English Prime ( E-Prime [To Exist or Not to Exist])
Immortalist
any form of (to_be) in what I write and/or say.
http://www.hilgart.org/papers_html/091S196.B07.html
In 1933, in Science and Sanity, Alfred Korzybski proposed that we should
abolish the "is of identity" from the English language. (The "is of
identity" takes the form X is a Y. e.g., "Joe is a Communist," "Mary is a
dumb file-clerk," "The universe is a giant machine," etc.) In 1949, D. David
Bourland Jr. proposed the abolition of all forms of the words "is" or "to
be" and the Bourland proposal (English without "isness") he called E-Prime,
or English-Prime.
http://fusionanomaly.net/eprime.html
"It was found that the background linguistic system (in other words, the
grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing
ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for
the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his
synthesis of his mental stock in trade."
--Benjamin Lee Whorf: 'Language, Thought and Reality'
English Prime - E-Prime for short. E-Prime comprises standard English with
all forms of the verb 'TO BE' deleted; its use prevents forms of the verb
'TO BE' creating erroneous and irrational generalisations in language and
thought. Further techniques presented in here provide for accuracy in
linguistic description such as to destroy the peculiar notion held by some
that assertions and opinions (using the 'TO BE' verb) exist as 'out there'
independent facts; the speaker gets re-attached to his comments and
thoughts - as it occurs in reality.
http://www.angelfire.com/nd/danscorpio/ep2.html
The idea for English Prime comes from a concern that "to be" verbs tend to
mislead our thinking. They do this in two ways: "to be" suggests an
equation, that saying "John is a football player." sounds like "John" and
"football player" equal one another, while in reality John has many more
categories in which he could fit; calling John a football player sounds like
you now know everything that can be known about John.
The verb "to be" also tends to suggest a frozen, static condition. The
universe constantly changes, but saying something "is" can lead us to ignore
changes. I like the comparison semanticists make between "maps" and
"territories": maps do not change as fast as the territories they represent
change. Using "is" reinforces the mistaken idea that the territories-words
represent continue on with no changes.
http://www.wonderfulwritingskillsunhandbook.com/html/e-prime.html
1. Personal Perspective:
E-Prime, the omission of the verb "to be" from English usage, alleges not
only to clarify meaning in written and spoken English, but also actually to
enhance critical thinking! So says its inventor, the semanticist D. David
Bourland, Jr.
2. Impersonal Perspective:
E-Prime is the omission of the verb "to be" from English usage, and is
alleged not only to clarify meaning in written and spoken English, but also
actually to enhance critical thinking! This is according to its inventor,
the semanticist D. David Bourland, Jr.
http://www.ctlow.ca/E-Prime/E-Prime.html
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING E -PRIME
Robert Anton Wilson
E-PRIME, abolishing all forms of the verb "to be," has its roots in the
field of general semantics, as presented by Alfred Korzybski in his 1933
book, Science and Sanity. Korzybski pointed out the pitfalls associated
with, and produced by, two usages of "to be": identity and predication. His
student D. David Bourland, Jr., observed that even linguistically sensitive
people do not seem able to avoid identity and predication uses of "to be" if
they continue to use the verb at all. Bourland pioneered in demonstrating
that one can indeed write and speak without using any form of "to be,"
calling this subset of the English language "E-Prime." Many have urged the
use of E-Prime in writing scientific and technical papers. Dr. Kellogg
exemplifies a prime exponent of this activity. Dr. Albert Ellis has
rewritten five of his books in E-Prime, in collaboration with Dr. Robert H.
Moore, to improve their clarity and to reap the epistemological benefits of
this language revision. Korzybski felt that all humans should receive
training in general semantics from grade school on, as "semantic hygiene"
against the most prevalent forms of logical error, emotional distortion, and
"demonological thinking." E-Prime provides a straightforward training
technique for acquiring such semantic hygiene.
To understand E-Prime, consider the human brain as a computer. (Note that I
did not say the brain "is" a computer.) As the Prime Law of Computers tells
us, GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT (GIGO, for short). The wrong software guarantees
wrong answers. Conversely, finding the right software can "miraculously"
solve problems that previously appeared intractable.
It seems likely that the principal software used in the human brain consists
of words, metaphors, disguised metaphors, and linguistic structures in
general. The Sapir-Whorf-Korzybski Hypothesis, in anthropology, holds that a
change in language can alter our perception of the cosmos. A revision of
language structure, in particular, can alter the brain as dramatically as a
psychedelic. In our metaphor, if we change the software, the computer
operates in a new way.
Consider the following paired sets of propositions, in which Standard
English alternates with English-Prime (E-Prime):
lA. The electron is a wave.
lB. The electron appears as a wave when measured with instrument-l.
2A. The electron is a particle.
2B. The electron appears as a particle when measured with instrument-2.
3A. John is lethargic and unhappy.
3B. John appears lethargic and unhappy in the office.
4A. John is bright and cheerful.
4B. John appears bright and cheerful on holiday at the beach.
5A. This is the knife the first man used to stab the second man.
5B. The first man appeared to stab the second man with what looked like a
knife to me.
6A. The car involved in the hit-and-run accident was a blue Ford.
6B. In memory, I think I recall the car involved in the hit-and-run accident
as a blue Ford.
7A. This is a fascist idea.
7B. This seems like a fascist idea to me.
8A. Beethoven is better than Mozart.
8B. In my present mixed state of musical education and ignorance, Beethoven
seems better to me than Mozart.
9A. That is a sexist movie.
9B. That seems like a sexist movie to me.
10A. The fetus is a person.
10B. In my system of metaphysics, I classify the fetus as a person.
The "A"-type statements (Standard English) all implicitly or explicitly
assume the medieval view called "Aristotelian essentialism" or "naive
realism." In other words, they assume a world made up of block-like entities
with indwelling "essences" or spooks- "ghosts in the machine." The "B"-type
statements (E-Prime) recast these sentences into a form isomorphic to modern
science by first abolishing the "is" of Aristotelian essence and then
reformulating each observation in terms of signals received and interpreted
by a body (or instrument) moving in space-time.
Relativity, quantum mechanics, large sections of general physics, perception
psychology, sociology, linguistics, modern math, anthropology, ethology, and
several other sciences make perfect sense when put into the software of
E-Prime. Each of these sciences generates paradoxes, some bordering on
"nonsense" or "gibberish," if you try to translate them back into the
software of Standard English.
Concretely, "The electron is a wave" employs the Aristotelian "is" and
thereby introduces us to the false-to-experience notion that we can know the
indwelling "essence" of the electron. "The electron appears as a wave when
measured by instrument-1" reports what actually occurred in space-time,
namely that the electron when constrained by a certain instrument behaved in
a certain way.
Similarly, "The electron is a particle" contains medieval Aristotelian
software, but "The electron appears as a particle when measured by
instrument-2" contains modern scientific software. Once again, the software
determines whether we impose a medieval or modern grid upon our
reality-tunnel.
Note that "the electron is a wave" and "the electron is a particle"
contradict each other and begin the insidious process by which we move
gradually from paradox to nonsense to total gibberish. On the other hand,
the modern scientific statements "the electron appears as a wave when
measured one way" and "the electron appears as a particle measured another
way" do not contradict, but rather complement each other. (Bohr's Principle
of Complementarity, which explained this and revolutionized physics, would
have appeared obvious to all, and not just to a person of his genius, if
physicists had written in E-Prime all along. . . .)
Looking at our next pair, "John is lethargic and unhappy" vs. "John is
bright and cheerful,' we see again how medieval software creates
metaphysical puzzles and totally imaginary contradictions. Operationalizing
the statements, as physicists since Bohr have learned to operationalize, we
find that the E-Prime translations do not contain any contradiction, and
even give us a clue as to causes of John's changing moods. (Look back if you
forgot the translations.)
"The first man stabbed the second man with a knife" lacks the overt "is" of
identity but contains Aristotelian software nonetheless. The E-Prime
translation not only operationalizes the data, but may fit the facts
better-if the incident occurred in a psychology class, which often conduct
this experiment. (The first man "stabs," or makes stabbing gestures at, the
second man, with a banana, but many students, conditioned by Aristotelian
software, nonetheless "see" a knife. You don't need to take drugs to
hallucinate; improper language can fill your world with phantoms and spooks
of many kinds.)
The reader may employ his or her own ingenuity in analyzing how "is-ness"
creates false-to-facts reality-tunnels in the remaining examples, and how
E-Prime brings us back to the scientific, the operational, the existential,
the phenomenological--to what humans and their instruments actually do in
space-time as they create observations, perceptions, thoughts, deductions,
and General Theories.
I have found repeatedly that when baffled by a problem in science, in
"philosophy," or in daily life, I gain immediate insight by writing down
what I know about the enigma in strict E-Prime. Often, solutions appear
immediately-just as happens when you throw out the "wrong" software and put
the "right" software into your PC. In other cases, I at least get an insight
into why the problem remains intractable and where and how future science
might go about finding an answer. (This has contributed greatly to my
ever-escalating agnosticism about the political, ideological, and religious
issues that still generate the most passion on this primitive planet.)
When a proposition resists all efforts to recast it in a form consistent
with what we now call E-Prime, many consider it "meaningless." Korzybski,
Wittgenstein, the Logical Positivists, and (in his own way) Niels Bohr
promoted this view. I happen to agree with that verdict (which condemns 99
percent of theology and 99.999999 percent of metaphysics to the category of
Noise rather than Meaning)--but we must save that subject for another
article. For now, it suffices to note that those who fervently believe such
Aristotelian propositions as "A piece of bread, blessed by a priest, is a
person (who died two thousand years ago)," "The flag is a living being," or
"The fetus is a human being" do not, in general, appear to make sense by
normal twentieth-century scientific standards.
http://www.nobeliefs.com/eprime.htm
E-prime
Software for Generating Psychology Experiments
http://personal.bgsu.edu/~randers/e-prime.htm
http://www.trans4mind.com/personal_development/GeneralSemantics/Ken'sEPrime.htm
http://alt-usage-english.org/excerpts/fxeprime.html
John Jones
Now that you've been discussing your new Bathroom Design for a while,
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§ Major Remodeling: upgrading appliances and knocking out walls
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Before you make any decision you will regret, take into consideration
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Finishing Touches to Your Newly Remodeled Bath
· Add a simple detail, such as a shelf along one wall, to display
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· Fill antique bowls or shaving mugs with pretty toiletries, such as
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· If you have room, consider adding a piece of outdoor furniture like
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Mix and match colors by using a light-colored stain for the background
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· Add fresh flowers or flowering plants to the room. Bathroom
remodeling is not only about concrete and cement!
· Seek out unusual vessels, such as wall vases, old watering cans or
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· Attach a beveled mirror to the wall over the sink and frame it with
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Products and ideas for the perfect bathroom.
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Bathroom remodel
Tips, tricks and traps of remodeling your bathroom.
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In order to minimize or eliminate this effect:
- Use warm-colored floors. Use the softening effect of warm-colored
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Warm-colored tiles
Albert
> You never wrote it. I'm not reading it. You read this instead:
Way to go, John. I see you are on to Immortalist.
--
"Mercifully free of the ravages of intelligence"
-- Time Bandits
Anthony G. Rubino
It is a 'nice try' to avoid the ontological implications of language;
but a rose by another names smells the same. It does have some merit in
emphasizing the limitations of observation and description, but a
science of observing and describing 'what is not' would, to overstate
its value, have little merit. The ontological implication is inherent in
consciousness itself even at the level of simple awareness or "qualia".
At the level of thought and self-identity it is indisputable and was
used by St. Anselm, and Descarte, repectively, as the foundation of
their positions.
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/trisector/
http://www.trisector.org/
So many misconceptions, so little time.
John Jones
connoiseurs choice for the period bathroom?
JJ
Will Twentyman
> As an exponent of the E-Prime dialect of English, I presently refuse to
> use any form of (to_be) in what I write and/or say.
>
Why not go with the Spanish approach: "ser" indicates a (semi-)permanent
state, while "estar" indicates a temporary state. Emotional states use
estar, while long-term characteristics use ser.
--
Will Twentyman
email: wtwentyman at copper dot net
Immortalist
"Anthony G. Rubino" <TRIS...@webtv.net> wrote in message
news:26299-421...@storefull-3251.bay.webtv.net...
> To Immortalist, on E-Prime:
>
> It is a 'nice try' to avoid the ontological implications of language;
> but a rose by another names smells the same. It does have some merit in
> emphasizing the limitations of observation and description, but a
> science of observing and describing 'what is not' would, to overstate
> its value, have little merit. The ontological implication is inherent in
> consciousness itself even at the level of simple awareness or "qualia".
> At the level of thought and self-identity it is indisputable and was
> used by St. Anselm, and Descarte, repectively, as the foundation of
> their positions.
>
The past will, responding to further past moments, shapes the current will,
responding to the last moments. This entire argument is backwards, we are
error driven trial and error machines. We only shine the light in places
that we have not shined them before because we remember that there was
nothing there on preceding trials. Though our charactor is formed by
circumstances, our own desires can do much to shape [adjust] these
circumstances; effects react back on causes which influence further effects.
Error driven systems work by won'ting or halting the normal course of
things, recognized by different areas of the brain responding to
differing time intervals.
http://www.willamette.edu/~gorr/classes/cs449/backprop.html
In backcasting techniques (commonly used by professional futurists) a model
is built withholding the most recent data from the human managing the model.
Once the system finds order in past data, say from the 1980s, it is fed the
record of the last several years. If it can accurately predict the 1993
outcome, based on what it found in the 1980s, then the pattern seeker has
won its wings. Farmer: "The system makes twenty models. We run them each
through a sieve of diagnostic statistics. Then the six of us will get
together to select the one to run live." Each round of model-building may
take days on the Company's computers. But once local order is detected, a
prediction based on it can be spun in milliseconds.
http://www.kk.org/outofcontrol/ch22-d.html
............................
Historical Reconstruction (Backcasting)
Backcasting is required when disputes arise over historical events. For
example, a group of retail customers may claim that certain wholesale system
sales caused an unjustified rise in their cost of power, or a generator may
claim that transmission access was unfairly denied. Backcasting allows the
re-creation of historical events within a model so that the cost impacts of
changes to what actually occurred (such as allowing transmission access) can
be computed. Slater Consulting has a great deal of experience in Backcasting
and provides expert testimony in support of Backcasting results.
http://slater-consulting.com/historical_reconstruction.htm
....................................
Backcasting is the antonym of forecasting. It entails starting from a
certain Image of the future (say, for the year 2050) and working back to the
present to find out what has to happen to ensure that future scenario is
achieved.
http://www.wau.nl/cool/coolbox/national/futureimages.htm
...........................................
Or we could choose an time, say yesterday, deprive the computer system of
the outcome today, set loose an competition of intuitive pattern seeking
algorithms, select the one that found today's outcome, try and predict
tommorow with it. One of the few known techiques that allow us to cut
through extreme complexity to achieve 'simplicity_without_reductionism'.
While forecasting asks about what future is likely to happen, backcasting
examines how desirable futures can be attained. The execution of
forecasting is to provide a one-time snapshot, while backcasting employs
continuous monitoring. Forecasting uses *extrapolation* from historical
data to converge on the most likely future while backcasting *interpolates*
from the target setting to diverge in possible futures with regard to
freedom of action.
http://edie.cprost.sfu.ca/summer/mail/msg00023.html
In the above example we interpolate from what happened and how it got there
and multiple varying programs that try to get there without knowing the
outcome.
...........................................
Backcasting: Forecasting is the process of thinking about the future as an
extension of the present and the past. Products developed through
forecasting are usually characterized by "er" words": faster, cheaper,
smaller, and stronger. Forecasting is a form of extrapolation that
ultimately is self limiting: sooner or later, products developed based on
forecasting will reach plateaus of diminishing returns, become too complex,
carry too much baggage, or suffer sudden obsolescence caused by power
shifts.
Backcasting is the creative process of identifying future customer needs and
core values, and interpolating back from there to current design strategies.
The starting point for the backcasting approach is the definition of a
desired situation at a determined point in the future. This leads to the
development of scenarios that connect our present status with the desired
future point.
Backcasting helps your product team identify, explore and clarify
restrictions in their thinking about new opportunities, and helps the team
to let go of these constraints. Backcasting also provides alternatives that
challenges the solutions generated from forecasting.
Convergent Design Inc. uses an array of creative problem solving techniques
to take your team through this process, and help them to begin a new
development cycle with the future in mind
http://www.convergentdesign.com/
Immortalist
"Will Twentyman" <wtwen...@read.my.sig> wrote in message
news:421bd03b$1...@newsfeed.slurp.net...
> Immortalist wrote:
>
>> As an exponent of the E-Prime dialect of English, I presently refuse to
>> use any form of (to_be) in what I write and/or say.
>>
>
> Why not go with the Spanish approach: "ser" indicates a (semi-)permanent
> state, while "estar" indicates a temporary state. Emotional states use
> estar, while long-term characteristics use ser.
>
But don't the emotional tones both continue to describe the "temporal
extension" ie, to_be of it?
How would the varying temporal extension denotation be used to interpret the
distinctions between As and Bs below?
lA. The electron is a wave.
lB. The electron appears as a wave when measured with instrument-l.
2A. The electron is a particle.
2B. The electron appears as a particle when measured with instrument-2.
3A. John is lethargic and unhappy.
3B. John appears lethargic and unhappy in the office.
4A. John is bright and cheerful.
4B. John appears bright and cheerful on holiday at the beach.
5A. This is the knife the first man used to stab the second man.
5B. The first man appeared to stab the second man with what looked like a
knife to me.
6A. The car involved in the hit-and-run accident was a blue Ford.
6B. In memory, I think I recall the car involved in the hit-and-run accident
as a blue Ford.
7A. This is a fascist idea.
7B. This seems like a fascist idea to me.
8A. Beethoven is better than Mozart.
8B. In my present mixed state of musical education and ignorance, Beethoven
seems better to me than Mozart.
9A. That is a sexist movie.
9B. That seems like a sexist movie to me.
10A. The fetus is a person.
10B. In my system of metaphysics, I classify the fetus as a person.
http://www.nobeliefs.com/eprime.htm
Will Twentyman
>
> "Will Twentyman" <wtwen...@read.my.sig> wrote in message
> news:421bd03b$1...@newsfeed.slurp.net...
>
>> Immortalist wrote:
>>
>>> As an exponent of the E-Prime dialect of English, I presently refuse
>>> to use any form of (to_be) in what I write and/or say.
>>>
>>
>> Why not go with the Spanish approach: "ser" indicates a
>> (semi-)permanent state, while "estar" indicates a temporary state.
>> Emotional states use estar, while long-term characteristics use ser.
>>
>
> But don't the emotional tones both continue to describe the "temporal
> extension" ie, to_be of it?
I don't see it as an emotional tone so much as whether a property is
asserted to exist, or whether the property is asserted to appear to exist.
> How would the varying temporal extension denotation be used to interpret
> the distinctions between As and Bs below?
>
> lA. The electron is a wave.
>
> lB. The electron appears as a wave when measured with instrument-l.
A states that the electron has a permanent property of being a wave, B
asserts only that it exhibits wave characteristics. Note: when doing
science, B is probably a more accurate statement.
> 2A. The electron is a particle.
>
> 2B. The electron appears as a particle when measured with instrument-2.
>
> 3A. John is lethargic and unhappy.
>
> 3B. John appears lethargic and unhappy in the office.
Here, again, the issue is whether perception accurately reflects his
state. Spanish would use estar to indicate that he truly is lethargic
and unhappy, but that it could change without warning.
> 4A. John is bright and cheerful.
>
> 4B. John appears bright and cheerful on holiday at the beach.
>
> 5A. This is the knife the first man used to stab the second man.
>
> 5B. The first man appeared to stab the second man with what looked like a
> knife to me.
Here, A is asserting a property for the knife, which may be incorrect,
while B asserts an observation which suggests the property stated in A.
Suppose it is known that the knife was used in the stabbing as
described in A. How would you restate it without using to_be?
> 6A. The car involved in the hit-and-run accident was a blue Ford.
>
> 6B. In memory, I think I recall the car involved in the hit-and-run
> accident
> as a blue Ford.
>
> 7A. This is a fascist idea.
>
> 7B. This seems like a fascist idea to me.
Here, we are distinguishing between fact and opinion. The idea may
objectively be a fascist idea, in which case to say it only seems like a
fascist idea is a much weaker statement.
Anthony G. Rubino
What does forecasting, or backcasting, have to do with E-Prime, and the
implication of existence in language?
Edgar Svendsen
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:0Ledncumob5...@adelphia.com...
English Prime doesn't seem as if it would go over very well in many common
situations.
If my wife says "Who made this mess on the kitchen floor?" and I answer "In
memory, I think I recall the small person we refer to as our son Johnny, as
making that mess." She's going to say "What the hell is the matter with
you?"
Ed
poopd...@gmail.com
Immortalist wrote:
> As an exponent of the E-Prime dialect of English, I presently refuse
to use
> any form of (to_be) in what I write and/or say.
>
> http://www.hilgart.org/papers_html/091S196.B07.html
>
> In 1933, in Science and Sanity, Alfred Korzybski proposed that we
should
> abolish the "is of identity" from the English language. (The "is of
> identity" takes the form X is a Y. e.g., "Joe is a Communist," "Mary
is a
> dumb file-clerk," "The universe is a giant machine," etc.) In 1949,
D. David
> Bourland Jr. proposed the abolition of all forms of the words "is" or
"to
> be" and the Bourland proposal (English without "isness") he called
E-Prime,
> or English-Prime.
No he didn't. He suggested that we should be careful in our use of "is
of identity" and not conflate it with other uses. And what you
describe as the "is of identity" isn't really the is of identity as
understood philosophically or linguistically. The is of identity
stipulates that two distinct names refer to a single object, as in the
case: "Scott is the author of Waverly."
'cid 'ooh
Immortalist
> To Immortalist:
>
> What does forecasting, or backcasting, have to do with E-Prime, and the
> implication of existence in language?
>
When you said;
> but a science of observing and describing
> 'what is not' would, to overstate its value,
> have little merit."
I came back with the merits of negative driven systems and the tally of
mistakes as a map of avoidence. I may have been wrong in interpreting your
meaning of "what is not," as reference to trial and error, so what did you
mean?
Immortalist
"Edgar Svendsen" <solo...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:aU7Td.9662$x53....@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
>
> "Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:0Ledncumob5...@adelphia.com...
>> As an exponent of the E-Prime dialect of English, I presently refuse to
>> use any form of (to_be) in what I write and/or say.
>>
>> http://www.hilgart.org/papers_html/091S196.B07.html
>>
>
> situations.
> If my wife says "Who made this mess on the kitchen floor?" and I answer
> "In memory, I think I recall the small person we refer to as our son
> Johnny, as making that mess." She's going to say "What the hell is the
> matter with you?"
>
> Ed
>
>> http://www.nobeliefs.com/eprime.htm
>>
defines the way a person behaves and thinks, must surely have it wrong
according to many cognitive scientists, including Noam Chomsky, Steven
Pinker, and others. Although the basic hypothesis of linguistic determinism
surely has flaws, one should not overly criticize the first people who began
thinking about this interesting subject. After all the subject refers to a
hypothesis, not a theory, and certainly not fact (yet).
Linguists today generally support either a 'strong' or a 'weak'
interpretation of the Sapir-Whorf-Korzybski hypothesis, and the leaning
seems to fall against the strong interpretation.
http://www.nobeliefs.com/Sapir-Whorf-Korzybski.htm
Immortalist
<poopd...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1109201988....@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
The idea of E-Prime originated with D. David Bourland, a student of
Korzybski's. The E-Prime unit demonstrates that students don't really need
to be nearly as much as they think. Conversely, getting rid of some of their
"ises" helps students see that E-Prime can help their writing in other
ways-by making them select better subjects, more active verbs, and fewer
flowery modifiers.
http://dfwcgs.net/sampler/ruth_eprime.html
A History of the 'Is of Identity'
Korzybski introduced general semantics to the world in two papers,"Time
Binding: The General Theory," written in 1924 and 1925. In these papers he
introduced his Structural Differential ("Anthropometer"), he discussed
consciousness of abstracting, confusion of the orders of abstraction,
silence on the objective levels, the individuality of objects,
non-aristotelian systems .... However, in neither of these papers did he use
the terms "identity" or "identification." He made no references whatsoever
to any "is of identity." These terms first made their appearance in
Korzybski's writings in 1931 in a paper he presented before the American
Mathematical Society in New Orleans. This paper is reprinted beginning on
page 747 in Science and Sanity.
Korzybski did not invent the expression "is of identity." The expression was
widely used in certain scholarly circles long before AK developed GS. For
example, in his 1931 paper AK gives credit to the writings of a 19th century
British mathematician, William Stanley Jevons, for formally discussing the
"is of identity" in connection with the Aristotelian "laws of thought" in
Jevons' 1883 book The Elements of Logic. (S&S p749)
Later in his paper AK quotes from the 1847 Formal Logic of the British
mathematician Augustus de Morgan: "The complete attempt to deal with the
term 'is' would go to the form and matter of everything in existence, at
least, if not to the possible form and matter of all that does not exist,
but might." (S&S p749-750)
Morgan's book also contains this statement, which Korzybski later quoted:
"The words 'is' and 'is not,' which imply the agreement or disagreement of
two ideas, must exist, explicitly or implicitly, in every assertion." (S&S
p3)
Long before S&S Bertrand Russell was writing of the "is of identity" in his
1903 book Principles of Mathematics. (Korzybski's Collected Writings p698)
Korzybski also quotes from George Santayana's 1923 book "Skepticism and
Animal Faith." Santayana wrote: "The little word 'is' has its tragedies; it
marries and identifies different things with the greatest innocence; and yet
no two are ever identical, and if therein lies the charm of wedding them and
calling them one, therein too lies the danger. Whenever I use the word 'is,'
except in sheer tautology, I deeply misuse it; and when I discover my error,
the world seems to fall asunder and the members of my family no longer know
one another." (S&S p3)
Clearly, the "is of identity" was well recognized by scholars long before
Korzybski's general semantics. Only after developing his theory of proper
evaluation through consciousness of abstracting and publishing two major
papers on the subject did AK introduce references to it.
Written 1996 by Steven Lewis (le...@pennvalley.cc.mo.us)
http://www.kcmetro.cc.mo.us/pennvalley/biology/lewis/historyis.htm
> 'cid 'ooh
>
Anthony G. Rubino
'What is' refers to what exists.
'What is not' refers to what does not exist.
It might appear that 'what is not' could not be referred to except for
the fact that we can extrapolate from our periods of consciousness to
periods when we were not, but we cannot refer to being aware of anything
that we were aware of during those periods of unconsciousness. One way
to look at it is that 'what is not' is a null set which precludes
differentiating any members of that set.
poopd...@gmail.com
<snip googled stuff>
You still don't get it. The examples you gave above are examples of
the "is of predication."
'cid 'ooh
Immortalist
<poopd...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1109294588.2...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
>
> Immortalist wrote:
>> <poopd...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>> news:1109201988....@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> <snip googled stuff>
>
> You still don't get it. The examples you gave above are examples of
> the "is of predication."
>
Let me check that out first brb;
The Frege-Russell Classification of 'is.'
One of the basic assumptions of the first-order logic of Gottlob Frege,
reproduced in the notation of Bertrand Russell, is that the 'be'
conjugation, usually represented in the form of the third-person singular
'is,' is semantically ambiguous between:
1. The 'is' of predication, as in 'Socrates is wise.'
2. The 'is' of identity, as in 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens.'
3. The 'is' of class-inclusion, as in 'Man is an animal.'
4. The 'is' of existence, which can include statements such as 'Socrates is,'
and the more common type of 'there is' locutions.
The two variants of 'the 'is' of existence,' which Peter Geach called the
'actuality' and 'there-is' uses, are often themselves regarded as separable.
The notation of both Frege and Russell, does not strictly distinguish
between them but is more usually concerned with the 'there is' variant.
Nevertheless, the fact that these different uses of 'is' are expressed by
means of three different and irreducible symbols in Frege's notation, means
that in at least three of these four different uses of the word 'is' are
taken as having a logically different meanings, independent of the syntactic
environment in which they occur. The distinctive character of identity
statements is particularly important within Frege's philosophy of language,
since it underpins the distinction between sense and denotation which he
introduces to solve paradoxes regarding identity statements and
propositional attitude reports.
This notion of 'is' as having a number of different meanings, which is here
given to a formal treatment, is the culmination of a long tradition in
philosophy. With Aristotle for example, there are indications that he held
to a distinction between the predicative and the existential uses of 'is.'
For it is not the same thing not to be something and not to be simpliciter,
though owing to the similarity of language to be something appears to differ
only a little from to be, and not to be something from not to be.
On Sophistical Refutations. 167a4-6
Since the 'there is' use does not occur in Attic Greek, Aristotle himself
does not make this distinction. However, with identity, class-inclusion and
predication, these are regarded by Aristotle as cases of 'the way in which
'to be' (ousia) is stated. All are thus regarded as cases of predication of
what is to be regarded as essential or accidental, with 'Socrates is a man'
and 'Socrates is pale' taken as examples of the first and the second
respectively. It is upon this basis that Aristotle then groups accidental
predications into those particular classes of essential predication that
form the basis of his categories.
At the other end of the historical scale, with Ludwig Wittgenstein, the
question of whether this particular aspect of Frege and Russell's logic was
rejected in his later philosophy is perhaps more difficult. The following
quotes seem to indicate that his position on this point was somewhat
ambiguous.
What does it mean to say that the "is" in "the rose is red" has a different
meaning from the "is" in "twice two is four"? If it is answered that it
means that different rules are valid for these two words, we can say that we
have only one word here. -And if all I am attending to is grammatical rules,
these do allow the use of the word "is" in both connections.-But the rule
which shews that the word "is" has different meanings in these sentences is
the one allowing us to replace "is" in the second sentence with the sign of
equality, and forbidding this substitution in the first sentence.
Philosophical Investigations I, 558.
Now isn't it queer that I say the word "is" is used with two different
meanings (as the copula and as the sign of equality), and should not care to
say that its meaning is its use; its use, that is, as the copula and the
sign of identity?
One would like to say that these two kinds of use do not yield a single
meaning; the union under one head is an accident, a mere inessential.
Philosophical Investigations I, 561.
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether these two different uses
highlighted by Wittgenstein, in addition to those identified by Frege and
Russell, are in fact aspects of the same use. And this indeed is what the
AIT analysis shows: That each of these meanings of 'is' can be explained in
terms of the relation between the Processant function and that of the
Extantal Imbuant.
Two: The 'is' of Predication.
Sentences like 'Socrates is wise,' attribute a particular quality or
characteristic to a subject. It is clear that this notion of predication
lies closest to the conception of the Processant function identified by AIT.
The main difference lies within the emphasis placed by AIT upon Extantal
Imbuancy, and its linking of the function of the 'be' conjugation to this
linguistic phenomenon. Thus a predicate can be seen as a separable mode of
existence of the subject, which means the attribution of a quality or
characteristic in such a way that the attribution itself becomes that which
allows a statement to have truth or falsehood. In other words, the utterance
'The tall man' is no different from the sentence 'The man is tall' in terms
of the qualities attributed to it. The difference lies within the fact that
the 'is' here allows the quality of 'tallness' to be separable from 'The
man.' This mode of existence is exhibited in such a way that it can be
examined and hence challenged.
The standard notion of 'predication' is strongly linked to that of the
'copula.' But from the above example it can be seen that the so-called
'copuletic function is inferred from the fact that where a predicate is
displayed as a quality of the subject, it can be effectively challenged as
to whether it does indeed pertain to the subject. Thus it is assumed that
the possibility of this disjunction arises out of a previous 'conjoining' of
the predicate to the subject. Yet since this quality stated in the predicate
can equally be stated as part of the subject, in such a way as not to allow
its disjunction, the notion of 'joining' is at best misleading.
The notion of Extantal Imbuancy allows this to be made clearer, since "The
tall man" announces the existence of this particular entity as an
inseparable whole, whereas "The man is tall" allows the announcement of the
same entity in terms of separable, and thus challengeable, elements. We can
then 'test' this proposition, as to whether 'tall' does indeed correspond to
'the man,' but only because this has been initiated into a separable
pertaining correspondence an explicit Processant. Without a Processant,
there would be no predicate to 'join' onto the subject.
Thus the 'is' here allows modes of existence to be displayed in terms of a
possible correspondence wherein, the predicate pertains to the subject. It
should of course be noted that there are in fact two types of
'correspondence' simultaneously at work here. The first is we can call a
'semantic correspondence,' and the second, directly attributable to the
Processant function, we can call 'propositional correspondence.' is Here,
the semantic reference of the predicate is separated from that of the
subject in order to be related back to it. This propositional correspondence
itself depends upon a semantic correspondence between the predicate and the
referent of the subject. If both these semantic correspondences hold, then
the proposition itself can be said to be true. Thus the Processant allows
correspondence/non-correspondence to be introduced into the formal structure
of language, in a way that goes beyond the correct/incorrect use of words
upon which semantic correspondence depends.
It is this notion of the Processant as a correspondence function that forms
the connection between 'the 'is' of predication,' 'the 'is' of identity,'
'the 'is' of class-inclusion,' and 'the 'is' of existence.'
Three: The 'is' of Identity.
This refers to sentences of the type "The Morning Star is the Evening Star,"
"Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens," or "Carl XVI Gustaf is the King of Sweden."
But it can also be seen within sentences like "Seeing is believing," where
both the verbs are gerundialised.
Since the 'is' in such sentences can be taken as stating 'is the same as' in
way that is not the case with predication, this 'is' is usually interpreted
as having an entirely different function here. This aspect of identity
statements means they have a 'substitution property' which, again,
distinguishes them from predication statements.
For example, the sentence "Carl XVI Gustaf is the King of Sweden," can be
interchanged to give "The King of Sweden is Carl XVI Gustaf." The resulting
sentence, whilst not identical to the first, has a definite and strongly
related sense. This 'substitution property' cannot be seen as operating
within a sentence like "Carl XVI Gustaf is eating," and it is upon this fact
that the distinction between 'the 'is' of predication' and 'the 'is' of
identity' is based.
In order to resolve this apparent distinction, two key elements of the AIT
analysis have to be seen as operative here. The first is propositional
correspondence, and the second is the Modal Switch. This is seen within a
sentence like "Carl XVI Gustaf is eating the apple," which would be analysed
as follows:
"Carl XVI Gustaf [Extantal Imbuant] is [Modal Processant] eating {the apple
[Extantal Objectant]} [Modal Informant].."
Here, the Extantal Objectant serves to establish that the apple is the
object to which the Imbuant is referred, in such a way that the mode of
existence of the Imbuant is also that of the Objectant. This means that a
'substitution' can also occur in this case, to give "The apple is being
eaten by Carl XVI Gustaf." Here, the mode of existence is transformed from
active to passive with regard to the switched Imbuant, in order to preserve
the original relation wherein the Objectant is referred to the Imbuant.
Thus, the 'substitution' at work within the identity statement can be seen
as a particular form of Modal Switch. The difference is that with the
substitution of "Carl XVI Gustaf is the King of Sweden," for "The King of
Sweden is Carl XVI Gustaf," the original relation is preserved with no
resultant change from active to passive tense. It is this difference between
these two forms of Modal Switch that is important here. This is because, in
any form of identity statement, the Modal Informant consists of an Extantal
Objectant alone. The Processant, in this case 'is,' simply has to perform
its standard function of initiating a separable pertaining correspondence
between the Imbuant and the Informant.
In its standard function, the Objectant is extantally subordinated to the
Imbuant, as the object to which its mode of action is directed, and is at
the same time bound to the mode of action. The Objectant is related to the
Imbuant through a shared mode of action. The mode of action hence
corresponds to both the Imbuant and the Objectant, with the difference that
with the Objectant this is a bound correspondence which can only be made
separable by reversing the sentence by means of the Modal Switch.
This relation is maintained in the identity statement, but here the
correspondence function of the Processant is focused directly onto the
Objectant, such that a correspondence obtains directly between them, as
opposed to the correspondence of both to a shared mode of action of one upon
the other. Hence the relation between Imbuant and Objectant necessarily has
a compressed and more limited scope than when mediated through a shared
modal aspect. Consequently, the Modal Switch has the same compressed form,
with no scope for tense adjustment, and is manifested as the 'substitution
property.'
Therefore, we can say that identity statements depend upon three elements:
The Processant function, which operates in exactly the same way as within
predication statements.
They must have a Modal Informant which consists of an Extantal Objectant
alone.
There must be an equivalence of singularity between Imbuant and
Informant/Objectant, which allows them to display the 'substitution
property.'
The Processant function allows for two semantic elements to have reference
to the same entity in such a way that the reference of the second element is
independent of the reference of the first. And it is the fact that these two
elements always refer to the same referent that is crucial to the Processant
function. But beyond its reliance on this basic correspondence, all other
characteristics specific to identity statements can be accounted for by
reference to semantic/syntactic factors other than the Processant function.
With identity statements, it is the correspondence function of the
Processant ensures that ensures that an Extantal Objectant must function
simultaneously as a Modal Informant. In other words, whatever is marked out
in the Objectant phrase refers to whatever is extantialised by the Imbuant.
This can be seen most clearly within direct statements of non-identity. For
example, in the sentence "Carl XVI Gustaf is not the King of France," the
Objectant, which is stated as not corresponding to the Imbuant, has a far
more ambiguous extantialisation, inasmuch as it may not be an Objectant that
corresponds to any Imbuant. Nevertheless, statements of non-identity can
still be said to display the 'substitution property.' For although "The King
of France is not Carl XVI Gustaf," extantialises a different entity, the
same non-correspondence is stated here as in "Carl XVI Gustaf is not the
King of France."
The equivalent singularity of reference within identity statements depends
upon the equivalence between proper nouns and definite article phrases. This
allows the correspondence between the Imbuant and the Informant/Objectant to
be one of 'identity.' In other words, the Processant function maintains the
two particularities in such a way that the second refers to the same entity
as the first. On the other hand, a statement of non-correspondence between
two particularities is interpreted as concerning two particularities, even
where the second only has an ambiguous extantialisation.
That the identity statement depends upon this equivalent singularity of
reference can be seen shown within such sentences as "The Munsters are the
Adams Family" or "Stan and Ollie are Laurel and Hardy." Again, the way in
which these kinds of sentences depend upon the Processant function is such
that they either display or do not display correspondence. But within a
sentence like "Stan is the Adams Family," this correspondence is rendered
semantically impossible by the lack of equivalent singularity. This again
derives from the limitation placed upon the correspondence function, which
has a 'compressed form' wherever the Informant consists of an Objectant
alone.
Four: The 'is' of Class-Inclusion.
This refers to sentences of the type 'Man is an animal,' 'Fido is a dog,
'The Whale is a mammal,' Mice are rodents,' etc.
Class-inclusion statements, like identity statements, have a Modal Informant
that consists of an Extantal Objectant alone. Furthermore, in line with the
AIT argument, the function of the 'is' within class-inclusion statements is
no different to that of predication statements. Thus the distinction between
class-inclusion and identity statements lies solely within the fact that the
former do not display an equivalent singularity of reference between the
Extantal Imbuant and Informant/Objectant. It is for this reason that they
lack the 'substitution property.'
The equivalent singularity of reference within identity statements depends
upon the equivalence between proper nouns and definite article phrases. With
class-inclusion statements on the other hand, whilst the Informant/Objectant
must have an indefinite reference, either in terms of an indefinite article
phrase or an indefinite plural, the Imbuant does not require this. Thus
class-inclusion statements must be seen in terms of the relation between the
Processant function and indefinite reference, and this resolves itself into
the question of the distinction between definite and indefinite reference.
In the opening paragraph of On Denoting, Bertrand Russell points out that
the definite article involves uniqueness. However, all that he has to say
about the indefinite article is:
A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g., 'a man' denotes not many men, but an
ambiguous man.
which in effect, says no more than that the indefinite article creates an
indefinite denotation.
But when looking at the difference between 'the man' and 'a man,' the most
striking feature is that the uniqueness and ambiguity by which Russell
distinguishes them is that they can be seen as two different implications in
each case. They do not indicate singularity in an equivalent manner
precisely because, in each case, there is a different implication as to how
the entity named relates to other entities to which the word 'man' also
applies.
When we say 'the man,' the implication of uniqueness means that the man
spoken of is unlike any other man we might speak of. He is not only
distinguished from any other entity to which the word 'man' does not apply,
but also from all other entities to which the word 'man' does apply. This is
implication inasmuch as the manner in which 'the man' differs from other
entities which can be named in the same way is not specifically stated.
When, on the other hand, we say 'a man,' he too is distinguished from any
other entity to which the word 'man' does not apply, but not from all other
entities to which the word 'man' does apply.
Thus the singularity which is implied by 'the man' is indeed that of
uniqueness, inasmuch as it states that no other man could be spoken of. On
the other hand, the singularity stated by 'a man' implies that other men
could be spoken of but are not. Hence the singularity implied by the
indefinite article does not extend beyond the simple fact that he is spoken
of. Thus when we say 'a man,' we are distinguishing what we are talking
about from all other entities that are not men, but not necessarily also
from all other entities that are men.
In this way, the distinction between definite and indefinite articles rests
upon the different way each depends upon the classification function of the
regular noun. The noun function itself is not of course explicitly singular;
the noun is applied to particular entity according to the identification of
the particular distinctions commensurate with its use. Definite and
indefinite articles both singularise the applicability of a regular noun;
but the distinction between them rests upon the different implied relation
of similarity that the singularised entity in each case has to other
entities to which the noun also applies.
Therefore, with class-inclusion statements, the correspondence function of
the Processant again maintains the two elements of the statement in such a
way that the second refers to the same entity as the first. But where the
Informant/Objectant is an indefinite article phrase, the Imbuant is stated
as corresponding to any entity which falls under what is stated in the
Informant/Objectant. Thus to say Socrates is a man,' implies a
correspondence between Socrates and any entity that is a man.
With class-inclusion statements however, the implication of singularity that
an indefinite article usually carries is lost when it functions within an
Informant/Objectant phrase. In other words, here the Imbuant is precisely
not distinguished from other entities to which the noun of the
Informant/Objectant indefinite article phrase also applies. This is because
the singularity implied by an indefinite article is such that the entity
named by the noun is distinguished from all other entities to which the noun
applies only to the extent that they are not spoken of. But with
class-inclusion statements, the Processant function ensures that the
indefinite article phrase refers to what is already spoken of in the
Imbuant. In this case therefore, it is the Imbuant, whether definite or
indefinite, singular or plural, which is distinguished from all other
entities to which the Informant/Objectant refers, only to the extent that it
is spoken of.
With 'Socrates is a man' therefore, Socrates is distinguished from all other
entities to which the noun 'man' applies only to the extent that he is
mentioned and they are not, but with the implication that he is
distinguished from all other entities that are not men, but not from all
other entities that are men. Thus we say that Socrates is 'included' in the
'class' of all entities to which the noun 'man' applies.
But in order to be a class-inclusion statement, another purely semantic
constraint, similar in a way to the equivalence of singularity that
characterises identity statements, must be present. Namely, the indefinite
article phrase that functions as the Informant/Objectant, must have a wider
range of reference than the Imbuant. In this respect, the difference between
'A whale is a mammal' and 'A mammal is a whale,' assuming the meaning of
both terms is understood, would mean that the second sentence would be
interpreted as a statement concerning some particular mammal. This in turn
brings out more clearly the ambiguity of the indefinite article, inasmuch as
it can mean either 'any' or 'at least one' depending upon the semantic
context in which it occurs.
http://www.angelfire.com/ab7/ait/Frege_Russell.html
The 'Is' of Predication.
This refers to sentences like "Socrates is wise, " that attribute a
particular quality or characteristic to a subject. It is clear that this
notion of predication lies closest to the conception of the Processant
function identified by AIT.
The main difference lies within the emphasis placed by AIT upon Extantal
Imbuancy, and its linking of the function of the 'be' conjugation to this
linguistic phenomenon. Thus a predicate can be seen as a separable mode of
existence of the subject, which means the attribution of a quality or
characteristic in such a way that the attribution itself becomes that which
allows a statement to have truth or falsehood. In other words, the utterance
"The tall man" is no different from the sentence "The man is tall" in terms
of the qualities attributed to it. The difference lies within the fact that
the *is* here allows the quality of *tallness* to be separable from *The
man. * This mode of existence is exhibited in such a way that it can be
examined and hence challenged.
It seems that the standard notion of *predication* is strongly linked to
that of the *copula. * But from the above example it can be seen that the
so-called *copuletic function* is inferred from the fact that where a
predicate is displayed as a quality of the subject, it can be effectively
challenged as to whether it does indeed pertain to the subject. Thus it is
assumed that the possibility of this disjunction arises out of a previous
*conjoining* of the predicate to the subject. Yet since this quality stated
in the predicate can equally be stated as part of the subject, in such a way
as not to allow its disjunction, the notion of *joining* is at best
misleading.
The notion of Extantal Imbuancy allows this to be made clearer, since "The
tall man" announces the existence of this particular entity as an
inseparable whole, whereas "The man is tall" allows the announcement of the
same entity in terms of separable, and thus challengeable, elements. We can
then *test* this proposition, as to whether 'tall' does indeed correspond to
'the man, ' but only because this has been initiated into a separable
pertaining correspondence by the *is. * Without the *is* there would be no
predicate to *join* onto the subject.
Thus the *is* here allows modes of existence to be displayed in terms of a
possible correspondence wherein, the predicate pertains to the subject. It
should of course be noted that there are in fact two types of
*correspondence* simultaneously at work here. The first we can call
*semantic correspondence. * Where someone points to a dog and says *cat, *
there is no semantic correspondence between the referent and the standard
usage of this particular word. The question of semantic correspondence does
not of course arise where the referent is not physically present, which is
precisely the case where the referent is made manifest through Extantal
Imbuance. Nevertheless, it is the distinction between the actually perceived
referent and that which is extantally imbued which allows semantic
non-correspondence to be made manifest.
The second type of correspondence, which we can call *propositional
correspondence, * is directly attributable to the Processant function. Here,
the semantic reference of the predicate is separated from that of the
subject in order to be related back to it. This propositional correspondence
itself depends upon a semantic correspondence between the predicate and a
particular aspect of the entity to which the subject refers.
If both these semantic correspondences hold, then the proposition itself can
be said to be true. Thus the Processant allows
correspondence/non-correspondence to be introduced into the formal structure
of language, in a way that goes beyond the correct/incorrect use of words
upon which semantic correspondence alone depends.
AND ANOTHER THING: Within the notion of "the *is* of predication, " logic
emphasises a distinction between *first-order predication, * where the
eligible subject phrase has the certain function of referring to something
or someone, as in the sentence "Socrates is wise, " and *second-order
predication, * as in the sentence "Wisdom is rare. " This is in many ways
similar to the AIT notion of the Reificant although, again, it fails to
place the way in which the distinction between *first order* and *second
order* predication relates directly to the question of the instantiation of
existence that is given in the subject, such that with *second order
predication* a mode of existence is itself instantiated into having a *free
standing* existence by the structure of the sentence.
As with the more general notion of predication, it is the relation of the
Imbunant to the Processant function that is crucial here. The AIT analysis
allows this distinction to be seen in terms of the structure of utterance,
as opposed to attempting to untangle it by means of the semantic (reference)
distinction it allows.
By Jon Neivens.
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/ispredication.htm
> 'cid 'ooh
>
Albert
<snip>
Yet another huge copied-and-pasted turd in my diskspace.
crypto_s...@hotmail.com
that what you think is not reality.
Alfred Korzibski devised a method that would allow for this kind of
mental transformation through a change in use of language. What you
DIDN'T extapolate from what he exposed was that you can attain the same
result through realization that you, as an individual, are describing
your own model of the outside reality when you speak, not reality in
itself.
Regards
Stonelock
Mike Burke
crypto_s...@hotmail.com says...
for years, because people seem to understand me better when I do.
See? Using E-prime does not mean that the communication sounds stilted
or contrived, even though many of the examples suck.
Tools are tools. (Maybe this violates the constructs of E-prime, maybe
not.) I also found Goldratt's "Thinking tools" very useful in some
contexts, despite their resemblance to ordinary propositional logic and
apparent violations of E-prime guidelines. Use what works. E-prime
works for me in some contexts, and if I hadn't investigated E-prime, I
might have deprived myself of a useful tool.
Ignorance of General Semantics and adherence to Classical Logic
expositon leads to some interesting experiments. Try constructing the
sentence, "Don't read this sentence." in LOGLAN.
I have trouble discussing Korzybski. In 35 years, I've only met 4 other
people who claim to have read his whole book, and only one other person
who read it more than once.
I usually refer people to the Bourland articles on the IGS site, but it
seems unavailable tonight.
crypto_s...@hotmail.com
Mike Burke wrote:
> In article <1109883034....@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com>,
> crypto_s...@hotmail.com says...
> > Such a disciplin is not necessary. What IS necessary IS becoming
aware
> > that what you think is not reality.
> >
> > Alfred Korzibski devised a method that would allow for this kind of
> > mental transformation through a change in use of language. What you
> > DIDN'T extapolate from what he exposed was that you can attain the
same
> > result through realization that you, as an individual, are
describing
> > your own model of the outside reality when you speak, not reality
in
> > itself.
> >
> > Regards
> > Stonelock
> >
> >
> Necessary or not, I've been using E-prime in my important
communications
> for years, because people seem to understand me better when I do.
They do because you don't sound like you are the bringer of absolute
truth. Also, the very exercice of having to think about everything in
other terms makes things clearer in one's mind.
I do not dismiss the tool you are using. I am merely pointing out that
it is not necessary if you find important to apply what Korzybski has
dug out.
> See? Using E-prime does not mean that the communication sounds
stilted
> or contrived, even though many of the examples suck.
I am aware it isn't restraining in any way. It is a way to formulate
sentences so that your perceptions, transmitted to others, are not
brought up as absolute truths, but only as one's understanding of
reality.
> Tools are tools. (Maybe this violates the constructs of E-prime,
maybe
> not.)
It does, but this is really not the issue. It is fairly easy, when
discussing with someone, to tell if someone thinks they are describing
reality vs describing their own model of reality.
I also found Goldratt's "Thinking tools" very useful in some
> contexts, despite their resemblance to ordinary propositional logic
and
> apparent violations of E-prime guidelines. Use what works. E-prime
> works for me in some contexts, and if I hadn't investigated E-prime,
I
> might have deprived myself of a useful tool.
>
> Ignorance of General Semantics and adherence to Classical Logic
> expositon leads to some interesting experiments. Try constructing
the
> sentence, "Don't read this sentence." in LOGLAN.
Linear logic is very restrictive when used to describe reality. Logic
through sets and subset seems to be more adequate.
What is LOGLAN?
> I have trouble discussing Korzybski. In 35 years, I've only met 4
other
> people who claim to have read his whole book, and only one other
person
> who read it more than once.
I read it once and a half :). A half when I was 18. I wasn't fully
aware of enough things to grasp what Korzybski exposed entirely. I
grasped enough for it to a considerable effect on my thinking though. I
fully read Science and Sanity when I was about 21 and then went on to
grasp, I think, a good part, if not most, of the essence of what was
exposed. I didn't sleep for days ( head was spinning ). Reading it a
second time would probably anchor some more things down for good.
Discussing about what Korzybski exposed is not an easy task. Most are
not aware at all about reality vs perception of reality, or do not like
to think about those issues. Those same people are afraid to put their
heads on the log if I may say so. They are afraid they won't fall back
on their feet once they start questioning their internal model of
reality, which for some who like to expand on their model, took years
to build.
Some even go as far as beleiving there is no underlying reality ( It
becomes next to impossible to discuss coherently with them ).
Regards
Stonelock