Dialectic -
Immortalist
[Greek dialektike (techne or methodos), the dialectic art or method, from
dialegomai I converse, discuss, dispute; as noun also dialectics; as adjective,
dialectical].
(1) In Greek philosophy the word originally signified "investigation by
dialogue", instruction by question and answer, as in the heuristic method of
Socrates and the dialogues of Plato. The word dialectics still retains this
meaning in the theory of education.
(2) But as the process of reasoning is more fundamental than its oral expression,
the term dialectic came to denote primarily the art of inference or argument. In
this sense it is synonymous with logic. It has always, moreover, connoted special
aptitude or acuteness in reasoning, "dialectical skill"; and it was because of
this characteristic of Zeno's polemic against the reality of motion or change
that this philosopher is said to have been styled by Aristotle the master or
founder of dialectic.
(3) Further, the aim of all argumentation being presumably the acquisition of
truth or knowledge about reality, and the process of cognition being inseparably
bound up with its content or object, i. e. with reality, it was natural that the
term dialectic should be again extended from function to object, from thought to
thing; and so, even as early as Plato, it had come to signify the whole science
of reality, both as to method and as to content, thus nearly approaching what has
been from a somewhat later period universally known as metaphysics. It is,
however, not quite synonymous with the latter in the objective sense of the
science of real being, abstracting from the thought processes by which this real
being is known, but rather in the more subjective sense in which it denotes the
study of being in connection with the mind, the science of knowledge in relation
to its object, the critical investigation of the origin and validity of knowledge
as pursued in psychology and epistemology. Thus Kant describes as "transcendental
dialectic" his criticism of the (to him futile) attempts of speculative human
reason to attain to a knowledge of such ultimate realities as the soul, the
universe, and the Deity; while the monistic system, in which Hegel identified
thought with being and logic with metaphysics, is commonly known as the "Hegelian
dialectic".
A. THE DIALECTIC METHOD IN THEOLOGY
[For dialectic as equivalent to logic, see art. LOGIC, and cf. (2) above. It is
in this sense we here speak of dialectic in theology.] The traditional logic, or
dialectic, of Aristotle's "Organon"--the science and art of (mainly deductive)
reasoning--found its proper application in exploring the domain of purely natural
truth, but in the early Middle Ages it began to be applied by some Catholic
theologians to the elucidation of the supernatural truths of the Christian
Revelation. The perennial problem of the relation of reason to faith, already
ably discussed by St. Augustine in the fifth century, was thus raised again by
St. Anselm in the eleventh. During the intervening and earlier centuries,
although the writers and Fathers of the Church had always recognized the right
and duty of natural reason to establish those truths preparatory to faith, the
existence of God and the fact of revelation, those praeambula fidei which form
the motives of credibility of the Christian religion and so make the profession
of the Christian Faith a rationabile obsequium, a "reasonable service", still
their attitude inclined more to the Crede ut intelligas (Believe that you may
understand) than to the Intellige ut credas (understand that you may believe);
and their theology was a positive exegesis of the contents of Scripture and
tradition. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, rational speculation
was applied to theology not merely for the purpose of proving the praeambula
fidei, but also for the purpose of analysing, illustrating and showing forth the
beauty and the suitability of the mysteries of the Christian Faith. This method
of applying to the contents of Revelation the logical forms of rational
discussion was called "the dialectic method of theology". Its introduction was
opposed more or less vigorously by such ascetic and mystic writers as St. Peter
Damian, St. Bernard, and Walter of St. Victor; chiefly, indeed, because of the
excess to which it was carried by those rationalist and theosophist writers who,
like Peter Abelard and Raymond Lully, would fain demonstrate the Christian
mysteries, subordinating faith to private judgment. The method was saved from
neglect and excess alike by the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century, and
was used to advantage in their theology. After five or six centuries of fruitful
development, under the influence, mainly, of this deductive dialectic, theology
has again been drawing, for a century past, abundant and powerful aid from a
renewed and increased attention to the historical and exegetical studies that
characterized the earlier centuries of Christianity.
B. DIALECTIC AS FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
[cf. (3) above]
(1) The Platonic Dialectic
From the beginnings of Greek philosophy reflection has revealed a twofold element
in the contents of the knowing human mind: an abstract, permanent, immutable
element, usually referred to the intellect or reason; and a concrete, changeable,
ever-shifting element, usually referred to the imagination and the external
senses. Now, can the real world possess such opposite characteristics? Or, if
not, which set really represents it? For Heraclitus and the earlier Ionians,
stability is a delusion; all reality is change--panta hrei. For Parmenides and
the Eleatics, change is delusion; reality is one, fixed, and stable. But then,
whence the delusion, if such there be, in either alternative? Why does our
knowledge speak with such uncertain voice, or which alternative are we to
believe? Both, answers Plato, but intellect more than sense. What realities, the
latter asks, are revealed by those abstract, universal notions we possess of
being, number, cause, goodness, etc., by the necessary, immutable truths we
apprehend and the comparison of those notions? The dialectic of the Platonic
"Ideas" is a noble, if unsuccessful, attempt to answer this question. These
notions and truths, says Plato, have for objects ideas which constitute the real
world, the mundus intelligibilis, of which we have thus a direct and immediate
intellectual intuition. These beings, which are objects of our intellectual
knowledge, these ideas, really exist in the manner in which they are represented
by the intellect, i. e. as necessary, universal, immutable, eternal, etc. But
where is this mundus intelligibilis? It is a world apart (choris), separate from
the world of fleeting phenomena revealed to the senses. And is this latter world,
then, real or unreal? It is, says Plato, but a shadowy reflex of reality, a
dissolving-view of the ideas, about which our conscious sense-impressions can
give us mere opinion (doxa), but not that reliable, proper knowledge (episteme)
which we have of the ideas. This is unsatisfactory. It is an attempt to explain
an admitted connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal elements in
knowledge by suppressing the reality of the latter altogether. Nor is Plato any
more successful in his endeavour to show how the idea, which for him is a really
existing being, can be at the same time one and manifold, or, in other words, how
it can be universal, like the mental notion that represents it.
(2) Aristotelean and Scholastic Dialectic
Aristotle taught, in opposition to his master Plato, that these "ideas" or
objects of our intellectual notions do not exist apart from, but are embodied in,
the concrete, individual data of sense. It is one and the same reality that
reveals itself under an abstract, universal, static aspect to the intellect, and
under a concrete, manifold, dynamic aspect to the senses. The Christian
philosophers of the Middle Ages took up and developed this Aristotelean
conception, making it one of the cardinal doctrines of Scholastic philosophy, the
doctrine of modern Realism. The object of the abstract, universal notion, they
taught, is real being; it constitutes and is identical with the individual data
of sense-knowledge; it is numerically multiplied and individualized in them,
while it is unified as a class-concept or universal notion (unum commune
pluribus) by the abstractive power of the intellect which apprehends the element
common to the individuals of a class without their differentiating
characteristics. The universal notion thus exists as universal only in the
intellect, but it has a foundation in the individual data of sense, inasmuch as
the content of the notion really exists in these sense-data, though the mode of
its existence there is other than the mode in which the notion exists in the
intellect: universale est formaliter in mente, fundamentaliter in re. Nor does
the intellect, in thus representing individual phenomena by universal notions,
falsify its object or render intellectual knowledge unreliable; it represents the
Real inadequately, no doubt, not exhaustively or comprehensively, yet faithfully
so far as it goes; it does not misrepresent reality, for it merely asserts of the
latter the content of its universal notion, not the mode (or universality) of the
latter, as Plato did.
But if we get all our universal notions, necessary judgments, and intuitions of
immutable truth through the ever-changing, individual data of sense, how are we
to account for the timeless, spaceless, changeless, necessary character of the
relations we establish between these objects of abstract, intellectual thought:
relations such as "Two and two are four", "Whatever happens has a cause", "Vice
is blameworthy"? Not because our own or our ancestors' perceptive faculties have
been so accustomed to associate certain elements of consciousness that we are
unable to dissociate them (as materialist and evolutionist philosophers would
say); nor yet, on the other hand, because in apprehending these necessary
relations we have a direct and immediate intuition of the necessary,
self-existent, Divine Being (as the Ontologists have said, and as some interpret
Plato to have meant); but simply because we are endowed with an intellectual
faculty which can apprehend the data of sense in a static condition and establish
relations between them abstracting from all change.
By means of such necessary, self-evident truths, applied to the data of
sense-knowledge, we can infer that our own minds are beings of a higher
(spiritual) order than material things and that the beings of the whole visible
universe--ourselves included--are contingent, i. e. essentially and entirely
dependent on a necessary, all-perfect Being, who created and conserves them in
existence. In opposition to this creationist philosophy of Theism, which arrives
at an ultimate plurality of being, may be set down all forms of Monism or
Pantheism, the philosophy which terminates in the denial of any real distinction
between mind and matter, thought and thing, subject and object of knowledge, and
the assertion of the ultimate unity of being.
(3) The Kantian Dialectic
While Scholastic philosophers understand by reality that which is the object
directly revealed to, and apprehended by, the knowing mind through certain
modifications wrought by the reality in the sensory and intellectual faculties,
idealist or phenomenalist philosophers assume that the direct object of our
knowledge is the mental state or modification itself, the mental appearance, or
phenomenon, as they call it; and because we cannot clearly understand how the
knowing mind can transcend its own revealed, or phenomenal, self or states in the
act of cognition, so as to apprehend something other than the immediate,
empirical, subjective content of that act, these philosophers are inclined to
doubt the validity of the "inferential leap" to reality, and consequently to
maintain that the speculative reason is unable to reach beyond subjective, mental
appearances to a knowledge of things-in-themselves. Thus, according to Kant, our
necessary and universal judgments about sense-data derive their necessity and
universality from certain innate, subjective equipments of the mind called
categories, or forms of thought, and are therefore validly applicable only to the
phenomena or states of sense-consciousness. We are, no doubt, compelled to think
of an unperceived real world, underlying the phenomena of external sensation, of
an unperceived real ego, or mind, or soul, underlying the conscious flow of
phenomena which constitute the empirical or phenomenal ego, and of an absolute
and ultimate underlying, unconditioned Cause of the ego and the world alike; but
these three ideas of the reason--the soul, the world, and God--are mere natural,
necessary products of the mental process of thinking, mere regulative principles
of thought, devoid of all real content, and therefore incapable of revealing
reality to the speculative reason of man. Kant, nevertheless, believed in these
realities, deriving a subjective certitude about them from the exigencies of the
practical reason, where he considered the speculative reason to have failed.
(4) The Hegelian Dialectic.
Post-Kantian philosophers disagreed in interpreting Kant. Fichte, Schelling, and
Hegel developed some phases of his teaching in a purely monistic sense. If what
Kant called the formal element in knowledge--i. e. the necessary, universal,
immutable element--comes exclusively from within the mind, and if, moreover, mind
can know only itself, what right have we to assume that there is a material
element independent of, and distinct from, mind? Is not the content of knowledge,
or in other words the whole sphere of the knowable, a product of the mind or ego
itself? Or are not individual human minds mere self-conscious phases in the
evolution of the one ultimate, absolute Being? Here we have the idealistic monism
or pantheism of Fichte and Schelling. Hegel's dialectic is characterized
especially by its thoroughgoing identification of the speculative thought process
with the process of Being. His logic is what is usually known as metaphysics: a
philosophy of Being as revealed through abstract thought. His starting-point is
the concept of pure, absolute, indeterminate being; this he conceives as a
process, as dynamic. His method is to trace the evolution of this dynamic
principle through three stages:
1. the stage in which it affirms, or posits, itself as thesis;
2. the stage of negation, limitation, antithesis, which is a necessary
corollary of the previous stage;
3. the stage of synthesis, return to itself, union of opposites, which follows
necessarily on (l) and (2).
Absolute being in the first stage is the idea simply (the subject-matter of
logic); in the second stage (of otherness) it becomes nature (philosophy of
nature); in the third stage (of return or synthesis) it is spirit (philosophy of
spirit--ethics, politics, art, religion, etc.).
Applied to the initial idea of absolute Being, the process works out somewhat
like this: All conception involves limitation, and limitation is negation;
positing or affirming the notion of Being involves its differentiation from
non-being and thus implies the negation of being. This negation, however, does
not terminate in mere nothingness; it implies a relation of affirmation which
leads by synthesis to a richer positive concept than the original one. Thus:
absolutely indeterminate being is no less opposed to, than it is identical with,
absolutely indeterminate nothing: or BEING-NOTHING; but in the oscillation from
the one notion to the other both are merged in the richer synthetic notion, of
BECOMING.
This is merely an illustration of the a priori dialectic process by which Hegel
seeks to show how all the categories of thought and reality (which he identifies)
are evolved from pure, indeterminate, absolute, abstractly-conceived Being. It is
not an attempt at making his system intelligible. To do so in a few sentences
would be impossible, if only for the reason, that Hegel has read into ordinary
philosophical terms meanings that are quite new and often sufficiently remote
from the currently accepted ones. To this fact especially is due the difficulty
experienced by Catholics in deciding with any degree of certitude whether, or how
far, the Hegelian Dialectic--and the same in its measure is true of Kant's
critical philosophy also--may be compatible with the profession of the Catholic
Faith. That these philosophies have proved dangerous, and have troubled the minds
of many, was only to be expected from the novelty of their view-points and the
strangeness of their methods of exposition. Whether, in the minds of their
leading exponents, they contained much, or little, or anything incompatible with
Theism and Christianity, it would be as difficult as it would be perhaps idle to
attempt to decide. Be that as it may, the attitude of the Catholic Church towards
philosophies that are new and strange in their methods and terminology must needs
be an attitude of alertness and vigilance. Conscious of the meaning traditionally
attached by her children to the terms in which she has always expounded those
ultimate philosophico-religious truths that lie partly along and partly beyond
the confines of natural human knowledge, and realizing the danger of their being
led astray by novel systems of thought expressed in ambiguous language, she has
ever wisely warned them to "beware lest any man cheat [them] by philosophy, and
vain deceit" (Coloss., ii, 8).
For the use of dialectic in the early Christian and medieval schools, see THE
SEVEN LIBERAL ARTS.
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04770a.htm
Albert
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote:
<snip>
Who convinced you that cutting and pasting from the web was
equivalent to understanding what you cut? Oh...I know. Your
definition of "identity." You mind parsed the words, and that is
identical to understanding.
--
"Today there is a wide measure of agreement, which on the
physical side of science approaches almost to unanimity, that the
stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality;
the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a
great machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental
intruder into the realm of matter; we are beginning to suspect
that we ought rather to hail it as the creator and governor of
the realm of matter"
--Sir James Jeans
Tim
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:97CdnXDICMX...@comcast.com...
absolutely nothing. But he did have the nerve to cut and paste information
on how to properly quote in another of his google exploits. It is ironic
that the very first line of his cut and paste job notes that "Used
effectively, quotations can provide important pieces of evidence and lend
fresh voices and perspectives to your narrative." If smokee had actually
read and understood what he cut and pasted he may have attempted a narrative
of his own. But no - apparently philosophy and thought are now the
prerogatives of google and the internet.
Immortalist
dialectical method of cross-examination, or to Hegel's dialectical model of
history.
Socratic Dialectic
In Plato's dialogues, Socrates typically "argues" by means of cross-examining
someone else's assertions in order to draw out the inherent contradictions within
the other's position. For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro to
provide a definition of piety. Euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is
loved by the gods. But, Socrates points out, the gods are quarrelsome and their
quarrels, like human quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. Euthyphro
consents that this is the case. Therefore, Socrates reasons, at least one thing
exists which certain gods love but other gods hate. Again, Euthyphro consents.
Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro's definition of piety is true, then there
must exist at least one thing which is both pious and impious (as it is both
loved and hated by the gods) -- which, Euthyphro admits, is absurd.
Hegelian Dialectic
Although Hegel never used such a classification himself, Hegel's dialectic is
often described as consisting of three stages: a thesis, an antithesis which
contradicts or negates the thesis, and a synthesis embodying what is essential to
each. In the Logic, for instance, Hegel describes a dialectic of existence:
first, existence must be posited as pure Being (thesis); but pure Being, upon
examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing (antithesis); yet both
Being and Nothing are united as Becoming (synthesis), when it is realized that
what is coming into being is, at the same time, also returning to nothing
(consider life: old organisms die as new organisms are created or born). Like
Socratic dialectic, Hegel's dialectic proceeds by making implicit contradictions
explicit: each stage of the process is the product of contradictions inherent or
implicit in the preceding stage. For Hegel, the whole of western history is one
tremendous dialectic, the largest moments of which chart a progression from
self-alienation as slavery to self-unification and realization as the rational,
constitutional state of free and equal citizens.
Marxist Dialectic
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels believed Hegel was "standing on his head", and
claimed to put him back on his feet, ridding Hegel's logic of its idealist
orientation, and conceiving what is now known as materialist or Marxist
dialectics. The dialectical approach to the study of history then gave rise to
historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works of Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky. Dialectical method came to be seen as the vital
foundation for any Marxist politics, through the work of Karl Korsch, Georg
Lukacs and certain members of the Frankfurt School.
Under Stalinism, Marxist dialectics developed into what was called "diamat"
(short for dialectical materialism), a system of thought which became
increasingly dogmatic and thus intellectually bankrupt due to the overpowering
influence of its attendant political ideology. Some Soviet academics, most
notably Evald Ilyenkov, did continue with philosophical studies of the marxist
dialectic free from ideological bias, as did a number of thinkers in the West.
See also: Dialectician, Universal Dialectic
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Dialectic
Immortalist
As a means of testing the validity of knowledge, Popper proposed a set of "rules
of scientific methodology" which he termed the "Hypothetico-Deductive Model" of
science.
"Hypothetico" means "based on hypotheses" and for Popper, the research process
revolves around the ability to develop and clearly state hypotheses that can be
tested in some way through social research.
Deduction (or to give it its proper name, deductive logic) is a way of making
authoritative statements (proofs) about what is not known by a thorough analysis
of what is known. The ability to make deductive statements is a very powerful
tool since it is the basis for drawing logical conclusions about specific events
from general events.
In sociological terms, a model is a small-scale representation of something (such
as, in this instance, a research process) that helps us to clarify the
relationship between the things involved by describing the relationship between
them in simplified terms. In this case, Popper's model suggests the various steps
we need to follow in order to "do research" and, as such, helps us to organise
the research process.
To put this in simpler terms, you will probably be familiar with fictional
detectives such as Sherlock Holmes. He solved a crime by systematically
investigating a case, collecting and analysing facts and, on the basis of these
facts, naming the person who committed the crime. This is an example of deduction
because Holmes was able to authoritatively state (or prove) something specific
(the identity of a murderer, for example) that was not initially known on the
basis of his general observations about things that were initially known (the
facts surrounding the case).
GWarne
tend to think in either/or terms such as mind/body or spirit/nature.
Hegel's dialectical logic moves from an analytical seperation of
objects into constituent ontological categories, then back to an
intuitive recomposition of the whole.
For example at first, when we apprehend a human being they are a
whole, a gestalt, if you will. Then we might choose, for instance, to
look at the "purely" psychological aspects to being human, as opposed
to the biological or the sociological. We can thus analytically
distinguish "pure psychology" although, in reality, human psychology
is always bound up with the biological and the sociological.
Dialectical logic compels the sincere philosopher to move back from
his or her analytical categories to a reapprehension of the object
itself, prior to analysis.
Too often philosophers get hung up on their analytic categories. "Mind
and matter", they might say, "are distinct forms of being; there is no
way to equate one with the other." Although in reality mind and matter
are continuously interpenetrating (eg. behaviour, body language, art
etc.), these undialectical philosophers resist interpretation of
phenomena that challenge their strict ontological divisions. They end
up creating elaborate buttresses for their analytical categories, and
the true object of their investigations become lost and forgotten.
Hegelian dialectics allows one to use whatever analytic categories one
chooses for one's investigations, without having to cast those
categories in stone. Always the emphasis is on the reality prior to
the logical analysis.
Immortalist
"GWarne" <gwar...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:f26fd06c.04070...@posting.google.com...
...Kojeve calls dialectic "a series of successive 'conversions' " whereby the
relation of consciousness to the world is progressively transformed. [57] Kant,
too, is close to Hegel's insight, in that he feels that the dialectic of reason
involves thought in a search which it cannot avoid since it is driven to the
search by an inner impulse to satisfy itself. [58] But while for Kant this search
precipitates thought into illusion, for Hegel it leads to the insight that
reality is in truth dialectical.
Kierkegaard constantly argues that Hegel's dialectic involves an illicit forcing
of movement and transition into his logic. Movement is a "chimera" and "mirage"
which is "produced only on paper" in Hegel's dialectic. [59] Hegel's
"introduction of movement into logic," Kierkegaard asserts, "is a sheer
confusion," [60] for "the category of transition [or becoming, or movement] is
itself a breach of immanence, a leap," [61] as opposed to the immanent necessity
Hegel associates with it. [62]
Many other commentators believe the same thing. George Stack, for example, writes
that "Hegelian logic could not account for the process of becoming or genesis,
and was especially unable to account for the transition from possibility to
actuality in an individual being's development." [63] And Calvin Schrag says
flatly that "everything that Hegel has to say about becoming and movement in his
logic is illusory." [64]
Unfortunately, all of these views are based on a profound misunderstanding -- the
misunderstanding that becoming is regarded by Hegel as the movement of abstract
categories of logic disembodied from any concrete historical situation and from
any existing individual who thinks those categories. But Hegel is quite clear on
this point. He says that "the principle of development, . . . [the principle of]
a capacity or potentiality striving to realize itself, [is a] formal conception
[which] finds actual existence in spirit, which has the history of the world for
its theater and sphere of realization" (PhH 54). The formal conception of
dialectic, Hegel's logic, is but the description of the lawlike patterns of
development which are concretely exemplified and realized in the world. [65]
Hence, the suggestion that Hegel's dialectic of becoming is a "mirage" which
"takes place only on paper," or that Hegel "could not account for becoming" or
"the transition from possibility to actuality," is completely unwarranted. This
sort of criticism reflects, I suppose, a distaste for Hegel's idealism in
general, where the truth of the being of objects is ultimately the "thing
thought'' the object for-consciousness. This leads Kierkegaard and others to the
conclusion that becoming and dialectic only occur for Hegel "in the head" and not
in concrete existents in the world. But this is simply not Hegel's view, for, as
we have seen, the fact is that the exemplification and manifestation of that
truth takes place in concretely situated beings in the world. Hegel makes this
point, which is the very crux of his grand synthesis, endlessly. The man of "
'sound common sense' . . . holds the opinion that philosophy is concerned only
with Gedankendingen ['thought-things or mental entities]." But, Hegel continues,
while philosophy "does have to do with these pure essences too," its task is to
recognize how they are "concretely embodied in existing things" (PhS 78f).
http://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/courses/HEGEL.HTML
Albert
gwar...@yahoo.ca (GWarne) wrote:
<snip>
Be cautious about arguing with Immortalist. He is too illiterate
to understand what you say and will instead post extensively from
web sites. Because he doesn't understand what he is posting, you
will find yourself arguing with yourself, and Immortalist simply
ripping pages from books and throwing them at you.
Raan
"Albert" <alwa...@tcac.net> wrote in message
news:20040708185...@lfs.mydomain.com...
> On 8 Jul 2004 11:22:10 -0700
> gwar...@yahoo.ca (GWarne) wrote:
> <snip>
>
> Be cautious about arguing with Immortalist. He is too illiterate
> to understand what you say and will instead post extensively from
> web sites. Because he doesn't understand what he is posting, you
> will find yourself arguing with yourself, and Immortalist simply
> ripping pages from books and throwing them at you.
Yes this is essentially correct and worse.
--
></>
Raan
Appearance as appearance.
What does that mean to you?
Look at his "inverted world"
--
></>
Immortalist
"Raan" <Raa...@One.org> wrote in message
news:ORMHc.52976$JG5.1...@news20.bellglobal.com...
The first thing that comes to my mind? That your a very stupid mother fucker.
Immortalist
"Raan" <Raa...@One.org> wrote in message
You are very gulable then because the paragraph you agreed with is untrue.
> --
> ></>
>
>
Albert
We both have experiential evidence that it is true. The heavy
posting from websites is verifiable by examining your past posts.
Your illiteracy and misunderstanding is also inferable from your
replies, by any reasonably intelligent person.
Immortalist
> On Sat, 10 Jul 2004 14:37:32 -0700
> "Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > "Raan" <Raa...@One.org> wrote in message
> > news:PRMHc.52977$JG5.1...@news20.bellglobal.com...
> > >
> > > "Albert" <alwa...@tcac.net> wrote in message
> > > news:20040708185...@lfs.mydomain.com...
> > > > On 8 Jul 2004 11:22:10 -0700
> > > > gwar...@yahoo.ca (GWarne) wrote:
> > > > <snip>
> > > >
> > > > Be cautious about arguing with Immortalist. He is too
> > > > illiterate to understand what you say and will instead post
> > > > extensively from web sites. Because he doesn't understand
> > > > what he is posting, you will find yourself arguing with
> > > > yourself, and Immortalist simply ripping pages from books
> > > > and throwing them at you.
> > >
> > > Yes this is essentially correct and worse.
> >
> > You are very gulable then because the paragraph you agreed with
> > is untrue.
>
> We both have experiential evidence that it is true. The heavy
> posting from websites is verifiable by examining your past posts.
> Your illiteracy and misunderstanding is also inferable from your
> replies, by any reasonably intelligent person.
>
That is not true. When we look at your past posts we find much lying and
deception. You change alot of things around and snip unfaily. What we have is a
case of your likes and dislikes and how you would portray anyone who violates
them as analytically in error. LOL
Raan
You have no clue at all what I am talking about, and you have the childish
gall to call me stupid let alone to impune my relation with my mother, when
your level of maturity would indicate your own unhealthy prolonged emotional
(if not physical) connection to your own mother. If you can ever manage to
read Hegel and actually comprehend him, then do yourself a big favour and
kick yourself in the ass as hard as you can for having been such a complete
joke of an ignoramus moron.
--
></>
Raan
Albert, contrary to a general tolerance for any viewpoint I do believe it is
long past the time we simply killfiled this adolescent. Don't you agree?
--
></>
Albert
"Raan" <Raa...@One.org> wrote:
<snip>
> Albert, contrary to a general tolerance for any viewpoint I do
> believe it is long past the time we simply killfiled this
> adolescent. Don't you agree?
My first instinct is to not to, because I do so delight in
watching him stutter when caught in a lie. I tried trimming the
crossposts to only philosophy groups when he claimed to only post
to alt.bible. But he lied about that too, so it didn't work. But
he is in fact so boring and repetitive that the joy has gone out
it. I'll probably save about a half-dozen of his posts. They are
guaranteed to cover the same ground he continues to go over ad
infinitum, ad nauseum. Now, if I can just figure out how to do
that on this newsreader.
Immortalist
"Raan" <Raa...@One.org> wrote in message
>
> You have no clue at all how homosexual I am, and you have the childish
> gall to call me a stupid fag let alone to impune my relation with my mother
> when you havn't gobble a nine inch cock
> your level of maturity would indicate your own
> (if not physical) connection to my own mother. If you can ever manage to
> read Homosexual literature, then do yourself a big favour and
> go screw around with a beautiful blond babe then
> --
Dude you are strange.
> ></>
>
>
Immortalist
> On Sun, 11 Jul 2004 16:36:04 -0400
> "Raan" <Raa...@One.org> wrote:
> <snip>
> > Albert, contrary to a general tolerance for any viewpoint I do
> > this healthy young man for his member appears very hard
> > Could you just imagine his thick member in your mouth
>
> My first instinct is to not to, because I do so delight in
> stroke my own member diligently while pondering his salty
> flavorings. My oh my I would forsake the Lord for one taste
> of his cock!
>
Guys guys, my old lady is getting jealous. I respect gays but I am not gay. Are
you Log Cabin Republicans for Bush in a gay church?