The "Problem" of Consciousness
andy-k
the closest concept we can find in order to give voice to that mystery --
the word we latch onto is "consciousness", but this word already has many
common everyday uses that only serve to obfuscate the issue. This noun
subliminally suggests to us that consciousness is a "thing", misleading us
into an implicit assumption of substance metaphysics. From here we feel
obliged to fall into one of three categories -- substance dualism,
materialistic monism, or idealistic monism. What I'm suggesting here that
this choice follows in the wake of a grammatical error, and that we can gain
a clearer perspective by nipping that error in the bud.
There have been many attempts to describe how the word "consciousness" is
being used in this particular application, and one serious problem is the
diversity of interpretations leading to much argumentation at
cross-purposes. Many such interpretations do not address the profound
mystery at the heart of this issue, but something quite unrelated, and
Chalmers has fittingly referred to papers that adopt such an interpretation
as a "bait-and-switch". The profound mystery being referred to here is the
problem of how the whole (within which the part resides) makes its
appearance (albeit a partial appearance) within the part (or to put it
better, as an aspect of the part).
This approach forces us to acknowledge our metaphysical prejudice in favor
of what has, unfortunately, become known as "realism" -- i.e. the implicit
belief that the world appearing within the part is not the "real world"
(thereby assuming a distinction between "appearance" and "reality",
phenomenon and noumenon). The alternative metaphysical hypothesis (i.e.
that this distinction is invalid) has disparagingly become known as
"anti-realism", and even more confusingly, as "direct realism" in contrast
to "indirect realism" (the latter also being known as "representational
realism").
Just to confuse the issue even more, some refer to anti-realism as
"idealism", yanking substance metaphysics back into the frame after its
explicit rejection. I suspect that this is because we face a similar problem
to that accompanying the adoption of the word "consciousness" when we adopt
the word "reality" in relation to this "realist/anti-realist" distinction --
i.e. we make of it another "thing", misleading us into an implicit
assumption of substance metaphysics.
It should be clear that what I'm getting at here is that the real "problem
of consciousness" is our misappropriation of language in respect of this
profound mystery. Call me a "new mysterian" if you will, but if the only
alternative is eliminativism then I'd rather be a new mysterian than an
ostrich any day. The big question for me is how to refer to this distinction
(I can no longer bring myself to refer to it as the "realist/anti-realist"
distinction) without falling into misleading grammatical errors. Perhaps
then we could discuss the subject without wasting time on such
misunderstandings.
Sir Frederick
An approach that might be akin to your "new mysterian" might
be the holism approach that allows "organizing principles" to
be in effect which are not dependent on any "part principles"
as promoted by reductionism. Part of any hard part would
be in allowing and formally stating any holistic
"organizing principles". Another part of the hard part is the
manifest personal experience we all seem to find. Even
with that experience judged an illusion based on self deceit,
the conjuring up of the illusion, complete with qualia, is "dumfounding".
--
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcn...@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
http://members.cox.net/fmmcneill
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"For all our conceits about being the center of the universe, we live in a routine planet of a humdrum star stuck away in an obscure corner ... on an unexceptional galaxy which is one of about 100 billion galaxies. That is the fundamental fact of the universe we inhabit, and it is very good for us to understand that."
- Carl Sagan (1934-1996)
:-))))Snort!)
**************************************
ara...@coldmail.nu
Here is a chart (jpg file) for sorting out philosophical choices.
According to it, the best ontological and epistemological combination
is non-reductive materialism and direct perception after it branches
from direct realism. Everything else oozes into solipsism, if you go by
those dotted lines that trace the consequences. Only the messenger, any
swords and pistols drawn should be waved at mysterious authority
figures.
http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/philo1.jpg
Web page source: http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/Appendix1.htm
* * * * * * *
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:SbGgg.4271$uP....@newsfe2-gui.ntli.net...
later, since it appears to me that whatever mystery there is is a mystery
only for those who insist on thinking about it in certain ways), I will
point out that I suspect part of our problem is looking at the whole matter
from the standpoint of the rather complex consciousness of a human being.
Many single-celled creatures are heliotropic. Now certainly there is SOME
sense in which the individual cells are "aware" of the light (i.e., in one
sense of the word are conscious of it), otherwise they would move about more
or less randomly (I know, not really randomly) rather than move toward the
light source. What is mysterious about that? Living things, from the
beginning, have manifested awareness; a plant will manifest root growth in
damp, nutrient rich soil, but not in dry sandy soil (if both are available);
surely some species of awareness is involved. Perhaps, your mystery of
consciousness is merely the mystery of life in disguise.
BS
andy-k
> Here is a chart (jpg file) for sorting out philosophical choices.
> According to it, the best ontological and epistemological combination
> is non-reductive materialism and direct perception after it branches
> from direct realism. Everything else oozes into solipsism, if you go by
> those dotted lines that trace the consequences. Only the messenger, any
> swords and pistols drawn should be waved at mysterious authority
> figures.
>
> http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/philo1.jpg
>
> Web page source: http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/Appendix1.htm
Thanks for that. I think the author examines the problem from precisely the
perspective I described as being grounded in grammatical errors, and
consequently ends up opting for a materialist ontology.
andy-k
> An approach that might be akin to your "new mysterian" might
> be the holism approach that allows "organizing principles" to
> be in effect which are not dependent on any "part principles"
> as promoted by reductionism. Part of any hard part would
> be in allowing and formally stating any holistic
> "organizing principles". Another part of the hard part is the
> manifest personal experience we all seem to find. Even
> with that experience judged an illusion based on self deceit,
> the conjuring up of the illusion, complete with qualia, is "dumfounding".
The fact that the world makes its appearance in the part is indeed
"dumbfounding" and undermines so-called "representational realism".
andy-k
> Without attempting to address this whole "mystery" (I may have more on
> that later, since it appears to me that whatever mystery there is is a
> mystery only for those who insist on thinking about it in certain ways), I
> will point out that I suspect part of our problem is looking at the whole
> matter from the standpoint of the rather complex consciousness of a human
> being. Many single-celled creatures are heliotropic. Now certainly there
> is SOME sense in which the individual cells are "aware" of the light
> (i.e., in one sense of the word are conscious of it), otherwise they would
> move about more or less randomly (I know, not really randomly) rather than
> move toward the light source. What is mysterious about that? Living
> things, from the beginning, have manifested awareness; a plant will
> manifest root growth in damp, nutrient rich soil, but not in dry sandy
> soil (if both are available); surely some species of awareness is
> involved. Perhaps, your mystery of consciousness is merely the mystery of
> life in disguise.
There's no denying that living systems respond to environmental stimuli, as
do many non-living systems. The word "consciousness" may perhaps justifiably
be used to describe the behavior of such systems. However, this simply
points up the difficulties associated with using this same word for the
application I described: the problem of how the whole (within which the part
turtoni
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
""Romance"" and emotions are more tools to be utilized by the energy moving
forward.
Where is came from and where it's going is I'm afraid seemingly none of our
business.
Burkar...@web.de
humans
from "the rest of the world" as from intelligent animals etc.
For me, consciousness is not something we do have or don't have but
something a (natural or artifical) system has more or less when we
think
about its inner states and its relationship to the environment.
One question is not *if* but *how much* conscious something is:
How much does something know about it inner states (desires, goals...)?
I think that all living (and some artifical) things have inherent
'goals' such as
plants need sunshine and water, animals also other food. The level of
consciousness then is the level of possibilities of how to reach the
goals
and especially about the "how" about the "hows" which also implies
learning/adaptation.
Burkart
andy-k
Yes, that's another way of defining consciousness, but unfortunately one
that is at variance with the definition I stipulated in my original post.
The "profound mystery" I referred to pertained to the definition I
stipulated.This just goes to show how treacherous language can be.
Anthony G. Rubino
andy-k wrote:
>
>Yes, that's another way of defining
>consciousness, but unfortunately one
>that is at variance with the definition I
>stipulated in my original post. The
>"profound mystery" I referred to
>pertained to the definition I
>stipulated.This just goes to show how
>treacherous language can be.
>
Consciousness is not a problem. Withought consciousness there could be
no solutions. One purpose of consciousness is to enable us to find
solutions. Sometimes we consciously create problems to exercise our
ability to do so. Sometimes we confuse ourselves because the solution is
not the one desired.
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/trisector/
So many misconceptions, so little time.
andy-k
> Consciousness is not a problem. Withought consciousness there could be no
> solutions. One purpose of consciousness is to enable us to find solutions.
> Sometimes we consciously create problems to exercise our ability to do so.
> Sometimes we confuse ourselves because the solution is not the one
> desired.
You may define consciousness that way if you wish, and others may define
consciousness as they wish, but the profound mystery being referred to here
is the problem of how the whole (within which the part resides) makes its
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
I guess I just fail to see why this "problem" which you discern is not just
a matter of the complexity of the awareness(es?) involved. I see a direct
evolutionary development from the "simple" awareness of the amoeba, through
the more complex awarenesses of the various stages of plant and animal. I
can discern no sharp cleavage between human awareness and that of the rest
of the living world. In fact, I regard thinking that way about it (i.e.,
that there is a sharp cleavage) is part of what generates the
pseudo-mystery. Your "definition" of consciousness (a whole appearing in a
an aspect of part of the whole) has absolutely no relationship to anything
which I experience in my awarenesses of myself or other things. I have
never to my knowledge been aware of the "whole" of myself or of anything
else. I am aware that I am aware, that is all. And, say, in visual
experience it is not the whole of me that is aware; it is my eyes which,
primarily, are aware (and whatever it is that the eye stimulates on the
receipt of light - retina, optic nerve, etc. - that I am NOT aware of; and
my glutimus maximus is not involved in the awareness either). If you
talking about some sort of "non-bodily" awareness which is a whole, I,
personally, have no awareness of any such entity.
BS
Anthony G. Rubino
andy-k wrote:
>
>You may define consciousness that way
>if you wish, and others may define
>consciousness as they wish, but the
>profound mystery being referred to here
>is the problem of how the whole (within
>which the part resides) makes its
>appearance (albeit a partial appearance)
>within the part (or to put it better, as an
>aspect of the part).
>
Does the partial appearance of the whole that appears in the part of the
whole that resides in the whole as an aspect of the part exist in any
sense? What is the nature of that existent? Is it conscious to anyone,
or to itself? If it is only conscious to itself, or if is not conscious
to anyone, what difference could it make to anyone how it made such an
appearance? To whom is it a profound mystery?
andy-k
> I guess I just fail to see why this "problem" which you discern is not
> just a matter of the complexity of the awareness(es?) involved. I see a
> direct evolutionary development from the "simple" awareness of the amoeba,
> through the more complex awarenesses of the various stages of plant and
> animal. I can discern no sharp cleavage between human awareness and that
> of the rest of the living world. In fact, I regard thinking that way
> about it (i.e., that there is a sharp cleavage) is part of what generates
> the pseudo-mystery.
I regard the direct evolutionary development from the simple to the complex
as a development of the data processing capability of the organism, and as
such there is, as you say, no discernible discontinuity. But if the mystery
I'm referring to may be accounted for in terms of data processing alone,
then all data processing systems should be equivalent in this respect, even
artifactual systems from the simple thermostat to the most complex of
supercomputers. Would you entertain such a hypothesis, or have I made an
error in my reasoning?
> Your "definition" of consciousness (a whole appearing
> in a an aspect of part of the whole) has absolutely no relationship to
> anything which I experience in my awarenesses of myself or other things.
> I have never to my knowledge been aware of the "whole" of myself or of
> anything else. I am aware that I am aware, that is all. And, say, in
> visual experience it is not the whole of me that is aware; it is my eyes
> which, primarily, are aware (and whatever it is that the eye stimulates on
> the receipt of light - retina, optic nerve, etc. - that I am NOT aware of;
> and my glutimus maximus is not involved in the awareness either). If you
> talking about some sort of "non-bodily" awareness which is a whole, I,
> personally, have no awareness of any such entity.
No, I think it's much simpler than that. The world presents itself. That
presentation gives the impression of being not the whole world but only a
part of it -- and a part that is consistent with there being a 'me' that is
taking a perspective upon the world as a part might take a perspective upon
the whole in which it is embedded. I don't think I'm saying anything
contentious here, but it does refer back to the point above -- does the
world present itself to, say, a pocket calculator in the same way?
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> "Bill Snyder" wrote:
>> I guess I just fail to see why this "problem" which you discern is not
>> just a matter of the complexity of the awareness(es?) involved. I see a
>> direct evolutionary development from the "simple" awareness of the
>> amoeba,
>> through the more complex awarenesses of the various stages of plant and
>> animal. I can discern no sharp cleavage between human awareness and that
>> of the rest of the living world. In fact, I regard thinking that way
>> about it (i.e., that there is a sharp cleavage) is part of what generates
>> the pseudo-mystery.
>
> I regard the direct evolutionary development from the simple to the
> complex
> as a development of the data processing capability of the organism, and as
> such there is, as you say, no discernible discontinuity. But if the
> mystery
> I'm referring to may be accounted for in terms of data processing alone,
> then all data processing systems should be equivalent in this respect,
> even
> artifactual systems from the simple thermostat to the most complex of
> supercomputers. Would you entertain such a hypothesis, or have I made an
> error in my reasoning?
>
are machines, whether a simple lever or a complex super-computer. If we
ever do get quantum computers, my view might change. I am having some fun
right now with Lloyd's Programming the Universe, in which he asks us to view
the whole universe as a quantum computer. It makes a kind of sense, but it
appears to me to be just a somewhat more complex version of mechanism, and
it does insist on treating the universe as a single unified whole. If I am
going to think of the universe that way (as a single unified whole), then I
would much prefer to think of the cosmos as a single living organsim born in
the "bang" and growing and developing as the living thing which it is.
>
>> Your "definition" of consciousness (a whole appearing
>> in a an aspect of part of the whole) has absolutely no relationship to
>> anything which I experience in my awarenesses of myself or other things.
>> I have never to my knowledge been aware of the "whole" of myself or of
>> anything else. I am aware that I am aware, that is all. And, say, in
>> visual experience it is not the whole of me that is aware; it is my eyes
>> which, primarily, are aware (and whatever it is that the eye stimulates
>> on
>> the receipt of light - retina, optic nerve, etc. - that I am NOT aware
>> of;
>> and my glutimus maximus is not involved in the awareness either). If you
>> talking about some sort of "non-bodily" awareness which is a whole, I,
>> personally, have no awareness of any such entity.
>
> No, I think it's much simpler than that. The world presents itself. That
> presentation gives the impression of being not the whole world but only a
> part of it -- and a part that is consistent with there being a 'me' that
> is
> taking a perspective upon the world as a part might take a perspective
> upon
> the whole in which it is embedded. I don't think I'm saying anything
> contentious here, but it does refer back to the point above -- does the
> world present itself to, say, a pocket calculator in the same way?
world presenting itself. It does no such thing; it is just there. That
perspective which is me experiences these and those things and activities
and then IN THOUGHT constructs the idea of a whole world of which the
perspective and things and activities are all a part. Since
thought-constructs exist only in thought, then of course the world presents
itself in the same way to me and to a pocket computer, i.e., it doesn't
PRESENT itself at all. The world is encountered by that active "me"
perspective (and presumably by other active sentient perspectives); but it
is encountered in bits and pieces, never as a whole (except after we have
constructed the concept of a "whole" world; then, it is encountered in
thought).
I suspect your "problem" or "mystery" arises out of mixing together what
exists only in thought with what is encountered as one lives in the world.
BS
Bob
wrote:
>If we ever do get quantum computers, my view might change.
Quantum cryptography is considered an instance of quantum computation
because an algorithm is executed to change plaintext into ciphertext.
--
"There is much to be said in favor of
the Internet. By giving us the opinions
of the uneducated, it keeps us in touch
with the ignorance of the community."
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>>
>> I regard the direct evolutionary development from the simple to the
>> complex as a development of the data processing capability of the
>> organism, and as such there is, as you say, no discernible discontinuity.
>> But if the mystery I'm referring to may be accounted for in terms of data
>> processing alone, then all data processing systems should be equivalent
>> in this respect, even artifactual systems from the simple thermostat to
>> the most complex of supercomputers. Would you entertain such a
>> hypothesis, or have I made an error in my reasoning?
>
> Not only would I entertain such a hypothesis, I would embrace it.
> Machines are machines, whether a simple lever or a complex super-computer.
> If we ever do get quantum computers, my view might change. I am having
> some fun right now with Lloyd's Programming the Universe, in which he asks
> us to view the whole universe as a quantum computer. It makes a kind of
> sense, but it appears to me to be just a somewhat more complex version of
> mechanism, and it does insist on treating the universe as a single unified
> whole. If I am going to think of the universe that way (as a single
> unified whole), then I would much prefer to think of the cosmos as a
> single living organsim born in the "bang" and growing and developing as
> the living thing which it is.
Most of the data processing that takes place in my brain doesn't make any
appearance in the world "as I experience it". If all data processing
systems are equivalent in this respect, then why is the world "as I
experience it" associated with only the data processing that goes on in a
very small part of my brain, rather than all of my brain? Or are there are
other perspectives generated by other parts of my brain that aren't
accessible from the part of my brain that's associated with the world
"as I experience it"?
>> The world presents itself. That presentation gives the impression of
>> being not the whole world but only a part of it -- and a part that is
>> consistent with there being a 'me' that is taking a perspective upon the
>> world as a part might take a perspective upon the whole in which it is
>> embedded. I don't think I'm saying anything contentious here, but it does
>> refer back to the point above -- does the world present itself to, say, a
>> pocket calculator in the same way?
>
> Our use of words would differ radically here. I would never speak of the
> world presenting itself. It does no such thing; it is just there. That
> perspective which is me experiences these and those things and activities
> and then IN THOUGHT constructs the idea of a whole world of which the
> perspective and things and activities are all a part. Since
> thought-constructs exist only in thought, then of course the world
> presents itself in the same way to me and to a pocket computer, i.e., it
> doesn't PRESENT itself at all. The world is encountered by that active
> "me" perspective (and presumably by other active sentient perspectives);
> but it is encountered in bits and pieces, never as a whole (except after
> we have constructed the concept of a "whole" world; then, it is
> encountered in thought).
I don't think we're so far apart on this as you have surmised, Bill. I was
wrestling with wording here, and "The world is" didn't seem enough.
However, if you're happy with that, then so am I. My argument still
stands -- the world that "just is" exhibits sufficient order to manifest as
a subjective perspective upon a more encompassing world that is in itself a
thought construct, a conceptual world-model, growing within the world that
"just is".
The issue here, then, is the status of this "more encompassing world" and
its relation to the world that "just is" -- is it nothing over and above a
thought construct within the world that "just is"? Your approach above --
embracing the hypothesis that every data processing system is associated
with its own "world that just is" -- would seem to suggest an answer in the
negative.
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
just those types of awareness that it has. So, the awareness grounded in
the sight, hearing, memory, etc., regions of the brain are those which
served the survival of the species best . Are there types of awareness
which are attainable which utilize other areas of the brain? I can see no
reason to say "No." And I have some grounds in my past for saying "Yes."
Why are we as we are? For the species, evolution. For the individual, the
genetic inheritance and the process of conditioned growth and development
which has taken place. I have no need for further explanation.
I believe I did not express the view which you just attributed to me
("embracing the hypothesis that every data processing system is associated
with its own 'world that just is'"); I do not even understand its meaning.
So, if I said anything that is equivalent to that, I misspoke in an
unintelligible (to me) manner.
My perspective is that that active dingus we are calling me moves about,
looks, listens, etc. and thereby encounters a "world". That "world", of
course, contains activity of its own which we learn about as we encounter
those activities. But when I say that, from the perspective of the me
dingus, the world just is, I mean simply that from the perspective of the me
dingus, there is a "given" place within which the encounters take place. I
do not mean to attribute some absolute type of existence to that place.
What that place is in which the encounters happen grows and develops as the
me grows and develops. I would not say that the me is aware of THE world,
but of A world which it has learned about through its encounters.
As for the status of the "more encompassing" world, it is a
thought-construct, as is THE world. Notice I did not say "mere"
thought-construct. That is a mere and smear use of the word. We cannot
live and function without thought-constructs. We just have to choose
carefully which ones we use and give any type of allegiance to, and, even
then, be wary that they do not mislead us.
BS
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>>
>> Most of the data processing that takes place in my brain doesn't make any
>> appearance in the world "as I experience it". If all data processing
>> systems are equivalent in this respect, then why is the world "as I
>> experience it" associated with only the data processing that goes on in a
>> very small part of my brain, rather than all of my brain? Or are there
>> are other perspectives generated by other parts of my brain that aren't
>> accessible from the part of my brain that's associated with the world "as
>> I experience it"?
>
> My response would be that the evolutionary process produced a creature
> with just those types of awareness that it has. So, the awareness
> grounded in the sight, hearing, memory, etc., regions of the brain are
> those which served the survival of the species best . Are there types of
> awareness which are attainable which utilize other areas of the brain? I
> can see no reason to say "No." And I have some grounds in my past for
> saying "Yes." Why are we as we are? For the species, evolution. For the
> individual, the genetic inheritance and the process of conditioned growth
> and development which has taken place. I have no need for further
> explanation.
It looks like you're saying that the world in which evolution proceeds is
prior to (more fundamental than) the world "as I experience it" (i.e. to the
world that "just is"), but I suspect you'd take issue with any claim for
priority here.
>> I don't think we're so far apart on this as you have surmised, Bill.
>> I was wrestling with wording here, and "The world is" didn't seem enough.
>> However, if you're happy with that, then so am I. My argument still
>> stands -- the world that "just is" exhibits sufficient order to manifest
>> as a subjective perspective upon a more encompassing world that is in
>> itself a thought construct, a conceptual world-model, growing within the
>> world that "just is".
>>
>> The issue here, then, is the status of this "more encompassing world" and
>> its relation to the world that "just is" -- is it nothing over and above
>> a thought construct within the world that "just is"? Your approach
>> above -- embracing the hypothesis that every data processing system is
>> associated with its own "world that just is" -- would seem to suggest an
>> answer in the negative.
>
> I believe I did not express the view which you just attributed to me
> ("embracing the hypothesis that every data processing system is associated
> with its own 'world that just is'"); I do not even understand its meaning.
> So, if I said anything that is equivalent to that, I misspoke in an
> unintelligible (to me) manner.
It is a mystery to me that the world that "just is" is somehow associated
with a data processing system in a more encompassing world (my brain)
that is part of the conceptual world-model appearing within the world that
"just is". If that mystery may be accounted for in terms of data processing
alone, as I understood you to be saying, then all data processing systems
should be equivalent in this respect, even artifactual systems from the
simple thermostat to the most complex of supercomputers. That is to say that
all data processing systems, regardless of their provenance, would be
associated with a world that, for them, "just is". Would you entertain such
a hypothesis, or have I made an error in my reasoning?
> My perspective is that that active dingus we are calling me moves about,
> looks, listens, etc. and thereby encounters a "world". That "world", of
> course, contains activity of its own which we learn about as we encounter
> those activities. But when I say that, from the perspective of the me
> dingus, the world just is, I mean simply that from the perspective of the
> me dingus, there is a "given" place within which the encounters take
> place. I do not mean to attribute some absolute type of existence to that
> place. What that place is in which the encounters happen grows and
> develops as the me grows and develops. I would not say that the me is
> aware of THE world, but of A world which it has learned about through its
> encounters.
>
> As for the status of the "more encompassing" world, it is a
> thought-construct, as is THE world. Notice I did not say "mere"
> thought-construct. That is a mere and smear use of the word. We cannot
> live and function without thought-constructs. We just have to choose
> carefully which ones we use and give any type of allegiance to, and, even
> then, be wary that they do not mislead us.
The place within which the encounters of the "me dingus" take place, and
the world that "just is" (the world "as I experience it") are, if I'm not
mistaken, different ways of saying the same thing. Referring back to the
issue of priority that I mentioned above, you say that the world in which
evolution takes place (i.e. the "more encompassing world") has produced a
creature with just that type of awareness that manifests as the world that,
for that creature, "just is". But if the claim for priority here is
mistaken, then the world that "just is" and the "more encompassing" world
must be co-arising -- i.e. there never was one without the other.
Am I correct to suspect that you take issue with that claim for priority?
And if so, then is my conclusion at fault?
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
my use of language. I may have spoken that way to emphasize that the idea
of the world presenting itself is wrong; BUT, I think that I have disavowed
such an idea both above and below. The "me dingus" and the "world" are
merely two poles of a process which is continuously becoming other than what
it has been. To treat either pole as an entity which possesses any kind of
self-existence is to create thought-constructs which lead quickly to
illusion.
As for the business about data-processing, that is wholly your language. I
would not speak that way. What goes on within the brain may have some
similarities to what many call data-processing, but as near as I can tell
from my brief forays into the neurological sciences (I wish there were as
many good quasi-popular summaries of those developments as there are of
stuff about the cosmos) that may NOT be anywhere near all that is happening
in the nervous system. And as far as I can tell, living things are the only
sentient beings. And, yes, I know that we can build machines which ape some
of the behaviors of sentient beings. I regard the idea that living things
are just complex machines to be plain silly. Build me a machine that
reproduces itself in the manner of an amoeba! Then, I might begin to be
persuaded that mechanism is a point of view to be taken seriously.
I will not repeat what I said above except to point out that I see the place
wherein the encounters occur to be constantly becoming other than it has
been, just as the me pole is doing the same.
As for co-arising, since both are thought-constructs they may or may not
both arise at the same time. Throughout our discussion here, you seem bent
on reifying (substantializing) all nouns and verbal expressions and thereby
create the "problem" or "mystery" which appears to bother you. There is no
"more-encompassing world" in contrast to a "less-encompassing one" except in
thought; there is no "me dingus" or "place of encounters" except in thought.
ALL distinctions arise in thought and should be treated as thought-objects.
What follows from that for me is that your "problem" is merely a conceptual
conundrum and what is needed is more careful attention to the "grammar" (to
use Buddha Thu's word) of the various terms being used. But, I have long
since lost any interest in attempting to unravel such purely conceptual
puzzles.
BS
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>>
>> It is a mystery to me that the world that "just is" is somehow associated
>> with a data processing system in a more encompassing world (my brain)
>> that is part of the conceptual world-model appearing within the world
>> that "just is". If that mystery may be accounted for in terms of data
>> processing alone, as I understood you to be saying, then all data
>> processing systems should be equivalent in this respect, even artifactual
>> systems from the simple thermostat to the most complex of supercomputers.
>> That is to say that all data processing systems, regardless of their
>> provenance, would be associated with a world that, for them, "just is".
>> Would you entertain such a hypothesis, or have I made an error in my
>> reasoning?
>
> We have major problems with language. There is no world that "just is" in
> my use of language. I may have spoken that way to emphasize that the idea
> of the world presenting itself is wrong; BUT, I think that I have
> disavowed such an idea both above and below. The "me dingus" and the
> "world" are merely two poles of a process which is continuously becoming
> other than what it has been. To treat either pole as an entity which
> possesses any kind of self-existence is to create thought-constructs which
> lead quickly to illusion.
I didn't mean to give the impression that I consider the "me" and the
"world" to have any kind of self-existence -- "two poles of a process of
continual becoming" suits me fine.
> As for the business about data-processing, that is wholly your language.
> I would not speak that way. What goes on within the brain may have some
> similarities to what many call data-processing, but as near as I can tell
> from my brief forays into the neurological sciences (I wish there were as
> many good quasi-popular summaries of those developments as there are of
> stuff about the cosmos) that may NOT be anywhere near all that is
> happening in the nervous system. And as far as I can tell, living things
> are the only sentient beings. And, yes, I know that we can build machines
> which ape some of the behaviors of sentient beings. I regard the idea
> that living things are just complex machines to be plain silly. Build me
> a machine that reproduces itself in the manner of an amoeba! Then, I
> might begin to be persuaded that mechanism is a point of view to be taken
> seriously.
Your comment that "data-processing [...] may NOT be anywhere near all that
is happening in the nervous system" comes pretty close to what I have
described as the "mystery". If I understand you correctly then you're saying
that you don't consider any artifactual data processing system to be
associated with a pole in the process of continual becoming in the same
manner that the human brain is.
>> The place within which the encounters of the "me dingus" take place, and
>> the world that "just is" (the world "as I experience it") are, if I'm not
>> mistaken, different ways of saying the same thing. Referring back to the
>> issue of priority that I mentioned above, you say that the world in which
>> evolution takes place (i.e. the "more encompassing world") has produced a
>> creature with just that type of awareness that manifests as the world
>> that, for that creature, "just is". But if the claim for priority here is
>> mistaken, then the world that "just is" and the "more encompassing" world
>> must be co-arising -- i.e. there never was one without the other.
>> Am I correct to suspect that you take issue with that claim for priority?
>> And if so, then is my conclusion at fault?
<snip>
> As for co-arising, since both are thought-constructs they may or may not
> both arise at the same time.
I see a connection here that I find intriguing. If the human brain is
associated with a pole in the process of becoming, and the world is another
pole in that same process, then a multiplicity of human brains in the world
would mean there are a multiplicity of poles accompanying the "world pole".
The connection I see is Plotinus' comment that individual souls and the
World Soul are "siblings".
> Throughout our discussion here, you seem bent on reifying
> (substantializing) all nouns and verbal expressions and thereby create the
> "problem" or "mystery" which appears to bother you. There is no
> "more-encompassing world" in contrast to a "less-encompassing one" except
> in thought; there is no "me dingus" or "place of encounters" except in
> thought. ALL distinctions arise in thought and should be treated as
> thought-objects.
>
> What follows from that for me is that your "problem" is merely a
> conceptual conundrum and what is needed is more careful attention to the
> "grammar" (to use Buddha Thu's word) of the various terms being used.
> But, I have long since lost any interest in attempting to unravel such
> purely conceptual puzzles.
I'm afraid I still enjoy them immensely.
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> (snip)
> Your comment that "data-processing [...] may NOT be anywhere near all that
> is happening in the nervous system" comes pretty close to what I have
> described as the "mystery". If I understand you correctly then you're
> saying
> that you don't consider any artifactual data processing system to be
> associated with a pole in the process of continual becoming in the same
> manner that the human brain is.
>
whole of a person. It is the whole human being including the whole nervous
system which functions as some sort of plurality in unity, not just the
brain. And it is not just human beings, but, sentient beings which have
the distinctive polar relationship with the world. And the whole human
being is not what is the pole opposed to the "place" of encounters. It is
awareness that is one pole and that of which the encounter creates a
specific awareness that is the other pole. We come to be aware of ourselves
as this specific bodily creature through the encounters as we come to be
aware of specific features of a world through the encounters (but note it is
the specific features that are primary; we become aware of a world only
later in the growth of awareness and the awareness of a world is through
thought about that of which we are aware). That awareness has some sort of
special relationship to a brain is constructed knowledge not something given
in experience.
If the mystery is associated with what is going on in the nervous system,
then it is an empirical problem best left to the neurological sciences.
No, I do not see how one can maintain (with my position) that there is one
world pole which is the same for the many polar awarenesses. In a sense,
there are as many "worlds" (i.e., places where encounters occur) as there
are sentient beings. Restricting myself to human beings, that these many
worlds have much in common and may each be but a perspective on "the" world
is a view acquired as the infant becomes a child and then continues to
mature. And, I believe, it is only a partially valid view. There are
significant repects in which individuals live in different worlds (in more
usual objectivist jargon, have quite different perspectives on "the" world).
The idea that there is but one cosmos (world) of which we all are a part,
and which can be investigated and known, but on which we may have quite
different perspectives, is a quite sophisticated thought-construct (which I
largely consider valid). But that idea is in no way fundamental to our
awarenesses of the various features of a world; nor is it mandated by those
awarenesses.
I am kind of surprised that you have not raised an obvious "objection" to
some of what I have been saying. If what is fundamental is a development
with two poles, one awareness, and the other a specific awareness occasioned
by the encounter, then where do the thought-constructs come from. What
creates the thought-constructs (including the thought-construct of the polar
development)? That appears to be the real "mystery". The question has a
close kinship with what is central to a number of koans: what is it that is
enlightened? We have eliminated any substantial self-being, indeed any kind
of self both outside of and within the skandhas. Does the thing that
creates thought-constructs and may become enlightened create itself? Or is
the world and the self only a bad dream playing on the surface of whatever
it is that is? Am I a butterfly dreaming that I am Bill Snyder, or am I
Bill Snyder dreaming that I am a butterfly? Whatever it is that is
ignorant, creates thought-constucts, and becomes enlightened, what is it?!?
Now, that IS a mystery.
Finally, my passing reference to Chuang Tzu may indicate to you that these
days I am far more a Taoist than a Buddhist, except for the sunyadavada and
Nagarjuna (and the Four Noble Truths).
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> that is happening in the nervous system" comes pretty close to what I
>> have described as the "mystery". If I understand you correctly then
>> you're saying that you don't consider any artifactual data processing
>> system to be associated with a pole in the process of continual becoming
>> in the same manner that the human brain is.
>
> I find it somewhat disturbing that your appear to treat the brain as the
> whole of a person. It is the whole human being including the whole
> nervous system which functions as some sort of plurality in unity, not
> just the brain.
Yes indeed -- criticism accepted.
> And it is not just human beings, but, sentient beings which have the
> distinctive polar relationship with the world.
A hypothesis to which I subscribe.
> And the whole human being is not what is the pole opposed to the "place"
> of encounters. It is awareness that is one pole and that of which the
> encounter creates a specific awareness that is the other pole. We come to
> be aware of ourselves as this specific bodily creature through the
> encounters as we come to be aware of specific features of a world through
> the encounters (but note it is the specific features that are primary; we
> become aware of a world only later in the growth of awareness and the
> awareness of a world is through thought about that of which we are aware).
> That awareness has some sort of special relationship to a brain is
> constructed knowledge not something given in experience.
I have difficulty separating constructed knowledge from what is given in
experience -- i.e. the idea that there could be what is given in experience
in the absence of constructed knowledge is just more constructed knowledge.
> If the mystery is associated with what is going on in the nervous system,
> then it is an empirical problem best left to the neurological sciences.
The challenge for any science is to find hypotheses that are testable,
and so far the scientists don't seem to be doing any better than the
philosophers.
>> I see a connection here that I find intriguing. If the human brain is
>> associated with a pole in the process of becoming, and the world is
>> another pole in that same process, then a multiplicity of human brains in
>> the world would mean there are a multiplicity of poles accompanying the
>> "world pole". The connection I see is Plotinus' comment that individual
>> souls and the World Soul are "siblings".
>
> No, I do not see how one can maintain (with my position) that there is one
> world pole which is the same for the many polar awarenesses. In a sense,
> there are as many "worlds" (i.e., places where encounters occur) as there
> are sentient beings. Restricting myself to human beings, that these many
> worlds have much in common and may each be but a perspective on "the"
> world is a view acquired as the infant becomes a child and then continues
> to mature. And, I believe, it is only a partially valid view. There are
> significant repects in which individuals live in different worlds (in more
> usual objectivist jargon, have quite different perspectives on "the"
> world). The idea that there is but one cosmos (world) of which we all are
> a part, and which can be investigated and known, but on which we may have
> quite different perspectives, is a quite sophisticated thought-construct
> (which I largely consider valid). But that idea is in no way fundamental
> to our awarenesses of the various features of a world; nor is it mandated
> by those awarenesses.
I think I understand what you're getting at here, but I still feel that each
member of the plurality of "processes of becoming" (each having its two
poles) must encompass (and be encompassed by) others in order for any
process of becoming to make an appearance in the "world pole" of another
as a sentient being. The implication is that there is an underlying unity
(or "World Soul") in association with that plurality.
> I am kind of surprised that you have not raised an obvious "objection" to
> some of what I have been saying. If what is fundamental is a development
> with two poles, one awareness, and the other a specific awareness
> occasioned by the encounter, then where do the thought-constructs come
> from. What creates the thought-constructs (including the
> thought-construct of the polar development)? That appears to be the real
> "mystery". The question has a close kinship with what is central to a
> number of koans: what is it that is enlightened? We have eliminated any
> substantial self-being, indeed any kind of self both outside of and within
> the skandhas. Does the thing that creates thought-constructs and may
> become enlightened create itself? Or is the world and the self only a bad
> dream playing on the surface of whatever it is that is? Am I a butterfly
> dreaming that I am Bill Snyder, or am I Bill Snyder dreaming that I am a
> butterfly? Whatever it is that is ignorant, creates thought-constucts,
> and becomes enlightened, what is it?!? Now, that IS a mystery.
You may not have intended your question to be taken literally so you may
have to forgive me here, but the idea that thought-constructs are "created"
by something (i.e. something *other* than thought-constructs) seems just to
be another thought-construct, and one that I feel more than a little wary
of. The question "what is it that is enlightened?" seems to mislead one into
thinking of self as a "thing", or at least to reinforce that idea (but
supposedly in order to focus attention on that presumption so that it may be
recognized as a thought-construct). The more direct question "where do
thought-constructs come from?" seems rather akin to the question "why is
there anything rather than nothing?" -- this is another question I find
troublesome because of the idea of "nothing" (in an absolute sense). All
roads lead to paradox, but it may be the case that some paradoxes aren't
just symptoms of our ignorance. Provisionally it suits me to accept that
thought-constructs "just are", which is why I didn't raise that objection.
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
is a myth. I am Kantian (to cite a western example) on the issue of
experience (or perhaps "perception" is a better word). All of our
experience is through and through structured by form. Even his hypothesis
of "raw data of sense" is questionable (and was for Kant); certainly if
there is such there is no way to get at it through structured experience. I
don't agree with Kant on the origin of that form which I see coming from the
hard wiring of the nervous system and from the conditioning prcess
(especially the acquisition of language) that impinges on the infant from
birth (if not before).
becoming (in sentient A) CAN make an appearance in the "world pole" of
another sentient being (in sentient B). I would use Leibniz's metaphor of
windowless monads here except it implies separate substances and the
windowlessness is only in respect to other sentient beings not to the world.
I really do believe that it is not possible for sentient A to exerience the
experiences of sentient B. No one else but me can experience my itches.
That we can comuunicate with each other and agree on many things about the
world (and you can agree with me that that rash itches) does not imply that
what directly relates to my "encounters" can appear in your sentience. The
encounters of any sentient are distinct and unique to that sentient; what is
learned through the encounters may be similar with what another sentient
learns through its encounters and the two sentients may share what they have
learned; but the encounters are unique to each sentient. Hence, I see no
point to a world soul.
thought-constructs in the individual, which I actually mentioned above in
relation to Kant: the hard-wiring of the nervous system and the social
conditioning process (especially the acquisition of language). But
fundamentally I agree with you. Part of the point of the question "What is
it that is enlightened?" is that the question is in a sense meaningless or,
perhaps better, that one must see past the question and its sugggested
paradox (in the Buddhist tradition) and then dissolve the question. But,
intellectually there still remain the apparent paradoxes and mysteries which
the intellect cannot resolve, except by putting them aside and, then,
ignoring them. Why does anything at all exist? You can analyze the meaning
or lack of meaning of the "why". You can explore the "anything" and its
"existence". You can reject the question. Yet, it still remains as the
"fundamental ground" of Metaphysics (in the speculative sense). And, in
defense of Heidegger, it is in that context that he expresses the question.
When we engage in speculation about origins (of the cosmos, of sentience, of
whatever) are we not seeking an answer to the question "why?" and not just
"how?" Maybe we should not be doing that, but aren't we (until we realize
what we are doing and the embarrassedly stop doing it for a time)?
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> is in experience -- i.e. the idea that there could be what is given in
>> experience in the absence of constructed knowledge is just more
>> constructed knowledge.
>
> I fully agree and had not intended to imply that. The "given" in
> experience is a myth. I am Kantian (to cite a western example) on the
> issue of experience (or perhaps "perception" is a better word). All of
> our experience is through and through structured by form. Even his
> hypothesis of "raw data of sense" is questionable (and was for Kant);
> certainly if there is such there is no way to get at it through structured
> experience. I don't agree with Kant on the origin of that form which I
> see coming from the hard wiring of the nervous system and from the
> conditioning prcess (especially the acquisition of language) that
> impinges on the infant from birth (if not before).
The idea of the hard wiring of the nervous system and the idea of the
conditioning process are part of that form, so it seems to me that we
must fall back on co-arising once again.
>> I think I understand what you're getting at here, but I still feel that
>> each member of the plurality of "processes of becoming" (each having
>> its two poles) must encompass (and be encompassed by) others in order
>> for any process of becoming to make an appearance in the "world pole"
>> of another as a sentient being. The implication is that there is an
>> underlying unity (or "World Soul") in association with that plurality.
>
> I suspect our diagreement here is that I do not believe that any process
> of becoming (in sentient A) CAN make an appearance in the "world pole"
> of another sentient being (in sentient B). I would use Leibniz's metaphor
> of windowless monads here except it implies separate substances and
> the windowlessness is only in respect to other sentient beings not to the
> world. I really do believe that it is not possible for sentient A to
> exerience the experiences of sentient B. No one else but me can
> experience my itches. That we can comuunicate with each other and agree
> on many things about the world (and you can agree with me that that rash
> itches) does not imply that what directly relates to my "encounters" can
> appear in your sentience. The encounters of any sentient are distinct and
> unique to that sentient; what is learned through the encounters may be
> similar with what another sentient learns through its encounters and the
> two sentients may share what they have learned; but the encounters are
> unique to each sentient. Hence, I see no point to a world soul.
I wasn't referring to a case of sentient A experiencing *the experiences of*
sentient B, but rather to sentient A experiencing sentient B. Now we get
back to my original point -- that there are two aspects to any sentient
being, firstly the experience of a world in which other sentient beings
appear, and secondly its appearance in the world that those other sentient
beings experience. We make an appearance in each others worlds.
We most certainly are.
Burkar...@web.de
> This just goes to show how treacherous language can be.
Yes, you are right. Unfortunately, a lot of people speak about
complicated things with "high" notions which can be interpretated in
many different ways and sometimes with loosing the 'real' basis. 'Real'
for me is when everything is consistent within *one* world (of
thinking), without any inconsistencies.
Burkart
1Z
Bill Snyder wrote:
> I fully agree and had not intended to imply that. The "given" in experience
> is a myth. I am Kantian (to cite a western example) on the issue of
> experience (or perhaps "perception" is a better word). All of our
> experience is through and through structured by form. Even his hypothesis
> of "raw data of sense" is questionable (and was for Kant);
If the data were never raw, how can they be meaningfully said to be
cooked or "structured by form" ?
Bill Snyder
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
>
> I wasn't referring to a case of sentient A experiencing *the experiences
> of*
> sentient B, but rather to sentient A experiencing sentient B. Now we get
> back to my original point -- that there are two aspects to any sentient
> being, firstly the experience of a world in which other sentient beings
> appear, and secondly its appearance in the world that those other sentient
> beings experience. We make an appearance in each others worlds.
>
case if there is one cosmos of which we are all a part. We encounter each
other. Now of course I recognize that the hypothesis of one cosmos of which
we are all a part, is a highly sophisticated thought-construct of the kind
known as eempirical hypotheses. But it does appear to me that there is an
awful lot of empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis, and that one
would be a fool to believe otherwise. If we are all a part of one cosmos
and live in the same neighborhood in that cosmos, how could we not encounter
one another and thus be in one another's "world poles"? So, I am in your
"world pole" and you are in mine. How could it be otherwise if we are
encountering one another?
I am quite willing to entertain as a speculative hypothesis that the cosmos
is a living being (and, hence, has a world soul, in Aristotle's sense of
"soul"). But, I certainly regard it as nothing but speculation and do not
see how the fact that sentient beings sometimes occur in each other's world
poles gives us any reason for believing that speculative hypothesis.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> of* sentient B, but rather to sentient A experiencing sentient B. Now we
>> get back to my original point -- that there are two aspects to any
>> sentient being, firstly the experience of a world in which other sentient
>> beings appear, and secondly its appearance in the world that those other
>> sentient beings experience. We make an appearance in each others worlds.
>>
> Then I am back to not seeing why that is a problem.
The challenge is to provide a testable hypothesis that explains how sentient
B (amongst everything else) can make an appearance in the world pole of
sentient A. I believe the absence of any such hypothesis to be what Chalmers
refers to as the "explanatory gap".
George Dance
> We intuit that there is a profound mystery to be addressed, and latch onto
> the closest concept we can find in order to give voice to that mystery --
> the word we latch onto is "consciousness", but this word already has many
> common everyday uses that only serve to obfuscate the issue. This noun
> subliminally suggests to us that consciousness is a "thing", misleading us
> into an implicit assumption of substance metaphysics. From here we feel
> obliged to fall into one of three categories -- substance dualism,
> materialistic monism, or idealistic monism. What I'm suggesting here that
> this choice follows in the wake of a grammatical error, and that we can gain
> a clearer perspective by nipping that error in the bud.
>
> There have been many attempts to describe how the word "consciousness" is
> being used in this particular application, and one serious problem is the
> diversity of interpretations leading to much argumentation at
> cross-purposes. Many such interpretations do not address the profound
> mystery at the heart of this issue, but something quite unrelated, and
> Chalmers has fittingly referred to papers that adopt such an interpretation
> as a "bait-and-switch". The profound mystery being referred to here is the
> problem of how the whole (within which the part resides) makes its
> appearance (albeit a partial appearance) within the part (or to put it
> better, as an aspect of the part).
>
> This approach forces us to acknowledge our metaphysical prejudice in favor
> of what has, unfortunately, become known as "realism" -- i.e. the implicit
> belief that the world appearing within the part is not the "real world"
> (thereby assuming a distinction between "appearance" and "reality",
> phenomenon and noumenon). The alternative metaphysical hypothesis (i.e.
> that this distinction is invalid) has disparagingly become known as
> "anti-realism", and even more confusingly, as "direct realism" in contrast
> to "indirect realism" (the latter also being known as "representational
> realism").
>
> Just to confuse the issue even more, some refer to anti-realism as
> "idealism", yanking substance metaphysics back into the frame after its
> explicit rejection. I suspect that this is because we face a similar problem
> to that accompanying the adoption of the word "consciousness" when we adopt
> the word "reality" in relation to this "realist/anti-realist" distinction --
> i.e. we make of it another "thing", misleading us into an implicit
> assumption of substance metaphysics.
>
> It should be clear that what I'm getting at here is that the real "problem
> of consciousness" is our misappropriation of language in respect of this
> profound mystery. Call me a "new mysterian" if you will, but if the only
> alternative is eliminativism then I'd rather be a new mysterian than an
> ostrich any day. The big question for me is how to refer to this distinction
> (I can no longer bring myself to refer to it as the "realist/anti-realist"
> distinction) without falling into misleading grammatical errors. Perhaps
> then we could discuss the subject without wasting time on such
> misunderstandings.
Put aside the theorizing for a moment and go with with what you know.
What you know (I'm assuming) is that you're aware of thoughts. Some
you're aware of more than once; some of those you can be aware of
whenever you want. What can you make of that?
1) You know that there's such a thing as your awareness, and that it's
not the same thing as any of the ideas you're aware of - since for each
one, sometimes you're aware but not aware of it. So that's two types
of existents - your awareness, and the ideas.
2) Since you can be aware of the same idea at different times (at
least, two ideas which are no different in any way you can see) it's
reasonable to infer that it is the same idea; meaning that it continues
to exist even when you aren't aware of it. That means it exists
somewhere else than your awareness - but somewhere else that's linked
to your awareness in the sense that an idea can pass from it to
awareness with no difficulty.
3) Since you're willing awareness (or perhaps lack of awareness) of
different ideas from time to time, you can infer the existence of one
other thing besides 1 and 2, whatever it is that allows you to move an
idea from non-awreness to awareness and vice versa - or your 'will.'
4) The whole related system - 1, 2, and 3 - is what's called
consciousness.
You, I, and everyone else knows that much about consciousness. But
that's about it.
That of course doesn't answer any of your questions. What it does, I
hope, is allow you to go back to the various theories with a base of
sure knowledge, independent of any of them, that may allow you to judge
among them.
andy-k
>
> Put aside the theorizing for a moment and go with with what you know.
> What you know (I'm assuming) is that you're aware of thoughts. Some
> you're aware of more than once; some of those you can be aware of
> whenever you want. What can you make of that?
>
> 1) You know that there's such a thing as your awareness, and that it's
> not the same thing as any of the ideas you're aware of - since for each
> one, sometimes you're aware but not aware of it. So that's two types
> of existents - your awareness, and the ideas.
There is the idea of self as an organism in its environment. Consequent upon
this idea of self is the idea that the organism has an internal copy of its
external environment, and that this internal copy is what is presently
manifest. And consequent upon this idea of representation is the idea that
the organism has awareness of its environment. The upshot is that
"awareness" is quite a high-level abstracted concept rather than something
"immediately known".
> 2) Since you can be aware of the same idea at different times (at
> least, two ideas which are no different in any way you can see) it's
> reasonable to infer that it is the same idea; meaning that it continues
> to exist even when you aren't aware of it. That means it exists
> somewhere else than your awareness - but somewhere else that's linked
> to your awareness in the sense that an idea can pass from it to
> awareness with no difficulty.
You can't step into the same river twice.
> 3) Since you're willing awareness (or perhaps lack of awareness) of
> different ideas from time to time, you can infer the existence of one
> other thing besides 1 and 2, whatever it is that allows you to move an
> idea from non-awreness to awareness and vice versa - or your 'will.'
"Will" is yet another thought abstracted from the concept of self as an
organism in its environment.
1Z
andy-k wrote:
> The challenge is to provide a testable hypothesis that explains how sentient
> B (amongst everything else) can make an appearance in the world pole of
> sentient A.
The question of qualia needs to be separated from the question of
representations.
If you have two video cameras and turm them towards each other, camera
A records camera B and vice ersa. Each makes "an appearance" to the
other.
Representation is purely structural and easily explained within
physicalism.
But the cameras do not have qualia, and physicalism has a problem
explaining
qualia. But not all qualia are part of representations in humans --
moods
have phenomenal feels too.
andy-k
Yes, the organism harbors a representation of its external environment and
its internal states in the form of information states mapping outputs to
inputs, and as such organisms often appear in each other's representations.
All of that may be explicable in terms of data processing alone, but not
e.g. the taste of a lemon. So we want to make a distinction between data
"in the world" and data "in me", and we end up qualifying the latter as
though it were a subset of the former (e.g. "data of consciousness", or
"data of experience"). But "the world" and "the me" are, as Bill has pointed
out, different poles of a single process consisting of thought-constructs.
If all inhomogeneity in that process may be referred to as data, then the
situation is reversed -- i.e. it is systems-data that is the subset. I
suspect, then, that the "question of qualia" is just a result of trying to
account for the set in terms of the subset -- or looking down the wrong end
of the telescope.
1Z
andy-k wrote:
> "1Z" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> >
> >> The challenge is to provide a testable hypothesis that explains how
> >> sentient B (amongst everything else) can make an appearance in the world
> >> pole of sentient A.
> >
> > The question of qualia needs to be separated from the question of
> > representations.
> >
> > If you have two video cameras and turm them towards each other, camera A
> > records camera B and vice ersa. Each makes "an appearance" to the other.
> > Representation is purely structural and easily explained within
> > physicalism. But the cameras do not have qualia, and physicalism has a
> > problem explaining qualia. But not all qualia are part of representations
> > in humans -- moods have phenomenal feels too.
>
> Yes, the organism harbors a representation of its external environment and
> its internal states in the form of information states mapping outputs to
> inputs, and as such organisms often appear in each other's representations.
> All of that may be explicable in terms of data processing alone, but not
> e.g. the taste of a lemon. So we want to make a distinction between data
> "in the world" and data "in me", and we end up qualifying the latter as
> though it were a subset of the former (e.g. "data of consciousness", or
> "data of experience")
Everything is a subset of "the world" -- but not necessarily of "the
external
world" or the "world-as-it-appears-to-me".
> . But "the world" and "the me" are, as Bill has pointed
> out, different poles of a single process consisting of thought-constructs.
The world -- THE world -- is not a thought construct."the external
world" or the "world-as-it-appears-to-me" may well be.
> If all inhomogeneity in that process may be referred to as data, then the
> situation is reversed -- i.e. it is systems-data that is the subset. I
> suspect, then, that the "question of qualia" is just a result of trying to
> account for the set in terms of the subset -- or looking down the wrong end
> of the telescope.
Your idealist conclusion comes from an equivocation on "world".
Qualia are part of the world..
The-world-as-it-appears-to-me is my construct.
andy-k
> The world -- THE world -- is not a thought construct
OH YES IT IS.
(Your turn.)
1Z
There must have been a world before there was a thought...
1Z
There must have been a world before there was a thought...
andy-k
> There must have been a world before there was a thought...
You'd think so, wouldn't you?
1Z
I would think that thought, yes.
The thought would not think itself.
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> "1Z" wrote:
>> > There must have been a world before there was a thought...
>>
>> You'd think so, wouldn't you?
>
> I would think that thought, yes.
"I" is just another thought.
1Z
So you disappear when I stop thinking about you ?
1Z
So you disappear when I stop thinking about you ?
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>>
>> "I" is just another thought.
>
> So you disappear when I stop thinking about you ?
No, the "I" disappears when I stop thinking about me.
Bill Snyder
"1Z" <peter...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1150142506.6...@c74g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
("me-pole") does not think "I" (the enduring substantive ego), the "I"
ceases to exist. As Descartes pointed out, you exist because you think that
you do. If you stop thinking that nonsense then your "I exist" ceases.
BS
1Z
That wasn't what I asked.
andy-k
Perhaps you missed my answer to what you asked then -- it was right at the
start of my reply.
1Z
I =/= "I"
George Dance
> "George Dance" wrote:
> >
> > Put aside the theorizing for a moment and go with with what you know.
> > What you know (I'm assuming) is that you're aware of thoughts. Some
> > you're aware of more than once; some of those you can be aware of
> > whenever you want. What can you make of that?
> >
> > 1) You know that there's such a thing as your awareness, and that it's
> > not the same thing as any of the ideas you're aware of - since for each
> > one, sometimes you're aware but not aware of it. So that's two types
> > of existents - your awareness, and the ideas.
>
> There is the idea of self as an organism in its environment. Consequent upon
> this idea of self is the idea that the organism has an internal copy of its
> external environment, and that this internal copy is what is presently
> manifest. And consequent upon this idea of representation is the idea that
> the organism has awareness of its environment. The upshot is that
> "awareness" is quite a high-level abstracted concept rather than something
> "immediately known".
But there's no reason to think that an organizm (or whatever) has to
have abstracted that concept before it can be aware of anything, that
looks false by immediate observation - by the evidence, my cat is as
aware of me as I am of it, for example. OTC, being aware of one's
environment looks necessary to even form a concept of the self as an
organism in its environment.
> > 2) Since you can be aware of the same idea at different times (at
> > least, two ideas which are no different in any way you can see) it's
> > reasonable to infer that it is the same idea; meaning that it continues
> > to exist even when you aren't aware of it. That means it exists
> > somewhere else than your awareness - but somewhere else that's linked
> > to your awareness in the sense that an idea can pass from it to
> > awareness with no difficulty.
>
> You can't step into the same river twice.
>
True; but that's a weak analogy. In what way is an idea like "5*2=10"
like a river? What reason to think that, when a person is aware of,
say, "5*2=10" on two different occasions, he's actually been aware of
two different thoughts rather than the same thought two different
times?
> > 3) Since you're willing awareness (or perhaps lack of awareness) of
> > different ideas from time to time, you can infer the existence of one
> > other thing besides 1 and 2, whatever it is that allows you to move an
> > idea from non-awreness to awareness and vice versa - or your 'will.'
>
> "Will" is yet another thought abstracted from the concept of self as an
> organism in its environment.
>
But again there's no evidence that it's necessary to abstract the
concept of 'will' in order to will anything. If I pick up my cat, it
will evidently will to get down; but there's no evidence of it having
an abstrac concept of 'will.'
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> "George Dance" wrote:
>> >
>> > 1) You know that there's such a thing as your awareness, and that it's
>> > not the same thing as any of the ideas you're aware of - since for each
>> > one, sometimes you're aware but not aware of it. So that's two types
>> > of existents - your awareness, and the ideas.
>>
>> There is the idea of self as an organism in its environment. Consequent
>> upon this idea of self is the idea that the organism has an internal copy
>> of its external environment, and that this internal copy is what is
>> presently manifest. And consequent upon this idea of representation is
>> the idea that the organism has awareness of its environment. The upshot
>> is that "awareness" is quite a high-level abstracted concept rather than
>> something "immediately known".
>
> But there's no reason to think that an organizm (or whatever) has to
> have abstracted that concept before it can be aware of anything, that
> looks false by immediate observation - by the evidence, my cat is as
> aware of me as I am of it, for example. OTC, being aware of one's
> environment looks necessary to even form a concept of the self as an
> organism in its environment.
I'm not arguing that the organism doesn't process data about its
environment and provide responses that are matched to that data
(sorry for the double negative). If you want to limit the concept of
awareness to the stimulus-response type of data processing then
that's all well and good, but when certain philosophers talk about the
"problem of consciousness" they aren't talking about the processing
of systems data but about what is "presently manifest" (I use that
phrase to remain consistent with the description I gave above).
>> > 2) Since you can be aware of the same idea at different times (at
>> > least, two ideas which are no different in any way you can see) it's
>> > reasonable to infer that it is the same idea; meaning that it continues
>> > to exist even when you aren't aware of it. That means it exists
>> > somewhere else than your awareness - but somewhere else that's linked
>> > to your awareness in the sense that an idea can pass from it to
>> > awareness with no difficulty.
>>
>> You can't step into the same river twice.
>
> True; but that's a weak analogy. In what way is an idea like "5*2=10"
> like a river? What reason to think that, when a person is aware of,
> say, "5*2=10" on two different occasions, he's actually been aware of
> two different thoughts rather than the same thought two different
> times?
I think there's a problem with language here. There is a process that we
call "thinking", but we abstract certain aspects of that process and reify
those aspects as if they were "things" in their own rights. It may be more
appropriate to say that thinking is the process of abstracting "things" out
of the continuum of another process, and that the thinking process has
become reflexive when we talk about thoughts. Some aspects of that
process remain invariant over the long term whilst others are ephemeral
(just like the various aspects of a water course), and so an aspect that
exhibits invariance (like the idea that 5*2=10) may repeatedly arise within
the thinking process.
>> > 3) Since you're willing awareness (or perhaps lack of awareness) of
>> > different ideas from time to time, you can infer the existence of one
>> > other thing besides 1 and 2, whatever it is that allows you to move an
>> > idea from non-awreness to awareness and vice versa - or your 'will.'
>>
>> "Will" is yet another thought abstracted from the concept of self as an
>> organism in its environment.
>>
> But again there's no evidence that it's necessary to abstract the
> concept of 'will' in order to will anything. If I pick up my cat, it
> will evidently will to get down; but there's no evidence of it having
> an abstrac concept of 'will.'
I would suggest that your cat is motivated by its desire to reduce
the discomfort it feels at being picked up, rather than by delayed
gratification. The latter is a very high level aspect of the thinking
process that demands the ability to contemplate "what is not".