1. Mullet: bottom dwelling marine warm water fishes with two barbels on the
chin.
2. Places where kids have "fat double chins" is where Bush and his kind will
defeat the weak liberals.
3. California and the west are going fat, big dog, therefore California's a
turnin' ta fat red Bush lovin' rationalists!
Hence; Liberal Mulletinizationalism will produce a better world today.
Nope. Just trying to build a bigger Confederate Fundy States
of America. Build a better stupid through spreading redneck
culture. Singlewide trailerparks, coast to coast. Communal
threeholers. Keepin' it all in the family. Sister's kids calling
you daddy. Praisin' the Lord and cleaning your guns.
>
http://www.elswhere.net/stereotype.gif
> Nope. Just trying to build a bigger Confederate Fundy States
> of America. Build a better stupid through spreading redneck
> culture. Singlewide trailerparks, coast to coast. Communal
> threeholers. Keepin' it all in the family. Sister's kids calling
> you daddy. Praisin' the Lord and cleaning your guns.
>
Social psychologists have defined prejudice in a variety of ways.
Technically, there are positive and negative prejudices; I can be prejudiced
against modern artists or prejudiced in favor of modern artists. This means
that, before I am introduced to Sam Smear (who I've been told is a modern
artist), I will be inclined to like or dislike him-and I will be inclined to
expect to see certain characteristics in him. Thus, if I associate the
concept modern artist with effeminate behavior, I would be filled with shock
and disbelief if Sam Smear were to swagger through the door looking as
though he could play middle linebacker for the Green Bay Packers. If I
associate the concept of modern arfistwith the radical end of the political
spectrum, I would be astonished if Sam Smear were wearing a Newt Gingrich
political button.
In this chapter, I will not be discussing situations that concern prejudice
"in favor" of people; accordingly, my working definition of prejudice will
be limited to negative attitudes. I will define prejudice as a hostile or
negative attitude toward a distinguishable group based on generalizations
derived from faulty or incomplete information. For example, when we say an
individual is prejudiced against blacks, we mean he or she is oriented
toward behaving with hostility toward blacks; the person feels that, with
perhaps one or two exceptions, all blacks are pretty much the same. The
characteristics he or she assigns to blacks are either totally inaccurate
or, at best, based on a germ of truth the person zealously applies to the
group as a whole.
In his classic book The Nature of Prejudice, Gordon Allport reported the
following dialogue:
Mr. X: The trouble with the Jews is that they only take care of their own
group.
Mr. Y: But the record of the Community Chest campaign shows that they gave
more generously, in proportion to their numbers, to the general charities of
the community, than did non-Jews.
Mr. X: That shows they are always trying to buy favor and intrude into
Christian affairs. They think of nothing but money; that is why there are so
many Jewish bankers.
Mr. Y: But a recent study shows that the percentage of Jews in the banking
business is negligible, far smaller than the percentage of non-Jews.
Mr. X: That's just it; they don't go in for respectable business; they are
only in the movie business or run night clubs.
This dialogue illustrates the insidious nature of prejudice far better than
a mountain of definitions. In effect, the prejudiced Mr. X is saying, "Don't
trouble me with facts; my mind is made up." He makes no attempt to dispute
the data presented by Mr. Y. He either distorts the facts in order to make
them support his hatred of Jews or he bounces off them, undaunted, to a new
area of attack. A deeply prejudiced person is virtually immune to
information at variance with his or her cherished stereotypes. As famed
jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once said, "Trying to educate a bigot is
like shining light into the pupil of an eye-it constricts."
It is reasonably safe to assume that all of us have some degree of
prejudice-whether it is against an ethnic, national, or racial group,
against people with different sexual preferences, against specific
geographical areas as places to live, or against certain kinds of food.
Let's take food as an example: In this culture, most people do not eat
insects. Suppose someone (like Mr. Y) were to tell you that caterpillars or
earwigs were a great source of protein and, when carefully prepared,
extremely tasty. Would you rush home and fry up a batch? Probably not. Like
Mr. X, you would probably find some other reason for your prejudice, such as
the fact that most insects are ugly. After all, in this culture, we eat only
aesthetically beautiful creatures-like lobsters!
Gordon Allport wrote his book in 1954; the dialogue between Mr. X and Mr. Y
might seem somewhat dated to the modern reader. Do people really think that
way?
The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/
>
>
>>
>
>
After gutting the mullet brine them for a
long time in the refrigerator, then smoke at
180 -- 200 F for several hours.
Serve with mustard & beer.
Bret Cahill
All conservatism is based on censorship of
economic information.
-- Bret Cahill
The worst sin toward our fellow creatures is not to hate them, but to be
indifferent to them: that's the essense of inhumanity.
George Bernard Shaw
Iindifferent to wacko fundys? Never.
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
(1) A group of bozos on a city street agree to join an social experiment.
(2) Subjects (bozos) are divided into groups on basis of trivial criteria
like flipping a coin to deterimine if one is in Group X or Group Y.
(3) Subjects do not interact, either within or between groups.
(4) Members of own group and other group remain anonymous.
(5) Subjects are then asked to allot money to two other subjects, designated
only by code number and group membership (X or Y). Subjects own outcomes
will not be affected by their allocation decisions.
(6) Despite minimal nature of these groups, subjects allocations
consistently favored other members of their own arbitrarily designated
groups, at the expense of members of the recently typed "outgroups".
[Tajfel] argues that the reason for this allocation strategy is to create a
differentiation between the groups which permits their group membership to
enhance their social identity.
Unreflected Ingroup Favoritism - and the bozo effect.
One who reflects does not discriminate?: On the role of unreflected
cognitive processes for the occurrence of ingroup favoritism between
artificial groups; A categorization of individuals in two groups based on
completely trivial criteria like flipping a coin to determine which group
one is assigned (Group X or Group Y), can be sufficient to cause mutual
preferences for one's own group.
Social identity theory assumes a fundamental striving towards a positive
distinction of one's own group from other groups. The tendency to a
preference for one's own group is clearly reduced in a situation involving
intergroup judgments on negative comparison dimensions or distribution
decisions on negative stimuli (burdens, aversive stimuli), in comparison to
those in the positive realm.
These basic judgment processes may be the fundamental determining factors of
and conditions for social discrimination. Of some influence may be the role
which evaluations of oneself play for the positive evaluation of minimal
social groups. It is assumed that an unreflected cognitive process is
critical for this, in the course of which, as a rule, the positive
self-image is transferred to the new ingroup. Due to the lesser degree of
similarity to oneself, an outgroup cannot benefit from such a generalization
process.
Correspondingly, a positive distinctiveness of one's own group can result
solely from the self-ingroup relation, independent of an ingroup-outgroup
comparison. There is a generalized positive attitude to the ingroup, and
demonstrating the role of a low degree of reflection for the occurrence of
favoritism in minimal intergroup situations and considerations of outgroups.
The randomly assigned individuals generally act as if those who share their
meaningless label are their good friends or close kin. Subjects indicate
that they like those who share their label. They rate others who share their
label as likely to have a more pleasant personality and to have produced
better output than outgroup members. Most strikingly, subjects allocate more
money and rewards to those who share their labels.
In other related social experiments at political rallies it has been noted
that researchers faking injuries, were helped more or less depending on
whether their protest sign, and slogans supported or went against those
around them who could help.
In tribal societies there is an us/them mentality supreme with some tribes
claiming other tribes are not even human. Ingroup/Outgroup pressures can't
be removed without losing something here. It would be well to note one of
the modern appearances of these trends in the Kingships of western and
central Europe. Religious interests, royal or imperial interest from the old
empire side, the common people, princes and many various interests, can be
matched one to one with all the current fluctuating interests in our modern
politic.
It seems to me that on a level of societal morality these interest group
tension can't be removed from the consideration of morality.
>> Social psychologists have defined prejudice in a variety of ways.
>> The Social Animal - Elliot Aronson - 8th Edition 1999
>> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0716733129/
>
> The worst sin toward our fellow creatures is not to hate them, but to be
> indifferent to them: that's the essense of inhumanity.
>
> George Bernard Shaw
>
> Iindifferent to wacko fundys? Never.
>
"hell is other people"
--Jean Paul Sartre
...is, in the briefest form possible, Sartre's definition of man's
fundamental sin. When the picture a man has of himself is provided by those
who see him, in the distorted image of himself that they give back to him,
he has rejected what the philosopher has called reality. He has, moreover,
rejected the possibility of projecting himself into his future and existing
in the fullest sense. In social situations we play a part that is not
ourself. If we passively become that part, we are thereby avoiding the
important decisions and choices by which personality should be formed.
http://www.theatrehistory.com/french/sartre002.html
-----------------------------------------
Being and Nothingness (1943). Its structure is unabashedly Cartesian,
consciousness ("being-for-itself") on the one side, the existence of mere
things ('being-in-itself") on the other. (The phraseology comes from Hegel).
But Sartre does not fall into the Cartesian trap of designating these two
types of being as separate "substances." Instead, Sartre describes
consciousness as "nothing"--"not a thing" but an activity, "a wind blowing
from nowhere toward the world."
Sartre often resorts to visceral metaphors when developing this theme (e.g.,
"a worm coiled in the heart of being"), but much of what he is arguing is
familiar to philosophical readers in the more metaphor-free work of Kant,
who also warned against the follies ("paralogisms") of understanding
consciousness as itself a (possible) object of consciousness rather than as
the activity of constituting the objects of consciousness. (As the lens of
the camera can never see itself--and in a mirror only sees a reflection of
itself--consciousness can never view itself as a consciousness and is only
aware of itself--"for itself"--through its experience of objects).
Ontologically, one might think of "nothingness" as "no-thing-ness," a much
less outrageous suggestion than those that would make it an odd sort of
thing...
...There is a third basic ontological category, on a part with the
being-in-itself and being-for-itself and not derivative of them. He calls it
"being-for-others." To say that it is not derivative is to insist that our
knowledge of others is not inferred, e.g., by some argument by analogy, from
the behavior of others, and we ourself are not wholly constituted by our
self-determinations and the facts about us. Sartre gives us a brutal but
familiar everyday example of our experience of being-for-others in what he
calls "the look." Someone catches us "in the act" of doing somethig
humiliating, and we find ourself defining ourself (probably also resisting
that definition) in their terms. In his Saint Genet (1953), Sartre describes
such a conversion of the ten-year-old Jean Genet into a thief. So, too, we
tend to "catch" one another in terms that are often unflattering. But these
judgments become an essential and ineluctable ingredient in our sense of
ourselves, and they too lead to conflicts--indeed, conflicts so basic and so
frustrating that in his play No Exit (1943) Sartre has one of his characters
utter the famous line, "Hell is other people."
In his later works, notably his Critique of Dialectical Reason (1958-59),
Sartre turned increasingly to politics and, in particular, toward a defense
of Marxism on existentialist principles. This entailed rejecting materialist
determinism, but it also required a new sense of solidarity (or what Sartre
had wistfully called, following Heidegger, Mitsein or "being with others").
http://www.mythosandlogos.com/Sartre.html
------------------------------------------
...Sartre was also, however, greatly concerned with the communal, social,
political, and ethical dimensions of human existence.
As a solitary individual, my consciousness would naturally be 'lost in the
world': all that I would be aware of would be the objects around me; and my
body would typically be, for me, merely instrumental -- again, directed
towards things outside me. There is little here to induce any sort of
self-consciousness. And there is little here to explain how being social
alters who and what we are, or how we behave.
In an anti-Cartesian spirit, Sartre denied that relations between people are
fundamentally 'cognitive' relations-he denied that the philosophically basic
issues concerned, say, our knowledge of the contents other minds, the
justification of our beliefs about other people, or the problem as to
whether we can genuinely know that other people are conscious at all.
Instead, Sartre provides an 'existentialist' analysis which denies that "my
fundamental connection with the Other is realised through knowledge" (B&N,
p. 233). He provides a series of vivid phenomenological descriptions
designed to bring to the fore 'a fundamental connection' between myself and
another, 'in which the Other is manifested in some way other than in the
knowledge I have of him' (Ibid, p. 253)-a connection which, it turns out, is
immediate, irreducible, and ultimately emotional, rather than
dispassionately cognitive.
The presence of another person-and especially the presence of someone who
confronts me, subjects me to scrutiny, and for whom I could become an object
of prurient curiosity, say, or physical repugnance-is something I experience
directly as threatening, and to which I spontaneously respond with anxiety
and shame. There is here, Sartre claims, a primitive, given, and inescapable
bond between myself and another, but it is 'a bond not of knowing, but of
being.' 'Beyond any knowledge I can have, I am this self which another
knows.' (Ibid, p. 261). As this last remark suggests, Sartre provides an
account of human existence, of what it is to be a human being, in which not
only one's awareness of others, but also one's spontaneous response to their
awareness of oneself, are alike constitutive of one's very identity as a
conscious being.
As soon as I become aware that I am being observed by another person, i.e.
another being-for-itself, I undergo a profound change. When the gaze of
another person falls on me, I become 'self-conscious', and I suffer an
immediate feeling of shame. [Note Sartre's description of what happens to
the person who is discovered eavesdropping]. Shame is the immediate
awareness that I am as others see me. With shame I become aware of my body
as just another object in the world; I become aware of my body as made of
matter (and we know what disgusting stuff Sartre thought matter is!); and I
become aware that another person can see me in any way they want (perhaps as
repulsive, despicable, stupid, pathetic ... etc).
The gaze of another thus comprises a threat, it is immediately experienced
as threatening in so far as it objectivizes me. If I respond to this threat
by submitting to it, my response is essentially masochistic; but if I
respond by returning the threat, and by attempting to objectivize the other,
then my response is basically sadistic. According to Sartre's pessimistic
view, "conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others", and, famously,
"Hell is other people".
http://www.shef.ac.uk/~phil/courses/325/Course_Pack_Phenom_Sartre.htm
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
http://www.pych-one.com/new-958901-4765.html
Then you are challenging the evidence that can be brought forth in the
defense of "Proposition 5?" You see Ethnicity is merely a "code number &
membership (TAG)" which the INSTINCT for splitting into groups is adjusted
to at a young age.
(1) A group of bozos on a city street agree to join an social experiment.
(2) Subjects (bozos) are divided into groups on basis of trivial criteria
like flipping a coin to deterimine if one is in Group X or Group Y.
(3) Subjects do not interact, either within or between groups.
(4) Members of own group and other group remain anonymous.
(5) Subjects are then asked to allot money to two other subjects, designated
only by code number and group membership (X or Y). Subjects own outcomes
will not be affected by their allocation decisions.
(6) Despite minimal nature of these groups, subjects allocations
consistently favored other members of their own arbitrarily designated
groups, at the expense of members of the recently typed "outgroups".
-------------------------------------------
Consider that this is a "drive" or "instinct" which is adjusted when the
individual is young. This urge to divide the world into us vs them.
When the population of a tribe reaches about 100 then conflict ensues and
the desire to (split) is revealed.
----------------------------------------------------
With an increase in tensions, violence in the Yanomamo villages develops
through
three levels, each requiring reflection, calculation, and moment-by-moment
decisions. The least dangerous form of fighting is the chest-pounding duel,
in
which men trade blows with their closed fists. The combatants challenge one
another in response to malicious gossip, stinginess in trade, or almost any
other
petty grievance. Anger abates, at the cost of bruises and blood that may be
coughed up for days afterward. The next level of aggression is club
fighting,
which is roughly equivalent to chest pounding but with a weapon. The wooden
clubs
are about the same shape as a pool cue but twice as large, six to nine feet
in
length. Most duels begin when one man catches his wife having sex with
another
man. The enraged husband challenges the rival to strike him on the head with
a
club. He stands still, holding his own club vertically. After taking the
blow, he
delivers one of his own. At this point, as blood streams down the face and
neck,
the fighting often becomes wilder, and the men try to strike one another on
other
parts of the body. Others join in, usually taking sides according to kinship
but
sometimes just to restore a fair balance. In late years the cranial dents
will be
proudly exhibited as evidences of bravery and manhood, as the cheek scars of
Heidelberg saber duelists used to be.
In the electric atmosphere of frequent chest pounding and club fighting, a
single
incident can trigger the decision to split the village. One club fight,
culminating a long series of incidents, will be enough. Or the community may
hold
together long enough to witness a still more violent episode, at the third
level
of aggression. Such was the case of Patanowa-teri, as witnessed by Chag-non.
It began when one young man stole the wife of another, who was allegedly
mistreating her. The two rivals then engaged in a brutal club fight.
Tensions had
been running high in the village, and soon almost every other man had joined
the
struggle. The headman of Patanowa-teri tried to control the melee by
restricting
the fighting to clubs. But the young man suddenly and unexpectedly speared
and
wounded the husband. Other men began to jab at each other with the sharpened
end
of their clubs. Enraged at the outcome, the headman ran his club through the
body
of the young man, who died when others tried to remove it. The wife was
given
back to her husband, who punished her by cutting off her ears with his
machete.
The relatives of the dead man were then ordered to leave Patanowa-teri to
avoid
further bloodshed. They traveled to the villages of the Monou-teri and
Bisaasi-teri, natural enemies of the Patanowa-teri, who promised to give
them
temporary protection in exchange for several women.
Promethean Fire - Reflections on the Origins of Mind
Charles J. Lumsdem - E.O. Wilson - 1983
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1583484256/
Mullet Supreme
2 large, beautiful, fat mullet
Marinade
2 cups white wine
1 cup brown vinegar
2 teaspoons peppercorns, crushed
juice of 1 large lemon
1 teaspoon salt
1 large brown onion, sliced
2 bay leaves, crumbled
pinch basil
Stuffing
2 cups cooked, fluffy rice, seasoned with salt and
freshly ground pepper
1 brown onion, chopped
pinch nutmeg
pinch cinnamon
1/2 green and red capsicum (pepper), chopped finely
1 large stalk celery, chopped finely
1/2 cup plain flour
1 egg
1 cup milk
dash worcestershire sauce
dash tabasco sauce
1 clove garlic, crushed and sliced (optional)
oil or butter
Sauce
2 tablespoons butter or margarine
3 tablespoons plain flour
pinch salt and pepper
dash tabasco sauce
1 teaspoon mustard powder
2 1/4 cups milk or 1/2 milk, 1/2 fish stock
1 teaspoon anchovy paste or essence
paprika
parsley, chopped
lemon wedges
2 liberals
1 gore
A little frog that speaks up is likely to be jumped by a snake.
>
> ------------------------------------------
>
> ...Sartre was also, however, greatly concerned with the communal, social,
> political, and ethical dimensions of human existence.
restructuring after the devastations of World War II no doubt [no, not
infrastructure devastation, but mind devastation; demoralization]
>
> As a solitary individual, my consciousness would naturally be 'lost in the
> world': all that I would be aware of would be the objects around me; and
> my body would typically be, for me, merely instrumental -- again, directed
> towards things outside me. There is little here to induce any sort of
> self-consciousness. And there is little here to explain how being social
> alters who and what we are, or how we behave.
>
> In an anti-Cartesian spirit, Sartre denied that relations between people
> are fundamentally 'cognitive' relations-he denied that the philosophically
> basic issues concerned, say, our knowledge of the contents other minds,
> the justification of our beliefs about other people, or the problem as to
> whether we can genuinely know that other people are conscious at all.
> Instead, Sartre provides an 'existentialist' analysis which denies that
> "my fundamental connection with the Other is realised through knowledge"
> (B&N, p. 233). He provides a series of vivid phenomenological descriptions
> designed to bring to the fore 'a fundamental connection' between myself
> and another, 'in which the Other is manifested in some way other than in
> the knowledge I have of him' (Ibid, p. 253)-a connection which, it turns
> out, is immediate, irreducible, and ultimately emotional, rather than
> dispassionately cognitive.
Ever 'feel' the presence of a pretty woman in the room? all the slug males
somehow find a greater flight of foot...a force of lift insues...
>
> The presence of another person-and especially the presence of someone who
> confronts me, subjects me to scrutiny, and for whom I could become an
> object of prurient curiosity, say, or physical repugnance-is something I
> experience directly as threatening, and to which I spontaneously respond
> with anxiety and shame. There is here, Sartre claims, a primitive, given,
> and inescapable bond between myself and another, but it is 'a bond not of
> knowing, but of being.' 'Beyond any knowledge I can have, I am this self
> which another knows.' (Ibid, p. 261). As this last remark suggests, Sartre
> provides an account of human existence, of what it is to be a human being,
> in which not only one's awareness of others, but also one's spontaneous
> response to their awareness of oneself, are alike constitutive of one's
> very identity as a conscious being.
>
> As soon as I become aware that I am being observed by another person, i.e.
> another being-for-itself, I undergo a profound change. When the gaze of
> another person falls on me, I become 'self-conscious', and I suffer an
> immediate feeling of shame. [Note Sartre's description of what happens to
> the person who is discovered eavesdropping]. Shame is the immediate
> awareness that I am as others see me. With shame I become aware of my body
> as just another object in the world; I become aware of my body as made of
> matter (and we know what disgusting stuff Sartre thought matter is!); and
> I become aware that another person can see me in any way they want
> (perhaps as repulsive, despicable, stupid, pathetic ... etc).
Bach created a world of cretins by his very existence. Closed away, in
privacy, one can be Bach; but before an audience, only the cretin.
>
> The gaze of another thus comprises a threat, it is immediately experienced
> as threatening in so far as it objectivizes me. If I respond to this
> threat by submitting to it, my response is essentially masochistic; but if
> I respond by returning the threat, and by attempting to objectivize the
> other, then my response is basically sadistic. According to Sartre's
> pessimistic view, "conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others",
> and, famously, "Hell is other people".
I wonder if our objectification of another [others] isn't anything more than
the bark of our particular form of tree? The thicker the bark...etc...
If so, I have a funny suspicion that below that bark, there is exists a
fundamental sameness but with a different set of bones to carry around and
to fight and fend for [for reasons of selection]. Hell, in this case, would
not necessarily be 'other people' [the short answer], but more the nature
the pits us against one another [this very world, and the predatory nature
that exists here; but then, that is mindless nature; perhaps with 'mind'
there can be a betterment...and evolving???]
>
> "hell is other people"
> --Jean Paul Sartre
>
> ...is, in the briefest form possible, Sartre's definition of man's
> fundamental sin.
it is also ourselves. I expect I've been doing too much
internalization all
the way round. I was in a 6:35 this morning, unable
to sleep again. I started to write a third e-mail
about the mess from yesterday, and changed my
mind. I recalled the message
and said "screw it." I'm planning on keeping a very
low profile and working more on policy issues. Although I enjoy the
stuff, and we
need some involvement, I can take a more relaxed
stance and probably accomplish more. There I go again.
>When the picture a man has of himself is provided by those
> who see him, in the distorted image of himself that they give back to
him,
> he has rejected what the philosopher has called reality.
We had a great plan establishing a feedback loop, and explained how
this would only
give a general idea of the magnitude of the problem.
We refused to even contemplate breaking out which is the only thing
that would provide meaningful
data. But they'll have "something" and so can put a
check mark in the box.
mk5000
"You kick the bucket, I'll swing my legs
Always remember the pact that we made
Too young to die, but old is the grave"--kings of leon
How about the fucking simplicity of birds of a feather stick together? Is
that a violation of some new age moral law; does that make me a Bozo? Or
are the real Bozo's the one's out there chasing goosetails as truth?
Social Identity is far deeper than X,Y,Z nonsense...and goes to the bones of
what we are; the familial heredity, shared history, and the common sense of
mind, heart, and puview of life; from which, a common understanding of such
things as law, order, and right and wrong are ultimately expressed and given
structure.
Perhaps the one greatest common chord is that of 'temperment'...and we don't
hear much about this from our great halls of objective science. Science
would throw male Siamese Betta's into the same bowl and say, 'Be Nice now'.
Ethnocentrism is a word idiot. It means nothing until YOU attach the
meaning. It is an intellectual's hobsnobbery trying to rise above you and
me...to not be an idiot himself. What I'm getting at, the 'superiority'
here is from the hobsnobbery intellectual who is looking down upon humanity
and somehow declaring a natural state of 'centrism' to all group identity is
somehow wrong. Many believe this very word is 'politically
motivated'...part of the arsenal of cultural marxism to persuade the natural
defenses of European culture (Western Civilization) to 'relax'...and allow
for multiculturism.
Multiculturism today is in the interests of both socialists and
globalists...a funny bedfellow setup to say the least. But the target is
the white male, western civilization, european rooted culture. The
globalists want cheaper labor of course; while the socialists [leftist
leaning college liberals for the most part] still have dreams of
redistributing wealth. Anyway, this word, Ethnocentrism, is a big idea
rampaging across our university campuses today...and most 'kids' buy into it
as part of the cirruculum. Until one realizes that the whole idea is not
for the edification of 'other ethnic' groups for some reason...but always
and always directed toward white european descended males.
AND NO ONE ELSE!!!
Read up on how to change culture; you discredit, disavow, tear down...before
you build up, restructure. But why? A better world? Yea, and I have the
London Bridge to sell you as well. The Corporate entity wants to tear down
national borders, erradicate national identity, and mix the world population
willy nilly for cheaper labor and lower costs. That's the real 'driver' of
such embecilic concepts like 'ETHNOCENTRISM'.
Here's a question. Can you tell me a single 'ethnic' group that is not
'centric'...or elsewise, would disenegrate? Perhaps I should 'donate' my
hard earned wages to someone's elses family and let my own starve? I mean,
that's the essence of this idea isn't it...to disavow one's own identity for
sake of the next guy? I live 'for' you...right? Ha...bullcrap. We need
another thread on selfishness and what it is philosophically. All beings
have a 'centric' self interest. And you can take that to the bank!!!