms of representations (which of course is the mainstream
> theory).
>
> > Indirect realism is possible.
>
> True; but that theory leads to its problems of its own. As witness,
> take the argument I'm having in the thread "objectivity is collective
> subjectivity", with an antagonist who has concluded, simply on the
> basis of the theory of indirect realism, that knowledge of an external
> world is impossible.- Hide quoted text -
>
>
-+JFalk+-
A dream then, or a thought, is also an unobservable? Since it cannot
be seen by a scientific instrument (you can see the electrical dance
in the brain, but not the dinosaur-hunting gameshow I'm currently
participating in as I sleep), it fits the definition you give.
To fudge and say that dreams, or thoughts, or quanta, do not exist --
well, that sounds like a cop-out.
Craig Franck
> "Wanker" wrote:
>> "Immortalist" wrote:
>> > We only perceive their appearances with our senses and mental
>> > faculties.
>
>>Grammatical rule for the use of the word 'perceive'.
>
>
> I can see how it looks that way, from the way that sentence was
> written. But 'direct perception' (and the ontological theory that
> follows from it, 'direct realism') does have a non-strawman meaning in
> philosophy; not that we can sense things without using our senses, but
> that in sensing our mind is experiencing the things themselves,
> rather than mental images or representations ('representatonal
> realism').
This distinction is purely semantical. It's some form of
representationalism cast as direct realism. It seems to mean
that what is perceived is the result of the perceptual process
that is the object itself: one perceptual interpretation of the
object is the way it appears to us.
If another creature looked at it and saw something different,
all this would mean is that it sensed a different set of
characteristics that belonged to the same object. What is
black to us might be infrared to something else.
This works as an analysis of natural language, but it fails in
that if it is an argument of how perception works, then it is
really a scientific question. Science says all we ever perceive
is the workings of our nervous system which have causal links
to objects in the environment.
So what is perceived is an artifact of the perceptual process.
Direct realism simply blurs this distinction by focusing on
what people mean when they say they perceive something,
which is not wrong, but technically incorrect.
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
brian fletcher
"Wanker" <simonh...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote in message
news:1170177223.2...@j27g2000cwj.googlegroups.com...
This is because 'perceive' and 'create' are two aspects of the same
observer.
"What you see is what you get". This works on many levels, as many people
are starting to discover, hence cliches such as "be careful what you wish
for" etc., given that a wish is a perception yet to be 'created'.
BOfL
brian fletcher
"George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1170185102.2...@v33g2000cwv.googlegroups.com...
Perhaps 'fleeting knowledge of an external world' would sit more comfortably
with him.
If you flew someone to the moon, without their knowing, they woke up and
looked back at Earth, initially they would see the moon. Until they
witnessed different phenomena.
My view is, that it what is continually happening to all of us, all of the
time.
Of course, when one recognises this, "fleeting" is a fulfilling and
enjoyable experience....and as 'real' as it gets.
BOfL
George Dance
the workings of my nervous system at all. I'll grant that scientists
can and do perceive the workings of subjects' nervous systems, but not
that they look at all like what the subjects are perceiving.
For example, a subject is looking at a lamp, while a scientist is
observing the workings of his nervous system. I doubt that the
scientist and the subject will be perceiving the same thing; that the
scientist ever detects a lamp in there, no matter how hard he looks.
Yet a lamp is precisely what the subject sees (or, if realism is
false, thinks he sees).
> So what is perceived is an artifact of the perceptual process.
> Direct realism simply blurs this distinction by focusing on
> what people mean when they say they perceive something,
> which is not wrong, but technically incorrect.
>
> --
> Craig Franck
> craig.fra...@verizon.net
> Cortland, NY
male...@hotmail.com
>The noumenon (plural: noumena) or thing in itself (German: Ding an
>sich) is defined, in contrast with observable phenomena, as that which
>cannot possibly be an object of the senses.
Or perhaps, as some have pointed out, the Ding an Sich is the thing
considered simply as not an object of the senses. The appearance
is considered simply as an object of the senses. The thing-in-itself
is a placeholder concept standing for an unknown thing, not for an
unknowable thing.
George Dance
> A typically knockabout polemic from David Stove.
>
> http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.html
A minor correction; the author is actually James Franklin.
<quote>
James Franklin
Philosophy 77 (2002): 615-24.
(pdf version)
"In 1985, the year Sydney University threatened him with disciplinary
action over his complaints about `Jobs for the Girls', David Stove ran
a Competition to Find the Worst Argument in the World. In his marking
scheme, half the marks went to the degree of badness of the argument,
half to the degree of its endorsement by philosophers. Thus an
argument was sought that was both very bad, and very prevalent.
"He awarded the prize to himself, for the following argument (Stove,
1995)
"We can know things only
as they are related to us
under our forms of perception and understanding
insofar as they fall under our conceptual schemes,
etc.
So,
we cannot know things as they are in themselves.
Perhaps that argument does not look familiar at first glance. It will
be argued that it is extraordinarily common, and that it has
underpinned many irrationalist programs in the history of thought,
from classical idealism to recent relativisms in the philosophy of
language, the philosophy of science, ethics and elsewhere.' </q>
Amazing, considering how often this argument is associated with
Immanuel Kant, that he gets only three sentences in the whole thing
(all three reading like an attempt to dissociate him from the Worst
Argument as much as possible):
<q> Talk of `forms of perception', and `things in themselves' may
suggest Kant, but it is not clear that Kant was imposed on by a `Worst
Argument'. Stove does pin a few small Gems on him (Stove, 1991, 160),
but they are not central to his argument.</q>
The conclusion is nice:
<q> There is therefore a genuine problem about how we can see, given
we have eyes. That gives no support to fallacious arguments of the
form `We have eyes, therefore we can't see.' </q>
One has to point out, though , that Ayn Rand had already used that
metaphor, to describe the same Argument, 40 years earlier:
<q> "[Kant's] argument, in essence, ran as follows: man is blind,
beause he has eyes - deaf, because he has ears - deluded, because he
has a mind - and the things he perceives do not exist, /because he
perceives them." [For the New Intellecual, 1961]
Wanker
> On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
Sure - there's a lot of that idea in 18th century philosophy - the
idea that the mind can reach out and grab something without the body
coming into contact with it. The idea of an unmediated perception. I
guess what I think about that is that - given what the word
'perception' means - it's both a misunderstanding of the meaning of
the word and a wrong-headed analogy.
As far as the meaning of the word 'perceive' goes, to perceive is to
per-ceive, both elements coming from Latin - the 'ceive' bit means to
'lay hold of', or 'to take', and the 'per' bit meaning 'through' -
thus the whole word means "To lay hold of through" .. (one's senses,
one's eyes, etc.). IOW there's no such thing as 'direct' perception
because perception is intrinsically indirect, and thus in virtue of
that intrinsic indirection can never be direct without redefining the
meaning of the word.
On top of that the 'grasping with the mind' idea relies on a metaphor
- that I grasp with my mind in way that is analogous to the way I
grasp with my hand, only more so. I do it without the intervention of
my hand, eye, or whatever. I suggest this isn't a good analogy because
of the lack of consistency in the analogy. For example: if I see an
apple using a pair of binocular that might be called indirect
perception because my perceptions are being mediated via the
binoculars. If I grasp the apple with my hands that might be called
direct perception as nothing mediates between my hand and the object.
Similarly if I grasp an argument not only is this a different use of
the word 'grasp' (could you mentally grasp an argument via some
binoculars?) but it's difficult to see how the distinction direct/
indirect can be applied here - what's would be a good analogy between
looking at something through binoculars and mentally grasping an
argument? Is there any mental object of which we'd be willing to say -
this mental object is not being grasped directly, but via another
mental object which I do grasp directly? Would an analogy might be a
candidate for this kind of mental object? But how so, seeing as once I
grasp the analogy I grasp the viewpoint the analogy leads me to? This
isn't like seeing with binoculars - when I see an object via
binoculars the binoculars don't magically go away.
> Here's a link to the wiki page, with some information on its first
> advocate, Thomas Reid. Notice how Reid predicts the skeptical
> outcome, of which the original post gives several examples, that
> follows from the other horn of that dilemma:
>
> <quote>
> Examples of the direct realist approach
> Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid lived at the same time as David Hume.
> Reid argued strenuously against the notion that ideas, or sense-data,
> are the immediate objects of perception at all - he rejected
> representationalism.
> One of Reid's arguments was very simple, and went like this: If
> representationalism is correct, then we are forced to either
> skepticism or phenomenalism. But skepticism and phenomenalism are both
> absurd; there surely is an external world, and we surely do have
> knowledge of it. So, by reductio ad absurdum, we must reject any
> theory that would force us to accept either skepticism or
> phenomenalism. So, we must reject representationalism.
> What would it mean to reject representationalism? It would mean
> accepting that we do not perceive sense data at all. When I look at my
> hand, I do not immediately perceive a bundle or series of hand sense
> data which represent my actual hand. No, I immediately perceive my
> hand. I do not perceive any hand sense-data at all. So the view up for
> consideration now is that we immediately, directly perceive the
> external world. </q>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_realism
But we perceive the world (I won't say the 'external world' because I,
like LW, believe this internal / external metaphor is also wrong-
headed) via our senses. Whether you want to call this direct or
indirect rather depends on whether or not you can think of a good idea
as to how we might perceive the world without any kind of mediation.
But the problem here (apart from the misunderstanding of the word
'perceive') is that even if you could imagine that you were connected
to the world in the same way as you were to your arms that wouldn't
help any as /this/ kind of perception would still be regarded as
mediated via our bodies.
The idea, IOW, is that the mind grasps its own objects directly, but
the things which are mediated to us via those objects are grasped
indirectly. But if you can't have an indirect grasp of a mental object
(I put this forward as an uncontroversial and generally held
philosophical belief), how could you have a direct grasp of that
thing? This would be a misuse of the direct / indirect distinction - a
case taking away one half of an equation while saying "This equation
still means the same as it did before".
-+JFalk+-
> On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Re: grasping with the hand vs. with the mind,
It seems to me that physically holding an object merely gives you the
*illusion* of control and a higher understanding than if you were
viewing the object at a distance, or seeing a picture of the object.
Yet, the existence/base reality/form or whatever you might call it is
not what is perceived, even if the object is in your hand. You are
still filtering, categorizing, judging the item through the imperfect,
impressionable wiring of your nervous system.
Have you ever had a beer served in a plastic pint "glass"? Not the
cheap, disposable kind, but a container identical to a regular --
well, pint glass made of glass? The weight is off. And the beer tastes
different. Is the beer different? Tremendous effort could be made to
indicate that there would be a slight difference in temperature or in
some other glass vs. plastic variable. But really, the beer does taste
the same. I do not detect the 0.2 degree temperature difference. What
I notice is that it seems somehow "cheaper" and less pleasurable
because the "glass" does not have the same heft as usual. This imparts
a feeling of slight disappointment, as at least some of the pleasure
in drinking is still attributed to it being an adult activity. I'm 31,
by the way, but I still get that feeling, at least very slightly.
Drinking out of plastic is associated with a childish activity. As
such, the act of drinking beer out of a plastic glass carries an
emotional "value" that twists the actual taste--even though the lab
equipment would say it is basically the same. This is merely one
component of the several thoughts and moods and level of attention
that may distort the true nature of the beer in the glass.
You cannot understand an object's true nature, I argue, whether you
see it from afar, or hold it in your hand, or drink it with some
buffalo wings on the side. Although I recommend testing the latter
activity as often as possible, just to ascertain the validity of my
argument. I know that can't logically disprove it, but dammit it's
worth a shot.
George Dance
> On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
> > > > the ultimate constituents of reality.
> > > > However, we can never perceive things in themselves directly.
> > > This is a misuse of the word 'direct' in relation to the word
> > > 'perceive'. In particular it implies that any perception which is
> > > mediated (by a sense organ, or some other means of perception) is an
> > > indirect perception, yet it provides no alternative model which would
> > > enable us to identify what a direct perception would be. A direct
> > > perception on this view, would be something that doesn't involve being
> > > a perception at all.
>
> > > > We only perceive their appearances with our senses and mental faculties.
> > >Grammatical rule for the use of the word 'perceive'.
>
> > I can see how it looks that way, from the way that sentence was
> > written. But 'direct perception' (and the ontological theory that
> > follows from it, 'direct realism') does have a non-strawman meaning in
> > philosophy; not that we can sense things without using our senses, but
> > that in sensing our mind is experiencing the things themselves,
> > rather than mental images or representations ('representatonal
> > realism'). It's one attempt to answer the knowledge problem posed by
> > r.r. (the Kantian dictum that we don't know anything about the things
> > "in themselves" being another); the other horn of that dilemma, with
> > its own problems.
>
> Sure - there's a lot of that idea in 18th century philosophy - the
> idea that the mind can reach out and grab something without the body
> coming into contact with it.
But that is certainly not the idea of Direct Realism at all; as was
pointed out earlier, it involves misusing the language. Both Direct
and Representative Realists agree with the scientific idea of sensory
perception - that our view of the external world comes into the brain,
physically, through the bodies. Where they part company is in what
they think happens next. The Direct Realist thinks that the mind is
directly aware of that sensory data, and therefore has information on
the external object 'in itself'; while the Indirect Realist thinks
that the brain somehow, by some unexplained process, translates the
nervous impulses from the senses into a mental object of some kind,
and that in consequence the mind never experiences outer reality at
all, but only an inner reality of mental objects.
> The idea of an unmediated perception. I
> guess what I think about that is that - given what the word
> 'perception' means - it's both a misunderstanding of the meaning of
> the word and a wrong-headed analogy.
>
It's not an analogy at all - it's a belief that, when I look at my
computer monitor, for example, my eyes are giving me information on an
actual computer monitor. Whereas, in the contrary Representatonal
Theory, what I'm looking at need not be a computer monitor at all; the
only thing that I'm actually aware of is a mental object that looks
like a computer monitor, which has nothing to do with reality, but
only with how the categories or whatnot of my mind interpret the
whatever-it-is that is actually there.
> As far as the meaning of the word 'perceive' goes, to perceive is to
> per-ceive, both elements coming from Latin - the 'ceive' bit means to
> 'lay hold of', or 'to take', and the 'per' bit meaning 'through' -
> thus the whole word means "To lay hold of through" .. (one's senses,
> one's eyes, etc.). IOW there's no such thing as 'direct' perception
> because perception is intrinsically indirect, and thus in virtue of
> that intrinsic indirection can never be direct without redefining the
> meaning of the word.
>
Again, though, that involves using the word 'indirect' in two ways:
one, to refer to the causal chain by which perception gets into the
eyes; two in the result that the mind sees. The conclusion being
that, because the process is indirect, the mind has no information on
what has been perceived - the external object 'in itself' - , but only
information about a mental object that the brain has somehow conjured
up, which may or may not have anything to do with the perceived
things at all.
Here's an analogy that I hope makes the point: a person is arrested
for robbing a store, and the prime piece of evidence is a video camera
recording of the robber clearly engaging in the act. The judge throws
that out, with the argument: "This evidence purports to be the events
in the store. However, since the evidence involved using an indirect
process of capturing the events on video, it cannot possibly be
evidence of anything of except what is on the video. Therefore, since
this trial is not about what is on the video, but about the events in
the store, the evidence is clearly irrelevant."
That is indeed the idea of Representational Realism; that the mind
grasps, and all that the mind can grasp, are its own mental objects;
physical reality 'in itself' being completely beyond its ken.
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> "George Dance"
>> > I can see how it looks that way, from the way that sentence was
>> > written. But 'direct perception' (and the ontological theory that
>> > follows from it, 'direct realism') does have a non-strawman meaning in
>> > philosophy; not that we can sense things without using our senses, but
>> > that in sensing our mind is experiencing the things themselves,
>> > rather than mental images or representations ('representatonal
>> > realism').
>> This works as an analysis of natural language, but it fails in
>> that if it is an argument of how perception works, then it is
>> really a scientific question. Science says all we ever perceive
>> is the workings of our nervous system which have causal links
>> to objects in the environment.
>>
> I'm sorry, Craig, but that last sentence lost me. I don't perceive
> the workings of my nervous system at all. I'll grant that scientists
> can and do perceive the workings of subjects' nervous systems, but not
> that they look at all like what the subjects are perceiving.
This just shows how precise you have to be with language
in discussions like this.
A better wording would have been our perceptions correlate
to events occurring in the neural substrate of the brain. The
strongest version of this holds, for example, that pain isn't
*caused* by the firing of certain neurons, but rather pain
*is* the firing of neurons.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theory
> For example, a subject is looking at a lamp, while a scientist is
> observing the workings of his nervous system. I doubt that the
> scientist and the subject will be perceiving the same thing; that the
> scientist ever detects a lamp in there, no matter how hard he looks.
> Yet a lamp is precisely what the subject sees (or, if realism is
> false, thinks he sees).
They do see clusters of neurons that resemble, to some
extent, the geometry of visual patterns. They could tell
whether someone was looking at a circle or a square.
The fact that the same patterns appear when one is
just thinking of an object is very strong evidence in some
debates over how imagination and mental imagery works.
This is a major point in cognitive science and philosophy
of mind. It seems hard to get from a neuron firing to the
experience of a particular qualia. One seems nothing like
the other.
But the idea is your experiences are what a brain looks
like from the inside, and brain physiology is what it looks
like from the outside.
Craig Franck
> "Wanker" wrote:
>> Sure - there's a lot of that idea in 18th century philosophy - the
>> idea that the mind can reach out and grab something without the body
>> coming into contact with it.
>
>
> But that is certainly not the idea of Direct Realism at all; as was
> pointed out earlier, it involves misusing the language. Both Direct
> and Representative Realists agree with the scientific idea of sensory
> perception - that our view of the external world comes into the brain,
> physically, through the bodies. Where they part company is in what
> they think happens next. The Direct Realist thinks that the mind is
> directly aware of that sensory data, and therefore has information on
> the external object 'in itself'; while the Indirect Realist thinks
> that the brain somehow, by some unexplained process, translates the
> nervous impulses from the senses into a mental object of some kind,
> and that in consequence the mind never experiences outer reality at
> all, but only an inner reality of mental objects.
The fact that it is an unexplained process should not be a
problem. If I light a match and hold it against my hand, the
light causes me to perceive it, and it causes me to burn my
hand.
The external world stands in some relation to the perceived
one by causing changes in a nervous system. Evolution
explains why the mapping process works so well.
A major problem with direct realism is it simply can't work
with astronomy. A star may not exist anymore when it is
being "directly perceived" a billion years after it produce the
photons that are intercepted by a piece of equipment.
So messenger particles are not the messenger. You
could hold the particles are a form of signature the object
makes, but calling it the object is just a semantical
solution to a physical problem.
> Here's an analogy that I hope makes the point: a person is arrested
> for robbing a store, and the prime piece of evidence is a video camera
> recording of the robber clearly engaging in the act. The judge throws
> that out, with the argument: "This evidence purports to be the events
> in the store. However, since the evidence involved using an indirect
> process of capturing the events on video, it cannot possibly be
> evidence of anything of except what is on the video. Therefore, since
> this trial is not about what is on the video, but about the events in
> the store, the evidence is clearly irrelevant."
The obvious response it the robbery caused the image to
form on the tape in the same way the robber's hand touching
to door caused finger prints to show up.
Wanker
> On Jan 31, 6:07 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> > > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
If you think that holding an object gives you the illusion of control,
what kind of control do you believe would give you non-illusory
control?
We sometimes teach the use of word 'control' by referring to actions
which are undertaken using our hands - given what you've just said do
you think this is an appropriate use of the word? If not, what use
would you give to the word 'control'?
Incidentally, I'd say holding something in your hand gives you a
different understanding from viewing the object at a distance. If you
also want to call that different understanding a 'higher'
understanding that's up to you, but you must mean 'higher' in a
metaphorical sense. In which case: Why does that metaphor seem
appealing to you?
> Yet, the existence/base reality/form or whatever you might call it is
> not what is perceived, even if the object is in your hand.
1) If the existence/base reality/form is something that can never be
perceived, what use is that existence/base reality/form?
2) For all we know when you hold an apple you could /really/ be
holding a squid, but if all anyone ever perceived was an apple how
would we prove that you were /really/ holding a squid? Doesn't that
seem like a rather large supposition?
> You are still filtering, categorizing, judging the item through the imperfect,
> impressionable wiring of your nervous system.
You say our nervous system is imperfect - what kind of nervous system
would you say is perfect? (Incidentally, 'perfect' comes from a Latin
root and means 'a finished thing' - I'm happy to accept that our
nervous system might in some senses be considered an evolutionary work
in progress, but seeing as evolution's never finished it's a moot
point as to whether evolution deals with perfection, or merely
change).
As to whether I am filtering the item through my nervous system or
whether my nervous system is doing it for me without my willful
intervention
> Have you ever had a beer served in a plastic pint "glass"? Not the
> cheap, disposable kind, but a container identical to a regular --
> well, pint glass made of glass? The weight is off. And the beer tastes
> different. Is the beer different?
No, but then you already said that when you said "The beer tastes
different".
> Tremendous effort could be made to
> indicate that there would be a slight difference in temperature or in
> some other glass vs. plastic variable. But really, the beer does taste
> the same.
Unless it tastes different.
> I do not detect the 0.2 degree temperature difference. What
> I notice is that it seems somehow "cheaper" and less pleasurable
> because the "glass" does not have the same heft as usual. This imparts
> a feeling of slight disappointment, as at least some of the pleasure
> in drinking is still attributed to it being an adult activity. I'm 31,
> by the way, but I still get that feeling, at least very slightly.
> Drinking out of plastic is associated with a childish activity. As
> such, the act of drinking beer out of a plastic glass carries an
> emotional "value" that twists the actual taste--even though the lab
> equipment would say it is basically the same. This is merely one
> component of the several thoughts and moods and level of attention
> that may distort the true nature of the beer in the glass.
It doesn't distort the true nature of the beer - it merely distorts
your /perception/ of its true nature. But even 'perfect' machines go
wrong sometimes.
> You cannot understand an object's true nature, I argue, whether you
> see it from afar, or hold it in your hand, or drink it with some
> buffalo wings on the side.
Then the object's true nature is a matter of pure speculation - in
which case I assert that any object's true nature is cheese. You'll
never be able to prove me wrong, and I'll never be able to prove me
right, but I'll carry this unshakeable conviction to the grave: That
all is cheese.
> Although I recommend testing the latter
> activity as often as possible, just to ascertain the validity of my
> argument. I know that can't logically disprove it, but dammit it's
> worth a shot.
I agree. Fancy a pint?
Wanker
>From the characterisation you've presented above I'd say that neither
the direct nor the indirect realist believe we're aware of things
outside our bodies directly, the only difference between them is that
the direct realist believes our brains receive sense-data from the
external world, whereas the indirect realist believes that data is
never received by the brain. (There's an interesting take on these
viewpoints in Frederick Pohl's novel "Man Plus").
> > The idea of an unmediated perception. I
> > guess what I think about that is that - given what the word
> > 'perception' means - it's both a misunderstanding of the meaning of
> > the word and a wrong-headed analogy.
>
> It's not an analogy at all - it's a belief that, when I look at my
> computer monitor, for example, my eyes are giving me information on an
> actual computer monitor. Whereas, in the contrary Representatonal
> Theory, what I'm looking at need not be a computer monitor at all; the
> only thing that I'm actually aware of is a mental object that looks
> like a computer monitor which has nothing to do with reality, but
> only with how the categories or whatnot of my mind interpret the
> whatever-it-is that is actually there.
It can't look /like/ a real computer monitor because - on this theory
- you don't know what a real computer monitor looks like at all. All
you have is your mental model of "computer monitor".
> > As far as the meaning of the word 'perceive' goes, to perceive is to
> > per-ceive, both elements coming from Latin - the 'ceive' bit means to
> > 'lay hold of', or 'to take', and the 'per' bit meaning 'through' -
> > thus the whole word means "To lay hold of through" .. (one's senses,
> > one's eyes, etc.). IOW there's no such thing as 'direct' perception
> > because perception is intrinsically indirect, and thus in virtue of
> > that intrinsic indirection can never be direct without redefining the
> > meaning of the word.
>
> Again, though, that involves using the word 'indirect' in two ways:
> one, to refer to the causal chain by which perception gets into the
> eyes;
Perception, unlike smoke, doesn't get in your eyes. I perceive things
using my eyes. Light gets into my eyes, bits of grit, occasionally the
odd fly if I'm out cycling without shades on. But not perception.
> two in the result that the mind sees.
Grammatical error! The mind does not see. My eyes see. Your eyes see.
I see. We see. My, your, our minds do not.
> The conclusion being that, because the process is indirect, the mind has no information on
> what has been perceived - the external object 'in itself' - , but only
> information about a mental object that the brain has somehow conjured
> up, which may or may not have anything to do with the perceived
> things at all.
Well the only way you'd have direct perception on that model would be
to - quite literally - jab things into your brain. That's the only way
I can think of to provide an unmediated perception of the thing in
question. But, as I pointed out earlier, this doesn't solve the
realist / idealist problem because mental objects are neither direct
or indirect; or rather - we might want to say they're directly
perceived, but seeing as one's own mental objects can never be
perceived indirectly it's a misuse of the direct / indirect
distinction.
> Here's an analogy that I hope makes the point: a person is arrested
> for robbing a store, and the prime piece of evidence is a video camera
> recording of the robber clearly engaging in the act. The judge throws
> that out, with the argument: "This evidence purports to be the events
> in the store. However, since the evidence involved using an indirect
> process of capturing the events on video, it cannot possibly be
> evidence of anything of except what is on the video. Therefore, since
> this trial is not about what is on the video, but about the events in
> the store, the evidence is clearly irrelevant."
Then the judge is a fool, as he believes there's a direct way to
capture things on video which is the opposite method from the correct
operation of the video camera he has designated as an 'indirect'
method.
And is therefore a matter of complete speculation: in which case -
give it to those of a religious bent who are willing to believe
anything anyone tells them and let them debate it. It matters not what
the answer is as no-one will ever be able to prove it one way or
another.
-+JFalk+-
> On 31 Jan, 20:45, "-+JFalk+-" <dr_blo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jan 31, 6:07 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> > > > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
> > Re: grasping with the hand vs. with the mind,
> > It seems to me that physically holding an object merely gives you the
> > *illusion* of control and a higher understanding than if you were
> > viewing the object at a distance, or seeing a picture of the object.
> If you think that holding an object gives you the illusion of control,
> what kind of control do you believe would give you non-illusory
> control?
There is no kind of control which would give me non-illusory control -
I guess I'd have to be lumped in with the Indirect Realists there,
according to George's succinct definition earlier. That said, the
problem that arises for me immediately is, what if I fire a cannon
into.. oh, let's say a stack of banana cream pies. The pies are
obliterated, pieces of pie and pie tin and earth and cannonball go
flying about, a crater is formed, the police are notified, etc. etc.
Many things happen which, at least for a time, disfigure the
landscape, the reality that was once a neat and tidy stack of cream
pies. So my actions have changed the reality around me, to be certain.
And everything I do, in fact, my very existence, has bearing on every
atom I contact, and every gravity field to which I belong. We do,
indeed, impart some gravitational influence on the moon and stars,
infinitesimal as it may be. Is this control, or merely influence?
> We sometimes teach the use of word 'control' by referring to actions
> which are undertaken using our hands - given what you've just said do
> you think this is an appropriate use of the word? If not, what use
> would you give to the word 'control'?
The "control" i used above was meant as the human emotion, especially
of feeling dominant, feeling like you grasp or understand a thing or
idea. When I hold the apple, I may eat it or throw it or crush it or
put it on the teacher's desk. So, in a sense, yes, I control the
position and short-term destiny of that apple. But do I understand all
of its "appleness"? Do I understand the apple in its base form, it's
redness, its tartness, etc.? No. I am not the apple, I do not
experience what the apple experiences, I do not think or feel as the
apple does.
> Incidentally, I'd say holding something in your hand gives you a
> different understanding from viewing the object at a distance. If you
> also want to call that different understanding a 'higher'
> understanding that's up to you, but you must mean 'higher' in a
> metaphorical sense. In which case: Why does that metaphor seem
> appealing to you?
Well on a gut level, yes, it would seem a "higher" lever of
understanding. But this is a dangerous line of thinking. To assume,
because of your proximity to a thing, or because more of your senses
than sight are able to experience it, that you understand it more, is
a boon to three-card-monty shysters the world over. Magicians and
pickpockets prey upon this gut feeling, that if you get close to
something, it can't surprise you. Feel this ring, feels solid doesn't
it? Do you see any wires or mirrors? Smell this flower, looks real,
doesn't it? And so on. Herein lies the point I was trying to make -
and thank you for artfully drawing it out: That our senses betray us
at all levels of interaction, whether near or far, and only rigorous
logic can attempt to separate reality from illusion.
> > Yet, the existence/base reality/form or whatever you might call it is
> > not what is perceived, even if the object is in your hand.
>
> 1) If the existence/base reality/form is something that can never be
> perceived, what use is that existence/base reality/form?
Its purpose is to remind us of the value and the presence of the thing-
in-and-of-itself, not our biases toward it. It is to remind us that we
are fallible and do not yet posess the ability to truly understand
even the simplest things. It is the mystic blueprint we cannot see.
> 2) For all we know when you hold an apple you could /really/ be
> holding a squid, but if all anyone ever perceived was an apple how
> would we prove that you were /really/ holding a squid? Doesn't that
> seem like a rather large supposition?
If "we" all see an apple (not the word apple, but the fleshy fruit
we're pretty much familiar with), and the truth is that I'm holding a
many-tentacled squid, does it make it any less real if we always fail -
fnord- to see the squid? Put a small, valuable totem, exactly the size
of a drum stick, made of purest jade, with ornate carvings done in the
12th century, in front of a one-year old, and set it next to a snare
drum. Try to tell the one-year-old that "That's not a drum stick!" BAM
BAM BAM BAM BAM
I get your point - if it walks like a duck... And yes, I've set up the
totem to look very similar to the drum stick, where there are more
than a few differences between an apple and a squid. But I'm not
talking about people mistaking a yacht for a golf tee. I'm talking
about people failing to see fine, and not-so-fine, distinctions
between things. Again, it's important (to me, anyway) to not ignore
the fact that we are, spiritually and mentally, like a bunch of one-
year olds.
> > You are still filtering, categorizing, judging the item through the imperfect,
> > impressionable wiring of your nervous system.
>
> You say our nervous system is imperfect - what kind of nervous system
> would you say is perfect? (Incidentally, 'perfect' comes from a Latin
> root and means 'a finished thing' - I'm happy to accept that our
> nervous system might in some senses be considered an evolutionary work
> in progress, but seeing as evolution's never finished it's a moot
> point as to whether evolution deals with perfection, or merely
> change).
Well by perfect, I mean "having no flaws in and of itself". Our
nervous system, and all the objects around us, have flaws. Nothing is
perfect as we perceive it because we can always find flaws. We're very
good at that, sometimes.
> As to whether I am filtering the item through my nervous system or
> whether my nervous system is doing it for me without my willful
> intervention
... sorry, the message got cut off. Maybe you lost interest. That's
ok. I sometimes
>
>
> > Have you ever had a beer served in a plastic pint "glass"? Not the
> > cheap, disposable kind, but a container identical
>
> ...
>
> read more »- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Cheers.
jillar...@webtv.net
Text 1:
"...We can know things only
as they are related to us under our forms of perception and
understanding insofar as they fall under our conceptual schemes, etc.
So, we cannot know things as they are in themselves..."
Text 2:
"...Talk of `forms of perception´, and `things in themselves´ may
suggest Kant, but it is not clear that Kant was imposed on by a `Worst
Argument´. Stove does pin a few small Gems on him (Stove, 1991,
160),.. "
=================================
VJ:
This paper criticizes Plato more than Kant in search of the the worst
argument Gem. Quite a stretch given the "thing-in-itself" is a Kantian
moniker and Plato never thought "things" remained unmanifested after
"research" was done as in his cave thesis. Franklin lumps Plato next to
Berkeley. A mistake, I think, that detracted from the better thinking
that followed in the rest of the text. Platonic forms are existent in
the "world" and not in a "mind". The part about "opinions" is not what
Plato thought knowledge was. The "world" of ideas was claimed as a
matter of real Being and not an idealism. It would have been better if
the text started with Berkeley and forgot about Plato.
I agree that the "thing-in-itself", as a basic concept for science, is a
covert basic concept for science [Heidegger] of a "thing itself"
[existentialism]. That makes it [thing-in-itself] unnecessary. Then why
is it "thing itself"? Because it is a transparent "presentation".
Franklin framed the problem of thing-in-itself without relatedness. This
might explain his prejudice for a any classical pov. Not only did he
blast Plato, if I remember correctly, he forgot Aristotle.
I agree more with Heidegger's pov, who pointed out that "transparency"
is consistent in our relatedness from the proximal to the conceptual
grounding of Being. So that science is possible by "clearing" the way
from immediately manifested knowledge to conceptually manifested
knowledge. The conceptual is not grounded in representation due to
grounded transparency in the circuit [thing to concept] of experiece.
We need basic concepts for science, but such a base must be aligned with
a consistency of Being which proceeds from the apprehension of things
themselves to the category of things. Things most certainly can be
"presented" in a "transparent" form if "Being itself" is transparent.
Therefore, pragmata and schemata are available to science. A Metaphysic
is unnecessary representation. Heidegger remained existentially
consistent on that point.
As for the worst argument ever. A professor @ UW Madison is arguing that
Sept. 11, 2001 was something covert. It is the same old "in-itself"
dubious thinking that joins with conspiracy theory. And the
"thing-in-itself" arguments in philosophy are little more than stating
that one must see through the conspiracy at work in Being in order to
gain a unique status within the short coming of one's own covert Being.
Which is nonsense.
VJillar
["If it looks and walks like a duck, it probably is a duck"... Louis
Armstrong.
tg
> On 31 Jan, 20:45, "-+JFalk+-" <dr_blo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jan 31, 6:07 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> > > > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
We tend to become more confident in our measurements (perception) when
we have apparently independent sources for information that is
apparently the same. This explains the plastic mug effect.
>In which case: Why does that metaphor seem
> appealing to you?
>
> > Yet, the existence/base reality/form or whatever you might call it is
> > not what is perceived, even if the object is in your hand.
>
> 1) If the existence/base reality/form is something that can never be
> perceived, what use is that existence/base reality/form?
>
> 2) For all we know when you hold an apple you could /really/ be
> holding a squid, but if all anyone ever perceived was an apple how
> would we prove that you were /really/ holding a squid? Doesn't that
> seem like a rather large supposition?
>
> > You are still filtering, categorizing, judging the item through the imperfect,
> > impressionable wiring of your nervous system.
>
> You say our nervous system is imperfect - what kind of nervous system
> would you say is perfect?
Our nervous system is what it is. The question is whether it has some
privileged status relative to any other system, for example the
sensory and neurological apparatus of a dog (or a rock). You are
correct in implying that the idea of perfection is meaningless, but
there is still the question of whether there is any *relative*
'better' knowing of things in themselves. Is there any merit to our
sense that more independent measurements determine more correctly the
nature of things?
-tg
>(Incidentally, 'perfect' comes from a Latin
> root and means 'a finished thing' - I'm happy to accept that our
> nervous system might in some senses be considered an evolutionary work
> in progress, but seeing as evolution's never finished it's a moot
> point as to whether evolution deals with perfection, or merely
> change).
>
> As to whether I am filtering the item through my nervous system or
> whether my nervous system is doing it for me without my willful
> intervention
>
> > Have you ever had a beer served in a plastic pint "glass"? Not the
> > cheap, disposable kind, but a container identical
>
> ...
>
> read more »
Wanker
> On Feb 1, 7:54 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:> On 31 Jan, 20:45, "-+JFalk+-" <dr_blo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Jan 31, 6:07 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
Well seeing as control involves some element of command or domination
I'd say this was just an influence.
> > We sometimes teach the use of word 'control' by referring to actions
> > which are undertaken using our hands - given what you've just said do
> > you think this is an appropriate use of the word? If not, what use
> > would you give to the word 'control'?
>
> The "control" i used above was meant as the human emotion, especially
> of feeling dominant, feeling like you grasp or understand a thing or
> idea. When I hold the apple, I may eat it or throw it or crush it or
> put it on the teacher's desk. So, in a sense, yes, I control the
> position and short-term destiny of that apple. But do I understand all
> of its "appleness"? Do I understand the apple in its base form, it's
> redness, its tartness, etc.? No. I am not the apple, I do not
> experience what the apple experiences, I do not think or feel as the
> apple does.
Just because you don't understand all about something doesn't mean you
don't control it. I don't understand all about cars, but I'm in
suitable control of my vehicle when I drive. No really, I am.
> > Incidentally, I'd say holding something in your hand gives you a
> > different understanding from viewing the object at a distance. If you
> > also want to call that different understanding a 'higher'
> > understanding that's up to you, but you must mean 'higher' in a
> > metaphorical sense. In which case: Why does that metaphor seem
> > appealing to you?
>
> Well on a gut level, yes, it would seem a "higher" lever of
> understanding. But this is a dangerous line of thinking. To assume,
> because of your proximity to a thing, or because more of your senses
> than sight are able to experience it, that you understand it more, is
> a boon to three-card-monty shysters the world over. Magicians and
> pickpockets prey upon this gut feeling, that if you get close to
> something, it can't surprise you. Feel this ring, feels solid doesn't
> it? Do you see any wires or mirrors? Smell this flower, looks real,
> doesn't it? And so on. Herein lies the point I was trying to make -
> and thank you for artfully drawing it out: That our senses betray us
> at all levels of interaction, whether near or far, and only rigorous
> logic can attempt to separate reality from illusion.
Ah, but logic, like language, is learned. And all learning comes
initially via the senses. Thus logic is learned via those damned
unreliable senses!
> > > Yet, the existence/base reality/form or whatever you might call it is
> > > not what is perceived, even if the object is in your hand.
>
> > 1) If the existence/base reality/form is something that can never be
> > perceived, what use is that existence/base reality/form?
>
> Its purpose is to remind us of the value and the presence of the thing-
> in-and-of-itself, not our biases toward it. It is to remind us that we
> are fallible and do not yet posess the ability to truly understand
> even the simplest things. It is the mystic blueprint we cannot see.
Sure - we don't know everything yet!
No - I submitted the message but it seems to have been truncated by
the google server. Nice one Google!
Wanker
> On Feb 1, 9:54 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > On 31 Jan, 20:45, "-+JFalk+-" <dr_blo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Jan 31, 6:07 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
It depends on the nature of the enquiry.
I've just started reading "The Complete Roderick" by John Sladek and
at the beginning a sociologist is questioning the head of the Roderick
(Roderick is an AI learning-computer) project. The head of the project
goes up the wall at the sociologist saying something like "Science,
unlike sociology, isn't a fucking opinion poll. Do you think Galileo
asked around before he came up with his count of the moons of
Saturn?".
It doesn't matter how many people count the moons from earth using
binoculars - we still get the same count. If we move slightly closer
though ...
-+JFalk+-
> On 2 Feb, 12:00, "tg" <tgdenn...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 1, 9:54 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > On 31 Jan, 20:45, "-+JFalk+-" <dr_blo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Jan 31, 6:07 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > > On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > > A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.
>
Re: "The Complete Roderick"
Sounds like a good book, is it?
Craig Franck
>"-+JFalk+-" wrote:
> > "Wanker" wrote:
> > > As to whether I am filtering the item through my nervous system or
> > > whether my nervous system is doing it for me without my willful
> > > intervention
>
> > ... sorry, the message got cut off. Maybe you lost interest. That's
> > ok. I sometimes
> No - I submitted the message but it seems to have been truncated by
> the google server. Nice one Google!
I believe you are overwhelming the server by not snipping
previous text. . .
George Dance
OK; but if the experience of the lamp is just a pattern of neurons,
then there'd be no such thing as a 'veridical experience' - whether
there was a lamp there, or anything for that matter, would be
something no one could conclude simply from experiencing neurons
firing in their brain. Indeed, that's one of the most common
arguments advanced for Indirect Realism, the 'Macbeth' argument - that
when Macbeth experiences a dagger, presumably his experience (which is
not generated by any external stimulus) is no different from there
being any dagger external to him.
One can argue that the experience can be tested further; but if the
only thing the tests can give any evidence of is what is occurring in
the testor's brain, what would that prove?
> --
> Craig Franck
> craig.fra...@verizon.net
> Cortland, NY- Hide quoted text -
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> "George Dance" wrote
>> > For example, a subject is looking at a lamp, while a scientist is
>> > observing the workings of his nervous system. I doubt that the
>> > scientist and the subject will be perceiving the same thing; that the
>> > scientist ever detects a lamp in there, no matter how hard he looks.
>> > Yet a lamp is precisely what the subject sees (or, if realism is
>> > false, thinks he sees).
>>
>> They do see clusters of neurons that resemble, to some
>> extent, the geometry of visual patterns. They could tell
>> whether someone was looking at a circle or a square.
> OK; but if the experience of the lamp is just a pattern of neurons,
> then there'd be no such thing as a 'veridical experience' - whether
> there was a lamp there, or anything for that matter, would be
> something no one could conclude simply from experiencing neurons
> firing in their brain.
The idea is that perception evolved in an environment that
creatures bet their lives on when they took certain experiences
to be real. So predators that were good at finding prey had a
better chance to reproduce. Our current situation is just a
case of statistical fallout.
As Bertrand Russell pointed out, there is no logical reason why
our perceptions should or should not resemble the external
world in a way that enables us to survive and cope, it's just a
fact that they must in some meaningful sense or we wouldn't be
here.
Ironically, the fact that they so often do not is what makes
perception function so well. We see a highly processed
version of the light that falls on our retinas; the raw feed would
be chaos.
> Indeed, that's one of the most common
> arguments advanced for Indirect Realism, the 'Macbeth' argument - that
> when Macbeth experiences a dagger, presumably his experience (which is
> not generated by any external stimulus) is no different from there
> being any dagger external to him.
If you examine people who have trouble with this sort of thing,
you will find almost all have some organic brain disorder, such
as schizophrenia. I believe a biological explanation is the
reticular activating system has a threshold that must be
reached in order to let a person act on something as if it were
a real perception, but this is not a philosophical rebuttal.
> One can argue that the experience can be tested further; but if the
> only thing the tests can give any evidence of is what is occurring in
> the testor's brain, what would that prove?
If this is a metaphysical objection, I don't believe it's in any way
determinable whether representational or direct realism is the
case or not, by definition. Both systems have trouble with
certain experiences and explain things the other cannot. And
like all metaphysical systems, they beg huge questions.
I believe direct realism fails almost every empirical test, and
that the other is an actual scientific theory of perception. But
without a detailed model of how conscious experience functions
it might be a question of semantics as to whether the situation
is best characterized as our being in direct contact with the
world around us or not. If light mediates "direct perception," I
don't see why electromagnetism in neurons shouldn't as well.
-+JFalk+-
I couldn't help but think of the guy in The Princess Bride when I
started reading your reply. I thought you were going to but out with
the "But, you've also bested my Spaniard, which means you must have
studied, and in studying you must have learned that man is mortal..."
line.
It's certainly a good point. Yes, logic, and mathematics, are learned
via the senses. But 2+2 equals 4, and T+F=F. The imperfect senses
don't typically invalidate simple math or logic, they lead to false
premises. Every time I get back to the argument about whether or not
1+1=2 can be trusted, I invariably default to: yes, always, unless you
can think of a counterexample. Of course, just because you can't think
of one, doesn't mean it doesn't exist--but the likelihood that a
counterexample exists is sufficiently small that, for our purposes, as
apes walking the woods, or, if you prefer, a virus sucking the life
out of the landscape, there *is* no counterexample. The set of TRUE is
so large that there is functionally no FALSE. It's like when my 7th-
grade math teacher spoke of convergence, where .9999999... equals 1.
What? No it doesn't! Uhh.. yes it does.
> > > > Yet, the existence/base reality/form or whatever you might call it is
> > > > not what is perceived, even if the object is in your hand.
>
> > > 1) If the existence/base reality/form is something that can never be
> > > perceived, what use is that existence/base reality/form?
>
> > Its purpose is to remind us of the value and the presence of the thing-
> > in-and-of-itself, not our biases toward it. It is to remind us that we
> > are fallible and do not yet possess the ability to truly understand
> > even the simplest things. It is the mystic blueprint we cannot see.
>
> Sure - we don't know everything yet!
Wait - what? So.. there *is* value in a doctorate degree? Boy, I hope
you're right.
>
> > Cheers.
Wanker
>
> I couldn't help but think of the guy in The Princess Bride when I
> started reading your reply. I thought you were going to but out with
> the "But, you've also bested my Spaniard, which means you must have
> studied, and in studying you must have learned that man is mortal..."
> line.
Ah! The Princess Bride is one of my favourite films:
Westley: [as he is unsuccessfully fighting Fezzik] Look, are you
just fiddling around with me or what?
Fezzik: I just want you to feel you're doing well. I hate for people
to die embarrassed.
> It's certainly a good point. Yes, logic, and mathematics, are learned
> via the senses. But 2+2 equals 4, and T+F=F. The imperfect senses
> don't typically invalidate simple math or logic, they lead to false
> premises. Every time I get back to the argument about whether or not
> 1+1=2 can be trusted, I invariably default to: yes, always, unless you
> can think of a counterexample. Of course, just because you can't think
> of one, doesn't mean it doesn't exist--but the likelihood that a
> counterexample exists is sufficiently small that, for our purposes, as
> apes walking the woods, or, if you prefer, a virus sucking the life
> out of the landscape, there *is* no counterexample. The set of TRUE is
> so large that there is functionally no FALSE. It's like when my 7th-
> grade math teacher spoke of convergence, where .9999999... equals 1.
> What? No it doesn't! Uhh.. yes it does.
Well 1 + 1 = 2 is an axiom and axioms are, by definition, true within
the system to which they are axiomatic. I don't know, but I've been
told there are mathematical systems where 1 + 1 doesn't equal 2. All
that means is that 1 + 1 = 2 is not an axiom within those systems.
> > > > > Yet, the existence/base reality/form or whatever you might call it is
> > > > > not what is perceived, even if the object is in your hand.
>
> > > > 1) If the existence/base reality/form is something that can never be
> > > > perceived, what use is that existence/base reality/form?
>
> > > Its purpose is to remind us of the value and the presence of the thing-
> > > in-and-of-itself, not our biases toward it. It is to remind us that we
> > > are fallible and do not yet possess the ability to truly understand
> > > even the simplest things. It is the mystic blueprint we cannot see.
>
> > Sure - we don't know everything yet!
>
> Wait - what? So.. there *is* value in a doctorate degree? Boy, I hope
> you're right.
Value in a doctorate! Are you mad!? ; )
> > > Cheers.
Wanker
Re: "The Complete Roderick"
Sounds like a good book, is it?
I haven't got far enough to really start enjoying it yet - he's just
setting up the characters one presumes he'll be using later in the
book. He's an engaging writer so far though - I definitely want to
read more. Miles better than, say, James Blish (eurgh).
Wanker
> I believe you are overwhelming the server by not snipping previous text. . .
I'm sure I don't know what you mean. ; )