Free Will is of a Hollow Debate
Iain
own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
predeterminedly unfree.
At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
level of operation that we cannot control. One could say this is
comparable to the unchanging bits of government, like our British Queen
or written constitutions of republics.
This does not free us from responsibility. Blair cannot blame his
actions on Her Majesty. If some unavoidable chain of events made
someone evil enough to do something, they are nonetheless evil,
whatever you take evil to be.
The phrase "free will is an illusion" is silly. There is no illusion,
only a mind and its functions.
~Iain
Denis Loubet
"Iain" <iain_i...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1126864603.3...@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Well said!
--
Denis Loubet
dlo...@io.com
http://www.io.com/~dloubet
http://www.ashenempires.com
Sir Frederick
"Mind" is an illusion. It is a quale(delusion) of
'consciousness' combined
with false folk theories on brain function.
"Free will" is part of those false folk theories.
We hold people accountable these days not
responsible : If they break it, they pay for it.
You need better stories, including better 'self' stories.
--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcn...@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
http://members.cox.net/fmmcneill
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"Discovery consists of seeing what everybody has
seen and thinking what nobody has thought."
-- Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (1893-1986)
:-))))Snort!)
**************************************
Denis Loubet
"Sir Frederick" <mmcn...@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:vobli1l54g95e8nl2...@4ax.com...(snip)
>>
> "Mind" is an illusion. It is a quale(delusion) of
> 'consciousness' combined
> with false folk theories on brain function.
> "Free will" is part of those false folk theories.
> We hold people accountable these days not
> responsible : If they break it, they pay for it.
>
> You need better stories, including better 'self' stories.
Accountable rather than responsible. Hmmm, I like that.
Wordsmith
they differ?
W : )
Sir Frederick
Accountable is only entity gross behavior driven as
measured by objective evidence,
responsibility also considers internal 'subjective' states such
as 'intent' (this may require court judgment).
If actual brain state history could be measured then these may
converge, but such is not the case.
For a person to 'hold themselves accountable' would be similar
to considering themselves 'responsible' as the brain state
history may be available through introspection.
SheBlewHimDidYouBlowHim
Publius
@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
> What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
> own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>
> They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
> irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
> free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
> predeterminedly unfree.
That's right. They could be random, but they aren't.
Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism, as
applied to human behavior. Determinism is the doctrine that all events are
predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human behavior is not
predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will exists.
At the same time, however, much of that same behavior *is* predictable
given certain other information, e.g., the values, interests, and goals of
the agent. Hence the behavior is not random either.
> At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
> cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
> machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
> back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
> application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
> but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
> level of operation that we cannot control.
That analogy is more apt than you might have supposed. The behavior of a
computer cannot be predicted from the laws of physics either. Regardless of
how it is constructed electronically, and regardless of the microcode
controlling that hardware, its behavior is only predictable based on the
running program. It is platform-independent. Hence the fact that the
microcode cannot be altered with software is irrelevant; the machine's
behavior is not determined by it.
Publius
> "Mind" is an illusion. It is a quale(delusion) of
> 'consciousness' combined
> with false folk theories on brain function.
> "Free will" is part of those false folk theories.
> We hold people accountable these days not
> responsible : If they break it, they pay for it.
"Mind" is no more an "illusion" than a tree, a triangle, or a square root.
It is a concept like any other. It is "real" if it has a role in a useful
explanatory theory.
Denis Loubet
"Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
news:_oKdnS1Fifq...@comcast.com...
> "Iain" <iain_i...@hotmail.com> wrote in news:1126864603.326986.159330
> @g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>
>> What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
>> own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>>
>> They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
>> irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
>> free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
>> predeterminedly unfree.
>
> That's right. They could be random, but they aren't.
>
> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism,
An abjectly arbitrary denial, I might add.
> as
> applied to human behavior. Determinism is the doctrine that all events are
> predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human behavior is not
> predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will exists.
Whoa! Please provide evidence supporting this claim! Are you claiming that
human behavior is MAGIC?
> At the same time, however, much of that same behavior *is* predictable
> given certain other information, e.g., the values, interests, and goals of
> the agent. Hence the behavior is not random either.
At what point does magic enter into it?
>> At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
>> cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
>> machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
>> back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
>> application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
>> but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
>> level of operation that we cannot control.
>
> That analogy is more apt than you might have supposed. The behavior of a
> computer cannot be predicted from the laws of physics either.
WTF? Computers are magic too?
> Regardless of
> how it is constructed electronically, and regardless of the microcode
> controlling that hardware, its behavior is only predictable based on the
> running program.
Which obeys the laws of physics.
> It is platform-independent. Hence the fact that the
> microcode cannot be altered with software is irrelevant; the machine's
> behavior is not determined by it.
What the hell are you talking about?
Pramod Subramanyan
Publius wrote:
> "Iain" <iain_i...@hotmail.com> wrote in news:1126864603.326986.159330
> @g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>
> > What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
> > own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
> >
> > They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
> > irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
> > free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
> > predeterminedly unfree.
>
> That's right. They could be random, but they aren't.
"Random" just means unpredictable - literally. What form the effects of
randomness takes is irrelevant. Also, it is impossible to prove that
something is "not random" by just making observations. Since there are
no equations on brain working yet, you don't really have any sort of
basis for that statement.
> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will.
Right. Determination of whether human actions are (in theory, at
least) predictable would be an important step forward in resolving the
free will issue.
> The doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism, as
> applied to human behavior. Determinism is the doctrine that all events are
> predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human behavior is not
> predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will exists.
>
> At the same time, however, much of that same behavior *is* predictable
> given certain other information, e.g., the values, interests, and goals of
> the agent. Hence the behavior is not random either.
>
> > At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
> > cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
> > machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
> > back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
> > application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
> > but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
> > level of operation that we cannot control.
>
> That analogy is more apt than you might have supposed. The behavior of a
> computer cannot be predicted from the laws of physics either. Regardless of
> how it is constructed electronically, and regardless of the microcode
> controlling that hardware, its behavior is only predictable based on the
> running program.
> It is platform-independent. Hence the fact that the
> microcode cannot be altered with software is irrelevant; the machine's
> behavior is not determined by it.
The analogy is in fact a whole of nonsense. Using the brain changes it.
This does not happen with the computer. Your thought processes are
altered as you read a book, or listen to music or solve a puzzle or do
anything for that matter. The microprocessor and its
instructions/interfaces remain constant ALL the time. This is a HUGE
difference. I'm afraid the computer analogy does not bring us any
closer to determining the answer to the free will.
I'm on nobody's side yet, but Pubilus's approach seems wrong.
Question: How do you explain (artistic) creativity without free will?
Denis Loubet
"Pramod Subramanyan" <pramodsu...@yahoo.co.in> wrote in message
news:1126944118.1...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
Well, I don't like his analogy either. But one could write a program that
simulates the operation of a brain, including the changable nature of that
brain.
> Your thought processes are
> altered as you read a book, or listen to music or solve a puzzle or do
> anything for that matter. The microprocessor and its
> instructions/interfaces remain constant ALL the time. This is a HUGE
> difference. I'm afraid the computer analogy does not bring us any
> closer to determining the answer to the free will.
But a programming analogy is still valid. The operation of the brain can in
theory be simulated. It's just molecules doing what molecules do.
> I'm on nobody's side yet, but Pubilus's approach seems wrong.
>
> Question: How do you explain (artistic) creativity without free will?
Well, as an artist, I explain it as the juxtaposition and distortion of
experiences, things the artist has seen, heard, or felt. The juxtapositons
and distortions themselves are based upon experiences. I'm willing to go out
on a limb and say there's no such thing as originality. You can't pull an
idea out of your head that can't be traced back to your experiences. It
doesn't happen.
All ideas have the physical universe as their ultimate source.
Iain
You haven't read properly what I wrote.
I said that although using a brain changes it, this change is
restricted to a high level of abstraction. Can we simultaneously
control the thoughts that in turn control our emotions? Maybe, but the
thoughts that control those thoughts? What about the dynamics that
affect our intentions? The causal chain is finite, and eventually there
is a level of operation over which we have no control, the "heart of
the operation", perhaps involving a level that can be changed by usage,
but not in accordance with our will. Somewhere below that is a layer
that is impenetrable to willful control.
The same goes for a computer system. High level software can alter low
level operating system variables, etc, etc, but it cannot control the
colour or layout the chip, etc. There is an intermediate layer of
changing the kernel, something high level software can do but not
during realtime\runtime without perhaps pulling the rug from under
itself.
All systems have a finite "neck length" -- some can lick their elbow
more easily than others.
~Iain
someone4
>What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
>own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
Personally I would call it our experience that events A and B were both
possible before we chose between them, i.e. we are free to will which
will happen.
Iain wrote:
>They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
>irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
>free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
>predeterminedly unfree.
That is correct, if you only consider causes within the physical plane.
If you consider the concept of a soul, then it explains how we are
experience a subjective awareness (are conscious), and our subjective
experience that A and B were both possible before we chose between
them.
Just because the universe is deterministic, effects have causes,
doesn't mean that the spiritual plane must work in the same way.
So with the concept of a soul (a part of us that is aware, and can
choose in a non-deterministic fashion) then our destiny is not fixed.
Iain wrote:
>At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
>cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
>machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
>back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
>application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
>but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
>level of operation that we cannot control. One could say this is
>comparable to the unchanging bits of government, like our British Queen
>or written constitutions of republics.
I think it is a mistake to compare us to computers. As Kurt Godel
pointed out, there are mathematical insights that we have, that are not
provable. They could never have been reached by logic, or algorithms.
So in that sense, we are not like computers.
http://www.exploratorium.edu/complexity/CompLexicon/godel.html
Also computers don't experience a subjective awareness, and there is no
physical theory that explains our subjective awareness. In fact there
is no explanation for it without the conception of a soul.
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-8219/1/5
Iain wrote:
>This does not free us from responsibility. Blair cannot blame his
>actions on Her Majesty. If some unavoidable chain of events made
>someone evil enough to do something, they are nonetheless evil,
>whatever you take evil to be.
How can you be responsible without a soul, it is not like you would
have had any options.
>From your perspective, if someone was to stab someone, then why are
they any more responsible than the knife, as from your perspective,
neither the knife nor the person had any options.
The concept of evil/selfishness assumes possible options. It makes no
sense to consider an atomic bomb 'evil', as it doesn't have any
options.
Iain wrote:
>The phrase "free will is an illusion" is silly. There is no illusion,
>only a mind and its functions.
The illusion would be that it seemed that A and B were both possible
before you chose between them. Without a soul, if all effects have
causes from within the physical plane, then only one was ever possible.
So there would be an illusion.
Though personally, my subjective experience, that I can raise either my
left or right hand, and that both were possible, and that I consciously
chose which one would happen, seems to me very real.
So until it is proved to me that I have no options, and that it is an
illusion, I will exercise my belief that I have options, and believe in
a soul, and a dualistic existence.
Pramod Subramanyan
>> snip irrelevant stuff <<
> I said that although using a brain changes it, this change is
> restricted to a high level of abstraction. Can we simultaneously
> control the thoughts that in turn control our emotions? Maybe, but the
> thoughts that control those thoughts? What about the dynamics that
> affect our intentions? The causal chain is finite, and eventually there
> is a level of operation over which we have no control, the "heart of
> the operation", perhaps involving a level that can be changed by usage,
> but not in accordance with our will. Somewhere below that is a layer
> that is impenetrable to willful control.
The problem is your lowest-level-unreachable hypothesis is just that, a
hypothesis. I need some sort of corroborative evidence to accept that.
And it is in that sense that I called the analogy "nonsense", how can
we deduce that since this applies to computers it applies to the human
brain which is massively parallel and hugely more complicated.
Q1. Why should changes be "restricted to a high level of abstraction"?
Q2. Why should there be a lowest level?
Q3. Why should it be unreachable?
Publius
news:7ZqdncXFift...@io.com:
>> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
>> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism,
> An abjectly arbitrary denial, I might add.
Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict which
movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
>> Determinism is the doctrine that all
>> events are predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human
>> behavior is not predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will
>> exists.
> Whoa! Please provide evidence supporting this claim! Are you claiming
> that human behavior is MAGIC?
Er, that is called the fallacy of black and white thinking. I.e., if
human behavior is not deterministic, it must be magic. There are other
alternatives. BTW, the burden of proof rests with the determinist, since
he is the one making the affirmative assertion. If you hold to the
determinist thesis, then it is up to you to produce the evidence for your
claim that human behavior can be predicted accurately and consistently
from the laws of physics.
> WTF? Computers are magic too?
Not at all. But their behavior while running an app cannot be predicted
from Ohm's Law.
>> Regardless of
>> how it is constructed electronically, and regardless of the microcode
>> controlling that hardware, its behavior is only predictable based on
>> the running program.
> Which obeys the laws of physics.
Indeed they do. But a system obeying the laws of physics and being
deterministic are two different things.
>> It is platform-independent. Hence the fact that the
>> microcode cannot be altered with software is irrelevant; the
>> machine's behavior is not determined by it.
>
> What the hell are you talking about?
Are you asking what platform-independent means?
Publius
> "Random" just means unpredictable - literally. What form the effects
> of randomness takes is irrelevant. Also, it is impossible to prove
> that something is "not random" by just making observations. Since
> there are no equations on brain working yet, you don't really have any
> sort of basis for that statement.
You are correct that "random" means unpredictable. And of course one may
decide whether a behavior is or is not random via observation. If one can
consistently predict a certain behavior, it is not random, and that is
determined by observing the behavior.
You are perhaps confusing the current question with the question of whether
one may determine if a given number was randonly generated by observation.
One cannot determine how a given number was generated by observing it. But if
one can produce an algorithm for generating that number, the number is no
longer random.
Much human behavior is not random because it *can* be predicted. But it can't
be predicted from the laws of physics.
> The analogy is in fact a whole of nonsense. Using the brain changes
> it. This does not happen with the computer. Your thought processes are
> altered as you read a book, or listen to music or solve a puzzle or do
> anything for that matter. The microprocessor and its
> instructions/interfaces remain constant ALL the time. This is a HUGE
> difference. I'm afraid the computer analogy does not bring us any
> closer to determining the answer to the free will.
Some very low-level processes in the brain are also unalterable, at least via
behavioral feedback. They are susceptible to degradation via normal
chemical/biological processes, and occur regardless of which books one reads
or music one hears.
Uncle Buck
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in
>news:7ZqdncXFift...@io.com:
>
>>> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
>>> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism,
>
>> An abjectly arbitrary denial, I might add.
>
>Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict which
>movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
>exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
>no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
You have no basis for making this claim, let alone an empirical one.
The kind of technology required to falsify your claim does not exist.
We are unable to completely examine the brain as of yet, and our
understanding of genetics and psychology are not complete. It's
entirely likely that with a complete examination of someone's brain -
even without the understanding of their genetics and their psychology
- you very well -could- determine what movie they are going to see.
But such a complete examination is presently impossible.
Unfalsifiable claims are not empirically valid.
--
L8r,
Uncle Buck
_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=
Those first to step up and say,
"Now is not the time for placing blame"
...
...are quite often to blame....
_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=~_o-O=
Publius
news:sruoi1lj7sqcc16fd...@4ax.com:
>>Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict which
>>movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
>>exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
>>no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
> You have no basis for making this claim, let alone an empirical one.
> The kind of technology required to falsify your claim does not exist.
Well, then, until it does exist, my claim (that one cannot predict human
behavior from the laws of physics) stands unrefuted.
> We are unable to completely examine the brain as of yet, and our
> understanding of genetics and psychology are not complete. It's
> entirely likely that with a complete examination of someone's brain -
> even without the understanding of their genetics and their psychology
> - you very well -could- determine what movie they are going to see.
And, what, pray tell, is the basis for the above probability estimate ("it
is entirely likely that . . .")?
> Unfalsifiable claims are not empirically valid.
My claim is not unfalsifiable. When you are able to accurately and
consistently predict behavior from the laws of physics, you will have
falsified it.
Uncle Buck
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>Uncle Buck <Uncl...@SpamMeNot.com> wrote in
>news:sruoi1lj7sqcc16fd...@4ax.com:
>
>>>Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict which
>>>movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
>>>exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
>>>no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
>
>> You have no basis for making this claim, let alone an empirical one.
>> The kind of technology required to falsify your claim does not exist.
>
>Well, then, until it does exist, my claim (that one cannot predict human
>behavior from the laws of physics) stands unrefuted.
Yes, true, but it also stands unsubstantiated. In other words, your
claim might just as well not exist.
>
>> We are unable to completely examine the brain as of yet, and our
>> understanding of genetics and psychology are not complete. It's
>> entirely likely that with a complete examination of someone's brain -
>> even without the understanding of their genetics and their psychology
>> - you very well -could- determine what movie they are going to see.
>
>And, what, pray tell, is the basis for the above probability estimate ("it
>is entirely likely that . . .")?
<sigh> The phrase means the same as "it's entirely possible", surely
you knew that. The basis for _that_ claim is because there is nothing
in our present world to indicate that it's entirely _im_possible.
Until we have some reason for believing it to be unlikely, it's
"entirely possible". If you can't accept "entirely likely" as
equating to "entirely possible" then fine, consider the statement
retracted and altered as indicated. :-)
>
>> Unfalsifiable claims are not empirically valid.
>
>My claim is not unfalsifiable. When you are able to accurately and
>consistently predict behavior from the laws of physics, you will have
>falsified it.
So, what technology do we presently have capable of studying an
active, living brain down to the smallest subatomic detail? Perhaps
we mean different things by "unfalsifiable". Your claim is
unfalsifiable in the exact same sense that at one time, the claim that
the Earth is flat was also unfalsifiable.
Publius
>>Well, then, until it does exist, my claim (that one cannot predict
>>human behavior from the laws of physics) stands unrefuted.
> Yes, true, but it also stands unsubstantiated. In other words, your
> claim might just as well not exist.
Er, no. It is substantiated by the evidence available to date.
>>And, what, pray tell, is the basis for the above probability estimate
>>("it is entirely likely that . . .")?
> <sigh> The phrase means the same as "it's entirely possible", surely
> you knew that.
Well, I admit I didn't know that "it is likely that" was synonymous with,
"It is possible that."
But I will stick my neck out and assert that knowledge of neurochemistry
and neurophyiology, no matter how complete, will never allow us to
predict human behavior in a deterministic way. That is because those
systems serve merely as a substrate from which higher-level information
structures can arise. Those structures follow their own laws, which are
not derivable from the laws governing the substrate. The substrate
supports the higher level functions, but does not determine them, just as
the hardware design and microcode of a computer supports (say) C++, but
does not determine it. We can compile and run C++ code on a variety of
platforms, with wildly different hardware designs and associated
microcode, and they'll behave the same way.
Weather offers another analogy. It is not possible to predict where a
hurricane will form in the South Atlantic next year, its strength, path,
scale, etc. Even though hurricanes obey the laws of physics, the system
is too complex --- there are too many variables, and too many possible
interactions among those variables, to predict them with any computing
resources currently available, or likely to be available in the
foreseeable future.
That doesn't imply that we will never be able to simulate a brain in
other hardware. But if we manage it, its behavior will be unpredictable
as well.
> So, what technology do we presently have capable of studying an
> active, living brain down to the smallest subatomic detail? Perhaps
> we mean different things by "unfalsifiable". Your claim is
> unfalsifiable in the exact same sense that at one time, the claim that
> the Earth is flat was also unfalsifiable.
Yes -- we do mean different things. A claim is unfalsifiable, in Popper's
sense, if *there is no conceivable empirical test that would count as
falsifying it*. Mere lack of technological means to verify or falsify it
does not disparage the claim. Thus, even though we do not at present have
means to verify or falsify whether there is life on Jupiter's moons, the
claim is not unfalsifiable in Popper's sense.
Denis Loubet
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in
> news:7ZqdncXFift...@io.com:
>
>>> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
>>> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism,
>
>> An abjectly arbitrary denial, I might add.
>
> Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict which
> movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
> exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
> no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
Sorry no. I and all my friends can predict exactly what I'll order at a
seafood restaurant. The chicken.
That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other decisions
are not as equally determined.
>>> Determinism is the doctrine that all
>>> events are predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human
>>> behavior is not predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will
>>> exists.
>
>> Whoa! Please provide evidence supporting this claim! Are you claiming
>> that human behavior is MAGIC?
>
> Er, that is called the fallacy of black and white thinking. I.e., if
> human behavior is not deterministic, it must be magic.
If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic. Otherwise,
it's physics.
> There are other
> alternatives.
To physics? That would be magic.
> BTW, the burden of proof rests with the determinist, since
> he is the one making the affirmative assertion.
You're the one claiming that some things operate contrary to the laws of
physics. Please demonstrate this.
> If you hold to the
> determinist thesis, then it is up to you to produce the evidence for your
> claim that human behavior can be predicted accurately and consistently
> from the laws of physics.
You are claiming that human behavior is contrary to the laws of physics.
Please support this claim.
>> WTF? Computers are magic too?
>
> Not at all. But their behavior while running an app cannot be predicted
> from Ohm's Law.
The laws of physics is a PLURAL. The operations of a computer that depend on
Ohm's law CAN be predicted by Ohm's law.
>>> Regardless of
>>> how it is constructed electronically, and regardless of the microcode
>>> controlling that hardware, its behavior is only predictable based on
>>> the running program.
>
>> Which obeys the laws of physics.
>
> Indeed they do. But a system obeying the laws of physics and being
> deterministic are two different things.
No. Either a system obeys the laws of physics, or it's magic. Take your
pick.
>>> It is platform-independent. Hence the fact that the
>>> microcode cannot be altered with software is irrelevant; the
>>> machine's behavior is not determined by it.
>>
>> What the hell are you talking about?
>
> Are you asking what platform-independent means?
I'm saying this platform-independant stuff is irrelevant.
Publius
>> Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict
>> which movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no
>> matter how exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his
>> childhood, and no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
>
> Sorry no. I and all my friends can predict exactly what I'll order at
> a seafood restaurant. The chicken.
>
> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other
> decisions are not as equally determined.
You overlooked the qualifiers. Your friends can very likely do that. But
they don't do it by examining your brain or your genetics. They can do it
because they know you; they know what you like and don't like. They can
learn those things about you by observing you over time, but not by
analyzing your brain.
The question was, "Can behavior be predicted *from the laws of physics* ---
remember?
>> Er, that is called the fallacy of black and white thinking. I.e., if
>> human behavior is not deterministic, it must be magic.
> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic.
> Otherwise, it's physics.
Who said anything about behavior being contrary to the laws of physics?
Human behavior is certainly consistent with the laws of physics. It is just
not predictable from them. Just as a hurricane is consistent with the
principles of meteorology, but not predictable from them, and the emergence
of elephants is consistent with the principles of evolution, but not
predictable by them. Those are all examples of systems which are causal,
but not deterministic.
> You are claiming that human behavior is contrary to the laws of
> physics. Please support this claim.
I made no such claim.
>> Are you asking what platform-independent means?
> I'm saying this platform-independant stuff is irrelevant.
It is, eh? A computer program may behave identically, even though running
on radically different hardware. Indeed, one may port the program to a
machine built from ropes and pulleys. That would seem to suggest that the
behavior of the program is substantially independent of the hardware.
Denis Loubet
"someone4" <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote in message
news:1126959307.4...@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> Iain wrote:
>>What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
>>own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>
> Personally I would call it our experience that events A and B were both
> possible before we chose between them, i.e. we are free to will which
> will happen.
And so the question is: Are we?
> Iain wrote:
>>They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
>>irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
>>free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
>>predeterminedly unfree.
>
> That is correct, if you only consider causes within the physical plane.
That is all we have evidence for.
> If you consider the concept of a soul, then it explains how we are
> experience a subjective awareness (are conscious), and our subjective
> experience that A and B were both possible before we chose between
> them.
Yes, we can make-up stuff to justify anything.
> Just because the universe is deterministic, effects have causes,
> doesn't mean that the spiritual plane must work in the same way.
But without any evidence that a spiritual plane exists, the concept is just
a made-up thing to hide our ignorance.
> So with the concept of a soul (a part of us that is aware, and can
> choose in a non-deterministic fashion) then our destiny is not fixed.
No. The concept is not enough. The soul would actually have to exist.
> Iain wrote:
>>At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
>>cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
>>machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
>>back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
>>application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
>>but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
>>level of operation that we cannot control. One could say this is
>>comparable to the unchanging bits of government, like our British Queen
>>or written constitutions of republics.
>
> I think it is a mistake to compare us to computers.
Why, both are molecules doing what molecules do.
> As Kurt Godel
> pointed out, there are mathematical insights that we have, that are not
> provable. They could never have been reached by logic, or algorithms.
> So in that sense, we are not like computers.
I can program a computer to reach illogical conclusions.
> Also computers don't experience a subjective awareness, and there is no
> physical theory that explains our subjective awareness. In fact there
> is no explanation for it without the conception of a soul.
How do you know anyone else experiences what you call subjective awareness?
By their behavior only. If a computer behaved as they do, you would have to
grant that it has subjective awareness, or resort to a double-standard.
> Iain wrote:
>>This does not free us from responsibility. Blair cannot blame his
>>actions on Her Majesty. If some unavoidable chain of events made
>>someone evil enough to do something, they are nonetheless evil,
>>whatever you take evil to be.
>
> How can you be responsible without a soul, it is not like you would
> have had any options.
This is true. But there are practical concerns. It is advantageous for you
to hold people responsible for their actions.
>>From your perspective, if someone was to stab someone, then why are
> they any more responsible than the knife, as from your perspective,
> neither the knife nor the person had any options.
This is true, this is why it is prudent to hold people responsible for their
actions even though they are just molecules doing what molecules do. Since
you cannot change what causes you happiness or suffering, it behooves you to
act in a manner that furthers the happiness, and minimizes the pain. It is
advantageous to operate within the assumption that you have free will, even
though free will is impossible.
> The concept of evil/selfishness assumes possible options. It makes no
> sense to consider an atomic bomb 'evil', as it doesn't have any
> options.
This is true.
> Iain wrote:
>>The phrase "free will is an illusion" is silly. There is no illusion,
>>only a mind and its functions.
Free will does not even meet the criteria for an illusion. An illusion has
to be detectable, free will is not. Free will is merely an assumption.
> The illusion would be that it seemed that A and B were both possible
> before you chose between them. Without a soul, if all effects have
> causes from within the physical plane, then only one was ever possible.
> So there would be an illusion.
No. There's nothing to point at in the decision-making process that you can
call free will, so there's no illusion, just an assumption. There's an
illusion that there was a choice, but that's not the same as free will. In
your decision between A and B, where does the free will enter the decision?
Don't you compare the options to your preferences, and reach your
conclusion? Where's the free will enter the picture? At what point does the
supposed soul reveal your decision to you independant of your evaluations?
> Though personally, my subjective experience, that I can raise either my
> left or right hand, and that both were possible, and that I consciously
> chose which one would happen, seems to me very real.
And I detect no application of free will in that description. It seems you
compare your options to your preferences and reach a conclusion. That seems
pretty programmatic.
> So until it is proved to me that I have no options, and that it is an
> illusion, I will exercise my belief that I have options, and believe in
> a soul, and a dualistic existence.
That's fine. As long as you act within the assumption that you and others
have free will, you should be able to avoid trying to fruitlessly
second-guess your decisions, and thus your deterministic path through life
should be easier than if you didn't.
Iain
Because altering the lower level mechanism that constitutes a higher
level mechinism makes changes to the layer before it distorts the
outcome of the change.
> Q2. Why should there be a lowest level?
If there is not, the machine is infinitely complex. If you can show
that one is possible, point taken.
> Q3. Why should it be unreachable?
This ia a paraphasure of the first question.
~Iain
Dianelos
> On Sat, 17 Sep 2005 12:42:03 -0500, Publius
> <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>
> >Uncle Buck <Uncl...@SpamMeNot.com> wrote in
> >news:sruoi1lj7sqcc16fd...@4ax.com:
> >
> >>>Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict which
> >>>movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
> >>>exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
> >>>no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
> >
> >> You have no basis for making this claim, let alone an empirical one.
> >> The kind of technology required to falsify your claim does not exist.
> >
> >Well, then, until it does exist, my claim (that one cannot predict human
> >behavior from the laws of physics) stands unrefuted.
>
> Yes, true, but it also stands unsubstantiated. In other words, your
> claim might just as well not exist.
Well, here is an argument which I would like to present in favor of the
view that human brains are fundamentally not predictable:
We agree that brains are physical systems. Now there exist very simple
physical systems (e.g. an electron shot towards two slots) the behavior
of which is fundamentally indeterministic. Even though it is true that
there is much to be learned about how human brains function, it is a
fact that a human brain is an incredibly complex physical system
(arguably the most complex system we know of), and is certainly many
orders of magnitude more complex than systems that are in fact
indeterministic. Therefore it would be a really amazing coincidence if
a human brain turned out to so precise as to be deterministic. Actually
it would be almost miraculous, as a deterministic brain offers no
survival advantage whatsoever, and is quite unnecessary from the
evolutionary point of view.
So unless one actually shows the contrary, the reasonable assumption is
that brains are not deterministic.
Having said that, even if we were to find out that brains are
deterministic or even predictable systems, it would not contradict our
subjective sense of free will. I claim there is nothing I could
possibly experience that would make me doubt the fact that I am free.
Publius
news:1127102059.9...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com:
> Having said that, even if we were to find out that brains are
> deterministic or even predictable systems, it would not contradict our
> subjective sense of free will. I claim there is nothing I could
> possibly experience that would make me doubt the fact that I am free.
That you, DG? Nice to see you back.
someone4
>>What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
>>own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>someone4 wrote:
>> Personally I would call it our experience that events A and B were both
>> possible before we chose between them, i.e. we are free to will which
>> will happen.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>And so the question is: Are we?
I don't know, and neither do you. I believe we are.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
>>>irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
>>>free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
>>>predeterminedly unfree.
>someone4 wrote:
>> That is correct, if you only consider causes within the physical plane.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>That is all we have evidence for.
We have the subjective very real evidence that we experience awareness,
which we cannot even begin to explain in terms of the physical plane.
>someone4 wrote:
>> If you consider the concept of a soul, then it explains how we are
>> experience a subjective awareness (are conscious), and our subjective
>> experience that A and B were both possible before we chose between
>> them.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Yes, we can make-up stuff to justify anything.
All explanations are made up. At the moment the concept of a soul (i.e.
something above all physical laws), is the only explanation of what we
subjectively experience (including how it is that we are aware).
>Denis Loubet wrote:
>> Just because the universe is deterministic, effects have causes,
>> doesn't mean that the spiritual plane must work in the same way.
someone4 wrote:
>But without any evidence that a spiritual plane exists, the concept is just
>a made-up thing to hide our ignorance.
You can assume that something doesn't exist unless there is objective
scientific evidence for it, but that is an assumption that has been
proven false again and again. There is no objective scientific evidence
that you experience subjective awareness, but you do.
>someone4 wrote:
>> So with the concept of a soul (a part of us that is aware, and can
>> choose in a non-deterministic fashion) then our destiny is not fixed.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>No. The concept is not enough. The soul would actually have to exist.
Yes it would.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
>>>cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
>>>machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
>>>back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
>>>application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
>>>but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
>>>level of operation that we cannot control. One could say this is
>>>comparable to the unchanging bits of government, like our British Queen
>>>or written constitutions of republics.
>someone4 wrote:
>> I think it is a mistake to compare us to computers.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Why, both are molecules doing what molecules do.
You are assuming your own conclusion.
>someone4 wrote:
>> As Kurt Godel
>> pointed out, there are mathematical insights that we have, that are not
>> provable. They could never have been reached by logic, or algorithms.
>> So in that sense, we are not like computers.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>I can program a computer to reach illogical conclusions.
Kurt Godel proved though that "that any consistent formal system strong
enough to axiomatize arithmetic must be incomplete; that is, there are
statements that are true but not provable. Also, one can't hope to
prove the consistency of such a system using the axioms themselves."
(taken from http://www.usna.edu/Users/math/meh/godel.html ).
Can you program a computer to be able to reach true mathematical
statements which are not provable?
>someone4 wrote:
>> Also computers don't experience a subjective awareness, and there is no
>> physical theory that explains our subjective awareness. In fact there
>> is no explanation for it without the conception of a soul.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>How do you know anyone else experiences what you call subjective awareness?
>By their behavior only. If a computer behaved as they do, you would have to
>grant that it has subjective awareness, or resort to a double-standard.
I don't assume people have subjective awareness by their behaviour
only, but by my experience that I do, and their similarity to me. If it
wasn't for my own experience that I wouldn't assume it of them. It is
true that if you take a strictly solipsist approach, that I can't know
it of them.
On a computer though, it is a totally different story. I have no reason
to think that my computer experiences subjective awareness, and no
reason to think if it processed a certain series of 1's or 0's that it
would suddenly gain it. What are you suggesting would be special about
this series of 1's and 0's? Are they magic? Try not to assume your own
conclusions in giving what I'm sure will be a reasoned response.
To put it another way, if we assume our awareness was not caused by a
soul, but was an experience of some physical activity of the brain, let
us call it physical activity X. If we assume that the brain follows the
laws of physics, conceptually we could model it exactly on a computer
(including physical activity X). If we model it correctly, the computer
should act exactly the same, though it wouldn't experience awareness,
as physical activity X was not actually happening on the computer it
was simulated. This wouldn't mean to say that we couldn't produce a
machine on which physical activity X did occur, and therefore would be
conscious (if our assumption was correct). It simply highlights that
behaviour gives no indication of consciousness, and to assume it does,
is to make an assumption based on ignorance.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>This does not free us from responsibility. Blair cannot blame his
>>>actions on Her Majesty. If some unavoidable chain of events made
>>>someone evil enough to do something, they are nonetheless evil,
>>>whatever you take evil to be.
>someone4 wrote:
>> How can you be responsible without a soul, it is not like you would
>> have had any options.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>This is true. But there are practical concerns. It is advantageous for you
>to hold people responsible for their actions.
Yes, in the world view you are stating, it could be argued that there
are practical reasons for holding people responsible, but there is no
concept of individual responsibility, or morality. In fact, the message
would be, if you are physically capable of doing it, then it must have
been your destiny, and there is nothing you could have done about it.
Teaching that world view would seem to be asking for another Columbine
High School massacre. That the gunmen reportedly asked for "those who
believe in God" to stand up, suggests that they were atheists, and may
have therefore followed the point of view, that if they were physically
capable of doing it, it must have been their destiny.
>someone4 wrote:
>>From your perspective, if someone was to stab someone, then why are
>> they any more responsible than the knife, as from your perspective,
>> neither the knife nor the person had any options.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>This is true, this is why it is prudent to hold people responsible for their
>actions even though they are just molecules doing what molecules do. Since
>you cannot change what causes you happiness or suffering, it behooves you to
>act in a manner that furthers the happiness, and minimizes the pain. It is
>advantageous to operate within the assumption that you have free will, even
>though free will is impossible.
Free will is not impossible, if we have a soul, it would be true, and
as I have stated above, your assumption that unless there is evidence
for something it doesn't exist, is yet another assumption based on
ignorance.
Even though you don't believe you have free will, and that you believe
that people who think that they do are deluded, you admit, that it is
difficult to go through life without believing in what you consider to
be a delusion to some extent.
>someone4 wrote:
>> The concept of evil/selfishness assumes possible options. It makes no
>> sense to consider an atomic bomb 'evil', as it doesn't have any
>> options.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>This is true.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>The phrase "free will is an illusion" is silly. There is no illusion,
>>>only a mind and its functions.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Free will does not even meet the criteria for an illusion. An illusion has
>to be detectable, free will is not. Free will is merely an assumption.
Though from your perspective, people would be deluded in believing that
they have it, and for practical purposes, you adopt this delusion in
order to live your life.
>someone4 wrote:
>> The illusion would be that it seemed that A and B were both possible
>> before you chose between them. Without a soul, if all effects have
>> causes from within the physical plane, then only one was ever possible.
>> So there would be an illusion.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>No. There's nothing to point at in the decision-making process that you can
>call free will, so there's no illusion, just an assumption. There's an
>illusion that there was a choice, but that's not the same as free will. In
>your decision between A and B, where does the free will enter the decision?
Free will is the concept that between A and B that both were possible,
and that I was free to will myself to do either. You believe this
assumption to be false, and therefore you are saying that people are
deluded in thinking they could do either.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Don't you compare the options to your preferences, and reach your
>conclusion?
Maybe I have no preferences that I can detect, maybe I am simply asked
to choose a number between 1 and a million.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Where's the free will enter the picture?
It is simply the conception, and the sensation that I have that both A
and B are possible and that I was free to will myself to do either.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>At what point does the
>supposed soul reveal your decision to you independant of your evaluations?
My soul is the essential me. A better way to look at it, might be when
does the brain present to me, the evaluations, that I (an aware soul)
choose between.
>someone4 wrote:
>> Though personally, my subjective experience, that I can raise either my
>> left or right hand, and that both were possible, and that I consciously
>> chose which one would happen, seems to me very real.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>And I detect no application of free will in that description. It seems you
>compare your options to your preferences and reach a conclusion. That seems
>pretty programmatic.
The concept of free will, in that description in terms of that it would
have been possible to have raised either my left hand, or my right
hand, and that I was free to will which would happen.
Whether I decide to raise my left hand or my right doesn't seem very
programmatic to me.
>someone4 wrote:
>> So until it is proved to me that I have no options, and that it is an
>> illusion, I will exercise my belief that I have options, and believe in
>> a soul, and a dualistic existence.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>That's fine. As long as you act within the assumption that you and others
>have free will, you should be able to avoid trying to fruitlessly
>second-guess your decisions, and thus your deterministic path through life
>should be easier than if you didn't.
So acting with the assumption that I am intrinsically a something above
physical laws (a soul for want of a better word) is actually
practically something that would be difficult to go through life
without believing to a certain extent.
Pramod Subramanyan
Iain wrote:
> > Q1. Why should changes be "restricted to a high level of abstraction"?
>
> Because altering the lower level mechanism that constitutes a higher
> level mechinism makes changes to the layer before it distorts the
> outcome of the change.
Nicely phrased prevarication. Did anybody else notice it doesn't mean
anything?
>
> > Q2. Why should there be a lowest level?
>
> If there is not, the machine is infinitely complex. If you can show
> that one is possible, point taken.
I can think of a machine that has just one level - hence no lowest
level (in the sense that you speak of it).
> > Q3. Why should it be unreachable?
>
> This ia a paraphasure of the first question.
I'm afraid not.
Let me rephrase : Why should the lowest level be immutable?
>
> ~Iain
The whole machine with levels analogy at best proves that computers
have no free will, which is rather obvious. What you have to prove is
why the brain should behave like a computer in these matters.
1Z
Iain wrote:
> At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
> cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
> machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
> back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
> application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
> but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
> level of operation that we cannot control. One could say this is
> comparable to the unchanging bits of government, like our British Queen
> or written constitutions of republics.
If the low-level stuff doesn't manifest at a high level, it doesn't
matter.
If it does, it can be controlled at *that* level.
> This does not free us from responsibility. Blair cannot blame his
> actions on Her Majesty. If some unavoidable chain of events made
> someone evil enough to do something, they are nonetheless evil,
> whatever you take evil to be.
>
> The phrase "free will is an illusion" is silly. There is no illusion,
> only a mind and its functions.
See you at the foot of the rainbow!
1Z
Publius wrote:
> "Iain" <iain_i...@hotmail.com> wrote in news:1126864603.326986.159330
> @g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>
> > What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
> > own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
> >
> > They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
> > irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
> > free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
> > predeterminedly unfree.
>
> That's right. They could be random, but they aren't.
>
> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism, as
> applied to human behavior.
No it isn't. Randomness of a kind that is too irational to be called
FW is also a denial of determinism. It is (at least) a 3-horse race.
> Determinism is the doctrine that all events are
> predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human behavior is not
> predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will exists.
Doesn't follow.
> At the same time, however, much of that same behavior *is* predictable
> given certain other information, e.g., the values, interests, and goals of
> the agent. Hence the behavior is not random either.
Predicting from the laws of physics always requires knowledge of
"initial conditions".
> > At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
> > cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
> > machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
> > back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
> > application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
> > but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
> > level of operation that we cannot control.
>
> That analogy is more apt than you might have supposed. The behavior of a
> computer cannot be predicted from the laws of physics either.
Absent initial conditions.
> Regardless of
> how it is constructed electronically, and regardless of the microcode
> controlling that hardware, its behavior is only predictable based on the
> running program.
Which is part of the initial conditions.
1Z
Publius wrote:
> Uncle Buck <Uncl...@SpamMeNot.com> wrote in
> news:610pi15fo21fu45dm...@4ax.com:
>
> >>Well, then, until it does exist, my claim (that one cannot predict
> >>human behavior from the laws of physics) stands unrefuted.
>
> > Yes, true, but it also stands unsubstantiated. In other words, your
> > claim might just as well not exist.
>
> Er, no. It is substantiated by the evidence available to date.
>
> >>And, what, pray tell, is the basis for the above probability estimate
> >>("it is entirely likely that . . .")?
>
> > <sigh> The phrase means the same as "it's entirely possible", surely
> > you knew that.
>
> Well, I admit I didn't know that "it is likely that" was synonymous with,
> "It is possible that."
>
> But I will stick my neck out and assert that knowledge of neurochemistry
> and neurophyiology, no matter how complete, will never allow us to
> predict human behavior in a deterministic way. That is because those
> systems serve merely as a substrate from which higher-level information
> structures can arise. Those structures follow their own laws, which are
> not derivable from the laws governing the substrate.
That is the metaphysical theory of Emergentism (in one of its stronger
varieties)
> The substrate
> supports the higher level functions, but does not determine them, just as
> the hardware design and microcode of a computer supports (say) C++, but
> does not determine it. We can compile and run C++ code on a variety of
> platforms, with wildly different hardware designs and associated
> microcode, and they'll behave the same way.
That is something different. The behaviour of a computer running a
programme
*is* physically predictable providing you include the programming as
part
of the initial conditions of the system. "Hardware independence" does
not
mean software has its own set of laws, it means different kinds of
harware
effectively follow the same laws at a certain level of abstraction.
> Weather offers another analogy. It is not possible to predict where a
> hurricane will form in the South Atlantic next year, its strength, path,
> scale, etc. Even though hurricanes obey the laws of physics, the system
> is too complex --- there are too many variables, and too many possible
> interactions among those variables, to predict them with any computing
> resources currently available, or likely to be available in the
> foreseeable future.
Too many variables for what or whom ? "Can't practically" doesn't mean
"can't possibly".
1Z
Dianelos wrote:
Therefore it would be a really amazing coincidence if
> a human brain turned out to so precise as to be deterministic. Actually
> it would be almost miraculous, as a deterministic brain offers no
> survival advantage whatsoever, and is quite unnecessary from the
> evolutionary point of view.
Actually, an indeterministic brain offers positive advantages --
unpredictability to predators, imaginative problem-solving, etc.
1Z
Denis Loubet wrote:
> "Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:n8CdnSxU-pn...@comcast.com...
> > "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in
> > news:7ZqdncXFift...@io.com:
> >
> >>> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
> >>> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism,
> >
> >> An abjectly arbitrary denial, I might add.
> >
> > Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict which
> > movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
> > exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
> > no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
>
> Sorry no. I and all my friends can predict exactly what I'll order at a
> seafood restaurant. The chicken.
>
> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other decisions
> are not as equally determined.
1) the subjective impression that one can make free choices
2) the evidence for indeterminism in physics.
> >>> Determinism is the doctrine that all
> >>> events are predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human
> >>> behavior is not predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will
> >>> exists.
> >
> >> Whoa! Please provide evidence supporting this claim! Are you claiming
> >> that human behavior is MAGIC?
> >
> > Er, that is called the fallacy of black and white thinking. I.e., if
> > human behavior is not deterministic, it must be magic.
>
> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic. Otherwise,
> it's physics.
If the laws of physics are indeterministic (and the current one are
indeed)
then indeterminism neednot be magic.
> > There are other
> > alternatives.
>
> To physics? That would be magic.
>
> > BTW, the burden of proof rests with the determinist, since
> > he is the one making the affirmative assertion.
>
> You're the one claiming that some things operate contrary to the laws of
> physics. Please demonstrate this.
Physics is not necessarily deterministic and currently isn't.
1Z
Denis Loubet wrote:
> Free will does not even meet the criteria for an illusion. An illusion has
> to be detectable, free will is not. Free will is merely an assumption.
It would have to be "merely an assumption" if there were evidence for
strict
determinism, but there isn't.
George Dance
> "Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:n8CdnSxU-pn...@comcast.com...
> > "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in
> > news:7ZqdncXFift...@io.com:
> >
> >>> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
> >>> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism,
> >
> >> An abjectly arbitrary denial, I might add.
> >
> > Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict which
> > movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
> > exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
> > no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
>
> Sorry no. I and all my friends can predict exactly what I'll order at a
> seafood restaurant. The chicken.
>
> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other decisions
> are not as equally determined.
What physical events (brain, childhood, or genetic) determine that you
will order the chicken?
> >>> Determinism is the doctrine that all
> >>> events are predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human
> >>> behavior is not predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will
> >>> exists.
> >
> >> Whoa! Please provide evidence supporting this claim! Are you claiming
> >> that human behavior is MAGIC?
> >
> > Er, that is called the fallacy of black and white thinking. I.e., if
> > human behavior is not deterministic, it must be magic.
>
> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic. Otherwise, it's physics.
The claim is not that something 'acts contrary to the laws of physics.'
The claim is that, knowing the basic laws of physics and the physical
events of a person's life, you cannot predict all that person's
behavior.
My brain obeys the same laws of physics as yours - can you predict from
that what meal I will order next time I go into a seafood restaurant?
If not, then: What other physical information would you need in order
to make a successful prediction?
> > There are other
> > alternatives.
>
> To physics? That would be magic.
Hmmm ... in this case, the physical events of my logging onto my usenet
program and observing your earlier post have resulted in my writing a
post in reply. Since there's no magic involved, the reply I wrote has
to have an entirely physical explanation - any physical structure like
me that observes a post with the physical structure of yours would have
to have written a reply with the exact same structure, no?
Yet there are undoubtedly other human beings who read the same post;
and I can't see any replies identical to mine anywhere. How could that
be?
> > BTW, the burden of proof rests with the determinist, since
> > he is the one making the affirmative assertion.
>
> You're the one claiming that some things operate contrary to the laws of
> physics. Please demonstrate this.
Here's the argument as I see it:
Premise: If physical laws fully explain the content of my reply, then
similar physical entities with the same stimulation and subject to the
same physical laws would have written the exact same reply.
Premise: There are physical entities with the same stimulation and
subject to the same physical laws.
Premise: No other such entity wrote the exact same reply.
Conclusion: Physical laws do not fully explain the content of my reply.
> > If you hold to the
> > determinist thesis, then it is up to you to produce the evidence for your
> > claim that human behavior can be predicted accurately and consistently
> > from the laws of physics.
>
> You are claiming that human behavior is contrary to the laws of physics.
> Please support this claim.
> >> WTF? Computers are magic too?
> >
> > Not at all. But their behavior while running an app cannot be predicted
> > from Ohm's Law.
>
> The laws of physics is a PLURAL. The operations of a computer that depend on
> Ohm's law CAN be predicted by Ohm's law.
So what particular laws of physics determine that you will order
chicken?
> >>> Regardless of
> >>> how it is constructed electronically, and regardless of the microcode
> >>> controlling that hardware, its behavior is only predictable based on
> >>> the running program.
> >
> >> Which obeys the laws of physics.
> >
> > Indeed they do. But a system obeying the laws of physics and being
> > deterministic are two different things.
>
> No. Either a system obeys the laws of physics, or it's magic. Take your pick.
The question is not whether, in writing this post, I've obeyed the laws
of physics. AFAIK, I have; I can't see any that I've violated, can
you? The question is whether those laws explain the structure of my
post.
George Dance
Iain wrote:
> What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
> own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>
> They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
> irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
> free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
> predeterminedly unfree.
> At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
> cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
> machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
> back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
> application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
> but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
> level of operation that we cannot control. One could say this is
> comparable to the unchanging bits of government, like our British Queen
> or written constitutions of republics.
In which case the mind's operation cannot be 'random'; an
uncontrollable level of operation does not give rise to random
behavior. Take the part of my brain that controls my breathing -
that's uncontrollable, as I can override it temporarily but can't stop
it completely by will alone. But it results in behavior - my breathing
- that is not random.
> This does not free us from responsibility. Blair cannot blame his
> actions on Her Majesty. If some unavoidable chain of events made
> someone evil enough to do something, they are nonetheless evil,
> whatever you take evil to be.
But you certainly cannot sensibly say that I'm either good or evil for
breathing, when in fact I cannot control whether I breathe or not. If
all my mental acts are analogous, it's not sensible to say that I'm
either good or evil for behaviour that results from any of them,
either.
> The phrase "free will is an illusion" is silly. There is no illusion,
> only a mind and its functions.
> ~Iain
George Dance
> "someone4" <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote in message
> news:1126959307.4...@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> > Iain wrote:
> >>What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
> >>own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
> >
> > Personally I would call it our experience that events A and B were both
> > possible before we chose between them, i.e. we are free to will which
> > will happen.
>
> And so the question is: Are we?
>
> > Iain wrote:
> >>They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
> >>irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
> >>free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
> >>predeterminedly unfree.
> >
> > That is correct, if you only consider causes within the physical plane.
>
> That is all we have evidence for.
snip
> > How can you be responsible without a soul, it is not like you would
> > have had any options.
>
> This is true. But there are practical concerns. It is advantageous for you
> to hold people responsible for their actions.
What kind of physical phenomenon is advantageousness? It has to be, if
only physical events determine whether anyone holds anyone else
responsible.
> >>From your perspective, if someone was to stab someone, then why are
> > they any more responsible than the knife, as from your perspective,
> > neither the knife nor the person had any options.
>
> This is true, this is why it is prudent to hold people responsible for their
> actions even though they are just molecules doing what molecules
> do.
What kind of physical phenomenon is prudence? How is prudence
observeable, for instance?
> Since
> you cannot change what causes you happiness or suffering, it behooves you to
> act in a manner that furthers the happiness, and minimizes the pain.
Granted that, given the assumption that what causes you happiness or
suffering is outside your control (as it's solely a matter of physical
events and physical laws), how can it be that your action is in any way
in your control? So (unless behooving is some physical event, or
physical force, or even a physical law), what does it matter how it
behooves one to act?
> It is
> advantageous to operate within the assumption that you have free will, even
> though free will is impossible.
Same objection; either advantageousness is a physical phenomenon, or
(by your dichotomy) it cannot affect behavior in any way.
> > The concept of evil/selfishness assumes possible options. It makes no
> > sense to consider an atomic bomb 'evil', as it doesn't have any
> > options.
>
> This is true.
>
> > Iain wrote:
> >>The phrase "free will is an illusion" is silly. There is no illusion,
> >>only a mind and its functions.
>
> Free will does not even meet the criteria for an illusion. An illusion has
> to be detectable, free will is not. Free will is merely an assumption.
>
> > The illusion would be that it seemed that A and B were both possible
> > before you chose between them. Without a soul, if all effects have
> > causes from within the physical plane, then only one was ever possible.
> > So there would be an illusion.
>
> No. There's nothing to point at in the decision-making process that you can
> call free will, so there's no illusion, just an assumption. There's an
> illusion that there was a choice, but that's not the same as free will. In
> your decision between A and B, where does the free will enter the decision?
In the assumption of a decision; if only A had been possible, the
organism could not have decided between A or B; it would have been
impossible for it to do B, period.
> Don't you compare the options to your preferences, and reach your
> conclusion?
What kinds of physical events are options or preferences? How does one
observe one of those? Contrariwise, if options or preferences are not
physical events, how could they have anything to with the organism's
behaviour? That's precisely what you dismissed as 'magic' earlier.
> Where's the free will enter the picture?
At the precise point where one starts postulating, or 'making up,'
things like decisions, options, and preferences to explain behavior.
> At what point does the
> supposed soul reveal your decision to you independant of your evaluations?
What kind of physical event is an evaluation? (Again, if must be one,
otherwise you're making up magic by your own admission).
> > Though personally, my subjective experience, that I can raise either my
> > left or right hand, and that both were possible, and that I consciously
> > chose which one would happen, seems to me very real.
>
> And I detect no application of free will in that description. It seems you
> compare your options to your preferences and reach a conclusion.
Which, assuming that options and preferences are physical events, that
they interact in a way ('comparison') that is governed by physical
laws, makes the poster's hand-raising a purely physical event.
However, both those assumptions are in question.
> That seems
> pretty programmatic.
If there's physical evidence of a program.
> > So until it is proved to me that I have no options, and that it is an
> > illusion, I will exercise my belief that I have options, and believe in
> > a soul, and a dualistic existence.
>
> That's fine. As long as you act within the assumption that you and others
> have free will, you should be able to avoid trying to fruitlessly
> second-guess your decisions, and thus your deterministic path through life
> should be easier than if you didn't.
Completely irrelevant; future events cannot play any causative role in
whether he assumes that he has free will or not - that assumption, on
your account, must have been determined by past events only.
Uncle Buck
<m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
>"1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in
>news:1127136292.4...@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>
>>> But I will stick my neck out and assert that knowledge of
>>> neurochemistry and neurophyiology, no matter how complete, will never
>>> allow us to predict human behavior in a deterministic way. That is
>>> because those systems serve merely as a substrate from which
>>> higher-level information structures can arise. Those structures
>>> follow their own laws, which are not derivable from the laws
>>> governing the substrate.
>
>> That is the metaphysical theory of Emergentism (in one of its stronger
>> varieties)
>
>Yes, it is. And it is the most viable theory presently available for
>explaining complex systems (IMHO).
>
>Here is a fairly good definition:
>
>http://www.eas.asu.edu/~kdooley/casopdef.html
>
>>> The substrate
>>> supports the higher level functions, but does not determine them,
>>> just as the hardware design and microcode of a computer supports
>>> (say) C++, but does not determine it. We can compile and run C++ code
>>> on a variety of platforms, with wildly different hardware designs and
>>> associated microcode, and they'll behave the same way.
>
>> That is something different. The behaviour of a computer running a
>> programme *is* physically predictable providing you include the
>> programming as part of the initial conditions of the system.
>
>But the programming is NOT part of the intitial physical condition of the
>system,
Actually, it has to be. The programming is stored on media, a process
which requires very specific and well-understood physical conditions
to be met. If its presence is to be considered as part of the system
at all, it must be so from the outset.
> and thus to include it would be a gratuitous extention of the
>meaning of "the laws of physics."
How so? Without a very predictible and well-understood adherence to
"the laws of physics", the information couldn't exist on the
comuputer.
>The information contained in the software
>is not derivable from the laws of physics (although it is not inconsistent
>with them), just as Joyce's *Ulysses* is not derivable from the laws of
>grammar, even though it is consistent with them.
Bad analogy. Grammar is an abstract. If grammer were a concrete,
physical thing with a well-understood structure and easily predictable
pattern of behavior, you would certainly be able to tell whether or
not it contained Joyce's "Ulysses". You can use grammar to interpret
various collections of words, thereby determining what they are and
what they mean. Likewise, you can use the laws of physics to
interpret the data as it exists on computer media, thereby determining
what it is and how it can be expected to behave. If you couldn't, the
entire concept of "programming" wouldn't even work.
someone4
issues (that things were incorrectly imbedded, and that words were
attributed to the wrong people), my mistake. Thought I'd repost with
the corrections.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
>>>own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>someone4 wrote:
>> Personally I would call it our experience that events A and B were both
>> possible before we chose between them, i.e. we are free to will which
>> will happen.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>And so the question is: Are we?
I don't know, and neither do you. I believe we are.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
>>>irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
>>>free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
>>>predeterminedly unfree.
>someone4 wrote:
>> That is correct, if you only consider causes within the physical
plane.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>That is all we have evidence for.
We have the subjective very real evidence that we experience awareness,
which we cannot even begin to explain in terms of the physical plane.
>someone4 wrote:
>> If you consider the concept of a soul, then it explains how we are
>> experience a subjective awareness (are conscious), and our subjective
>> experience that A and B were both possible before we chose between
>> them.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Yes, we can make-up stuff to justify anything.
All explanations are made up. At the moment the concept of a soul (i.e.
something above all physical laws), is the only explanation of what we
subjectively experience (including how it is that we are aware).
>someone4 wrote:
>> Just because the universe is deterministic, effects have causes,
>> doesn't mean that the spiritual plane must work in the same way.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>But without any evidence that a spiritual plane exists, the concept is just
>a made-up thing to hide our ignorance.
You can assume that something doesn't exist unless there is objective
scientific evidence for it, but that is an assumption that has been
proven false again and again. There is no objective scientific evidence
that you experience subjective awareness, but you do.
>someone4 wrote:
>> So with the concept of a soul (a part of us that is aware, and can
>> choose in a non-deterministic fashion) then our destiny is not fixed.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>No. The concept is not enough. The soul would actually have to exist.
Yes it would.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>At some point, there is always a level of abstraction so low that we
>>>cannot control it -- just as a computer cannot control what version of
>>>machine code it uses, however much you program it to do so. We can loop
>>>back unto ourselves and control our own emotions, just as a Windows
>>>application can change operating system settings(at a level below it),
>>>but for the whole thing to function there must come an uncontrolable
>>>level of operation that we cannot control. One could say this is
>>>comparable to the unchanging bits of government, like our British Queen
>>>or written constitutions of republics.
>someone4 wrote:
>> I think it is a mistake to compare us to computers.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Why, both are molecules doing what molecules do.
You are assuming your own conclusion.
>someone4 wrote:
>> As Kurt Godel
>> pointed out, there are mathematical insights that we have, that are not
>> provable. They could never have been reached by logic, or algorithms.
>> So in that sense, we are not like computers.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>I can program a computer to reach illogical conclusions.
Kurt Godel proved though that "that any consistent formal system strong
enough to axiomatize arithmetic must be incomplete; that is, there are
statements that are true but not provable. Also, one can't hope to
prove the consistency of such a system using the axioms themselves."
(taken from http://www.usna.edu/Users/math/meh/godel.html ).
Can you program a computer to be able to reach true mathematical
statements which are not provable?
>someone4 wrote:
>> Also computers don't experience a subjective awareness, and there is no
>> physical theory that explains our subjective awareness. In fact there
>> is no explanation for it without the conception of a soul.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>How do you know anyone else experiences what you call subjective awareness?
>By their behavior only. If a computer behaved as they do, you would have to
>grant that it has subjective awareness, or resort to a double-standard.
I don't assume people have subjective awareness by their behaviour
only, but by my experience that I do, and their similarity to me. If it
wasn't for my own experience that I wouldn't assume it of them. It is
true that if you take a strictly solipsist approach, that I can't know
it of them.
On a computer though, it is a totally different story. I have no reason
to think that my computer experiences subjective awareness, and no
reason to think if it processed a certain series of 1's or 0's that it
would suddenly gain it. What are you suggesting would be special about
this series of 1's and 0's? Are they magic? Try not to assume your own
conclusions in giving what I'm sure will be a reasoned response.
To put it another way, if we assume our awareness was not caused by a
soul, but was an experience of some physical activity of the brain, let
us call it physical activity X. If we assume that the brain follows the
laws of physics, conceptually we could model it exactly on a computer
(including physical activity X). If we model it correctly, the computer
should act exactly the same, though it wouldn't experience awareness,
as physical activity X was not actually happening on the computer it
was simulated. This wouldn't mean to say that we couldn't produce a
machine on which physical activity X did occur, and therefore would be
conscious (if our assumption was correct). It simply highlights that
behaviour gives no indication of consciousness, and to assume it does,
is to make an assumption based on ignorance.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>This does not free us from responsibility. Blair cannot blame his
>>>actions on Her Majesty. If some unavoidable chain of events made
>>>someone evil enough to do something, they are nonetheless evil,
>>>whatever you take evil to be.
>someone4 wrote:
>> How can you be responsible without a soul, it is not like you would
>> have had any options.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>This is true. But there are practical concerns. It is advantageous for you
>to hold people responsible for their actions.
Yes, in the world view you are stating, it could be argued that there
are practical reasons for holding people responsible, but there is no
concept of individual responsibility, or morality. In fact, the message
would be, if you are physically capable of doing it, then it must have
been your destiny, and there is nothing you could have done about it.
Teaching that world view would seem to be asking for another Columbine
High School massacre. That the gunmen reportedly asked for "those who
believe in God" to stand up, suggests that they were atheists, and may
have therefore followed the point of view, that if they were physically
capable of doing it, it must have been their destiny.
>someone4 wrote:
>>From your perspective, if someone was to stab someone, then why are
>> they any more responsible than the knife, as from your perspective,
>> neither the knife nor the person had any options.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>This is true, this is why it is prudent to hold people responsible for their
>actions even though they are just molecules doing what molecules do. Since
>you cannot change what causes you happiness or suffering, it behooves you to
>act in a manner that furthers the happiness, and minimizes the pain. It is
>advantageous to operate within the assumption that you have free will, even
>though free will is impossible.
Free will is not impossible, if we have a soul, it would be true, and
as I have stated above, your assumption that unless there is evidence
for something it doesn't exist, is yet another assumption based on
ignorance.
Even though you don't believe you have free will, and that you believe
that people who think that they do are deluded, you admit, that it is
difficult to go through life without believing in what you consider to
be a delusion to some extent.
>someone4 wrote:
>> The concept of evil/selfishness assumes possible options. It makes no
>> sense to consider an atomic bomb 'evil', as it doesn't have any
>> options.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>This is true.
>> Iain wrote:
>>>The phrase "free will is an illusion" is silly. There is no illusion,
>>>only a mind and its functions.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Free will does not even meet the criteria for an illusion. An illusion has
>to be detectable, free will is not. Free will is merely an assumption.
Though from your perspective, people would be deluded in believing that
they have it, and for practical purposes, you adopt this delusion in
order to live your life.
>someone4 wrote:
>> The illusion would be that it seemed that A and B were both possible
>> before you chose between them. Without a soul, if all effects have
>> causes from within the physical plane, then only one was ever possible.
>> So there would be an illusion.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>No. There's nothing to point at in the decision-making process that you can
>call free will, so there's no illusion, just an assumption. There's an
>illusion that there was a choice, but that's not the same as free will. In
>your decision between A and B, where does the free will enter the decision?
Free will is the concept that between A and B that both were possible,
and that I was free to will myself to do either. You believe this
assumption to be false, and therefore you are saying that people are
deluded in thinking they could do either.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Don't you compare the options to your preferences, and reach your
>conclusion?
Maybe I have no preferences that I can detect, maybe I am simply asked
to choose a number between 1 and a million.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Where's the free will enter the picture?
It is simply the conception, and the sensation that I have that both A
and B are possible and that I was free to will myself to do either.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>At what point does the
>supposed soul reveal your decision to you independant of your evaluations?
My soul is the essential me. A better way to look at it, might be when
does the brain present to me, the evaluations, that I (an aware soul)
choose between.
>someone4 wrote:
>> Though personally, my subjective experience, that I can raise either my
>> left or right hand, and that both were possible, and that I consciously
>> chose which one would happen, seems to me very real.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>And I detect no application of free will in that description. It seems you
>compare your options to your preferences and reach a conclusion. That seems
>pretty programmatic.
The concept of free will, in that description in terms of that it would
have been possible to have raised either my left hand, or my right
hand, and that I was free to will which would happen.
Whether I decide to raise my left hand or my right doesn't seem very
programmatic to me.
>someone4 wrote:
>> So until it is proved to me that I have no options, and that it is an
>> illusion, I will exercise my belief that I have options, and believe in
>> a soul, and a dualistic existence.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>That's fine. As long as you act within the assumption that you and others
>have free will, you should be able to avoid trying to fruitlessly
>second-guess your decisions, and thus your deterministic path through life
>should be easier than if you didn't.
So acting with the assumption that I am intrinsically a something above
Publius
news:1127135558....@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
> No it isn't. Randomness of a kind that is too irational to be called
> FW is also a denial of determinism. It is (at least) a 3-horse race.
>
>> Determinism is the doctrine that all events are
>> predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human behavior is
>> not predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will exists.
>
> Doesn't follow.
>
>> At the same time, however, much of that same behavior *is*
>> predictable given certain other information, e.g., the values,
>> interests, and goals of the agent. Hence the behavior is not random
>> either.
>
> Predicting from the laws of physics always requires knowledge of
> "initial conditions".
Knowing the interests, values, etc., of the agent requires no knowledge
whatsoever of the intitial conditions *as those would be expressed by the
laws of physics*. One may know of another's interests and values without
knowing anything whatever about the laws of physics, or anything whatever
about the state of that agent's brain.
You are correct that alternatives to physical determinism include both free
will and randomness. But much human behavior is not random, either. It is
predictable --- it is just not predictable from the laws of physics.
Publius
news:1127136292.4...@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>> But I will stick my neck out and assert that knowledge of
>> neurochemistry and neurophyiology, no matter how complete, will never
>> allow us to predict human behavior in a deterministic way. That is
>> because those systems serve merely as a substrate from which
>> higher-level information structures can arise. Those structures
>> follow their own laws, which are not derivable from the laws
>> governing the substrate.
> That is the metaphysical theory of Emergentism (in one of its stronger
> varieties)
Yes, it is. And it is the most viable theory presently available for
explaining complex systems (IMHO).
Here is a fairly good definition:
http://www.eas.asu.edu/~kdooley/casopdef.html
>> The substrate
>> supports the higher level functions, but does not determine them,
>> just as the hardware design and microcode of a computer supports
>> (say) C++, but does not determine it. We can compile and run C++ code
>> on a variety of platforms, with wildly different hardware designs and
>> associated microcode, and they'll behave the same way.
> That is something different. The behaviour of a computer running a
> programme *is* physically predictable providing you include the
> programming as part of the initial conditions of the system.
But the programming is NOT part of the intitial physical condition of the
system, and thus to include it would be a gratuitous extention of the
meaning of "the laws of physics." The information contained in the software
is not derivable from the laws of physics (although it is not inconsistent
with them), just as Joyce's *Ulysses* is not derivable from the laws of
grammar, even though it is consistent with them.
>> Weather offers another analogy. It is not possible to predict where a
>> hurricane will form in the South Atlantic next year, its strength,
>> path, scale, etc. Even though hurricanes obey the laws of physics,
>> the system is too complex --- there are too many variables, and too
>> many possible interactions among those variables, to predict them
>> with any computing resources currently available, or likely to be
>> available in the foreseeable future.
> Too many variables for what or whom ? "Can't practically" doesn't mean
> "can't possibly".
If the system is complex enough that analysis of all possible causal
pathways between times T0 and Tn would exceed the resources (time, matter,
energy) available for computation, then "impractical" becomes "impossible."
Here is an excerpt from a previous post on this topic you might find
interesting:
------------------
If the Big Bang is the event occurring at time T0, then it is
unpredictable in principle, since there are no prior states from which it
could be predicted. (Determinism involves predicting a future state from
a present one). Of course, if you subscribe to some kind of cyclic
theory, then the BB did not occur at time T0 (indeed there may be no time
T0).
The future state of a system (its state at Tn) is unpredictable in
principle if:
1. Uncaused events can occur at any time prior to Tn which can alter the
system's state, or
2. If the number of possible causal paths through the system cannot be
analyzed (which LaPlace allows is required) using only the resources
available within the system (time, energy, matter).
It might be helpful to distinguish between "strong" determinism and
"weak" determinism: the former says that all events are caused AND that
they are in principle predictable; the latter says only that they are
caused. LaPlace is an exponent of "strong" determinism.
Now clearly, future uncaused events would render the state of the system
at Tn unknowable. But that doesn't actually undercut the deterministic
thesis: the thesis assumes that the system is closed, that is, that the
present variables in the system are the only variables there will ever be
in the system. By introducing uncaused events, we throw a monkey wrench
into the works; we undercut the premise that the initial states of all
variables in the system are known, by adding a new variable whose value
was not taken into account at T0. So the determinist could cry foul.
Uncaused events refute determinism (both strong and weak), but only by
denying one of its premises. I think it more interesting to refute it
while accepting the premises. We can do that, I think, by showing that
the state of the system at a sufficiently distant Tn cannot be predicted,
given LaPlace's assumptions. We can do this if we can find subsystems
satisfying requirement #2. Many complex adaptive systems have this
property.
Related to #2 is the problem of precision. Nonlinear systems are those
where small differences in initial conditions can produce large
differences down the line. But there is a limit to the precision which
any starting conditions can be measured, related to Planck's Constant. So
there is chaos at the limits of measurement, which can magnify as the
system evolves.
I have no quarrel with a determinism that claims only that the universe
is causal, provided it is not held to be predictable. Although of course
even that "weak" determinism can probably not be maintained, given that
some events (quantum events) are apparently uncaused.
I think we need a "weak" determinism, for the reasons Kant suggested. We
have no hope of understanding the universe (our experiences of it) if it
is not substantially causal. We can tolerate some randomness, but if any
element of our experience might be random, such that we could have
confidence in none of the causal patterns we try to impose upon our
experience, that experience would be a "great buzzing confusion." Perhaps
we could call this (an unpredictable determinism with some randomness) as
a "very weak determinism." :-)
> If one
> found a system that appeared to be un-deterministic how would one
> answer the objection that it was, in fact, determined but that one was
> not considering all the causal factors because you had not discovered
> them yet.
That is the "hidden variables" argument. It cannot be refuted, since that
would involve proving an open-ended negative. And it doesn't address the
indeterminacy resulting from #2.
> There may be subtle differences in meaning between saying a system is
> deterministic and saying a system is determinable. Can there be a
> system which is entirely causal but which cannot be predicted because
> no algorithm can be constructed which models it with perfect accuracy?
> Something on the order of Goedel's proof that some true propositions
> in mathmatics cannot be proven within the system.
The Goedel proof is closely related to the problem of #2. There is an
irreducible randomness in any system. The axioms of all formal systems
are random numbers.
Publius
>>But the programming is NOT part of the intitial physical condition of
>>the system,
>
> Actually, it has to be. The programming is stored on media, a process
> which requires very specific and well-understood physical conditions
> to be met. If its presence is to be considered as part of the system
> at all, it must be so from the outset.
Er, no. The programming is part of the initial conditions of the *run*.
But not of the hardware system, and is not derivable from the physical
laws governing the operation of that hardware. Only the microcode is part
of the initial hardware conditions, and it is arbitrary (it is not itself
derivable from Ohm's Law or its corollaries).
> How so? Without a very predictible and well-understood adherence to
> "the laws of physics", the information couldn't exist on the
> comuputer.
Quite true. But adherence to the laws of physics and derivability from
them are two different things. For a system to be deterministic you need
the latter.
> Bad analogy. Grammar is an abstract. If grammer were a concrete,
> physical thing with a well-understood structure and easily predictable
> pattern of behavior, you would certainly be able to tell whether or
> not it contained Joyce's "Ulysses".
You can translate *Ulysses* into the most rigorous formal language you
wish, and it will still not be derivable from the axioms of that system.
That is because the substance of *Ulysses* (and any other novel) lies in
its semantic content, not in its syntax. The syntax supplies a framework
upon which semantic meaning can be built. But interpretations of the
latter depend upon principles which have nothing essential to do with the
syntax. That is why you can translate *Ulysses* into Icelandic and
preserve most of its meaning. The novel is "syntax independent," just as
C++ is platform-independent.
A given semantic structure can be built atop a variety of substrates,
with wildly different physical structures. The substrate can be
considered a black box. It makes no difference how it works, as long as
meets certain criteria.
> You can use grammar to interpret
> various collections of words, thereby determining what they are and
> what they mean.
No. The rules of grammar will not give the (semantic) meaning of
anything. Observing those rules is a *necessary* condition for decoding
the meaning, but is nowhere near sufficient. Determinism declares that
knowledge of conditions at a given time T are *sufficient* to predict the
state of the system at T1.
Denis Loubet
"1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1127136725.1...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
>
> Denis Loubet wrote:
>> "Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
>> news:n8CdnSxU-pn...@comcast.com...
>> > "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in
>> > news:7ZqdncXFift...@io.com:
>> >
>> >>> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
>> >>> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism,
>> >
>> >> An abjectly arbitrary denial, I might add.
>> >
>> > Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict
>> > which
>> > movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
>> > exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
>> > no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
>>
>> Sorry no. I and all my friends can predict exactly what I'll order at a
>> seafood restaurant. The chicken.
>>
>> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other
>> decisions
>> are not as equally determined.
>
> 1) the subjective impression that one can make free choices
What impression? Point to the part of decision making where free choices
happen. I can't find it. I weigh preferences against options and reach
conclusions. I could program a computer to do that.
For instance: I never chose to not like seafood. That is a preference
imposed upon me by circumstances beyond my control. It now heavily biases my
food choices. When I weigh my food preferences against the food options
before me, I must operate under an arbitrarily imposed bias against seafood.
I could write a program to choose food for me, and I would give seafood a
strong negative weighting.
Again, why should I assume any of my other choices are not equally
determined by biases that are beyond my control.
> 2) the evidence for indeterminism in physics.
If you're talking QM, I fail to see how that allows for free choices. It
seems to be a randomizer, if anything, and random isn't free.
>> >>> Determinism is the doctrine that all
>> >>> events are predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human
>> >>> behavior is not predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will
>> >>> exists.
>> >
>> >> Whoa! Please provide evidence supporting this claim! Are you claiming
>> >> that human behavior is MAGIC?
>> >
>> > Er, that is called the fallacy of black and white thinking. I.e., if
>> > human behavior is not deterministic, it must be magic.
>>
>> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic. Otherwise,
>> it's physics.
>
> If the laws of physics are indeterministic (and the current one are
> indeed)
> then indeterminism neednot be magic.
Here's where I have a problem. In one view, we have a Newtonian clockwork
universe that is called deterministic because we should in theory be able to
predict with absolute certainty the outcome of any chain of cause and
effect. The introduction of QM effects to that Newtonian universe certainly
screws up the predictive aspect of the universe, but it does not affect the
way the laws of physics operate. It's a randomizing factor thrown into a
clockwork machine. If an atom decays at a completely indeterminate time, the
clockwork mechanism of the universe accomodates the debris of that
unexpected decay with clockwork precision.
What do you call a deterministic universe modified by random quantum
effects? It's not deterministic, but it's not completely random either. And
for macro-scale purposes, the universe is Newtonian. I strongly suspect that
quantum effects do not seriously influence mental activity, and even if they
did, it would be a randomizing effect, and not a magic wand that allows
things to proceed outside the laws of physics.
>> > There are other
>> > alternatives.
>>
>> To physics? That would be magic.
>>
>> > BTW, the burden of proof rests with the determinist, since
>> > he is the one making the affirmative assertion.
>>
>> You're the one claiming that some things operate contrary to the laws of
>> physics. Please demonstrate this.
>
> Physics is not necessarily deterministic and currently isn't.
I have to assume you're talking about QM. Please demonstrate that QM has
anything to do with making a choice.
Denis Loubet
"George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1127140831.9...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
> Denis Loubet wrote:
>> "Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
>> news:n8CdnSxU-pn...@comcast.com...
>> > "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in
>> > news:7ZqdncXFift...@io.com:
>> >
>> >>> Predictability is entirely germane to the question of free will. The
>> >>> doctrine of free will is nothing more than a denial of determinism,
>> >
>> >> An abjectly arbitrary denial, I might add.
>> >
>> > Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict
>> > which
>> > movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no matter how
>> > exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his childhood, and
>> > no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
>>
>> Sorry no. I and all my friends can predict exactly what I'll order at a
>> seafood restaurant. The chicken.
>>
>> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other
>> decisions
>> are not as equally determined.
>
> What physical events (brain, childhood, or genetic) determine that you
> will order the chicken?
The simple fact that I don't like the taste of seafood. I don't know why I
don't like the taste of seafood. I never CHOSE not to like the taste of
seafood. My dislike of seafood is a preference imposed upon me, and outside
my control.
This arbitrarily imposed bias, among many other equally arbitrary food
preferences, determines my food choices.
Can you point out how my food choices are supposed to be free if the
preferences I use to weigh against the food options I have are imposed and
arbitrary?
Can you provide a reason to assume my other preferences and motives aren't
equally as imposed and arbitrary?
>> >>> Determinism is the doctrine that all
>> >>> events are predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human
>> >>> behavior is not predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will
>> >>> exists.
>> >
>> >> Whoa! Please provide evidence supporting this claim! Are you claiming
>> >> that human behavior is MAGIC?
>> >
>> > Er, that is called the fallacy of black and white thinking. I.e., if
>> > human behavior is not deterministic, it must be magic.
>>
>> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic. Otherwise,
>> it's physics.
>
> The claim is not that something 'acts contrary to the laws of physics.'
> The claim is that, knowing the basic laws of physics and the physical
> events of a person's life, you cannot predict all that person's
> behavior.
>
> My brain obeys the same laws of physics as yours - can you predict from
> that what meal I will order next time I go into a seafood restaurant?
> If not, then: What other physical information would you need in order
> to make a successful prediction?
Are you saying your decision is independant of the laws of physics?
If your brain obeys the laws of physics, then the molecules of your brain do
what they do according to the laws of physics. There's no room for the
molecules to go off on their own and disobey the laws of physics. So things
can transpire only one way.
If you agree that the molecules of your brain obey the laws of physics, then
you must agree that yes, your choice is absolutely predictable from starting
conditions.
Now, I'm speaking in the realm of a Newtonian universe for simplicity. If
you include Quantum Mechanics, now you insert a randomizing factor into the
predictable clockwork of the Newtonian universe. However, random does not
equal free, as in free will or free choice. Random equals being a slave to a
random number generator.
>> > There are other
>> > alternatives.
>>
>> To physics? That would be magic.
>
> Hmmm ... in this case, the physical events of my logging onto my usenet
> program and observing your earlier post have resulted in my writing a
> post in reply.
Yes, and every bit of that was inevitable, but modified by quantum events.
> Since there's no magic involved, the reply I wrote has
> to have an entirely physical explanation -
Yes, absolutely. Your brain is a physical object.
> any physical structure like
> me that observes a post with the physical structure of yours would have
> to have written a reply with the exact same structure, no?
They would have to be exactly like you, in exactly the same circumstances,
yes.
> Yet there are undoubtedly other human beings who read the same post;
> and I can't see any replies identical to mine anywhere. How could that
> be?
They aren't exactly like you, nor are they in exactly the same
circumstances.
Tell me, was you post magically revealed to you to write? Or was it a matter
of some deliberation. Can you be certain that the motivations behind your
post were not arbitrary impositions just like my attitude towards seafood?
Can you be sure that your post was not the product of a mechanical
processing of imposed preferences?
>> > BTW, the burden of proof rests with the determinist, since
>> > he is the one making the affirmative assertion.
>>
>> You're the one claiming that some things operate contrary to the laws of
>> physics. Please demonstrate this.
>
> Here's the argument as I see it:
>
> Premise: If physical laws fully explain the content of my reply, then
> similar physical entities with the same stimulation and subject to the
> same physical laws would have written the exact same reply.
Yes, they would have to be exactly identical to you and in exactly the same
circumstances.
> Premise: There are physical entities with the same stimulation and
> subject to the same physical laws.
Really? There is another YOU in the universe? Please, demonstrate this to be
the case!
> Premise: No other such entity wrote the exact same reply.
I stongly suspect that's because there's no such entity.
> Conclusion: Physical laws do not fully explain the content of my reply.
Or that there's no such entity.
I do not accept premise 2.
>> > If you hold to the
>> > determinist thesis, then it is up to you to produce the evidence for
>> > your
>> > claim that human behavior can be predicted accurately and consistently
>> > from the laws of physics.
>>
>> You are claiming that human behavior is contrary to the laws of physics.
>> Please support this claim.
>> >> WTF? Computers are magic too?
>> >
>> > Not at all. But their behavior while running an app cannot be predicted
>> > from Ohm's Law.
>>
>> The laws of physics is a PLURAL. The operations of a computer that depend
>> on
>> Ohm's law CAN be predicted by Ohm's law.
>
> So what particular laws of physics determine that you will order
> chicken?
The fact that the laws of physics modified by QM has determined that I don't
like seafood. Hence, I will order the chicken.
>> >>> Regardless of
>> >>> how it is constructed electronically, and regardless of the microcode
>> >>> controlling that hardware, its behavior is only predictable based on
>> >>> the running program.
>> >
>> >> Which obeys the laws of physics.
>> >
>> > Indeed they do. But a system obeying the laws of physics and being
>> > deterministic are two different things.
>>
>> No. Either a system obeys the laws of physics, or it's magic. Take your
>> pick.
>
> The question is not whether, in writing this post, I've obeyed the laws
> of physics. AFAIK, I have; I can't see any that I've violated, can
> you?
No, you've written exactly what the molecules of your brain obeying the laws
of physics determined you would write.
> The question is whether those laws explain the structure of my
> post.
If they explain the structure of your brain, then they explain the structure
of your post.
Denis Loubet
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in
> news:9OqdnZFf29u...@io.com:
>
>>> Au contraire. The denial is entirely empirical. You cannot predict
>>> which movie some randomly-selected individual will go to next, no
>>> matter how exhaustively you examine his brain, his genetics, or his
>>> childhood, and no matter how competent you are in quantum theory.
>>
>> Sorry no. I and all my friends can predict exactly what I'll order at
>> a seafood restaurant. The chicken.
>>
>> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other
>> decisions are not as equally determined.
>
> You overlooked the qualifiers. Your friends can very likely do that. But
> they don't do it by examining your brain or your genetics. They can do it
> because they know you; they know what you like and don't like. They can
> learn those things about you by observing you over time, but not by
> analyzing your brain.
Excuse me, you included "or his childhood". I obviously assumed then that
knowledge of the person's past behaviors was included among your qualifiers.
> The question was, "Can behavior be predicted *from the laws of
> physics* ---
> remember?
No. I remember phrases like "or his childhood". It's right up there, you
didn't snip the paragraph.
Are you trying to assert that the laws of physics allow molecules in brains
to do things apart from the laws of physics? Yes or no.
>>> Er, that is called the fallacy of black and white thinking. I.e., if
>>> human behavior is not deterministic, it must be magic.
>
>> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic.
>> Otherwise, it's physics.
>
> Who said anything about behavior being contrary to the laws of physics?
> Human behavior is certainly consistent with the laws of physics. It is
> just
> not predictable from them.
If it's not determined, then that means something is functioning contrary to
physical law.
> Just as a hurricane is consistent with the
> principles of meteorology, but not predictable from them, and the
> emergence
> of elephants is consistent with the principles of evolution, but not
> predictable by them. Those are all examples of systems which are causal,
> but not deterministic.
Then something is not obeying physical law.
>> You are claiming that human behavior is contrary to the laws of
>> physics. Please support this claim.
>
> I made no such claim.
If human behavior is not deterministic, then it is contrary to physical law.
Please understand, I am arguing under the premise of a Newtonian universe
for the sake of simplicity. I ignore quantum effects because the addition of
a randomizing factor does not affect the arguments about free will. My
simplification does have an issue concerning the predictability of events.
In the Newtonian clockwork universe, all events are the inevitable result of
an inevitable chain of cause and effect. When you add QM to that universe,
you get a clockwork operation modified by random input. Neither of these
situations is friendly to the concept of free will.
>>> Are you asking what platform-independent means?
>
>> I'm saying this platform-independant stuff is irrelevant.
>
> It is, eh? A computer program may behave identically, even though running
> on radically different hardware. Indeed, one may port the program to a
> machine built from ropes and pulleys. That would seem to suggest that the
> behavior of the program is substantially independent of the hardware.
And the relevance of this is...?
Denis Loubet
>> Iain wrote:
>>>What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
>>>own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>
>>someone4 wrote:
>>> Personally I would call it our experience that events A and B were both
>>> possible before we chose between them, i.e. we are free to will which
>>> will happen.
>
> Denis Loubet wrote:
>>And so the question is: Are we?
>
> I don't know, and neither do you. I believe we are.
I have evidence that my choices are not free. I have no evidence that they
are. I thus conclude that they are not free, until such time as new data
indicates the contrary.
>>> Iain wrote:
>>>>They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
>>>>irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
>>>>free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
>>>>predeterminedly unfree.
>
>>someone4 wrote:
>>> That is correct, if you only consider causes within the physical plane.
>
> Denis Loubet wrote:
>>That is all we have evidence for.
>
> We have the subjective very real evidence that we experience awareness,
> which we cannot even begin to explain in terms of the physical plane.
But we can manipulate that subjective awareness through physical means. For
instance, a surgeon can cut out the speech center of your brain, and
suddenly you can no longer even think in words. I consider that sufficent
justification for concluding that speech is a bit of perfectly physical grey
matter.
Do you have similarly convincing evidence to support a non-physical plane?
>>someone4 wrote:
>>> If you consider the concept of a soul, then it explains how we are
>>> experience a subjective awareness (are conscious), and our subjective
>>> experience that A and B were both possible before we chose between
>>> them.
>
> Denis Loubet wrote:
>>Yes, we can make-up stuff to justify anything.
>
> All explanations are made up.
Then we have nothing further to discuss.
Denis Loubet
Doesn't the fact that we don't see matter acting contrary to physical law
suggest that things are deterministic?
I know that QM throws in a randomizing factor, but come on, neither a
clockwork Newtonian universe or a QM universe are friendly to the concept of
free will.
Dutch
> Can you point out how my food choices are supposed to be free if the
> preferences I use to weigh against the food options I have are imposed and
> arbitrary?
Those imposed taste preferences are suggestions which you are free to
override.
Denis Loubet
"Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message
news:11ivepb...@news.supernews.com...
No. No amount of will on my part will cause me to like seafood. The only
thing that will cause me to *eat* seafood is a circumstance where another
preference is weighted higher than my dislike for seafood. Such as
starvation, or a wish not to insult a host.
We are a mass of warring arbitrary preferences.
Publius
>> You overlooked the qualifiers. Your friends can very likely do that.
>> But they don't do it by examining your brain or your genetics. They
>> can do it because they know you; they know what you like and don't
>> like. They can learn those things about you by observing you over
>> time, but not by analyzing your brain.
> Excuse me, you included "or his childhood". I obviously assumed then
> that knowledge of the person's past behaviors was included among your
> qualifiers.
The reference to childhood was intended as denial of so-called
"sociological determinism" (behavior is determined by features of early
childhood environment), not simply observation of past behavior. A
meaningful determinism must postulate that behavior is determined by
factors external to the agent.
> Are you trying to assert that the laws of physics allow molecules in
> brains to do things apart from the laws of physics? Yes or no.
No. But the behavior of the organism is not predictable from the behavior
of molecules (or any other structures) in the brain. The brain generates
an electromagnetic field which organizes itself into a dynamic,
exceedingly complex information structure from stored data along with
data incoming from the environment. The current state of that information
structure --- not the current physical state of the brain --- determines
behavior. Trying to understand and predict behavior by analysis of the
brain is like trying to understand and predict the 9th Symphony being
broadcast from a radio station by examining the circuit diagram of the
transmitter.
The brain has to be able to generate a field of the required type. But
once it is "up and running," the detailed structure of that field is a
complex function of past experiences and the current sensory environment.
There is no simple or constant correlation between brain states and
behavior.
>> Just as a hurricane is consistent with the
>> principles of meteorology, but not predictable from them, and the
>> emergence
>> of elephants is consistent with the principles of evolution, but not
>> predictable by them. Those are all examples of systems which are
>> causal, but not deterministic.
>
> Then something is not obeying physical law.
>
>>> You are claiming that human behavior is contrary to the laws of
>>> physics. Please support this claim.
>>
>> I made no such claim.
>
> If human behavior is not deterministic, then it is contrary to
> physical law.
No. There is no requirement that law-governed systems be deterministic.
That is an unwarranted metaphysical assumption, and there are all kinds
of systems that refute it, such as those I mentioned.
>> It is, eh? A computer program may behave identically, even though
>> running on radically different hardware. Indeed, one may port the
>> program to a machine built from ropes and pulleys. That would seem to
>> suggest that the behavior of the program is substantially independent
>> of the hardware.
>
> And the relevance of this is...?
It means you will have a hard time predicting the behavior of the
software from physical laws governing the hardware.
Dutch
"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in message
news:xtadnS9Vz5T...@io.com...
>
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message
> news:11ivepb...@news.supernews.com...
>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>
>>> Can you point out how my food choices are supposed to be free if the
>>> preferences I use to weigh against the food options I have are imposed
>>> and arbitrary?
>>
>> Those imposed taste preferences are suggestions which you are free to
>> override.
>
> No. No amount of will on my part will cause me to like seafood.
You are wrong, that is a choice you are making. There is nothing inherent in
seafood or in you that causes you to dislike it, you accepted that value
judgment long ago and it has become reality for you. You can overcome it if
you want to.
Dutch
"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>
>>> Can you point out how my food choices are supposed to be free if the
>>> preferences I use to weigh against the food options I have are imposed
>>> and arbitrary?
>>
>> Those imposed taste preferences are suggestions which you are free to
>> override.
>
> No. No amount of will on my part will cause me to like seafood. The only
> thing that will cause me to *eat* seafood is a circumstance where another
> preference is weighted higher than my dislike for seafood. Such as
> starvation, or a wish not to insult a host.
>
> We are a mass of warring arbitrary preferences.
The fact that you recognize that your dislike of seafood is arbitrary should
be the clue that it does not need to remain a dislike.
I have been through this exercise, disliking foods since childhood for
irrational reasons, then discarding those prejudices when I came to the
realization that they were arbitrary. They existed because I associated
certain foods with unpleasant times, fear of the unknown, or because like
other kids, I wanted to assert my identity, and disliking certain foods is a
way to do it. It had nothing to do with the actual taste of the foods.
Denis Loubet
Thoughts and ideas are physical patterns of matter in physical brains, and
they can cause physical behaviors.
Everything is physical.
(snip)
>> Since
>> you cannot change what causes you happiness or suffering, it behooves you
>> to
>> act in a manner that furthers the happiness, and minimizes the pain.
>
> Granted that, given the assumption that what causes you happiness or
> suffering is outside your control (as it's solely a matter of physical
> events and physical laws), how can it be that your action is in any way
> in your control? So (unless behooving is some physical event, or
> physical force, or even a physical law), what does it matter how it
> behooves one to act?
Ah, I think I see your difficulty. If everything is inevitable, then what
use is advice?
Look at it this way: It is inevitable that I offer this advice. It is
inevitable that someone reads it. It is inevitable that the reader acts on
the advice. It is inevitable that his life is improved by his acting on the
advice.
At least I hope so.
But you see, each step is an inevitable chain of cause and effect. Yet
clearly someone can read my advice and act upon it. So offering advice, with
it's advantageous behooving, is a valid thing to do.
>> It is
>> advantageous to operate within the assumption that you have free will,
>> even
>> though free will is impossible.
>
> Same objection; either advantageousness is a physical phenomenon, or
> (by your dichotomy) it cannot affect behavior in any way.
Clearly someone can read my advice and act upon it even though it's all
inevitable. Cause and effect. I will play my part in the chain because I
have no choice.
(snip)
>> > Though personally, my subjective experience, that I can raise either my
>> > left or right hand, and that both were possible, and that I consciously
>> > chose which one would happen, seems to me very real.
>>
>> And I detect no application of free will in that description. It seems
>> you
>> compare your options to your preferences and reach a conclusion.
>
> Which, assuming that options and preferences are physical events, that
> they interact in a way ('comparison') that is governed by physical
> laws, makes the poster's hand-raising a purely physical event.
> However, both those assumptions are in question.
Really?
Raising the hand or not raising the hand are the options, and they are both
physical.
Preferences are patterns of matter in brains that bias it's logic.
I can program a computer to raise or lower a mechanical hand.
Everything is physical.
>> That seems
>> pretty programmatic.
>
> If there's physical evidence of a program.
My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a physical
structure in my brain.
>> > So until it is proved to me that I have no options, and that it is an
>> > illusion, I will exercise my belief that I have options, and believe in
>> > a soul, and a dualistic existence.
>>
>> That's fine. As long as you act within the assumption that you and others
>> have free will, you should be able to avoid trying to fruitlessly
>> second-guess your decisions, and thus your deterministic path through
>> life
>> should be easier than if you didn't.
>
> Completely irrelevant; future events cannot play any causative role in
> whether he assumes that he has free will or not - that assumption, on
> your account, must have been determined by past events only.
Future events cannot, but his EXPECTATION of future events can. He's a link
in the chain of cause and effect.
Dutch
> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a physical
> structure in my brain.
It's a structure over which you have control. Just as you change a structure
of ignorance by learning you can change the structure of an arbitrary food
preference by an exercise of will.
Therion Ware
On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 01:13:04 -0700 in alt.atheism, Dutch ("Dutch"
<n...@email.com>) said, directing the reply to alt.atheism
Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the fire?
Roger Johansson
Iain wrote:
> What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
> own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>
> irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
> free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
> predeterminedly unfree.
You try to see this from a scientic point of view, like it was about
physics and the properties of the physical universe.
But "free will" is a concept from the social world.
Some people have been made mentally stronger than others, so they seem
to control others will power. A hypnotist is an extreme but fully valid
example.
The shy school boy who cannot speak when he is confronted by a naked
girl is what we are really talking about.
During the school years girls are stronger and smarter than boys of the
same age. The girls have secretly been prepared by creationists, you
know, the people who create so much, like the gender roles, the eternal
love, the holy matrimony, the holy wrath, the holy spirit, the male
mind.
Later in life the boys become men, and get more social and mental power
than girls. Roles are changing in life, but it is always about social
domination, social power from hidden violence. Love based on hidden
violence feels like a drug. There is a big difference between grown-up
love and puppy love.
One of them is created by religious people, speed freaks, the other is
more natural.
You have to be very determined to have free will in this culture, that
is why it is called a deterministic universe.
But we are still talking about the social universe in a certain
cultural pattern, not the physical universe.
Practically everything you see and hear on tv is about the social life
and the psychology of the created minds of creationism. It doesn't
matter what the program seems to be about, the main theme is always
social life under the creationist system.
When two men in a movie stand and point at each other with guns, the
stress level is very high, and they stand there, sweating, threatening
each other, faced with the ultimate violence, death, they are showing a
social event, how two men meet and how they handle their minds and the
social actions.
Such a situation is impossible from a scientific, technical, military
point of view. The first one who shoots will survive so the situation
ends very quickly, in real life. In the movies or in a soap opera the
threatening, stressful situation goes on and on and on..
Because it is a social and mental training men think they need, to have
free will, they need to defend their honor when meeting other men. They
have an adrenaline based self-confidence.
--
Roger J.
Denis Loubet
"Therion Ware" <autod...@city-of-dis.com> wrote in message
news:e5jvi1519jg363o6a...@4ax.com...
Apparently Dutch thinks so.
Denis Loubet
>
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>>
>>>> Can you point out how my food choices are supposed to be free if the
>>>> preferences I use to weigh against the food options I have are imposed
>>>> and arbitrary?
>>>
>>> Those imposed taste preferences are suggestions which you are free to
>>> override.
>>
>> No. No amount of will on my part will cause me to like seafood. The only
>> thing that will cause me to *eat* seafood is a circumstance where another
>> preference is weighted higher than my dislike for seafood. Such as
>> starvation, or a wish not to insult a host.
>>
>> We are a mass of warring arbitrary preferences.
>
> The fact that you recognize that your dislike of seafood is arbitrary
> should be the clue that it does not need to remain a dislike.
Maybe you can choose to become a masochist at a whim, and suddenly enjoy
pain. I cannot.
> I have been through this exercise, disliking foods since childhood for
> irrational reasons, then discarding those prejudices when I came to the
> realization that they were arbitrary.
This does not reflect my experience. My dislike of seafood is neither
rational nor irrational, it is simply a fact.
> They existed because I associated certain foods with unpleasant times,
> fear of the unknown, or because like other kids, I wanted to assert my
> identity, and disliking certain foods is a way to do it. It had nothing to
> do with the actual taste of the foods.
I don't like the taste of seafood. Deal with it.
Denis Loubet
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>
>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>> physical structure in my brain.
>
> It's a structure over which you have control.
Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
Dutch
"Therion Ware" <autod...@city-of-dis.com> wrote
> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 01:13:04 -0700 in alt.atheism, Dutch ("Dutch"
> <n...@email.com>) said, directing the reply to alt.atheism
>>"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>> No. No amount of will on my part will cause me to like seafood.
>>
>>You are wrong, that is a choice you are making. There is nothing inherent
>>in
>>seafood or in you that causes you to dislike it, you accepted that value
>>judgment long ago and it has become reality for you. You can overcome it
>>if
>>you want to.
>
> Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the fire?
That is a very poor analogy, fire causes severe pain and immediate tissue
damage, and we are hard-wired as living organisms to recoil from physical
injury. A better analogy; if he detests football could he train himself to
enjoy it? The answer is yes. It is the same principle as people who have
fears from childhood that they overcome. When I met my wife she had phobias
about bugs and water. Now she can let a bee walk about on her without
flinching, and we enjoy deep-sea fishing and scuba diving.
Dutch
>> Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the fire?
>
> Apparently Dutch thinks so.
Exposing yourself to harm is not comparable to learning to appreciate some
food which you "arbitrarily" decided to dislike. There is nothing arbitrary
about avoiding physical injury.
I am right about this.
someone4
>>>>What mean we by "free will"? People always say "The ability to make our
>>>>own decisions" and "are we responsible", etc, etc.
>>>someone4 wrote:
>>>> Personally I would call it our experience that events A and B were both
>>>> possible before we chose between them, i.e. we are free to will which
>>>> will happen.
>> Denis Loubet wrote:
>>>And so the question is: Are we?
somone4 wrote:
> I don't know, and neither do you. I believe we are.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>I have evidence that my choices are not free. I have no evidence that they
>are. I thus conclude that they are not free, until such time as new data
>indicates the contrary.
What evidence do you have?
>>>> Iain wrote:
>>>>>They also tie it in with predetermination or lack of it. This is
>>>>>irrelevant; Even if there is no predetermination, this does not entail
>>>>>free will, because minds could still be randomly unfree instead of
>>>>>predeterminedly unfree.
>>>someone4 wrote:
>>>> That is correct, if you only consider causes within the physical plane.
>> Denis Loubet wrote:
>>>That is all we have evidence for.
>someone4 wrote:
>> We have the subjective very real evidence that we experience awareness,
>> which we cannot even begin to explain in terms of the physical plane.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>But we can manipulate that subjective awareness through physical means. For
>instance, a surgeon can cut out the speech center of your brain, and
>suddenly you can no longer even think in words. I consider that sufficent
>justification for concluding that speech is a bit of perfectly physical grey
>matter.
Have you a link for that?
I was talking about our awareness. I would consider the brain soul idea
to be analogous to the terminator in the terminator movie. The
terminator is sentient (this would be analogous to the soul), but it
also has non-sentient systems that give it information, that it then
chooses what to do with.
You have no explanation for how matter can be aware, there is no
concept of awareness in any physical theory.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Do you have similarly convincing evidence to support a non-physical plane?
That I am aware.
>>>someone4 wrote:
>>>> If you consider the concept of a soul, then it explains how we are
>>>> experience a subjective awareness (are conscious), and our subjective
>>>> experience that A and B were both possible before we chose between
>>>> them.
>> Denis Loubet wrote:
>>>Yes, we can make-up stuff to justify anything.
>someone4 wrote:
>> All explanations are made up.
Denis Loubet wrote:
>Then we have nothing further to discuss.
Fine.
Dutch
>
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>>
>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>>>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>>>
>>>>> Can you point out how my food choices are supposed to be free if the
>>>>> preferences I use to weigh against the food options I have are imposed
>>>>> and arbitrary?
>>>>
>>>> Those imposed taste preferences are suggestions which you are free to
>>>> override.
>>>
>>> No. No amount of will on my part will cause me to like seafood. The only
>>> thing that will cause me to *eat* seafood is a circumstance where
>>> another preference is weighted higher than my dislike for seafood. Such
>>> as starvation, or a wish not to insult a host.
>>>
>>> We are a mass of warring arbitrary preferences.
>>
>> The fact that you recognize that your dislike of seafood is arbitrary
>> should be the clue that it does not need to remain a dislike.
>
> Maybe you can choose to become a masochist at a whim, and suddenly enjoy
> pain. I cannot.
Assuming that the pain is under controlled non-injurious conditions, such as
erotic spanking, yes you could.
>> I have been through this exercise, disliking foods since childhood for
>> irrational reasons, then discarding those prejudices when I came to the
>> realization that they were arbitrary.
>
> This does not reflect my experience. My dislike of seafood is neither
> rational nor irrational, it is simply a fact.
It is real, but it is a choice.
>> They existed because I associated certain foods with unpleasant times,
>> fear of the unknown, or because like other kids, I wanted to assert my
>> identity, and disliking certain foods is a way to do it. It had nothing
>> to do with the actual taste of the foods.
>
> I don't like the taste of seafood. Deal with it.
That's fine, but it's not written in stone, it's a choice you have made. I
submit that if you were placed in circumstances where you had to eat seafood
to survive that you would not only do so, but you would very quickly learn
to enjoy the delicate flavours it offers and would continue to enjoy it
thereafter, even when other foods became available.
Do you dislike football? Opera? What other things do you dislike? With few
exceptions, they could become passions if you chose to make them so.
Dutch
"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>
>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>
> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
Unless your brain is wired in some bizarre, unique fashion then I can
extrapolate this principle to you. Brain connections are destroyed and new
ones created all the time, that's what learning is. You are becoming
defensive because you have chosen to make a dislike of seafood as a
permanent part of your identity, and you perceive that identity as being
threatened. You also seem to have adopted a "no-free-will" philosophy that
is hindering your cognitive development. The ability to adapt at will is a
much more useful capacity to identify with than fixed arbitrary positions.
Denis Loubet
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>
>>> Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the fire?
>>
>> Apparently Dutch thinks so.
>
> Exposing yourself to harm is not comparable to learning to appreciate some
> food which you "arbitrarily" decided to dislike.
Excuse me, I did not choose to dislike seafood. You don't fucking get to
tell me different.
> There is nothing arbitrary about avoiding physical injury.
>
> I am right about this.
Prove it.
Denis Loubet
>
> "Therion Ware" <autod...@city-of-dis.com> wrote
>
>> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 01:13:04 -0700 in alt.atheism, Dutch ("Dutch"
>> <n...@email.com>) said, directing the reply to alt.atheism
>>>"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>
>>>> No. No amount of will on my part will cause me to like seafood.
>>>
>>>You are wrong, that is a choice you are making. There is nothing inherent
>>>in
>>>seafood or in you that causes you to dislike it, you accepted that value
>>>judgment long ago and it has become reality for you. You can overcome it
>>>if
>>>you want to.
>>
>> Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the fire?
>
> That is a very poor analogy, fire causes severe pain and immediate tissue
> damage, and we are hard-wired as living organisms to recoil from physical
> injury.
And we are hard wired to avoid certain tastes. There are tastes that are
universally avoided.
> A better analogy; if he detests football could he train himself to enjoy
> it? The answer is yes.
Only through the use of a competeing preference. Only if football were
preferable to the alternatives.
> It is the same principle as people who have fears from childhood that they
> overcome.
Because the alternatives are preferable to the fear. The alternative
preferences are no less imposed.
> When I met my wife she had phobias about bugs and water. Now she can let a
> bee walk about on her without flinching, and we enjoy deep-sea fishing and
> scuba diving.
How nice for you. Obviously the preference to overcome the phobia was
weighted higher than the phobia itself. But the preference to overcome the
phobia is no less imposed than the phobia itself.
Dutch
"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>>>> Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the fire?
>>>
>>> Apparently Dutch thinks so.
>>
>> Exposing yourself to harm is not comparable to learning to appreciate
>> some food which you "arbitrarily" decided to dislike.
>
> Excuse me, I did not choose to dislike seafood.
Yes you did, it's exactly what you did. You said it yourself, "We are a mass
of warring arbitrary preferences".
"arbitrary preferences" Your dislike of seafood was probably originally
based on the fact that it tastes "different" than other meats. This dislike
formed a neural pathway. Rather than attempting to cultivate a taste for
seafood, you subsequently decided that this preference was immutable, this
decision keeps that pathway regenerating in the same form. This serves some
other need in you, for permanence perhaps, so there's no impetus to change
it.
> You don't fucking get to tell me different.
Sure I do.
>> There is nothing arbitrary about avoiding physical injury.
>>
>> I am right about this.
>
> Prove it.
I need your cooperation for that, I don't anticipate getting it. You are
content with your illusion of powerlessness, so be it.
Dutch
>
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message
> news:11j0q54...@news.supernews.com...
>>
>> "Therion Ware" <autod...@city-of-dis.com> wrote
>>
>>> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 01:13:04 -0700 in alt.atheism, Dutch ("Dutch"
>>> <n...@email.com>) said, directing the reply to alt.atheism
>>>>"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>
>>>>> No. No amount of will on my part will cause me to like seafood.
>>>>
>>>>You are wrong, that is a choice you are making. There is nothing
>>>>inherent in
>>>>seafood or in you that causes you to dislike it, you accepted that value
>>>>judgment long ago and it has become reality for you. You can overcome it
>>>>if
>>>>you want to.
>>>
>>> Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the fire?
>>
>> That is a very poor analogy, fire causes severe pain and immediate tissue
>> damage, and we are hard-wired as living organisms to recoil from physical
>> injury.
>
> And we are hard wired to avoid certain tastes. There are tastes that are
> universally avoided.
Seafood is not one of them, homo sapiens in fact originally thrived and
developed above all other primates based on a taste for seafood.
>> A better analogy; if he detests football could he train himself to enjoy
>> it? The answer is yes.
>
> Only through the use of a competeing preference. Only if football were
> preferable to the alternatives.
That doesn't matter, if you wanted to develop an appreciation for football
you could, of your own free will, and it would be a genuine appreciation.
>> It is the same principle as people who have fears from childhood that
>> they overcome.
>
> Because the alternatives are preferable to the fear.
Yes, choosing the enlightened path instead of remaining a victim of
arbitrary fears or dislikes.
> The alternative preferences are no less imposed.
Self-imposed. Adults learn to abandon imposed preferences and develop ones
of their own choosing.
>> When I met my wife she had phobias about bugs and water. Now she can let
>> a bee walk about on her without flinching, and we enjoy deep-sea fishing
>> and scuba diving.
>
> How nice for you.
Indeed! Those are FUN activities.
> Obviously the preference to overcome the phobia was weighted higher than
> the phobia itself.
Fine, that means that she had the ability to discard a dislike/fear and
replace with a like for the same thing. Call it self-actualization or
self-awarness if you want to hang a label on it.
> But the preference to overcome the phobia is no less imposed than the
> phobia itself.
Imposed by who or what? Her rational adult mind, in the interest of
appreciating and valuing as many things in life as possible,
recognizing that it was a *choice* to fear bugs, *chose* to discard the fear
and replace it with fascination, respect, and interest.
Denis Loubet
>
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>
>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>
>>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>>
>>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>>
>> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
>
> Unless your brain is wired in some bizarre, unique fashion then I can
> extrapolate this principle to you.
If you had started the sentence with the word "Perhaps", I would have had no
problem.
> Brain connections are destroyed and new ones created all the time, that's
> what learning is.
Yes.
> You are becoming defensive because you
Fuck you again, please.
> have chosen to make a dislike of seafood as a permanent part of your
> identity,
Please quote where I have suggested permanence.
> and you perceive that identity as being threatened.
Well, you are directly contradicting my description of my subjective state
of which you know nothing. May I make arbitrary claims about yours too?
> You also seem to have adopted a "no-free-will" philosophy that is
> hindering your cognitive development.
This observation I have no problem with. You used the word "seem". I happen
to think you're wrong, but since I have been wrong in the past, I could
easily be wrong now.
> The ability to adapt at will is a much more useful capacity to identify
> with than fixed arbitrary positions.
At present my dislike of seafood is fixed. Circumstances could force a
change in that dislike. But that would mean I am slaved to circumstance, a
view which I happen to agree with.
turtoni
>
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message
> news:11ivjdk...@news.supernews.com...
>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>
>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>
>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>
> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
i'd agree with dutch that our tastes are conditioned.
but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste for
seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
realistically it's probably because you already have such an array of
options to choose from that you that you lack the desire/drive/energy to be
bothered to cultivate a taste for seafood.
dutch may actually be displaying an identity threatened because he doesnt
like the fact that you dont like seafood. for example, if dutch is actually
dutch (from the nerthlands) i know they highly prize eatting seafood and
even enjoying swallowing raw herring which to outsiders is likely to be a
digusting idea and therefore up for mockery...
turtoni
Dutch
>> have chosen to make a dislike of seafood as a permanent part of your
>> identity,
>
> Please quote where I have suggested permanence.
Since you believe that your dislike of seafood is beyond your control that
would make it permanent, since no outside force is likely to come along to
change it.
>> and you perceive that identity as being threatened.
>
> Well, you are directly contradicting my description of my subjective state
> of which you know nothing. May I make arbitrary claims about yours too?
I am postulating a possible explanation for your perception that your
preferences are beyond your control.
[..]
> At present my dislike of seafood is fixed. Circumstances could force a
> change in that dislike. But that would mean I am slaved to circumstance, a
> view which I happen to agree with.
If you can imagine some external circumstance imposing a change in your
preferences why do you find it difficult to imagine changing them of your
own volition? Why do you give external forces more control over something as
personal as your own tastes and deny any autonomy over them?
I would agree that outside circumstances or suggestions may influence my
decision to change my views, ideas or preferences, but it is I who
ultimately does it.
Dutch
"turtoni" <tur...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:HKudnQOlG45...@comcast.com...
>
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in message
> news:MMSdnUzQ_ud...@io.com...
>>
>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message
>> news:11ivjdk...@news.supernews.com...
>>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>>
>>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>>
>>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>>
>> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
>
> i'd agree with dutch that our tastes are conditioned.
He and I both believe that. My view is that the child's mind perceives
conditioning as coming entirely from the outside, while the adult realizes
that while there are outside *influences*, it is always *I* who consents to
adopting a preference.
> but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste for
> seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
He is defending a position of no-free-will, therefore the idea that he can
choose his own preferences, tastes, likes or dislikes, threatens his basic
philosophical position, therefore his identity
> realistically it's probably because you already have such an array of
> options to choose from that you that you lack the desire/drive/energy to
> be bothered to cultivate a taste for seafood.
Exactly. That confirms my position that tastes can be developed, dislikes
turned into likes by conscious acts. We do not need to wait for some act of
God to force us to change them.
> dutch may actually be displaying an identity threatened because he doesnt
> like the fact that you dont like seafood. for example, if dutch is
> actually dutch (from the nerthlands) i know they highly prize eatting
> seafood and even enjoying swallowing raw herring which to outsiders is
> likely to be a digusting idea and therefore up for mockery...
Now you are being the armchair psychoanalyst. I'm not Dutch, and my identity
is not threatened by other people's tastes, I am simply trying to tell this
fine person that he is not as powerless as he imagines.
turtoni
>
> "turtoni" <tur...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:HKudnQOlG45...@comcast.com...
>>
>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in message
>> news:MMSdnUzQ_ud...@io.com...
>>>
>>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message
>>> news:11ivjdk...@news.supernews.com...
>>>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>>>
>>>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>>>
>>>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>>>
>>> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
>>
>> i'd agree with dutch that our tastes are conditioned.
>
> He and I both believe that. My view is that the child's mind perceives
> conditioning as coming entirely from the outside, while the adult realizes
> that while there are outside *influences*, it is always *I* who consents
> to adopting a preference.
children quickly learn that they have choices. choices dont necessary equate
to having free will.
>> but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste for
>> seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
>
> He is defending a position of no-free-will, therefore the idea that he can
> choose his own preferences, tastes, likes or dislikes, threatens his basic
> philosophical position, therefore his identity
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviourism
>> realistically it's probably because you already have such an array of
>> options to choose from that you that you lack the desire/drive/energy to
>> be bothered to cultivate a taste for seafood.
>
> Exactly. That confirms my position that tastes can be developed, dislikes
> turned into likes by conscious acts. We do not need to wait for some act
> of God to force us to change them.
but the environment also steers and condtions our behavior. in fact more so
than we might realize and therefore in some sense we don't have much in the
way of free will because we're pretty much fundamentally driven to not have
free will by our superego's for survivals sake. saying that you can choose
to eat fish is nice but hardly any great sign of free will.
>> dutch may actually be displaying an identity threatened because he doesnt
>> like the fact that you dont like seafood. for example, if dutch is
>> actually dutch (from the netherlands) i know they highly prize eating
>> seafood and even enjoying swallowing raw herring which to outsiders is
>> likely to be a disgusting idea and therefore up for mockery...
> Now you are being the armchair psychoanalyst. I'm not Dutch, and my
> identity is not threatened by other people's tastes, I am simply trying to
> tell this fine person that he is not as powerless as he imagines.
having "no-free-will" doesnt mean that we are powerless. it probably just
means that we're not crazy ;-)
turtoni
Denis Loubet
>
> "turtoni" <tur...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:HKudnQOlG45...@comcast.com...
>>
>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote in message
>> news:MMSdnUzQ_ud...@io.com...
>>>
>>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message
>>> news:11ivjdk...@news.supernews.com...
>>>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>>>
>>>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>>>
>>>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>>>
>>> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
>>
>> i'd agree with dutch that our tastes are conditioned.
>
> He and I both believe that. My view is that the child's mind perceives
> conditioning as coming entirely from the outside, while the adult realizes
> that while there are outside *influences*, it is always *I* who consents
> to adopting a preference.
What causes you to adopt a preference? If you present an argument that
convinces me to enjoy seafood, you've merely presented a conflicting
preference that overpowers the first. I'm still a puppet.
>> but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste for
>> seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
>
> He is defending a position of no-free-will, therefore the idea that he can
> choose his own preferences, tastes, likes or dislikes, threatens his basic
> philosophical position, therefore his identity
Fuck you. I would LOVE to have free will. That would be an awesome thing.
But unfortunately I am just a machine. I happen to be made of meat rather
than metal, and my gears and cogs are molecular in size, but that doesn't
change the fact that I am a machine.
As a machine, the operation of my gears and cogs allow no room for the
ad-libs of free will. No room for the magic you insist occurs.
>> realistically it's probably because you already have such an array of
>> options to choose from that you that you lack the desire/drive/energy to
>> be bothered to cultivate a taste for seafood.
>
> Exactly. That confirms my position that tastes can be developed, dislikes
> turned into likes by conscious acts. We do not need to wait for some act
> of God to force us to change them.
The conscious act of changing a preference is ITSELF the result of likes and
dislikes imposed by circumstance. You can't escape it.
>> dutch may actually be displaying an identity threatened because he doesnt
>> like the fact that you dont like seafood. for example, if dutch is
>> actually dutch (from the nerthlands) i know they highly prize eatting
>> seafood and even enjoying swallowing raw herring which to outsiders is
>> likely to be a digusting idea and therefore up for mockery...
>
> Now you are being the armchair psychoanalyst.
Oh, and you HAVEN'T been?
> I'm not Dutch, and my identity is not threatened by other people's tastes,
Ah, so you claim, but I can just employ the rhetorical tactic you are so
fond of and simply contradict you: In fact your identity IS threatened by
other peoples tastes, you ARE from the Netherlands, and you ARE an armchair
psychoanalyst. Your protestations to the contrary are just a pathetic
defensive mechanism designed to protect your superstitious desire for free
will from the overwhelming evidence of your machine-hood, which you know is
true.
> I am simply trying to tell this fine person that he is not as powerless as
> he imagines.
As well as presuming to decree what my subjective state **really** is.
Denis Loubet
>
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>
>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>
>>> have chosen to make a dislike of seafood as a permanent part of your
>>> identity,
>>
>> Please quote where I have suggested permanence.
>
> Since you believe that your dislike of seafood is beyond your control that
> would make it permanent, since no outside force is likely to come along to
> change it.
Nonsense. External and internal circumstances can change preference weights.
But the change depends on other other imposed preferences overwhelming the
first. You can't escape your preferences.
>>> and you perceive that identity as being threatened.
>>
>> Well, you are directly contradicting my description of my subjective
>> state of which you know nothing. May I make arbitrary claims about yours
>> too?
>
> I am postulating a possible explanation for your perception that your
> preferences are beyond your control.
They can only change by being supplanted by OTHER imposed preferences. The
motive to change a preference is itself an imposition.
>> At present my dislike of seafood is fixed. Circumstances could force a
>> change in that dislike. But that would mean I am slaved to circumstance,
>> a view which I happen to agree with.
>
> If you can imagine some external circumstance imposing a change in your
> preferences why do you find it difficult to imagine changing them of your
> own volition?
Because there's NO SUCH THING AS VOLITION. What you call volition is a
machine-like comparison of preferences to options. You compare the benefits
of changing your preference against your preferences. For instance, I would
like to enjoy seafood because I could then enjoy it with my friends.
Currently my imposed aversion to seafood precludes that. But if the
preference to enjoy it with my friends overwhelms the aversion, then I can
enjoy it with my friends. This requires that there exist a circumstance that
changes the weighting of those preferences.
> Why do you give external forces more control over something as personal as
> your own tastes and deny any autonomy over them?
Because I never chose to dislike seafood. The circumstances that imposed
that dislike upon me were not of my choice.
> I would agree that outside circumstances or suggestions may influence my
> decision to change my views, ideas or preferences, but it is I who
> ultimately does it.
So you do NOT compare preferences to options to reach a decision? Somehow
this "I" you're talking about just magically reveals your decision to you,
independant of any conscious evaluation?
Denis Loubet
>
> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>
>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>
>
>>>>> Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the fire?
>>>>
>>>> Apparently Dutch thinks so.
>>>
>>> Exposing yourself to harm is not comparable to learning to appreciate
>>> some food which you "arbitrarily" decided to dislike.
>>
>> Excuse me, I did not choose to dislike seafood.
>
> Yes you did, it's exactly what you did. You said it yourself, "We are a
> mass of warring arbitrary preferences".
I fail to see the relevance. And stop *telling* me what the fuck I did.
> "arbitrary preferences" Your dislike of seafood was probably originally
> based on the fact that it tastes "different" than other meats. This
> dislike formed a neural pathway.
That could very well be so.
> Rather than attempting to cultivate a taste for seafood,
That was not an option once the neural pathway was formed. If a cultivated
taste did not exist, then a cultivated taste was not a presented option.
> you subsequently decided that this preference was immutable,
There was no reason to presume otherwise.
> this decision keeps that pathway regenerating in the same form. This
> serves some other need in you, for permanence perhaps, so there's no
> impetus to change it.
Irrelevant. Since no options were provided, no choice was made. And the
pathway was, in this illustration, the result of circumstances, as was any
subsequent lack of motive to change the pathway.
Denis Loubet
No, that's the main issue that you refuse to comprehend.
> if you wanted
Wanted? That would be a PREFERENCE, wouldn't it? Why yes, it would. Where
did THAT preference come from? The circumstance of a convincing external
argument? The circumstance of football being the only entertainment on
television for some reason?
> to develop an appreciation for football you could, of your own free will,
> and it would be a genuine appreciation.
No. "Your own free will" is just circumstance causing a change in preference
weighting.
>>> It is the same principle as people who have fears from childhood that
>>> they overcome.
>>
>> Because the alternatives are preferable to the fear.
>
> Yes, choosing the enlightened path instead of remaining a victim of
> arbitrary fears or dislikes.
Choosing the "enlightened" path is just another example of comparing
arbitrary preferences to the options. It's mechanical.
>> The alternative preferences are no less imposed.
>
> Self-imposed. Adults learn to abandon imposed preferences and develop ones
> of their own choosing.
I can see your ego is tied up in this.
>>> When I met my wife she had phobias about bugs and water. Now she can let
>>> a bee walk about on her without flinching, and we enjoy deep-sea fishing
>>> and scuba diving.
>>
>> How nice for you.
>
> Indeed! Those are FUN activities.
Yes, it certainly sounds fun.
>> Obviously the preference to overcome the phobia was weighted higher than
>> the phobia itself.
>
> Fine, that means that she had the ability to discard a dislike/fear and
> replace with a like for the same thing.
No, circumstance dictated that ability.
> Call it self-actualization or self-awarness if you want to hang a label on
> it.
Call it circumstance.
>> But the preference to overcome the phobia is no less imposed than the
>> phobia itself.
>
> Imposed by who or what?
Circumstance.
> Her rational adult mind, in the interest of appreciating and valuing as
> many things in life as possible,
> recognizing that it was a *choice* to fear bugs, *chose* to discard the
> fear and replace it with fascination, respect, and interest.
This is a description of someone comparing preferences to options and
grinding out a conclusion. This is just like me comparing my food
preferences to a seafood menu and grinding out the conclusion that I'll have
the chicken. The only difference is complexity, since food choices are a lot
less complex than lifestyle choices.
Dutch
"turtoni" <tur...@comcast.net> wrote
>
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
[..]
>>>>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>>>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>>>>
>>>>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>>>>
>>>> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
>>>
>>> i'd agree with dutch that our tastes are conditioned.
>>
>> He and I both believe that. My view is that the child's mind perceives
>> conditioning as coming entirely from the outside, while the adult
>> realizes that while there are outside *influences*, it is always *I* who
>> consents to adopting a preference.
>
> children quickly learn that they have choices.
In some ways, but they often perceive many of their choices as absolute
facts.
> choices dont necessary equate to having free will.
True enough, but they can be a indicator of it.
>>> but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste for
>>> seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
>>
>> He is defending a position of no-free-will, therefore the idea that he
>> can choose his own preferences, tastes, likes or dislikes, threatens his
>> basic philosophical position, therefore his identity
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviourism
>
>>> realistically it's probably because you already have such an array of
>>> options to choose from that you that you lack the desire/drive/energy to
>>> be bothered to cultivate a taste for seafood.
>>
>> Exactly. That confirms my position that tastes can be developed, dislikes
>> turned into likes by conscious acts. We do not need to wait for some act
>> of God to force us to change them.
>
> but the environment also steers and condtions our behavior. in fact more
> so than we might realize and therefore in some sense we don't have much in
> the way of free will because we're pretty much fundamentally driven to not
> have free will by our superego's for survivals sake. saying that you can
> choose to eat fish is nice but hardly any great sign of free will.
It's easy enough to obfuscate a discussion into irrelevance, but this is the
context we have and the question is, are likes and dislikes, particularly
food, facts or choices?
>>> dutch may actually be displaying an identity threatened because he
>>> doesnt like the fact that you dont like seafood. for example, if dutch
>>> is actually dutch (from the netherlands) i know they highly prize eating
>>> seafood and even enjoying swallowing raw herring which to outsiders is
>>> likely to be a disgusting idea and therefore up for mockery...
>
>> Now you are being the armchair psychoanalyst. I'm not Dutch, and my
>> identity is not threatened by other people's tastes, I am simply trying
>> to tell this fine person that he is not as powerless as he imagines.
>
> having "no-free-will" doesnt mean that we are powerless. it probably just
> means that we're not crazy ;-)
Saying we have no free will sounds like a fashionable way to avoid
responsibility.
Dutch
"Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
[..]
> What causes you to adopt a preference?
Could be any number of things.. maybe I wanted to appear sophisticated,
maybe I wanted to please my parents, maybe I wanted to taste as many of the
varied joys of life as I could. Some of those reasons reflect being like a
puppet of one's environment, others reflect being a conscious actor in it.
> If you present an argument that convinces me to enjoy seafood, you've
> merely presented a conflicting preference that overpowers the first. I'm
> still a puppet.
I'm not trying to convince you enjoy seafood, I am trying to convince that
you could decide to enjoy it if you wanted to. That makes you in that
instance the puppeteer of your own puppet show. You can decide to NOT bother
to aquire the taste because it's too much trouble, but just knowing that you
can exercise the choice makes you the puppeteer.
>>> but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste for
>>> seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
>>
>> He is defending a position of no-free-will, therefore the idea that he
>> can choose his own preferences, tastes, likes or dislikes, threatens his
>> basic philosophical position, therefore his identity
>
> Fuck you. I would LOVE to have free will. That would be an awesome thing.
> But unfortunately I am just a machine. I happen to be made of meat rather
> than metal, and my gears and cogs are molecular in size, but that doesn't
> change the fact that I am a machine.
You are more than a machine, you are a living organism with a highly
developed sense of self-awareness. No machine has that.
> As a machine, the operation of my gears and cogs allow no room for the
> ad-libs of free will. No room for the magic you insist occurs.
Lots of our responses are scripted and automatic, but there is plenty of
room between the lines for freedom of choice. You could decide out of the
blue to learn to play the classical guitar or sing, just for the fun of it.
>>> realistically it's probably because you already have such an array of
>>> options to choose from that you that you lack the desire/drive/energy to
>>> be bothered to cultivate a taste for seafood.
>>
>> Exactly. That confirms my position that tastes can be developed, dislikes
>> turned into likes by conscious acts. We do not need to wait for some act
>> of God to force us to change them.
>
> The conscious act of changing a preference is ITSELF the result of likes
> and dislikes imposed by circumstance. You can't escape it.
You are confusing acting within the context of the world and being utterly
controlled by that world.
>>> dutch may actually be displaying an identity threatened because he
>>> doesnt like the fact that you dont like seafood. for example, if dutch
>>> is actually dutch (from the nerthlands) i know they highly prize eatting
>>> seafood and even enjoying swallowing raw herring which to outsiders is
>>> likely to be a digusting idea and therefore up for mockery...
>>
>> Now you are being the armchair psychoanalyst.
>
> Oh, and you HAVEN'T been?
Yes I do have that habit, I thought that was implied in that statement.
>> I'm not Dutch, and my identity is not threatened by other people's
>> tastes,
>
> Ah, so you claim, but I can just employ the rhetorical tactic you are so
> fond of and simply contradict you: In fact your identity IS threatened by
> other peoples tastes, you ARE from the Netherlands, and you ARE an
> armchair psychoanalyst. Your protestations to the contrary are just a
> pathetic defensive mechanism designed to protect your superstitious desire
> for free will from the overwhelming evidence of your machine-hood, which
> you know is true.
OK, remain a powerless automaton, it's no skin off my nose. I prefer to
exercise choice whenever I can.
>> I am simply trying to tell this fine person that he is not as powerless
>> as he imagines.
>
> As well as presuming to decree what my subjective state **really** is.
Did you exercise any choice in making that statement, or was it just the
noise of the machine?
Dutch
>
> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message
> news:11j1d2h...@news.supernews.com...
>>
>> "Denis Loubet" <dlo...@io.com> wrote
>>>
>>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>>
>>>> have chosen to make a dislike of seafood as a permanent part of your
>>>> identity,
>>>
>>> Please quote where I have suggested permanence.
>>
>> Since you believe that your dislike of seafood is beyond your control
>> that would make it permanent, since no outside force is likely to come
>> along to change it.
>
> Nonsense. External and internal circumstances can change preference
> weights. But the change depends on other other imposed preferences
> overwhelming the first. You can't escape your preferences.
What is the external source of a desire to taste life?
>>>> and you perceive that identity as being threatened.
>>>
>>> Well, you are directly contradicting my description of my subjective
>>> state of which you know nothing. May I make arbitrary claims about yours
>>> too?
>>
>> I am postulating a possible explanation for your perception that your
>> preferences are beyond your control.
>
> They can only change by being supplanted by OTHER imposed preferences. The
> motive to change a preference is itself an imposition.
If it comes from within yourself then by definition it is not imposed. The
*idea* that one can choose may be learned, but a decision to choose can be
made autonomously.
>>> At present my dislike of seafood is fixed. Circumstances could force a
>>> change in that dislike. But that would mean I am slaved to circumstance,
>>> a view which I happen to agree with.
>>
>> If you can imagine some external circumstance imposing a change in your
>> preferences why do you find it difficult to imagine changing them of your
>> own volition?
>
> Because there's NO SUCH THING AS VOLITION.
The why is there a word volition?
> What you call volition is a machine-like comparison of preferences to
> options. You compare the benefits of changing your preference against your
> preferences. For instance, I would like to enjoy seafood because I could
> then enjoy it with my friends.
Why don't you try it? Order some mild filet of sole in a delicate sauce,
have some nice white wine, asparagus tips and wild rice. Tell yourself that
are going to enjoy the meal. Don't you believe that it might work?
> Currently my imposed aversion to seafood precludes that. But if the
> preference to enjoy it with my friends overwhelms the aversion, then I can
> enjoy it with my friends. This requires that there exist a circumstance
> that changes the weighting of those preferences.
The circumstance already exists, you. I submit that YOU decide what weight
you place on various outcomes then you act accordingly. In this case it
requires probably some gradual steps to overcome the aversion, cultivate the
taste until change occurs. You must place considerable value on this idea
that you are a machine or puppet controlled by external forces, which makes
it unlikely that you would initiate a course of action which might result in
this change.
>> Why do you give external forces more control over something as personal
>> as your own tastes and deny any autonomy over them?
>
> Because I never chose to dislike seafood. The circumstances that imposed
> that dislike upon me were not of my choice.
I believe that, but those circumstances only have the power that you give
them. Maintaining the status quo in fact is also an act of free will.
>> I would agree that outside circumstances or suggestions may influence my
>> decision to change my views, ideas or preferences, but it is I who
>> ultimately does it.
>
> So you do NOT compare preferences to options to reach a decision? Somehow
> this "I" you're talking about just magically reveals your decision to you,
> independant of any conscious evaluation?
I can't see how you get that from what I said. We live in a world of outside
influences and circumstances not of our own making. We depend on them for
our very existence, we make decisions within this context even those
decisions are to allow others to make all our choices for us.
Dutch
[..]
>>>>>> Do you think Denis could learn to enjoy sticking his hand in the
>>>>>> fire?
>>>>>
>>>>> Apparently Dutch thinks so.
>>>>
>>>> Exposing yourself to harm is not comparable to learning to appreciate
>>>> some food which you "arbitrarily" decided to dislike.
>>>
>>> Excuse me, I did not choose to dislike seafood.
>>
>> Yes you did, it's exactly what you did. You said it yourself, "We are a
>> mass of warring arbitrary preferences".
>
> I fail to see the relevance. And stop *telling* me what the fuck I did.
Sorry, it's not personal, I see choices everywhere. Women who stay in
abusive relationships are making a choice, addicts who slowly kill
themselves are making a choice. People who go work, race cars or to baseball
games are making a choice. As I said before, even the choice to give up
personal autonomy is a choice.
>> "arbitrary preferences" Your dislike of seafood was probably originally
>> based on the fact that it tastes "different" than other meats. This
>> dislike formed a neural pathway.
>
> That could very well be so.
>
>> Rather than attempting to cultivate a taste for seafood,
>
> That was not an option once the neural pathway was formed. If a cultivated
> taste did not exist, then a cultivated taste was not a presented option.
Cultivating a taste for a food is an exercise, like learning the scales on a
piano, not an option that would have been handed to you on a platter.
>> you subsequently decided that this preference was immutable,
>
> There was no reason to presume otherwise.
There was no reason to presume it is either.
>> this decision keeps that pathway regenerating in the same form. This
>> serves some other need in you, for permanence perhaps, so there's no
>> impetus to change it.
>
> Irrelevant. Since no options were provided, no choice was made.
I am informing you of the option now.
And the
> pathway was, in this illustration, the result of circumstances, as was any
> subsequent lack of motive to change the pathway.
The decision to protect the old pathway and not build a new one is also a
choice. The most powerful force in your dislike of seafood is not the
chemicals in seafood or some property of your tastebuds, it is your belief
that you dislike it.
Dutch
>>> And we are hard wired to avoid certain tastes. There are tastes that are
>>> universally avoided.
>>
>> Seafood is not one of them, homo sapiens in fact originally thrived and
>> developed above all other primates based on a taste for seafood.
>>
>>>> A better analogy; if he detests football could he train himself to
>>>> enjoy it? The answer is yes.
>>>
>>> Only through the use of a competeing preference. Only if football were
>>> preferable to the alternatives.
>>
>> That doesn't matter,
>
> No, that's the main issue that you refuse to comprehend.
It's not the main issue, there are always circumstances in life. The issue
is how we react to them.
>> if you wanted
>
> Wanted? That would be a PREFERENCE, wouldn't it? Why yes, it would. Where
> did THAT preference come from? The circumstance of a convincing external
> argument? The circumstance of football being the only entertainment on
> television for some reason?
Those are just circumstances, none of which matter unless YOU decide that
it's what you want, OR you decide to give up your autonomy to someone or
something else.
>> to develop an appreciation for football you could, of your own free will,
>> and it would be a genuine appreciation.
>
> No. "Your own free will" is just circumstance causing a change in
> preference weighting.
Whose preference weighting? If you are weighing different options and
choosing the one you prefer then you are exercising free choice.
>>>> It is the same principle as people who have fears from childhood that
>>>> they overcome.
>>>
>>> Because the alternatives are preferable to the fear.
>>
>> Yes, choosing the enlightened path instead of remaining a victim of
>> arbitrary fears or dislikes.
>
> Choosing the "enlightened" path is just another example of comparing
> arbitrary preferences to the options. It's mechanical.
It's giving yourself the power to choose among all the available options,
rather than choosing to say that due to some external force seafood is off
the menu for me.
>>> The alternative preferences are no less imposed.
>>
>> Self-imposed. Adults learn to abandon imposed preferences and develop
>> ones of their own choosing.
>
> I can see your ego is tied up in this.
Of course, all of our egos are involved.
>>>> When I met my wife she had phobias about bugs and water. Now she can
>>>> let a bee walk about on her without flinching, and we enjoy deep-sea
>>>> fishing and scuba diving.
>>>
>>> How nice for you.
>>
>> Indeed! Those are FUN activities.
>
> Yes, it certainly sounds fun.
>
>>> Obviously the preference to overcome the phobia was weighted higher than
>>> the phobia itself.
>>
>> Fine, that means that she had the ability to discard a dislike/fear and
>> replace with a like for the same thing.
>
> No, circumstance dictated that ability.
She always had the ability, she just failed to recognize it.
>> Call it self-actualization or self-awarness if you want to hang a label
>> on it.
>
> Call it circumstance.
Circumstance did not give her the ability to choose to overcome her fears,
it showed her that it was possible, as I am doing now.
>>> But the preference to overcome the phobia is no less imposed than the
>>> phobia itself.
>>
>> Imposed by who or what?
>
> Circumstance.
>
>> Her rational adult mind, in the interest of appreciating and valuing as
>> many things in life as possible,
>> recognizing that it was a *choice* to fear bugs, *chose* to discard the
>> fear and replace it with fascination, respect, and interest.
>
> This is a description of someone comparing preferences to options and
> grinding out a conclusion. This is just like me comparing my food
> preferences to a seafood menu and grinding out the conclusion that I'll
> have the chicken. The only difference is complexity, since food choices
> are a lot less complex than lifestyle choices.
The significant point is that part of the menu is off limits to you due to
an imposed limitation which you choose to perpetuate. Dietary phobias are
not life or death, but some phobias are crippling. The principle is the same
and it is critical to living enlightened. I have known people who only liked
a couple of foods, one kind of music or TV program and disliked and
mistrusted most people. These are people whose menu of life was severely
limited, and they would never have understood that they chose that view of
life.
Sleepyhead
Well OK, I'm sure people have /some/ choice in the manner of their
lives, but /completely/ free choice? What if they were abused as kids
and their manner of life resulted from that? How much choice might they
have had about such abuse? Maybe they could have sought help? What if
they didn't know they needed it? What if no help was available?
One has - as you have observed - a choice amonst /available/ options.
To say that people who live crappy lives have chosen to have crappy
lives flies in the face of a lot of available evidence that says (in
essence) if you have poor parenting, poor diet and poor education
you're likely to end up in a poor area with a poorly-paid job with few
prospects. The fact that /anyone/ can drag themselves out of a
situation like that is a testament to that person's strength of will
and/or character, but that's no reason to denigrate those who don't
have that strength of will or character. There, but for the grace of
God ...
> It's not the main issue, there are always circumstances in life. The issue is how we react to them.
And if no-one ever taught you that lesson, how would you know?
1Z
Publius wrote:
> Uncle Buck <Uncl...@SpamMeNot.com> wrote in
> news:0oqui15lnhdnfas3q...@4ax.com:
>
> >>But the programming is NOT part of the intitial physical condition of
> >>the system,
> >
> > Actually, it has to be. The programming is stored on media, a process
> > which requires very specific and well-understood physical conditions
> > to be met. If its presence is to be considered as part of the system
> > at all, it must be so from the outset.
>
> Er, no. The programming is part of the initial conditions of the *run*.
> But not of the hardware system, and is not derivable from the physical
> laws governing the operation of that hardware. Only the microcode is part
> of the initial hardware conditions, and it is arbitrary (it is not itself
> derivable from Ohm's Law or its corollaries).
If you want to predict a physical system , you have to start
with the initial conditions of *that* particular system on that
occasion, which in this case includes the (physical implementation)
of the software that is to be run on the hardare on that particular
occasion.
You can't predict how a generic computer will behave independently
of the software, but that is just arbitrarily leaving out some relevant
information about the physical starting conditions.
> > How so? Without a very predictible and well-understood adherence to
> > "the laws of physics", the information couldn't exist on the
> > comuputer.
>
> Quite true. But adherence to the laws of physics and derivability from
> them are two different things. For a system to be deterministic you need
> the latter.
No, nothing much can be derived from the laws of physics *alone*. The
point
is to be derived the way we actually do derive things, using
laws+initial conditions. If you want to predict tomorrow's weather, you
have to feed in today's.
> No. The rules of grammar will not give the (semantic) meaning of
> anything. Observing those rules is a *necessary* condition for decoding
> the meaning, but is nowhere near sufficient. Determinism declares that
> knowledge of conditions at a given time T are *sufficient* to predict the
> state of the system at T1.
Hurrah! And the conditions include whatver software your hardware is
attempting to run.
1Z
Denis Loubet wrote:
> If it's not determined, then that means something is functioning contrary to
> physical law.
Physical law does not have to be deterministic, and, as currently
understood,m
it isn't.
1Z
Denis Loubet wrote:
> "1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> >> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other
> >> decisions
> >> are not as equally determined.
> >
> > 1) the subjective impression that one can make free choices
>
> What impression? Point to the part of decision making where free choices
> happen. I can't find it. I weigh preferences against options and reach
> conclusions. I could program a computer to do that.
You *can* choose to live your life like a robot; you *can* choose
to live it randomly , like Luke Reinhardt's Dice Man.
> For instance: I never chose to not like seafood. That is a preference
> imposed upon me by circumstances beyond my control. It now heavily biases my
> food choices. When I weigh my food preferences against the food options
> before me, I must operate under an arbitrarily imposed bias against seafood.
> I could write a program to choose food for me, and I would give seafood a
> strong negative weighting.
>
> Again, why should I assume any of my other choices are not equally
> determined by biases that are beyond my control.
Aha...you're *assuming* it ? Haven't you tried overcoming a bias,
towards
candy or cigarettes or something ?
> > 2) the evidence for indeterminism in physics.
>
> If you're talking QM, I fail to see how that allows for free choices. It
> seems to be a randomizer, if anything, and random isn't free.
http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html
> >> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic. Otherwise,
> >> it's physics.
> >
> > If the laws of physics are indeterministic (and the current one are
> > indeed)
> > then indeterminism neednot be magic.
>
> Here's where I have a problem. In one view, we have a Newtonian clockwork
> universe that is called deterministic because we should in theory be able to
> predict with absolute certainty the outcome of any chain of cause and
> effect. The introduction of QM effects to that Newtonian universe certainly
> screws up the predictive aspect of the universe, but it does not affect the
> way the laws of physics operate.
Yes it does. They are indeterministic now.
> It's a randomizing factor thrown into a
> clockwork machine. If an atom decays at a completely indeterminate time, the
> clockwork mechanism of the universe accomodates the debris of that
> unexpected decay with clockwork precision.
No it doesn't, because the knock-on effects will be subject to
indetemrinism
too. Consider a nuclear chain reaction.
> What do you call a deterministic universe modified by random quantum
> effects? It's not deterministic, but it's not completely random either. And
> for macro-scale purposes, the universe is Newtonian.
Not uniformly
http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/phy_smqm.html#randomness
> I strongly suspect that
> quantum effects do not seriously influence mental activity, and even if they
> did, it would be a randomizing effect, and not a magic wand that allows
> things to proceed outside the laws of physics.
I suspect differently on both scores. Suspicion, is of course, not
proof.
> >> > There are other
> >> > alternatives.
> >>
> >> To physics? That would be magic.
> >>
> >> > BTW, the burden of proof rests with the determinist, since
> >> > he is the one making the affirmative assertion.
> >>
> >> You're the one claiming that some things operate contrary to the laws of
> >> physics. Please demonstrate this.
> >
> > Physics is not necessarily deterministic and currently isn't.
>
> I have to assume you're talking about QM. Please demonstrate that QM has
> anything to do with making a choice.
turtoni
>
> "turtoni" <tur...@comcast.net> wrote
>>
>> "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote
>
> [..]
>
>>>>>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>>>>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>>>>>
>>>>> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
>>>>
>>>> i'd agree with dutch that our tastes are conditioned.
>>>
>>> He and I both believe that. My view is that the child's mind perceives
>>> conditioning as coming entirely from the outside, while the adult
>>> realizes that while there are outside *influences*, it is always *I* who
>>> consents to adopting a preference.
>>
>> children quickly learn that they have choices.
>
> In some ways, but they often perceive many of their choices as absolute
> facts.
you try telling that to a kid walking around a supermarket.
in some sense that is true anyway. food is food. try eating a brick for
example.
but sure you could devolop the eating disorder pica.
>> choices dont necessary equate to having free will.
> True enough, but they can be a indicator of it.
you learn soon enough that you can only eat food unless of course you have
an eating disorder.
>>>> but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste for
>>>> seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
>>>
>>> He is defending a position of no-free-will, therefore the idea that he
>>> can choose his own preferences, tastes, likes or dislikes, threatens his
>>> basic philosophical position, therefore his identity
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviourism
>>
>>>> realistically it's probably because you already have such an array of
>>>> options to choose from that you that you lack the desire/drive/energy
>>>> to be bothered to cultivate a taste for seafood.
>>>
>>> Exactly. That confirms my position that tastes can be developed,
>>> dislikes turned into likes by conscious acts. We do not need to wait for
>>> some act of God to force us to change them.
>>
>> but the environment also steers and condtions our behavior. in fact more
>> so than we might realize and therefore in some sense we don't have much
>> in the way of free will because we're pretty much fundamentally driven to
>> not have free will by our superego's for survivals sake. saying that you
>> can choose to eat fish is nice but hardly any great sign of free will.
>
> It's easy enough to obfuscate a discussion into irrelevance, but this is
> the context we have and the question is, are likes and dislikes,
> particularly food, facts or choices?
your arguement is that having choice implies the existence of free will.
it'd probably be better if you argued that making decisions implies that we
have free will. but the behaviorists argue that our decisions are determined
by the environment either through association or reinforcement.
>>>> dutch may actually be displaying an identity threatened because he
>>>> doesnt like the fact that you dont like seafood. for example, if dutch
>>>> is actually dutch (from the netherlands) i know they highly prize
>>>> eating seafood and even enjoying swallowing raw herring which to
>>>> outsiders is likely to be a disgusting idea and therefore up for
>>>> mockery...
>>
>>> Now you are being the armchair psychoanalyst. I'm not Dutch, and my
>>> identity is not threatened by other people's tastes, I am simply trying
>>> to tell this fine person that he is not as powerless as he imagines.
>>
>> having "no-free-will" doesnt mean that we are powerless. it probably just
>> means that we're not crazy ;-)
>
> Saying we have no free will sounds like a fashionable way to avoid
> responsibility.
no. it means that you will behave rationally and therefore accept
responsibility.
turtoni
Derek
>"Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote in message news:11j1dm0...@news.supernews.com...
>> "turtoni" <tur...@comcast.net> wrote in message news:HKudnQOlG45...@comcast.com...
>>> but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste for
>>> seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
>>
>> He is defending a position of no-free-will, therefore the idea that he can
>> choose his own preferences, tastes, likes or dislikes, threatens his basic
>> philosophical position, therefore his identity
>
>Fuck you.
Denis, there are a couple of things you need to
know about Dutch to understand his reasons for
claiming your diet threatens your "philosophical
position" and "identity." Once you've understood
these reasons you'll see that he's doing nothing
other than projecting his own failings onto you; an
old and nasty habit he's never been able to shake.
Dutch usually confines himself to vegan-related
groups, and when first appearing on them some
five years ago he put himself forward as an
advocate for animal rights with statements such
as;
"I am an animal rights believer."
Dutch 12 Feb 2001 http://tinyurl.com/4ybt3
and
"My contention is that 'animal rights' have sprouted
like branches from the tree of "HUMAN RIGHTS".
They are derivative. They reflect from a) what our
own rights are b) to what degree and how we value
the animal or species."
Dutch 23 Feb 2001 http://tinyurl.com/3ljkh
To maintain what later turned out to be a patently
false "philosophical position" and "identity" as an
animal rights proponent, he declared that he could
eat no meat at all, and that his aversion to it was in
full control with statements such as;
"I can't even look at meat anymore after 17
years, the aversion is in full control."
Dutch Mar 27 2001 http://tinyurl.com/8u3s5
and
"Now after 18 years without meat, I can hardly
stand the sight and smell of it, for good reason,
it would make me sick if I ate it, no more
adaptation."
Dutch Dec 25 2001 http://tinyurl.com/ayghu
As we can see, for Dutch to maintain his false
"philosophical position" and "identity" as an animal
rights advocate he felt the need to declare that
the eating of meat was not an option to him; his
aversion to it was in full control, and if he ate it
he would be sick. Note also that he claimed there
would be no more adaption for him for change.
However, within a few short months his false
"philosophical position" and "identity" was easily
broken apart by the genuine advocates for the
proposition of animal rights and vegetarians on
the groups he infested, and this state of affairs led
him to make a massive U-turn on the proposition
with statements such as;
"They have no rights because the very idea of
a world of animals with rights is a laugh."
Dutch 7 Aug 2001 http://tinyurl.com/6wffc
and
"Well, I don't believe in the idea of animal rights, I
find it irrational …."
Dutch 28 Aug 2002 http://tinyurl.com/47wy4
Now, of course, since his "philosophical position"
and "identity" as an animal rights advocate was
shown for the charade it was, he eats meat and
openly declares it to maintain his newer so-called
"philosophical position" with statements such as;
"I like the taste of everything I eat, otherwise I
wouldn't eat it.
....
I eat meat because it is good nutritous food,
AND I like it."
Dutch Jul 15 2004 http://tinyurl.com/7hczx
Dutch never was a vegetarian, in my opinion, but
while trying to ingratiate himself with other vegetarians
on animal-related forums he pretended he was in
an effort to maintain his false "identity" as one.
Contrary to what he wrote below this sentence, his
identity is very much threatened by other people's
tastes, and so he adopts those same tastes himself
while pretending to be what he isn't.
>I would LOVE to have free will.
Sorry, but you don't have it, for the reasons you've
already explained and more.
[..]
>> I'm not Dutch, and my identity is not threatened by other people's tastes,
>
>Ah, so you claim
Exactly. As we can see by his statements above,
his identity IS very much threatened by other
people's tastes, which is why he claimed to have
a fully-controlling aversion to meat when pretending
to promote animal rights and now declares that he
does in fact like meat while taking on his newer
identity as an anti-animal rights proponent against
vegans.
Note also that during a conversation on people's
diets and their control over them, he once told an
opponent that his wife was anorexic, and that people
like her, "In their current state of mind they **lack
control** over their eating habits."
[start - Ron to Dutch]
> You don't like that I hold the anorexic accountable
> and disagree that they have no control over their
> life.
[Dutch]
In their current state of mind they lack control over
their eating habits, but that is not and should not be
viewed as a death sentence."
Dutch Jan 30 2005 http://tinyurl.com/9pfbq
In short, Denis, with Dutch you're dealing with a
person DOES believe that people have no control
over their eating habits, and whose "philosophical
position" and "identity", whatever its current form,
is very much "threatened by other people's tastes."
turtoni
it might be depressing to imagine ourselves as machines. slaves to love but
you could imagine it as trying to master the "machine" to make the most of
our unique abilities.
turtoni
Roger Johansson
Democracy means "rule by the people".
It was developed in opposition of earlier power structures which
existed for the benefit of a single ruler, or a small elite.
The concept "democracy" was invented by the greeks, but was largely
forgotten during the dark ages, when the church ruled Europe.
It was reborn by Humanism which set out to find better ways to rule a
world than rule by the church or rule by the pope.
>From the year 1500 Humanism has developed into our modern views on
democracy, equality, human rights, individual freedom, scientific
thinking, rationality, etc..
The advantages of democracy over dictatorship, plutocracy, and other
forms of "rule by the few":
More people are involved in the ruling, more discussions gives better
decisions, the country is ruled for the benefit of the whole people,
not just for the benefit of the upper class or the leader, the king,
the high priest, etc..
Sometimes the word democracy is used to fool people. Like in the 30-ies
when the nazi's used the word socialist in their party name, just
because socialism was very popular then. So they needed to have that
word in their party name to attract voters, hiding the fact that they
were actually enemies of socialism, and soon killed millions of
socialists, communists, democrats, workers union people, and
intellectuals in general (many of them jews) who did not agree with
their ideas.
Democracy has been used in the same way, as a nice label, to fool
people. To make people believe that the religious or capitalist elite
is actually working for the people. Plutocracy, rule by the rich, often
disguises as "democracy", with elections every four years, but the
people only get to choose one of two candidates, and both of them
represent financial interests.
In such plutocracies the people have nothing to say between the
elections.
Democracy has been developed further, beyond voting once every 4 years.
The workers movement and the reformist socialist parties, together with
some liberals, have during the 20th century developed a democracy in
Europe which builds on a continous participation of the people.
Everywhere decisions are made the people should have a say, and
possibilities to get involved in the decision process.
Workers unions demanded, and got, their own representants on the board
of every big company.
Workplace democracy has been developed very far in some countries.
Schools and hospitals now use democratic procedures to make decisions,
instead of earlier systems where somebody was elected or hired to
handle a certain task, and he handled it like a dictator, making his
own decisions all by himself.
Today there are public discussions and democratic decision making at
all levels and in all kinds of issues in the society.
Transparency means that the people and media have the right to see what
is going on inside all authorities.
We have similar rights as a defendants lawyer to see all material the
other side has which we could have use for when we try to influence
what is happening in a democracy.
Computers and internet are now used to modernize the democracy in
Europe and all over the world, to make the information to the public as
complete as possible. Earlier a lot of paper was used to make paper
copies of everything anybody wanted a copy of, and lots of working
hours was used to serve media and citizens evergrowing demand for
information. Today a county can set up a web site and publish
everything important on that site.
The citizens have the right to get involved in the democratic processes
everywhere in society, not just once every four years, but every day.
This includes and supercedes the old ideas freedom of speach, the right
to come together and discuss, the right to demonstrate. Workplace
democracy. You can give your opinion in different ways, alone or
together with others. You have the right to start new political
parties.
You can use electronic means, like sending emails, writing in
newspapers, writing to political representants, blogging, mailing
lists, discussion groups, etc..
--
Roger J.
George Dance
Denis Loubet wrote:
> "George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
> news:1127140831.9...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
> > Denis Loubet wrote:
> >> "Publius" <m.pu...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
> >> news:n8CdnSxU-pn...@comcast.com...> >> > news:7ZqdncXFift...@io.com:
> >> >
> >>
> >> I and all my friends can predict exactly what I'll order at a
> >> seafood restaurant. The chicken.
> >>
> >> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other
> >> decisions
> >> are not as equally determined.
> >
> > will order the chicken?
>
> The simple fact that I don't like the taste of seafood. I don't know why I
> don't like the taste of seafood. I never CHOSE not to like the taste of
> seafood. My dislike of seafood is a preference imposed upon me, and outside
> my control.
Let's see: You don't know why you prefer chicken to seafood (a
preference I share, BTW); therefore you have no evidence that that
dislike was either one you came up with yourself or one imposed on you;
therefore you have no evidence that you came up with it yourself;
therefore (you conclude) it was imposed on you. Does that reproduce
your argument here accurately?
> This arbitrarily imposed bias, among many other equally arbitrary food
> preferences, determines my food choices.
>
> Can you point out how my food choices are supposed to be free if the
> preferences I use to weigh against the food options I have are imposed and
> arbitrary?
Depends who imposed it. My hands are free to type right now, even
though my motor nerves are in continuous control of them; whereas they
would not be free if anyone or anything else was in control of them.
Similarly, my will would be free if I was the one determining it, and
unfree if anything else was determining it.
Since it's unknown who or what imposed your food preferences on you,
that doesn't rule out their being self-imposed. (You have no memory of
them being self-imposed, but, by the same token, you have no memory of
them being imposed by anyone or anything else, either.) If they were
self-imposed, they'd be free, and your food choices would be similarly
free; if imposed by anything else, unfree.
> Can you provide a reason to assume my other preferences and motives aren't
> equally as imposed and arbitrary?
Not at all. Since you have the preferences and motives, they're
imposed; and since you don't know why you have them, they're arbitrary.
The only question is whether you imposed them on yourself, or
something else imposed them on you.
> >> >>> Determinism is the doctrine that all
> >> >>> events are predictable from the basic laws of physics. Most of human
> >> >>> behavior is not predictable from the laws of physics. Thus, free will
> >> >>> exists.
> >> >
> >> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic. Otherwise,
> >> it's physics.
> >
> > The claim is not that something 'acts contrary to the laws of physics.'
> > The claim is that, knowing the basic laws of physics and the physical
> > events of a person's life, you cannot predict all that person's
> > behavior.
> >
> > My brain obeys the same laws of physics as yours - can you predict from
> > that what meal I will order next time I go into a seafood restaurant?
> > If not, then: What other physical information would you need in order
> > to make a successful prediction?
>
> Are you saying your decision is independant of the laws of physics?
Again, no; what I'm saying is that there are no known laws of physics
that determine one's menu choice at a seafood restaurant. For me or
anyone to accept that there are such laws, and that for me to order
shrimp instead of chicken would violate one, requires quite a leap of
faith; especially when you can't point to any such law, but only
postulate that there is one.
> If your brain obeys the laws of physics, then the molecules of your brain do
> what they do according to the laws of physics.
Certainly; but their's no reason to think that my (or your) choice of
chicken at a seafood restaurant is determined by our brain's molecular
structure. It may be that we'd both order chicken because our brains
are similar in molecular structure, in a way that the brains of those
who order lobster are not; but it would violate no laws of physics for
there to be no such similarities or differences.
> There's no room for the
> molecules to go off on their own and disobey the laws of physics.
But in fact, though I do almost always eat chicken at seafood
restaurants, once I did order shrimp (just to try it). Since it was
impossible for the molecules in my brain to have disobeyed the laws of
molecular physics in that instance, it's reasonable to think that the
laws of molecular physics do not determine that I'll order chicken in
any similar instances.
> So things
> can transpire only one way.
Yet in situations like the one we're discussing, things do not
transpire in only one way - some people order chicken and some shrimp,
some people order chicken one meal and shrimp another - and the laws of
molecular physics do not appear to be violated in any case. Which
makes it reasonable to think that the laws of molecular physics do not
determine situations like these.
> If you agree that the molecules of your brain obey the laws of physics, then
> you must agree that yes, your choice is absolutely predictable from starting
> conditions.
On the assumption that the laws of molecular physics are what determine
my choices; which has not been proven, and which there's reason to
think is false.
> Now, I'm speaking in the realm of a Newtonian universe for simplicity. If
> you include Quantum Mechanics, now you insert a randomizing factor into the
> predictable clockwork of the Newtonian universe.
Indeed; if preferences were generated by quantum states in my brain
(somewhat analogous to the way the lottery computer generates random
numbers), that would not put them outside the laws of physics; just
under a different set (quantum mechanics vs. molecular physics).
However, it would not be the case that 'things could happen only one
way.'
> However, random does not
> equal free, as in free will or free choice. Random equals being a slave to a
> random number generator.
Hmmm ... I can let a random number generator make decisions for me.
For instance, when I buy a lottery ticket, I can get a Quick Pick, in
which case the generator decides my numbers. But I'm hardly that
generator's slave, as (any time I buy a ticket) I can pick my own
numbers instead.
If every time I went to buy a ticket, the machine decided (by the same
random program) whether to print my numbers or substitute its own, then
I would not have a free choice of what ticket I would buy. By the same
token, since I decide that and not the generator, I do have a free
choice. So a free choice is not incompatible with a random choice.
Similarly for will - if my preferences were generated at random, by
quantum states in my brain, then even if I automatically acted on all
of them that would not make my will unfree - as it would be my brain,
and not (for instance) the lottery machine or another brain's quantum
states generating them.
But in fact I cannot act on all my preferences; in some cases they're
inconsistent, and I have to decide between them; which is another
reason for thinking that random generation does not equal unfree.
> >> > There are other
> >> > alternatives.
> >>
> >> To physics? That would be magic.
> >
> > Hmmm ... in this case, the physical events of my logging onto my usenet
> > program and observing your earlier post have resulted in my writing a
> > post in reply.
>
> Yes, and every bit of that was inevitable, but modified by quantum events.
> > Since there's no magic involved, the reply I wrote has
> > to have an entirely physical explanation -
>
> Yes, absolutely. Your brain is a physical object.
>
> > any physical structure like
> > me that observes a post with the physical structure of yours would have
> > to have written a reply with the exact same structure, no?
>
> They would have to be exactly like you, in exactly the same circumstances, yes.
Not what I said. They'd have to be similar enough that the exact same
laws of physics applied to both; but there's no reason to postulate
exact similarity of all 'circumstances'. Some 'circumstances' would
not be relevant.
> > Yet there are undoubtedly other human beings who read the same post;
> > and I can't see any replies identical to mine anywhere. How could that
> > be?
>
> They aren't exactly like you, nor are they in exactly the same
> circumstances.
And just why would they have to be? So far you've only suggested two
determining 'circumstances': the molecular structure of the human
brain, and the laws of molecular physics - and two humans reading your
original post would be alike wrt those.
> Tell me, was you post magically revealed to you to write? Or was it a matter
> of some deliberation.
Deliberation, for sure; over a period of time, in which some of my own
circumstances changed. (Which is why 'exactly the same circumstances'
is too strong a condition - I wasn't in 'exactly the same
circumstances' throughout the deliberation and composition, myself.)
> Can you be certain that the motivations behind your
> post were not arbitrary impositions just like my attitude towards seafood?
Yep; I'm aware of the reasons for my post, and that nothing external to
me came up with them.
> Can you be sure that your post was not the product of a mechanical
> processing of imposed preferences?
Yeah; I can recognize when someone does impose a preference of theirs
on me (and forces my action in that sense), or when things or
circumstances rule out a preference (and constrain my action); and it's
not something that I'm likely to forget. But I have absolutely no
memory of that happening when I wrote you. That's not absolute
certainty - I could have repressed the memory - but I'm as sure of it
as I am that I did make a post to you (which also, at the moment,
depends on my memory).
> >
> > Here's the argument as I see it:
> >
> > Premise: If physical laws fully explain the content of my reply, then
> > similar physical entities with the same stimulation and subject to the
> > same physical laws would have written the exact same reply.
>
> Yes, they would have to be exactly identical to you and in exactly the same
> circumstances.
False, as above; they would not have to 'exactly identical,' but merely
similar enough that the identical physical laws would determine their
behavior.
> > Premise: There are physical entities with the same stimulation and
> > subject to the same physical laws.
>
> Really? There is another YOU in the universe? Please, demonstrate
> this to be the case!
It's not necessary that there be another 'me'. Someone else with
exactly the same brain structure and life experiences, but with a
different name, would not be 'me;' nor would someone living in another
city; but those are irrelevant circumstances: the contents of my post
did not depend on my name or the city I lived in. A vast number of
other of my 'circumstances' were equally irrelvant.
> > Premise: No other such entity wrote the exact same reply.
>
> I stongly suspect that's because there's no such entity.
>
> > Conclusion: Physical laws do not fully explain the content of my reply.
>
> Or that there's no such entity.
>
> I do not accept premise 2.
Only because, apparently, you misunderstood premise 1.
[snip the rest, as it's mostly a rehash of the above]
George Dance
> > Denis Loubet wrote:
> >> "someone4" <glenn....@btinternet.com> wrote in message
> >> news:1126959307.4...@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> >> > How can you be responsible without a soul, it is not like you would
> >> > have had any options.
> >>
> >> This is true. But there are practical concerns. It is advantageous for
> >> you
> >> to hold people responsible for their actions.
> >
> > What kind of physical phenomenon is advantageousness? It has to be, if
> > only physical events determine whether anyone holds anyone else
> > responsible.
>
> Thoughts and ideas are physical patterns of matter in physical brains, and
> they can cause physical behaviors.
Certainly not by definition: most people use 'thoughts' and 'ideas' to
mean things of which they're only mentally aware; their only evidence
of them being as subjective as their evidence of free will.
You may be arguing that, for every thought, there is some corresponding
brain event - some 'pattern' - in each case. But it's not valid to
infer from that that, for any particular or unique thought or idea,
there is a corresponding particular or unique brain event or 'pattern';
that no one could have the thought or idea without their brain having
that pattern, that reproducing that pattern in someone's brain would
cause them to have that thought or idea, and so on.
> Everything is physical.
Which would not rule out wills, or choices, or minds, or even 'souls',
since they'd all be physical as well. Whether that makes them all
determined is another matter; that depends on what physical structure
gives rise to them (and consequently, what laws of physics govern what
happens to them).
> (snip)
> >> Since
> >> you cannot change what causes you happiness or suffering, it behooves you
> >> to
> >> act in a manner that furthers the happiness, and minimizes the pain.
> >
> > Granted that, given the assumption that what causes you happiness or
> > suffering is outside your control (as it's solely a matter of physical
> > events and physical laws), how can it be that your action is in any way
> > in your control? So (unless behooving is some physical event, or
> > physical force, or even a physical law), what does it matter how it
> > behooves one to act?
>
> Ah, I think I see your difficulty. If everything is inevitable, then what
> use is advice?
No, my difficulty lies more with reconciling the phenomenon of advice
with your hypothesis that human action is determined by the brain's
molecular structure.
Quite often, people will take advice; meaning, they'll adopt a new
thought, idea, belief, or preference (or reject one they've already
had) in response to spoken or written advice from another person or a
book. But, for your hypothesis to be correct (since the laws of
physics rule out action at a distance) it must be the case that the
sound or light waves must be modifying the subjects' brains' molecular
structure. At the same time, and at least as often, people do not do
so, in response to the exact same stimuli - two people can read the
same book or hear the same speaker, and one takes the advice
while one does not. So it must be the case here that the waves do not
modify the brain's molecular structure.
Which is not how the laws of large-body physics work at all: there, the
same matter and energy inputs, applied to the same matter and energy,
always produces the same output. ('Same' does not mean 'exactly
identical in all circumstances, BTW - my baby finger pushing the 'a'
key on my keyboard is no different than yours, in any relevant way, so
it produces the same output, even though we and our computers are not
'exactly identical'.)
Yet here we have physical waves resulting in different patterns of
thought - and no explanation of why that should be.
> Look at it this way: It is inevitable that I offer this advice. It is
> inevitable that someone reads it. It is inevitable that the reader acts on
> the advice. It is inevitable that his life is improved by his acting on the
> advice.
>
> At least I hope so.
>
> But you see, each step is an inevitable chain of cause and effect.
No, I don't see that. When I press the 'a' key on my keyboard, and an
A appears on my screen, I can see that as an inevitable chain of cause
and effect. If my wife did the same thing right after me, and nothing
happened, I would see that instead as some kind of anomaly - which I
wouldn't try to gloss over by saying that my wife's fingers are not
exactly the same as mine.
Similarly, when my wife and I read the same thing, and I conclude one
thing and she concludes another, I don't see that as an inevitable
chain of cause and effect, either. If someone could show me inevitable
chains of cause and effect that would result in our reaching our
respective conclusions, then I would; but I would not simply assume
there were such chains, and then start looking for explanations for why
I had no evidence of them.
> Yet
> clearly someone can read my advice and act upon it.
Indeed; which means, by your account, that sound waves emanating from
you (or light waves emanating from one of your posts) apparently have
the power to change some people's brains' molecular structures,
provided that those brains are in a certain state or states; and not
otherwise.
Which is an interesting hypothesis, but not one that you've upheld in
any way (save to dismiss all competing hypotheses as 'magic').
> So offering advice, with
> it's advantageous behooving, is a valid thing to do.
>
> >> It is
> >> advantageous to operate within the assumption that you have free will,
> >> even
> >> though free will is impossible.
> >
> > Same objection; either advantageousness is a physical phenomenon, or
> > (by your dichotomy) it cannot affect behavior in any way.
>
> Clearly someone can read my advice and act upon it even though it's all
> inevitable. Cause and effect. I will play my part in the chain because I
> have no choice.
> (snip)
>
> >> > Though personally, my subjective experience, that I can raise either my
> >> > left or right hand, and that both were possible, and that I consciously
> >> > chose which one would happen, seems to me very real.
> >>
> >> And I detect no application of free will in that description. It seems
> >> you
> >> compare your options to your preferences and reach a conclusion.
> >
> > Which, assuming that options and preferences are physical events, that
> > they interact in a way ('comparison') that is governed by physical
> > laws, makes the poster's hand-raising a purely physical event.
> > However, both those assumptions are in question.
>
> Really?
>
> Raising the hand or not raising the hand are the options, and they are both
> physical.
Indeed; but raising or not raising my hand is not itself an 'option' or
a 'preference' - I might prefer to raise my hand, or consider the
options of raising my hand, but neither of those is the same thing as
my hand going up; one happens in my mind (and, presumably, there's
something analogous that happens in my brain), and the other in my arm.
> Preferences are patterns of matter in brains that bias it's logic.
In common usage, preferences are no such thing - they're something
people are only subjectively aware of. I'd accept, as a rewrite:
"Preferences have corresponding patterns of matter in brains".
Whether those patterns of matter do determine the brain's 'logic'
(whatever that is; I assume it's something like the 'logic' of
circuitry), is a different matter - it's certainly not a matter of a
priori definition.
> I can program a computer to raise or lower a mechanical hand.
Since that requires human agency just as much as raising or lowering
one of your own hands, it's no evidence that human agency is reducible
to mechanics.
> Everything is physical.
Yes, you've said that.
> >> That seems
> >> pretty programmatic.
> >
> > If there's physical evidence of a program.
>
> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a physical
> structure in my brain.
Assuming that your dislike has a corresponding physical structure in
your brain: why should that be evidence of a program? My cigarette
lighter has a physical structure; yet that's not evidence that it has a
program.
The one reason I can see is that, unlike my lighter, humans can act in
more than one way - their action is more complex - which means having
to postulate something like a computer program that actually governs it
(whereas, for the lighter, one does not have to).
At the same time, you, I, and everyone else have this subjective
experience of something called a 'will' that governs our behavior; so
(on the assumption that we've already agreed to wrt thoughts, ideas,
and preferences, that a subjective experience is evidence of a physical
structure in the brain), it's reasonable to think that the will (or
perhaps the mind itself) is such a program.
Obviously that would not be a free will, if someone else programmed it
into you in the same way you programmed the mechanical hand. But,
given the lack of evidence for such a programmer (not to mention the
sheer complexity of the program), it's not reasonable to conclude that
it is an unfree will.
> >> > So until it is proved to me that I have no options, and that it is an
> >> > illusion, I will exercise my belief that I have options, and believe in
> >> > a soul, and a dualistic existence.
> >>
> >> That's fine. As long as you act within the assumption that you and others
> >> have free will, you should be able to avoid trying to fruitlessly
> >> second-guess your decisions, and thus your deterministic path through
> >> life
> >> should be easier than if you didn't.
> >
> > Completely irrelevant; future events cannot play any causative role in
> > whether he assumes that he has free will or not - that assumption, on
> > your account, must have been determined by past events only.
>
> Future events cannot, but his EXPECTATION of future events can.
Certainly; expectations, no less than ideas, beliefs, and preferences,
can affect decisions. The relevant questions being: first, are those
expectations the result of the brain's physical structure, or of a
program (a 'mind') existing within that structure (which, I think,
we've finally decided in favour of the program); second, is that
program self-created or created by something external to it?
> He's a link
> in the chain of cause and effect.
In many ways, we are just that: if someone taps my knee when my legs
are crossed, for example, my leg will kick. That's evidence of
behavior being determined by internal structure rather than an add-on
program, though; so it's no evidence that any such program is subject
to the same laws of cause and effect.
Publius
news:1127310741.7...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com:
> More people are involved in the ruling, more discussions gives better
> decisions . . .
What is the evidence for that? Suppose you are facing heart surgery. The
surgeons are debating whether a coronary bypass or balloon angioplasty
would be the better approach in your case. Do you suppose a better decision
would be reached if the hospital janitorial staff were invited to join the
discussion? Everyone in the cafeteria?
> . . . the country is ruled for the benefit of the whole people,
> not just for the benefit of the upper class or the leader, the king,
> the high priest, etc.
Where is the evidence for that? What policies of what democratic government
(or any other form of government) has ever benefited "the whole people?" In
fact, what policies might *conceivably* benefit "the whole people?" Every
one I can think of benefits some persons and disadvantages others.
> Everywhere decisions are made the people should have a say, and
> possibilities to get involved in the decision process.
If you and your childhood sweetheart decide to marry, should the people at
large have a say in that decision?
> Workers unions demanded, and got, their own representants on the board
> of every big company.
If you hire a plumber to fix a leaky pipe in your house, does he thereby
acquire a "say" in your household budget thereafter? Perhaps a right to
crash there when he feels like it?
> Schools and hospitals now use democratic procedures to make decisions,
If they are inviting the janitorial staff to participate in decisions about
whether or not to do surgeries, please let us know which hospitals those
are. I'm sure many would wish to avoid them.
> The citizens have the right to get involved in the democratic processes
> everywhere in society, not just once every four years, but every day.
What is the justification for that claim? The citizens have a right to be
involved in deciding which movie you watch tonite?
Pretty naive stuff, Roger.
Publius
news:1127300226.5...@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
>> Er, no. The programming is part of the initial conditions of the
>> *run*. But not of the hardware system, and is not derivable from the
>> physical laws governing the operation of that hardware. Only the
>> microcode is part of the initial hardware conditions, and it is
>> arbitrary (it is not itself derivable from Ohm's Law or its
>> corollaries).
> If you want to predict a physical system , you have to start
> with the initial conditions of *that* particular system on that
> occasion, which in this case includes the (physical implementation)
> of the software that is to be run on the hardare on that particular
> occasion.
Well, now, if you are a determinist, there are no "particular systems."
There is only one continuous, monolithic system. And any later state of
that system can be predicted from any earlier one, together with the
system's laws of motion. By postulating a set of initial conditions that
cannot be derived from earlier ones, and then arbitrarily defining a system
as beginning at that T0, you have already violated determinism.
> If you want to predict tomorrow's weather, you have to feed in today's.
True. But today's must also be derivable from yesterday's. And so on back
to time T0. There are no breaks.
>> No. The rules of grammar will not give the (semantic) meaning of
>> anything. Observing those rules is a *necessary* condition for
>> decoding the meaning, but is nowhere near sufficient. Determinism
>> declares that knowledge of conditions at a given time T are
>> *sufficient* to predict the state of the system at T1.
> Hurrah! And the conditions include whatver software your hardware is
> attempting to run.
Reconsider in the light of the above.
Publius
news:1127301507.5...@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com:
>> Here's where I have a problem. In one view, we have a Newtonian
>> clockwork universe that is called deterministic because we should in
>> theory be able to predict with absolute certainty the outcome of any
>> chain of cause and effect. The introduction of QM effects to that
>> Newtonian universe certainly screws up the predictive aspect of the
>> universe, but it does not affect the way the laws of physics operate.
> Yes it does. They are indeterministic now.
I don't get it. In one thread, you're arguing for determinism, and in
another, arguing against it.
??
Denis Loubet
Yes. I use a clockwork Newtonian universe for simplicity when dealing with
physical law as regards free will.
I use it because the existence of QM doesn't really change the thrust of the
arguments. It's my understanding that QM throws a randomizing wrench into
the Newtonian universe. But when discussing free will, being a slave to a
random number generator is no different from being slave to a deterministic
universe. At no point does "free" enter the picture.
Dutch
"Sleepyhead" <simonh...@usa.net> wrote in message
news:1127294645.7...@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>> The significant point is that part of the menu is off limits to you due
>> to an imposed limitation which you choose to perpetuate ...
>
> Well OK, I'm sure people have /some/ choice in the manner of their
> lives, but /completely/ free choice?
I'm not arguing "completely" free choice, I'm saying that free will exists.
> What if they were abused as kids
> and their manner of life resulted from that? How much choice might they
> have had about such abuse? Maybe they could have sought help? What if
> they didn't know they needed it? What if no help was available?
>
> One has - as you have observed - a choice amonst /available/ options.
> To say that people who live crappy lives have chosen to have crappy
> lives flies in the face of a lot of available evidence that says (in
> essence) if you have poor parenting, poor diet and poor education
> you're likely to end up in a poor area with a poorly-paid job with few
> prospects. The fact that /anyone/ can drag themselves out of a
> situation like that is a testament to that person's strength of will
> and/or character, but that's no reason to denigrate those who don't
> have that strength of will or character. There, but for the grace of
> God ...
I am not attempting to demean anyone nor make politically correct
statements, I am observing and reporting from my experience. Many people who
fall into addiction, crime and prison, etc.. had every chance in life, many
who had bad upbringings will thrive. The difference is in the choices people
make along the way. Yes, the deck is often stacked for or against you, but
circumstances do not tell the whole story.
>
>> It's not the main issue, there are always circumstances in life. The
>> issue is how we react to them.
>
> And if no-one ever taught you that lesson, how would you know?
Maybe they just get it, maybe not. Some people spend their lives making the
choice to give up their choices to others, or to live by rote, dominated by
habit or emotions. That's just the way it is, people don't always recognize
their own power.
Dutch
[..]
>>>>>>>> My dislike for seafood is evidence of a program. The dislike is a
>>>>>>>> physical structure in my brain.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's a structure over which you have control.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please don't fucking presume to tell me about my fucking brain.
>>>>>
>>>>> i'd agree with dutch that our tastes are conditioned.
>>>>
>>>> He and I both believe that. My view is that the child's mind perceives
>>>> conditioning as coming entirely from the outside, while the adult
>>>> realizes that while there are outside *influences*, it is always *I*
>>>> who consents to adopting a preference.
>>>
>>> children quickly learn that they have choices.
>>
>> In some ways, but they often perceive many of their choices as absolute
>> facts.
>
> you try telling that to a kid walking around a supermarket.
Children are not expected to understand.
> in some sense that is true anyway. food is food. try eating a brick for
> example.
>
> but sure you could devolop the eating disorder pica.
That's an extremism, like the putting your hand in fire argument.
>>> choices dont necessary equate to having free will.
>
>> True enough, but they can be a indicator of it.
>
> you learn soon enough that you can only eat food unless of course you have
> an eating disorder.
Within that context, where does the decision come from to like *only*
weiners and macaroni, nothing else? That's not a preference any more, it's
self-imposed bondage.
>>>>> but i dont believe that your lack of interest in developing a taste
>>>>> for seafood is because your "identity" feels threatened.
>>>>
>>>> He is defending a position of no-free-will, therefore the idea that he
>>>> can choose his own preferences, tastes, likes or dislikes, threatens
>>>> his basic philosophical position, therefore his identity
>>>
>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviourism
>>>
>>>>> realistically it's probably because you already have such an array of
>>>>> options to choose from that you that you lack the desire/drive/energy
>>>>> to be bothered to cultivate a taste for seafood.
>>>>
>>>> Exactly. That confirms my position that tastes can be developed,
>>>> dislikes turned into likes by conscious acts. We do not need to wait
>>>> for some act of God to force us to change them.
>>>
>>> but the environment also steers and condtions our behavior. in fact more
>>> so than we might realize and therefore in some sense we don't have much
>>> in the way of free will because we're pretty much fundamentally driven
>>> to not have free will by our superego's for survivals sake. saying that
>>> you can choose to eat fish is nice but hardly any great sign of free
>>> will.
>>
>> It's easy enough to obfuscate a discussion into irrelevance, but this is
>> the context we have and the question is, are likes and dislikes,
>> particularly food, facts or choices?
>
> your arguement is that having choice implies the existence of free will.
> it'd probably be better if you argued that making decisions implies that
> we have free will.
I'm not going to split hairs, I see your point.
> but the behaviorists argue that our decisions are determined by the
> environment either through association or reinforcement.
Our choices certainly are, but not all our decisions.
>>>>> dutch may actually be displaying an identity threatened because he
>>>>> doesnt like the fact that you dont like seafood. for example, if dutch
>>>>> is actually dutch (from the netherlands) i know they highly prize
>>>>> eating seafood and even enjoying swallowing raw herring which to
>>>>> outsiders is likely to be a disgusting idea and therefore up for
>>>>> mockery...
>>>
>>>> Now you are being the armchair psychoanalyst. I'm not Dutch, and my
>>>> identity is not threatened by other people's tastes, I am simply trying
>>>> to tell this fine person that he is not as powerless as he imagines.
>>>
>>> having "no-free-will" doesnt mean that we are powerless. it probably
>>> just means that we're not crazy ;-)
>>
>> Saying we have no free will sounds like a fashionable way to avoid
>> responsibility.
>
> no. it means that you will behave rationally and therefore accept
> responsibility.
How is it more rational to eat only weiners and macaroni all your life,
blaming fate on your limited palate, than to accept responsibility for those
limitations and decide to develop a taste for more foods?
Denis Loubet
>
> Denis Loubet wrote:
>> "1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
>> >> That being the case, what reason do I have for believing my other
>> >> decisions
>> >> are not as equally determined.
>> >
>> > 1) the subjective impression that one can make free choices
>>
>> What impression? Point to the part of decision making where free choices
>> happen. I can't find it. I weigh preferences against options and reach
>> conclusions. I could program a computer to do that.
>
> You *can* choose to live your life like a robot; you *can* choose
> to live it randomly , like Luke Reinhardt's Dice Man.
I choose to live it as if I have free will, but with the knowledge that I
don't.
>> For instance: I never chose to not like seafood. That is a preference
>> imposed upon me by circumstances beyond my control. It now heavily biases
>> my
>> food choices. When I weigh my food preferences against the food options
>> before me, I must operate under an arbitrarily imposed bias against
>> seafood.
>> I could write a program to choose food for me, and I would give seafood a
>> strong negative weighting.
>>
>> Again, why should I assume any of my other choices are not equally
>> determined by biases that are beyond my control.
>
> Aha...you're *assuming* it ? Haven't you tried overcoming a bias,
> towards
> candy or cigarettes or something ?
Why would I do that? Ah yes, because a competing imposed bias motivates me
to do it.
>> > 2) the evidence for indeterminism in physics.
>>
>> If you're talking QM, I fail to see how that allows for free choices. It
>> seems to be a randomizer, if anything, and random isn't free.
>
> http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html
Guy writes a strawman and then knocks it down. This is supposed to convince
me of something?
Tell me how being a slave to a random number generator is better than being
slave to a deterministic universe.
>> >> If something acts contrary to the laws of physics, it's magic.
>> >> Otherwise,
>> >> it's physics.
>> >
>> > If the laws of physics are indeterministic (and the current one are
>> > indeed)
>> > then indeterminism neednot be magic.
>>
>> Here's where I have a problem. In one view, we have a Newtonian clockwork
>> universe that is called deterministic because we should in theory be able
>> to
>> predict with absolute certainty the outcome of any chain of cause and
>> effect. The introduction of QM effects to that Newtonian universe
>> certainly
>> screws up the predictive aspect of the universe, but it does not affect
>> the
>> way the laws of physics operate.
>
> Yes it does. They are indeterministic now.
No. Gravity does not reverse direction, Ohm's law does not change, the
surface tension of water remains the same.
>> It's a randomizing factor thrown into a
>> clockwork machine. If an atom decays at a completely indeterminate time,
>> the
>> clockwork mechanism of the universe accomodates the debris of that
>> unexpected decay with clockwork precision.
>
> No it doesn't, because the knock-on effects will be subject to
> indetemrinism
> too. Consider a nuclear chain reaction.
>
>
>> What do you call a deterministic universe modified by random quantum
>> effects? It's not deterministic, but it's not completely random either.
>> And
>> for macro-scale purposes, the universe is Newtonian.
>
> Not uniformly
>
> http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/phy_smqm.html#randomness
>
>> I strongly suspect that
>> quantum effects do not seriously influence mental activity, and even if
>> they
>> did, it would be a randomizing effect, and not a magic wand that allows
>> things to proceed outside the laws of physics.
>
> I suspect differently on both scores. Suspicion, is of course, not
> proof.
I have the evidence that we have never detected anything operating contrary
to physical law.
>> >> > There are other
>> >> > alternatives.
>> >>
>> >> To physics? That would be magic.
>> >>
>> >> > BTW, the burden of proof rests with the determinist, since
>> >> > he is the one making the affirmative assertion.
>> >>
>> >> You're the one claiming that some things operate contrary to the laws
>> >> of
>> >> physics. Please demonstrate this.
>> >
>> > Physics is not necessarily deterministic and currently isn't.
>>
>> I have to assume you're talking about QM. Please demonstrate that QM has
>> anything to do with making a choice.
(crickets)