Unreasonable Generalization?
Wordsmith
Wordsmith :)
Urthman
news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
> All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
>
Political problems are the "appearance" of problems and not necessarily
actual problems. "Politically correct" is distinct from both "correct" and
"polite" which means that "politically correct" is not necessarily either.
So, "political" in these contexts often (but not always) means illusory,
with-fascade, veneered, masked, phoney, deceptive, etc. but do not imply
actual lies! Plausible deniability!
These tend to relate to interpersonal behavioral difficulties, a lack of
self esteem etc., when one is required to assign the "political" label as if
to imply importance.
Has anyone ever labeled something a "political" problem for the sole purpose
of downplaying it's significance?
Tris
>
> Wordsmith :)
Where do you draw the line?
Wordsmith
> "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
> news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
> > All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
> >
>
> Political problems are the "appearance" of problems and not necessarily
> actual problems. "Politically correct" is distinct from both "correct" and
> "polite" which means that "politically correct" is not necessarily either.
> So, "political" in these contexts often (but not always) means illusory,
> with-fascade, veneered, masked, phoney, deceptive, etc. but do not imply
> actual lies! Plausible deniability!
But once political problems appear, they become, ipso facto, actual problems.
What my general statement means is that there are no political dysfunctions
that do not first originate in problems of pure morality. If you can think
of any that do, lay it on us.
> These tend to relate to interpersonal behavioral difficulties, a lack of
> self esteem etc., when one is required to assign the "political" label as if
> to imply importance.
Why would one be "required" to assign politics to it? It could be kept to
oneself.
> Has anyone ever labeled something a "political" problem for the sole purpose
> of downplaying it's significance?
I'd say the opposite: things get labeled such to UP-play the significance!
Wordsmith :)
Mirza Borogovac
Wordsmith wrote:
>
> All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
Or practical ones, such as: they have resources, we have guns, hmmm.....
Do you asume that everyone in politics has an intrest of humanity in
mind?
Wordsmith
I don't. Pride is often described by theologins as the cornerstone of
all moral failings. What the maxim is getting at is this: if there were
no moral problems, political ones would not arise.
Wordsmith :)
PS By the way, I'm not sure if I read that axiom in a book or if I came
up with it myself...probably the former! *shrug*
Wordsmith
> "Urthman" <urt...@usa.net> wrote in message news:<J9%I7.44860$hZ.42...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> > "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
> > news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
> > > All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
> > >
> >
> > Political problems are the "appearance" of problems and not necessarily
> > actual problems. "Politically correct" is distinct from both "correct" and
> > "polite" which means that "politically correct" is not necessarily either.
> > So, "political" in these contexts often (but not always) means illusory,
> > with-fascade, veneered, masked, phoney, deceptive, etc. but do not imply
> > actual lies! Plausible deniability!
>
> But once political problems appear, they become, ipso facto, actual problems.
> What my general statement means is that there are no political dysfunctions
> that do not first originate in problems of pure morality. If you can think
> of any that do, lay it on us.
Sorry, Urthman and all, what I meant was: "If you can think of any that
*don't*...".
Wordsmith
No, I'm sorry to say.
W :(
Urthman
I have to review this thought for a moment and will try to get back to you.
<revisiting> maybe I have covered that below ... or maybe not at all!
> > > These tend to relate to interpersonal behavioral difficulties, a lack
of
> > > self esteem etc., when one is required to assign the "political" label
as if
> > > to imply importance.
> >
> > Why would one be "required" to assign politics to it? It could be kept
to
> > oneself.
> >
> > > Has anyone ever labeled something a "political" problem for the sole
purpose
> > > of downplaying it's significance?
> >
> > I'd say the opposite: things get labeled such to UP-play the
significance!
There have been situations where the question is asked "is it really a
problem or is [he] just being political about it?" - to mean that an
individual is "playing to the crowd" rather than servicing a genuine issue.
Recently (past year or so), the decision to build a desalination plant in
the Tampa Bay area was questioned in just that way - alleged to be
"politically motivated" as opposed to being the product of a real need. Lots
of television advertisements later, the opposition has quieted down, and I
believe the plant is going up.
Silence is consent!?!
I would think that in many situations the "political problem" IS the moral
dilemma that is sometimes rooted in "personal issues". Bill Clinton's
"political problems" were indirectly caused by his personal problem with
sex, and not specifically a direct or relevant moral quandry. The political
problem (while surrounded by non-synonymous moral questions) *becomes* its
own moral dilemma when one must question the significance of a "personal
lie" as it applies to his ability (or inability) to do his job. It is for
that ability *alone* that he was there in the first place. While in Congress
and the court rooms, one is supposed to tell the truth, it isn't supposed to
also serve the function of a public confessional.
Wasn't it Mark Twain that said "the opposite of progress is Congress" in
reference to this very issue - politicalism vs. realism? Isn't 'political'
somehow synonymous with 'religious' but without the fancy costume or
quasi-Victorian speech patterns?
Semi-OT: Have you ever noticed that whenever George W Bush speaks
"officially", he generally delivers three or four words at a pop, pausing at
verbs and articles? ... this is the 'art' of "political" speaking. For
example, take the first line of the paragraph that is two PPs above this
one, he would 'speak' it like this:
I would think that <pause>
in many situations <pause>
the "political problem" <pause>
IS the moral dilemma <pause>
that is sometimes rooted <pause>
in "personal issues". <longer pause to next sentence>
... and always on the last couple of words in a given sentence, he decends
in pitch. The "sometimes roo .." (line 5) would typically go up in pitch and
the trailing " ..ted" would drop below the pitch of the initial "some". For
"effect", the stressors or accents would be the "many" in the second line
and "moral dilemma" in the forth.
This is skill in the "art" of presenting (or persuading) political issues.
During the tax-rebate thing, he spoke of a small midwestern family of
Hispanic descent - presenting a picture that he was resolving a -ta-da-
"political problem", and was using this very technique of "designed" speech
patterns to "sell" his intentions. And he never really mapped out the plan,
he simply spoke around it.
For the sake of argument, and ASSUMING that my above assertions have merit,
exactly WHERE are the moral issues in this scenario?
(By the way, the above Semi-OT scenario does not genuinely represent my true
feelings)
-urthman 8o]
Urthman
> > > "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
> > > news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
> > > > All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
"Political problems" has two (or more) distinct meanings that can often be
confused in the absence of context. There's the "political process" of
making law, and there's the more "devious" sub-culture surrounding
government that is laced with lobbyists, private interest groups, secret
agendas and a strong need to "look good".
In the "making of laws", for the most part, one would think that a "moral
good" is at the core of the process. I would think that in many
propositions, there is a situational ethics issue that stimulates the need
to "do something about it". But, more often than not, (and imo), laws tend
to compensate for necessary educational content and (or 'thus') to
compensate for stupidity.
Air bag and seat belt laws, for example, protect the drunk driver in what
(to him) is a front end collision, while the poor innocent getting side
swiped (or struck off-axis) is hamburger! These laws are not morally
motivated. Mr. Nihilist says: they are merely compensations and piss-poor
substitutes for "other unresolved inadequacies".
But, even then: the abortion issue has been used as a campaign tool; gun
laws tap at the very heart of the Constitution; the banishing of religion in
schools is a total FUBAR redefinition of "Freedom" of religion; the term
"discrimination" has nothing to do with ethnic-bigotry; and the importance
and legal acceptance of private interest groups, business interests, dubious
campaign donations and lobbyists all run against the core meaning of
democracy.
So, on THIS definition of political problems/issues, I tend to think that
personal self interest and compensating for poor educational standards and
content (and/or for the sake of "appearances") are at the root of most of
the public political issues and activities.
Poor education has provided a huge resource for the politically inclined (a
situation-point where the two distinct definitions come together). Public
stupidity = "convenient" political opportunity!
<snippage to save "paper">
T. Max Devlin
>I'm sorry - I'm an idiot!
>
>> > > "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
>> > > news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
>
>> > > > All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
>
>"Political problems" has two (or more) distinct meanings that can often be
>confused in the absence of context. There's the "political process" of
>making law, and there's the more "devious" sub-culture surrounding
>government that is laced with lobbyists, private interest groups, secret
>agendas and a strong need to "look good".
Or, more honestly, there is the real world, and there is your delusional
fantasies about bad guys who do evil in the real world.
--
T. Max Devlin
*** The best way to convince another is
to state your case moderately and
accurately. - Benjamin Franklin ***
Wordsmith
> I'm sorry - I'm an idiot!
>
> > > > "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
> > > > news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
>
> > > > > All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
>
> "Political problems" has two (or more) distinct meanings that can often be
> confused in the absence of context. There's the "political process" of
> making law, and there's the more "devious" sub-culture surrounding
> government that is laced with lobbyists, private interest groups, secret
> agendas and a strong need to "look good".
I define a political problem thus: any disagreement between/among two or
more people. (A person alone can't have a political problem. One struggling
with oneself has a psychological problem.)
> In the "making of laws", for the most part, one would think that a "moral
> good" is at the core of the process. I would think that in many
> propositions, there is a situational ethics issue that stimulates the need
> to "do something about it". But, more often than not, (and imo), laws tend
> to compensate for necessary educational content and (or 'thus') to
> compensate for stupidity.
Laws are also said to save us from ourselves! *LOL*
> Air bag and seat belt laws, for example, protect the drunk driver in what
> (to him) is a front end collision, while the poor innocent getting side
> swiped (or struck off-axis) is hamburger! These laws are not morally
> motivated. Mr. Nihilist says: they are merely compensations and piss-poor
> substitutes for "other unresolved inadequacies".
Concur. Every time a law is implemented, although it may "solve" one problem,
it creates a whole new group of unforseen problems in the future. So a
course correction in the form of yet another law is needed. Laws upon
laws upon laws...
> But, even then: the abortion issue has been used as a campaign tool; gun
> laws tap at the very heart of the Constitution; the banishing of religion in
> schools is a total FUBAR redefinition of "Freedom" of religion; the term
> "discrimination" has nothing to do with ethnic-bigotry; and the importance
> and legal acceptance of private interest groups, business interests, dubious
> campaign donations and lobbyists all run against the core meaning of
> democracy.
Good examples all.
> So, on THIS definition of political problems/issues, I tend to think that
> personal self interest and compensating for poor educational standards and
> content (and/or for the sake of "appearances") are at the root of most of
> the public political issues and activities.
>
> Poor education has provided a huge resource for the politically inclined (a
> situation-point where the two distinct definitions come together). Public
> stupidity = "convenient" political opportunity!
I guess whether one sees it as parasitic or symbiotic depends on one's
inclination to pessimism or optimism, respectively.
Wordsmith :)
> <snippage to save "paper">
Urthman
"T. Max Devlin" <tm...@commercelinks.net> wrote in message
news:552evt8idnf83npe6...@4ax.com...
> Strolling through alt.philosophy, I heard Urthman say:
> >I'm sorry - I'm an idiot!
> >
> >> > > "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
> >> > > news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
> >
> >> > > > All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
> >
> >"Political problems" has two (or more) distinct meanings that can often
be
> >confused in the absence of context. There's the "political process" of
> >making law, and there's the more "devious" sub-culture surrounding
> >government that is laced with lobbyists, private interest groups, secret
> >agendas and a strong need to "look good".
>
> Or, more honestly, there is the real world, and there is your delusional
> fantasies about bad guys who do evil in the real world.
Evil? What's evil?
You're telling me that there isn't anyone in the real world committing acts
motivated primarily by self-service? And that no one ever lies about their
reasons, and/or intentions?
Please, explain further ...
T. Max Devlin
>"T. Max Devlin" <tm...@commercelinks.net> wrote in message
>news:552evt8idnf83npe6...@4ax.com...
>> Strolling through alt.philosophy, I heard Urthman say:
>> >I'm sorry - I'm an idiot!
>> >
>> >> > > "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
>> >> > > news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
>> >
>> >> > > > All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
>> >
>> >"Political problems" has two (or more) distinct meanings that can often be
>> >confused in the absence of context. There's the "political process" of
>> >making law, and there's the more "devious" sub-culture surrounding
>> >government that is laced with lobbyists, private interest groups, secret
>> >agendas and a strong need to "look good".
>>
>> Or, more honestly, there is the real world, and there is your delusional
>> fantasies about bad guys who do evil in the real world.
>
>Evil? What's evil?
Devious? A strong need to "look good"? Laced with lobbyists? Secret
agendas? These are good things?
>You're telling me that there isn't anyone in the real world committing acts
>motivated primarily by self-service?
I'm saying that trying to explain how humans work using such hopeless
and pointless descriptions is counter-productive, and little more than
assuming your conclusions.
You can accept the presumption that all humans always act from
"self-interest" because there is no other possible motivation. Which is
fine, so long as you realize that this means 'self-interest' is the way
humans are *supposed* to act, and that there is nothing about
self-interest which makes altruism a matter of wanting to 'look good'.
Just because you do not yet understand how altruism is self-interest
does not mean that it cannot be self-interest.
You can, alternatively, reject the materialist teleology and presume
that all humans act from some other more concrete motivation. The issue
becomes how concrete you need to be; is "reason" a motivation, is
"ethical" a motivation, is "happy" a motivation? Throwing them all into
a big box marked "self-interest" doesn't solve the problem, you see. It
only makes deluding yourself easier.
>And that no one ever lies about their
>reasons, and/or intentions?
They try to, that they do. It is silly to say that no-one is ever
dishonest, that's true, but it is a supportable argument (which I
seriously plan to support right here) that no one ever manages to lie
about anything. In every case where someone attempts to lie, they are
forced to select their words in a way which either makes it not a lie,
or makes it an obvious attempt to be dishonest (in some very very few
cases). Sentience is the activity of language, and words cannot be
effectively assembled to claim something which is a "real lie", as it
were.
>Please, explain further ...
The basic ontology is called the philosophy of reason. It explains
self-awareness as sentience and consciousness. Consciousness is the
ability to compare images and experiences. Animals can 'learn', though
we may call it 'conditioned response' or 'limited cognition'. Humans
have a better trick. A consciousness compares mentally and works based
on that comparison. A sentience does much more. A sentience creates a
*word* to label the gestalt of the comparison. Using an inferential
mechanism, language provides a mechanism for building up a mental model
of the universe which, while still quite inaccurate and even delusional,
is nevertheless superior to simple consciousness.
Humans are motivated by a quest for dignity, signified by their desire
to be ethical and happy, at the same time. A balancing act, obviously,
just as Humpty Dumpty prophesied. However, despite decades and possibly
centuries of post-modernism, people continue to use words correctly.
Words are not categories; they are descriptions. The meaning of a word
is not simply its conventional referent, however, but the gestalt of
meaning shared by all previous usage in context. It is this meaning
which causes a sentience to determine whether or not to use a particular
word. This choice, whether purposeful or automatic, ensures that all
claims are true, if you understand them correctly. This mechanism is
consistent for normal speech (rhetoric) rigorous language (analytic) and
true sentiments (metaphoric), and in thus explaining all language
consistently, it presents itself as a universal theory of rhetoric.
Rough Rider II
>
> Wordsmith :)
>
A lot of good posts here that takes this subject to depths. But I always
thought 'politics' was about one thing... obtaining POWER. One must wrest
that away from the opposition before they can put their advocated policy in
effect. In other words, there is no morality that guides political
meanuvering in itself. BUT...part of the game is that one must continue to
appear moral as they play this quite treacherous game [actually, too serious
to be a game really].
Wordsmith
You're a real cynic, RR, you know that? I *do* think politicians are
guided by an ideal of good, but if they choose not to heed the ideal, that
doesn't bode well for them or us. Moral problems arise in individuals, and
then blossom forth into the workaday world in the form of political problems.
Eliminate the former and the latter won't occur. Cause and effect!
Wordsmith :)
T. Max Devlin
>"Rough Rider II" <r...@n-jcenter.com> wrote in message news:<tTBK7.36018$qx2.2...@bin5.nnrp.aus1.giganews.com>...
>> "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
>> news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
>> > All political problems are reducible to moral ones.
>> >
>> > Wordsmith :)
>> >
>>
>> A lot of good posts here that takes this subject to depths. But I always
>> thought 'politics' was about one thing... obtaining POWER. One must wrest
>> that away from the opposition before they can put their advocated policy in
>> effect. In other words, there is no morality that guides political
>> meanuvering in itself. BUT...part of the game is that one must continue to
>> appear moral as they play this quite treacherous game [actually, too serious
>> to be a game really].
>
>You're a real cynic, RR, you know that? I *do* think politicians are
>guided by an ideal of good, but if they choose not to heed the ideal, that
>doesn't bode well for them or us.
Don't you think it is possible that it is when they heed ideals, rather
than other things, like real life, that they bode unwell?
>Moral problems arise in individuals, and
>then blossom forth into the workaday world in the form of political problems.
>Eliminate the former and the latter won't occur. Cause and effect!
Ah, but which is the cause and which the effect requires a consistent
teleology.
I think politicians are just normal reasonable people like everyone
else, and most of the foolish rhetoric like 'Rough Rider' spews is
simply sour grapes and delusion.
Urthman
news:88amvtg1ddu5lvlno...@4ax.com...
Truth or not, it doesn't matter. Perceptions of these matters are far more
"effective" than truth. Given that 49% of those eligible to vote did not
help select a President this past election (regardless of the "real"
reasons) may suggest that there are over 120,000,000 people that share in
this "foolish rhetoric" delusion in one form or another.
Right or wrong - it doesn't matter at all - it is an extremely "effective"
delusion and is gaining momentum (I think there's an "Uncle Al" with a web
page that has far more statistics and info - can't remember the link).
Democracy is a system where we select our own rulers - (paraphrased)
observation from James Madison. This is in conflict with the idea of a
government "For the people, by the people and of the people".
T. Max Devlin
>> I think politicians are just normal reasonable people like everyone
>> else, and most of the foolish rhetoric like 'Rough Rider' spews is
>> simply sour grapes and delusion.
>
>Truth or not, it doesn't matter. Perceptions of these matters are far more
>"effective" than truth.
Having to put the word in quotes indicates it is not being used
properly. Is perception more effective than truth or is it not?
>Given that 49% of those eligible to vote did not
>help select a President this past election (regardless of the "real"
>reasons) may suggest that there are over 120,000,000 people that share in
>this "foolish rhetoric" delusion in one form or another.
I see it similarly; most people realize that as long as a reasonable
president is chosen, they have little reason to vote, and no ability to
outweigh those who are dogmatic in their support of candidate. So long
as the candidate is reasonable, there will be no bloody revolution.
But...
>Right or wrong - it doesn't matter at all - it is an extremely "effective"
>delusion and is gaining momentum (I think there's an "Uncle Al" with a web
>page that has far more statistics and info - can't remember the link).
When you think web pages reflect reality, you've lost touch with
reality.
>Democracy is a system where we select our own rulers - (paraphrased)
>observation from James Madison. This is in conflict with the idea of a
>government "For the people, by the people and of the people".
Huh? I think you're confusing government with lack of government,
actually. There certainly is no fundamental conflict between democracy
and popularism.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
T. Max Devlin
>"T. Max Devlin" <tm...@voicenet.com> wrote in message
>> Strolling through alt.philosophy, I heard Urthman say:
>> >"T. Max Devlin" <tm...@voicenet.com> wrote in message
>> [...]
>> >> I think politicians are just normal reasonable people like everyone
>> >> else, and most of the foolish rhetoric like 'Rough Rider' spews is
>> >> simply sour grapes and delusion.
>> >
>> >Truth or not, it doesn't matter. Perceptions of these matters are far more
>> >"effective" than truth.
>>
>> Having to put the word in quotes indicates it is not being used
>> properly. Is perception more effective than truth or is it not?
>
>application of a term, not necessarily being used, as you phrased it,
>"improperly".
I think we would just differ on the meaning of the term 'properly'. To
me it means the term is not contentious as used in context. You have
put the word in quotes, and as you stated, this indicates you are not
using it the way it normally is.
>[...]The term "effective" used
>in my previous post was placed in quotes because there is nothing explicitly
>in the *design* of perception, per se', for it to have an effect, or to
>affect, decision making.
Apparently we have a difference of opinion on what perception means, as
well. It certainly seems to me as if the "design" of perception (which
obviously is put in quotes because I am not claiming there was a
designer) is entirely and completely for it to have an effect on
decision-making.
>Since it was too much trouble to understand the first time around;
>perceptions have a greater impact on the decision making process than any
>'real' truth, and sometimes even more so than actual belief.
Nice generalization, but it doesn't really mean anything. The only
truth that is truth is real truth, and "actual belief" is perception.
>> >Given that 49% of those eligible to vote did not
>> >help select a President this past election (regardless of the "real"
>> >reasons) may suggest that there are over 120,000,000 people that share in
>> >this "foolish rhetoric" delusion in one form or another.
>>
>> I see it similarly; most people realize that as long as a reasonable
>> president is chosen, they have little reason to vote, and no ability to
>> outweigh those who are dogmatic in their support of candidate. So long
>> as the candidate is reasonable, there will be no bloody revolution.
>> But...
>
>I'm sure that one thought gives you such great comfort. :)
Not any more than any other thought.
>However, while some, or perhaps only a few, may actually feel that way,
>there are a broad range of far less harmless opinions in the mix.
You know what they say about opinions. Considering the fact that most
people do not have (as far as they can explicate) a complete and
consistent morality, have been taught from birth to be post-modernists,
and have become deluded into thinking that the only proper reasoning is
mathematics, I have little concern for their self-reported motivations.
It is not second-guessing to note that they could very well be mistaken.
>And, not
>all of them are necessarily correct or incorrect. Generally, to the one who
>spews, their view is as they perceive it, and perception, especially in the
>absence of real demonstrations to the contrary, drives opinion and response.
I would hope that everyone else would do the same. Are you suggesting a
faith-based alternative to decision-making as a replacement to
perception?
>You, of course, offered your perception which may (or may not) represent
>actual fact, and may not even represent your own actual belief!
Were I a post-modernist, I would be forced to agree. As it stands, I
offered my analysis, which is based on both reasoning and perception, it
represents truth whether it is "actual fact" or just a working
hypothesis, and it is a conviction more than a belief, since it can,
unlike religious sentiment, actually be tested against the real world.
>Revolution (bloody or otherwise) can only be avoided when the will of the
>people is asserted as the fundamental guidelines for offering solutions and
>making rules.
"The will of the people" is an imaginary thing. Persons have will (but
not 'free will'), groups of people do not. You should use "the desires
of the people" to ensure your claim remains true both analytically and
metaphorically. But your claim is true of all things in a society, not
only revolution.
[...]
>> When you think web pages reflect reality, you've lost touch with
>> reality.
>
>If you think that the source of information alone determines it's merit, or
>lack thereof, you've lost touch with reality. :)
I did not mention the source of information, only the method of
publication. When you think web pages reflect reality, you've lost
touch with reality.
>Generally, multiple sources of information are required to make an
>assessment of such an ambiguous topic as politics or the harsh realities of
>not-voting. The one mentioned happens to be only one of them. The CIA
>Factbook web page on the United States discloses the economic failure in
>this country, the DOJ Bureau of Statistics discusses the alarming increase
>in crime and incarceration rates with questionable conviction rates (rape,
>for example, at 5%), and there are numerous other government web sites and
>downloadable PDF files that discuss the collapsing electoral process and
>some of the various reasons people do not vote.
>
>All of these sources collectively indicate a greater problem.
It matters little what odd facts you try to put together, the issue is
identifying the problem more pointedly, and conspiracy theories are
typically broad-ranging.
>So ... define revolution!?! Could consistent and established criminal
>tendencies (established to the point of being a cultural constant) be
>considered a revolution (of sorts)?
No. Revolution is violent overthrow of the government. Rebellion is
local revolution. Certainly, either term can be metaphorically used to
reference just about any human activity, in some context, but that is
not what I was speaking of, hence the adjective "bloody".
>> >Democracy is a system where we select our own rulers - (paraphrased)
>> >observation from James Madison. This is in conflict with the idea of a
>> >government "For the people, by the people and of the people".
>>
>> Huh? I think you're confusing government with lack of government,
>> actually. There certainly is no fundamental conflict between democracy
>> and popularism.
>
>No, I am not. There is a conceptual difference between the ideals of
>Democracy and what has become of the American government. But, more to the
>point, exactly how are we, the people, being represented in government?
Compare ideas to the real world, not ideology, and you won't run into
problems trying to build a perfect government.
>If I was to hire an attorney, agent or manager who then represented me in
>the same fashion and to the same degree as many lawmakers represent their
>constituent bodies, would that actually come close to being even a
>marginally acceptable performance of services?
You cannot hire anyone to represent you in the fashion of a legislator.
>As a pure hypothetical - if an anti-Semitist found himself in the position
>of representing a predominantly Jewish community, would the community suffer
>from this "representation", or would it be more accurate to state that the
>community would suffer from either false or improper representation.
I won't try to base my philosophy on hypothetical people and imaginary
examples. Reason is verified against the real world, not an imaginary
representation of the real world.
>To be
>truly represented should NOT be impacted by the personal beliefs of the
>representative UNLESS he actually represents himself (or something else)
>more, and therefore does NOT do his job! Eventually, the people will rebel!
No, people will never ever be perfectly objective. They cannot, for
that is not what they should be doing. That is no cause for rebellion.
>In essence, James Madison's observation is valid, that democracy had (back
>then) become Pariamentary RULE, not popular rule, and with a dynamic elected
>membership!
Well, you are confusing the republican nature of the government with the
democratic nature of the country. Every person gets a vote, and so it
is a democracy. It is not 'pure' democracy, according to some, because
everyone doesn't vote on every issue. I'm not going to quibble about
ideological labels, however. A dynamically elected legislator is the
democracy which is not popular rule which I was referring to.
>Is this a good thing?
Idealism is rarely a good thing. Checking the real world, the
government is neither perfect nor fatally flawed. Just watch that Bush
fellah; he looks a bit too much like a crusader at this point.
>> Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
>
>Not at all, and, not at all!
Too bad.
Tris
> "T. Max Devlin" <tm...@voicenet.com> wrote in message
> news:88amvtg1ddu5lvlno...@4ax.com...
> > Strolling through alt.philosophy, I heard Wordsmith say:
> > >"Rough Rider II" <r...@n-jcenter.com> wrote in message
> news:<tTBK7.36018$qx2.2...@bin5.nnrp.aus1.giganews.com>...
> > >> "Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
> > >> news:cddcc385.01111...@posting.google.com...
> > I think politicians are just normal reasonable people like everyone
> > else, and most of the foolish rhetoric like 'Rough Rider' spews is
> > simply sour grapes and delusion.
>
> Truth or not, it doesn't matter. Perceptions of these matters are far more
> "effective" than truth. Given that 49% of those eligible to vote did not
> help select a President this past election (regardless of the "real"
> reasons) may suggest that there are over 120,000,000 people that share in
> this "foolish rhetoric" delusion in one form or another.
>
> Right or wrong - it doesn't matter at all - it is an extremely "effective"
> delusion and is gaining momentum (I think there's an "Uncle Al" with a web
> page that has far more statistics and info - can't remember the link).
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
Urthman
"T. Max Devlin" <tm...@voicenet.com> wrote in message
news:07upvt05itt2dugmt...@4ax.com...
> Strolling through alt.philosophy, I heard Urthman say:
> >"T. Max Devlin" <tm...@voicenet.com> wrote in message
> >news:v4fmvt4fpjh65n6ha...@4ax.com...
> >> Strolling through alt.philosophy, I heard Urthman say:
> >> >"T. Max Devlin" <tm...@voicenet.com> wrote in message
> >> [...]
> >> >> I think politicians are just normal reasonable people like everyone
> >> >> else, and most of the foolish rhetoric like 'Rough Rider' spews is
> >> >> simply sour grapes and delusion.
> >> >
> >> >Truth or not, it doesn't matter. Perceptions of these matters are far
more
> >> >"effective" than truth.
> >>
> >> Having to put the word in quotes indicates it is not being used
> >> properly. Is perception more effective than truth or is it not?
> >
> >Often times, the use of quotes indicates a separation from a more
colloquial
> >application of a term, not necessarily being used, as you phrased it,
> >"improperly".
>
> I think we would just differ on the meaning of the term 'properly'. To
> me it means the term is not contentious as used in context. You have
> put the word in quotes, and as you stated, this indicates you are not
> using it the way it normally is.
Ok. I'll agree with that. Clarity is a good thing.
> >[...]The term "effective" used
> >in my previous post was placed in quotes because there is nothing
explicitly
> >in the *design* of perception, per se', for it to have an effect, or to
> >affect, decision making.
>
> Apparently we have a difference of opinion on what perception means, as
> well. It certainly seems to me as if the "design" of perception (which
> obviously is put in quotes because I am not claiming there was a
> designer) is entirely and completely for it to have an effect on
> decision-making.
>
> >Since it was too much trouble to understand the first time around;
> >perceptions have a greater impact on the decision making process than any
> >'real' truth, and sometimes even more so than actual belief.
>
> Nice generalization, but it doesn't really mean anything. The only
> truth that is truth is real truth, and "actual belief" is perception.
A generalization: It takes ten times more information to persuade someone to
change their internalized perception of something than it ever took for them
to make their mind up in the first place. An individual can go through the
same failing routine over and over again and never pay attention to whatever
might be causing things to run off track - especially the blindingly
obvious. Thus, ones perceptions often resist the presentation of reality,
and are generally the ideas that one asserts as truth, which is (by any
definition) belief.
But, despite 'actual' belief, an individual may go against his or her better
judgment and make a decision or take action based on a conflicting
acceptance of programmatic proper protocol, politeness or correctness not
directly related to what they consistently believe to be actually correct
behavior. How many people, for example, continue to go to church with the
family but never adhere to the practices of that faith outside of that
repetitious weekly event?
What we perceive to be the right thing to do has precedence over repeated
evidence that it is wrong and what we may actually believe to be right or
wrong.
> >> >Given that 49% of those eligible to vote did not
> >> >help select a President this past election (regardless of the "real"
> >> >reasons) may suggest that there are over 120,000,000 people that share
in
> >> >this "foolish rhetoric" delusion in one form or another.
> >>
> >> I see it similarly; most people realize that as long as a reasonable
> >> president is chosen, they have little reason to vote, and no ability to
> >> outweigh those who are dogmatic in their support of candidate. So long
> >> as the candidate is reasonable, there will be no bloody revolution.
> >> But...
> >
> >I'm sure that one thought gives you such great comfort. :)
>
> Not any more than any other thought.
>
> >However, while some, or perhaps only a few, may actually feel that way,
> >there are a broad range of far less harmless opinions in the mix.
>
> You know what they say about opinions. Considering the fact that most
> people do not have (as far as they can explicate) a complete and
> consistent morality, have been taught from birth to be post-modernists,
> and have become deluded into thinking that the only proper reasoning is
> mathematics, I have little concern for their self-reported motivations.
> It is not second-guessing to note that they could very well be mistaken.
All legislation is driven by opinions, and assuming that what "they say" has
any relevance, then all legislation is driven by those that have one of
them, also! :)
All {knowledge, thought, belief, understanding} is opinion with varying
degrees of certainty or conviction.
> >And, not
> >all of them are necessarily correct or incorrect. Generally, to the one
who
> >spews, their view is as they perceive it, and perception, especially in
the
> >absence of real demonstrations to the contrary, drives opinion and
response.
>
> I would hope that everyone else would do the same. Are you suggesting a
> faith-based alternative to decision-making as a replacement to
> perception?
All decision making that is not faith based has been designed into machines
for automated mass production. Ideas of spacial coordinates, geometry and
work related physics are settled issues, and on being settled, machines can
be constructed to eliminate inefficient human interference. There is very
little room (if any -or- at this time) for debate, and we have the greatest
faith that we understand the necessary principles while it all appears to be
(at least) mostly reliable.
All decisions are faith-based!
<snip>
> Were I a post-modernist, I would be forced to agree. As it stands, I
> offered my analysis, which is based on both reasoning and perception, it
> represents truth whether it is "actual fact" or just a working
> hypothesis, and it is a conviction more than a belief, since it can,
> unlike religious sentiment, actually be tested against the real world.
>
> >Revolution (bloody or otherwise) can only be avoided when the will of the
> >people is asserted as the fundamental guidelines for offering solutions
and
> >making rules.
>
> "The will of the people" is an imaginary thing. Persons have will (but
> not 'free will'), groups of people do not. You should use "the desires
> of the people" to ensure your claim remains true both analytically and
> metaphorically. But your claim is true of all things in a society, not
> only revolution.
The term 'will' as in the 'will of the people' is indiscinct in that context
from 'wants', 'wishes' or 'desires'. To 'do what you will' is the same as to
'do what you want'. There was no error in that statement.
IMO, 'free will' is an illusion caused by a capacity for idealistic vision
and the capacity to translate imagined ideas into working models. This is
one of those ideas that have been redefined, over time, into something no
longer applicable to humans.
'Free will' is a phenomenon that is simply part of the human behavioral
model, and is certainly not a constant state of being.
Conspiracy-theories of the paranoid tend to be really silly, and generally
suggest a need for psychoanalysis and therapy.
To conspire: to join in a secret agreement to do an unlawful or wrongful act
or an act which becomes unlawful as a result of the secret agreement.
A conspiracy, in a democracy, would typically include any secret activities
that elected members take part in that the people are not entitled to know
about. Closed sessions of Congress, for example, would be conspiracies, but
not necessarily conspiring against the constituent body. The Warren
commission sessions and findings would constitute a conspiracy.
It's the perception of it that defines it, not the actual practice. For
example, despite the fact that an ashtray (clean, of course) can be used as
a candy dish, one might still insist that it is an ashtray. So long as no
one (of any significance) actually sees conspiracy in secrecy, then there is
none, and the candy dish is still an ashtray.
But 'conspiracy' is irrelevant, realized or not. The entire point of the
all-too-common complaint-set is a faint (perhaps instinctive) realization of
a mechanical failure, where, over a long period, the people have had less to
do with government other than the selection of ruling members, and the
government has been slowly chipping away at the original assertions of
freedoms and rights.
In general, ones expectations based on what one has been taught to accept as
the definitive basis for the American Government does not reconcile with
experience. A typical assertion would be that: given Democracy means 'X',
Freedom means 'Y' and Rights mean 'Z', that if one cannot actually perceive
{X, Y AND Z} in the manner that they understand them, then something must be
wrong, and there must be something to fear.
> >So ... define revolution!?! Could consistent and established criminal
> >tendencies (established to the point of being a cultural constant) be
> >considered a revolution (of sorts)?
>
> No. Revolution is violent overthrow of the government. Rebellion is
> local revolution. Certainly, either term can be metaphorically used to
> reference just about any human activity, in some context, but that is
> not what I was speaking of, hence the adjective "bloody".
Revolution in your context is a violent overthrow of government, but the
idea or term is certainly not limited to that single activity. Revolution
includes fundamental change, and any effort for the purpose of causing such
change in the political and/or socioeconomic landscape, or merely within
social paradigm. There is no requirement that it be successful.
Given this expanded definition; consistent and established criminal
tendencies (established to the point of being a cultural constant) can be
considered 'revolution'. The act of defiance is an expression that the
criminal wishes law (not necessarily the one(s) broken) or the
socio-political-economic landscape to be somehow different, and given the
violence associated with the criminal life style (especially in the act of
resisting arrest or carrying out their typical behaviors) it should also
satisfy the requirements of your application as well - by being 'bloody' -
it has simply failed ... so far.
All revolutionaries are considered by their opponent to be criminals. While
the oppressed see themselves as being oppressed, the oppressors see them as
being mindless trouble makers and potential criminals, perhaps someday to
be, themselves, revolting. :)
It's all in the eye of the beholder - ones perception of it, not necessarily
the truth of it.
> >> >Democracy is a system where we select our own rulers - (paraphrased)
> >> >observation from James Madison. This is in conflict with the idea of a
> >> >government "For the people, by the people and of the people".
> >>
> >> Huh? I think you're confusing government with lack of government,
> >> actually. There certainly is no fundamental conflict between democracy
> >> and popularism.
> >
> >No, I am not. There is a conceptual difference between the ideals of
> >Democracy and what has become of the American government. But, more to
the
> >point, exactly how are we, the people, being represented in government?
>
> Compare ideas to the real world, not ideology, and you won't run into
> problems trying to build a perfect government.
What ideology?
> >If I was to hire an attorney, agent or manager who then represented me in
> >the same fashion and to the same degree as many lawmakers represent their
> >constituent bodies, would that actually come close to being even a
> >marginally acceptable performance of services?
>
> You cannot hire anyone to represent you in the fashion of a legislator.
If I were to hire an attorney to represent me, and he failed to consult with
me whatsoever, I'd probably have cause to have him disbarred, especially if
the applicable events don't go my way. If an agent or manager - I'd have
sufficient cause for legal action against them. If my attorney, agent or
manager could make deals without my consult, could be wined and dined to
work against my wishes or best interests ... well ... I guess it's a damn
good thing that I cannot hire anyone to represent me in the same fashion as
a legislator.
On the other hand:
If, however, the attorney, agent or manager were to behave this way and
neither he nor I knew any better, then all would be (perceived as being)
right with the world despite the outcome, and all of my subsequent actions
and decisions in response to that outcome would be driven by these
perceptions. Right, wrong or indifferent - it doesn't really matter.
> >As a pure hypothetical - if an anti-Semitist found himself in the
position
> >of representing a predominantly Jewish community, would the community
suffer
> >from this "representation", or would it be more accurate to state that
the
> >community would suffer from either false or improper representation.
>
> I won't try to base my philosophy on hypothetical people and imaginary
> examples. Reason is verified against the real world, not an imaginary
> representation of the real world.
I don't base my beliefs on hypothetical people and imaginary situations.
Reason is verified against the real world, and in the absence of real world
resources, with available and subjectively qualifiable representations of a
real world model. Accepted philosophical and scientific ideas, alone, cannot
provide all of the answers not otherwise available in the real world. The
anticipation of events and circumstances not accessible within the realm of
actual experience can sometimes be reasonably modeled (or synthesized).
Hypothesis is the primary agent of intended change and invention, both good
and bad. Without hypothesis, there cannot be such change. Speculation is a
primary tool of the various law enforcement agencies. The hypothesis is
made, a synthesis is asserted and the results are evaluated. But it all
begins with the imagined circumstance or scenario and is tested against a
hypothetical model.
One might imagine a change in some thing that exists in the real world for
the purpose of optimizing the use of that thing, or perhaps imagine using it
in a different manner for a different purpose.
(I don't believe that Einstein ever got a train to approach the speed of
light! This, in the absence of real-world experience, is my own assumption
that he did not)
A first-generation assumption can often be reasonably tested in the
real-world, given opportunity and resources, or perhaps functional and
representational examples can be found. A second-generation assumption is
ALMOST worthless without first testing the original assumptions that the
second is based upon. Third-generation speculation is generally unreliable
since the further one gets from the real and experienced world, the lower
the potential for reliability.
To avoid using such resources is as much a failure as overwhelming
indulgence. My hypothetical is a first-generation assumption based on the
definition of being 'representative', and being distinct from 'surrogate'. I
think it's also called a 'thought experiment', but I generally don't 'like'
that phrase. (It's a matter of taste)
But, in the absence of imagined models, there is no innovation, no change
and certainly no growth. In the absence of change, your (or my) philosophy
becomes as dogmatic as any other religion.
> >To be
> >truly represented should NOT be impacted by the personal beliefs of the
> >representative UNLESS he actually represents himself (or something else)
> >more, and therefore does NOT do his job! Eventually, the people will
rebel!
>
> No, people will never ever be perfectly objective. They cannot, for
> that is not what they should be doing. That is no cause for rebellion.
People don't have to be perfectly objective, there is nothing in human
nature to demonstrate this as even a remote possibility; they simply need to
be satisfied that all is right with their perceived world.
> >In essence, James Madison's observation is valid, that democracy had
(back
> >then) become Pariamentary RULE, not popular rule, and with a dynamic
elected
> >membership!
>
> Well, you are confusing the republican nature of the government with the
> democratic nature of the country. Every person gets a vote, and so it
> is a democracy. It is not 'pure' democracy, according to some, because
> everyone doesn't vote on every issue. I'm not going to quibble about
> ideological labels, however. A dynamically elected legislator is the
> democracy which is not popular rule which I was referring to.
Every person gets to select those that can vote directly on the issues. That
is the extent and limit of the peoples power in todays democracy (apart from
referendums and various forms of protest). 'Pure' democracy is impractical,
since it would require that all the people be in session as much as their
representatives would be if there were any, which there wouldn't be in a
'pure' democracy. Thus, the purpose of representation!
The whole idea of being called a 'representative' is because they are
empowered to 'represent' the desires of whomever placed them in office. If
their job is NOT specifically to represent, then this 'title' should be
changed to a more accurate descriptor so as to be much less {confusing,
distracting, deceptive}.
There'd be a much different perception of the election process if the people
were to select an individual to whom they were granting their powers (or to
whom they were giving them away), rather than picking an alleged
'representative'.
> >Is this a good thing?
>
> Idealism is rarely a good thing. Checking the real world, the
> government is neither perfect nor fatally flawed. Just watch that Bush
> fellah; he looks a bit too much like a crusader at this point.
Idealistic vision - the hypothesis - is the agent of change. The American
government would not exist if not for idealism. 'Bloody' revolution would
not occur; we'd still be living in caves muttering giberish. I would not
suggest that cave-dwelling would not be a better thing, however, but what we
have today is a lot more interesting and more fun - or at least, it is what
I am accustomed to, so I merely (behaviorally) assert it as being better.
Blind hero-worship patriotism is usually a dangerous thing - eventually!
Urthman
T. Max Devlin
Shno prob.
>"T. Max Devlin" <tm...@voicenet.com> wrote in message
>> Strolling through alt.philosophy, I heard Urthman say:
[...]
>> I think we would just differ on the meaning of the term 'properly'. To
>> me it means the term is not contentious as used in context. You have
>> put the word in quotes, and as you stated, this indicates you are not
>> using it the way it normally is.
>
>Ok. I'll agree with that. Clarity is a good thing.
[...]
>> >Since it was too much trouble to understand the first time around;
>> >perceptions have a greater impact on the decision making process than any
>> >'real' truth, and sometimes even more so than actual belief.
>>
>> Nice generalization, but it doesn't really mean anything. The only
>> truth that is truth is real truth, and "actual belief" is perception.
>
>A generalization: It takes ten times more information to persuade someone to
>change their internalized perception of something than it ever took for them
>to make their mind up in the first place.
I would say you are off by a rather large number of orders of magnitude,
to be honest.
>An individual can go through the
>same failing routine over and over again and never pay attention to whatever
>might be causing things to run off track - especially the blindingly
>obvious.
Here I disagree, and would have to make a very firm distinction between
thought and action. People are reasonable, and so the number of
failures are quite profound when considering action. But they are
reasoning, so the number of failures is absolutely trivial when
considering thinking.
The real problem is we've built ourselves such a world of ease and
convenience that it requires something quite gargantuan to prompt them
to consider changing their thinking, when it does not require direct
change in their action.
>Thus, ones perceptions often resist the presentation of reality,
>and are generally the ideas that one asserts as truth, which is (by any
>definition) belief.
Again, I'd suggest a dichotomy between the presentation of reality, and
reality. The issues of philosophy are simply so subtle that they might
well die of old age before the combined presentation of reality
sufficiently contradicts their perception that they would be able to
change their mind.
>But, despite 'actual' belief, an individual may go against his or her better
>judgment and make a decision or take action based on a conflicting
>acceptance of programmatic proper protocol, politeness or correctness not
>directly related to what they consistently believe to be actually correct
>behavior.
Here we might devolve into the essentially Freudian theory of
conscious/sub-conscious. I don't believe in the sub-concious, so that's
problematic for me, but I think the problem is resolved by noting that
you are equating decision and action, which I also reject. The issue,
in the end, is not 'correct' behavior or proper behavior, as that
requires only the acceptance of those people that you know, but ethical
behavior, and proper reasoning, which demands a 'universal perspective',
as characterized by the term 'God', or 'panpsychim'.
>How many people, for example, continue to go to church with the
>family but never adhere to the practices of that faith outside of that
>repetitious weekly event?
Well, going to church with the family is one of those practices, so we
need a finer granularity to discuss "proper" behavior, as well as a
wider scope.
>What we perceive to be the right thing to do has precedence over repeated
>evidence that it is wrong and what we may actually believe to be right or
>wrong.
This is the fundamental basis of my "philosophy of reason". Reasoning
is not, as all authorities will claim, a process of deductive logic. It
is a matter of inductive logic, or inference; it requires a large number
of observations to induce any action or behavior (or conclusion leading
to either), rather than a singular 'fact' which somehow magically
disproves a long history of experiences, to convince another. All you
can do is keep trying, as moderately and accurately as you can manage,
to convince them, and it is not because they are stupid that they do not
agree but rather because they are not stupid. They've just been taught
a lot of stupid ideas.
[...]
>All legislation is driven by opinions, and assuming that what "they say" has
>any relevance, then all legislation is driven by those that have one of
>them, also! :)
I think it is important to distinguish various 'types' or bases of
opinion. Legislation is driven by justice, though it might seem odd to
say it, thousands of years after Socrates deconstructed that concept.
All people engaged in legislation believe they are enacting justice, by
codifying what is or is not just. Everyone has an opinion, and that is
pretty much all we have (but for those few who are lucky enough to think
that math is absolute), so to say that all legislation is driven by
opinion is a bit skewed, since there are so many other issues involved.
>All {knowledge, thought, belief, understanding} is opinion with varying
>degrees of certainty or conviction.
This I won't be able to agree with, I'm afraid. Most knowledge is
opinion. Properly scientific knowledge, however, is not. It might be
used to inform an opinion, but it by itself must be considered fact, or
you might as well just adopt a religion and die in ignorance.
[...]
>> I would hope that everyone else would do the same. Are you suggesting a
>> faith-based alternative to decision-making as a replacement to
>> perception?
>
>All decision making that is not faith based has been designed into machines
>for automated mass production.
No, no. Not quite. I will agree that decisions which are not
*prefernence*-based or *opinion*-based can be reduced to an algorithm,
but the vast majority of thought cannot be and certainly has not be so
reduced.
>Ideas of spacial coordinates, geometry and
>work related physics are settled issues, and on being settled, machines can
>be constructed to eliminate inefficient human interference. There is very
>little room (if any -or- at this time) for debate, and we have the greatest
>faith that we understand the necessary principles while it all appears to be
>(at least) mostly reliable.
Between math and real life, you find so little. That is sad. In truth,
there are an infinite number of things which cannot be reduced to
physics.
>All decisions are faith-based!
This is false reasoning, I'm afraid. Decisions might be opinion based,
but if you consider all opinion faith, then you are fooling yourself.
;-)
[...]
>> "The will of the people" is an imaginary thing. Persons have will (but
>> not 'free will'), groups of people do not. You should use "the desires
>> of the people" to ensure your claim remains true both analytically and
>> metaphorically. But your claim is true of all things in a society, not
>> only revolution.
>
>The term 'will' as in the 'will of the people' is indiscinct in that context
>from 'wants', 'wishes' or 'desires'.
I wouldn't go quite that far. You should be able to abstract 'will' as
more volitional, 'want' as less, 'wish' as less concrete (as in not
related to the physical world) and 'desires' as more concrete.
>To 'do what you will' is the same as to
>'do what you want'. There was no error in that statement.
To do what you will is to act based on opinion, on 'free will'. To act
based on want is desire, and is far too closely related to physical
gratification for me to consider it a mature outlook on the world.
>IMO, 'free will' is an illusion caused by a capacity for idealistic vision
>and the capacity to translate imagined ideas into working models.
So you believe you have not chosen your opinion? That you have no free
will and are therefore not responsible for typing those words?
(Note and apology; it is a trick question.)
>This is
>one of those ideas that have been redefined, over time, into something no
>longer applicable to humans.
If so, it is irrelevant, because the issue concerns what *is* applicable
to humans.
>'Free will' is a phenomenon that is simply part of the human behavioral
>model, and is certainly not a constant state of being.
I wasn't using the term to reference either a behavioral model or a
state of being, but simply a mechanism utilized by sentience to modify
the physical world. Do you honestly believe you have no free will?
[...]
>> >Generally, multiple sources of information are required to make an
>> >assessment of such an ambiguous topic as politics or the harsh realities of
>> >not-voting. [...]
>
>> >All of these sources collectively indicate a greater problem.
>>
>> It matters little what odd facts you try to put together, the issue is
>> identifying the problem more pointedly, and conspiracy theories are
>> typically broad-ranging.
>
>Conspiracy-theories of the paranoid tend to be really silly, and generally
>suggest a need for psychoanalysis and therapy.
You better watch that condescending assumption of some absolute
measurement of rationality. It gets in the way when considering
philosophy.
[...]
>But 'conspiracy' is irrelevant, realized or not.
The issue was 'conspiracy theory', not actual conspiracy.
>The entire point of the
>all-too-common complaint-set is a faint (perhaps instinctive) realization of
>a mechanical failure, where, over a long period, the people have had less to
>do with government other than the selection of ruling members, and the
>government has been slowly chipping away at the original assertions of
>freedoms and rights.
As the number of citizens in a society grows, this is a natural effect,
and cannot be arbitrarily defined as a bad thing. Personally, I don't
want to have to double-check every decision by the government, and would
just as soon somebody else handled it while I remained ignorant while I
go about living my life, and I will not apologize for that.
(Returning briefly to an issue of rhetoric and theory; imagine how
different the world might be if we used the phrase "apologize that"
rather than 'apologized for that', in keeping with the literary
definition of 'apology'.)
>In general, ones expectations based on what one has been taught to accept as
>the definitive basis for the American Government does not reconcile with
>experience.
I disagree, but then I'm a supposedly middle-classed white male, so
perhaps I'm deluded.
>A typical assertion would be that: given Democracy means 'X',
>Freedom means 'Y' and Rights mean 'Z', that if one cannot actually perceive
>{X, Y AND Z} in the manner that they understand them, then something must be
>wrong, and there must be something to fear.
Symbolic logic is never going to get you anywhere, if you cannot reduce
the symbols to mathematically defined values of mathematically defined
things. I think you just said that, though. ;-)
[...]
>Revolution in your context is a violent overthrow of government, but the
>idea or term is certainly not limited to that single activity.
But it must be limited to that idea, that gestalt, or it is a
meaningless token in a language which is useless except for concluding
your assumptions.
>Revolution
>includes fundamental change, and any effort for the purpose of causing such
>change in the political and/or socioeconomic landscape, or merely within
>social paradigm. There is no requirement that it be successful.
Actually, there is. A failed revolution is indistinguishable, after the
fact at least, from a rebellion. If it succeeds it creates a new
entity; if it fails, it was an action which occurred only inside a
single entity.
>Given this expanded definition; consistent and established criminal
>tendencies (established to the point of being a cultural constant) can be
>considered 'revolution'.
All the more reason not to expand it that way, then. This is a
totalitarian concept, that any criminal activity is treasonous.
>The act of defiance is an expression that the
>criminal wishes law (not necessarily the one(s) broken) or the
>socio-political-economic landscape to be somehow different, and given the
>violence associated with the criminal life style (especially in the act of
>resisting arrest or carrying out their typical behaviors) it should also
>satisfy the requirements of your application as well - by being 'bloody' -
>it has simply failed ... so far.
A bloody revolution must succeed in order to be a revolution; otherwise
it is a civil war. A criminal is not acting in defiance of the culture
(to act in defiance of a culture requires more than even rebellion), but
simply defying a local statute. Whether that locality is the entire
nation or just a borough, to assume it requires a "life-style" is,
again, totalitarianism. All it requires is disagreement, not rebellion.
>All revolutionaries are considered by their opponent to be criminals.
They are considered to be rebels. They are only criminals if there is a
law against revolution. One of the reasons I am so proud to be an
American is that we reject such notions. The rebels of the south were
not criminals, they were merely rebels, fueled by idealism rather than
morality. I will denigrate them for trying to protect slavery as an
institution; I refuse to fault them for trying to secede so that they
can do so.
>While
>the oppressed see themselves as being oppressed, the oppressors see them as
>being mindless trouble makers and potential criminals, perhaps someday to
>be, themselves, revolting. :)
Everybody sees themselves as the 'good guys', and everyone else as the
'bad guys'. Get used to it.
>It's all in the eye of the beholder - ones perception of it, not necessarily
>the truth of it.
A good way to fail at philosophy is to reduce the argument to
"perception versus truth" thinking, and is always signified by claiming
you know truth while others know only perception. There can be no
difference, in a complete and consistent philosophy.
[...]
>> Compare ideas to the real world, not ideology, and you won't run into
>> problems trying to build a perfect government.
>
>What ideology?
Any and all ideology.
>> >If I was to hire an attorney, agent or manager who then represented me in
>> >the same fashion and to the same degree as many lawmakers represent their
>> >constituent bodies, would that actually come close to being even a
>> >marginally acceptable performance of services?
>>
>> You cannot hire anyone to represent you in the fashion of a legislator.
>
>If I were to hire an attorney to represent me, and he failed to consult with
>me whatsoever, I'd probably have cause to have him disbarred, especially if
>the applicable events don't go my way. If an agent or manager - I'd have
>sufficient cause for legal action against them. If my attorney, agent or
>manager could make deals without my consult, could be wined and dined to
>work against my wishes or best interests ... well ... I guess it's a damn
>good thing that I cannot hire anyone to represent me in the same fashion as
>a legislator.
>
>On the other hand:
>
>If, however, the attorney, agent or manager were to behave this way and
>neither he nor I knew any better, then all would be (perceived as being)
>right with the world despite the outcome, and all of my subsequent actions
>and decisions in response to that outcome would be driven by these
>perceptions. Right, wrong or indifferent - it doesn't really matter.
This is very hard to follow, let alone grasp, let alone understand. But
it seems (appears, is perceived) to me as saying that you will blindly
accept whatever someone you hire tells you. Not a very smart way to
live.
[...]
>> I won't try to base my philosophy on hypothetical people and imaginary
>> examples. Reason is verified against the real world, not an imaginary
>> representation of the real world.
>
>I don't base my beliefs on hypothetical people and imaginary situations.
Oh, you would be surprised, I think, if you understood how seriously
that is meant.
>Reason is verified against the real world, and in the absence of real world
>resources, [...]
It is lies.
>Hypothesis is the primary agent of intended change and invention, both good
>and bad. [...]
Hypothesis is not an agent.
>One might imagine a change in some thing that exists in the real world for
>the purpose of optimizing the use of that thing, or perhaps imagine using it
>in a different manner for a different purpose.
>
>(I don't believe that Einstein ever got a train to approach the speed of
>light! This, in the absence of real-world experience, is my own assumption
>that he did not)
But Einstein did math, not anything else. As for verification against
the real world, there have been a great number of them for Einstein's
math. Your Einstein is hypothetical, and his need to clock the speed of
trains is imaginary.
You see what I mean?
>A first-generation assumption can often be reasonably tested in the
>real-world, given opportunity and resources, or perhaps functional and
>representational examples can be found. A second-generation assumption is
>ALMOST worthless without first testing the original assumptions that the
>second is based upon.
No, it is entirely worthless without doing so. But the identification
of what is a 'generation' will get you into trouble. Einstein's work,
for instance, is first generation, as is every other scientific fact.
>Third-generation speculation is generally unreliable
>since the further one gets from the real and experienced world, the lower
>the potential for reliability.
I think you mean 'prediction' rather than speculation. And it does make
a difference. Indirect evidence is just as good as direct evidence, if
your context remains within the strict realm of science. The matter of
abstraction of knowledge does not easily reduce to integral
"generations".
>To avoid using such resources is as much a failure as overwhelming
>indulgence. My hypothetical is a first-generation assumption based on the
>definition of being 'representative', and being distinct from 'surrogate'. I
>think it's also called a 'thought experiment', but I generally don't 'like'
>that phrase. (It's a matter of taste)
I would use 'gedanken', given the context.
>But, in the absence of imagined models, there is no innovation, no change
>and certainly no growth. In the absence of change, your (or my) philosophy
>becomes as dogmatic as any other religion.
You have effectively replicated the work of Popper. He said it in terms
that other philosophers will buy into, and you have not, but the essence
of the idea is the same. But despite that, he still railed against
imagined models, by demanding that induction be rejected and deduction
be entirely embraced for science to be valid, just as I insist that
reasoning must be verified against the real world for ideas to be valid.
[...]
>People don't have to be perfectly objective, there is nothing in human
>nature to demonstrate this as even a remote possibility;
That last I cannot agree with, for mathematics is demonstrably valid and
objective.
>they simply need to
>be satisfied that all is right with their perceived world.
Well, all people want to be happy, certainly, but they also want to be
ethical, and this entails an endless conviction that all is not right
with their perceived world, and needs modification through their own
efforts.
[...]
>There'd be a much different perception of the election process if the people
>were to select an individual to whom they were granting their powers (or to
>whom they were giving them away), rather than picking an alleged
>'representative'.
I don't see that there is any difference. I think we disagree on what
the representative is representing. You believe (I'm afraid to say that
this is the common rhetorical idea, with no insult intended) that they
represent your ideals, and I believe they merely represent your
political power. Which is, obviously, slight. But in the aggregate is
mighty. A representative should vote *their* conscience, however, not
yours. So it behooves you to be careful when you vote (which explains
the dearth of real voters in our democracy quite handily, as well).
>> >Is this a good thing?
>>
>> Idealism is rarely a good thing. Checking the real world, the
>> government is neither perfect nor fatally flawed. Just watch that Bush
>> fellah; he looks a bit too much like a crusader at this point.
>
>Idealistic vision - the hypothesis - is the agent of change.
Impossible. Only actions can be an agent of change.
>The American
>government would not exist if not for idealism. [...]
True, but meaningless.