Causal Realism
Immortalist
Causal realism assumes that the causes of our sense experience are
physical objects in the external world. Causal realism takes as its
starting point the observation that the main biological function of our
senses is to help us find our way around our environment. It is through
our senses that we acquire beliefs about our environment. According to
causal realism, when I see my guitar what actually happens is that
light rays reflected from the guitar cause certain effects on my retina
and on other areas of my brain. This leads to me acquiring certain
beliefs about what I am seeing. The experience of acquiring the beliefs
is the experience of seeing my guitar.
The route by which we acquire perceptual beliefs is important: not just
any route will do. For me actually to see my guitar it is essential
that my guitar is the cause of the beliefs I acquire about it. The
appropriate causal link for seeing is that brought about by an object
reflecting light rays on to my retina and the subsequent processing of
this information in my brain. If, for example, I was under the
influence of drugs and was merely hallucinating, then this would not be
a case of seeing my guitar. The drug rather than the guitar would have
been the cause of my beliefs.
Seeing is a matter of acquiring information about my surroundings
rather than producing mental representations of any kind. Like
representative realism, causal realism assumes that there really is an
external world which continues to exist whether or not it is being
experienced. It also assumes that the beliefs we acquire through our
sense organs are generally true - that is why as a result of natural
selection in the course of evolution our sense receptors are as they
are: they tend to give us reliable information about our environment.
Another great advantage of causal realism over rival theories of
perception is that it can easily explain the fact that our existing
knowledge affects what we perceive. In acquiring information our system
of classification, and our existing knowledge, directly affect how we
treat incoming information and what we select and interpret as
relevant. We will return to this in the section on 'Observation' in the
next chapter (see pp. 83-5).
Criticisms of causal realism
- Experience of seeing
The main criticism of causal realism is that it doesn't take adequate
account of what it is actually like to see something, the qualitative
aspect of sight. It reduces the experience of perceiving to a form of
information gathering. However, causal realism is the most satisfactory
theory of perception to date.
- Assumes real world
Causal realism makes the assumption that there is a real world out
there that exists independently of people perceiving it. This is what
is known as a metaphysical assumption - in other words it is an
assumption about the nature of reality. Someone of idealist tendencies
would find this metaphysical assumption unacceptable. However, since
most of us are committed to a belief that there is a real world that
exists independently of us, this assumption can be seen as a point in
favour of causal realism, rather than as a criticism of it.
PHILOSOPHY: THE BASICS
Nigel Warburton
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0415146941/
Epistemology is one of the core areas of philosophy. It is concerned
with the nature, sources and limits of knowledge. Epistemology has been
primarily concerned with propositional knowledge, that is, knowledge
that such-and-such is true, rather than other forms of knowledge, for
example, knowledge how to such-and-such. There is a vast array of views
about propositional knowledge, but one virtually universal
presupposition is that knowledge is true belief, but not mere true
belief (see Belief and knowledge). For example, lucky guesses or true
beliefs resulting from wishful thinking are not knowledge. Thus, a
central question in epistemology is: what must be added to true beliefs
to convert them into knowledge?
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P059
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/
http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies/naturalized-epistemology.php
a niece of the Oak Lady
cog-scientist Steve Lehar, from
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/hist.html
(S. Lehar) Bertrand Russell, originally himself a critical realist,
eventually discovered the resolution to this quandary with a realist
version of Kant's epistemological dualism. What finally convinced
Russell was consideration of the causal chain of vision. Light from an
object in the world enters the eye, where it is transduced to a neural
signal in the optic nerve, from whence it is eventually transformed
into a pattern of activation in the visual cortex. There are two
aspects of that perceptual activity, an electrophysiological aspect
measurable by cortical electrodes, and a phenomenal or experiential
aspect in the form of the percept itself. But the two are different
manifestations of the same underlying structure, and therefore if the
first is located within the physical brain, then the second must also
be in the brain. (Russell 1927 p. 137-143) Russell observed that a
potent source of confusion in this matter is a confusion of physical
space with perceptual space. For although our percept of the external
world appears external to our head, it is not external to our true
physical head, but only to our perceptual head in perceptual space. All
of our perceptual space, including the externally perceived world, is
inside our physical head in physical space. (Russell 1927) This
explanation of perception finally resolved all of the epistemological
problems inherent in naive realism and in idealism without resort to
any supernatural gods or mystical souls. It accounts for the fact that
the perceived world appears external although we know it to be
internal, by the fact that the external world of perception is internal
to our physical brain. It accounts for the realism known to common
sense, by the fact that the phenomenal world, while truly internal and
shut-in within the physical brain, nevertheless accurately reflects
certain geometrical aspects of the external world, which is thereby
knowable indirectly through its perceptual replica. It accounts for the
fact that different individuals each have their own unique perspective
on a commonly viewed object by the fact that each individual percipient
has his own perceptual copy of the commonly viewed object. And it does
away with the incredible proliferation of infinite sets of different
perspectives for every object in the world, as well as with notions of
phenomenal sense data which are experienced but which do not or may not
actually exist. Bertrand Russell's epistemological dualism and causal
theory of perception should therefore have resolved the epistemological
question once and for all. But curiously it did not, and the reason why
it has failed to do so is almost as interesting and significant as the
epistemological question itself.
Anyone can read the rest and the what preceded at:
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/epist/hist.html
I
Immortalist
Sounded kinda like Locke;
Locke begins to construct his own theory of the origins of knowledge.
The short answer is: from experience. The long answer is Book II. Book
II lays out Locke's theory of ideas. He argues that everything in our
mind is an idea, and that all ideas take one of two routes to arrive in
our mind: either they come in through the senses, or else they come in
through the mind's reflection on its own operation.
http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/lockeessay/
Under the unassuming heading "Other Considerations Concerning Simple
Ideas," Locke next introduces one of the most important topics in the
entire Essay: the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Locke tells us that there is a crucial difference between two kinds of
simple ideas we receive from sensation. Some of the ideas we receive
resemble their causes out in the world, while others do not. The ideas
which resemble their causes are the ideas of primary qualities:
texture, number, size, shape, motion. The ideas which do not resemble
their causes are the ideas of secondary qualities: color, sound, taste,
and odor.
The best way to understand the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities is in terms of explanation. Whenever you have the
sensation of a square book the cause of that sensation is some sort of
shape out in the world (though not necessarily squareness, since there
may be some optical illusion, because distance, for instance, forcing
you to perceive the shape incorrectly), so the explanation for
sensation of shape is shape in the external world. Whenever you have a
sensation of blue, on the other hand, the cause is not blueness out in
the world. The cause is some specific arrangement of the insensible
parts of matter. Explanations for secondary qualities refer only to
primary qualities.
http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/lockeessay/section4.rhtml
> I
a niece of the Oak Lady
A problem that causal-based perception presents for idealism and
radical empiricism is that one has to contend that empirical evidence
for the brain being the cause of or having a correlation to perception
or consciousness is: "It's only a deceptive 'storyline' that experience
is engaging in." Which then begs general experience having some kind of
orderly intelligence that is overseeing the inter-consistency of these
deceptive storylines. The more complex the reasoning becomes the more
it resembles something akin to creationists arguing that "God or the
Devil only made it look like the Earth is billions of years old and
that evolution happened, it's really only a shallow facade". There's
probably a way for idealism or experientialism to wriggle out without
appealing to either metaphysical or immanent intelligence, but it would
require a lot of insights that the average person couldn't follow (or
be willing to accept as baggage because of the parsimony principle).
I
Stephen Harris
This also reminds me of speculating that we reside in a computer
simulation like "The Matrix". Where is the original reality which
generates the simulation and simulations of simulation running
inside simulations? It is like an infinite regress.
So it boils down to who made God. Or, what created the universe
if God did not create the universe. One has to postulate that
nothing created God, that God always was, no beginning and no end,
or one can be scientific and say the universe, or the potential
for the universe manifested without a cause, a prior source in
the chain of creation.
Either way, with Science or God, you get back to having no
First Cause as a stipulation so it is an article of faith.
That is why the logical arguments for Creationism or Science
are alway inconclusive either way; they both require faith
or belief without evidence as to how the universe came to be,
and the answer in both cases is the same: X just always has been.
Regards,
Stephen
Anthony G. Rubino
Stephen Harris wrote:
>
>Either way, with Science or God, you get
>back to having no First Cause as a
>stipulation so it is an article of faith. That >is why the logical
arguments for
>Creationism or Science are alway
>inconclusive either way; they both
>require faith or belief without evidence
>as to how the universe came to be, and
>the answer in both cases is the same: X
>just always has been.
>
"Either way you get back to having no First Cause as a stipulation so it
is an article of faith."
But the answer in both cases is is not the same. 'X just always has
been' is applicable to just one of them. Either choice excludes the
question of the Cause of the First Cause becauseit is a non-logical
question: i.e., a question that has no logical meaning or significance
except to deny the choice, which is contradictory..
If God is chosen, He is the First Cause of the Universe. and the
relationships between God and the Universe can be meaningful and
important. It in no way effects any other considerations regarding the
Universe. The Universe is what it is. It is Reality, like it or not,
whether it was created or not.
If a Godless Universe is chosen as the First Cause, then God is excluded
form existence and no further mention of God should be made. To talk
about what does not exist is a logical absurdity, or at the very least,
whoever does so cannot know anything about what they are talking about:
i.e., the assertion 'God does not exist' cannot be reasonably supported
by anything beyond that assertion.
That some atheists have a compulsion to talk about God is based on
psychological considerations rather than on logical ones. Some theists
also have a fanatical compulsion to talk about God in contexts in which
there is no meaningful logical purpose for similar reasons: e.g., to
'justify' their choice.
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/trisector/
So many misconceptions, so little time.
Cormagh
> This also reminds me of speculating that we reside in a computer
> simulation like "The Matrix". Where is the original reality which
> generates the simulation and simulations of simulation running
> inside simulations? It is like an infinite regress.
In other words, nihilism.
> So it boils down to who made God.
A question that doesn't matter at all, and on more than one level
doesn't make sense.
> Or, what created the universe if God did not create the universe.
A little more to the point, but still relatively unimportant. All
questions about the universe being difficult, interesting and yet quite
satisfying to solve.
> One has to postulate that
> nothing created God, that God always was, no beginning and no end,
> or one can be scientific and say the universe, or the potential
> for the universe manifested without a cause, a prior source in
> the chain of creation.
One does not have to state either of these silly points A & B. B does
not follow from non-A, for example, and vice versa.
> Either way, with Science or God, you get back to having no
> First Cause as a stipulation so it is an article of faith.
I respectfully disagree. One does not have to "leap" to stating there
is "no first cause" in order to justify his prior refusal to justify
either of your points A & B.
> That is why the logical arguments for Creationism or Science
> are alway inconclusive either way; they both require faith
> or belief without evidence as to how the universe came to be,
> and the answer in both cases is the same: X just always has been.
I think this is BS. Logical arguments for science are not always
inconclusive. There is no proof that "X just always has been."
Scientific argument is often fruitful in substantiating strings of
facts. Are you stating that "logical arguments for science" are
anything other than the facts that science elucidates? There is no
other purpose for science and no other justification of it.
It seems this is merely an attempt to justify Creationism as a way of
standing up as a style of anti-science or a reasonable philosophy, as
opposed to merely being the traditional and uninspired religious
rejection of empirical fact that it is. It is not a valid or reasonable
philosophy, it is an anathema to human society, and shame on you for
trying to confound it with real philosophy.
jle...@ccn.ac.uk
Surely CAUSAL REALISM is not the same as PERCEPTUAL REALISM even if
perceptual realism might need to rely on real and acurate causal links
between a perciever and what is percieved. Causal realism aught to be
mainly concerned with the nature of any links between any phenomona
that are supposed to be causally related. It should be asserting
something like that these links belong to the phenomena themselves, or
at least that that is true of some group or type of such links. And
also that we can make sense of how they do so belong to the phenomona
themselves and so objectively belonging to them. This would be in
contrast to a Humean type view, for instance, where there are no such
links but phenomona are simply found together constantly.
Knowledge is another subject again:
If we take the way we understand the world, and our justification for
such supposed understanding as the sort of thing that leads us to feel
entitled to say 'we know such and such' then what passes for knowledge
will depend on our understanding of the world and the justification for
supposing that understanding, so 'knowledge', as well as 'truth' will
not be fundamental concepts but parasitic on our understanding of the
world and reasons for it. But our understanding will often make use of
or depend on the causal relation, so if the causal relation can be seen
as depending on the nature of links existing between phenomona
themselves our understanding, to the extent it relies on that relation
will also be on a realists, objective basis. If sense cannot be made of
links existing between causally related phenomona in themselves such
understanding based on that relation also cannot appear properly
objectively based on such phenomena, or experiences or 'stuff'
Anyway I have put my views on the web at 'causal-realism.zoomshare.com'
if anyon is interested
jle...@ccn.ac.uk
I'm afraid I made a gaff in my previous post; Perceptual realism is
also not the same as realism regarding the causal process through which
an accurate perception may be thought to be produced. Which is what I
think you are refering to at the start of this post. Sorry! I'm
terribly bad at being accurate. And isn't it odd and a pain that all I
seem to be doing is talking about the correct use of these words--the
correct use of words is exactly what I'm bad at.