quales and colour....again
Errol
of blue (possibly the colour of an enemies uniform) The machine
detects the colour and destroys the object or person. Has the machine
detected or also experienced the colour? it would depend on the
intelligence of the machine of course. If the machine was a sentient
AI robot, designed to mimic the vision processing capabilities of a
human with an electronic brain, a mind and consciousness, could it be
said that the machine has experienced the colour? If colour was a
quale, could the machine have experienced a quale? If the machine is
indeed sentient and perfectly mimics a human, then if humans
experience a quale, then logically, so must the robot.
In the case of a human replacing the machine, but also with the same
destructive capability, the question would depend on the vision
capability of the person. Could a blind person with some kind of
technical augmentation, "experience" the colour as pulses on the skin,
or different notes of sound. Could that experience be comparable to
the experience a normally sighted person undergoes when seeing this
particular shade?
The qualists to be consistant should insist that the blind person has
not experienced the quale of blueness of that shade, but the fact that
it's a human, means that the human has the potential to experience the
quale, even though physical limitations prevent the person from doing
so.
If the machine could experience the quale but the human could not,
then the quale must be equal to the mental experience of having
functioning visual apparatus.
therefore blue quale = light of the wavelength for blu processed by
retina, rods, visual cortex and brain.
Conclusion
quales are terminology only, and add no further value to what we
already understand about the process of seeing colour
PS the destructive potential to destroy the enemy has nothing
whatsover to do with the thought experiment other than to attract the
attention of you jaded sceptics and believers in quales.
yippee yi ho ti hey.
dulce do your pardner
swing that quale by the balls
to justify thems getting harder
Michael Gordge
> imagine a machine set up to destroy anything coloured a specific shade
> of blue (possibly the colour of an enemies uniform) The machine
> detects the colour and destroys the object or person. Has the machine
> detected or also experienced the colour?
Given your mystical tendencies and premises, what do ewe mean by
"experienced" Ewool?
MG
Errol
Colour has psychological impact as well as the mere perception of the
colour.
There are support groups to help people overcome their fear of the
colour red for example, due to trauma involving bloody accidents or
association with blushing and self consciousness.
By the way, have you accepted that position as elder in your church
yet oh mystic one?
ZerkonXXXX
> imagine a machine
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vectorscope
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectrometer
Look, what we call color is part of the
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum
It is part of light. Color is a form of visible electromagnetic radiation.
So to make your same case you do not really need to get into what color
seems to be to people or how color is experienced. Color is defined
outside of the human experience as is rock or water.
A TV engineer for instance, will look at a properly calibrated
Vectorscope to see 'red' not as a color but as a wave pattern on a scope.
The base reference for calibration of this scope will be another
electronic signal, color bars, which also has no relation to how colors
seem to be. So if the engineer sees blue as red, they will easily know it
as anyone else could. Other than the word itself, blue is not a product
of human consensus.
So to hold the position that color is restricted to 'quale', all light
and all information delivered by light would have to be included which
verifies your conclusion of "no further value".
Errol
> On Fri, 03 Jul 2009 01:18:53 -0700, Errol wrote:
> > imagine a machine
>
The only point i disaggree with is your contention that colour is not
experienced.
The neuron firings dredge up past memories of colour with thousands of
associations, which might have psychological implications due to half
forgotten experiences.
Colour has psychological impact as well as the mere perception of the
colour.
There are support groups to help people overcome their fear of the
colour red for example, due to trauma involving bloody accidents or
association with blushing and self consciousness.
Colour exists outside the human experience as do rock and water, but
colour processed by the human brain includes a host of remembered
associations. These associations do not require quales to explain
them. memory and experience is sufficient.
Errol
> > imagine a machine
>
PS The whole point of the post is to set up a thought experiment to
show that quales are superflous.
Art
wrote:
>imagine a machine set up to destroy anything coloured a specific shade
>of blue (possibly the colour of an enemies uniform) The machine
>detects the colour and destroys the object or person. Has the machine
>detected or also experienced the colour?
Detection and experience are entirely different. Nobody knows how to
design conscious machines that actually _experience_ colors. But
the design of machines to _detect_ colors is simple.
>it would depend on the
>intelligence of the machine of course. If the machine was a sentient
>AI robot, designed to mimic the vision processing capabilities of a
>human with an electronic brain, a mind and consciousness, could it be
>said that the machine has experienced the colour?
Sure, but nobody knows how to design such a machine.
>If colour was a
>quale, could the machine have experienced a quale? If the machine is
>indeed sentient and perfectly mimics a human, then if humans
>experience a quale, then logically, so must the robot.
Sure, but nobody knows how to design such a machine.
>In the case of a human replacing the machine, but also with the same
>destructive capability, the question would depend on the vision
>capability of the person. Could a blind person with some kind of
>technical augmentation, "experience" the colour as pulses on the skin,
>or different notes of sound. Could that experience be comparable to
>the experience a normally sighted person undergoes when seeing this
>particular shade?
Experiencing color as "pulses on the skin" is not the same experience
sighted people have.
>The qualists to be consistant should insist that the blind person has
>not experienced the quale of blueness of that shade, but the fact that
>it's a human, means that the human has the potential to experience the
>quale, even though physical limitations prevent the person from doing
>so.
That's correct.
>If the machine could experience the quale but the human could not,
>then the quale must be equal to the mental experience of having
>functioning visual apparatus.
That sentence doesn't compute.
>therefore blue quale = light of the wavelength for blu processed by
>retina, rods, visual cortex and brain.
Nope. Qualia refer to conscious experience.
>Conclusion
>quales are terminology only, and add no further value to what we
>already understand about the process of seeing colour
Nonsense. We know nothing about the process of _experiencing_
colors. We only know about the physics and many brain processes
connected with sight. Nobody understands consciousness.
Errol
>
> Sure, but nobody knows how to design such a machine.
>
> Sure, but nobody knows how to design such a machine.
>
Dang! It's a frigging hypothetical machine as in thought experiment
If you ever read any of my posts on AI you would know that
I didn't have to make it a bloody robot but did so for effect only.
>
> Experiencing color as "pulses on the skin" is not the same experience
> sighted people have.
>
I know that. it's to set up the comparison in which the machine
experiences a hypothetical quale of colour but the human doesn't
> >The qualists to be consistant should insist that the blind person has
> >not experienced the quale of blueness of that shade, but the fact that
> >it's a human, means that the human has the potential to experience the
> >quale, even though physical limitations prevent the person from doing
> >so.
>
> That's correct.
>
Good we are on the same page then
> >If the machine could experience the quale but the human could not,
> >then the quale must be equal to the mental experience of having
> >functioning visual apparatus.
>
> That sentence doesn't compute.
>
Why?, let your imagination give the robot perfect simulation of all
human faculties.
If a human would experience a colour quale then so would the perfect
copy.
> >therefore blue quale = light of the wavelength for blu processed by
> >retina, rods, visual cortex and brain.
>
> Nope. Qualia refer to conscious experience.
>
Why is the light of the wavelength called blue (or shade of blue),
processed by the brain as colour, NOT conscious experience?
> >Conclusion
> >quales are terminology only, and add no further value to what we
> >already understand about the process of seeing colour
>
> Nonsense. We know nothing about the process of _experiencing_
> colors. We only know about the physics and many brain processes
> connected with sight. Nobody understands consciousness.
>
That is perhaps your opinion based on a misunderstanding of what you
thought I was getting at.
If the robot with perfect visual apparatus experiences a color quale
and the human with impared visual apparatus does not, then what is the
difference between them. The condition of the visual apparatus only,
not the brain.
the quale is equal to the recording of the blue light on the retina
and processed by the visual cortex and brain.
The concept of a quale adds nothing to this as both brains are the
same, only the visual apparatus differs.
dorayme
Art <nu...@zilch.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 01:18:53 -0700 (PDT), Errol <vs.e...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>
> >The qualists to be consistant should insist that the blind person has
> >not experienced the quale of blueness of that shade, but the fact that
> >it's a human, means that the human has the potential to experience the
> >quale, even though physical limitations prevent the person from doing
> >so.
>
> That's correct.
The only thing that I can see that might be correct is that every
reasonable person agrees that humans have the capacity to see colour and
to seem to see colour. Expressions like "experiencing the quale of
blueness" are not the least bit clearer than "consciously seeing that
something is blue".
Never give an inch to the qualia brigade, Art, they will take a mile! <g>
--
dorayme
Errol
>
> > >The qualists to be consistant should insist that the blind person has
> > >not experienced the quale of blueness of that shade, but the fact that
> > >it's a human, means that the human has the potential to experience the
> > >quale, even though physical limitations prevent the person from doing
> > >so.
>
> > That's correct.
>
> The only thing that I can see that might be correct is that every
> reasonable person agrees that humans have the capacity to see colour and
> to seem to see colour. Expressions like "experiencing the quale of
> blueness" are not the least bit clearer than "consciously seeing that
> something is blue".
Which is exactly my point dora. I don't support the idea of quales
giving dualism the edge over materialism. seems you are a bit confused
as to where you stand on the issue and have some problems interpreting
what has been already stated here.
John Stafford
> imagine a machine set up to destroy anything coloured a specific shade
> of blue (possibly the colour of an enemies uniform) The machine
> detects the colour and destroys the object or person. Has the machine
> detected or also experienced the colour? it would depend on the
> intelligence of the machine of course. If the machine was a sentient
> AI robot, designed to mimic the vision processing capabilities of a
> human with an electronic brain, a mind and consciousness, could it be
> said that the machine has experienced the colour? If colour was a
> quale, could the machine have experienced a quale? If the machine is
> indeed sentient and perfectly mimics a human, then if humans
> experience a quale, then logically, so must the robot.
IMHO, quale is just a word that means "it is a terminal and ineffable
state" and people who go on and on about it are boring. That's my quale
of quale talk.
> In the case of a human replacing the machine, but also with the same
> destructive capability, the question would depend on the vision
> capability of the person. Could a blind person with some kind of
> technical augmentation, "experience" the colour as pulses on the skin,
> or different notes of sound. Could that experience be comparable to
> the experience a normally sighted person undergoes when seeing this
> particular shade?
Normally sighted people of the same culture have similar emotional
responses to colors. Simply saying 'blue' might invoke the response, but
only to one who has experienced that blue via sight. One who has never
had sight will not have the same experience.
> The qualists to be consistant should insist that the blind person has
> not experienced the quale of blueness of that shade, but the fact that
> it's a human, means that the human has the potential to experience the
> quale, even though physical limitations prevent the person from doing
> so.
Of what significance is potential here, and why even mention it?
> If the machine could experience the quale but the human could not,
> then the quale must be equal to the mental experience of having
> functioning visual apparatus.
Not necessarily. First, the robot is not of our culture and second the
detection of blue to the robot might be a simple binary ding while in
the human it is inter-related among vastly complex and unknown
interactions of the brain.
> therefore blue quale = light of the wavelength for blu processed by
> retina, rods, visual cortex and brain.
OK, but you are denying the qualites of their religious magical thinking.
> Conclusion
> quales are terminology only, and add no further value to what we
> already understand about the process of seeing colour.
That's good by me.
John Stafford
> On Fri, 03 Jul 2009 01:18:53 -0700, Errol wrote:
>
>> imagine a machine
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vectorscope
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectrometer
>
> Look, what we call color is part of the
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum
>
> It is part of light. Color is a form of visible electromagnetic radiation.
>
> So to make your same case you do not really need to get into what color
> seems to be to people or how color is experienced. Color is defined
> outside of the human experience as is rock or water.
Presuming the subtext of this thread is human's experiencing color, then
color per se is defined as parts of the _visual_ electromagnetic
spectrum. For a normally sighted person, color is certainly defined
within human experience. It is an experience. Seeing radio-waves is not
defined within human experience because we simply cannot see them.
Indeed, we can use instruments to detect color - and radio waves, but
the later are not part of human experience.
Art
wrote:
>> >therefore blue quale = light of the wavelength for blu processed by
>> >retina, rods, visual cortex and brain.
>>
>> Nope. Qualia refer to conscious experience.
>>
>
>Why is the light of the wavelength called blue (or shade of blue),
>processed by the brain as colour, NOT conscious experience?
Because nobody knows how conscious experience works. Merely
talking about the physics and neuron pattern firings, etc, explains
nothing about conscious experiences, which are subjective.
As I said, nobody knows how to design a conscious robot. Consciousness
is a mystery.
John Jones
> The machine
> detects the colour
I stopped reading at the thought of that silly idea.
Giga
"Errol" <vs.e...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:bf301d7d-176c-4ca0...@a36g2000yqc.googlegroups.com...
> imagine a machine set up to destroy anything coloured a specific shade
> of blue (possibly the colour of an enemies uniform) The machine
> detects the colour and destroys the object or person. Has the machine
> detected or also experienced the colour? it would depend on the
> intelligence of the machine of course. If the machine was a sentient
> AI robot, designed to mimic the vision processing capabilities of a
> human with an electronic brain, a mind and consciousness, could it be
> said that the machine has experienced the colour? If colour was a
> quale, could the machine have experienced a quale? If the machine is
> indeed sentient and perfectly mimics a human, then if humans
> experience a quale, then logically, so must the robot.
Hard to see how it could known what the internal life of a machine is like.
It seems impossible even to know about other people in this way.
>
> In the case of a human replacing the machine, but also with the same
> destructive capability, the question would depend on the vision
> capability of the person. Could a blind person with some kind of
> technical augmentation, "experience" the colour as pulses on the skin,
> or different notes of sound. Could that experience be comparable to
> the experience a normally sighted person undergoes when seeing this
> particular shade?
No. Its a different modality path in the brain.
>
> The qualists to be consistant should insist that the blind person has
> not experienced the quale of blueness of that shade, but the fact that
> it's a human, means that the human has the potential to experience the
> quale, even though physical limitations prevent the person from doing
> so.
No
>
> If the machine could experience the quale but the human could not,
> then the quale must be equal to the mental experience of having
> functioning visual apparatus.
But you precified that it was a sentient robot. In other words it is aware
of internal representation of *itself* inside a world. This far more than
just a 'visual [data collection] system'.
Giga
"ZerkonXXXX" <Z...@erkonx.net> wrote in message
news:pan.2009.07...@erkonx.net...
> On Fri, 03 Jul 2009 01:18:53 -0700, Errol wrote:
>
>> imagine a machine
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vectorscope
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectrometer
>
> Look, what we call color is part of the
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_spectrum
>
> It is part of light. Color is a form of visible electromagnetic radiation.
>
> So to make your same case you do not really need to get into what color
> seems to be to people or how color is experienced. Color is defined
> outside of the human experience as is rock or water.
OK so what colour are x-rays?
>
> A TV engineer for instance, will look at a properly calibrated
> Vectorscope to see 'red' not as a color but as a wave pattern on a scope.
> The base reference for calibration of this scope will be another
> electronic signal, color bars, which also has no relation to how colors
> seem to be. So if the engineer sees blue as red, they will easily know it
> as anyone else could. Other than the word itself, blue is not a product
> of human consensus.
But are they expertiencing the same colour as you? You may both call it red
but how do you know its the same?
>
> So to hold the position that color is restricted to 'quale', all light
> and all information delivered by light would have to be included which
> verifies your conclusion of "no further value".
I ask again, what colour is an x-ray?
Giga
"John Stafford" <now...@nowhere.nl> wrote in message
news:x9GdndxC9u4QiNPX...@supernews.com...
Strictly speaking instruments can detect the frequency of the light and from
that it can be deduced what name most people will call their internal
experience of that frequency of EM if it is in the tiny range which can
detected by the human eye.
Giga
= 'Quale' is just a label for elements of a conscious experience, maybe a
colour, form, sound, touch etc. We are all, presumably, familiar with quales
and if quales just existing was an argument for dualism then dualism has
won. AFAIU a materialist can admit they have quales with no danger of
slipping into dualism.
dorayme
"Giga" <"Giga" <just(removetheseandaddmatthe end)ho...@yahoo.co>
wrote:
> 'Quale' is just a label for elements of a conscious experience, maybe a
> colour, form, sound, touch etc. We are all, presumably, familiar with quales
> and if quales just existing was an argument for dualism then dualism has
> won. AFAIU a materialist can admit they have quales with no danger of
> slipping into dualism.
Presumably, for it to be a useful label, we must have some idea of what
element is being talked about. What makes a philosopher think there is
an element that can be named? Someone sees a red post box and he wants
to isolate some element in this act of seeing, yes?
Well, there are all sorts of things going on here, what element in
particular does he mean? There is a man but he does not mean him. There
is a mind, he does not mean it. There is the post box, he does not mean
this either. What does he mean then?
The traditional answer to this is something like: he means something
that goes on that has nothing necessarily to do with the post box. A man
can seem to see a red post box when there is no red post box there. When
there is an hallucination, there seems at least to be something that is
directly given to the man.
However, it does *not* follow from that something seems to be given to
him that it is. But let us probe a little more on our philosopher's
behalf.
It may well be true that the man seems to see a red post box. It may
well be true that he is undergoing a mental process. We can say that he
is somehow describing this mental process when he is not under any
illusion about himself. For example, he may very well know there is no
red post box in the room, that he has had a medication which has known
side effects of making people seem to see things that are not there.
Very well. But where does an element that deserves a name come in? We
already know he seems to see something. We can already rather well
describe the situation.
It is a mistake to jump from this to say that there is a seeming-to-see
object. There is a person seeming to see something and there is a brain
that is undergoing a mental event. Beyond this we don't know.
--
dorayme
walterimlenz
> ...
I'm not addressed, but I want to note that I go along with all
of it.
Walter Imlenz
Giga
"dorayme" <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote in message
news:doraymeRidThis-F53...@news.albasani.net...
OK, I think I finaly understand what you mean. But to add to your
description obviously this seeming-to-see event happens within a
consciousness as well, yes?
> --
> dorayme
dorayme
Seeming to see something is almost quintessentially done consciously. I
don't know about it happening "within a consciousness" but then I am
perhaps being pedantic. But it is important in this area to be pretty
careful how we speak. The reason I say it is quintessential is that it
can be contrasted with seeing that is not consciously noted or attended
to. Ever played table tennis at an advanced level? (I was a school champ
for a few years running ... <g>). You do not consciously see a lot of
things that happen, it's too fast.
Interestingly enough, perhaps this is a bit off topic, there is quite a
lot of seeing that can happen unconsciously and not all of it is like in
the table tennis way (where you must have seen a lot of stuff without
being conscious of it).
I am talking about the rather interesting phenomenon of "blind sight"
where people look and can tell if various objects are there but they do
not *seem to see* them at all. This is different to the table tennis
case in that it can be very deliberate. They simply do not report that
they seem to see certain things but when asked questions about things in
front of them, their answers are quite beyond chance! Here there is
unconscious seeing I guess... They see but do not seem to see! It s a
rare condition.
--
dorayme
Errol
ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
>
> > If the machine could experience the quale but the human could not,
> > then the quale must be equal to the mental experience of having
> > functioning visual apparatus.
>
> But you precified that it was a sentient robot. In other words it is aware
> of internal representation of *itself* inside a world. This far more than
> just a 'visual [data collection] system'.
>
>
Went away for the weekend. Not ignoring
I was trying to show that the experience of colour is dependant on
hardware, (mostly eyes and brain).
The robot is not a philosophical zombie which does not experience
qualia.
A human without retina cannot experience blue (even rubbing your eyes
when closed will not produce colour if you have no cones and rods to
stimulate)
A perfect artificial copy of a human can at least conceptually and I
think metaphysically, experience colour
Errol
>
> It is a mistake to jump from this to say that there is a seeming-to-see
> object. There is a person seeming to see something and there is a brain
> that is undergoing a mental event. Beyond this we don't know.
>
This is the subjective perspective of the the explanatory gap.
"We have an incomplete grasp of what goes on objectively in the brain
and the body. But there is, it seems, a vast chasm between the two. It
is very hard to see how this chasm in our understanding could ever be
bridged. For no matter how deeply we probe into the physical structure
of neurons and the chemical transactions which occur when they fire,
no matter how much objective information we come to acquire, we still
seem to be left with something that we cannot explain, namely, why and
how such-and-such objective, physical changes, whatever they might be,
generate so-and-so subjective feeling, or any subjective feeling at
all. "
The physicalist view of experiences and feelings suggest that some
physical qualities or states are irreducibly subjective entities.
These subjective entities are IMO the result of experience.
Giga
= I'll accept that is certainly possible in which case we face exactly the
same problems in determining what it is experiencing as we do with a person.
So I'm not sure how much this idea brings us?
Errol
John Stafford
> [...]
> I am talking about the rather interesting phenomenon of "blind sight"
> where people look and can tell if various objects are there but they do
> not *seem to see* them at all. This is different to the table tennis
> case in that it can be very deliberate. They simply do not report that
> they seem to see certain things but when asked questions about things in
> front of them, their answers are quite beyond chance! Here there is
> unconscious seeing I guess... They see but do not seem to see! It s a
> rare condition.
The part of the brain that 'sees' as you described is not available to
the language center. It is associated with lower levels of behavior
which consciousness cannot reach.
So our intellect is rather like a stranger to its body, hence dualism.
I'm suggesting that consciousness is a sense like sight, hearing, and
so-forth and it is commingled with the language center which exists so
that we can communicate, symbolically, with others of our species.
Language is entirely primitive, incomplete, and quite possibly by
necessity so that we don't tumble into a recursive lock-up.
ZerkonXXXX
> The only point i disaggree with is your contention that colour is not
> experienced.
I have not made myself clear then. I am not saying unique color is not
experienced in unique manner. I am saying, which you may be also, is that
this unique manner of experience does not define the unique color. Just
as water might be a thing of joy to one but horror to another does not
alter water nor the possibility of more neutral human perceptions of it.
> The neuron firings dredge up past memories of colour with thousands of
> associations, which might have psychological implications due to half
> forgotten experiences.
>
> Colour has psychological impact as well as the mere perception of the
> colour.
> There are support groups to help people overcome their fear of the
> colour red for example, due to trauma involving bloody accidents or
> association with blushing and self consciousness.
>
> Colour exists outside the human experience as do rock and water, but
> colour processed by the human brain includes a host of remembered
> associations. These associations do not require quales to explain them.
> memory and experience is sufficient.
Agree, the concept forces an absolute and unqualified separation between
thought and experience.
dorayme
John Stafford <now...@nowhere.nl> wrote:
> dorayme wrote:
> > [...]
> > I am talking about the rather interesting phenomenon of "blind sight"
> > where people look and can tell if various objects are there but they do
> > not *seem to see* them at all. This is different to the table tennis
> > case in that it can be very deliberate. They simply do not report that
> > they seem to see certain things but when asked questions about things in
> > front of them, their answers are quite beyond chance! Here there is
> > unconscious seeing I guess... They see but do not seem to see! It s a
> > rare condition.
>
>
> The part of the brain that 'sees' as you described is not available to
> the language center. It is associated with lower levels of behavior
> which consciousness cannot reach.
What does "not available" mean? And "cannot reach"? The must mean
something that does not make being conscious of seeing impossible!
--
dorayme
Errol
ho...@yahoo.co> wrote:
> "Errol" <vs.er...@gmail.com> wrote in message
It supports the idea that quales can be explained within a physicalist
framework, and by adding memory and experience to fill in the
subjective side of the gap, it can be a complete explanation for what
we call qualia.
Errol
I would add memory and experience to those senses and you have the
basic components of consciousness. memory is key, because it provides
a sense of continuity and thereby a sense of self. An animal without a
decent longterm memory capability could hardly attain sentience.
Giga
=Unless of course your theoretical robot is complicated enough that it can
generate a non-material consciousness, in some way.
John Stafford
It means that in blind sight, the brain sees objects but with part of
the brain that does not communicate in any way with the language
centers; the seeing is not available to consciousness. The person avoids
obstacles but cannot explain that he does or why.
dorayme
John Stafford <now...@nowhere.nl> wrote:
We know that in blind sight, people do not see things in the normal way.
But they are able to describe what they are 'not seeing' with *language*
as far as I know, so I have no real idea what you are saying with this
business of not being available to the language centre. It sounds more
scientific than we have a right to be, we do not know enough about the
matter.
--
dorayme
Giga
colosum (sic the bundle of fibre connecting the two somewhat independent
halves of the brain) cut (often because of very severe epilepsy). This would
imply that there is a communication difficulty causing this, especially as
one side of the brain is more specialised for language (left?). I've even
seen where the person is asked to copy a picture that is in front them and
they only draw one side of it.
Zinnic
> In article <OqudnbIsbO2-d8zXnZ2dnUVZ_qadn...@supernews.com>,> > > In article <uqydnXXG8bZXQc3XnZ2dnUVZ_hadn...@supernews.com>,
Behaviour, not language, is used for evidence of 'seeing' via the
blind sight neural pathways.
Your ignorance in this area is obvious. Read up on the subject of
'blind' sight.Then admit that "as far as you know" is not far enough.
Zinnic
Patricia Aldoraz
Would you try to be more civil, Zinnic, please? There is no need for
such bitterness. No one really knows how blind sight works, there are
various clues to various things. What Giga said was scientifically
interesting. What you are saying is simply harassment. Be nicer, it
won't kill you. No wonder poor old dorayme is wary of you.
Zinnic
wrote:
> such bitterness. No one really knows how blind sight works, there are
> various clues to various things. What Giga said was scientifically
> interesting. What you are saying is simply harassment. Be nicer, it
Are you so enamoured of Dorayme that you are 'blind' to the fact that
I was defending Giga's "scientifically interesting" post against
Dorayme's ill-informed criticism?
I guess to be called on a gross error is harrassment in your book. I
do not subscribe.
As to civility-check it out with your hero!
Zinnic
Patricia Aldoraz
> Are you so enamoured of orayme that you are 'blind' to the fact that
> I was defending Giga's "scientifically interesting" post against
> orayme's ill-informed criticism?
dorayme's criticism was not ill-informed. He is rarely ill-informed.
Wash your mouth out after saying such a horrible thing. He is very
sensitive. There is no need for you to defend Giga, I will defend him
when he deserves it.
Zinnic
wrote:
OK! Dorayme. You had me going, but I admit it was amusing :-)
Goodbye Patricia, I will miss you.!
Zinnic