define "existence"
anglicus
I'm just a little curious to see what people will say.....
-anglicus
ps: maybe I'll throw in my own thoughts on the matter after a few
responses have been posted...
Reply-to address contains spamblock. E-mail:
anglicus [AT] earthlink.net
<http://home.earthlink.net/~anglicus>
<http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Troy/8965>
ANTHONY RUBINO
of all that exists: i.e., if "?#!" exists, it has, at the very least,
the property of existence; conversely, if "?#!" has existence, it
exists.
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Parthenon/1881
mirror site: http://members.tripod.com/~trisector2/index.html
rfra...@my-dejanews.com
angl...@net.earthlink (anglicus) wrote:
>
> I'm just a little curious to see what people will say.....
>
> -anglicus
>
> ps: maybe I'll throw in my own thoughts on the matter after a few
> responses have been posted...
I don't want to think about it.
(Therefore, it doesn't exist.)
--
-- Rich
-- http://home.att.net/~rocq/bixResume.html
--
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
Val Miranda
anglicus wrote in message <363d4def...@news.earthlink.net>...
>
>I'm just a little curious to see what people will say.....
>
> -anglicus
>
>ps: maybe I'll throw in my own thoughts on the matter after a few
>responses have been posted...
Existence, as do definitions, get bogged down in circularity. Existence is
self-evident, but, anway, I'll say existence is reality, anything that is
which comprise the material and immaterial. Existence, then, is the
material and immaterial. It is found in what is called reality. Reality is
material and immaterial as is existence. Some may say there is no
immaterial, existence being limited to mass-energy, particles-waves, but I
exhaust existence by organizing it in its possible totality as material and
immaterial.
Regards,
Val
Peter van Velzen
As most words it can have more than one meaning.
1. Existence: The property of existing.
Having an Existence = existing.
2. Existence: The period during wich an object exists as such.
(that is with all of the properties we ascribe to it)
Ex: The universe existed for several billion years.
Its existence spans several billion years
Ex: Some isotopes only exist for part of a second.
It's existence is very short.
3. Existence: The total of interactions made by an object.
My Existence is full of E-mails.
Take pick!
Peter van Velzen
Amstelveen
The Netherlands
Nelson Thompson
> I'm just a little curious to see what people will say.....
Existence is, at its foundation, a statement about sentient perception.
For a thing to "exist" it must demonstrate persistence of form or
identity. But demonstrate to what? To the sentient observer.
It is the observer who defines "persistence", "form" and "identity". It
is the observer who categorizes and names the thing in the first place,
who observes whether or not the thing named maintains a sufficient
portion of its properties through the passage of time (however tiny) as
to justify saying, "Yeah, the thing exists".
The thing can be as palpable as a mountain, as fleeting as a subnuclear
particle, or as immaterial as an ideal. It exists because we say it
exists.
Nelson
Derek Doss
Val Miranda wrote:
> anglicus wrote in message <363d4def...@news.earthlink.net>...
> >
> >I'm just a little curious to see what people will say.....
> >
> > -anglicus
> >
> >ps: maybe I'll throw in my own thoughts on the matter after a few
> >responses have been posted...
>
> Existence, as do definitions, get bogged down in circularity. Existence is
> self-evident, but, anway, I'll say existence is reality, anything that is
> which comprise the material and immaterial. Existence, then, is the
> material and immaterial. It is found in what is called reality. Reality is
> material and immaterial as is existence. Some may say there is no
> immaterial, existence being limited to mass-energy, particles-waves, but I
> exhaust existence by organizing it in its possible totality as material and
> immaterial.
>
> Regards,
> Val
>
It's also important to point out as Kant does that "Existence is not a
predicate." It's not a quality like blueness or mass...or any other attribute.
You can't separate existence as a feature of any object. Kant's statement
specifically refers to the ontological argument for the existence of god.
Val Miranda
Derek Doss wrote in message <363EB0A3...@pacbell.net>...
Existence is comprised of two predicates: material and immaterial.
>
Rex Bennett
>anglicus wrote:
>> I'm just a little curious to see what people will say.....
>
Wow! You read my mind. You're not allowed to do that! (g)
To your definition, I would add one more thing, a footnote so to speak--
"what we perceive, we have named matter/energy and includes all the
attributes that come from it. So in that sense, 'existence' is
'matter/energy,'
and that includes even thoughts which are made of the same 'material.'
Rex
Val Miranda
Rex Bennett wrote in message ...
>Nelson Thompson wrote in message <363E7B0D...@texas.net>...
>>anglicus wrote:
>>> I'm just a little curious to see what people will say.....
>>
>>Existence is, at its foundation, a statement about sentient perception.
>>For a thing to "exist" it must demonstrate persistence of form or
>>identity. But demonstrate to what? To the sentient observer.
>>
>>It is the observer who defines "persistence", "form" and "identity". It
>>is the observer who categorizes and names the thing in the first place,
>>who observes whether or not the thing named maintains a sufficient
>>portion of its properties through the passage of time (however tiny) as
>>to justify saying, "Yeah, the thing exists".
>>
>>The thing can be as palpable as a mountain, as fleeting as a subnuclear
>>particle, or as immaterial as an ideal. It exists because we say it
>>exists.
Nelson, Rex said that our minds create reality. Now you are going even
further: you said that the mind creates existence. It as though we have
usurped the work of God ( I am an open-minded agnostic); man creates reality
and existence, or do you mean just his own?. But does that mean there is no
agreement on reality? Is your reality vastly different from mine? I do not
mean personal experiences because they are. Don't we have something in
common.? Your hand feels pain if it is kept for a while in a hot flame. If
we can't swim, we both drown; if you roman-candle, you die. It seems as
though personal reality is confused with impersonal reality, maybe to coin a
new phrase. Now you and Rex are going to tell me that reality and existence
are only personal. I'll then call you idealists--that is no expletive.
Regards,
Val
>>
>>Nelson
>
>Wow! You read my mind. You're not allowed to do that! (g)
>To your definition, I would add one more thing, a footnote so to speak--
>"what we perceive, we have named matter/energy and includes all the
>attributes that come from it. So in that sense, 'existence' is
>'matter/energy,'
>and that includes even thoughts which are made of the same 'material.'
Rex, can you demonstrate that ideas are not immaterial; better, prove that
they are material.
Regards,
Val
>
>Rex
>
>
>
Rex Bennett
Thoughts (ideas and perception) are electro-chemical. The processing
of them is electro-chemical and the storage and recall of them is
electro-chemical. Quite similar, in fact, to computer thought's which are
simply electrical. You can generate thoughts and perceptions in humans
by using a minute electrical probe on the surface of the brain. You can
alter perception and thoughts with chemicals. You can even do much
of that "predictably." You can promote visual in certain parts of the
brain, and auditory in others. You can simulate sexual sensations, words,
pictures, and even memories. You can eliminate depression with
seritonin reuptake inhibitors (such as Prozac), reduce Attention
Deficit Disorder, alleviate schizophrenia, psychosis. You can improve
memory and even increase IQ. With continued advances in technology,
we will eventually be able to reproduce all functions of the brain.
The brain is a bio-chemical machine and its processes are electro-chemical.
Let the body die, and brain waves stop. That is brain death, and it is
final. Brains can even be imaged now with PET scanners that will show
what areas of the brain are functioning when given specific tasks. This
is the same in everyone who is not damaged in some way. The images
are very detailed. There is no question any longer about whether
"thoughts" exist separately or not. They are an integrated part of the
functioning of the brain. Thoughts are *NOT* immaterial. They are
definitely matter/energy.
Rex
Val Miranda
Rex, I have prevuiyskt read just about the same material that you have just
posted. One wonders if there can be any immaterial in a material universe,
but ideas and space do seem to come close. I plan to do a post on thought,
the "I", and consciousness.
Regards,
Val
>
>Rex
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
Rex Bennett
This part was addressed to Nelson, but I'd like to comment on it.
The mind does create "reality." Reality is not the same as existence.
The mind does not "create" existence. However, when we go to
define "existence" then we can only do it from our subjective reality.
"Persistence" is key for defining existence. The Sun is there today,
it will be there tomorrow, and you can tell me that you see it as well.
Even when we do not directly perceive it, it is still there. Our personal
perceptions of it are our "reality." It exists whether or not we are
currently perceiving it. Others, under the correct circumstances, can
perceive it in some way.
This philosophical view point is refereed to as "causal realism." That
is the modern philosophical standpoint. Causal Realism
acknowledges the important role of perception in the determination
of "reality." It also goes one step further, it "assumes" that there
is "something" that is being perceived -- that is "existence" and that
these perceptions are not just creations of the mind. The view that
"existence" is a creation of the mind, is idealism. Causal Realism
hold the view that existence is independent of the mind, but our
perception/cognition of it ("reality") is the only way that we can know
it and describe it.
I do not know if Nelson holds the exact same view, but I would
believe that he does.
Rex
Val Miranda
Okay, Rex, the mind creates reality from existence; furthermore, reality is
not existence as you would say. Let's define existence: Existence is what
is or existence is what reality is derived from. Existence, then, is the
substratum of reality. That is Kantian idealism with existence as a
substratum. I have always maintained that if Kantian idealism is to make
any sense, existence would have to be its noumena, not something
intellectual.
Regards,
Val
Rex
>
>
>
>
>
Rex Bennett
>
>Okay, Rex, the mind creates reality from existence; furthermore, reality is
>not existence as you would say. Let's define existence: Existence is
what
>is or existence is what reality is derived from. Existence, then, is the
>substratum of reality. That is Kantian idealism with existence as a
>substratum. I have always maintained that if Kantian idealism is to make
>any sense, existence would have to be its noumena, not something
>intellectual.
And you were right. Kant was wrong and so was Descartes.
We must begin somewhere. Descartes failed to distinguish
sensation and perception from cognition, and ended up with
believing that cognition (ideas, mind) was the creator of
existence. And this resulted in an irresolvable duality.
The mind was the creator of "reality" but not of
existence. Sensation, perception are the "stuff" that reality is
made from, but that implies "something" to sense, something
to perceive. Since cognition does not precede existence -- it
does not even precede sensation and perception -- then the
world is not of the mind. There is something that really exists.
One of the great strengths of causal realism over rival theories
of perception is that it can easily explain the fact that our
existing knowledge affects what we perceive. In acquiring
information, our system of classification, and our existing
knowledge, directly affect how we treat incoming information
and what we select and interpret as relevant.
Best regards,
Rex
Val Miranda
Rex Bennett wrote in message ...
Rex, Thanks for the comments. I try to rid myself of such predjudices while
attempting to understand other views which seem opposed to my own. I could
adjust my own view to Causal Realism easily enough, and I do not think that
my current view is that divergent. I just place the emphasis on the
unerring senses, but I realize that the brain processes sensation as
perception, and that erring thought converts perception to conception and
proposition. I think that Peter is not quite correct in suggesting a
comprehensive examination of the "I" of thought. What I think he should
have suggested is a comprehensive examination of consciousness and conscious
thought-- not so much the entity, because Freud did examine that quite well
for us. And that is what I am doing now: making an examination of
consciousness and conscious thought.
Cheers!
Val
>Best regards,
>Rex
>
>
>
Nelson Thompson
> Val Miranda wrote in message <720l0a$7...@bgtnsc03.worldnet.att.net>...
> >
> >Rex Bennett wrote in message ...
> >>>For a thing to "exist" it must demonstrate persistence of form or
> >>>identity. But demonstrate to what? To the sentient observer.
> >Nelson, Rex said that our minds create reality. Now you are going even
> >further: you said that the mind creates existence. It as though we have
> >usurped the work of God ( I am an open-minded agnostic); man creates reality
> >and existence, or do you mean just his own?. But does that mean there is no
> >agreement on reality? Is your reality vastly different from mine?
No, I do not mean that 'man creates reality' in the physical sense. I
mean simply that "existence" and "exists" are concepts which exist only
the realm of languaging. It requires a sentient (languaging) being in
order for the statement "that thing exists" to be declared. And the
thing will only appear to exist if the sentient being (human or
otherwise) perceives the thing and perceives that its attributes endure
over a finite period of time (however fleeting).
Now, if you want to get really philosophical, you can talk about
Existence, (the sum total of everything that has physical reality). And
then you can talk about "Existence", the human concept of what is and is
not a part of Existence. Trying to keep these two concepts distinct is
non-trivial. :-)
Nelson
Nelson Thompson
> Thoughts (ideas and perception) are electro-chemical. The processing
> of them is electro-chemical and the storage and recall of them is
> electro-chemical. Quite similar, in fact, to computer thought's which are
> simply electrical. You can generate thoughts and perceptions in humans
> by using a minute electrical probe on the surface of the brain. You can
> alter perception and thoughts with chemicals. You can even do much
> of that "predictably."
Rex, I think I shall disagree with you here. There are many
electro-chemical processes (ECP) that are not thoughts. A battery, for
example. We do know that ECP has *something* to do with thinking and
thoughts, but I believe it would be a mistake to assume that thoughts
are merely ECP.
A thought is something that can only be experienced by a "mind". In
fact, if we indentify a thought as that which a mind "labels" a thought,
then only a sentient (languaging) mind may identify thoughts.
Yes, I can alter my thoughts with chemicals, or electrical stimulations,
but I can also alter them by merely thinking of fuzzy pink bunnies with
straw hats. (See? I did it!) I can alter my house with a sledge
hammer, but it does not follow that therefore my house consists of
sledge hammers (or the impacts therefrom).
> The brain is a bio-chemical machine and its processes are electro-chemical.
> Let the body die, and brain waves stop. That is brain death, and it is
> final. Brains can even be imaged now with PET scanners that will show
> what areas of the brain are functioning when given specific tasks. This
> is the same in everyone who is not damaged in some way. The images
> are very detailed. There is no question any longer about whether
> "thoughts" exist separately or not. They are an integrated part of the
> functioning of the brain. Thoughts are *NOT* immaterial. They are
> definitely matter/energy.
I believe that though the ECP are definitely matter/energy, "thoughts"
can at best be described as being "mediated" by ECP. A wave may be
mediated by the surface of a lake, but the wave is NOT just water, or
the lake's surface. The water is necessary for the existence of the
wave. But just any old configuration of water (say, a waterfall, a
droplet, or a vortex) is not necessarily a wave.
Nelson
Nelson Thompson
> The mind does create "reality." [snip good stuff]
> [snip more good stuff] existence is independent of the mind, but our
> perception/cognition of it ("reality") is the only way that we can know
> it and describe it.
>
> I do not know if Nelson holds the exact same view, but I would
> believe that he does.
Ahhh, ... yup. I sure do.
Although I come by my point of view via General Semantics (Korzybski)
rather than Causal Realism per se.
G/S says the the "reality" we experience consists of languaging and
thought structures composed of sensory images linked together by
languaging. We "live" in our mental world (like a simulation), and we
cannot distinguish between our subjective reality and the physical
existence which gives rise to our sensory perceptions.
Korzybski summarized existence ("the territory") and our subjective
reality ("the map") with the terse statement: "The map is not the
territory."
Nelson
Nelson Thompson
> And you were right. Kant was wrong and so was Descartes.
Wow! Am I ever relieved! :-)
> We must begin somewhere. Descartes failed to distinguish
> sensation and perception from cognition, and ended up with
> believing that cognition (ideas, mind) was the creator of
> existence. And this resulted in an irresolvable duality.
> [snip]
> One of the great strengths of causal realism over rival theories
> of perception is that it can easily explain the fact that our
> existing knowledge affects what we perceive. In acquiring
> information, our system of classification, and our existing
> knowledge, directly affect how we treat incoming information
> and what we select and interpret as relevant.
Korzybski would call these "distinctions"; the ability to classify a
perception as a 'thing' AND to distinguish that thing from 'not-thing'.
The nice thing about distinctions is that not only is a 'forest' a
distinction, but so is 'love' and 'honor'. The one is material and the
other two are not.
Greetings
Nelson
Nelson Thompson
> Rex, Thanks for the comments. I try to rid myself of such predjudices while
> attempting to understand other views which seem opposed to my own. I could
> adjust my own view to Causal Realism easily enough, and I do not think that
> my current view is that divergent. I just place the emphasis on the
> unerring senses, but I realize that the brain processes sensation as
> perception, and that erring thought converts perception to conception and
> proposition. I think that Peter is not quite correct in suggesting a
> comprehensive examination of the "I" of thought. What I think he should
> have suggested is a comprehensive examination of consciousness and conscious
> thought-- not so much the entity, because Freud did examine that quite well
> for us. And that is what I am doing now: making an examination of
> consciousness and conscious thought.
Well said.
I, too, am on that same quest. I have Dennett's book "Conciousness
Explained", and I intend to post some short summaries from it. [Some
day...] Though Dennett's approach (in the first three chapters) seems
pretty solid, the difficulty is the obtuse jargon he uses; he is so keen
to say exactly what he means (rigorously) that he is quite hard to
read.
Oh, well.... onward through the fog.
Greetings
Nelson
The Drake
>
>I believe that though the ECP are definitely matter/energy, "thoughts"
>can at best be described as being "mediated" by ECP. A wave may be
>mediated by the surface of a lake, but the wave is NOT just water, or
>the lake's surface. The water is necessary for the existence of the
>wave. But just any old configuration of water (say, a waterfall, a
>droplet, or a vortex) is not necessarily a wave.
>
>Nelson
Do not forget that we ourselves are no more than organic, carbon based
computers. Computers "think" by silicon based processes and we think by
carbon based processes. If one knows Chemistry, they know how close Silicon
is to Carbon, and thereby ECP's are universal, its the medium that's
important.
Val Miranda
Nelson Thompson wrote in message <3658B710...@texas.net>...
My examination is underway, but I will not check any references in my quest.
I shall simply examine myself again and again. Incidentally, I am a
materialist who believes that existence can be or is immaterial as well.
Too, I have read authors who have said that matter does not exist. I know
that you are familiar with the saying: no matter, never mind. Well, if
there is no matter, perhaps there are electrons and quarks which form
protons and neutrons. Did I read in a high school text that there are 92
natural elements and their combinations? That is what I call matter. As I
recall, even a favorite of Mr. Bennett, Lord Russell, denied matter. But
not Democritus who said matter and space--that is all there is, and he
didn't know anything about particles-waves and energy-matter.
Regards,
Val
>
>Greetings
>Nelson
peter...@yahoo.com
Nelson Thompson <nels...@texas.net> wrote:
> Rex Bennett wrote:
> > Thoughts (ideas and perception) are electro-chemical. The processing
> > of them is electro-chemical and the storage and recall of them is
> > electro-chemical. Quite similar, in fact, to computer thought's which are
> > simply electrical. You can generate thoughts and perceptions in humans
> > by using a minute electrical probe on the surface of the brain. You can
> > alter perception and thoughts with chemicals. You can even do much
> > of that "predictably."
>
But the experience of 'redness' is not the book.
If you stimulate someones brain with an electric probe, they experience
'redness'.
Why conclude that the 'redness' *is* the current ?
> I believe that though the ECP are definitely matter/energy, "thoughts"
> can at best be described as being "mediated" by ECP. A wave may be
> mediated by the surface of a lake, but the wave is NOT just water, or
> the lake's surface. The water is necessary for the existence of the
> wave. But just any old configuration of water (say, a waterfall, a
> droplet, or a vortex) is not necessarily a wave.
>
> Nelson
>
Well said.
In article <73arf7$o...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>,
"The Drake" <drak...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>
> Do not forget that we ourselves are no more than organic, carbon based
> computers. Computers "think" by silicon based processes and we think by
> carbon based processes. If one knows Chemistry, they know how close Silicon
> is to Carbon,
Non-sequitur. What about Gallium Arsenide, and various other substances ?
> and thereby ECP's are universal,
The processes on a chip are not electro-chemical.
> its the medium that's
> important.
>
>
Drake, you seem to be arguing from a similarity of material to
a similarity of low-level processes (ECP's) to
a similarity of high-level processes (consciousness = programming),
but each step of your argument is highly dubious.
--
Regards,
Peter D Jones
Brighton, UK
Rex Bennett
>that you are familiar with the saying: no matter, never mind. Well, if
>there is no matter, perhaps there are electrons and quarks which form
>protons and neutrons. Did I read in a high school text that there are 92
>natural elements and their combinations?
> That is what I call matter. As I
>recall, even a favorite of Mr. Bennett, Lord Russell, denied matter.
Never! You must have been drinking wine that day. (g)
Rex Bennett
>Rex Bennett wrote:
>> Thoughts (ideas and perception) are electro-chemical. The processing
>> of them is electro-chemical and the storage and recall of them is
>> electro-chemical. Quite similar, in fact, to computer thought's which
are
>> simply electrical. You can generate thoughts and perceptions in humans
>> by using a minute electrical probe on the surface of the brain. You can
>> alter perception and thoughts with chemicals. You can even do much
>> of that "predictably."
>
>electro-chemical processes (ECP) that are not thoughts. A battery, for
>example. We do know that ECP has *something* to do with thinking and
>thoughts, but I believe it would be a mistake to assume that thoughts
>are merely ECP.
>
>A thought is something that can only be experienced by a "mind". In
>fact, if we indentify a thought as that which a mind "labels" a thought,
>then only a sentient (languaging) mind may identify thoughts.
>
>Yes, I can alter my thoughts with chemicals, or electrical stimulations,
>but I can also alter them by merely thinking of fuzzy pink bunnies with
>straw hats. (See? I did it!) I can alter my house with a sledge
>hammer, but it does not follow that therefore my house consists of
>sledge hammers (or the impacts therefrom).
Is our concept of "mind" as a separate "entity" from the brain more than
just a wrong model? What if "the mind" doesn't really exist at all?...just
the brain with its thoughts? From what I have been reading, "the mind"
(thoughts) are made up of specific sequences of firing synapses.
This metafunction -- strictly electro-chemical -- is "the mind." I have
posted for more information, and will get back on this topic. In the
meantime, below is some interesting information I have pulled off the
web. Good reading --
. . . . . . . . . . .
How the Brain Comes to Think
"What is thought except a movement that is not connected to a motor neuron."
Attributed to Walle Nauta
"It is remarkable that there is no comprehensive theory of how the brain
works."
Per E. Roland
Abstract: I construct a comprehensive explanation of how the brain works and
show how a movement comes to be disconnected from a motor neuron. I examine
the vertebrate and in particular the mammalian brain. I describe the brain
as a neural net.
Prologue
This is not a theory, this is a series of observations on certain nuclei and
tracts of the brain. In addition there are six hypotheses and a few
conjectures about how they may work together.
When the brain is explained it is seen to be simple and easily grasped. The
explanation is not earth-shaking, it may be likened to the game of chess. To
explain the game I describe the board and the pieces, I list the rules. This
completes the explanation, one piece of paper suffices. Endless books have
been written (and more to come) about the intricacies of play. Games between
masters may be quoted but one sheet of paper lays down the rules.
In the same way the explanation of the brain is also seen to be simple. I
describe the neurons and the larger tracts, I list the rules of axonal
growth and synaptic modification. That neither of these is completely known
is of no moment, the main picture is clear and the details shall be filled
in later. With the overall plan in mind I can decide which details are
important and which are less so.
A distraction is the relationship between mind and brain, between the soul
and the body. I leave this to the philosophers. The brain will work exactly
the same whether it is associated with a soul or not.
My objective universe is a closed system. Energy and mass interact with no
help from soul. This simple position is easy to state, easy to believe, but
I may maintain it only with great difficulty when I speak of the brain. Men
find themselves in need of an homunculus, a little man who sits in the
center of the brain watching a television screen and punching buttons. The
more sophisticated postulate a soul (mind) that selects from the data
proffered by the brain, manipulates this data, decides, and forwards the
decision to the brain for execution. In a physical universe there can be no
homunculus.
Any talk of biological organisms must base itself on evolution and
homeostasis. Life is reducible to matter and motion. The particulars of
cellular life follow as DNA begets RNA and RNA begets proteins. By evolution
I mean that DNA replicates itself imperfectly and is subject to mutation. By
homeostasis I mean that the instantaneous protein surround of the DNA reacts
to a fluctuating universe to produce a constant milieu about the DNA.
I may expect no 'Why?' but only 'How'.
As the fetus grows, a nervous system appears. The genome exists today
because in the past it constructed a brain that functioned at birth to
preserve homeostasis in a hostile universe. Organic chemistry leads me to
believe it shall do so again. The genome wires the brain to move the
organism toward food, water, and a mate, to find a secure resting place, and
to avoid the predator. As a group, these wired drives satisfy the larger
homeostasis of protecting the DNA from an unkind world. The molecules of
each individual neuron rearrange themselves to keep what is in effect a
running average of the activity of afferent neurons. These running averages
alter the wired responses of the brain to incoming signal energy.
All animals begin their lives with a neural system that can maneuver them
through the milieu that previous generations of their species experienced at
birth. Some hit the ground running while others depend on their parents. The
genome constructs a fully functioning brain that can direct the body so it
may survive in a hostile environment.
It is I who assign purpose to the brain. The DNA molecules know nothing of
goals, they survive as they survived.
Description of the Brain
I am interested in the human brain as a part of the physical world. The
brain part of a neural net composed of sensory neurons that receive signal
energy from sense organs, motor neurons that transmit permuted signal energy
to muscles, and interneurons that connect the two and permute the signal
energy.
The most primitive neural connections known appear in certain jellyfish,
they have sensory neurons that are connected directly to motor neurons.
Their motor output is simple, as simple as turning on an electric light. In
certain other jellyfish a neural net appears, interneurons are interposed,
they connect sensory neuron to motor neuron but also connect with each
other. No more advanced neural connections are known.
The neurons in the human neural net are segregated and clumped into nuclei,
such an organization invites analysis. It is important to know that all
vertebrate neural nets share the same architecture, all mammalian neural
nets share the same floor plan. Mouse, Rat, Man, it is all one; they differ
only in neuron count.
The neural net is wired (by the genome) to cause the organism to approach,
to seek. That which is approached I call the good.
The neural net is wired (by the genome) to evade, to retreat. That which is
evaded I call the bad.
The neural net is altered by the milieu.
I do not start my investigation at the top with an neural net that has the
ability to perform a mathematical demonstration. I start at the bottom and
show how a neural net survived in the world and evolved into a structure
that performs such mathematical demonstrations as an idle by-product.
The Source of All Things
First hypothesis: The brain stem contains the circuitry that activates the
neurons in the forebrain that seek food, water, and a mate. The brain stem
also contains the circuitry involved in eating, drinking, and the sex act.
The neurons of the reticular formation form an alarm system; they watch for
the predator.
The reticular formation in the brain stem, the size of a little finger in
man, is the prime alarm. The genetic residue of the original pre-vertebrate
brain, it retains its pre-eminence. This primal brain monitors the
environment for any evidence of the approach of a predator. All sensory
input (except olfactory) falls indiscriminately on neurons of the reticular
formation; they habituate to the environment. This puzzles
neurophysiologists; how is a neuron to integrate these diverse afferents
except as noise? Noise it is, but it is noise with a level and the level is
the message. Evolution has written in the genome that any change may be
followed by sudden death. Upon such a disturbance the reticular formation
halts motor output, alerts the forebrain, and directs sensory organs toward
the source. If it is asleep, alerting the forebrain wakes the mammal. The
forebrain evaluates the threat and evades the predator. The DNA knows
nothing of death, but it survives because it produces a structure that is
attentive.
I create the object: quarks, sub-atomic particles, atoms, molecules,
synapses, neurons, columns, tracts, ganglia, neural centers, nuclei, brains.
Having created the object, I say that this object does things for a reason.
If I look at the neuron, I say that it sums the activity of afferent
synapses. If I look at the reticular formation, I see the neurons acting as
a group. I say they have a function, a purpose. The molecules involved say
that they are obeying the fundamental laws of physics.
Second hypothesis: The neurons of the reticular formation turn off the
forebrain during periods in which there is more chance of being eaten than
of eating.
Conjecture: The reticular formation contains two groups of neurons that make
up a clock. This clock gradually phase-locks with the sun during the first
year of life. Diurnally a rostral group dominates and puts the forebrain to
sleep and, alternately, a caudally located group dominates and wakes the
forebrain. These two groups of neurons form a flip-flop; they alternately
inhibit each other.
All the neurons are alive and fully functioning always. I see a neuron as
dynamically active along a scale that runs from bursting to quiescent, the
neuron sees only afferent synapses. When I say a neuron, or several neurons,
'activates' another, I speak of its function as part of a brain. The
conductor of an orchestra and a member of the audience are both alive but
somehow I wish to say the conductor is working and the auditor is not. I
wish to say that the conductor is creating music although he plays no
instrument. I wish to continue this distinction even if the auditor makes
small movements in time with the music.
It would be a basic error, however, to think that a neuron turns on and off
like an electric light. What does happen is that the molecules rearrange
themselves to alter the probability that a neuron will fire during a
particular interval. Exocytosis is the release of a packet of
neurotransmitter following the arrival of an axonal pulse. It occurs with
probability. I do not know how the molecules alter this probability.
The neurons of the brain stem make the neurons of the forebrain ineffective
by stopping the inhibition of the neurons of the reticular nucleus of the
thalamus that in turn then inhibit the neurons of the lateral and medial
geniculate bodies and of the ventral posterior nucleus of the thalamus. The
reticular formation disconnects the forebrain by cutting off its sensory
input.
I say the reticular formation 'turns off' the forebrain. That sleep
accompanies this 'turning off' is irrelevant. I have ruled out all questions
involving awareness other than noting them.
The forebrain, as activated by the brain stem, evades the predator, seeks
food, water, a mate, and finds a secure resting place. The brain stem
handles eating, drinking, and the sex act. At other times, the mammal
retreats to its burrow and the reticular formation turns off the forebrain
to immobilize the body and conserve energy. This is the foundation of a
foraging strategy that resides in the genome. The DNA that balanced its
energy equation survived.
All the things I think of as living, as wanting to get about in the world,
originate in my brain stem. In humans the forebrain has so flowered that it
apparently functions by itself, but this is not true. Without an active
constellation of neurons in the brain stem there is nothing.
When the reticular formation turns on the neurons of the forebrain by
lowering their thresholds and by inhibiting the reticular nucleus of the
thalamus, the neurons of the thalamus and the basal ganglia open to the
universe. Signal energy now passes through the thalamus, filters through the
neocortex, the striatum, and the globus pallidus, being permuted into a
motor program that is fine tuned by the cerebellum. After passing through
the ventral anterior and ventral lateral nuclei of the thalamus and the
pre-motor and motor areas of the neocortex, this motor program drives the
muscles.
A motor program is a sequence of activated neurons that I see as a process.
I see it headed for muscles that when energized will perform an action that
has meaning to me. I liken it to the perforated paper roll that drives a
player piano. The music lies in the manner in which the holes are sequenced.
Similarly, the motor program exists only as a sequence of activated neurons.
Man sleeps in remembrance of his evolutionary past when he was not nearly so
high on the food chain. These two functions of the reticular formation,
watching for the predator and providing the master foraging strategy, are
essential to life. Take them away and the species disappears. I can survive
without metaphysics but not without the reticular formation.
The thalamus acts as a peripheral unit, sometimes on (awake) and sometimes
off (sleeping). The neurons of the reticular formation control the action.
When they call for movement, there is movement; when they call for sleep,
there is sleep.
Learning
Learning has two phases: one before genesis, the other epigenetic. The part
that comes before encompasses the entire history of the living cell;
survival has written it in the genome. The genome constructs a brain-driven
organism that can survive to reproduce. The excitation of a particular
pattern of neurons in this brain is a drive. The part that comes after
involves the location of food and water sources, of sex partners, of secure
resting places, and the characteristics of the predator. The neural
plasticity that the genome installed is sufficient to explain epigenetic
learning. All epigenetic learning follows from the satisfaction or
frustration of a drive or from pain.
The brain is plastic. Synapses are strengthened and weakened, axons grow and
new synapses are formed, weakened ones are sloughed. Some specific cases are
highly time dependent, others continue throughout a lifetime. The Hebbian
hypothesis is popular, that synapses are strengthened by coincident
activation of presynaptic and postsynaptic neurons. I suggest another
procedure. If either the approach or the averse network is activated,
recently active synapses in particular regions of the brain are
strengthened. This could be a hormonal effect.
The DNA wires a subset of the neurons in the neural net to cause the animal
to approach things that in the past lead to survival of the DNA. If the
sensory neurons at the head end of a simple creature sense food the DNA has
wired the circuit to swing the head toward the food. Some of these neurons
evolved to form a reinforcement circuit. They alter the brain to seek the
good at a greater distance. When the good has been acquired these neurons
will cause synapses to be strengthened that will cause the animal to
approach this good more forcibly in the future. An important part of this
network is the medial forebrain bundle. I call this network the approach
circuit.
The universe excites a sensory neuron. It excites one or more interneurons
that, in turn, excite a motor neuron. As humans, we possess many
interneurons (100 to 1000 billion, say). I speak of this action as drive and
motor response. Self excitation complicates this process in the brain stem.
Third hypothesis: When a drive is satisfied the approach network is
activated, it strengthens recently energized synapses in the reticular
formation and the cerebellum.
Conjecture: When signal energy (internal or external) excites a
constellation of neurons in the brain stem or they self-excite, I experience
it subjectively as a drive; it causes motor activity. If the motor activity
quiets the drive, it also excites neurons of the approach network. The DNA
has hardwired this group of neurons to respond to the satisfaction of a
drive.
When my approach network is active, I experience it with various nuances; I
know it as satisfaction, pleasure, success, euphoria. When signal energy
turns on the approach network, it strengthens recently active synapses in
that portion of the reticular formation that I denote the arousal system. If
this complex of signal energy occurs in the future, the arousal system will
inhibit the reticular nucleus of the thalamus and the associated motor
program will proceed through the thalamus to the motor and pre-motor areas.
Conjecture: The DNA hardwired the approach network but neural plasticity
allows the environment to fine tune it.
Fourth hypothesis: When signal energy arouses the averse network, it
strengthens recently energized synapses in the reticular nucleus of the
thalamus.
Conjecture: The DNA has hardwired a group of neurons, the central grey, to
respond to failure to satisfy a drive or to body damage. This is the averse
network. When signal energy turns on the averse network, it strengthens
recently active synapses in the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. If this
complex of signal energy occurs in the future, the reticular nucleus of the
thalamus will halt motor programs flowing through the thalamus.
Conjecture: The DNA hardwired the averse network but neural plasticity
allows the environment to fine tune it.
I experience the activity of these neurons as frustration, failure,
depression, or pain. That which my genome wired my body to approach, I am
aware of as good; that which it wired my body to avoid, I am aware of as
bad. The approach and averse networks exist because previous generations of
the organism survived; I may not ask for further explanation.
Thinking
Fifth hypothesis: Exciting the neurons of the reticular nucleus of the
thalamus causes mammals to hesitate by halting passage of motor programs
through the ventral anterior-ventral lateral complex. Hesitation, under
lesser pressure from the brain stem, I call thinking.
The reticular nucleus of the thalamus surrounds the thalamus. Its function
is selectively to inhibit thalamic nuclei. I commonly refer to the thalamus
as a relay center. I should note its true function of NOT relaying. Signal
energy initiates an action, and it can halt an action before it begins. This
simple mechanism is enough to explain all the delayed behavior that I call
thinking.
Conjecture: When incoming signal energy falls on synapses in the reticular
nucleus of the thalamus that the averse network strengthened in the past,
these neurons inhibit relay neurons in the ventral anterior-ventral lateral
complex. This inhibition stops motor programs en route to the motor and
pre-motor cortex; the movement-to-be becomes a movement-in-abeyance.
This is how a movement is disconnected from a motor neuron.
The mammal hesitates until the conditions change, or the signal energy
excites a motor program with fewer strengthened synapses in the reticular
nucleus of the thalamus, or the overriding demands of the reticular
formation inhibit the reticular nucleus and the mammal either attacks or
retreats.
Conjecture: If the milieu is non-threatening the reticular nucleus of the
thalamus will periodically halt incoming signal energy by inhibiting the
ventrobasal complex and the medial and lateral geniculate bodies in the
thalamus. Without inhibiting pressure from the reticular formation, the
reticular nucleus of the thalamus continues this inhibiting activity.
The signal energy continues to move about the cortex and to enter the basal
ganglia where it energizes successive motor programs. They succeed one
another as the neurons of the active motor program become habituated. The
reticular nucleus of the thalamus inhibits the ventral anterior-ventral
lateral complex of the thalamus from relaying them to the pre-motor cortex.
This sequence of aborted movements is a sequence of thoughts. The mammal is
thinking.
Conjecture: Association occurs when the reticular nucleus blocks incoming
signal energy and the last neurons exercised continue to fire until
habituation silences them.
I am aware of this constellation of neurons as a thought. As these neurons
habituate, other constellations follow them in a ring. I am aware of them as
different aspects of this thought. The constellations follow one another in
sequence until a constellation is unavailable (refractory) when its turn
comes. When this happens a constellation, which the (now) refractory one
previously suppressed, starts up. This new constellation is a member of a
new ring. I am aware of it as a new thought hooked to the previous ring by a
common member.
I do not know what condition of a neuron causes me to be aware of it. It may
be somewhat active, or somewhat quiet. It may be bursting, or some
particular pattern of molecules may have occurred. I simply do not know. I
am aware of an exalted neuron, that is all.
When signal energy exalts certain constellations I am aware of a thought.
When it exalts certain others I am aware of an emotion. Or I am aware of a
drive.
During hesitation the signal energy moves around in the cortex and the basal
ganglia, turning into one motor program after another. It does not
dissipate; a healthy brain finely adjusts itself to keep the signal energy
active without runaway amplification. Local inhibitory neurons provide
negative feedback. When one with fewer trouble connotations emerges, energy
no longer flows through to keep the reticular nucleus of the thalamus
excited. The inhibiting energy from the reticular formation becomes
dominant. The motor program flows through the ventral anterior-ventral
lateral complex of the thalamus and on to the pre-motor and motor cortices.
The mammal has decided.
Thinking is an activity of the brain. Mastery of an academic field requires
that one, personally, experience all known errors. Each error causes
strengthening of synapses in the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. If this
situation arises again, I will stop. The putative movement does not proceed.
Similarly each success activated the medial forebrain bundle. A cascade of
neural action strengthens synapses in neurons of the reticular formation
that inhibit the reticular nucleus. I will reenter this successful path
should it appear in the future. If food is at hand and life is secure, the
forebrain is idle; it may take up mathematical demonstrations, quantum
mechanics, or metaphysics. My brain thinks, I am aware of the thoughts.
Sixth hypothesis: The reticular formation in the brain stem can demand
action by inhibiting the reticular nucleus of the thalamus.
Conjecture: The reticular formation can override the trouble energy, inhibit
the reticular nucleus of the thalamus, and cause action. Whatever motor
program is currently active proceeds through the ventral anterior-ventral
lateral complex en route to the muscles.
Trouble may follow but there IS action. An excited neural constellation in
the reticular formation is a drive. The constellation may respond to sensory
neurons monitoring the internal milieu, may become spontaneously active, or
may respond to synapses previously strengthened by the approach network.
Conjecture: The reticular formation (in the healthy mammal) demands action
when the reticular nucleus of the thalamus hesitates between alternatives.
The forebrain neurons that inhibit the reticular nucleus also inhibit a
constellation in the reticular formation. When the reticular nucleus becomes
active this constellation in the reticular formation also becomes active but
with a slower rise time. This constellation inhibits the reticular nucleus.
I must have this prime mover in the brain; I must have circuitry that
demands action without any compelling excitation from the external
environment. This is how I motivate Buridan's ass, eternally hesitant
between two equidistant piles of hay. Survival depends on the ability to
walk the narrow line between too much caution and too little. A proper
balance leads to survival that is, in the end, the final arbitrator of my
pursuits.
Epilogue
Consciousness has two aspects: an objective alertness, and a subjective
awareness. One who looks for the manipulation of a symbol system sees a
soul, one who looks for a wiring diagram sees a brain.
To conjugate:
I am aware.
You are alert.
He behaves in an intelligent manner.
You say you are also aware. I believe you.
The brain is alert; the soul (mind, self) is aware. When I design a brain I
put awareness to one side since there is no place, no need, for soul in a
material world. Yet I would delineate a brain that requires only an
awareness of its operations for a mental life to be. My brain thinks; I am
aware of the thoughts of my brain.
If I design a machine brain to this model of the mammalian brain, I may ask
myself, 'Does the machine think?' Of course it does. Is it aware of its
thoughts? God has not given it to man to know.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Rex Bennett
>fact, if we indentify a thought as that which a mind "labels" a thought,
>then only a sentient (languaging) mind may identify thoughts.
>
>Yes, I can alter my thoughts with chemicals, or electrical stimulations,
>but I can also alter them by merely thinking of fuzzy pink bunnies with
>straw hats. (See? I did it!) I can alter my house with a sledge
>hammer, but it does not follow that therefore my house consists of
>sledge hammers (or the impacts therefrom).
An Editorial from "Brain and Mind Magazine" for reading. Interesting
material!
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dr. Silvia Helena Cardoso
What is Mind?
The brain, although being the most complex structure existing on Earth - and
perhaps in the Universe - is a well-defined object: it is a material entity
located inside the skull, which may be visualized, touched and handled. It
is composed of chemical substances, enzymes and hormones which may be
measured and analyzed. Its architecture is characterized by neuronal cells,
pathways and synapses. Its functioning depends on neurons, which consume
oxygen, exchanging chemical substance through their membranes, and
maintaining states of electrical polarization interrupted by brief periods
of depolarization.
But... what about the mind?
It is amazing to verify that even after several centuries of philosophical
ponderations, hard dedication to brain research and remarkable advances in
the field of neuroscience, the concept of mind still remains obscure,
controversial and impossible to define within the limits of our language.
One strongly held view is that the mind is an entity distinct from the
brain; this speculation has its historical roots: the early theories, termed
dualistic hypotheses of the brain function, which stated that the material
brain can be viewed mechanistically but that mind is some entity with
different and undefined physical character. In such theories the mind was
seen as synonymous with the soul, forming an integral part of the prevailing
religious culture. For example, René Descartes (1596-1650) the french
philosopher, perpetuated Plato's (428-348 B.C.) mind-body dualism
philosophically separating the mind and the body (1). He stimulated the
debate "How does the non material mind influence the brain and vice versa ?"
His ideas permeated philosophical and scientific views right up to the
present day, changing the way in which mainstream research approached the
problem of self. Since the mind and brain were now usually viewed as
isolated entities, research into these areas was inherently separate;
biochemists concerned themselves with objective somatic mechanisms,
psychologists wrestled with the subjective properties of the mind;
philosophers and theologians carried with them the spirit and soul.
Mind is a definition which tries to rescue the essence of man. The essence
of a person arises from the existence of mental functions which permit him
or her to think and to perceive, to love and to hate, to learn and to
remember, to solve problems, to communicate through speech and writing, to
create and to destroy civilizations. These expressions are closely related
with brain functioning. Therefore, without the brain, the mind cannot exist,
without the behavioral manifestation, the mind cannot be expressed.
Spirit and soul seem to be religious and metaphysical interpretations of the
mind. Neuroscience has understood the brain and the mind as a result of
experimental investigation. Acceptance or rejection of the existence of the
spirit and soul depends on faith and religious conviction, which cannot be
proved or disproved by experimental methods. It seems to be more coherent to
think that beliefs are dependent on physiological activity of the brain and
of our cultural environment. We cannot have religious concepts if we do not
have a functioning brain (e.g., as when the brain activity is blocked by
coma or deep anesthesia) and we cannot believe in things which we do not
learn, hear, or experience. It is not impossible to think that some people
can "learn" to believe in the existence of God, life after death and
supernatural forces because the brain is provided with emotional centers in
order to satisfy psychological needs. I frequently ask myself: "Is there any
brain region involved with mystic-religious experience? Could either lesions
or absence of those regions abolish religious beliefs? Or, on the contray,
could "electrical storms" (hyperstimulation of neuronal circuits) provoked
by psychotic or epileptic seizure be acting on specific brain circuitry that
processes a possible religious feeling?"
Scientists are generally reluctant to combine experimental work with
philosophy and usually reject consideration of possible theological
implications of their studies. However, a few studies in this field have
begun to appear. Saver & Rabin (2) found that clues to the neural substrates
of religious experience, near-death experiences and the intake of
hallucinogens may be deduced from limbic epilepsy (the limbic system is
described as the emotional system of the brain). Ramachandran (3) reported
that patients with temporal seizures (the temporal lobe is involved with
many complex functions including emotion and memory) sometimes experience
God and religious ectasy during seizures and are intensely religious. Assal
& Bindschaedier (4) reported a case of religious delusion in a 39-year-old
woman who had suffered a head injury with right temporal concussion 13 years
before.
Few neuroscientists, such as the Nobel Prize recipient Sir John Eccles,
asserted that the mind is distinct from the body, but most of them now
believe that all aspects of mind, which are often equated with
consciousness, are likely to be explained in a more materialistic way as the
behavior of neuronal cells. In the opinion of the famous neurophysiologist
José Maria Delgado (5) "it is preferable to consider the mind as a
functional entity devoid of metaphysical or religious implications per se
and related only to the existence of a brain and to the reception of sensory
inputs".
If the brain has explained the mind, how to explain mental events as being
caused by the activity of large sets of neural cells? Neuroscientists,
timidly, have begun to combat the idea that this question is either purely
philosophical or elusive to study experimentally and have been approaching
the problem scientifically. They have begun to gain some understanding of
possible brain mechanisms that may underlie the most complex process in
human behavior and experience, such as the phenomena of consciousness,
attention and thought.
Certainly, one of the most remarkable examples to illustrate the
relationship between the brain and the consciousness are the findings which
state that there seems to be "two brains" in each head (6), that is, each
hemisphere (each half of the brain) is anatomically a mirror image of each
other, since most structures are present in both sides and they communicate
by massive bands of fiber systems. Functionally, however, each hemisphere
has its own areas of mental specialization, a phenomenon we call "brain
lateralization". For example, the left hemisphere is involved in highly
verbal and rational functions, while the right hemisphere is related to
artistic and spatio-visual functions. The interconnecting fibers play an
important role in coordinating the activities of the hemispheres; their
lesion may cause the individual to behave as if the two hemisphere were
responsible for two separate consciousnesses, as firstly noted by R. Sperry
(who was awarded the Nobel for that). In other words, if the "bridge"
between the two hemispheres is destroyed one half of our brain cannot know
what the other is doing.
Another significant finding in neurosciences is the correlation of mental
events such as learning with chemicals and structural changes of the nerve
cells (7). Currently, we know that in our brain new neuronal branches growth
in response to environmental and cultural diversity, that is, to training
and experience. Each neuron seems to contribute to many behaviors and mental
activities. Modern techniques are now beginning to reveal how the brain
accomplishes the remarkable feat of learning. Networks of artificial neurons
on conventional computers are helping to explain the ability of the brain to
process and to retain information. Also, modern cognitive sciences, which
use a vast array of new techniques, are being able to study objectively many
components of mental process, such as attention, awareness, visual
cognition, language, mental imagery, etc., and are being correlated with
neural activity by means of computerized functional imaging and are now open
to scientific investigation.
Finally, we realize not only the brightness and fascination exerted on us by
human mental functions, which is responsible for the creation and evolution
of our society, but also by the darkness and despair of mental dysfunctions,
which destroy and affect the internal and external environments of the human
being. Also in this field, the impressive advances in neuroscience and
genetics are revealing the anatomic, biochemical and hereditary bases of
schizophrenia, mania, affective and mood disorders, anxiety, intellectual
deficits, memory disturbances and many other (8, 9).
In conclusion, more and more we are realizing what so many influential
philosophers and theologians of past centuries could not understand: that
the brain is complex enough to account for the mysteries of learning,
memory, emotion, creativity, consciousness, mystical-religious experience
and madness. If we agree to think about the mind as it were a set of mental
functions rather than a spirit, soul or immaterial substance, it will
becomes easier to get on with the necessary empirical studies and thus
substantial progress could be made not only in the search for the nature of
man as a cognitive individual, but also in the alleviation of mental ills
and in a better understanding of cultural and religious beliefs, which,
along so many centuries have brought great pleasures - and afflictions - to
Humankind.
Silvia Helena Cardoso, PhD
Editor-in-chief and founder, Brain & Mind
Rex Bennett
Nelson Thompson wrote in message <3658B2B9...@texas.net>...
>Rex Bennett wrote:
>> Thoughts (ideas and perception) are electro-chemical. The processing
>> of them is electro-chemical and the storage and recall of them is
>> electro-chemical. Quite similar, in fact, to computer thought's which
are
>> simply electrical. You can generate thoughts and perceptions in humans
>> by using a minute electrical probe on the surface of the brain. You can
>> alter perception and thoughts with chemicals. You can even do much
>> of that "predictably."
>
>Rex, I think I shall disagree with you here. There are many
>electro-chemical processes (ECP) that are not thoughts. A battery, for
>example. We do know that ECP has *something* to do with thinking and
>thoughts, but I believe it would be a mistake to assume that thoughts
>are merely ECP.
I requested information from neuro-physiologists about brain and mind.
Here is one reply from Dr. Jeffery Stern:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I think you mean "conscious awareness" when you say "mind". Yes? No? The
totality of brain function is the mind. One aspect of brain function
(perhaps feedback with the prefrontal cortex) brings aspects of brain
function (or mind) to explicit awareness. Be advised that your question is
the most enduring one in all of psychology if not in all of science. If you
wish more I can suggest some excellent references. How much have you looked
into this?
Jeff Stern Ph.D.
................................................
I have extracted one sentence from his reply above to repost below for
cognitive effect:
"One aspect of brain function (perhaps feedback with the prefrontal cortex)
brings aspects of brain function (or mind) to explicit awareness."
Rex
meeuwtje
Nelson Thompson heeft geschreven in bericht <3658AC77...@texas.net>...
>Rex Bennett wrote:
>> Val Miranda wrote in message <720l0a$7...@bgtnsc03.worldnet.att.net>...
>> >
>> >Rex Bennett wrote in message ...
>> >>> It exists because we say it exists.
>
agreement on reality? Is your reality vastly different from mine?
>
>otherwise) perceives the thing and perceives that its attributes endure
over a finite period of time (however fleeting).
Can somebody speak of existence if there is nobody who can speak? The
answer to to this question must be no.
If we collectively decide not to refer to the sun we do not live in total
darkness. Existence is a concept in a language system used by an animal or
machine and it refers to that what is. We have this abstract concept because
it is difficult to define what is and what is not.
You can state that the world merely is that what is a fact But then you
would have a hard time explaining what the facts are and you would logicaly
end up not allowed talking about much but those facts. Thus leaving much out
of existence.
Perhaps you can atribute some criteria, in order for something to be like it
must persist in time and have extension in space but our senses can deceive
us and what we think can be false. Existence is not necessarely related to
the blind observer and his or her confused mind.
We donot have an agreement on reality. We have different believes and
experiences but we do share our existence. Simply because we feel us being
in the world.
meeuwtje
>The answer to to this question must be no.
>If we collectively decide not to refer to the sun we do not live in total
darkness.
>Existence is a concept in a language system used by an animal or machine
and it refers to that what is.
>We have this abstract concept because it is difficult to define what is and
what is not.
>You can state that the world merely is that what is a fact But then you
would have a hard time explaining what the facts are and you would logicaly
end up not allowed talking about much but those facts.
>Thus leaving much out of existence.
it must persist in time and have extension in space but our senses can
deceive us and what we think can be false.
>Existence is not necessarely related to the blind observer and his or her
confused mind.
>We donot have an agreement on reality.
>We have different believes and experiences but we do share our existence.
>Simply because we feel us being
Nelson Thompson heeft geschreven in bericht <3658AC77...@texas.net>...
>Rex Bennett wrote:
>> Val Miranda wrote in message <720l0a$7...@bgtnsc03.worldnet.att.net>...
>> >
>> >Rex Bennett wrote in message ...
>> >>Nelson Thompson wrote in message <363E7B0D...@texas.net>...
>> >>>[snip] It exists because we say it exists.
>> But does that mean there
is no
>> >agreement on reality? Is your reality vastly different from mine?
>
>
>Nelson
Val Miranda
Rex Bennett wrote in message ...
Rex, Thanks for the neurophisiology; it expresses my view. There is no I,
you, me, self, soul, or mind--only the functioning brain of the body-brain.
The brain-body is you and me. However, I am a materialist who believes that
existence is material and immaterial.
Regards,
Val
>
>Rex
>
>
Val Miranda
Rex Bennett wrote in message ...
Rex, perhaps. But my memory may have failed me. I may have misread him.
But I was disappointed with what I read, because it put a nail in the coffin
of my philosophy, and it seemed as though he denied matter while affirming
the atom and quantum mechanics. I will have to re-check out this most
elementary book by the good Lord.
Regards,
Val
>
>
Nelson Thompson
> Can somebody speak of existence if there is nobody who can speak? The
> answer to to this question must be no.
Hmmm. It is not the ability to speak that is the issue. I think.
> If we collectively decide not to refer to the sun we do not live in total
> darkness. Existence is a concept in a language system used by an animal or
> machine and it refers to that what is. We have this abstract concept because
> it is difficult to define what is and what is not.
Okay. Existence is not "caused" by our speaking it. The sun does
exist. It has physical reality independent of our observations and
opinions.
> You can state that the world merely is that what is a fact. But then you
> would have a hard time explaining what the facts are and you would logicaly
> end up not allowed talking about much but those facts. Thus leaving much out
> of existence.
There are a lot of "facts" so I don't think we would run out of things
to say. However, you are correct in that in the realm of
"conversations", facts make up a small portion. Chiefly, we talk about
what we think the facts "mean", or how to interpret the facts. And then
we talk a lot about what we "believe".
> Perhaps you can atribute some criteria, in order for something to be like it
> must persist in time and have extension in space but our senses can deceive
> us and what we think can be false. Existence is not necessarely related to
> the blind observer and his or her confused mind.
Well, let's take an observer with a confused mind. What is "existence"
to that person? It may be quite different than it is to you or me.
However, when I speak of observing, I am NOT including the various forms
of optical illusions, deceptions, or mental confusions. To understand
the role that language plays in the human mind and our conciousness of
reality, we must first limit ourselves to valid, repeatable, verifiable
observations of reality. When we have understood this, then we can
begin to question the nature of illusions, deceptions, etc.
> We do not have an agreement on reality. We have different believes and
> experiences but we do share our existence. Simply because we feel us being
> in the world.
I can accept that. In fact, I believe that when you see an oak leaf or
toss a pebble into a pond, your experience of that is "the same" as my
experience of seeing an oak leaf or tossing a pebble. (We could spend
days defining the phrase "the same", so I'll just leave it for now.)
Our lack of agreement usually (I think) is not about the facts, but
about what the facts 'mean'. We both agree that Napolean Bonaparte
almost conquered Europe. But you might say that he was a cruel tyrant
and I might say he was an enlightened visionary ahead of his time.
Nelson
Frank T. De Angelis
>
> Rex Bennett wrote in message ...
> >
> >Nelson Thompson wrote in message <3658B2B9...@texas.net>...
> >>Rex Bennett wrote:
> >>> Thoughts (ideas and perception) are electro-chemical. The processing
> >>> of them is electro-chemical and the storage and recall of them is
> >>> electro-chemical. Quite similar, in fact, to computer thought's which
> >are
> >>> simply electrical. You can generate thoughts and perceptions in humans
> >>> by using a minute electrical probe on the surface of the brain. You can
> >>> alter perception and thoughts with chemicals. You can even do much
> >>> of that "predictably."
> >>Rex, I think I shall disagree with you here. There are many
> >>electro-chemical processes (ECP) that are not thoughts. A battery, for
> >>example. We do know that ECP has *something* to do with thinking and
> >>thoughts, but I believe it would be a mistake to assume that thoughts
> >>are merely ECP.
<snip>
> >. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> >
> >I think you mean "conscious awareness" when you say "mind". Yes? No? The
> >totality of brain function is the mind. One aspect of brain function
> >(perhaps feedback with the prefrontal cortex) brings aspects of brain
> >function (or mind) to explicit awareness. Be advised that your question is
> >the most enduring one in all of psychology if not in all of science. If you
> >wish more I can suggest some excellent references. How much have you looked
> >into this?
> >
> >Jeff Stern Ph.D.
> >................................................
<snip>
>
> Rex, Thanks for the neurophisiology; it expresses my view. There is no I,
> you, me, self, soul, or mind--only the functioning brain of the body-brain.
> The brain-body is you and me. However, I am a materialist who believes that
> existence is material and immaterial.
Hi Rex, Val, Nelson, etc.!:
I shudder to think that the human mind can be reduced to bundles of electro-chemical nerves; not
because I believe it lessens the dignity of the human race - ala the adversaries of Darwin and
Hobbes, but because of the lack of philosophical/logical methodology.
I would expect Dr. Stern to view the world from the currently popular (and very near-sighted - I
might add) neuro-physiological position of behaviorism. I am not going to rekindle the age-old
battle of behaviorism vs. humanism and nature vs. nurture, per se, but I am going to rekindles
and take up the linguistic (Wittgenstein and Ryle) and rational (Husserl--> Sartre) points
raised against such thinking.
Firstly, the concept of the mind (both philosophically -- e.g., in contrast to the body, mental
vs. the physical, and in ordinary language) is not simply equivalent to the brain (or, in Dr.
Stern's definition, "the totality of brain function") - which I think is a cop-out. The mind is
not a spatio-temporal concept; the brain is. How can you reduce electro-chemical impulses of
the brain to free willing action, regardless of the behavioristic-like probabilities of
predicting human acts? Can a strictly empirical-physiological study ever explain intentionality
and inter-subjectivity?
>> > Rex said that our minds create reality. But does that mean there is no
agreement on reality? Is your reality vastly different from mine?
>
Rex, don't minds create reality to the extent that our "projects" reflect (1) non-empirical and
non-electro-chemical criteria, and (2) culturally shared meanings through a common linguistic
perspective? Moreover, neither of these points and positions contradict a materialist conception
of the world. We actively constitute reality through the way in which our shared interests and
material reality shapes our perspective. How we view the world -- as a culture, already existing
with ideologies and within the institutions of the state -- determines how we decide to define
and "cut it up into pieces," linguistically. Thus, this may be explained on a material and
primordial basis, but it cannot account for the revolutionary and quite unpredictable changes
that occur in thinking and in action, all throughout various stages and epochs of history. We
make our own history, even if it is through those great individuals who rise to the occasion out
of necessity ("Necessity is the mother of invention").
If the mind were no more than electro-chemical impulses and responses, then wouldn't ALL of our
actions be completely determined, without any qualitative and revolutionary jumps and quirks in
history? How do we understand and explain the human mind and spirit (let alone the various
levels of gratification and human meaning attached to the sexual act) if we reduce it to a
"totality of brain functions," electro-chemically based? With all of the marvels of modernday
science, we can get, for example, a CAT scan three dimensional picture of the brain, but can we
geta picture of "the mind"? If we set a structure up (e.g., a computer) in a bi-nomial way,
then we only get a bi-valued universe of "And"/"OR" gates, creating its own limitations of a
false dichotomy and bifurcation. I would say that we give our world meaning -- as a culture and
as a society -- through our shared experiences, and in and through a language, essentially
active in process...actively constituting (creating) it and re-creating it, in a profound way.
Man vs. machine: Can computers think?
Can computers do any more than what they are programmed for? Can they "decide" and "choose" in
ways that are beyond the possibilities of how they were programmed? No. The series of
philosophical debates between Paul Churchland (UCSD) and John Searle (UC, Berkeley), which were
aired in _Scientific American_ magazine (that I cannot for the life of me find, right now),
duplicated (in a high-tech. way) those of Norman Malcom vs. the very CRUDE AND MECHANISTIC
materialists (based upon an obsolete and atomistic Hobbesian model) in the introductory
philosophical text, _About Philosophy_, by Robert Paul Wolff. Like it or not, what all of these
philosophical debates have to come to terms with, is the free will vs. determinism controversy.
Humans makes choices that are beyond programming, both literally and figuratively. The speed
and possibilities of synthesizing all of the IN-put, as impressive as it all truly is, simply
cannot escape the initial boundaries; whereas, the human mind is capable of no boundaries
whatsoever. As Sartre would say, 'there are no limitations to consciousness.' That is why he
says that "consciousness is a being which is not what it is and is what it is not." As Husserl,
before him, says, "consciousness is an act" and all human actions are intentional acts of
consciousness. It is constantly in the process of negating what is before it. The material
reality of our environment and history may shape a good deal of our thoughts and actions,
but...? Well, Dr. Stern's convenient wording of "totality of the brain functions" may
beg-the-question by concealing what it points to... the philosophical idea that the whole is
greater than the mere sum total of its parts. THIS is what the mind is, that the brain is not.
Intentionality cannot be programmed (any more than computer-mathemtaical logic can really
"exhaust all of the possibilities"). "Electro-chemical" and other hi-tech physiologically
limited masks may describe and explain brain functions, but thay cannot explain the mind and
human behavior. 99% of all the brain tumor patients' behaviors may be predictable, but why the
1% pick up a gun and go on a random shooting spree cannot be explained by the physiological
condition of the brain tumor, can it? In a way, think about it; it cannot really be explained
any more than why a Protestant actually shoots a Catholic in Belfast, can it? Wouldn't it be
analagous, absurd, and in Sartrian bad faith to claim that a mother protected her baby because
she was a mother (that is, had "the motherly instinct"), when mothers also abandon their babies
in trash cans? Do you see? What really explains behavior - and the mind?
What is truly unique and remarkable about the Cartesian Cogito, is not the "ergo sum" that
follows, but the reflective consciousness on the ego -- that is, consciously looking to
consciousness as the very object of consciousness -- which leads the way to the alter ego,
intentionality, and intersubjectivity in general (the interpenetration of consciousnesses), as a
prerequisite for language. Unfortunately, for Descartes, Husserl revealed this in his _Cartesian
Meditations_, and suggested that, at the "noetic" descriptive level, different forms of
consciousness -- including perception, recollection, and retention -- greatly vary in the degree
of clarity and distinctness. In the final analysis, for Descartes, any and every "Cogito"
exists as a conscious act, proving that "Cogito, ergo cogito." For Husserl, and post-Husserlian
philosophy, however, there is no metaphysical dualism concerning the mind and body. As an
organism, a totality, they are harmonious (regardless of Husserl's hokey allusions to Leibnizian
monads), but the mind cannot just be reduced to the brain, the nervous system, or some "totality
of brain functions," as if it were no more than a "bundle of nerves" (determining our every
action).
Transcendental Philosophy:
The mind can transcend itself and its experiences; especially in imagination, tied to experience
or not. Whether we are in the process of Cartesian doubt or Husserlian "Bracketing," we
transcend our empirical perceptions and experiences. The brain and the entire nervous system
allows us to perceive objects, but the human mind transcends all of that in imagination and
creativity, and via the meaning we choose to attach to it. We may not be able to leave our body,
physically - literally, with and through our mind, but we can suspend it - temporarily.
Personally, I do not know if we can fully succeed in eliminating all presuppositions from our
mind, since we cannot think outside of language (and, hence, strip ourselves of
institutionalized ideas [i.e., ideologies] and influences); but we can ATTEMPT it, and isn't
this the key? Isn't this what descartes had in mind; i.e., that we can attempt to doubt our
existence, but really can't? We can imagine -- and only imagine -- what an animal thinks and how
it symbolizes (as opposed to Cartesian self-reflecting, questioning/doubting the veracity of an
experience, and giving and interpreting meaning), but we cannot do it without some
anthropomorphizing. The imagination and creativity of art, religion, philosophy, etc. is of the
human mind, and/but cannot be explained (away) by a "totality of brain functions," can it?
I may be a "bundle of nerves," but I still have my mind...and it is still a terrible thing
to waste!
F.T. De Angelis
ANTHONY RUBINO
My complements on a fine presentation. Still a little too deeply steeped
in historical references for my taste, but much more betterer :) than
some of your recent posts.
The fact that I agree with you, of course, has nothing to do with my
appreciation of your presentation.
Cor ad cor,
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Parthenon/1881
mirror site: http://members.tripod.com/~trisector2/index.html
Frank T. De Angelis
There are several reasons why I use many references to the German and to
philosophers within the context of the history of philosophy. None of
these reasons have to do with name dropping, a strong ego, or an appeal
to authority, but, rather, it is because they are all strictly based
upon philosophical foundations. Do not take the following in a personal
way. It is merely my explanation of the above.
PHILOSOPHY, 102 B
On German terms:
Although my main area of emphasis was in 19th-20th century German
philosophy, key German terms -- not adequately expressed in their
English translations -- have been commonly referred to in the original
German. This occurs frequently in both philosophical literature and in
academia (and is not limited to graduate courses in philosophy). In many
-- if not most -- of these cases, these terms have profound implications
for philosophy; e.g., esp. "aufhebung," carrying with it, the idea of
moving beyond, in the sense of a transcendence, yet containing the
dialectical idea of preserving and destroying, both at the same time.
This is closest to the archaic and somewhat obsolete and esoteric
English word, "sublation," but nothing in English really does it
justice. It has been grossly distorted in English (and in French), by
the trnslation of "synthesis."
I am completely convinced that German is the most precise -- and the
most revelatory -- of all the languages, especially for philosophy. Cf.,
e.g., the German terms for perception, sense-certainty, etc. They zero
in on philosophically precise notions, placing them in a ladder of
progression, if you will, concerning deep meaning of both clarity and
distinctness. Epistemologically and logically, perception, and to
perceive, is one step beyond immediate sense-certainty, and (like most
German terms, unlike English) is built upon the synthesis of smaller
words. In this case, the term is a synthesis of "taking truthfully,"
implying a mediating mental process of weeding out what would count as
an erroneous and/or mistaken perception. So, "sinnliche Gewissheit" and
"Wahrnehmung" are important terms (in understanding the "Wahrheit der
Gewissheit" as "the truth of certainty," in logically and
phenomenologically leading us up to the path of self-consciousness)
where much is philosophically lost in the translation. And, furthermore,
just as I have shown in my translations and interpretations of the
Hebrew Bible - in my book, much more is at stake here -- in substance --
than just a literary loss of the puns. More than any other language
(and even though English is a Germanic language, here, it follows more
along the lines of other, more sloppy influences of the
Anglo-Saxon/Celtic heritage) the German does this best, far more than
the Greek language (with Latin and French being much less precise).
I thought that the average German workers who I drank beer with at the
HofbräuHaus in München had a better understanding of philosophical
concepts than most Americans -- and not just due to the fact that
Europeans value philosophy more than Americans -- but primarily due to
their language. Philosophical import and precision is built right into
their very language. I had an argument about that with a diplomat on a
train in Switzerland-Germany, but he was claiming that French was more
precise than German. He pointed to the fact that French was considered
to be the diplomatic language, but I argued that it was not at all due
to philosophical-like precision.
It is very commonplace to find key German terms in English philosophical
literature and courses. In addition -- due to the level of rigor and
specificity in analyzing philosophical ideas -- most upper division
classes and all graduate courses in philosophy use the original language
of the philosophers' key terms (because much is often lost in the
translation). There are tremendous differences in the possible meaning
and interpretation of certain words, for example, between Descartes'
Latin and French versions of _The Meditations_. And although we
generally do not need to get that boringly technical (on this ng.), it
makes a big difference. When reading secondary material on Sartre in
English, it is common to find "pour-soi" and "en-soi" used, as it is
common to find the "ding an-sich" terminology in virtually all English
commentaries, even though it adds nothing to the English. Likewise, all
commentaries on Descartes use the Cogito/Cogitare/Cogitatum, Dubito,
etc. terminology. With "Aufhebung," "Dasein," "Wissenschaft,"
"Wirklichkeit," "praxis," "eidos," "ousia," and a great, great deal of
other terms, mostly in Greek and German, I (and most philosophers) feel
that it makes all the difference in the world. I don't think that you
can adequately understand philosophers or do philosophy without knowing
something about the key philosophical terms in those languages
(especially if you are going to discuss those terms as they are used by
those philosophers). I believe that it is quite impossible to accurately
read and understand, say, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, without knowing
some German. I believe that -- in many instances -- the same is true of
the Greeks.
What I do not do (and what I strongly criticize most of medieval-->
modern philosophy for doing) is use a foreign language as an elitist,
ego boosting lever of superiority and domination. I have always hated
the fact that Latin was used, almost exclusively, as a private and
elitist statement of exclusivity within the educated circles (and I will
always appreciate Hume for totally breaking away from that tradition).
What Is Philosophy?
Due to the fact that philosophy -- like any other discipline -- has a
rigorous history of sorting out and going beyond the basic mistakes or
limitations of previous philosophers, it is essential to know exactly
what these corrections and additions (usually, further elucidations and
distinctions) are. To this extent, philosophy is the history of
philosophy, and one cannot be aware of or "do" philosophy without a deep
grounding in this history. Although it is true that the mark of a
philosopher is revealed in his or her imagination and creativity -
bringing forth new ideas, it would be sheer folly to blunder and
flounder about due to misunderstandings and/or ignorance of what had
already been accomplished and ruled out. In the tradition of Hegel and
Husserl, I take philosophy to be a "rigorous science" as well as an art,
due to the prerequisite and emphasis of methodology. But, aside from
that, good (let alone, "great") philosophy, like good and great art,
requires a deep understanding of its past in order to really move beyond
it to something new. As you well know, the best and most avant garde
artists and musicians have been classically trained. Having deep
foundations within the history of those traditions enabled them to build
off of them into a totally new avenue within their perspective
disciplines. Likewise, great philosophers must build and work off of
their predecessors. In plain English, poor philosophy is that which is
done in complete ignorance of its own past. To this extent, philosophy
IS its own history. So, relatively speaking, philosophy IS the history
of philosophy. For example, it would be silly to address basic ideas in
Descartes' philosophy without the knowledge of what was improved-upon,
discounted, and further delineated by others - regardless of which ones
you accept or reject. One ought to be aware, for example, of Husserl and
Sartre's critical comments on Descartes' Cogito - whether they are
accepted or not, lest they make silly claims, displaying an ignorance of
what has been "augehoben." It's like saying, "been there, done that." To
be sure, the philosophical community is not like the scientific
community, where the latter requires basic agreement - working off of
accepted paradigms. To this extent, no one can totally discount Plato,
just as no one has an exclusive hold on the truth. But, by the same
token, it would be silly to either defend or refute, say, Plato's notion
of Forms or his political theory of cyclical revolutions and Forms of
government, without being familiar with Aristotle's critical, in-depth
analysis and revision. In other words, this has little to do with the
acceptance or rejection, per se, of a philosopher's ideas, but it has
everything to do with understanding and accounting for subsequent
philosophers' critiques of the very position one is defending or
rejecting.
Aside from their religious dogma, one of the essential ways in which
people like Augustine and Aquinas were truly philosophers was that they
understood, explained, and argued from the Platonic and/or Aristotelian
traditions of philosophy; not just for the sake of tradition, but for
the application of precise philosophical principles. Another was that
they methodically and methodologically argued according to principles of
(their) logic. There was something else, though... perhaps, equally
important. For me - personally, I find it both remarkable and admirable
that they shook off a great deal of dogma and "debate-team-like
politiking" by fully addressing their critics in lengthy series of
objections and replies. It is this aspect that truly separates them from
the non or a-philosophical religious thinkers. This is what separates
philosophy from merely "debating" (and justice from law and lawyering).
In this sense, philosophers must account for their own history as they
"spin their web of ideas" in an interconnected way. So, one must address
Husserl's distinctions of clarity and distinctness within the varying
"noetic" descriptive thought-forms of perception, recollection,
retention, etc., for example, if one is to philosophically analyze the
Cartesian notion of the immediacy of truth via "clear and distinct
ideas." Cartesian doubt is even more problematic, necessitating an
understanding of an entire philosophical history of critical and
important twists and turns.
I know that this all sounds real boring to many subscribing readers, but
anything less than this is simply not doing philosophy - falling short
of the mark. Now, I am not suggesting that we need to be quite this
"professional," in the technical and academic philosophical sense (I
hardly even proofread my ng. articles), but we can't confuse everyday
language with technical philosophical jargon, either. I know that this
is not a professional philosophy ng., and I am glad that it is not (for
I do not wish to be any more technical and verbose than I already am, or
appear to be - to the layman), but some things on this ng. are just not
very philosophical, like..well, say, confusing Cartesian Meditations
with the Indo-Asiatic art of meditating.
I have plenty of original thoughts (and have had them published), but
outside of the context of the history of philosophy, they are just
unconnected philosophical ejaculations into the wind, so to speak. I
would agree that professional, academic philosophy has strayed far
beyond the original and etymological meaning of "philia-sophia," but
pontificating over philosophers and specific philosophical ideas,
without ever acknowledging the objections and elucidations of their
followers - on those very specific points, borders on the
philosophically criminal. As I have always told my students, Socrates
died for our philosophical sins. So, these are the reasons I use German
(and other foreign) terms and point to certain relevant philosophers and
their clarifications, distinctions, critiques, and modifications of
earlier views. If I am criticized for doing that, then so be it; but, it
seems to me to be somewhat analagous to the part in the movie,
_Amadeus_, where Emperor Josef tells Mozart, "too many notes," without
being able to actually pinpoint which ones are superfluous. I do not
believe that it is a matter of "taste." I do it because it is relevant.
It must be done, in the name of philosophy.
Ciao,
F.T. De Angelis
Nelson Thompson
> Hi Rex, Val, Nelson, etc.!:
>
> I shudder to think that the human mind can be reduced to bundles of electro-chemical nerves; not
> because I believe it lessens the dignity of the human race - ala the adversaries of Darwin and
> Hobbes, but because of the lack of philosophical/logical methodology.
Hi, Frank. I must say that I hesitate to respond to your posts because
they are often so intimidatingly well exposited. But, for this once, I
shall take my trepidation in hand and enter the lion's den. As it
were. {g}
It seems to me that the main problem with current views of the mind, is
the attempt to perform an Aristotelian reduction of the mind into its
component parts. It is hugely tempting to assign the role of component
parts to the pieces of the brain that we can see and/or detect via
physical means: cells, nerve bundles, nerve firings, chemical signals,
etcetera. I believe this is a total dead end, an intellectual "red
herring" across the trail.
> [snip]
> Firstly, the concept of the mind (both philosophically -- e.g., in contrast to the body, mental
> vs. the physical, and in ordinary language) is not simply equivalent to the brain (or, in Dr.
> Stern's definition, "the totality of brain function") - which I think is a cop-out. The mind is
> not a spatio-temporal concept; the brain is. How can you reduce electro-chemical impulses of
> the brain to free willing action, regardless of the behavioristic-like probabilities of
> predicting human acts? Can a strictly empirical-physiological study ever explain intentionality
> and inter-subjectivity?
> [snip]
> If the mind were no more than electro-chemical impulses and responses, then wouldn't ALL of our
> actions be completely determined, without any qualitative and revolutionary jumps and quirks in
> history? How do we understand and explain the human mind and spirit (let alone the various
> levels of gratification and human meaning attached to the sexual act) if we reduce it to a
> "totality of brain functions," electro-chemically based? [snip]
I propose that the nature of mind can best be approached by considering
a multi-level structure of emergent phenomena, each level with its own
"rules".
Consider the Gas Law equations, which are based upon statistical
analysis of the movement of gas molecules. Given a single molecule, or
a few, is it possible to derive from their behavior the Gas Law
equations? No. Does a single molecule obey the Gas Law equations? The
question is meaningless, as you are trying to compare utterly different
paradigms. A molecule obeys *its* rules, nor do its rules constitute in
any sense a "part" of the Gas Laws. In huge numbers, taken
collectively, gas molecules have a collective behavior not apparent in
the individual molecule.
Consider gas (like our atmosphere). It obeys *its* rules and has *its*
behavior. When we reduce it to its elementals, we do NOT speak of
molecules, we speak of pressure, temperature, density, and wind
currents. These concepts are elemental for describing the atmosphere,
but make no sense at all in describing a single molecule.
Consider a tornado, a highly structured, orderly pattern of atmospheric
winds, that arises out of the chaos within a turbulent storm. A tornado
obeys *its* own laws (which we are still not too clear on). It is
dynamically self-generative, a concept that has no bearing to a
container of gas.
If you go the other direction, you find that protons, neutrons and
electrons obey totally different laws than those of the emergent atoms
and molecules which they comprise. And below that is another paradigm
level, the quarks, which have *their* own unique laws.
Enough analogy. Cells, neurons, nerve impulses obey their laws, but
this is not mind. In huge aggregates, these 'elementals' serve to form
a new, emergent, paradigm that has *its* own rules, that are NOT the
rules of cells and impulses. Like waves on the surface of a lake depend
upon the existence of the water, the elements of this new paradigm
*depend* upon the paradigm layer below, but they are NOT OF that
paradigm. In fact, let's call this new paradigm of aggregate cell
activity "waves", just as a mnemonic.
The elementals of these "waves" would NOT be nerve firings or chemical
triggers. Water waves have elementals such as velocity, amplitude,
constructive and destructive interference. None of these apply to mere
water as such. In like manner, our "waves" would have unique elementals
and rules.
Consider that in the brain, we are no doubt dealing with astronomical
numbers of these "waves", so they in turn would give rise to a second
new emergent paradigm, with *its* elementals and rules. We might
arbitrarily call this level of paradigm, "actors".
We might have to go through several more levels of emergent phenomenon
before we even arrive at the paradigm of mental/linguistic modeling of
observed reality. Just as a speculation, we might one day find that we
have identified nine layers, labeled "nerve firing", "waves", "actors",
"attractors", "orchards", "agents", "colonies", "tentions" and finally
"nundrums".
Then and only then will we begin to understand the mind as the
interation among hordes of semi-sentient, self-directing "nundrums"
(whatever they turn out to be).
There. That's all I have time for. Hope this contributes.
Nelson
Rex Bennett
other than ancient philosophers or continental philosophers.
I was never versed well in continental philosophers, and
it's been so long since I read the ancients, I have to keep
looking everything up. If I had enough time (and patience)
to read everything, I would be more well rounded. I don't
know what that would gain me, but I would be more well
rounded. (g)
>From: Frank T. De Angelis <spar...@fda.net>
>Subject: Re: Brain, Mind, Existence
>Date: Monday, November 30, 1998 4:18 AM
>Val Miranda wrote:
>
> Rex Bennett wrote in message ... > >A reply of request for
information from Dr. Jeffery Stern below: > > > >Nelson
>Thompson wrote in message <3658B2B9...@texas.net>... >
>>Rex Bennett wrote: > >>> Thoughts (ideas and perception)
>are electro-chemical. The processing > >>> of them is
>electro-chemical and the storage and recall of them is > >>>
>electro-chemical. Quite similar, in fact, to computer
. . .
> >>Rex, I think I shall disagree with you here. There are
>many > >>electro-chemical processes (ECP) that are not
>thoughts. A battery, for > >>example. We do know that ECP
. . .
. . . . . . . . > > > >I think you mean "conscious
>awareness" when you say "mind". Yes? No? The > >totality of
>brain function is the mind. One aspect of brain function >
>(perhaps feedback with the prefrontal cortex) brings
>aspects of brain > >function (or mind) to explicit
>awareness. Be advised that your question is > >the most
>enduring one in all of psychology if not in all of science.
>If you > >wish more I can suggest some excellent references.
>How much have you looked > >into this?
> >
> >Jeff Stern Ph.D.
> >................................................
<snip>
> > Rex, Thanks for the neurophisiology; it expresses my
>view. There is no I, > you, me, self, soul, or mind--only
>the functioning brain of the body-brain. > The brain-body is
>you and me. However, I am a materialist who believes that >
>existence is material and immaterial.
>Hi Rex, Val, Nelson, etc.!:
>I shudder to think that the human mind can be reduced to
>bundles of electro-chemical nerves; not because I believe it
>lessens the dignity of the human race - ala the adversaries
>of Darwin and Hobbes, but because of the lack of
>philosophical/logical methodology.
Can you explain that? What do you mean about the lack
of methodology? And what are the pitfalls there?
>I would expect Dr. Stern to view the world from the
>currently popular (and very near-sighted - I might add)
>neuro-physiological position of behaviorism.
The man seems to know what he is talking about and he seems
extremely well rounded to me, well versed in philosophy as well
as in science. He recommended two exceptional books to me,
both of which I have already bought, and one I have started to
read. Just because a person is a scientist, don't expect them to
be nearsighted. I wish I'd had the brains of an Isaac Asimov!
> I am not going
>to rekindle the age-old battle of behaviorism vs. humanism
>and nature vs. nurture, per se, but I am going to rekindles
>and take up the linguistic (Wittgenstein and Ryle) and
>rational (Husserl--> Sartre) points raised against such
>thinking.
Jeezz. I thought battling with Nelson and Val was hard enough!
Now I have to take on Wittgenstein, Ryle, Husserl, and Sartre?
Humph. On the other hand, they are all dead, so what am I
worried about? (g) Forgive me if I weakly try to implant some
humor here. I wouldn't want to be accused of being offensive.
>Firstly, the concept of the mind (both philosophically --
>e.g., in contrast to the body, mental vs. the physical, and
>in ordinary language) is not simply equivalent to the brain
>(or, in Dr. Stern's definition, "the totality of brain
>function") - which I think is a cop-out. The mind is not a
>spatio-temporal concept; the brain is. How can you reduce
>electro-chemical impulses of the brain to free willing
>action, regardless of the behavioristic-like probabilities
>of predicting human acts? Can a strictly
>empirical-physiological study ever explain intentionality
>and inter-subjectivity?
Yes it can. At least the book I have here says it can, but I
haven't read that chapter yet. (g)
On a more serious note, let me counter your objection with
an objection. Can you explain to me the fundamental basis
(akin to "proof") of a separate mind/brain duality? Can you tell
me the nature of how the mind and brain can be "separate"
functioning entities? Can you tell me how the "mind" functions
separately from the brain? Can you tell me how the "mind"
functions at all? If you can't, then you are starting from a very
weak and unsupported position. Brain/mind duality has been
static for centuries, but science has continued on. Science
keeps pushing our envelope of knowledge and expanding into
new fields and new horizons. Where has philosophy gone on
it own? What has it discovered recently without science
backing it? Philosophy, by itself, has reached its limit. It reached
its limit by the time it reached logical positivism and linguistic
analysis. There was no where else it could go on its own. So now
philosophy must team up with science if it still wants to go anywhere.
This is a "side issue" but it is paramount to the very topic we are
discussing "brain/mind" duality.
>> > Rex said that our minds create reality. But does that
>mean there is no agreement on reality? Is your reality
>vastly different from mine? >
You might be able to say that there is "shared reality" and
"personal reality." Shared reality is "hard-wired based"
and "culturally based." This part of our world of "reality" is
very much in agreement with the whole tribe. The
hard-wired part to the whole world, the cultural part to the
cultural base. Add to this the ingredient that ties it all together:
the same "existence" that our realities are based on.
Personal reality is due to our differences from others. Small
genetic changes, and one's own personal history. What have
we experienced and how have we related these experiences?
How many times in your life have you suddenly become aware
that you we perceiving things differently to everyone else?
Many times, I am sure. This shows that we are always working
with at least TWO functional sets of reality.
>Rex, don't minds create reality to the extent that our
>"projects" reflect (1) non-empirical and
>non-electro-chemical criteria, and (2) culturally shared
>meanings through a common linguistic perspective?
I don't know what you mean by the first. Our awareness is not
on an electro-chemical basis. It is when we are out
exercising and stop to drink a Gator Aide to replenish our
electrolytes. Awareness doesn't operate on the "micro" level,
it operates on the "macro" level. Its much like the Holodeck
in Star Trek. A grand illusion is created by the intricate
functioning of a computer simulating a "real" world and
"real life" activities.
> Moreover,
>neither of these points and positions contradict a
>materialist conception of the world. We actively constitute
>reality through the way in which our shared interests and
>material reality shapes our perspective. How we view the
>world -- as a culture, already existing with ideologies and
>within the institutions of the state -- determines how we
>decide to define and "cut it up into pieces,"
>linguistically. Thus, this may be explained on a material
>and primordial basis, but it cannot account for the
>revolutionary and quite unpredictable changes that occur in
>thinking and in action, all throughout various stages and
>epochs of history. We make our own history, even if it is
>through those great individuals who rise to the occasion out
>of necessity ("Necessity is the mother of invention").
To rise to the occasion, you have to do something that other
people believe can't be done. Either you are aware "it can't
be done," or you are determined to overcome the situation.
Take your body for instance. Who would have believed that
$7.00 worth of chemicals could combine to create something
that could do all this? Even to this typing on your screen, even
to the design and building of the computer it is on? Does that
mean we should not believe that the body is not built out of
chemicals? Does that mean that we should not accept that
a handful of chemicals combined under great heat in a liquid
soup to form a simple lifeform that evolved into a sentient
being that can question the workings of his own mind? If you
can answer that, you can answer your own question.
>If the mind were no more than electro-chemical impulses and
>responses, then wouldn't ALL of our actions be completely
>determined, without any qualitative and revolutionary jumps
>and quirks in history?
No, nothing is "determined." All things are caused by some
action or interrelation. There is plenty of randomness in
events on the macro level to keep macro events twisting and
turning. Everyone's environment has enough differences to
allow for different events and different sequences of events.
Groups of events can "converge" at certain points in time
to create a totally new direction that was unexpected. Even
now, we cannot predict the future with any accuracy, yet we
know all the past. With all this knowledge, and if everything is
"determined" then we should be able to predict any future
with accuracy. The fact that it can't be done tells us that
the viewpoint is in error.
> How do we understand and explain the
>human mind and spirit
What are you calling the human "mind" and "spirit?"
> (let alone the various levels of
>gratification and human meaning attached to the sexual act)
What needs to be "explained?"
>if we reduce it to a "totality of brain functions,"
>electro-chemically based?
Remember that this is a "description." It is cognition.
It is KNOWLEDGE by description. What you are seeking
to do is to KNOW by cognition that which is unknowable
by cognition, but only by "acquaintance", by "experience."
Epistemology has long known that there are TWO major
divisions of KNOWLEDGE: knowledge by acquaintance
(experiential) and knowledge by description (cognition.)
These are fundamental physical differences in nature.
Like the electron and the proton, one does not translate
into the other. To change this, you would have to change
the laws of nature.
> With all of the marvels of
>modernday science, we can get, for example, a CAT scan three
>dimensional picture of the brain, but can we geta picture of
>"the mind"?
Not with a CAT scanner, but you can with a PET scanner. (Positron
Emission Tomography.) However, with the PET scanner, they
discovered that the "mind" *is* the brain in operation. There is no
separate "mind" that sits a micron or two above the brain. There is
the brain and its functioning, and they can picture the electro-chemical
functioning of the brain for each specific task. The pictures are
basically the same for everyone doing the same tasks unless there
is some damage to the brain. Then the pictures can vary wildly.
They are going into ever finer detail in this investigation of the brain/
mind. All evidence says (not just PET) that the "mind" (what we
picture or conceive of as "mind" is an illusion. "The mind" really
does not exist. "The mind" is not "the" mind at all. It is made up
of many thousands and thousands of different brain functions. There
is no "unified process" that is the brain. There is no separate
"entity" sitting there above the brain and somehow communicating
with it. There is the brain and ITS functions. It is the brain that
is the controller. All the separate functions of the brain makes up
a "collective" of functions that we refer to as "mind," but there is
no real "mind." There never was.
> If we set a structure up (e.g., a computer) in
>a bi-nomial way, then we only get a bi-valued universe of
>"And"/"OR" gates, creating its own limitations of a false
>dichotomy and bifurcation.
So does our brain. Cut the two hemispheres apart, and you
destroy the supporting structure of the brain that allows the
two hemispheres to communicate and correlate data. You
will have two functioning brains inside one skull. The left
half will literally not know what the right half is doing. So here
again, we have physical proof of the functioning of the brain.
The only major differences (as I know now) between a brain
and a computer is that no computer we have yet built is
complicated enough to correlate to the brain. However,
some scientist believe that the future holds the man/machine
which has a brain and computer functioning together as one.
At long last, Nietzsche will have his Superman.
> I would say that we give our
>world meaning -- as a culture and as a society -- through
>our shared experiences, and in and through a language,
>essentially active in process...actively constituting
>(creating) it and re-creating it, in a profound way.
That we do, and our world gives us meaning. That does
not mean that we have to deny our fundamental nature
and our fundamental structure. Is the Sun any less brilliant
because we know it is made of lowly hydrogen? Look at
its complexity and its *importance* to all life! It is the
furnace of the cosmos. Without it there would be nothing
but dead, dark, lifeless matter.
>Man vs. machine: Can computers think?
>
>Can computers do any more than what they are programmed for?
>Can they "decide" and "choose" in ways that are beyond the
>possibilities of how they were programmed? No. The series of
>philosophical debates between Paul Churchland (UCSD) and
>John Searle (UC, Berkeley), which were aired in _Scientific
>American_ magazine (that I cannot for the life of me find,
>right now), duplicated (in a high-tech. way) those of Norman
>Malcom vs. the very CRUDE AND MECHANISTIC materialists
>(based upon an obsolete and atomistic Hobbesian model) in
>the introductory philosophical text, _About Philosophy_, by
>Robert Paul Wolff. Like it or not, what all of these
>philosophical debates have to come to terms with, is the
>free will vs. determinism controversy.
In my estimation, the "free will" vs. "determinism" controversy
is meaningless and, I might even say, delusional. Of course,
there is always the possibility I might be wrong. (g) I think it
has resulted in the biggest waste of philosophical brain power
in history. It is a "contextual argument." And neither context
is accurate. In my view, determinism doesn't even exist. Neither
does free will. These are ATTITUDES, not actual "states" of
processes. All the causality of the Universe does not add up to
"determinism." And all the actions of man do not add up to
free will. There is no "state" of free will, and there is no "state"
of determinism.
I wrote a post about this fairly recently. You may have seen it.
If not, or if you would like to read an critique it, I think I can
dig it up again. It is too long to add to this already too-long
message. I am always keen to want to discuss and debate
fundamental issues. Another thing I should bring up is that I
have been accused of being "too sure" of myself and of being
"too cocky." I assure you I am not cocky. I know all too well the
limitations of my feeble brain. But I am "sure of myself" because
that is the only attitude that allows me to attack the Great Thoughts
of the Centuries by the Great Minds. Otherwise, how could a
lowly, feeble mind like mine hope to question the Greats? And
for that reason, "the earth was flat for thousands of years," and
"weight determined how fast an object falls to earth."
> Humans makes choices
>that are beyond programming, both literally and
>figuratively. The speed and possibilities of synthesizing
>all of the IN-put, as impressive as it all truly is, simply
>cannot escape the initial boundaries;
You are making a judgment on the future, which we cannot
predict. We are at the very birth of the "computer age." New
technologies, new materials, and new conceptual views can
vastly improve computers beyond anything we can now imagine.
Give it time. Computers do not have the limitations that many
people suppose. There is also the VERY REAL possibility of
computer/brain integration. Don't laugh. It is already being done!
The potential is staggering!
> whereas, the human
>mind is capable of no boundaries whatsoever.
I don't agree with that. We do have the limitations of physics
and the limitations of knowledge. I am sure you are well
versed in epistemology, so there is no reason to go further
on this. But there are definite boundaries to the human mind.
> As Sartre would
>say, 'there are no limitations to consciousness.' That is
>why he says that "consciousness is a being which is not what
>it is and is what it is not."
I have tried reading Sartre, but I am afraid that I kept getting lost
in jargon. Of course, that was many years ago. He may look different
now. I must admit that I am turned off by sayings that sound
"mystical" or "quasi-religious."
> As Husserl, before him, says,
>"consciousness is an act" and all human actions are
>intentional acts of consciousness.
All human actions external to the body, or including human
actions internal to the body? Have you never seen someone
with Turrets (sp?) syndrome knock over a coffee cup? Was
that intentional? Was it "conscious?" If either of these cases
are not true, then Husserl was wrong. (Can I be so bold? <g>)
> It is constantly in the
>process of negating what is before it.
I don't believe that. Life forms are in the process of living,
not negating. All processes are in a state of constant change.
Change is the necessary agent for process. There is a
constant exchange of energy and mass.
> The material reality
>of our environment and history may shape a good deal of our
>thoughts and actions, but...? Well, Dr. Stern's convenient
>wording of "totality of the brain functions" may
>beg-the-question by concealing what it points to... the
>philosophical idea that the whole is greater than the mere
>sum total of its parts. THIS is what the mind is, that the
>brain is not.
Humm, Frank. What about the Sun? Is it not greater than the
sum of its hydrogen? Does it even look like hydrogen?
So if we deny that the mind is made up of the brain, do we
deny that the sun is made up of hydrogen in a specific
complex relationship? Or is there some "little man" sitting at
the center of the sun, controlling everything? Or is the
"Sun Process" really "spirit?" Nature is replete with example
of the sum of the parts being "greater than the whole." We
must be careful that we do not trick ourselves with our own
language.
> Intentionality cannot be programmed (any more
>than computer-mathemtaical logic can really "exhaust all of
>the possibilities").
How can you be sure of that?
> "Electro-chemical" and other hi-tech
>physiologically limited masks may describe and explain brain
>functions, but thay cannot explain the mind and human
>behavior. 99% of all the brain tumor patients' behaviors may
>be predictable, but why the 1% pick up a gun and go on a
>random shooting spree cannot be explained by the
>physiological condition of the brain tumor, can it?
Are we going to deny the structure of the brain because of
our brain's own inability to predict events which are based
on millions of correlations? What basis do we have for that?
> In a
>way, think about it; it cannot really be explained any more
>than why a Protestant actually shoots a Catholic in Belfast,
>can it? Wouldn't it be analagous, absurd, and in Sartrian
>bad faith to claim that a mother protected her baby because
>she was a mother (that is, had "the motherly instinct"),
>when mothers also abandon their babies in trash cans? Do you
>see? What really explains behavior - and the mind?
Simple behaviors can easily be explained and reproduced.
Immensely complex behaviors are beyond our ability. That does
not mean that human behaviors are random. Society is based
on the fact that most human behaviors are reasonably predictable.
But randomness and complexity do enter the picture. At that
point, predictability may be tossed out of the window. However,
you can be sure that more people each day will do reasonably
predictable acts (within limits) than those who will do completely
unpredictable acts. Otherwise, society would be impossible.
Place people under extreme stress, and predictability in a random
situation falls dramatically.
Predictability comes from "structured behaviors." These are
reasonably repetitive. Unstructured, random situations may
lead to unstructured behaviors.
>What is truly unique and remarkable about the Cartesian
>Cogito, is not the "ergo sum" that follows, but the
>reflective consciousness on the ego -- that is, consciously
>looking to consciousness as the very object of consciousness
>-- which leads the way to the alter ego, intentionality, and
>intersubjectivity in general (the interpenetration of
>consciousnesses), as a prerequisite for language.
Descartes was a genius, but his thought experiments lead to
stagnation regarding understanding of the function of the brain.
People adopted this "body/mind" dualism, and most people
still retain it today even though it has been destroyed. I view
Descartes mind/body dualism as a major stumbling block to
philosophy. It is not just an illusion, it is a delusion, and in that
respects affects the outcome of perspective.
>Unfortunately, for Descartes, Husserl revealed this in his
>_Cartesian Meditations_, and suggested that, at the "noetic"
>descriptive level, different forms of consciousness --
>including perception, recollection, and retention -- greatly
>vary in the degree of clarity and distinctness. In the
>final analysis, for Descartes, any and every "Cogito" exists
>as a conscious act, proving that "Cogito, ergo cogito."
It is the PERCEPTION of COGNITION that creates the dilemma.
And then we have the COGNITION of PERCEPTION. Which
came first, the chicken or the egg?
> For
>Husserl, and post-Husserlian philosophy, however, there is
>no metaphysical dualism concerning the mind and body. As an
>organism, a totality, they are harmonious (regardless of
>Husserl's hokey allusions to Leibnizian monads), but the
>mind cannot just be reduced to the brain, the nervous
>system, or some "totality of brain functions," as if it were
>no more than a "bundle of nerves" (determining our every
>action).
You are correct when you say that the "mind cannot just be
reduced to the brain" and its functions. That would be
reducing EXPERIENTIAL knowledge to COGNITIVE knowledge.
Will we have to settle for a "dualism" of knowledge? It appears
so for the immediate future, but technology may change that.
We communicate (transmit) knowledge to others COGNITIVELY,
using the mediums of cognition. We can indirectly transmit
it EXPERIENTIALLY on a limited basis by using pictures and
mediums that correspond to knowledge by acquaintance.
But imagine in the future that we can place a helmet over our
heads and "see" what others are seeing, feel what others are
feeling. We would be able to communicate sensory experience
directly, INCLUDING consciousness. At that point, where does
one "mind" end, and the other begin? The potential for that is
staggering!
I don't know if you ever experience this, Frank -- but I suppose that
most brains function alike -- there are times when I momentarily
try to transmit vast amounts of information to other people
telepathically. No, I am not smoking reefer, nor am I associating
with space aliens. This is a real experiential event. There is no
telepathy, but the "intention is there." There are times at work
where people ask me "simple questions" that require a large
amount of information to prepare the person to understand the
"simple explanation." Its at moments like these that a form of
"mental frustration" manifests itself since I do not want to go into
long-winded explanations of complicated relationships just to
explain a trivial "simple question." The effort is far greater than
the anticipated result. At that moment, I sense a "packet" of
compressed information encased in an emotion. In that "packet"
is contained all the information a person would need to understand
the answer, if only I could TRANSMIT it experientially. If I had
that helmet I was talking about , perhaps I could transmit it.
I hope that doesn't sound weird to you. I have never seen anyone
else express that experience...outside of a mental hospital anyway.
And perhaps that is why others do not reveal the experience. I
wonder if others do have it? I wonder if the emotional packet really
contains the intended information or if it is just an illusion? But it does
appear to be a "composite, already processed, complete understanding"
without the need for raw data. In other words, "experiential cognition."
Now wait a minute while I go get my thorazine. (g)
>Transcendental Philosophy:
>
>The mind can transcend itself and its experiences;
>especially in imagination, tied to experience or not.
Now exactly what do you mean when you say that
"the mind can transcend itself"? Can you flesh that
out with details and examples?
>Whether we are in the process of Cartesian doubt or
>Husserlian "Bracketing," we transcend our empirical
>perceptions and experiences. The brain and the entire
>nervous system allows us to perceive objects, but the human
>mind transcends all of that in imagination and creativity,
>and via the meaning we choose to attach to it. We may not be
>able to leave our body, physically - literally, with and
>through our mind, but we can suspend it - temporarily.
>
>Personally, I do not know if we can fully succeed in
>eliminating all presuppositions from our mind, since we
>cannot think outside of language (and, hence, strip
I am not convinced that we can't "think outside of language."
We can think in pictures and in bundles of experiences.
We do not develop our experiential thinking process because
we are structured to use our cognitive thinking process.
But I do believe it is possible to think without words. As a
matter of fact, I am sure of it. To what degree it can be
developed, I am not sure.
>ourselves of institutionalized ideas [i.e., ideologies] and
>influences); but we can ATTEMPT it, and isn't this the key?
Yes, we should.
>Isn't this what descartes had in mind; i.e., that we can
>attempt to doubt our existence, but really can't? We can
>imagine -- and only imagine -- what an animal thinks and how
>it symbolizes (as opposed to Cartesian self-reflecting,
>questioning/doubting the veracity of an experience, and
>giving and interpreting meaning), but we cannot do it
>without some anthropomorphizing. The imagination and
>creativity of art, religion, philosophy, etc. is of the
>human mind, and/but cannot be explained (away) by a
">totality of brain functions," can it?
It does not "explain it away." It expresses it cognitively.
> I may be a "bundle of nerves," but I still have my
>mind...and it is still a terrible thing to waste!
>
>F.T. De Angelis
Care to share my thorazine? (g)
Rex
Frank T. De Angelis
Rex:
>I shudder to think that the human mind can be reduced to
>bundles of electro-chemical nerves; not because I believe it
>lessens the dignity of the human race - ala the adversaries
>of Darwin and Hobbes, but because of the lack of
>philosophical/logical methodology.
Can you explain that? What do you mean about the lack
of methodology? And what are the pitfalls there?
>I would expect Dr. Stern to view the world from the
>currently popular (and very near-sighted - I might add)
>neuro-physiological position of behaviorism.
Well, quickly (Nelson, do NOT READ THIS HUGE PARAGRAPH!), I am referring to reducing human
consciousness and behavior to (what I consider to be) the strictly naturalistic/physiological
methods, models, laws, and paradigms. I take this to be nothing more than a reduction of
descriptions and explanations by forcing everything relevant into neurologically
(physiologically) based psychiatric methodologies. As much as the existential psychological,
hermeneutic, and phenomenological methodologies have been treated as a relic of the past, I might
remind you that the entire methodological viewpoint of psychiatry, being little more than an
applical appendage to -- and under -- neurology-pathology, may very well reflect more of the
political and economic dominance achieved in the AMA's coup over psychology in recent years. Wow,
this is another whole can of worms, but, I believe that it goes more to the heart of the politics
and economics of research and dominance of the AMA than it does to a comprehensive methodological
basis for physiological-neurological-electrical-chemical models in the analases of human
behavior. This is part of the methodological problem of explaining human behavior (reduced to
behaviorism and psychologism) based on highly anthropomorphized analogies by socio-biologists and
people like Isaac Asimov, who may know alot about animals, but nothing about humans. This is
precisely what anthropologists (such as Ashley Montagu, and a million others), humanists (such as
Erich Fromm, whom you also thought was so great - when recommending his _Sane Society_ in another
post on alienation in modernday society), and a countless number of other (methodologically)
"anti-medical/psychiatric psychiatrists (such as Thomas Szasz and -- what I call -- the
Braginsky, Braginsky, and Ring _Methods of Madness_ "foolow-up") have maintained.
(I am sorry that I strung this all out into one giant "insane man's paragraph," but I knew that
this would merely beg-the-question and open up an entire can of worms more than it would explain
anything. In any case, this is -- for the most part -- what I had in mind, when I referred to a
particular study of the mind as a methodologically limited one, hand-in-hand with my claim of
reductionism.)
:Nelson Thompson wrote:
> It seems to me that the main problem with current views of the mind, is
> the attempt to perform an Aristotelian reduction of the mind into its
> component parts. It is hugely tempting to assign the role of component
> parts to the pieces of the brain that we can see and/or detect via
> physical means: cells, nerve bundles, nerve firings, chemical signals,
> etcetera. I believe this is a total dead end, an intellectual "red
> herring" across the trail.
>
Yes. This Aristotelian procedure (much like the Cartesian and Hobbesian) reflects a very
mechanical, mechanistic view vs. a more organismic one; however, I would call your more organic
analysis and explanation more of one explaining away the general Cartesian dualistic notion of
Mind vs. Body -- with your view of the brain (actually, the entire central nervous system) as a
totality/organism -- than one of the Mind vs. the Brain - specifically. The brain and the entire
nervous system can be explained in terms of electro-chemical impulses, waves, and laws - etc.,
and can even be explained in some of the neo-quasi phrenologist analyses; but the concept of the
mind is something far beyond any laws.
Dear Nelson and Rex:
What I am saying (and said, earlier) is that the Mind is very much a mental construct of
activities (intentional --> choices) far beyond the explanation of the central nervous system and
involuntary reflexes. Far beyond the electro-chemical influences upon the brain, including many
of which strongly influence and, thus, modify our behavior (e.g., through the use of drugs,
etc.), the mind is more like that of a limitless ocean bound by no-thing. The brain is both a
physical (and, thus, a physio-electro-chemical) entity and object of study and reference --
somewhat analagous (e.g., in "behavior") to other models in nature (as you have clearly
demonstrated) -- AND something quite beyond that naturalistic/physiological understanding. What
that "something" is is INCLUDED within the (even) more general category of semantics, called "the
mind." Agreed, much of the central nervous system cannot be categorized and dissected into a
Mind vs. Body dualism, but our notion of "mind" goes far beyond any physiological/neurological
psychologizing and reductionism captured by any so-called "laws."
> I propose that the nature of mind can best be approached by considering
> a multi-level structure of emergent phenomena, each level with its own
> "rules".
Perhaps, and probably, my point is more of a distinction between the language of "mind" and
"brain." This is why I mentioned Ryle (Gilbert Ryle's _The Concept of Mind_) and Wittgenstein.
Let me briefly lay out a few revelatory examples of everyday common language here:
What, indeed, is the meaning of this?
"I think I am losing my mind..."
or...
"It's clearly a matter of mind over matter."
or...
"That was a mindless act."
better yet, "how can anyone really know what is in my mind or what I am thinking?"
There is no technical vs. everyday usage of the term "Mind," is there? To this extent, there will
always be "wonders of the mind," regardless of "the latest" in science. Maybe, for dramatic
purposes only ("don't you kids at home try this" OR QUOTE ME ON THIS!), mind and/or (= or vs.)
brain debates may not be completely mixing oranges with apples but are more like mixing oranges
with tangelos and then, tangelos with Mandarin oranges. (But/so, if we just limit the analysis to
the above issue of the semantic matter, concerning "The Mind," I would be happy.)
This (in the latter, rather loose analogy), is in the spirit of Ryle--> Witt., in the sense in
which I refer to the entire category of the mind; i.e., as a semantic matter, a verbal dispute.
The meanings attached to these usages do not in any way make the mind identical to what your
descriptions infer. So, in this (major) sense (of the term "mind") it would not even be a matter
of the following distinctions which you astutely and painstakingly make:
> Given a single molecule, or
> a few, is it possible to derive from their behavior the Gas Law
> equations? No. Does a single molecule obey the Gas Law equations? The
> question is meaningless, as you are trying to compare utterly different
> paradigms. A molecule obeys *its* rules, nor do its rules constitute in
> any sense a "part" of the Gas Laws. In huge numbers, taken
> collectively, gas molecules have a collective behavior not apparent in
> the individual molecule.
Or even...
> Cells, neurons, nerve impulses obey their laws, but
> this is not mind... Like waves on the surface of a lake depend
> upon the existence of the water, the elements of this new paradigm
> *depend* upon the paradigm layer below, but they are NOT OF that
> paradigm.
>
> The elementals of these "waves" would NOT be nerve firings or chemical
> triggers. Water waves have elementals such as velocity, amplitude,
> constructive and destructive interference. None of these apply to mere
> water as such. In like manner, our "waves" would have unique elementals
> and rules.
The "totality of brain functions" is that of an organism. Yes, you're both quite right. And, yes,
there are separate levels of laws and paradigms, as well as lower-to-higher levels, one dependent
upon the other (which is what I was describing -- and do so, below -- in the more
phenomenological philosophical realm of consciousness and materialism), but that does not come
close to explaning the usage of the term "mind," which is much, much more of a limitless, lawless
mental construct. This is but one of several reasons why the mental and physical are not
identical, even though they are not unrelated. Descartes thought that the mind and body
interacted "occasionally" ("Occasionalism") - quite a silly notion, I believe. More like Leibniz
and the post-Leibnizean views, there is clearly an inseparable connection and harmony between the
two, but that does not make them equivalent, for one cannot be explained by -- or exchanged for
-- the other.
One of my main points is that you cannot simply reduce all of the "projects" of human activity
(of consciousness, the mind, etc.) to a physio-chemical level. In most post-Hegelian materialist
axioms and applications, while consciousness requires the material basis (claiming that there is
no consciousness without matter) for its very existence, it, itself, is not something in the
sense of a spatio-temporal object as much as it is merely a mental/linguistic construct. I would
say that what you (Nelson) are calling this organism, and what you (Rex, from Dr.Stern) are
calling this totality, I would call the central nervous system, including the brain. Moreover, I
would call the brain and entire central nervous system both physical and mental, but not really
"the mind." Consciousness (awareness) and the Mind imply something (actually, "No- thing) far
beyond this realm.
Wheew! Late again. Fini ! I just have to quit now.
Sincerely,
F.T. De Angelis
Frank T. De Angelis
(Oh, boy! I am stressed. I was very upset that I stayed long enough to
address about 1/3 of the other points raised by you, just when my
computer crashed, forcing a re-start and losing the entire post.)
Correction:
>psychiatrists (such as Thomas Szasz and -- what I call -- the
> Braginsky, Braginsky, and Ring _Methods of Madness_ "foolow-up") have maintained.
>
"foolow-up" should read "followed-up" - obviously.
Well, I'll just have to work on this very slowly, but, to begin with, I
now realize that both you and Nelson are not as close to the
physiological-determinist position as I has thought earlier.
What do I mean by spirit? Ah ha. Historically and etymologically, Spirit
was another word for Mind (e.g., Hegel's _Phänomenologie des Geistes_ is
sometimes translated as Mind and sometimes as Spirit, due to the lack of
distinction.) I do not mean it in any religious sense, but in the more
mental sense, including all of the uses in language of being "spirited"
(just as Socrates talked of the auxiliary class of military and civil
servants as being "spirited" and honorable). An energetic horse, we say,
is "spirited"; so, I use it in a more "passionate" human sense, like
having "soul, brother." Imagination, creativity, Spirit/passion,
compassion, etc. are the human qualities I talk about that have little
to do with the thirst at the drinking fountain and other lower
bio-physiological needs. Little in the way of biology and physiology,
little in the way of genes, electro-impulses, etc. have to do with most
of our (Maslowian) "higher needs." Many people have sex, not just for
procreation (the religious conservatives fit nice and snug in here), nor
evn for pleasure, but out of sheer boredom and due to social, filial,
and an individual's pressure out of guilt and a forced sense of
obligation. As a matter of fact, most cases of impotency have nothing to
do with sterility, but psychological factors not attributed to anything
in the genetic or physiological "environment."
I concede to you that much of intelligence and artistic genius is not
learned, but innate - in the genealogical deck of cards dealt to us,
but, the choice to be spirited, imaginative, creative, productive, etc.
cannot even be spatio-temporally located. Regardless of a right brain,
left brain analysis (almost bordering on the quackery of ancient
phrenology - DUE TO WHAT MEANING IS ATTACHED TO IT AND WHAT CONLUSIONS
ARE DRAWN FROM this methodological process of empirical inquiry), we all
have (men and women) equal CHOICES in being imaginative, creative, etc.
So, all of these attributes of the mind, are far above and beyond the
call of the more primordial level (which, to an extent, both you and
Nelson are saying).
Rex, concerning your humor: Contrar, Piere! I always appreciate humor
(from Woody Allen to the biblical puns of the "J" author - as you well
know), so I will reciprocate by spinning this little masochistic
satirical tale of dark humor. The start will obviously be a straw man,
but it will increasingly close in on my point, concerning our
differences (I hope, and without becoming a part of a slippery-slope
piece of logic):
I am an addict, and that is why I stayed in order to reply back to your
posts, missing all of my daily obligations. This was beyond my control,
To calm me down, since my "nerves are shot" - as the doctor said, I took
valium, which worked just fine; but, I had to take cocaine in order to
get a little kick, "pick-me-up," you know - get a little "spirited,"
until I realized that I wasn't eating. So, then I smoked some pot in
order to slow me down a bit, eat, and sleep; but, then I missed a whole
day of work. I lost my job and got so fat and depressed that I snorted
some coke, but knew that I had to eat, so I have gotten quite addicted
to twinkies. After the suger rush of twinkie ingestion, there was just
nothing left to me, so I had to kill. This was not my fault, and I was
told -- by my psychoanalytical psychiatrist -- that it was all submerged
in my unconscious mind. He prescribed quite a few drugs in order to
modify my behavior. After all, it is all due to the chemical imbalances
in my system, not to mention my "bad genes." I am sick, because I have
no control over my actions. I am simply not to blame, so, if I am not
at all aware of my actions, how can I possibly be morally and legally
responsible? I have "tired blood," so I guess I should take Geritol --
or, better yet, what it contains -- alcohol! That's it, I'll just take
an aspirin and/or Tylenol for my headache, along with the alcohol. Heah!
Boy, I just love these expensive solutions and psychiatric witnesses
accompanying my lawyers at my homicide trial. There must be a god I can
depend upon that will wash all of my sins away... and it is called
medical science and law. I am getting more hi-tech bang for the buck in
my
psychoanalytical-neurological-psychiatric/physiological/neuro-electro-
chemico-(drug) therapy. Boy, isn't American capitalism great?
Hmm. Maybe it wasn't such a bargain. The guy next door just quit - all
of the above vices. Hmm. He must have a strong will; I don't!!!!! I wish
I were born with a strong will. Oh well, that's why I need mdeical
science and the "dream team" of lawyers. How else could I possibly do it
all? I was born with a weak will. Don't you kids at home try this!
That's it for now.
F.T. De Angelis
Frank T. De Angelis
(Oh, boy! I am stressed. I was very upset that I stayed long enough to
address about 1/3 of the other points raised by you, just when my
computer crashed, forcing a re-start and losing the entire post.)
Correction:
>psychiatrists (such as Thomas Szasz and -- what I call -- the
> Braginsky, Braginsky, and Ring _Methods of Madness_ "foolow-up") have maintained.
>
"foolow-up" should read "followed-up" - obviously.
I were born with a strong will. Oh well, that's why I need medical
Frank T. De Angelis
Wow! I shot all of that out of me so fast, I now see that I should have
proof-read it first. "analases"(sic!)? Indeed! Correction: "analyses."
I'm embarrassed. Future posts will just have to be better thought-out
and checked. No more late rush jobs as I am trying to run out of the
door.
F.T. De Angelis
Val Miranda
It is not consciousness that looks to consciousnes, but it is conscious
thought, word thought, that looks to consciousness; they are not the same.
>>-- which leads the way to the alter ego, intentionality, and
>>intersubjectivity in general (the interpenetration of
>>consciousnesses), as a prerequisite for language.
>
>Descartes was a genius, but his thought experiments lead to
>stagnation regarding understanding of the function of the brain.
>People adopted this "body/mind" dualism, and most people
>still retain it today even though it has been destroyed. I view
>Descartes mind/body dualism as a major stumbling block to
>philosophy. It is not just an illusion, it is a delusion, and in that
>respects affects the outcome of perspective.
>
>>Unfortunately, for Descartes, Husserl revealed this in his
>>_Cartesian Meditations_, and suggested that, at the "noetic"
>>descriptive level, different forms of consciousness --
>>including perception, recollection, and retention -- greatly
>>vary in the degree of clarity and distinctness. In the
>>final analysis, for Descartes, any and every "Cogito" exists
>>as a conscious act, proving that "Cogito, ergo cogito."
>
>It is the PERCEPTION of COGNITION that creates the dilemma.
>And then we have the COGNITION of PERCEPTION.
No, Cognition is conceputalized. Perception should pertain only to what is
objective. There, then, is the conception of perception which is cognized
(known or thought).
Which
>came first, the chicken or the egg?
Obviously, it was the chicken (check special creation). The egg is a result
of the chicken. No one speaks of evolving eggs.
Rex, I am in agreemenrt with much of what you have said. FT, who, nowdays,
believes in the mind-body dualism of Descartes?
Regards,
Val
Rex
>
>
>
>
>
>
Frank T. De Angelis
FRUITS AND NUTS
>Rex, I am in agreemenrt with much of what you have said. FT, who, >nowdays,
>believes in the mind-body dualism of Descartes?
What? I argued (A) AGAINST the mind-body dualism of Descartes, saying
that occasional interaction was absurd. On the other hand, (B) I
objected to the setting up of the problem as one of Mind/Body, but
preferred Mind/Brain (as a non-exclusive either-AND-or). On the one
hand, (A) one cannot separate the mental from the physical, but, on the
other, (B) one cannot confuse them, either. We cannot understand the
Mind, per se, as a physical, spatio-temporal object, since it is a very,
very general conception (with no limitations), also revealed by the
lattitude in our usage of the word, Mind, making it nothing more than a
semantic matter. We cannot understand and/or explain the ultimate ACTS
of choice/intentionality of the Mind. So, rather than this being the
case of confusing apples with oranges -- as I said -- it is more like
confusing tangelos with oranges [a non-traditional logical point where
oranges are (A) and, in another respect, aren't (B) tangelos]. In a way,
a tangelo is and isn't an orange (and a tangerine), but, the much more
general concept of mind is not at all like a part of the organism (that
is, the central nervous system). So, it seems that either the analogy of
tangerines vs. oranges is appropriate (being more like mixing apples and
oranges), or the Mandarin orange/orange analogy is (where there is
nothing more than a semantic matter of a verbal dispute at stake).
My (linear) model and example placed the materialist structure of being
as the necessary basis for consciousness, but this model (of
consciousness not existing without matter) is neither epistemological
(so, is not to be confused with metaphysical problems) nor linear,
logically. Now, I do not accept Kant's epistemological solutions (i.e.,
of separating the world of fact/IS from value/OUGHT), but just recall
his unity of rational and empirical cognition in the world of phenomena,
while eliminating the empirical from the world of noumena. In a similar
fashion, however, we cannot confuse the mind with the brain...and its
mental functions which are not separable from its physical attributes!
We all agree that there are levels of consciousness more or less
immediate from impulses to the brain, from simple reflexes to seeking
water when we thirst. And we all know the effects of dopamine and
caffeine on the brain and central nervous system, but this has nothing
to do with ultimate choices in human behavior. Your body can be tired,
but you do not go to sleep, or vice versa. More abstract functions
completely obliterate this "partnership," if you will. Don't tell me
that imagination, creativity, productivity, the will, etc. is
spatio-temporal or physical in any way. What sense does it make to speak
of the location and physiology of willing? 'Environmental' factors may
or may not 'contribute' to 'strong' or 'weak willing,' but exactly what
does that mean (for understanding human action)? Something physical?
Physiological? A physiological compulsion? Let's change the wording to,
"ultimately, what is it that makes us do what we do" (for example, in a
split second decision)? There are people who break habits, change, etc.
F.T.
Nelson Thompson
> actions be completely determined, without any qualitative and revolutionary jumps and quirks in
> history?
No, not necessarily. If all electro-chemical processes were themselves
linear and deterministic, then you would be right. It's a sure bet that
they are not. Neurons themselves are so small that they are not that
far above quantum effects, therefore a neuron's reaction to stimulus is
a probablistic event. Furthermore, a neuron's response is known to be
possible only after a threshhold is reached with the stimulus, therefore
it is not linear.
Another physical analogy: the weather. The basic equations for the Gas
Laws and for the movement of gaseous matter (winds) are well known and
precisely defined. (Actually, the latter are differential equations)
But the dif. equations are nonlinear. Since they must be used
repetively to predict the weather an hour from now, two hours, three,
etcetera, their predictions become less and less valid the further out
you predict. The biggest, fastest, meanest computers in the world
cannot and never will be able to predict the weather out past (about)
three weeks. Yes, the equations are deterministic, but the weather is
NOT. No matter how precisely correct your starting data is, the error
in your prediction will grow without bounds.
This has become the heart of so-called "chaos theory". That chaos
(orderly indeterminism) is driven by processes which are highly
non-linear. Chaotic processes are by their very nature "orderly" on an
abstract level, and "indeterminate" on the predictive level.
> How do we understand and explain the human mind and spirit (let alone the various
> levels of gratification and human meaning attached to the sexual act) if we reduce it to a
> "totality of brain functions," electro-chemically based? With all of the marvels of modernday
> science, we can get, for example, a CAT scan three dimensional picture of the brain, but can we
> geta picture of "the mind"?
Here is the Gordian Knot: You cannot get a "picture" of a mind, you can
only "be" a mind. You are attempting to untangle the nature of
something that is profoundly recursive and self-referential. The only
"access" we have to "mind" is to "be" a mind experiencing itself.
One DG poster around here has as his tagline: "In order to understand
recursion, we must first understand recursion!" He hit the problem
squarely on the head, in my opinion.
More later.
--
Nelson Thompson
"Specialization is for Insects." R. A. Heinlein
Frank T. De Angelis
>
> Frank T. De Angelis wrote:
> > actions be completely determined, without any qualitative and revolutionary jumps and quirks in
> > history?
>
> linear and deterministic, then you would be right.
The problem is that that is precisely what any talk of "electro-chemical processes" smacks of;
i.e., basically, a mechanical, regulated process (regardless of the implications of another whole
can of worms called the "chaos" theory).
> It's a sure bet that
> they are not. Neurons themselves are so small that they are not that
> far above quantum effects, therefore a neuron's reaction to stimulus is
> a probablistic event. Furthermore, a neuron's response is known to be
> possible only after a threshhold is reached with the stimulus, therefore
> it is not linear. (Cf., below.)
>
> Another physical analogy: the weather. The basic equations for the Gas
> Laws and for the movement of gaseous matter (winds) are well known and
> precisely defined. (Actually, the latter are differential equations)
> But the dif. equations are nonlinear. Since they must be used
> repetively to predict the weather an hour from now, two hours, three,
> etcetera, their predictions become less and less valid the further out
> you predict. The biggest, fastest, meanest computers in the world
> cannot and never will be able to predict the weather out past (about)
> three weeks. Yes, the equations are deterministic, but the weather is
> NOT. No matter how precisely correct your starting data is, the error
> in your prediction will grow without bounds.
Are you saying that the inability to accurately predict the weather (beyond three weeks) is
analogous to the inability of predicting human behavior? The former is dependent upon not having
enough of the same type of information, but the latter is not; a choice to act in one way rather
than in another is quite a different thing. (Cf., below.)
> This has become the heart of so-called "chaos theory". That chaos
> (orderly indeterminism) is driven by processes which are highly
> non-linear. Chaotic processes are by their very nature "orderly" on an
> abstract level, and "indeterminate" on the predictive level.
Don't tell me that this is an analogy to human behavior as 'lawfulness without laws' (or
'lawlessness with laws')? This still harps on a very mechanical model of patterning human behavior
after the natural world. Is something better, or valued because it is natural (e.g., over the
artifical)? This is folly, being both similar to -- and reminiscent of -- Hobbes' model of human
behavior. Freedom, in the human world, was considered to be "freedom from physical restraint,"
based upon the natural model of freedom of movement, the lack of impediments. Thus, freedom from
bodily restraint was the natural/human basis, it was argued, for the very beginning of the
political and economic theory of possessive individualism (out of serfdom and the slave trade of
mercantilism). This, in turn, led to the narrow-minded atomistic theory that all commodities were
exchangable according to the so-called "natural laws of supply and demand," including labor (i.e.,
for people to be bought and sold as a commodity on the marketplace). This, of course is greatly
narrow-minded...BECAUSE it is a very limited, reified, and fetishized -- and, hence, fallacious --
analysis of human behavior. All of this is predictable -- and only works -- as long as people
accept it; i.e., act as if it is true. Can we predict revolutions on the basis of commodity-like
behavior? Humans radically change their institutions, including (not just the political, but) the
economic, legal, moral, etc. Humans fundamentally change those laws and ways of doing things, while
nature does not.
Mankind not only acts within, with, against, and upon nature, but also in a way in which nature and
natural objects are fundamentally transformed. This human transformation of the world devalues --
and 'transvalues' -- all natural models of analysis (including all of those referring to human
processes as being physiological, electro-chemical, bio-chemical, etc.).
Quantitative (incremental, measurable) changes vs. qualitative changes in nature -- and how and why
they come about -- are (or, can be) very, very different from drastic changes in human behavior.
This CAN be from bio-chemical changes, but it need not be. You can call this "orderly
indeterminism," but it would be quite farcical, wouldn't it?
> > How do we understand and explain the human mind and spirit (let alone the various
> > levels of gratification and human meaning attached to the sexual act) if we reduce it to a
> > "totality of brain functions," electro-chemically based? With all of the marvels of modernday
> > science, we can get, for example, a CAT scan three dimensional picture of the brain, but can we
> > geta picture of "the mind"?
> Here is the Gordian Knot: You cannot get a "picture" of a mind, you can
> only "be" a mind. You are attempting to untangle the nature of
> something that is profoundly recursive and self-referential. The only
> "access" we have to "mind" is to "be" a mind experiencing itself.
Yes, and the word, 'mind,' is a mental, creative picture of a mind tied to language. There isn't
any one material entity existing in spatio-temporal reality like a brain. And why it IS
self-referential is precisely why it is different from electro-chemical processes and laws, not to
mention the lack of analogy with predicting the weather. Impulses to the brain are not exactly the
same things as ideas, either. The Mind, per se, is a human invention, itself. But, then again,
most people prematurely think that Berkeley was so ridiculous - with his concept of ideas = all
reality.
For him, all empirical perceptions were (called) ideas (empirical idealism). Later, some
intermediary within the process was 'invented' in order to supposedly eliminate the problems of the
phenomenal vs. the "ding an-sich." So, Russell -- and others -- invented things like "sense-data."
The biggest problem, of which I have been trying to touch upon, is that most of these creative
models and paradigms -- ending up as ideas mistaken for entities -- have all begged-the-question,
so to speak. We tend to think that because we have a new way (or word) of looking at the world, and
of describing a process, we must also have a newly found 'entity' that must accompany that word
(the correspondence theory of truth and the ostensive theory of meaning). Describing mental human
acts in terms of determinate or indeterminate electro-chemical impulses adds little (if anything)
to the analysis of human behavior; especially if we are to judge the theory/paradigm on heuristic
criteria. How does one control one's behavior?
A BRIEF EXERCISE IN ABSURDITY:
*Forces, waves, particles, and fields are quite mysterious. Gravitational fields are those of
attraction. They are in and behind everything, including love - another form of attraction. So,
astrology is right, too. It can't predict all of the time, but it, too, has a great track record -
with the exceptions of what we just don't know enough about (or what knowledge and advice people do
not act on). Now we know that all of universe contains electricity. Why? Well, because we are all,
at the subatomic level, composed of the same elements. That's just a scientific fact of life. Hmm.
that's the healing power of magnet bracelots, magnets in shoes, and other magnetic attraction
gadgets, including the principle of love affairs... yada, yada, yada*...nada, nada, nada.
In the final analysis, let me just say one thing: I am NOT at all claiming (1) that the brain and
the C.N.S. are strictly (i.e., exclusively) physical objects, void of -- or completely separate
from -- mental processes, and (2) that the basic animal-like functions, described in terms of
electro-chemical functions, are all that different from those in the human realm. We all agree that
there is some kind of an 'uncertainty principle' to human behavior, but exactly what that is is
where we part company. Here, I am not as concerned with what a model CAN (help us) do as with what
it cannot do.
F.T.
Val Miranda
Frank T. De Angelis wrote in message <366646...@fda.net>...
>Hi Val:
>
>FRUITS AND NUTS
>
>nowdays,
>>believes in the mind-body dualism of Descartes?
>
>that imagination, creativity, productivity, the will, etc. is
>spatio-temporal or physical in any way. What sense does it make to speak
>of the location and physiology of willing? 'Environmental' factors may
>or may not 'contribute' to 'strong' or 'weak willing,' but exactly what
>does that mean (for understanding human action)? Something physical?
>Physiological? A physiological compulsion? Let's change the wording to,
>"ultimately, what is it that makes us do what we do" (for example, in a
>split second decision)? There are people who break habits, change, etc.
So, Frank, your position is in between Descartes and the position that there
is no mind, I, or self which is my position. The functioning brain-body--
that is all there is. Now this is what I consider to be the major question:
Is there a real existing immaterial self, mind, or I? I do not know, I do
not think so, but I do hope so; and it is for us to find out. The larger
question: Is there any immaterial existent in this material (pardon my
obsolete metaphysical materialist position) universe?
Regards,
PS: It is irritating to distort someone's position. But I thought that you
are either on the side of my extreme position or closer to Descartes or at
least somewhere in the middle. You either believe in a mind or you don't.
Others speak of a mind (you do). I say there is no mind--just a brain-body
functioning. That is what is called the concept of mind. Mind is a
concept. The existent is the brain-body.
>F.T.
Christoffer Vig
Val Miranda wrote in message <747ug0$h...@bgtnsc01.worldnet.att.net>...
>Is there a real existing immaterial self, mind, or I? I do not know, I do
>not think so, but I do hope so; and it is for us to find out. The larger
>question: Is there any immaterial existent in this material (pardon my
>obsolete metaphysical materialist position) universe?
>
>Regards,
Hello!
If you really want to explore the possibility of an immaterial self, I
believe Thomas Aquinas could be a good matter of investigation. If you state
the problem as you do: "Is there anything immaterial", I think it makes good
sense reading medieval philosophy. For although many people of today dont
really believe in angels and so on, the main point for Thomas is the
philosophical arguments, showing how the material world ultimately points or
demonstrates that there need be something immaterial, Thomas of course, had
from scripture quite detailed accounts of exactly how this immateriality had
to be understood, but as I see it, we dont need to share his belief in the
Bible. Anthony Kenny has recently written a book called "Aquinas on mind".
He thinks Thomas can have a lot to offer on matters of the mind. However,
Kenny is very susceptible of any accounts of angels and the disembodied
existence of the soul. I think this makes him miss an important point, the
same point as Val wants an answer to. Is there something immaterial?
I will try to show how Thomas account of the process of intellection makes
it clear that there has to be an immaterial self, that the intellect is
immaterial.
A boy sees five apples. What he really sees is five similarly shaped
objects, similar in color, smelling good. What makes him know there are five
apples, and not five distinct entities? Abstraction from sense data makes
the similarity clear. Five. Now, seeing the five apples is something
different to thinking there are five apples. The five apples in reality can
be eaten, the five apples in the mind cannot. Thinking, abstraction, is
stripping the specific material conditions of the thing perceived, so as to
think about the "form" of the thing, the general characteristics. Thinking
about something necessarily implies thinking about it in a general way. We
think about apples stripped form this specific matter, but we do not think
about apples without a general concept of materiality necessary for the
apples to exist. We cannot think the eternal apple, the concept of an apple,
always has to be thought of in connection with the possibility of being
materialised in some specific matter.
Now the boy gets older. He still loves apples. Apples in reality are
concrete, apples in thought are abstract. Thinking about apples makes his
mouth water, the concept is not purely abstract or immaterial, but contains
more immateriality than the apple on the table. The boy thinks about himself
thinking about apples. The object of his thought is his thought of apples.
His thought of apples is something close to the apple on the table. When the
boy reflects about his thinking of apples, he abstracts one further level.
This new thought is more abstract, it is only secondarily related to the
apple on the table, primarily to the apple in the concept. Self reflection
makes thoughts approach immateriality. If the mind was a computer this would
mean short circuit. But since the intellect is rooted in immateriality, we
can think highly abstract thoughts about ourselves and our own thinking.
it should be the other way around I guess)
Neurophysiological research is not able to explain the process of
abstraction. Although there can be registered brain activity and heaps of
details about the innerworkings of the brain, this will never explain why it
is that we think. Abstraction and intellectual thought takes place through
the workings of the brain, but it is not the brain that thinks, these firing
neurons are not thinking.
Thats it for now. Have a nice day. Thanks for reading this.
Christoffer
"Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing;
and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species,
is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect
reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of
intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible
species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily
understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness"
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, I, Q85 A2
www.newadvent.org\summa\
meeuwtje
Nelson wrote
>"Our lack of agreement usually (I think) is not about the facts, but
>about what the facts 'mean'. We both agree that Napolean Bonaparte
>almost conquered Europe. But you might say that he was a cruel tyrant
>and I might say he was an enlightened visionary ahead of his time."
>
>I wonder if those facts mean anything. If we both accept the fact that 2000
years ago there lived a man who said he was the son of god. Surely we can
have a different interpretation of what he meant with that. I suppose that
facts only mean something in some story. Facts are grasped in language,
consciously sought for, methodicaly gathered and purposly produced by people
named scientists perhaps to shed some light on a dark mystery.
"To understand
>the role that language plays in the human mind and our conciousness of
>reality, we must first limit ourselves to valid, repeatable, verifiable
>observations of reality."
If that is the question I wonder why you go around that way to find an
answer. What do you want to demonstrate with these valid, repeatable,
verifiable
observations of reality? Certainly you must have some suppositions about
that role of language. Otherwise you would probably haven't posed the
question in the first place.
Nevertheless a interesting theme indeed. I suspect that we shall never find
Websters dictionary located somewhere in the human
brain. Perhaps does language construct the way we think about reality and
the reality of thinking it self. Via that route I suppose that language can
play a role in consciousness.
Frank T. De Angelis
> If you really want to explore the possibility of an immaterial self, I
> believe Thomas Aquinas could be a good matter of investigation. If you state
> the problem as you do: "Is there anything immaterial", I think it makes good
> sense reading medieval philosophy. For although many people of today dont
> really believe in angels and so on, the main point for Thomas is the
> philosophical arguments, showing how the material world ultimately points or
> demonstrates that there need be something immaterial, Thomas of course, had
> from scripture quite detailed accounts of exactly how this immateriality had
> to be understood, but as I see it, we dont need to share his belief in the
> Bible. Anthony Kenny has recently written a book called "Aquinas on mind".
> He thinks Thomas can have a lot to offer on matters of the mind.
Hi, Christoffer:
Well, I studied Anthony Kenny's analyses in graduate school, but not on
Aquinas. I did happen to study under a few Thomists, though. In general
- and personally, I think that Aquinas was a rigorous logician and I
(almost) fully agree with his philosophy of HUMAN law; however, his
concepts of essence, existence, etc. are hardly original, and Aristotle
is the basis for his metaphysics. Even his proofs for the existence of
God are patterned after Aristotelian philosophy [and, in particular, the
Peripatetic Unmoved Mover argument(s)].
Having said that, I must say, I agree with your following analysis (far
below).
I cannot disagree with the Thomist explanation of the human intellect
(in his _Summa Theologica_, Q LXXXV.), in general, as holding the middle
place between the cognitive power of the sense (the act of a coporeal
organ) and that of the "angelic intellect," sans positing the actual
existence of the "angelic" and "soul" (as defined by him). For
illustrative purposes only, I find the "three grades" of cognitive
powers helpful, though simplistic.
F.T. De Angelis
Frank T. De Angelis
Let me clarify my position, both to a degree of generality and
specificity. For, on a simplistic level, I agree with the way in which
you discussed the universal vs. the particular. I do not see a
contradiction (in the "logically impossible" sense) between what a THING
IS and what IT IS CALLED. I believe that they are two sides of the same
coin, so to speak.
Let me clarify my position(s) through philosophically convenient
categories. Here are the labels:
(1) Metaphysically, I am a materialist; meaning that material reality
gives rise to ideas.
(1a.) Well, all ideas are dialectically interconnected to matter
(dialectical materialism); so, a change in one changes the other
(matter, ideas; subject, object; mental, physical). I am taking the
term, dialectic-s/al in the strict sense of Logic, as an internally
necessary methodology (as opposed to an external play; i.e., not just as
a temporary treatment to get to what I consider an undialectical end
[ala Plato, Kant, etc.]).
Now, I like your example of the universal and particular, which is
really Platonic. The actual Aristotelian position, however, of
incorporating form into matter -- i.e., as formed matter -- which I
agree with, along with most modernday philosophers, is vastly "superior"
("Aufgehobung," from a philosophical position) to the Platonic theory of
Ideas. In regard to the three levels of cognition, I accept the general
notion of the first two levels, even though -- on a much more
sophisticated and comprehensive scale -- I agree with Hegel's logical
development of cognition as stated in his _Phänomenologie_ (cf. #2).
(1b.) In the area of ontology (which is pretty much the only specific
area of metaphysics I deem to be important and "concrete"), I would
consider myself of the philosophical school of anthropological ontology
(or, ontological anthropology).
(2) Epistemologically, I am a rationalist (Hegelian); meaning, we learn
through mediating processes of consciousness, self-consciousness, and
the unity of consciousnesses (both perceiving and conceiving, ultimately
constituting meaning).
(2a.) So, I am deeply invested in phenomenological studies and
transcendental philosophy.
Do ideas exist? The ego? Spirit? Essence?
(3) When it comes to metaphysical-linguistic battles, for example, over
realism vs. nominalism and/or conceptualism (ala Ockham), I tend to
favor the latter. But, I actually do so -- and in all of the above
(except, perhaps, #2), I am convinced -- in a way which is completely
compatible with the Wittgenstein I know and subscribe to. (Cf. Renford
Bambrough's famous article in George Pitcher's (ed.) _Wittgenstein:
Philosophical Investigations: A Collection of Critical Writings_,
*Universals and Family resemblances*).#
(1/3) I see two very different (but not mutually exclusive), yet
legitimate methodologies arriving at the same conclusions, here.## In
the above treatment of Witt., by B., John Wisdom is quoted as saying,
"whereas propositions involving universals cannot be compared or
contrasted with propositions that do not involve universals, since ALL
propositions involve universals...(even) "This is Jack." This, I take to
be a part of Hegel's dialectical meaning in his _Logic_.
Taken by themselves, both Hegel and Witt.'s position is neither that of
the realists nor that of the nominalists, per se. Both positions (as
usual) have been reconciled, whether or not you agree with their
analyses.
The world of chemistry -- and the chemist's theoretical model -- is that
of natural and artifical processes, synthetically combining to bring
forth something new; whereas, a dialectical analysis and process is that
of an internal "preserving and destroying" and actually moving on with a
qualitative jump forward (Aufhebung).
(4) Concerning the philosophy of science - in general, I subscribe to
Thomas Kuhn's historico-paradigmic/heuristic model in _The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions_, and see it as being compatible, in both method
and conclusions as the Hegelian-Marxist and Wittgensteinian.
In any case, I see the point you raise concerning the brain, mind, and
existence (both material and immaterial) in terms of metaphysics and
language, particularly in and through the philosophical problem(s) of
nominalism/conceptualism vs. realism. I reject the set-up (and
presuppositions) of that very problem, as stated. Witt. and dialectical
analyses presuppose no such bifurcation to begin with.
____________
# Cf., pp. 194-5.
## That is, the above procedure in line with "Ordinary Language
Analysis," cuopled with the dialectical treatment of
universal-particular-individual propositions in _Hegel's Science of
Logic_, pp. 623-702 (A.V. Miller trans.).
Best Regards,
F.T. De Angelis
http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
Val Miranda
Christoffer Vig wrote in message <748cbm$m6t$1...@readme.uio.no>...
>
>Val Miranda wrote in message <747ug0$h...@bgtnsc01.worldnet.att.net>...
>>
>>Frank T. De Angelis wrote in message <366646...@fda.net>...
>>>Hi Val:
>>>
>>>FRUITS AND NUTS
>> Now this is what I consider to be the major question:
>>Is there a real existing immaterial self, mind, or I? I do not know, I do
>>not think so, but I do hope so; and it is for us to find out. The larger
>>question: Is there any immaterial existent in this material (pardon my
>>obsolete metaphysical materialist position) universe?
>>
>>Regards,
>>Val
>
>Hello!
>believe Thomas Aquinas could be a good matter of investigation. If you
state
>the problem as you do: "Is there anything immaterial", I think it makes
good
>sense reading medieval philosophy. For although many people of today dont
>really believe in angels and so on, the main point for Thomas is the
>philosophical arguments, showing how the material world ultimately points
or
>demonstrates that there need be something immaterial, Thomas of course, had
>from scripture quite detailed accounts of exactly how this immateriality
had
>to be understood, but as I see it, we dont need to share his belief in the
>Bible. Anthony Kenny has recently written a book called "Aquinas on mind".
>Kenny is very susceptible of any accounts of angels and the disembodied
>existence of the soul. I think this makes him miss an important point, the
>same point as Val wants an answer to. Is there something immaterial?
>
>Christoffer
>
>
>"Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing;
>and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible
species,
>is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect
>reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of
>intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the
intelligible
>species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is
primarily
>understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness"
>Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, I, Q85 A2
Many years ago when I was young I read St. T. But I was a Catholic then,
and I believed everything he said. I shall have to reread hm.
Regards,
Val
>
>www.newadvent.org\summa\
>
>
rob
"limit to verifiable observations of reality"
I think one only need look at the origin of language to reveal
the
role of language.
I do not endorse language constructing our reality but i
propose
that language reflects the expression of reality as we *know*
it.
Language was invented.
I can imagine the first language of grunts which were uttered
as a result of some emotional outburst caused by some event
or situation as in (UHHHG! : stop eating so much or your butt
will meet with the working end of this sharp stick)
Of course it did not require many sharp sticks in the butt for
everyone to learn what UHHHG! meant because they
obviously experienced it or observed.
Language then allowed a common association so as to share
or simply communicate basic emotions or direct sensory input
{fear, hunger,desire, pain, sight ?}
Interestingly enough...
It seems to me (from simple experimentation) that all of the
words in
any language, are simply a label for a *set* of other simpler
words.
Words have definitions using a collection of words,
these words each have definitions and so on....
When you trace these definitions back you find that those
defining words are very basic. (object, harm, want, pain, fear
etc...)
So, modern, sophisticated language merely affords some
luxury of saying one word to represent a collection of some
number of other words.
So what ! you may interject ?
The trouble is,
As sophisticated as our language appears ,
How can we ever hope to express any more than
what the language supports for expression !
rob
meeuwtje wrote in message
>Nelson wrote
> [snip]
Nelson Thompson
DANG! Too late. I already read it.
What was it about??
:-P
Nelson
Frank T. De Angelis
>
> Frank T. De Angelis wrote:
>
> DANG! Too late. I already read it.
>
> What was it about??
>
> :-P
>
> Nelson
Look, I am saying -- and agreeing -- that, yes, you need a brain in
order to have "a mind," and that brains are made up of neurons. Okay?
The mind, spirit, etc., however, are not corporeal and
spatio-temporaral, but exist only if the brain does. Such talk of
existence in the same way in which a brain exists would be nothing more
than a wordgame. Do you like this better? ("<")
This next week (in reply to you and Rex), I'll incorporate (or, extend)
the brain and mind discussion into computers, and why computers are no
more than flattering reflections of human minds (ala Searle and "pie ala
me"). (The only problem is that I get can't any work done on my computer
while I am doing that.)
F.T.
Nelson Thompson
> order to have "a mind," and that brains are made up of neurons. Okay?
> The mind, spirit, etc., however, are not corporeal and
> spatio-temporaral, but exist only if the brain does. Such talk of
> than a wordgame. Do you like this better? ("<")
Yes. I agree with this. I would think it obvious that the mind is not
corporeal.
> This next week (in reply to you and Rex), I'll incorporate (or, extend)
> the brain and mind discussion into computers, and why computers are no
> more than flattering reflections of human minds (ala Searle and "pie ala
> me"). (The only problem is that I get can't any work done on my computer
> while I am doing that.)
Please not to sacrifice your work. Unless you absolutely must. :-)
I would be quite surprised if you concluded that computer were in any
significant way similar to the human mind. For one, the computer is
seriously deterministic. Even AI programs to diagnose illness or play
chess are mere "adding machines", albeit quite complex ones.
I'm not willing (at this point in time, anyway) to conclude that the
human mind is a super-complex "adding machine".
Enjoy
Nelson
Nelson Thompson
> Are you saying that the inability to accurately predict the weather (beyond three weeks) is
> analogous to the inability of predicting human behavior? The former is dependent upon not having
> enough of the same type of information, but the latter is not; a choice to act in one way rather
> than in another is quite a different thing. (Cf., below.)
No. It has been demonstrated ("the so-called butterfly effect") that
even with an unbounded amount of information about the current state of
the weather, prediction beyond 2 to 3 weeks is inherently impossible --
in principal. This indeterminism is part and parcel of the "weather
process" itself, as the elemental forces and phenomena that comprise it
are highly non-linear.
I suggest that in like manner, human behavior is indeterminate.
> > This has become the heart of so-called "chaos theory". That chaos
> > (orderly indeterminism) is driven by processes which are highly
> > non-linear. Chaotic processes are by their very nature "orderly" on an
> > abstract level, and "indeterminate" on the predictive level.
>
> Don't tell me that this is an analogy to human behavior as 'lawfulness without laws' (or
> 'lawlessness with laws')?
I'm not familiar with those concepts. I am saying that there many
instances of phenomena in the 'natural world' which are inherently
unpredictable.
> Mankind not only acts within, with, against, and upon nature, but also in a way in which nature and
> natural objects are fundamentally transformed. This human transformation of the world devalues --
> and 'transvalues' -- all natural models of analysis (including all of those referring to human
> processes as being physiological, electro-chemical, bio-chemical, etc.).
Precisely. Would this 'trans-natural' model of human behavior be caused
by the linguistic nature of our higher mental processes? Rather than
being merely 'natural' reactions to natural stimuli, we operate in a
whole new paradigm of behavior, one that is very heavily influenced by
*concepts* (which surely do not have any existence in the 'natural'
world).
> Quantitative (incremental, measurable) changes vs. qualitative changes in nature -- and how and why
> they come about -- are (or, can be) very, very different from drastic changes in human behavior.
> This CAN be from bio-chemical changes, but it need not be. You can call this "orderly
> indeterminism," but it would be quite farcical, wouldn't it?
I'm not sure. [It can be very hard to follow you, sometimes.] On the
surface, I would say, I think you are correct. Drastic changes in human
behavior need not be from bio-chemistry. It could be from
bio-linguistics (I make that term up). It could be from even higher
orders of linguistic influence, that we humans experience as 'insights',
et al.
BTW, I am not 'trying' to be farcical here. I am keeping my sense of
humor tightly bound in this conversation. :-)
> > Here is the Gordian Knot: You cannot get a "picture" of a mind, you can
> > only "be" a mind. You are attempting to untangle the nature of
> > something that is profoundly recursive and self-referential. The only
> > "access" we have to "mind" is to "be" a mind experiencing itself.
>
> Yes, and the word, 'mind,' is a mental, creative picture of a mind tied to language. There isn't
> any one material entity existing in spatio-temporal reality like a brain. And why it IS
> self-referential is precisely why it is different from electro-chemical processes and laws, not to
> mention the lack of analogy with predicting the weather. Impulses to the brain are not exactly the
> same things as ideas, either. The Mind, per se, is a human invention, itself.
Absolutely. It is often useful (and occassionally necessary) to remind
ourselves that it is not WE who 'have language', but rather that
language 'has us'. The mind is a linguistic construct. And there is no
'thing' that exists (spacio-temporally) that we can point to as the
referent of 'mind'.
You have another point. Mind is different than weather. They both may
be indeterminate in behavior (to different extents, as well), but there
exists no paradigm (that I can think of) wherein they may be otherwise
'compared'. The mind is of a totally different 'nature'. I suggested
that human behavior may be indeterminate (like weather) out of a loose
'similarity' in the behavior of the underlying 'equations' of both.
However, I am not rabidly attached to the idea that there may be
'equations' underlying mental activity.
What I am saying is, that *if there were*, then certainly those
'equations' would embody multiple layers of non-linearity, such that
even given the equations, you could no more predict a human's behavior
five minutes from now than I can swim to Mars.
> But, then again,
> most people prematurely think that Berkeley was so ridiculous - with his concept of ideas = all
> reality.
>
> For him, all empirical perceptions were (called) ideas (empirical idealism). Later, some
> intermediary within the process was 'invented' in order to supposedly eliminate the problems of the
> phenomenal vs. the "ding an-sich." So, Russell -- and others -- invented things like "sense-data."
>
> The biggest problem, of which I have been trying to touch upon, is that most of these creative
> models and paradigms -- ending up as ideas mistaken for entities -- have all begged-the-question,
> so to speak. We tend to think that because we have a new way (or word) of looking at the world, and
> of describing a process, we must also have a newly found 'entity' that must accompany that word
> (the correspondence theory of truth and the ostensive theory of meaning).
I like that. So, in speaking of mind, we are assuming there is an
'entity' that corresponds to the word. In this, we may be mistaken. A
question: would you consider a process to be an entity?
> Describing mental human
> acts in terms of determinate or indeterminate electro-chemical impulses adds little (if anything)
> to the analysis of human behavior; especially if we are to judge the theory/paradigm on heuristic
> criteria. How does one control one's behavior?
As I (think I) said before. Attempting to describe mental acts in terms
of electro-chemical yada yada is an exercise in either futility or
absurdity, perhaps both. Indeterminate or otherwise. However, I still
hold the door open that there may be a separate and 'disentangled'
paradigm (not electro-chemical, but something entirely different), a
paradigm that is (alas) linguistic and abstract in nature, that can be
used to model human behavior (and therefore give us an 'understanding'
of how the mind-process works). **AND** I would still insist that this
new understanding would probably have no predictive value either (at
least for any single human).
> A BRIEF EXERCISE IN ABSURDITY:
...you lost me here...
> In the final analysis, let me just say one thing: I am NOT at all claiming (1) that the brain and
> the C.N.S. are strictly (i.e., exclusively) physical objects, void of -- or completely separate
> from -- mental processes, and (2) that the basic animal-like functions, described in terms of
> electro-chemical functions, are all that different from those in the human realm. We all agree that
> there is some kind of an 'uncertainty principle' to human behavior, but exactly what that is is
> where we part company. Here, I am not as concerned with what a model CAN (help us) do as with what
> it cannot do.
Ah. Okay. Looking for what a model cannot do is just as important.
Yes.
Enjoy
Nelson
Val Miranda
Nelson Thompson wrote in message <366B448A...@texas.net>...
>Frank T. De Angelis wrote:
Discussing mind is like discussing God: you may be discussing the
non-existent. There is no evidence that a God exists and there is no
evidence that a mind exists, but there is a brain, consciousness, and
conscious thought. If you want to call those mind, fine.
Regards,
Val
Frank T. De Angelis
>
> Frank T. De Angelis wrote:
Oh, then I guess my computer discussion should be aimed at Rex.
Besides, before I do that, I definitely want to take a look at Searle
vs. Churchland's articles in _Scientific American_. I looked, before,
and cannot find them.
Ciao,
F.T.
Nelson Thompson
> Discussing mind is like discussing God: you may be discussing the
> non-existent. There is no evidence that a God exists and there is no
> evidence that a mind exists, but there is a brain, consciousness, and
> conscious thought. If you want to call those mind, fine.
whoa! You be playing for high stakes! :-)
Yes, there is (are) brain(s). Of this we empirical proof.
Yes, there is (are) consciousness(es). Of this we have only anecdotal
evidence: I have experienced MY consciousness, but no one else has or
can. I hear you saying that you have consciousness, but I can only
accept your word; it is a plausible anecdote. And we are all in the
same boat. My consciousness is merely a "story" I have told you about.
It's too bad that a person could not experience multiple
consciousnesses, and from this deduce what they have in common.
Anthony Buckland
> ...
> It's too bad that a person could not experience multiple
> consciousnesses, and from this deduce what they have in common.
Rex Bennett
Sheesh. Got a little carried away there, didn't you! (g) As to psychology
and
psychiatry, there is only one form (2 variations) I give credence to these
days:
Rational Emotive Therapy and Cognitive Therapy. They are the only forms
that actually help people and that make sense. A whole host of mental
illnesses cannot be cured by talking. Only drug therapy helps those. Most
cannot be cured since they are physiological in origin. The only thing that
*has* helped a whole host of mental/brain diseases are the targeted
medications that have been developed after much research.
It is only the scientific approach that has made any gain. All the others
have
remained frozen in a old mystical state, much like the mental dualism
of philosophy. Lots of words that go nowhere.
What is it that you think the old methodologies can accomplish? Why have
they not accomplished it then?
>:Nelson Thompson wrote:
>
>> It seems to me that the main problem with current views of the mind, is
>> the attempt to perform an Aristotelian reduction of the mind into its
>> component parts. It is hugely tempting to assign the role of component
>> parts to the pieces of the brain that we can see and/or detect via
>> physical means: cells, nerve bundles, nerve firings, chemical signals,
>> etcetera. I believe this is a total dead end, an intellectual "red
>> herring" across the trail.
>>
>Yes. This Aristotelian procedure (much like the Cartesian and Hobbesian)
reflects a very
>mechanical, mechanistic view vs. a more organismic one; however, I would
call your more organic
>analysis and explanation more of one explaining away the general Cartesian
dualistic notion of
>Mind vs. Body -- with your view of the brain (actually, the entire central
nervous system) as a
>totality/organism -- than one of the Mind vs. the Brain - specifically. The
brain and the entire
>nervous system can be explained in terms of electro-chemical impulses,
waves, and laws - etc.,
>and can even be explained in some of the neo-quasi phrenologist analyses;
but the concept of the
>mind is something far beyond any laws.
"far beyond any laws?" Have you ventured squarely into mysticism here?
Have you abandoned science for fog? Do you actually believe that the "mind"
is above any laws? Have you ever seen *any* system or process that did
not obey its structural/operational laws? I haven't.
>Dear Nelson and Rex:
>
>What I am saying (and said, earlier) is that the Mind is very much a mental
construct of
>activities (intentional --> choices) far beyond the explanation of the
central nervous >system and involuntary reflexes.
Here you are selling free will, even at a procedural level. It is as though
there
is some being external to the brain controlling this. It should be clear
that
this thinking is contradictory and leads to all kinds of problems.
Keep in mind that the brain is hardwired. It is designed to react to
stimulation.
> Far beyond the electro-chemical influences upon the brain, including many
>of which strongly influence and, thus, modify our behavior (e.g., through
the use of drugs, >etc.), the mind is more like that of a limitless ocean
bound by no-thing.
Upon what do you base this belief?
> The brain is both a
>physical (and, thus, a physio-electro-chemical) entity and object of study
and reference --
>somewhat analagous (e.g., in "behavior") to other models in nature (as you
have clearly
>demonstrated) -- AND something quite beyond that naturalistic/physiological
understanding. What
>that "something" is is INCLUDED within the (even) more general category of
semantics, called "the
>mind." Agreed, much of the central nervous system cannot be categorized
and dissected into a
>Mind vs. Body dualism, but our notion of "mind" goes far beyond any
physiological/neurological
>psychologizing and reductionism captured by any so-called "laws."
I don't see where it does. It is an ultra-complex system, and hides much
of what is going on inside of gray matter. It is not unlike an ecosystem
that is constantly balancing itself. Its structure is too complex to grasp
at
a single moment, but it is a process like any other. And like all
processes,
it is based on an exchange in matter and energy. And in that respect,
it is a physical phenomenon.
>> I propose that the nature of mind can best be approached by considering
>> a multi-level structure of emergent phenomena, each level with its own
>> "rules".
If you consider a computer, it is not unlike that in a more simplistic
sense,
although there is nothing "simple" about a computer. It amazes me that
a bunch of little 1's and 0's can do so much that is so fantastic! Little
on/
off states. And yet, we have enormous complexity, and the ability to
"process" information and even "sense data." What you have is layer
upon layer of integrated systems that all are aimed for some final output.
The computer can be predicted within certain bounds and so can the
body/brain. The brain has many processing centers that are sharing and
relating information to others. The one difference is the level of
complexity to reach "consciousness." However, for all our breast beating
about "consciousness," *almost all* the brain's processes are
"unconscious." What comes into the field of consciousness is very small
indeed.
>Perhaps, and probably, my point is more of a distinction between the
language of "mind" and
>"brain." This is why I mentioned Ryle (Gilbert Ryle's _The Concept of
Mind_) and Wittgenstein.
You write at though the "mind" is still one "process" one "entity." It has
already be demonstrated that is not the case. The brain has "many minds."
Separate the two hemispheres, and one doesn't know the other exists!
>Let me briefly lay out a few revelatory examples of everyday common
language here:
>
>What, indeed, is the meaning of this?
>"I think I am losing my mind..."
I am hallucinating. My thought processes are not functioning properly.
>or...
>
>"It's clearly a matter of mind over matter."
It is clearly a matter of determination.
>
>or...
>
>"That was a mindless act."
This was a careless and horrid act.
>better yet, "how can anyone really know what is in my mind or what I am
thinking?"
Your brain and your thoughts are separated from other brains and thoughts,
so there is no way of telling.
The point is not whether the brain and its processes are complex; we
already know that they are. The question is whether there is a
"meta-process" that is functioning separate from the brain and its
normal processes. We have no evidence that there is. The evidence
points in the other direction.
>
>There is no technical vs. everyday usage of the term "Mind," is there? To
this extent, there will
>always be "wonders of the mind," regardless of "the latest" in science.
Maybe, for dramatic
>purposes only ("don't you kids at home try this" OR QUOTE ME ON THIS!),
mind and/or (= or vs.)
>brain debates may not be completely mixing oranges with apples but are more
like mixing oranges
>with tangelos and then, tangelos with Mandarin oranges. (But/so, if we just
limit the analysis to
>the above issue of the semantic matter, concerning "The Mind," I would be
happy.)
The brain is an organ. The "mind" is the collective processes that we are
aware of.
A more interesting question might be: "What is process?"
All of existence, not just the mind, are made up of processes
upon processes upon processes. So is mind a reflection of
the Universe?
>This (in the latter, rather loose analogy), is in the spirit of Ryle-->
Witt., in the sense in
>which I refer to the entire category of the mind; i.e., as a semantic
matter, a verbal
I'm glad you used the word "category" here, because that is precisely what
"mind" is. It is a category of brain processes.
>> Given a single molecule, or
>> a few, is it possible to derive from their behavior the Gas Law
>> equations? No. Does a single molecule obey the Gas Law equations? The
>> question is meaningless, as you are trying to compare utterly different
>> paradigms. A molecule obeys *its* rules, nor do its rules constitute in
>> any sense a "part" of the Gas Laws. In huge numbers, taken
>> collectively, gas molecules have a collective behavior not apparent in
>> the individual molecule.
>
>Or even...
>
>> Cells, neurons, nerve impulses obey their laws, but
>> this is not mind... Like waves on the surface of a lake depend
>> upon the existence of the water, the elements of this new paradigm
>> *depend* upon the paradigm layer below, but they are NOT OF that
>> paradigm.
>>
>> The elementals of these "waves" would NOT be nerve firings or chemical
>> triggers. Water waves have elementals such as velocity, amplitude,
>> constructive and destructive interference. None of these apply to mere
>> water as such. In like manner, our "waves" would have unique elementals
>> and rules.
Dr. Stern tells me that the "wave construct" as far as mind goes is not
valid.
Nor does a single neuron determine anything. It takes constellations of
neurons to transmit "information." This information triggers changes in
states of cells and molecules. There is no "mind" functioning above the
brain, or as a separate "process" that is somehow detached from the
brain. The brain is made up of thousands of processing centers and
millions of sub-processing systems. These are all linked to each other
in pathways that are constantly changing. The "roadways" of thought are
"inside" the brain, not external to it.
>The "totality of brain functions" is that of an organism. Yes, you're both
quite right. And, yes,
>there are separate levels of laws and paradigms, as well as lower-to-higher
levels, one dependent
>upon the other (which is what I was describing -- and do so, below -- in
the more
>phenomenological philosophical realm of consciousness and materialism), but
that does not come
>close to explaning the usage of the term "mind," which is much, much more
of a limitless, lawless
>mental construct.
Lawless it may be, because it is an erroneous construct.
> This is but one of several reasons why the mental and physical are not
>identical, even though they are not unrelated.
Whoa. Wait a minute. "Mental" is made up of physical processes. That
makes mental physical. Mental is not "immaterial," to use one of Val's
terms. Physical equates to matter/energy. The brain is a complicated
processor of matter/energy. It does not process "immaterial."
If it is not the processing of matter/energy (in this case "information')
then
what is it?
You put so much energy into this, I almost feel bad attacking it this way.
Almost. (g)
Best regards,
Rex
now get to work!.....
Rex Bennett
>>
>> I'm not willing (at this point in time, anyway) to conclude that the
>> human mind is a super-complex "adding machine".
>>
>> Enjoy
>> Nelson
>++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
>Oh, then I guess my computer discussion should be aimed at Rex.
>
>Besides, before I do that, I definitely want to take a look at Searle
>vs. Churchland's articles in _Scientific American_. I looked, before,
>and cannot find them.
Yes, aim them at me. I'll see what I can do. (g)
Rex
(Still working on your book?)
G.Fennet
(The only problem is that I get can't any work done on my computer
> while I am doing that.)
>
@ But IF you are "doing that" it would be my pleasure to
enjoy the politeness seeing my email to you replied in which
I asked you if there is such as an etymological dictionary for Turkish
and (old) Greek.
August Fennet.
Val Miranda
Nelson Thompson wrote in message <366C4A1C...@dynacs.infohwy.com>...
>Val Miranda wrote:
>> Discussing mind is like discussing God: you may be discussing the
>> non-existent. There is no evidence that a God exists and there is no
>> evidence that a mind exists, but there is a brain, consciousness, and
>> conscious thought. If you want to call those mind, fine.
>
>whoa! You be playing for high stakes! :-)
>
>Yes, there is (are) brain(s). Of this we empirical proof.
>
>Yes, there is (are) consciousness(es). Of this we have only anecdotal
>evidence: I have experienced MY consciousness, but no one else has or
>can. I hear you saying that you have consciousness, but I can only
>accept your word; it is a plausible anecdote. And we are all in the
>same boat. My consciousness is merely a "story" I have told you about.
>
>consciousnesses, and from this deduce what they have in common.
What is interesting in ego-splitting is that various personalities use the
same body and some even know about each other. Now if all of those
personalities used the same consciousness, they would all know about each
other; but some personalities are foreign to other personalities. One may
conclude (probably in error) that the personalities who later become aware
of each other may be able to make a report on multiple consciousness. If
not that, then they take turns using the same consciousness.
Let's continue to eliminate and say that their is no consciousness and
conscious thought, but only the activity of a functioning brain. The final
steps would be the denial of the body, because a knowledge of the body
depends on consciousness, Since there is no consciousness, there would not
be a report on the body. So we are forced to believe that the brain-body is
consciousness and conscious thought..
peter...@yahoo.com
"Rex Bennett" <rben...@tampabay.rr.com> wrote:
> Frank T. De Angelis wrote in message <366540...@fda.net>...
[big snip]
> >One of my main points is that you cannot simply reduce all of the
> "projects" of human activity
> >(of consciousness, the mind, etc.) to a physio-chemical level. In most
> post-Hegelian materialist
> >axioms and applications, while consciousness requires the material basis
> (claiming that there is
> >no consciousness without matter) for its very existence, it, itself, is not
> something in the
> >sense of a spatio-temporal object as much as it is merely a
> mental/linguistic construct. I would
> >say that what you (Nelson) are calling this organism, and what you (Rex,
> from Dr.Stern) are
> >calling this totality, I would call the central nervous system, including
> the brain. Moreover, I >would call the brain and entire central nervous
> system both physical and mental, but not really
> >"the mind." Consciousness (awareness) and the Mind imply something
> (actually, "No- thing) far
> >beyond this realm.
>
> If it is not the processing of matter/energy (in this case "information')
> then
> what is it?
>
Although information is matter/energy in the sense that it needs
some sort of physical medium, it is also independant of the
particular nature of the medium. The works of Shakepeare
can exist in book form, CD-ROM or in the human mind.
When we talk about the works of Shakespeare we do so in
without bothering about the material medium in question -- we treat
it as non-physical. This should give us a clue about
how to talk about minds as being different from brains
without introducing cartesian ghosts.
More later, time permitting.
--
Regards,
Peter D Jones
Brighton, UK
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
rben...@tampabay.rr.com
A good librarian should be able to tell you that. I suggest
a university library. They get paid to know this stuff!
Frank T. De Angelis
> ... - ala the adversaries
> >>of Darwin and Hobbes, but because of the lack of
> >>philosophical/logical methodology.
> >
> >Can you explain that? What do you mean about the lack
> >of methodology? And what are the pitfalls there?
> >
> ...reducing human
> >consciousness and behavior to (what I consider to be) the strictly
> naturalistic/physiological
> >methods, models, laws, and paradigms. I take this to be nothing more than a
> reduction of
> >descriptions and explanations by forcing everything relevant into
> neurologically
> >(physiologically) based psychiatric methodologies. As much as the
> existential psychological,
> >hermeneutic, and phenomenological methodologies have been treated as a > relic of the past
> when I referred to a
> >particular study of the mind as a methodologically limited one,
> hand-in-hand with my claim of
> >reductionism.)
>
> It is only the scientific approach that has made any gain. All the others
> have
> remained frozen in a old mystical state, much like the mental dualism
> of philosophy. grasp
> now get to work!.....
(Sorry; I'm somewhat hard-pressed for keeping up with all of the
reply-posts. I had to take a little "vacation" from writing on my books.
I need to take a look at the Searle material -- as I stated before --
prior to commenting on the computer and/or science issues.)
In general, concerning methodology:
I take issue with the presumption that methodology begins with -- or CAN
begin with -- "the scientific method," per se. That, my dear friend, in
philosophy (as I see it), prematurely boasts of an unwarranted set of
presuppositions that need to be explained. Any so-called "scientific
method" just begs-the-question.
In other words, any scientific method requires a philosophy of science.
What I am suggesting is that once this road has been embarked upon...
we find that (1) there really is no fixed set of axioms and/or paradigms
from which science proceeds. In philosophical thinking, we just haven't
gone back far enough in the inquiry if we presume that there is a clear,
practical, and "unchanging" set of principles (including the very,
so-called "Laws of nature") by which the scientific community proceeds.
I think this would be philosophically naive (even if we reject the
radical claims of a Thomas Kuhn, Lynd, etc, in the philosophy of
science). (2) The numerous and problematic "exceptions" to the
scientific theory -- even as it is understood by its greatest
philosophical advocates, such Carl Hempel, Nagel, and Popper -- are
couched in terms of "anomalies,""post hoc hypotheses," etc. This -- I
believe -- is significant because it is revelatory of what is
essentially problematical.
Question #1: Is the scientific model (i.e., e.g., the building process
of a hypothesis-to-theory, and then the testing and verifying of that
theory) more of a procedural one (from theory to practice) or a circular
one (where you end up "proving" something in quite the "ad hoc" reverse
order)?
Question #2: What is the real "objective" nature of this "observation
and experimentation" process? Is this one which presupposes a "naive
realism" of objectification (and, thus, one of reification)?
Question # 3: What is it that we actually "prove" in a theory which is
"impossible to disprove" and, moreover, what will count as "disproving"
a theory if ALL scientific theories have always contained anomalies?
Question # 4: Do the "truths of science" (i.e., all-too-often called
"proven theories") actually CHANGE, as Kuhn claimed they did, and, if
so, is it because they are heuristically based and/or governed (based
upon the circularity of what scientifically pragmatic problems and
solutions need to be solved at any given time) by the very constraints
and parameters of the 'who,'' why,' and 'how much' regarding grants and
funding? Does this not all somehow affect both the beginning and end
results of what passes for science within the scientific community?
Question # 5: Does this circularity not affect the MEANING attached
(i.e., e.g., conclusions drawn) to the results of science? For example,
does (what I have been referring to as) a neuro-physiological
methodological reductionism not direct us towards the hasty (and
certainly premature) conclusion that the EKG analyses of comparisons and
contrasts between homosexual male, straight male, and straight female
brains "prove" that homosexuality is innate? Isn't that quite a "Monica
Lewinsky" mouthful, since this may very well have demonstrated the exact
opposite in the cause-and-effect relationships and, hence, assumptions
(especially since this infamous study was based upon autopsies of dead
homosexual AIDS patients)?
Do you get my drift? Do you see what I have been getting at, concerning
methodology and science?
F.T. De Angelis
Frank T. De Angelis
>
> In article <01be2346$d86c1f40$3c0c0c3e@default>,
> "G.Fennet" <tim...@zeelandnet.nl> wrote:
> > To F.T.De Angelis
> >
> > (The only problem is that I get can't any work done on my computer
> > > while I am doing that.)
> > >
> >
> > @ But IF you are "doing that" it would be my pleasure to
> > enjoy the politeness seeing my email to you replied in which
> > I asked you if there is such as an etymological dictionary for Turkish
> > and (old) Greek.
> >
> > August Fennet.
>
> A good librarian should be able to tell you that. I suggest
> a university library. They get paid to know this stuff!
>
Say What???? I don't get it! I honestly do not know what all of this is
about, beginning with who is doing the asking and what is being asked of
me. I am quite perplexed here! In any case, I am not aware of any
etymological dictionary of Turkish-Greek reflecting "loan words" (I
think that is what you are asking). I am not sure of what you are
asking, let alone "who" is doing the asking.
Well, there are numerous and various etymological Greek dictionaries
(ranging from Mycaenean to Classical/biblical Greek), and I have
personally used quite a few, but...concerning the influence on Turkish?
When you say "old" do you mean Attic Greek, Homeric, Classical (circa
N.T. Biblical), etc? When you say "Turkish," exactly what do you mean?
If we are talking ancient, do you mean Anatolian, Hittite cuneiform,
Persian-Mede, Arabic, etc. - or what? I suppose I could check if I had
more to go on.
Offhand - and strictly a priori, I would assume that there would be a
great deal of Greek influence in the area of Turkey, beginning with the
Greek colonization there (c. 6th Century, BCE), and by the time
Herodotus wrote his History. So, I would guess that many Greek words
would have influenced the development of the Turkish language (which I
am completely ignorant of).
What I think would be even more interesting (and probable), is the
ancient Cretan/Cypriote (Etocretan) influence upon the development of
ancient-to-modern Turkish languages.
I'll take a look around at the university.
Still very, very perplexed (?)
F.T. De Angelis
Rex Bennett
>
>Rex:
>
>>I shudder to think that the human mind can be reduced to
>>bundles of electro-chemical nerves; not because I believe it
>>of Darwin and Hobbes, but because of the lack of
>>philosophical/logical methodology.
>
>Can you explain that? What do you mean about the lack
>of methodology? And what are the pitfalls there?
>
>>currently popular (and very near-sighted - I might add)
>>neuro-physiological position of behaviorism.
>
>Well, quickly (Nelson, do NOT READ THIS HUGE PARAGRAPH!), I am referring to
>consciousness and behavior to (what I consider to be) the strictly
naturalistic/physiological
>methods, models, laws, and paradigms. I take this to be nothing more than a
reduction of
>descriptions and explanations by forcing everything relevant into
neurologically
>(physiologically) based psychiatric methodologies. As much as the
existential psychological,
>hermeneutic, and phenomenological methodologies have been treated as a
>particular study of the mind as a methodologically limited one,
hand-in-hand with my claim of
>reductionism.)
Sheesh. Got a little carried away there, didn't you! (g) As to psychology
and
psychiatry, there is only one form (2 variations) I give credence to these
days:
Rational Emotive Therapy and Cognitive Therapy. They are the only forms
that actually help people and that make sense. A whole host of mental
illnesses cannot be cured by talking. Only drug therapy helps those. Most
cannot be cured since they are physiological in origin. The only thing that
*has* helped a whole host of mental/brain diseases are the targeted
medications that have been developed after much research.
It is only the scientific approach that has made any gain. All the others
have
remained frozen in a old mystical state, much like the mental dualism
>One of my main points is that you cannot simply reduce all of the
"projects" of human activity
>(of consciousness, the mind, etc.) to a physio-chemical level. In most
post-Hegelian materialist
>axioms and applications, while consciousness requires the material basis
(claiming that there is
>no consciousness without matter) for its very existence, it, itself, is not
something in the
>sense of a spatio-temporal object as much as it is merely a
mental/linguistic construct. I would
>say that what you (Nelson) are calling this organism, and what you (Rex,
from Dr.Stern) are
>calling this totality, I would call the central nervous system, including
the brain. Moreover, I >would call the brain and entire central nervous
system both physical and mental, but not really
>"the mind." Consciousness (awareness) and the Mind imply something
(actually, "No- thing) far
>beyond this realm.
If it is not the processing of matter/energy (in this case "information')
then
what is it?
You put so much energy into this, I almost feel bad attacking it this way.
Rex Bennett
Anthony Buckland
>
> Frank T. De Angelis wrote in message <366540...@fda.net>...
> >Hi, Nelson and Rex (sorry, I only have time for a "two-fer")
> >
> >Rex:
> >
> >>I shudder to think that the human mind can be reduced to
> >>bundles of electro-chemical nerves; not because I believe it
> >>lessens the dignity of the human race - ala the adversaries
> >>of Darwin and Hobbes, but because of the lack of
> >>philosophical/logical methodology.
As the current US President (this weekend, anyway) has said,
it depends on what the definition of "is" is. The human
brain is that jelly mechanism inside your skull, and nothing
else. But an entity produced by evolution isn't just its
component entities; it is its forming entities acting in its
forming relation. A mind is a brain thinking. Conceivably
the activity pattern of the human mind contemplating, to use
as an example another current thread, transcendental
idealism may eventually be induced in some other entities,
say a collection of computer components (well, teachers manage to
induce it in millions of partlytrained human brains every year,
don't they?). But however and wherever we may copy it, the
pattern will never be a physically distinct entity itself;
it can be held up to examination only as a pattern, one
more concept in a brain or ready for a brain to input from
a storage medium.
_____________________________________________________________
I believe that God is not our parent but our child and,
like the children of our bodies, is born from our acts of love.
http://mypage.direct.ca/b/buckland
Frank T. De Angelis
Re:
Rex Bennett wrote:
>
> Frank T. De Angelis wrote in message <366540...@fda.net>...
> >>I shudder to think that the human mind can be reduced to
> >>bundles of electro-chemical nerves...
> >Can you explain that? What do you mean about the lack
> >of methodology? And what are the pitfalls there?
> >
> > I might
> >remind you that the entire methodological viewpoint of psychiatry, being
> little more than an
> >applicable appendage to -- and under -- neurology-pathology, may very well
> reflect more of the
> >political and economic dominance achieved in the AMA's coup over psychology
> in recent years. Wow,
> >this is another whole can of worms, but, I believe that it goes more to the
> heart of the politics
> >and economics of research and dominance of the AMA than it does to a
> comprehensive methodological
> >basis for physiological-neurological-electrical-chemical models in the
> analyses of human
> >behavior. This is part of the methodological problem of explaining human
> behavior (reduced to
> >behaviorism and psychologism) based on highly anthropomorphized analogies
> by socio-biologists and
> when I referred to a
> >particular study of the mind as a methodologically limited one,
> hand-in-hand with my claim of
> >reductionism.)
>
...
> brain and the entire
> >nervous system can be explained in terms of electro-chemical impulses,
> waves, and laws - etc.,
> >and can even be explained in some of the neo-quasi phrenologist analyses;
> but the concept of the
> >mind is something far beyond any laws.
>
> "far beyond any laws?" Have you ventured squarely into mysticism here?
> Have you abandoned science for fog? Do you actually believe that the "mind"
> is above any laws?
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
My remarks reflect both an attack on and questioning of fundamental
methodological principles.
Firstly, we cannot (can we?) have the same methodological principles
(because we do not have the same subject or object of study) as a
philosophy of science for both nature and humanity; i.e., there are no
same "laws" governing nature and the human realm. So, natural sciences
and social sciences are distinctly different -- I claim -- in a variety
of ways in which they can be studied and understood in terms of
predictability of behavior.
Secondly, that all so-called "laws," are understood more in terms of
"principles," "forces," and/or "tendencies." This is especially
appropriate as/since we constantly see them in struggle, contradiction,
and change. "Laws of gravity," for example, have been altered several
times and in several different ways, especially since we have seen that
"it"(i.e., those "forces") are dependent upon a markably changing/aging
galaxy and universe.
Concepts of freedom, concerning human behavior, in the making and
reshaping of human history (control over our own destiny), certainly
changes the ways in which humans do/have/will and do/have/will not
follow "laws." "Laws of Thought," especially, should be referred to as
"principles of thought."
Even natural laws (with our without a so-called chaos theory) should be
seen as "tendencies" (as the laws of nature change - as we have seen in
both the history of science and the philosophy of science), being
totally dependent upon how we view them and, more importantly, the
inevitable anomalies accompanying them.
For both the natural and human realm I suggest that we can see
"lawfulness" operating (and I am even willing to admit "purposiveness,"
especially in terms of "natural selection" and "survival of the
fittest") side-by-side with "randomness." We must always keep in mind,
however, that the main difference(s) between the former and the latter
is that the one operates according to structures it, itself, does not
create, while the other does!
These remarks, in and of themselves, point to problems within
methodologies (esp., a "positivist" methodology); aimed at both the
confusion of (i.e., the failure to distinguish between) and -- at the
same time -- the similarity in pitfalls from a faulty method of
overlysimplifying the so-called objective truths of nature and humanity.
Positivism, far beyond the limits of sociology, is both a general method
and a philosophy of science. The repercussions of such a view, just in
regard to nature - alone, have been catastrophic (as we have not learned
our lesson in thinking that we could master and overcome the "forces" of
nature).
I previously called this objectification (of methodological positivism)
a reification and reductionism, reflecting some naive view of the "ding
an-sich." Naive Realism is just that...a naive view that we come to know
the world as if it were composed of objects as they are "in-themselves,"
supposedly independent of our viewing them, constituting them,
interpreting them, and interacting with them in an endless manifold of
ways.
Signing off, for now.
F.T. De Angelis
G.Fennet
> A good librarian should be able to tell you that. I suggest
> a university library. They get paid to know this stuff!
@ MEAT BALLS WHO WRITE ANSWERS LIKE THIS
SHOULD MIND THEIR OWN BUSINESS.
A.Fennet
Ray Lanthier
alternatives than reductionism and emergentism. One does not have to deploy too many analytical
skills to understand the untenability of reductionism (physicalism).
So the more 'acceptable' philosophy of mind uses the 'emergent property' device.
The problem with overcoming the categorical difficulties of reductionism by using
the concept of the emergent property, is that is succeeds too well. It explains nothing because it
can be invoked to explain anything unexplainable in terms of physical laws. (There are many such
phenomena, not the least of which is human thinking). Also emergentism presumes the impossibility
of disembodied consciousness. As far as I can tell , this is an a priori, by no means
self-evident.
Life, Homo Sapiens, Mind are all 'emergent'. Neat.
Frank T. De Angelis wrote:
> Nelson Thompson wrote:
> >
> > Frank T. De Angelis wrote:
> > > Well, quickly (Nelson, do NOT READ THIS HUGE PARAGRAPH!), I am referring to reducing human
> > > consciousness and behavior to (what I consider to be) the strictly ...
> >
> > DANG! Too late. I already read it.
> >
> > What was it about??
> >
> > :-P
> >
> > Nelson
>
> Look, I am saying -- and agreeing -- that, yes, you need a brain in
> order to have "a mind," and that brains are made up of neurons. Okay?
> The mind, spirit, etc., however, are not corporeal and
> spatio-temporaral, but exist only if the brain does. Such talk of
> existence in the same way in which a brain exists would be nothing more
> than a wordgame. Do you like this better? ("<")
>
> This next week (in reply to you and Rex), I'll incorporate (or, extend)
> the brain and mind discussion into computers, and why computers are no
> more than flattering reflections of human minds (ala Searle and "pie ala
> me"). (The only problem is that I get can't any work done on my computer
> while I am doing that.)
>
> F.T.
Frank T. De Angelis
>
> To F.T.De Angelis
>
> (The only problem is that I get can't any work done on my computer
> > while I am doing that.)
> >
>
> enjoy the politeness seeing my email to you replied in which
> I asked you if there is such as an etymological dictionary for Turkish
> and (old) Greek.
>
> August Fennet.
? Yes, of course. Sorry. As I said, below, in another response, I do
not know if there is such an etymological dictionary, showing the Greek
loan words of ancient Turkish (languages, from Anatolian/Hittite to
modern Turkish). I will look - next time I am at the university.
Sincerely,
F.T. De Angelis
Frank T. De Angelis
>
> Contemporary philosophy of mind is haunted by the shiboleth of dualism. It seems to leave few
> alternatives than reductionism and emergentism.
I think that there are many alternatives out there -- and, contemporary
-- but few seem to be popular, today. Perhaps (as I am convinced) that
is because philosophy itself is devalued -- if at all valued -- in our
contemporary society. I do not think that there is much doubt as to why
this last generation has been called "X."
Exactly what do you mean by "emergentism"?
F.T. De Angelis
http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
peter...@yahoo.com
spar...@fda.net wrote:
> Ray Lanthier wrote:
> >
> > Contemporary philosophy of mind is haunted by the shiboleth of dualism. It
seems to leave few
> > alternatives than reductionism and emergentism.
>
> I think that there are many alternatives out there -- and, contemporary
> -- but few seem to be popular, today.
There must be at least 6 or 8 different major approaches to the mind
body problem.
> Exactly what do you mean by "emergentism"?
>
Several of the non-reductionists on this thread have taken an
'epiphenomenalist' POV, which is that mental activity cannot be reduced to
neurones firing in the same way that a wave in the sea cannot be reduced to a
water molecule. The problem is that such an epiphenomenon has no causality of
its own -- so although consiousness may be accounted for, intentionality and
will are not. Emergentism comes closer to regarding the mind as a 'thing' in
its own right, able to act causally on the physical brain, but with the
proviso that it cannot exist separately from the physical brain (rather like
mistletoe on an oak tree, to take a seasonal parallel). This avoids the
problem of Cartesian ghosts, but as as Ray remarked, it introduces a high
degree of arbitrariness. It lacks a mechanism to explain exactly *why* minds
should only be associated with certain kinds of matter, i.e. brains.
More later, hopefully.
> F.T. De Angelis
> http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
>
--
Regards,
Peter D Jones
Brighton, UK
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
Frank T. De Angelis
The below quote (from a recent "Czar" post on Evolution/science/
Creationism) comes precisely from one of those phenomenological
Hermeneuticists I have been talking about. Gould shares my perspective
of science and philosophy of science, especially on methodology and
philosophy of social science. Both of us have had similar academic
training and reflect those areas of interdisciplinary interest...namely,
political philosophy and sociology. As a matter of fact, he has been
both the editor and contributor of many, many articles and books
(including anthologies - _Positivism and Sociology_, etc.) on this/these
subjects.
*************************************************************
In science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a
degree that it would be perverse to withold provisional
assent." I suppose that apples might start to rise
tomorrow, but the possibility does not merit equal time
in physics classrooms.
-Stephen Jay Gould
*************************************************************
I believe that this statement reflects a view that can be understood
best in terms of Thomas Kuhn's theory. This does not at all detract from
or lessen the probable intention of the person quoting Gould as it adds
to the meaning of methodology and the heuristic/pragmatic nature of the
scientific method.
Ciao, ciao, chow mein.
F.T. De Angelis
P.S. (Well Rex, I drew myself into it, this time! I checked out the
alt.phil. ng. after adding only one paragraph to my novel [even if it
was the one that changed the entire ending, giving a relatively absurd
piece of popular garbage a unique and philosophical twist and turn to
the entire theme and plot...hee, hee, hee.] Well, it's back to the
"computer" drawing board, for me.)
http://home.fda.net/~spartacus
Nelson Thompson
> [snip] concept of the emergent property, is that is succeeds too well. It explains nothing; it
> can be invoked to explain anything unexplainable in terms of physical laws. (There are many such
> phenomena, not the least of which is human thinking). Also emergentism presumes the impossibility
> of disembodied consciousness. As far as I can tell , this is an a priori, by no means
> self-evident.
> Life, Homo Sapiens, Mind are all 'emergent'. Neat.
I am dumb-founded. Speechless. :-|
On the surface anyway, it appears you have a solid point here, Ray. I
shoulda thought about that.
Yes, I have been guilty of using emergentism as an explanation, and
often. It never occurred to me that its "universal applicability" was
its very Achilles Heel.
Very much like using the argument, "God can do anything; He is
omnipotent."
Thanks.
--
G.Fennet
>
> ? Yes, of course. Sorry. As I said, below, in another response, I do
> not know if there is such an etymological dictionary, showing the Greek
> loan words of ancient Turkish (languages, from Anatolian/Hittite to
> modern Turkish). I will look - next time I am at the university.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> F.T. De Angelis
>
Thank you very much.
I will be looking foreward to it.
Gr.
August Fennet
rwc
Aekarr
In article <748fd2$i77$1...@news.surfnet.nl>, "meeuwtje" <meeu...@dds.nl> writes:
> If we both accept the fact that 2000
>years ago there lived a man who said he was the son of god. Surely we can
>have a different interpretation of what he meant with that.
On what basis would we agree to this? If you assume that every utterance
attributed to Jesus in the NT actually came from his mouth, then you would
conclude that he claimed to be the son of god. I think there is good reason to
believe he did not say everything attributed to him, so maybe he never claimed
to be the son of god.
*Be sure to delete "NOSPAM" from e-mail address before sending e-mail to me.*
Thanks.
Arnold E. Karr
Greenville, SC
bod...@my-dejanews.com
aek...@aol.comNOSPAM (Aekarr) wrote:
>
> In article <748fd2$i77$1...@news.surfnet.nl>, "meeuwtje" <meeu...@dds.nl>
writes:
>
> > If we both accept the fact that 2000
> >years ago there lived a man who said he was the son of god. Surely we can
> >have a different interpretation of what he meant with that.
>
> On what basis would we agree to this? If you assume that every utterance
> attributed to Jesus in the NT actually came from his mouth, then you would
> conclude that he claimed to be the son of god. I think there is good reason to
> believe he did not say everything attributed to him, so maybe he never claimed
> to be the son of god.
Or that everything he said is attributed to him. After the thousands of
gospels that were rejected in the Councils, it is very argueable whether we
know a word of what was said by the man named Jesus. And then, if we do,
there are the question of internal context, external context, etc. etc.
Miguel Angel Gonzalez