Proof of an External World?
George Dance
there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
(granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
QED
Frederick Williams
>
> I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
>
> If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
Not at all. Just because you imagine X, that does not mean that you
want X.
> OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
>
> QED
--
Remove "antispam" and ".invalid" for e-mail address.
Rupert
You seem to be assuming that if solipsism were correct you would never
have an unfulfilled desire. This is not obvious to me.
Michael A. Clem
There are all these people who keep arguing and disagreeing with me.
Either there is an external world with all these other people in it, or
I'm one sick puppy to deliberately bring such conflict into my reality.
For that matter, there's heat and cold and pain and hunger and disease
and war and...
Hey! There we go: the world is a product of my diseased mind. I'm
glad I got that cleared up with myself. Now go away! <poof!>. I said,
begone! depart! Leave these premises! Uh, why aren't you disappearing?
a_friend
> There are all these people who keep arguing and disagreeing with me.
> Either there is an external world with all these other people in it, or
> I'm one sick puppy to deliberately bring such conflict into my reality.
> For that matter, there's heat and cold and pain and hunger and disease
> and war and...
> Hey! There we go: the world is a product of my diseased mind. I'm
> glad I got that cleared up with myself. Now go away! <poof!>. I said,
> begone! depart! Leave these premises! Uh, why aren't you disappearing?
Dear Sick Puppy:
The world (your construction of reality) is a little one-sided (okay,
you are a sick puppy). There is hunger and there is an abundance of
wealth to feed many. There is disease and treatments and cures with new
solutions on the horizon. There is war and the potential for long
lasting peace for many. There is death and new generations who will
learn from us and surpass us in terms of development and evolution.
There are those who do what we might call evil acts, and there are many
who do "good" on a daily basis.
How you constructed reality is a product of your own mind. You do live
in the world that you create.
Go, go, go, said the bird
Revision of this potential sci-fi drama.
Rather than being the fundamental origin or self, the "I" might only
enjoy special status as a useful but disposable POV for an autonomous
continuum of events (the latter being the actual, non-anthropic
"solipsist"). By not qualifying as an avatar at all (i.e., lacking even
a remote resemblance to what the autonomous continuum was), the
POV-identity could be doomed to perish like all the other human
characters in the unfolding experience.
After the former POV's death, the "camera-angle" of public and private
sensations (images, sounds, touchings, odors, feelings, thoughts, etc)
would then shift to the perspective of a different human or animal
member of the intermittently apprehended cast of Earth (scheduled
programming already in progress!) so that the fractionally observed but
still internally consistent(???) regularities of nature continue their
progression in these absurd speculations. Like a movie whose scenes and
internal dynamics reliably perform as if there is really is a
"rest-of-the-movie-world" extended beyond the viewing screen.
"Go, go, go, said the bird: humankind cannot bear very much reality."
--TS Eliot
BernardZ
george...@yahoo.ca says...
> I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard
If all you want is proof of the external world do the following.
1) Open the cupboard
2) Put your hand inside the cupboard
3) Slam the door shut hard.
If you still doubt the external world go to step (1).
Repeat the following until you are convinced.
--
If you are not there at the close, you will not get the sale.
Observations of Bernard - No 102
George Dance
> In article <1154477790.4...@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
> george...@yahoo.ca says...
>
> If all you want is proof of the external world do the following.
>
> 1) Open the cupboard
> 2) Put your hand inside the cupboard
> 3) Slam the door shut hard.
>
> If you still doubt the external world go to step (1).
>
> Repeat the following until you are convinced.
That's the proof attributed to Samuel Johnson, which fails for obvious
reasons.
George Dance
> George Dance wrote:
> >
> > I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> > there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> > to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
> >
> > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
>
> Not at all. Just because you imagine X, that does not mean that you
> want X.
Oh? Why would I imagine things I didn't want to imagine?
George Dance
Well, if there's nothing but me (my mind), there's nothing to frustrate
any of my desires but me.
George Dance
"Duh!" would have been sufficient. I agree that it's an apparently
obvious point to make; however, it's one that I've never seen made in
the 2 millennia of literature on the subject.
All solipsism has ever been able to offer is a possibility - it's not
impossible that it's all in one's mind - and a challenge: how can you
prove that there is an external world, without relying on any
assumptions that there is?
john
George Dance wrote:
> BernardZ wrote:
> > In article <1154477790.4...@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
> > george...@yahoo.ca says...
>
> >
> > If all you want is proof of the external world do the following.
> >
> > 1) Open the cupboard
> > 2) Put your hand inside the cupboard
> > 3) Slam the door shut hard.
> >
> > If you still doubt the external world go to step (1).
> >
> > Repeat the following until you are convinced.
>
> That's the proof attributed to Samuel Johnson, which fails for obvious
> reasons.
> If all you want is proof of the external world do the following.
> 1) Open the cupboard
> 2) Put your hand inside the cupboard
> 3) Slam the door shut hard.
> If you still doubt the external world go to step (1).
> Repeat the following until you are convinced.
That's the proof attributed to Samuel Johnson, which fails for obvious
reasons.
from an earlier posting
A boy on his way to work walking down a path and in his way steps a
philosopher, ''excuse me'' said the boy. ''Boy'' said the philosopher
''what evidence do you have that I exist'' the boy looked down at his
working boots, thought, walked up to the philosopher and kicked him
hard
in the shin and continued on his way. Looking back he saw all of the
hopping philosophers supposed philosophies wafting into the ether.
What are the obvious reasons???
john.
andy-k
I don't know what it can mean for a solipsist to speak of "my imagination".
"Me" and "not-me" are the two sides of that abstraction known as the self
concept (i.e. they are a product of the imagination), and so without a
"not-me" there could be no "me". Consequently, as itself a product of the
imagination, what can it mean for the "me" to claim ownership of the
imagination?
AlanS
>Oh? Why would I imagine things I didn't want to imagine?
Ask yourself.
If you were sure, why would you feel the need to convince "others"?
LauLuna
George Dance wrote:
> If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
>
> OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
>
> QED
Are you able to fulfill all your wishes when dreaming? Have you never
had a nightmare?
And as for the stories of the slammed hand and the stepped on
philosopher, could they not have happened similarly in dreams?
And finally, is everything you dream real?
Regards
Frederick Williams
>
> Frederick Williams wrote:
> > George Dance wrote:
> > >
> > > I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> > > there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> > > to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
> > >
> > > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
> >
> > Not at all. Just because you imagine X, that does not mean that you
> > want X.
>
> Oh? Why would I imagine things I didn't want to imagine?
Imagining a thing is not the same as wanting to imagine it. For
example, I may not be able to keep a bad image out of my mind even
though I would like to.
Brian Fletcher
"George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1154477790.4...@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
I've juist re watched What The "Bleep Do We Know". A film put together by a
conglomoration of Harvard professors and various others from many scientific
diciplines. Just been shown on Fox.
This is "compulsive viewing' fro advocates and sceptics alike, and covers
your point extremely well.
BOfL
a_friend
Seems about right. Wanting somethat that you can't or won't have is the
self engaging in frustration.
In your earlier example, had you wanted coffee earlier in the day while
the shops were open, your frustration wouldn't have taken place.
Had you purchased coffee when you had been to the shops on your last
visit, your wanting and your frustration would have been greatly
minimized.
Immortalist
George Dance wrote:
> I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
>
> If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
>
Dr. Know & the Braino Helmet
Imagime that a superscientist invents machine--we shall call it a
"braino," - that enables him to produce hallucianations in certain
subjects . The machine operates by influencing the brain of a subject
who wears a special cap, called a "braino cap." when the braino cap is
placed on a subject's head, the operator of the braino can affect his
brain so as to produce any hallucination in the subject that the
operator wishes. The braino is a hallucination-producing machine. The
hallucinations produced by it may be as incomplete, systematic, and
coherent as the operator of the branio desires to make them.
The present argument starts from the premise that the braino is a
logical possibility, and consequently that there should be
hallucinations that are coherent, complete, and systematic in every
way. From the premise of logical possibility, we conclude that we in
fact have no way of telling whether or not we are hallucinating.
If the braino is a logical possibility, then how can we tell that
hallucinations are not in fact so hard to detect? On the contrary, we
may suffer hallucinations that we cannot detect. If it is logically
possible that hallucinations should be coherent, complete, and
systematic in every way, then there is no way of detecting at any
moment that we are not suffering from a hallucionation.
How we can tell that we are not hallucinating. The braino argument is
intended to establish that we can never tell this, even if we can
sometimes tell that we are hallucinating. Consider some perceptual
belief that you would maintain does not from hallucinations. what
experiences guarantee this? Indeed, what experiences provide you with
any evidence of it?
Notice that whatever experience you indicate, the braino argument will
be quite sufficient to prove that such an experience is no guarantee
against hallucianation. All we need do is imagine that you have,
unknown to yourself, the braino cap on your head. the operator of the
braino is producing the very experiences you claim guarantee that you
are not hallucinating.
Imagine that all people are controlled by the braino and that the
machine is run by some evil being, Dr. Know, who plots to keep us
completely in error through hallucinations. Dr. Know does not wish to
be detected, so he supplies hallucinations that are coherent, complete,
and systematic. Indeed, the hallucinations he produced in us are a
PERFECT COUNTERFEIT OF REALITY.
Our experiences fulfill our expectations and contain no more surprises
than we would expect from reality. But is it not reality we experience;
our perceptual beliefs about the world are quite mistaken, for the
source of our experiences is a mere machine, the braino, which creates
hallutionations. In such a predicament we might have just the sort of
perceptual beliefs we now have, based on experiences exactly similar to
those we now have. But our perceptual beliefs would be altogether
false.
The imagined situation is exactly similar to ours with respect to the
reasons or evidence we would have for our perceptual beliefs.
Experience is virtually the same in both cases. Consequently, if we
lack knowledge in one situation, we must surely lack it in the other.
Obviously, we lack knowledge when we are controlled by the braino, for
then our perceptual beliefs are false. Hence, we also lack knowledge in
our present situation. More precisely, our perceptual beliefs fail to
constitute knowledge in either case.
We believe that we are not controlled by such a machine, and if we are
fortunate in this belief, then no doubt many of our perceptual beliefs
are true. It is, however, good fortune and not good evidence that we
should thank for correctness of these beliefs.
We are just lucky if there is no Dr. Know controlling us with a braino;
and from that good fortune may result the further good fortune that
most of our perceptual beliefs are true. it is just a matter of luck,
however, and nothing epistemologically more glorious than that.
If a belief is true as a result of luck, then it is a lucky guess--not
knowledge.
Adapted from Keith Lehrer
http://hume.ucdavis.edu/phi102/lecmenu.htm
> OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
>
Kant would agree that space and time are necessary for anything to
happen in, but to claim that space and time are necessary doesn't argue
well for what happens in some space during a particular time.
But you have not eliminated the possibility that you are the entire
world and in this world events takes place which are representations of
what might happen in "a" hypothetical world.
> QED
gibbs
"George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1154477790.4...@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
Sigh...
An external world isn't something that needs proving since it is the
assumption built into how we speak, think, and react to the world. There is
no proof of an external world.
zinnic
>
> How you constructed reality is a product of your own mind. You do live
> in the world that you create.
What a 'Godly' position to be in (Oops! In which to be. Or to be in
which?).
Surely you meant to say, how he conceives of reality constructs his own
mind?
Zinnic
Wordsmith
Perhaps because the illusion is magnificently stubborn?
W : )
zinnic
>
>
> I've juist re watched What The "Bleep Do We Know". A film put together by a
> conglomoration of Harvard professors and various others from many scientific
> diciplines. Just been shown on Fox.
And various others from various many "unscientific indisciplines".
> This is "compulsive viewing' fro advocates and sceptics alike, and covers
> your point extremely well.
>
Advocates and sceptics of what? The film or your POV?
The film has merit because it demonstrates how effectively the
scientific system dispels the mists of mysticism (I love esses. It
must be the s-s-s-serpent in me). :- {>
The few crumbs thrown to mystic pseudo-scientists were motivated by
commercialism.
Have a G'day... Zinnic
Zinnic
a_friend
I wrote what I meant. Objection to a perspective because you construct
it as being 'godly' is your issue to deal with -- good luck with that.
My perspective is that each of has the power, ability, capacity (chose
the term that works for you) to construct the world from a variety of
information and in a variety of ways.
I don't believe in gods, so anything that may be 'godly' is fine by me.
Religiously trained and religiously disciplined individuals may object
to any appearance of 'godly' things. I accept this for them and
disagree for myself.
George Dance
> George Dance wrote:
> > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
> >
> > OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> > has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> > (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
> >
> > QED
>
> Are you able to fulfill all your wishes when dreaming? Have you never
> had a nightmare?
I've never fulfilled any wishes when dreaming; AFAIK, it's not
something one does when dreaming. So there's no absurdity there;
that's not even a relevant example from what I can see.
> And as for the stories of the slammed hand and the stepped on
> philosopher, could they not have happened similarly in dreams?
Those aren't my stories.
> And finally, is everything you dream real?
I'm not sure what you mean: (i) is everything I dream exactly the way
it is in reality'? No. (ii) did every concept in a dream originate
with something real? DK.
zinnic
Immortalist wrote:
> George Dance wrote:
> > I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> > there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> > to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
> >
> > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
> >
>
> Dr. Know & the Braino Helmet
>
> Imagime that a superscientist invents machine--we shall call it a
> "braino," - that enables him to produce hallucianations in certain
> subjects . The machine operates by influencing the brain of a subject
> who wears a special cap, called a "braino cap." when the braino cap is
> placed on a subject's head, the operator of the braino can affect his
> brain so as to produce any hallucination in the subject that the
> operator wishes. The braino is a hallucination-producing machine. The
> hallucinations produced by it may be as incomplete, systematic, and
> coherent as the operator of the branio desires to make them.
I presume that the "brainio cap" hallucinates the wearer into the
beliet that he does not wear it.
> The present argument starts from the premise that the braino is a
> logical possibility, and consequently that there should be
> hallucinations that are coherent, complete, and systematic in every
> way. From the premise of logical possibility, we conclude that we in
> fact have no way of telling whether or not we are hallucinating.
On what basis do you premiss that the "braino" is a logical
possibility? Because it cannot be disproven? Are all possibilites
except contradictions logical? The acceptance of a premise is the
foundation of a logical conclusion. Explain to me how a premise
(possibility) is 'in itself' logical. Because it is not an
"impossibility? Duh!
> If the braino is a logical possibility, then how can we tell that
> hallucinations are not in fact so hard to detect? On the contrary, we
> may suffer hallucinations that we cannot detect. If it is logically
> possible that hallucinations should be coherent, complete, and
> systematic in every way, then there is no way of detecting at any
> moment that we are not suffering from a hallucionation.
But why stop here? What if the scientist himself was unaware that he
was wearing a superior scientist's "brainno cap" and was being induced
to hallucinate that he was creating hallucinations with a hallucinatory
"braino" fitted to a hallucinatory individual?. Let us go on. What if
the 'superior scientist' was himself wearing etc. etc.? We regress
from your initial 'possibity' to the infinite possibilities that dilute
your original 'possibility' beyond reason.
>
> > OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> > has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> > (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
> >
>
> Kant would agree that space and time are necessary for anything to
> happen in, but to claim that space and time are necessary doesn't argue
> well for what happens in some space during a particular time.
That something 'happened' gives credence to the existence of space and
time. What happened is besides the point (irrelevant) .
> But you have not eliminated the possibility that you are the entire
> world and in this world events takes place which are representations of
> what might happen in "a" hypothetical world.
It really does not matter. As long as each "entire world' accepts the
consensus of reality that allows all of other "entire worlds" to
prosper in their environment, then 'so be it'. If there is a
'Puppeteer' we have no choice but to go through all motions of being
human that the 'Puppeteer' decides. Our consolation should be in the
enjoyment of the action "he" imparts to inert dummies.
Zinnic
>
> > QED
George Dance
The only reason for that would be that something else was overriding
the 'want' part of your mind, and forcing you to think of the image.
If that forcing agent was your own mind, then the absurdity's still
there; because your mind is also creating the preference to not think
of that image.
a_friend
> LauLuna wrote:a
> > George Dance wrote:
> > > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
> > >
> > > OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> > > has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> > > (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
> > >
> > > QED
> >
> > Are you able to fulfill all your wishes when dreaming? Have you never
> > had a nightmare?
>
> I've never fulfilled any wishes when dreaming; AFAIK, it's not
> something one does when dreaming. So there's no absurdity there;
> that's not even a relevant example from what I can see.
Dreaming or fantasy (or thought if you will) is also a great antidote
to the phenomenon of boredom and anxiety. The goal of dreaming is not
to accomplish anything, but rather to avoid something else -- an
anxious state or in being alone.
A highly goal-oriented society is merely a society that doesn't manage
anxiety well.
George Dance
> "George Dance" <george...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> >Oh? Why would I imagine things I didn't want to imagine?
>
> Ask yourself.
Why would I ask myself something like that? If you think that's
something that happens to you, then you explain it.
> If you were sure, why would you feel the need to convince "others"?
I don't understand the question. Sure of what? What need to convince
"others"? What "others"?
zinnic
Well said.
It amazes me how many argue against the reality of an external world
but deny their own argument by real reactions to their theoretical
'unreality'.
Zinnic
john
> And as for the stories of the slammed hand and the stepped on
> philosopher, could they not have happened similarly in dreams?
I am not one who wishes to destroy the fanciful game of bandying
around immature pseudo intellectual ideas for I recognize that it is
an important function in the development of the intellect of those who
can afford the luxury of playing the word-word game. I add here- at the
expense of the less fortunate who live in the shit, horror and squalor
of the *real* world. (Although I may have no right to, I ask that one
always keeps in mind that what allows us to play this game, from the
political /economic expediency of supplying weapons which results in
the torn off limbs Mothers fathers and babies to the economic
expediency of allowing vast numbers of beautiful innocent and naive
human beings to die from hunger ,etc) I don't ask that one considers
this whilst playing the game, for it would spoil the game, but I think
that it would be nice if one kept it in, even the back of ones, mind,
For this is the *real* world.
Having said that I will offer an answer to your question . The answer
is no. Putting aside the essence of the philosopher story , which
was only to show that when one encounters the *real* world, usually,
ones professed philosophies, as Humph said ,'doesn't amount to a
hill of beans'.
Given that knowledge is only the result of experience one cannot dream
of something that one has not experienced of. (Remember here that
interrelating 'bits' of knowledge and remembering them is also
experience ) This is why one can dream of giraffes with wheels or cars
with legs etc. During dreaming ones brain can encourage ones endocrine
system to respond to and even encourage the sensations that one might
experiences during dreaming. But one of the things that the brain
cannot do is to re-create the actual pain of e.g. being kicked in the
shin or having ones hand slammed in a door. So, this is why 'they
could not happen similarly in dreams' (as Marlon says, "ipso
facto".)
john
zinnic
a_friend wrote:
> zinnic wrote:
> > >
> > > How you constructed reality is a product of your own mind. You do live
> > > in the world that you create.
> >
> > What a 'Godly' position to be in (Oops! In which to be. Or to be in
> > which?).
> > Surely you meant to say, how he conceives of reality constructs his own
> > mind?
> > Zinnic
>
> I wrote what I meant. Objection to a perspective because you construct
> it as being 'godly' is your issue to deal with -- good luck with that.
> My perspective is that each of has the power, ability, capacity (chose
> the term that works for you) to construct the world from a variety of
> information and in a variety of ways.
I agree that conception of reality (the world) is constructed from "a
variety of information and in a variety of ways". My point is that
'conception of reality" is the mind.. That the mind does not construct
but is constructed from experience. No experience, no mind. Different
experience, different mind.
> I don't believe in gods, so anything that may be 'godly' is fine by me.
> Religiously trained and religiously disciplined individuals may object
> to any appearance of 'godly' things. I accept this for them and
> disagree for myself.
I was being facetious. IMO the religionist's God should be held
responsible for its own creation. I do not believe that individuals
whose minds are constructed from their experiences should be held to
the same standard, especially those whose experiences were asocial
and/or violent .
I oppose religion's attempts to impose its beliefs on the conduct of
others, but I accept that it comforts so many who are terrorised by the
prospect of their mortality.
I reckon our differences are insufficeint to preclude that we be
'friends'
Enjoyed discussing withyou.
Zinnic.
rupertm...@yahoo.com
You may have a desire to have the experience of drinking a cup of
coffee, but not actually have this experience. The situation is
frustrating your desire. But as far as I can tell, this is consistent
with solipsism. This situation could occur even though nothing exists
except your mind.
Brian Fletcher
"Frederick Williams" <Frederick...@antispamtesco.net.invalid> wrote
in message news:44CFFC9A...@antispamtesco.net.invalid...
> George Dance wrote:
>>
>> I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
>> there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
>> to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
>>
>> If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
>> product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
>> and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
>> things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
>> have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
A good example of misunderstanding of the word imagination.
Everything we create comes from our imagination.Another way of putting it is
"coffee" is imagination crystalised.
In my view, a solipsist sees the difference between 'his' projection, as
seperate from that of the "group"
BOfL
>
> Not at all. Just because you imagine X, that does not mean that you
> want X.
>
>> OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
>> has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
>> (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
>>
>> QED
>
>
Sir Frederick
an internal world. Our subjective experiences
that we deceitfully confuse as an external world are
based on processing deceit.
Qualia and such are sense driven
hallucinations with validity based on neural processing
self deceit and perhaps manifests from higher realms in
organizing principles.
Any actual external world is beyond imagining.
George Dance
> George Dance wrote:
> > BernardZ wrote:
> > > In article <1154477790.4...@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
> > > george...@yahoo.ca says...
> > >
> > > If all you want is proof of the external world do the following.
> > >
> > > 1) Open the cupboard
> > > 2) Put your hand inside the cupboard
> > > 3) Slam the door shut hard.
> > >
> > > If you still doubt the external world go to step (1).
> > >
> > > Repeat the following until you are convinced.
> >
> > That's the proof attributed to Samuel Johnson, which fails for obvious
> > reasons.
>
>
> A boy on his way to work walking down a path and in his way steps a
> philosopher, ''excuse me'' said the boy. ''Boy'' said the philosopher
> ''what evidence do you have that I exist'' the boy looked down at his
> working boots, thought, walked up to the philosopher and kicked him
> hard
> in the shin and continued on his way. Looking back he saw all of the
> hopping philosophers supposed philosophies wafting into the ether.
>
> What are the obvious reasons???
The philosopher starts with the same sensory impressions as anyone
else, "I see a cupboard door" or "I see a boy"; what he questions is
the legitimacy of concluding, from sense impressions alone, that "The
cupboard door exists" or "The boy exists". Since that's precisely
what's in question, adding a second sense impression - "I touch the
cupboard door" or "I hear the boy" - doesn't do anything to answer the
question. For the same reason, adding a third sensory impression - "I
feel pain from the cupboard door" or "I feel pain from the boy" -
doesn't do anything to answer it, either.
If the philosopher were to be convinced by the last step - that
something affected him enough to cause pain - then he would have been
convinced even before the first step - when something affected him
enough to have a visual impression. In which case either 'proof' would
have been completely superfluous.
George Dance
So I have a desire - to drink a cup of coffee (C) - and create a
situation in which I act to have it happen. At the same time I have
another desire - to not have a cup of coffee - and create a situation
(the same situation) in which it doesn't happen (~C).
It could be, as you say, that I wanted C to happen, but arranged things
so that ~C would happen instead; but why would it? If I really wanted
C, why would I have ~C happen instead? Or, if I really wanted ~C, why
would I be wanting and acting for C instead?
George Dance
People certainly can speak and think about things that they do not
believe exist in the external world; so there's no such assumption
built into those activities. There is such an assumption in your
phrase 'react to the world', but only because you put it there; one
could substitute 'react to one's sense impressions', which eliminates
that assumption, and a solipsist would probably do just that.
> There is
> no proof of an external world.
You must mean no good proof, as some proofs have been presented. Are
you claiming that good proofs of an external world are impossible?
a_friend
A blind person never sees the cupboard or a boy. We will argue that boy
exist despite the blind person's inability to have those sensory
experiences. A deaf person will not hear the boy. Assuming that we
process information the same, or that we have same information is to
overlook the reality of human experience. To the deaf or blind person,
we are still going to argue that what our senses tell is true or
reality. There reality is different.
The question is an essential one where one person perceives/sees a
cupboard door and another doesn't.
gibbs
"Sir Frederick" <mmcn...@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:8m93d212ra88topkm...@4ax.com...
That's a wild point of view and I think it is mistaken. Our experiences are
of an actual world, otherwise nothing we say makes any sense and nothing we
say about the world can be verified. Phrased another way: we don't
experience our experiences, but an actual world. This doesn't mean that our
experiences are indubitable, for certainly they are not. But what mistakes
we do make when we think or talk about the world are, in principle,
correctable (by checking something again, by talking to other people, etc.).
The very idea of a hallucination doesn't make any sense if their isn't an
actual world that we can perceive correctly. We know we've hallucinated or
that someone has hallucinated because there is an actual world that we can
refer to that allows us to distinguish halluncinatory experience from a true
perceptual experience.
Sir Frederick
The Copernican Revolution would observe you as a hubris addict.
Do you still have the flat earth as the center of the universe, with the
sun going overhead each day? Humans are NOT the defining source
of any reality.
Please struggle with the analogy we have with a painting, a painting
with "figures" that do not have the conceptual tools for conceiving
the painting, the painting canvas, the painter, or the painting viewers.
I do not understand what is really going on. I do not trust any understanding
foisted off on us by either evolution or folk lore theories. Those sources
have shown only ad hoc understandings, all being anachronistic, now obsolete.
BernardZ
george...@yahoo.ca says...
I would have thought the question is how far do you go with your theory.
Whether the door exists is interesting but my bloody and painful hand
after a few slams of the door, is something else.
--
If you are not there at the close, you will not get the sale.
Observations of Bernard - No 102
99
Internalism, as I understand it, revolves around the notion that one's
phenomenal-content will be what it is regardless of whether or not it
has a relationship to an external environment (seemingly newspeak for
"parallelism"). But if I had my way, I would label that view as strong
or radical internalism; and define a weak internalism as most of one's
waking experiences having a relation to external events. E.g., in the
context of science descriptions or even scientific realism, the
perceived image of a cloudy sky would be the result of electromagnetic
waves striking the eyes which in turn had an absorption and re-emission
encounter with molecules in the atomosphere prior to that (or whatever
the in-depth or legitimate account).
A respectable anti-realism would only enter the picture in terms of
whether or not our experiential and scientific symbolism is an accurate
depiction of external affairs --whether or not it's possible for human
knowledge and perception to perfectly mimic the ontology of world, and
not the demented opinion that there is nothing else but one's own
phenomenal flow. It would be utterly trivial for anti-realism to
point-out that our acoustic and visual languages are not what compose
the world "out-there" (unless it's literally warring with realists who
contend just that about explanatory models). But with the
phenomenal-content of consciousness, it's perhaps more of a question
mark concerning if it is a form of transfigured symbolism.
Brian Fletcher
"zinnic" <zeen...@gate.net> wrote in message
news:1154563445....@b28g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
Always do. :-). You too.
I see that the science is always 'catching up' with what you refer to as
mysticism.
I prefer the word "awareness", which we all can relate to, and some can even
see a consistent growth in their own awareness that goes beyond the group
understanding.
An example. many years ago, when steroids poked out their ugly head (more
accurately, the misuse of them), I applied a basic spiritual 'template',
formed a hypothesis, and years later, science confirmed.
The borders of scientific understanding are often as the result of what some
wouold describe as a "mystical" experience.
All part of the o/a integration.
BOfL
andy-k
independently of our ideas about it. The idealist attacks that picture as if
he were attacking a statement. The realist defends it as though he were
stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. What practical
advantage is conferred by such arguments? None."
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 402,3.
gibbs
>> There is no proof of an external world.
>
> You must mean no good proof, as some proofs have been presented. Are
> you claiming that good proofs of an external world are impossible?
Both proving something and having doubts about something require that there
are things that are exempt from doubting and are taken for granted. What I
am claiming is that you can't prove what is taken for granted to prove or
doubt things. If we're wrong about this assumption, then what guarentees
the truth of anything we say, ever?
gibbs
"99" <opti...@draze.com> wrote in message
news:1154618737....@s13g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
With regard to your weak internalism, I don't think the fact that we know
how perception takes place means that don't actually perceive what's in the
world. Its a kind of genetic fallacy, perhaps, to reduce something to how
it originates and claim that it is therefore not what it is or it is other
than what it is.
99
Trying to avoid the unwavering convictions of either is one thing, but
to to say that these arguments have no utility seems a dogmatic
conclusion in itself, reeking a bit of self-omniscience. In Arthur
Fine's brand of post-realism, they remain tool-like polarities, each
bringing a different understanding to the the table. I'm not a defender
of Fine's NOA or any other irrealisms (still in the process of
investigating them further, in fact). My point is only that
Wittgenstein should not have leaped to such hasty conclusions about the
warfare between realism and anti-realism having no practicality.
"The core position is neither realist nor anti-realist; it mediates
between the two. The core position is what [Arthur] Fine defines as
'common sense epistemology' or The Natural Ontological Attitude." .....
NOA gives a commonality to all different philosophies towards the
interpretation of science by which these philosophies can be compared
and contrasted on neutral ground. Through the different philosophies
combining via the use of NOA, this ensures the development and progress
of science. Although NOA is not committed to "progressivism" of
realism, NOA ensures progression through bringing all philosophies to
this "common ground". NOA is independent of any labeled or
philosophical category. It does not have to fit into any specific
framework of principles, i.e., realism, anti-realism, empiricism,
fundamentalism.... (Erica Samuelson in , "Referat on Arthur Fine's
NOA")
99
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> "Our normal form of expression gives us a picture of a world that exists
>> independently of our ideas about it. The idealist attacks that picture
>> as if he were attacking a statement. The realist defends it as though
>> he were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being.
>> What practical advantage is conferred by such arguments? None."
>>
>> Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 402,3.
>
> Trying to avoid the unwavering convictions of either is one thing, but
> to to say that these arguments have no utility seems a dogmatic
> conclusion in itself, reeking a bit of self-omniscience. In Arthur
> Fine's brand of post-realism, they remain tool-like polarities, each
> bringing a different understanding to the the table. I'm not a defender
> of Fine's NOA or any other irrealisms (still in the process of
> investigating them further, in fact). My point is only that
> Wittgenstein should not have leaped to such hasty conclusions about the
> warfare between realism and anti-realism having no practicality.
Witt was concerned with the realism/anti-realism issue in the Tractatus,
published in 1921. The Philosophical Investigations were published in 1953.
It seems a little hasty to accuse Witt of leaping to hasty conclusions about
that issue in the latter publication.
> "The core position is neither realist nor anti-realist; it mediates
> between the two. The core position is what [Arthur] Fine defines as
> 'common sense epistemology' or The Natural Ontological Attitude." .....
> NOA gives a commonality to all different philosophies towards the
> interpretation of science by which these philosophies can be compared
> and contrasted on neutral ground. Through the different philosophies
> combining via the use of NOA, this ensures the development and progress
> of science. Although NOA is not committed to "progressivism" of
> realism, NOA ensures progression through bringing all philosophies to
> this "common ground". NOA is independent of any labeled or
> philosophical category. It does not have to fit into any specific
> framework of principles, i.e., realism, anti-realism, empiricism,
> fundamentalism.... (Erica Samuelson in , "Referat on Arthur Fine's
> NOA")
I don't understand what bearing the issue has upon the pursuit of science,
though I accept that many scientists are prejudiced in favor of realism.
99
Are you almost suggesting that people thousands of years ago knew as
much about the cosmos as we do today? Our understanding of the world is
incomplete because our perceptual systems are limited, they evolved
only enough to enable us to survive, and our reasoning capacities --our
ability to infer "more" from our limited information via this or that
procedure has carried us the rest of the way. Just as it's legitimate
for a lifetime blind person to wonder about what she's missing out-on,
so we should be humble about our internal simulations of the world
--that despite most of our waking experiences having a relationship to
the external dynamics assailing the sensory systems of the body, this
epistemological "pipeline" to the ontic environment is nevertheless a
narrow one.
99
gibbs
> Are you almost suggesting that people thousands of years ago knew as
> much about the cosmos as we do today?
No, not at all, I can't see how your question follows. You are talking
about knowledge of the world now, which is different. That they had
perceptual experiences of the world I have no doubt.
>Our understanding of the world is
> incomplete because our perceptual systems are limited, they evolved
> only enough to enable us to survive, and our reasoning capacities --our
> ability to infer "more" from our limited information via this or that
> procedure has carried us the rest of the way. Just as it's legitimate
> for a lifetime blind person to wonder about what she's missing out-on,
> so we should be humble about our internal simulations of the world
> --that despite most of our waking experiences having a relationship to
> the external dynamics assailing the sensory systems of the body, this
> epistemological "pipeline" to the ontic environment is nevertheless a
> narrow one.
The fact that how perceptual experience of the world is limited or that our
understanding of the world is limited doesn't mean that what we experience
is any less real.
99
andy-k wrote:
> "99" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> >> "Our normal form of expression gives us a picture of a world that exists
> >> independently of our ideas about it. The idealist attacks that picture
> >> as if he were attacking a statement. The realist defends it as though
> >> he were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being.
> >> What practical advantage is conferred by such arguments? None."
> >>
> >> Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 402,3.
> >
> > Trying to avoid the unwavering convictions of either is one thing, but
> > to to say that these arguments have no utility seems a dogmatic
> > conclusion in itself, reeking a bit of self-omniscience. In Arthur
> > Fine's brand of post-realism, they remain tool-like polarities, each
> > bringing a different understanding to the the table. I'm not a defender
> > of Fine's NOA or any other irrealisms (still in the process of
> > investigating them further, in fact). My point is only that
> > Wittgenstein should not have leaped to such hasty conclusions about the
> > warfare between realism and anti-realism having no practicality.
>
> Witt was concerned with the realism/anti-realism issue in the Tractatus,
> published in 1921. The Philosophical Investigations were published in 1953.
> It seems a little hasty to accuse Witt of leaping to hasty conclusions about
> that issue in the latter publication.
>
I had an atheist great-uncle who converted to theism later in life. It
does not always follow that more years of reflection equals a better
conclusion, especially if neurons and organs deteriorate via age or
various afflictions along the way. ;)
> > "The core position is neither realist nor anti-realist; it mediates
> > between the two. The core position is what [Arthur] Fine defines as
> > 'common sense epistemology' or The Natural Ontological Attitude." .....
> > NOA gives a commonality to all different philosophies towards the
> > interpretation of science by which these philosophies can be compared
> > and contrasted on neutral ground. Through the different philosophies
> > combining via the use of NOA, this ensures the development and progress
> > of science. Although NOA is not committed to "progressivism" of
> > realism, NOA ensures progression through bringing all philosophies to
> > this "common ground". NOA is independent of any labeled or
> > philosophical category. It does not have to fit into any specific
> > framework of principles, i.e., realism, anti-realism, empiricism,
> > fundamentalism.... (Erica Samuelson in , "Referat on Arthur Fine's
> > NOA")
>
> I don't understand what bearing the issue has upon the pursuit of science,
> though I accept that many scientists are prejudiced in favor of realism.
Yeah, realism probably has become the majority position with scientists
just as with philosophers of science, after logical empiricism hit a
train back in the 1960s. Hopefully it's only the contingent or
conditional kind of realism that Ian Hacking advocates. But according
to Henry Folse, no view has really managed to be the "king of the hill"
again in terms of beating back its critics wholesale:
"Thus in the last forty years philosophy of science has gone from a
field formerly dominated by a single "received view" to an arena of
volatile debate with no single dominant contender for a new acceptable
model of scientific knowledge. This fact has made it one of the most
lively and pivotal domains of philosophy, for the issues now occupying
center stage in philosophy of science touch upon basic questions of
epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology. Through these debates the
nature of philosophy of science has changed tremendously from the
attempt to build a formal model of an idealized perfect science quite
apart from any historical account of what scientists really do, to the
attempt to build a philosophically acceptable view of science based
upon a detailed historical examination of the actual patterns of
reasoning employed in concrete episodes in the advance of science. En
route these discussions have called into question such basic
presuppositions as the belief that there is some pattern of reasoning
which justifies acceptance of scientific theories, that there is some
methodology called "the scientific method," that science has anything
at all to say about the nature of reality, and that science can be
examined apart from the social, cultural context in which it actually
evolves. Because of the central role that science plays in contemporary
culture, these upheavals in philosophy of science have reverberated in
a variety of disciplines including history, political science,
sociology, art, religious studies, and other disciplines too numerous
to name. ~~~~~~ quote from Folse's "Introduction To Philosophy Of
Science"
99
gibbs
> Humans are NOT the defining source of any reality.
Of course, not. But that doesn't mean that humans don't actually experience
reality.
> Please struggle with the analogy we have with a painting, a painting
> with "figures" that do not have the conceptual tools for conceiving
> the painting, the painting canvas, the painter, or the painting viewers.
> I do not understand what is really going on. I do not trust any
> understanding
> foisted off on us by either evolution or folk lore theories. Those sources
> have shown only ad hoc understandings, all being anachronistic, now
> obsolete.
The fact that we can have "understandings" that we can call anachronistic
(or correct) only makes sense if there an "external" world against which we
can check our understandings.
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> Witt was concerned with the realism/anti-realism issue in the Tractatus,
>> published in 1921. The Philosophical Investigations were published in
>> 1953. It seems a little hasty to accuse Witt of leaping to hasty
>> conclusions about that issue in the latter publication.
>
> I had an atheist great-uncle who converted to theism later in life.
Not an unreasonable shift when you consider that the nearer one gets to
death, the more comfort one may find in the metaphysical postulate of an
afterlife.
> It does not always follow that more years of reflection equals a better
> conclusion, especially if neurons and organs deteriorate via age or
> various afflictions along the way. ;)
It does not always follow that mature conclusions are the result of impaired
faculties either. Witt held the realist/anti-realist issue to be nonsensical
throughout his academic life.
"Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out
strictly, coincides with pure realism. the self of solipsism shrinks to a
point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with
it."
Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.64.
Wordsmith
Brian Fletcher wrote:
> "Frederick Williams" <Frederick...@antispamtesco.net.invalid> wrote
> in message news:44CFFC9A...@antispamtesco.net.invalid...
> > George Dance wrote:
> >>
> >> I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> >> there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> >> to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
> >>
> >> If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> >> product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> >> and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> >> things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> >> have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
>
>
> A good example of misunderstanding of the word imagination.
>
> Everything we create comes from our imagination.Another way of putting it is
> "coffee" is imagination crystalised.
>
> In my view, a solipsist sees the difference between 'his' projection, as
> seperate from that of the "group"
>
> BOfL
Solipsism, by its nature, is highly discriminating. It has to be.
W : )
Wordsmith
Rupert wrote:
> George Dance wrote:
> > I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> > there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> > to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
> >
> > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
> >
> > has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> > (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
> >
>
> You seem to be assuming that if solipsism were correct you would never
> have an unfulfilled desire. This is not obvious to me.
It would if you were a solipsist...maybe.
W : )
Immortalist
zinnic wrote:
> Immortalist wrote:
> > George Dance wrote:
> > > I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> > > there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> > > to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
> > >
> > > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
> > >
> >
> >
> > Imagime that a superscientist invents machine--we shall call it a
> > "braino," - that enables him to produce hallucianations in certain
> > subjects . The machine operates by influencing the brain of a subject
> > who wears a special cap, called a "braino cap." when the braino cap is
> > placed on a subject's head, the operator of the braino can affect his
> > brain so as to produce any hallucination in the subject that the
> > operator wishes. The braino is a hallucination-producing machine. The
> > hallucinations produced by it may be as incomplete, systematic, and
> > coherent as the operator of the branio desires to make them.
>
> I presume that the "brainio cap" hallucinates the wearer into the
> beliet that he does not wear it.
>
Not necessarily since that the person could be in a hallucination
allows any logically possible events including a dream in which the
person is wearing a cap that makes him have a dream.
> > The present argument starts from the premise that the braino is a
> > logical possibility, and consequently that there should be
> > hallucinations that are coherent, complete, and systematic in every
> > way. From the premise of logical possibility, we conclude that we in
> > fact have no way of telling whether or not we are hallucinating.
>
> On what basis do you premiss that the "braino" is a logical
> possibility? Because it cannot be disproven? Are all possibilites
> except contradictions logical? The acceptance of a premise is the
> foundation of a logical conclusion. Explain to me how a premise
> (possibility) is 'in itself' logical. Because it is not an
> "impossibility? Duh!
>
The basis for logical possibility is consistency or the lack of
contradiction between possibilities.
One can say that unicorns are a logical possibility since we have
cannot decide whether we have observed all animals on earth or not and
still claim that even though the unicorn is logically possible or
impossible and we cannot decide which it continues to be an appeal to
ignorance to claim that because we cannot disprove it that it must
exist.
Consistency and possibility are two different words with different
meanings.
> > If the braino is a logical possibility, then how can we tell that
> > hallucinations are not in fact so hard to detect? On the contrary, we
> > may suffer hallucinations that we cannot detect. If it is logically
> > possible that hallucinations should be coherent, complete, and
> > systematic in every way, then there is no way of detecting at any
> > moment that we are not suffering from a hallucionation.
>
> But why stop here? What if the scientist himself was unaware that he
> was wearing a superior scientist's "brainno cap" and was being induced
> to hallucinate that he was creating hallucinations with a hallucinatory
> "braino" fitted to a hallucinatory individual?. Let us go on. What if
> the 'superior scientist' was himself wearing etc. etc.? We regress
> from your initial 'possibity' to the infinite possibilities that dilute
> your original 'possibility' beyond reason.
> >
At this point in the debate that would be similar to a concession on
the part of the rationalist since he wants to argue that we know
reality enough to claim one theory for it, excluding the brains in vats
theory.
> > > OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> > > has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> > > (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
> > >
> >
> > Kant would agree that space and time are necessary for anything to
> > happen in, but to claim that space and time are necessary doesn't argue
> > well for what happens in some space during a particular time.
>
> That something 'happened' gives credence to the existence of space and
> time. What happened is besides the point (irrelevant) .
>
The conclusion "there is an external world" is just one of the things
that could happen in space and time. We must exclude all other
possibilities in order to be certain and declare what shall happen in
spacetime. The relevence is that anything you mention happens in space
and time.
> > But you have not eliminated the possibility that you are the entire
> > world and in this world events takes place which are representations of
> > what might happen in "a" hypothetical world.
>
> It really does not matter. As long as each "entire world' accepts the
> consensus of reality that allows all of other "entire worlds" to
> prosper in their environment, then 'so be it'. If there is a
> 'Puppeteer' we have no choice but to go through all motions of being
> human that the 'Puppeteer' decides. Our consolation should be in the
> enjoyment of the action "he" imparts to inert dummies.
> Zinnic
>
No, you must eliminate the possibility that one of these people is the
entire physical universe and other people and things are events within
this one consciouss thing. I do not want to appeal to ignorance here
but that it is possible that one person is the entire universe it
cannot be claimed that there is a shared hallucination like;
Imagine that all people are controlled by the braino and that the
machine is run by some evil being, Dr. O, who plots to keep us
completely in error through hallucinations. Dr. O does not wish to be
detected, so he supplies hallucinations that are coherent, complete,
and systematic. Indeed, the hallucinations he produces in us are a
perfect counterfiet reality. Our experiences fulfill our expectations
and contain no more surprises than we would expect from reality. But it
is not reality we experience; our perceptual beliefs about the world
are quite mistaken, for the source of our experiences is a mere
machine, the braino, which creates hallucinations. In such a
predicament we might have just the sort of perceptual beliefs we now
have, based on experiences exactly similar to those we now have. But
our perceptual beliefs would be altogether false.
The imagined situation is exactly similar to ours with respect to the
reasons or evidence we would have for our perceptual beliefs.
Experience is virtually the same in both cases. Consequently, if we
lack knowledge in one situation, we must surely lack it in the other.
Obviously, we lack knowledge when we are controlled by the braino, for
then our perceptual beliefs are false. Hence, we also lack knowledge in
our present situation. More precisely, our perceptual beliefs fail to
constitute knowledge in either case.
We believe that we are not controlled by such a machine, and if we are
fortunate in this belief, then no doubt many of our perceptual beliefs
are true. It is however, good fortune and not good evidence that we
should thank for the correctness of these beliefs. We are just lucky if
there is no Dr. O controlling us with a braino; and from that good
fortune may result the further good fortune that most of our perceptual
beliefs are true. It is just a matter of luck, however, and nothing
epistemologically more glorious than that. If a belief is true as a
result of luck, then it is a lucky guess-not knowledge.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
>
> >
> > > QED
rupertm...@yahoo.com
No, that's not what I said. It's just that you don't have the
experience of drinking a cup of coffee. That doesn't entail that you
have a desire not to have the experience.
a_friend
We could both sit in the same room and write for 5 minutes what we are
aware of. There will be differences and there will be similarities.
a_friend
Isn't life interesting -- a world with no guarantees!
How do I know if you truly beleive what you wrote? How do I know if you
are playing Devil's Advocate? How do I know if your beliefs are in
transition from belief X to belief Y.
a_friend
Assailing? I am curious about your percpetion of our sensory experience
in the world. I rarely feel overwhelmed by anything that is provided.
gibbs
"a_friend" <a_f_r_...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1154652979.3...@h48g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
> How do I know if you truly beleive what you wrote? How do I know if you
> are playing Devil's Advocate? How do I know if your beliefs are in
> transition from belief X to belief Y.
Good questions. The answer is, of course, that there is no certainty.
However, the lack of certainty does not mean that there aren't answers to
them, but only that mistakes are possible.
gibbs
"a_friend" <a_f_r_...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1154652979.3...@h48g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
> are playing Devil's Advocate? How do I know if your beliefs are in
> transition from belief X to belief Y.
Good questions. The answer is, of course, that there is no certainty. But
the lack of certainty does not mean that there aren't answers to
them or that the answers can never be determined, but only that mistakes are
possible.
a_friend
Your point was a wanting for guarantees. I operate from the perspective
that there are none.
Brian Fletcher
"Wordsmith" <word...@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
news:1154636229....@m79g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
Perhaps that should read "I" have to be. To not is not to be. That is the
answer!!!
BOfL
Brian Fletcher
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:cX%zg.26932$oo2....@newsfe4-gui.ntli.net...
> "George Dance" wrote:
>>I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
>> there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
>> to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
>>
>> If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
>> product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
>> and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
>> things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
>> have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
>>
>> has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
>> (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
>>
>> QED
>
> imagination".
Thats simple. I and what is part of me is is seperate. How many times a day
do you refer to people speaking of "their mind?" Same situation.
> "Me" and "not-me" are the two sides of that abstraction known as the self
> concept (i.e. they are a product of the imagination),...
......not if the "self" is doing the imagining
> and so without a
> "not-me" there could be no "me".
You and your creations are also seperate.
Consequently, as itself a product of the
> imagination, what can it mean for the "me" to claim ownership of the
> imagination?
Dont need to claim ownership. What makes you imagine that ? :-)
(dont you just love the language !)
BOfL
>
Brian Fletcher
Even the subjective experience of what constitutes 5 minutes ;-))
BOfL
>
99
andy-k wrote:
> "99" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> >> Witt was concerned with the realism/anti-realism issue in the Tractatus,
> >> published in 1921. The Philosophical Investigations were published in
> >> 1953. It seems a little hasty to accuse Witt of leaping to hasty
> >> conclusions about that issue in the latter publication.
> >
> > I had an atheist great-uncle who converted to theism later in life.
>
> Not an unreasonable shift when you consider that the nearer one gets to
> death, the more comfort one may find in the metaphysical postulate of an
> afterlife.
Also even touching upon how what might seem gibberish to some can still
be practical: religious beliefs reaping money for evangelical
charlatans and helping political regimes of the past (even present)
stay in business. Amazingly, I can't seem to conjure anything off the
top of my head at this moment that I'd hazard to assert is totally
useless, in which somebody afterwards probably wouldn't chime in and
remark: "Oh, yeah? Yesterday I....." or "My grandparents survived the
worst winter in history by not succumbing to your disdain for....."
> > It does not always follow that more years of reflection equals a better
> > conclusion, especially if neurons and organs deteriorate via age or
> > various afflictions along the way. ;)
>
> It does not always follow that mature conclusions are the result of impaired
> faculties either. Witt held the realist/anti-realist issue to be nonsensical
> throughout his academic life.
>
> "Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out
> strictly, coincides with pure realism. the self of solipsism shrinks to a
> point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with
> it."
>
> Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.64.
Maybe I'm misunderstanding the intention here, but I'll it that the
correlation to solipsism is supposed to be his knock against realism?
After reading some of the rest of that section, I'm at least a tad
skeptical that it is a malicious jab at realism's torso. Starting at
5.62 he writes:
"This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is
in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it
cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this
is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language
which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. The world and
life are one. I am my world. (The microcosm.) ...... The subject does
not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world."
Ah, well, whatever the case may be. Your initial quote that started
this had me reflexively feeling it had something to do with the
scientific realism versus scientific anti-realism debate in POS
(possibly because of LP's idolization of Wittgenstein), but it's
actually the older generalized tango between the two in philosophy. My
bad.
99
99
Just metaphoric. The brain constructs a map of a world from the
micro-battering that the body is taking. Pressure waves pounding the
eardrums, photons striking the eyes, electric charges pulsing back
against the hands and skin, molecules infiltrating the gustatory and
olfactory receptors. Evolving analytical and statistical systems for
trying to figure out what kind of surrounding thug (environment) is
carrying out the assault on the body and nervous system:
http://www.sinauer.com/detail.php?id=7528
99
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> "Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed
>> out strictly, coincides with pure realism. the self of solipsism shrinks
>> to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated
>> with it."
>>
>> Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.64.
>
> Maybe I'm misunderstanding the intention here, but I'll it that the
> correlation to solipsism is supposed to be his knock against realism?
>
> After reading some of the rest of that section, I'm at least a tad
> skeptical that it is a malicious jab at realism's torso.
I took it to be a dig at those who maintain that there is a useful
distinction to be made, rather than an argument in favor of anti-realism.
> Starting at 5.62 he writes:
>
> "This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is
> in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it
> cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this
> is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language
> which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. The world and
> life are one. I am my world. (The microcosm.) ...... The subject does
> not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world."
The OP wrote about the solipsist who claims that "the world is a product of
my imagination". I don't know what it can mean for a solipsist to speak of
"my imagination". "Me" and "not-me" are the two sides of that abstraction
known as the self concept (i.e. they are a product of the imagination), and
so without a "not-me" there could be no "me". Consequently, as itself a
product of the imagination, what can it mean for the "me" to claim ownership
of the imagination?
> Ah, well, whatever the case may be. Your initial quote that started
> this had me reflexively feeling it had something to do with the
> scientific realism versus scientific anti-realism debate in POS
> (possibly because of LP's idolization of Wittgenstein), but it's
> actually the older generalized tango between the two in philosophy.
> My bad.
Just that the distinction confers no practical advantage.
a_friend
There is an orientation to space and time that occurs and the cognitive
measurement (time) between events of awareness. Time is a fixed system
of measurement between events, as metric or imperial often fixed
'absolute' measures of other objects.
My awareness of events and between events determines how I subjectively
relate to time. The more engaged that I am in X the less aware of the
passage of time -- a disorientation to space-time, if you will.
Subjectively, I lost track of time. On review, I can find the precise
amount of time that it took to respond to this post.
a_friend
Wow. It sounds so violent. I exist in harmony with my environment.
Inasmuch as sound waves reach me, I also send out my own sound waves. I
prefer a state of homeostasis or equanimity rather than an organism
against a world. I view that my hand can move through air and water,
rather than my hand being assaulted, attacked or bombarded by these
things.
Interesting choices for reality.
George Dance
> >> There is no proof of an external world.
> >
> > You must mean no good proof, as some proofs have been presented. Are
> > you claiming that good proofs of an external world are impossible?
>
> Both proving something and having doubts about something require that there
> are things that are exempt from doubting and are taken for granted. What I
> am claiming is that you can't prove what is taken for granted to prove or
> doubt things.
In order to prove any one thing, one has to take other things for
granted; otherwise one could never end a proof, or even start one,
really. My proof was no exception - I took as axiomatic that I had the
experience I described; that that much was real. (Otherwise, there
would be no contradiction.)
OTOH, there's no assumption that the things I described - the walk to
the store, being in the store, et al - were anything more than
experiences. A word like "store" can stand either for a certain type
of environment that I, you, and virtually everyone else experiences; or
it can stand for that plus our theories that explain the experience(s);
but there's no need for it to stand for more than the experience(s).
> If we're wrong about this assumption, then what guarentees
> the truth of anything we say, ever?
But that's precisely why no theories should be taken as axiomatic, but
that OTC all of one's axioms should be as fully criticizeable as any
other theorized beliefs. If the axioms are not true, then nothing
whatever guarantees the truth of any of their corollaries.
George Dance
Assuming solipsism, my mind produced ~C, just as my mind produced my
acting for C. I'll go along with not calling the first a 'desire',
because (for one thing) it's not a desire that I was aware of.
However, it's a fact that both my acting for C, and my getting ~C, had
the same source - which is the apparent absurdity.
zinnic
Immortalist wrote:
> zinnic wrote:
> > Immortalist wrote:
> > I presume that the "brainio cap" hallucinates the wearer into the
> > beliet that he does not wear it.
> >
>
> Not necessarily since that the person could be in a hallucination
> allows any logically possible events including a dream in which the
> person is wearing a cap that makes him have a dream.
>
> >
> > possibility? Because it cannot be disproven? Are all possibilites
> > except contradictions logical? The acceptance of a premise is the
> > foundation of a logical conclusion. Explain to me how a premise
> > (possibility) is 'in itself' logical. Because it is not an
> > "impossibility? Duh!
> >
>
> The basis for logical possibility is consistency or the lack of
> contradiction between possibilities.
>
that the braino cap exist and not exist' is illogical because, being
internally contradictory it is impossible for it to be valid. The
contradictory statements-- 'it is possible that the braino cap exists '
and 'it is possible that the brain cap not exist' are both valid but it
is a stretch to claim they are both logical. Ah well. Sigh! I guess
that philosophers love to stretch. I concede that both are 'possibly
logical' but, not being a philosopher, I concede nothing furthur ;-).
> One can say that unicorns are a logical possibility since we have
> cannot decide whether we have observed all animals on earth or not and
> still claim that even though the unicorn is logically possible or
> impossible and we cannot decide which it continues to be an appeal to
> ignorance to claim that because we cannot disprove it that it must
> exist.
> Consistency and possibility are two different words with different
> meanings.
Here endeth the lesson?
> > But why stop here? What if the scientist himself was unaware that he
> > was wearing a superior scientist's "brainno cap" and was being induced
> > to hallucinate that he was creating hallucinations with a hallucinatory
> > "braino" fitted to a hallucinatory individual?. Let us go on. What if
> > the 'superior scientist' was himself wearing etc. etc.? We regress
> > from your initial 'possibity' to the infinite possibilities that dilute
> > your original 'possibility' beyond reason.
> > >
>
> At this point in the debate that would be similar to a concession on
> the part of the rationalist since he wants to argue that we know
> reality enough to claim one theory for it, excluding the brains in vats
> theory.
I thought it was more a use of Occam's principle. That is, a plea to
stand on the turtle we feel with our feet and ignore the 'all the way
down' others..
etc, etc <snip>
I cannot feel Dr. O, so I eliminate him along with the rest of the
turtles.
Regards....Zinnic
Immortalist
I think that the proper inductive treatment would be to convert all to
hypothetical in this instance;
If brainos exist then X.
or as a disjunction for the more analytic look;
either the braino exists or
the braino does not exist.
> > One can say that unicorns are a logical possibility since we have
> > cannot decide whether we have observed all animals on earth or not and
> > still claim that even though the unicorn is logically possible or
> > impossible and we cannot decide which it continues to be an appeal to
> > ignorance to claim that because we cannot disprove it that it must
> > exist.
> > Consistency and possibility are two different words with different
> > meanings.
>
> Here endeth the lesson?
>
I should say, possibility and contingency or maybe that something is
possible makes no move or automatic assertion towards a claim that
something must exist because it cannot be disproven.
http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e01.htm
http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e04.htm
http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/index.htm
http://info-pollution.com/ignorance.htm
Can you describe the evidence you used to determine that all times when
Dr. O stimulates illusions are not times when he could make it so you
could not feel him? Or are you claiming that this "feeling" is outside
of the brain and its activities? If it is the activities of the brain
then it seems possible that the underlying nerve cells could be
stimulated in the particular way that they are now stimulated to
produce experiences but by some other source?
> Regards....Zinnic
zinnic
Immortalist wrote:
> zinnic wrote:
> > Immortalist wrote:
<snip>
> I should say, possibility and contingency or maybe that something is
> possible makes no move or automatic assertion towards a claim that
> something must exist because it cannot be disproven.
>
I see the logic in your hypothetical conditional but I am unable to
detect logic in 'brainos are possible". and cannot reconcile myself to
your -unicorns are a "logical possibility". This is because
'possible' has such potential to pollute 'logic'.
For example, one may claim that the possible must exist because it
cannot be disproven (not proven to be impossible). This may be
semantics, shemantics but it is not fallacious.
> > > > But why stop here? What if the scientist himself was unaware that he
> > > > was wearing a superior scientist's "brainno cap" and was being induced
> > > > to hallucinate that he was creating hallucinations with a hallucinatory
> > > > "braino" fitted to a hallucinatory individual?. Let us go on. What if
> > > > the 'superior scientist' was himself wearing etc. etc.? We regress
> > > > from your initial 'possibity' to the infinite possibilities that dilute
> > > > your original 'possibility' beyond reason.
> > > > >
> > >
> > > At this point in the debate that would be similar to a concession on
> > > the part of the rationalist since he wants to argue that we know
> > > reality enough to claim one theory for it, excluding the brains in vats
> > > theory.
> >
> > I thought it was more a use of Occam's principle. That is, a plea to
> > stand on the turtle we feel with our feet and ignore the 'all the way
> > down' others..
> <snip>
> > > No, you must eliminate the possibility that one of these people is the
> > > entire physical universe and other people and things are events within
> > > this one consciouss thing. I do not want to appeal to ignorance here
> > > but that it is possible that one person is the entire universe it
> > > cannot be claimed that there is a shared hallucination like;
> > >
> > > Imagine that all people are controlled by the braino and that the
> > > machine is run by some evil being, Dr. O,
> >> etc, etc <snip>
>
> > I cannot feel Dr. O, so I eliminate him along with the rest of the
> > turtles.
>
> Can you describe the evidence you used to determine that all times when
> Dr. O stimulates illusions are not times when he could make it so you
> could not feel him? Or are you claiming that this "feeling" is outside
> of the brain and its activities? If it is the activities of the brain
> then it seems possible that the underlying nerve cells could be
> stimulated in the particular way that they are now stimulated to
> produce experiences but by some other source?
>
My point is that Dr, O may or may not exist. As you state, there is no
way in which I can gain evidence of his existence or non-existence.
Thus, because I feel that I am not being controlled my rational
pragmatic response is to consign him (along with the turtles ) to the
infinity of other irrelevant possibilities. As a part we can never
encompass the Whole. On with the puppet show!.
Zinnic
MiniMeOne
You said..."so if solopsism exists..."
By definition of the english language, and the fact that we can either
know or look up what the word is supposed to mean, there IS A THEORY
that only the self can be verified.....what I used to call brain
research theory....it takes someone with a brain to be curious about a
brain, and invent hypothesis about it...so what absolute "reality" can
we ensure is correct to all other species with a brain? Hard to
say....thus, it is a theory, imho.
Your, "on the contrary"....simply poses the innuendo you don't buy the
theory in the first place....so why as us about your coffee scenario?
I've actually had a dream I could describe just as your coffee story,
and, in fact, have lived it to a varied degree, but more along the
lines of that I've left my abode to get some coffee, and have changed
my mind about getting any by the time I arrive at store and/or coffee
shop.
Since I find it a rarity that the store nearby is completel "out" of a
coffee product, me, in my proof of an external world would have checked
at another store.
of course, that preumes to me several other topics of discussion better
left elsewhere, like in dream meanings, coffee dependency and market
conditions, as well as manifestation, body-mind connections, and, why
you may or may not have labeled your desire as the "need" to get coffee
in the first place.
grins,
mmo
Brian Fletcher
My view is , the more engaged in your activity (particularly if it is
creative), the more you are in touch with reality, which transends time.
Time by your definition, is always a relative distortion.
BOfL
>
George Dance
> George Dance wrote:
> > john wrote:
> > > George Dance wrote:
> > > > BernardZ wrote:
> > > > > In article <1154477790.4...@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
> > > > > george...@yahoo.ca says...
> > > > >
> > > > > If all you want is proof of the external world do the following.
> > > > >
> > > > > 1) Open the cupboard
> > > > > 2) Put your hand inside the cupboard
> > > > > 3) Slam the door shut hard.
> > > > >
> > > > > If you still doubt the external world go to step (1).
> > > > >
> > > > > Repeat the following until you are convinced.
> > > >
> > > > That's the proof attributed to Samuel Johnson, which fails for obvious
> > > > reasons.
> > >
> > > from an earlier posting
> > >
> > > A boy on his way to work walking down a path and in his way steps a
> > > philosopher, ''excuse me'' said the boy. ''Boy'' said the philosopher
> > > ''what evidence do you have that I exist'' the boy looked down at his
> > > working boots, thought, walked up to the philosopher and kicked him
> > > hard
> > > in the shin and continued on his way. Looking back he saw all of the
> > > hopping philosophers supposed philosophies wafting into the ether.
> > >
> > > What are the obvious reasons???
> >
> > The philosopher starts with the same sensory impressions as anyone
> > else, "I see a cupboard door" or "I see a boy"; what he questions is
> > the legitimacy of concluding, from sense impressions alone, that "The
> > cupboard door exists" or "The boy exists". Since that's precisely
> > what's in question, adding a second sense impression - "I touch the
> > cupboard door" or "I hear the boy" - doesn't do anything to answer the
> > question. For the same reason, adding a third sensory impression - "I
> > feel pain from the cupboard door" or "I feel pain from the boy" -
> > doesn't do anything to answer it, either.
>
> A blind person never sees the cupboard or a boy. We will argue that boy
> exist despite the blind person's inability to have those sensory
> experiences. A deaf person will not hear the boy. Assuming that we
> process information the same, or that we have same information is to
> overlook the reality of human experience. To the deaf or blind person,
> we are still going to argue that what our senses tell is true or
> reality. There reality is different.
A blind person could still hear both the cupboard door (slam it!) or
the boy; a deaf person could still see both the cupboard door and the
boy; a person who was both blind and deaf could still touch or feel
both the cupboard door and the boy. It's not the case that either "the
door exists" or "the boy exists" are true for one person and false for
another; that there are different objective realities for the different
people.
Without that common reality, one can 'argue' till one is blue in the
face that something or other exists or does not exist, without
convincing anyone. Take, for example, the debate between moral
intuitionists (who claim that they can perceive rightness or wrongness)
and the rest of us (who do not).
> The question is an essential one where one person perceives/sees a
> cupboard door and another doesn't.
It is only an essential question in a case (like the one involving
moral intuition where a hypothesized aspect of reality can be perceived
using only one sense. That's not the case for either the blind or deaf
persons.
George Dance
> "Our normal form of expression gives us a picture of a world that exists
> independently of our ideas about it. The idealist attacks that picture as if
> he were attacking a statement. The realist defends it as though he were
> stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. What practical
> advantage is conferred by such arguments? None."
>
> Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 402,3.
By that point in his career, Wittgenstein had pretty much concluded
that philosophy in general had no practical value. Even earlier, in
the Tractatus, he'd compared philosophy to a ladder one that one could,
after climbing once, throw away or destroy as having no further value.
George Dance
> "99" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> >> "Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed
> >> out strictly, coincides with pure realism. the self of solipsism shrinks
> >> to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated
> >> with it."
> >>
> >> Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.64.
> >
> > Maybe I'm misunderstanding the intention here, but I'll it that the
> > correlation to solipsism is supposed to be his knock against realism?
> >
> > After reading some of the rest of that section, I'm at least a tad
> > skeptical that it is a malicious jab at realism's torso.
>
> I took it to be a dig at those who maintain that there is a useful
> distinction to be made, rather than an argument in favor of anti-realism.
As I read it, he's saying that either theory (to be viable) has to
explain the same facts as well as the other; at which point there would
be no practical difference between them.
> > Starting at 5.62 he writes:
> >
> > "This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is
> > in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it
> > cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this
> > is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language
> > which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. The world and
> > life are one. I am my world. (The microcosm.) ...... The subject does
> > not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world."
>
> The OP wrote about the solipsist who claims that "the world is a product of
> my imagination". I don't know what it can mean for a solipsist to speak of
> "my imagination".
A solipsist believes that all that (he knows) exists is the self and
its experiences - which in my case, is myself and my experiences.
That's the only 'self' that I know of.
> "Me" and "not-me" are the two sides of that abstraction
> known as the self concept (i.e. they are a product of the imagination), and
> so without a "not-me" there could be no "me".
Well, no, that doesn't follow; there could be me or nothing.
> Consequently, as itself a
> product of the imagination, what can it mean for the "me" to claim ownership
> of the imagination?
The only imagination this self (me) is aware of is my imagination.
Perhaps there is some other Imagination - Berkeley's God, Hegel's Idea,
or whatnot - that determines the 'not-me' part of reality. But that's
already a retreat from solipsism to idealism. And that idealism has to
postulate the existence of both self and non-self, no less than
realism, or it falls into the same absurdity.
For suppose that the Imagination were all there was. Then it
determined ~C. Yet it also determined that I would act for C; which is
the same absurdity as previously. So there have to be at least two
imaginations - Imagination (which determined that I would get ~C) and
my imagination (which determined that I would want and act for C).
George Dance
> George Dance wrote:
> > > George Dance wrote:
> > > > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > > > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > > > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > > > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > > > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
> > > >
> > > > OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> > > > has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> > > > (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
> > > >
> > > > QED
> > >
> > > had a nightmare?
> >
> > I've never fulfilled any wishes when dreaming; AFAIK, it's not
> > something one does when dreaming. So there's no absurdity there;
> > that's not even a relevant example from what I can see.
>
> Dreaming or fantasy (or thought if you will) is also a great antidote
> to the phenomenon of boredom and anxiety. The goal of dreaming is not
> to accomplish anything, but rather to avoid something else -- an
> anxious state or in being alone.
Dreaming is something that occurs to me when I'm asleep. There's no
goal involved. Fantasizing and thinking are different from dreaming,
and distinct from each other (all fantasizing is thinking, but not vice
versa).
> A highly goal-oriented society is merely a society that doesn't manage
> anxiety well.
George Dance
> "Frederick Williams" <Frederick...@antispamtesco.net.invalid> wrote
> in message news:44CFFC9A...@antispamtesco.net.invalid...
> >>
> >> I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> >> there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> >> to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
> >>
> >> product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> >> and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> >> things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> >> have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
>
>
> Everything we create comes from our imagination.Another way of putting it is
> "coffee" is imagination crystalised.
>
imagination was uncreative; in fact, as I was assuming solipsism, I
implied that exact opposite: that my imagination created both my
acting to get coffee and the result that I did not get any.
> In my view, a solipsist sees the difference between 'his' projection, as
> seperate from that of the "group"
A solipsist believes in (because h's certain of) only himself and his
experiences.
>
> BOfL
>
>
> >
> > Not at all. Just because you imagine X, that does not mean that you
> > want X.
> >
> >> OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination, there
> >> has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> >> (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
> >>
> >> QED
> >
> >
> > --
> > Remove "antispam" and ".invalid" for e-mail address.
George Dance
andy-k wrote:
> "George Dance" wrote:
> >I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
> > there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
> > to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
> >
> > If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
> > product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
> > and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
> > things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want to
> > have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
> >
> > has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
> > (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
> >
> > QED
>
> concept (i.e. they are a product of the imagination), and so without a
> "not-me" there could be no "me".
If there's only me, then there's me or nothing - 'nothing' is 'not-me'.
Not only is there no inconsistency in thinking that; it's the same
thing as thinking: If there's only the self, then there's the self or
nothing - 'nothing' is 'not-self'. So I don't even see your
distinction between self and me, much less a difference that it
reflects.
> Consequently, as itself a product of the
> imagination, what can it mean for the "me" to claim ownership of the
> imagination?
I think you're confusing the concept of 'self' (or 'me') with its
referent. Obviously the concept is a product of the imagination, but
that doesn't imply that the imagination created the self. In the same
way, for example, the concept of imagination is a product of the
imagination, but that does not imply that the imagination created the
imagination (as that would be absurd: the imagination would have to
exist at the same time as the imagination did not exist).
andy-k
> By that point in his career, Wittgenstein had pretty much concluded
> that philosophy in general had no practical value. Even earlier, in
> the Tractatus, he'd compared philosophy to a ladder one that one could,
> after climbing once, throw away or destroy as having no further value.
"My method throughout is to point out mistakes in language. I am going to
use the word "philosophy" for the activity of pointing out such mistakes.
Why do I wish to call our present activity philosophy, when we also call
Plato's activity philosophy? Perhaps because of a certain analogy between
them, or perhaps because of the continuous development of the subject.
Or the new activity may take the place of the old because it removes mental
discomforts the old was supposed to."
( -- Lectures in Philosophy, 23.)
"What is your aim in philosophy? -- To shew the fly the way out of the
fly-bottle."
( -- Philosophical Investigations, 309.)
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> The OP wrote about the solipsist who claims that "the world is a
>> product of my imagination". I don't know what it can mean for a
>> solipsist to speak of "my imagination".
>
> A solipsist believes that all that (he knows) exists is the self and
> its experiences - which in my case, is myself and my experiences.
> That's the only 'self' that I know of.
What, then, is this "me" that is "having" these experiences?
>> "Me" and "not-me" are the two sides of that abstraction
>> known as the self concept (i.e. they are a product of the
>> imagination), and so without a "not-me" there could be no "me".
>
> Well, no, that doesn't follow; there could be me or nothing.
Without a "not-me" there could be nothing -- i.e. there could
be no "me" -- I don't think this is a point of disagreement.
However, if you are saying that without a "not-me" there could
still be a "me", then again I'd ask what does this "me" consist of?
>> Consequently, as itself a product of the imagination, what can
>> it mean for the "me" to claim ownership of the imagination?
>
> The only imagination this self (me) is aware of is my imagination.
I'll be in a better position to understand you when you've described this
"me".
George Dance
> "George Dance" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> >> The OP wrote about the solipsist who claims that "the world is a
> >> product of my imagination". I don't know what it can mean for a
> >> solipsist to speak of "my imagination".
> >
> > A solipsist believes that all that (he knows) exists is the self and
> > its experiences - which in my case, is myself and my experiences.
> > That's the only 'self' that I know of.
>
> What, then, is this "me" that is "having" these experiences?
The experiences reduce to events and awareness of them; the 'me' is the
awareness (and (arguably?) some of the events as well).
> >> "Me" and "not-me" are the two sides of that abstraction
> >> known as the self concept (i.e. they are a product of the
> >> imagination), and so without a "not-me" there could be no "me".
> >
> > Well, no, that doesn't follow; there could be me or nothing.
>
> Without a "not-me" there could be nothing -- i.e. there could
> be no "me" -- I don't think this is a point of disagreement.
> However, if you are saying that without a "not-me" there could
> still be a "me", then again I'd ask what does this "me" consist of?
>
If there was in fact no not-me, then me (I) would consist of
everything. That still gives two distinct concepts of 'me' and
'not-me' - 'me' would be everything, and 'not-me' would be nothing.
> >> Consequently, as itself a product of the imagination, what can
> >> it mean for the "me" to claim ownership of the imagination?
> >
> > The only imagination this self (me) is aware of is my imagination.
>
> I'll be in a better position to understand you when you've described this
> "me".
As a primitive, it's awareness, plus (some) of the things the awareness
is aware of.
a_friend
The more one is engaged in an activity the more is unaware of their
aloneness, for example. An engagement with X and an unwareness of Y
doesn't seem to be an adequate explanation of reality. As well, if time
is party of reality then an unawareness for time while engaged in an
acitivity does seem to be reality. Time can be measure between the
start and end of the activity (event) whether we do or not is a
question of our awareness of it -- reality even.
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> What, then, is this "me" that is "having" these experiences?
>
> The experiences reduce to events and awareness of them; the 'me' is the
> awareness (and (arguably?) some of the events as well).
Is, then, the solipsist arguing that since there are experiences there must
also be an "experiencer" ("awareness"), imagined as though it were some
"thing" in its own right, *separate and distinct* from its experiences?
>> Without a "not-me" there could be nothing -- i.e. there could
>> be no "me" -- I don't think this is a point of disagreement.
>> However, if you are saying that without a "not-me" there could
>> still be a "me", then again I'd ask what does this "me" consist of?
>
> If there was in fact no not-me, then me (I) would consist of
> everything. That still gives two distinct concepts of 'me' and
> 'not-me' - 'me' would be everything, and 'not-me' would be nothing.
So the solipsist must conclude that "I am everything" -- i.e. not just some
"experiencer" that is "having" these experiences -- not just some
"awareness" that could exist in the absence of anything to be aware of --
but *everything* -- *all* experiences included. Now where is this
"experiencer"?
>> >> Consequently, as itself a product of the imagination, what can
>> >> it mean for the "me" to claim ownership of the imagination?
>> >
>> > The only imagination this self (me) is aware of is my imagination.
>>
>> I'll be in a better position to understand you when you've described this
>> "me".
>
> As a primitive, it's awareness, plus (some) of the things the awareness
> is aware of.
"Some" of the things? Can the solipsist make that argument?
Brian Fletcher
> Brian Fletcher wrote:
>> "Frederick Williams" <Frederick...@antispamtesco.net.invalid>
>> wrote
>> in message news:44CFFC9A...@antispamtesco.net.invalid...
>> >>
>> >> I want to have a cup of coffee; I go to the cupboard and discover
>> >> there's no coffee; all the stores are closed but one, and when I walk
>> >> to it there's no coffee for sale. So I have to do without.
>> >>
>> >> If solipsism was correct, and the world I perceive were solely the
>> >> product of my imagination, then: I thought I wanted a cup of coffee,
>> >> and imagined myself acting to get a cup. And also: I imagined that
>> >> things were such that I could not have one; therefore I did not want
>> >> to
>> >> have one. Which is prime facie absurd.
>>
>>
>> Everything we create comes from our imagination.Another way of putting it
>> is
>> "coffee" is imagination crystalised.
>>
> What's the misunderstanding? I certainly did not imply that
> imagination was uncreative; in fact, as I was assuming solipsism, I
> implied that exact opposite: that my imagination created both my
> acting to get coffee and the result that I did not get any.
>
I'm not suggesting you dont understand, but many do.
BOfL
>
>
>> In my view, a solipsist sees the difference between 'his' projection, as
>> seperate from that of the "group"
>>
>> BOfL
>>
>>
>> >
>> > Not at all. Just because you imagine X, that does not mean that you
>> > want X.
>> >
>> >> OTOH, if the world were not solely the product of my imagination,
>> >> there
>> >> has to be an external world; something besides my imagination. So
>> >> (granting the absurdity) there is an external world.
>> >>
>> >> QED
>> >
>> >
Brian Fletcher
And what of somebody who has moved beyond such belief? Would the word
solipsist not fit ?
BOfL
Brian Fletcher
More simply, we each move in and out of the "time track". The more my
attention is "in the moment", the lighter I feel.
BOfL
>
a_friend
When one feels light and enjoys feeling light, they are unlikely to
experience the next moment in preference to the current moment.
See: A philosoph of contentment.
The issue though was that of reality. If you are in the moment then you
lack awareness for many things that are in the moment -- a part of
reality. As I write this I have no clue as to what is happening in
downtown Beijing. It is happening despite my being in this moment with
my response to you. The people in downtown Beijing are likely unaware
of you and I exchanging these perspectives. They too, however, exist in
reality.
A here and now approach is an exclusion of then and there. Both are
within reality. Two types of time and types of space.
George Dance
> "George Dance" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> >> What, then, is this "me" that is "having" these experiences?
> >
> > The experiences reduce to events and awareness of them; the 'me' is the
> > awareness (and (arguably?) some of the events as well).
>
> Is, then, the solipsist arguing that since there are experiences there must
> also be an "experiencer" ("awareness"), imagined as though it were some
> "thing" in its own right, *separate and distinct* from its experiences?
I'm not sure that every solipsist would say that; it's just an obvious
inference to me. The awareness is different from any of the events -
it's known directly that there can be awareness without this or that
event, and (by inference) there can be this or that event without
awareness of it. So by Leibniz's Law, they're not just distinct but
different.
> >> Without a "not-me" there could be nothing -- i.e. there could
> >> be no "me" -- I don't think this is a point of disagreement.
> >> However, if you are saying that without a "not-me" there could
> >> still be a "me", then again I'd ask what does this "me" consist of?
> >
> > If there was in fact no not-me, then me (I) would consist of
> > everything. That still gives two distinct concepts of 'me' and
> > 'not-me' - 'me' would be everything, and 'not-me' would be nothing.
>
> So the solipsist must conclude that "I am everything" -- i.e. not just some
> "experiencer" that is "having" these experiences -- not just some
> "awareness" that could exist in the absence of anything to be aware of --
> but *everything* -- *all* experiences included. Now where is this
> "experiencer"?
The metaphysical solipsist would conclude that there was nothing but
his experiences, and presumably answer, "everywhere" or "the only place
there is." An epistemological solipsist would conclude, more weakly,
that he doesn't know anything beyond his own experiences - so
presumably he'd answer, "I don't really know."
>
> >> >> Consequently, as itself a product of the imagination, what can
> >> >> it mean for the "me" to claim ownership of the imagination?
> >> >
> >> > The only imagination this self (me) is aware of is my imagination.
> >>
> >> I'll be in a better position to understand you when you've described this
> >> "me".
> >
> > As a primitive, it's awareness, plus (some) of the things the awareness
> > is aware of.
>
> "Some" of the things? Can the solipsist make that argument?
The metaphysical solipsist would say, "All of the things" (and the
epistemological solipsist "All the things I know of"); but everyone, I
think would have to argue that the self includes 'some' things. For
example, I consider my body to be part of my self, on the premise that
my awareness of it is as continuous as my awareness itself, and
Leibniz's Law again.
George Dance
I don't think so; though it depends on which way one moves. One way,
and the way I've argued for, is toward an objective (mind-independent)
reality or external world. Believers in objective reality are a pretty
big crowd - every idealist and evert materialist qualifies - but I
don't think any of their number could be called 'solipsists,' by
definition.
The other way to move would be toward extreme or global scepticism -
denying that (one can know) that there is anything at all, even
oneself. That view involves its own contradictions, as Sextus
E,mpiricus famously argued against the Skeptics' Academy. (He asked
them what they knew, and they told him they knew nothing; he replied
that in that case they didn't know that, and therefore might know
something after all.) I don't think it would be fair to characterize
global scepticism as solipsism, either; though probably a lot of global
sceptics really are solipsists, in that deep down they do believe they
exist.
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> Is, then, the solipsist arguing that since there are experiences there
>> must also be an "experiencer" ("awareness"), imagined as though it were
>> some "thing" in its own right, *separate and distinct* from its
>> experiences?
>
> I'm not sure that every solipsist would say that; it's just an obvious
> inference to me. The awareness is different from any of the events - it's
> known directly that there can be awareness without this or that event, and
> (by inference) there can be this or that event without awareness of it.
> So by Leibniz's Law, they're not just distinct but different.
I'm sure it's just an obvious inference for the solipsist too, but my claim
is that the solipsist is being inconsistent in holding that view.
>> So the solipsist must conclude that "I am everything" -- i.e. not just
>> some "experiencer" that is "having" these experiences -- not just some
>> "awareness" that could exist in the absence of anything to be aware of --
>> but *everything* -- *all* experiences included. Now where is this
>> "experiencer"?
>
> The metaphysical solipsist would conclude that there was nothing but
> his experiences, and presumably answer, "everywhere" or "the only place
> there is."
So the solipsist is claiming that he is the experiential gestalt -- the sum
total of all experience. But that must include the experiential inference
from experience to experiencer, and to subscribe to that inference is as
much as to claim that there is something else that is "having" this
experience, separate, distinct, and different to this experience -- i.e. to
place something outside the "everywhere", beyond "the only place there is".
> An epistemological solipsist would conclude, more weakly,
> that he doesn't know anything beyond his own experiences - so
> presumably he'd answer, "I don't really know."
And in giving that answer he tacitly conjectures the existence of a "knower"
that is separate, distinct, and different to what is known -- i.e. something
beyond "his own experience".
Brian Fletcher
My view is that the individual is always moving towards the subjective
view, which is mind independent.
> Believers in objective reality are a pretty
> big crowd - every idealist and evert materialist qualifies - but I
> don't think any of their number could be called 'solipsists,' by
> definition.
"They" could be referred to as a "solipsist entity".
I have found that the few I know who could be described as solipsists have a
great sense of respect for others, whereas the "group solipsists" usually
get strength in nuimbers, and dientify themselves through opposing
views.They share a comfort zone.
>
> The other way to move would be toward extreme or global scepticism -
> denying that (one can know) that there is anything at all, even
> oneself.
I would say human spirit denies that possibility. The individual is always
evolving away from the group.
> That view involves its own contradictions, as Sextus
> E,mpiricus famously argued against the Skeptics' Academy. (He asked
> them what they knew, and they told him they knew nothing; he replied
> that in that case they didn't know that, and therefore might know
> something after all.)
He realised they did know something, but wern't ready to acknowledge that
fact. He was talking to a group afterall.
> I don't think it would be fair to characterize
> global scepticism as solipsism, either; though probably a lot of global
> sceptics really are solipsists, in that deep down they do believe they
> exist.
I am inspite of my beliefs :-)
BOfL
>
Brian Fletcher
There is no "next moment". This appears when the "dual mind" kicks in.
>
> See: A philosoph of contentment.
>
> The issue though was that of reality. If you are in the moment then you
> lack awareness for many things that are in the moment -- a part of
> reality.
Not what the transcendentalists describe. More of an overview, which can
either be focused in or out. Im certain that is where the "visionary" in us
eminates. A "glimpse" can expand.
> As I write this I have no clue as to what is happening in
> downtown Beijing. It is happening despite my being in this moment with
> my response to you. The people in downtown Beijing are likely unaware
> of you and I exchanging these perspectives. They too, however, exist in
> reality.
Agreed, but I would suggest it is only because there is no value in viewing
Beijing while focusing on this exchange. The ability to shift ones focus is
a "moment-us" development.
>
> A here and now approach is an exclusion of then and there. Both are
> within reality. Two types of time and types of space.
I have found I can see more of there and then, the more I am here and now.
Perhaps a Hu-bble experience . (Hu being a very profound mantra which is
purported to facilitate shifts in perspective).
BOfL
>