>>>> On 07/21/2012 12:53 PM, brian mitchell
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> noname  wrote:

>>>>>> Some experiences will stop the mind,
>>>>>> most will not; when it is stopped
>>>>>> we have an opportunity to experience
>>>>>> the unthinking self...

>>>>> Your attribution of selfhood or
>>>>> individuality to what is there when
>>>>> thought stops isn't universally
>>>>> shared and may not be necessary.
>>>>> Experience is individualised, but what
>>>>> is experienced may not be.
>>>>> The question seems to revolve around
>>>>> what it is that experiences and what it
>>>>> is to experience. But
>>>>> does it matter? Does it matter whether
>>>>> one refers to 'the unthinking mind', or
>>>>> 'no-mind', or 'the
>>>>> unthinking self'? What's in a name?

>>>> You post seems to qualify as a
>>>> soliloquy.  Eating too many Ham-lettes
>>>> can do that I suppose. <g>  If you had a
>>>> specific point you wanted to
>>>> make, I missed it in the ponderings, so
>>>> if you feel it's important you
>>>> might spell it out for the simpletons
>>>> (hand raised).

>>> The burden:
>>>> Your attribution of selfhood or
>>>> individuality to what is there when
>>>> thought stops isn't universally
>>>> shared and may not be necessary.

>>> Elaboration of burden:
>>>> Experience is individualised, but what
>>>> is experienced may not be.

>> Thank you for the clarification, I did
>> apparently misunderstand; I thought you
>> were saying that (a) experiences are
>> individualized, but (b) what it is that
>> experiences might not be individualized.

>> Yes, experiencing is individual, and some
>> experiences are "universal", or at least
>> commonly experienced by many individuals.

>> Either that which experiences is itself an
>> individual, or it is simply a delusion in
>> the mind of a lonely "God".  Applying a
>> usefulness razor eliminates the
>> possibility that what experiences is
>> simply a schizoid personality segment in
>> the mind of a mad deity, because if that
>> case is true then everything is pointless
>> and without value superior to the state of
>> non-existence commonly known as "death"

>>> Because we are persons, manifest,
>>> incarnate etc, one can point to a place
>>> and time where a
>>> particular realization or whatever
>>> occurs, but these (in the kind of case
>>> we're talking about)
>>> aren't intrinsic to the content of the
>>> experience.

>> Sorry, you lost me with "these aren't
>> intrinsic to the content of the
>> experience".

>>> To assume that what is experienced (the
>>> Unthought) in some way *belongs* to the
>>> one having the experience, such as
>>> revealing an essence or a
>>> hitherto hidden part, may be an
>>> assumption too far.

>> I think it is not, in itself, though the
>> presumption that an experience is a
>> material property of something that must
>> therefore be material in order to own it
>> would be going too far.

>>> Amplification on the elaboration, left
>>> hanging:
>>>> The question seems to revolve around
>>>> what it is that experiences and what it
>>>> is to experience.

>>> There is a natural, native, possibly
>>> naive assumption that *I* experience, but
>>> that is open to
>>> question. For example, "I" may simply be
>>> a by-product of the recording of an event
>>> in memory.

>> Here we arrive at the difference between
>> an accreted ego and the true self around
>> which it accretes, and by accreting,
>> occluding the true self which has
>> permitted fear to cover it with delusion.

>>> The Turn:
>>>> But
>>>> does it matter? Does it matter whether
>>>> one refers to 'the unthinking mind', or
>>>> 'no-mind', or 'the
>>>> unthinking self'? What's in a name?

>>> A shift in perspective, a different
>>> angle. Do any of these definitions and
>>> markers, such as 'self',
>>> 'no-self', 'Mind', 'no-mind' and so on,
>>> refer to things, objects, which can be
>>> materially and
>>> significantly distinguished from one
>>> another in the course of the living
>>> moment? Are they helpful?
>>> Why should weight be put on them?

>>> THAT is the question...

>> The answer is yes, although liberation
>> from suffering can be attained through the
>> simple expedient of suicide, it is only
>> the true liberated self which has the
>> capacity to do.

> what?

>> On 07/21/2012 11:18 PM, small tortoiseshell wrote:
>>> what you dont grasp

>> Please do "enlighten" me as to which dogma I have failed to accept
>> unquestioningly.

>>> is that there is no separate ' reality' from what
>>> is that 'shoves' anything in anyones face.

>> If what is most essentially you is not separate from the world at large
>> then neither exists...

> This is, apparently, a realization that some have arrived at over the ages.

> But this is your resistant dogma.

>> I agree with that bit, and yes such is possible.  But attention requires
>> something to attend to; without something to attend to, attention cannot
>> be sustained.

>>> without having to attribute that to a separate '
>>> reality'.

>> Separateness has degrees.  Man is neither separate from his environment,
>> nor is he identical with his environment; there is an interrelationship
>> between man and environment which cannot be broken by attempting to
>> pretend the environment away.  It is only through the conceptual
>> difference between man and environment that attention can gain traction
>> by having something to attend to.

> (Thus have I heard) in true attention there is no attender, only the attended to. If there is even a
> smidgeon of consciousness that attention is being paid, that isn't full attention. Consciousness is
> implicit in your "conceptual difference" above.

>> Every living being has the innate ability to differentiate between what
>> is and what is not...

> I don't think this is so; only living beings capable of conceptualisation can do that, since "what
> is not" is, by definition, not perceptible. Every living being has the innate ability to sense
> whatever lies within its sensory range and is present to be sensed, can one say more?

>>>>> In any case, the humble goal of Buddhism is liberation from suffering,
>>>>> is it not?  Is this a
>>>>> fleeting liberation or a permanent liberation from suffering?  If it
>>>>> is a permanent liberation from
>>>>> suffering it implies a permanent non-suffering "self", and if it is
>>>>> fleeting and occasional it is
>>>>> useless.

>>>> Whatever the value of such arguments, that logic is flawed.

>>> That is not obvious to me.  When you say "whatever its value, it is
>>> flawed", that sounds like
>>> religious dogma... it seems like saying that no matter how true
>>> something is, it's false.

>> It just means that I'm not addressing the issue of the value of
>> such arguments.  The logic itself was flawed; that's not too
>> complicated, and it doesn't involve dogma.

> If you have a reason for considering that logic flawed, I would like to understand what it is.

>>> That is reasonable logic, but eliminating "the sense of" self is
>>> delusion if self has not been
>>> eliminated.

>> And *creating* "the sense of" self is delusion if there is no
>> "real" abiding self.

> Yes, it would be; it would be interesting to hear how you think something which does not exist can
> delude itself.

>>> Here we run into difficulty.  "Buddhist teachings" does not
>>> necessarily mean what Gautama Buddha
>>> taught.  Buddhist teachings is equivalent to "Christian teachings"
>>> which include the apostles' views
>>> and the Pope's latest opinion in addition to what is written in red
>>> letters.

>> It goes back to the earliest recorded teachings, and
>> interpretations over thousands of years.

> It is "interpretations" by people who have inhaled the catechism without experiencing what it
> represents that are problematic.

>> You can think what you want, obviously.  But don't imagine
>> that you can call something else "Buddhism" and people will
>> just accept it as such (for whatever reason you feel the
>> need to label it that way).

> I am not a "Buddhist", nor a "Taoist" or "Christian" or anything else that requires me to be what
> the organization wants me to be.

>>>> eliminating the sense of an
>>>> abiding self is the only truly effective way (although
>>>> intermediate steps can nevertheless be helpful).

>>> Suffering is eliminated through the withering of attached desire, not
>>> by convincing oneself that it
>>> is some imaginary person who is suffering.

>>> And although Gautama Buddha set liberation from suffering as the
>>> humble goal of Buddhism,

>> He "set that as the goal" as skillful means.

> "Skillful means" is a Buddhist cantrip lacking intrinsic value; liberation can be understood by the
> masses and realized by some of them, which is better than nothing.

>>> it is not
>>> by any means the end of the way; it is rather a goal which is
>>> teachable, a reachable destination
>>> from which to begin.  Liberation which requires the death of the
>>> individual prevents one from
>>> continuing on the way.

>> I guess you know better than Buddhist sages over the centuries.

> That is unknowable to me, but I am certainly not about to abandon myself to their desired beliefs
> and pour gasoline on myself while smoking.

>> But you've introduced another logical fallacy, where you are now
>> equating dropping the illusion of self with death.

> If there is no real abiding self, what is there to die?

> A grandiose presumption that somehow I feel that my "deeply
> held beliefs" are being attacked, and therefore I must
> counterattack against poor noname and his hallowed teachings.

> Your comments were simply grating on my basic sense of good
> reasoning (which you introduced, don't try that one).  But
> I give up.

>>>>> On 07/21/2012 12:53 PM, brian mitchell
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> noname  wrote:

>>>>>>> Some experiences will stop the mind,
>>>>>>> most will not; when it is stopped
>>>>>>> we have an opportunity to experience
>>>>>>> the unthinking self...

>>>>>> Your attribution of selfhood or
>>>>>> individuality to what is there when
>>>>>> thought stops isn't universally
>>>>>> shared and may not be necessary.
>>>>>> Experience is individualised, but
>>>>>> what
>>>>>> is experienced may not be.
>>>>>> The question seems to revolve around
>>>>>> what it is that experiences and what
>>>>>> it
>>>>>> is to experience. But
>>>>>> does it matter? Does it matter
>>>>>> whether
>>>>>> one refers to 'the unthinking mind',
>>>>>> or
>>>>>> 'no-mind', or 'the
>>>>>> unthinking self'? What's in a name?

>>>>> You post seems to qualify as a
>>>>> soliloquy.  Eating too many Ham-lettes
>>>>> can do that I suppose. <g>  If you had
>>>>> a
>>>>> specific point you wanted to
>>>>> make, I missed it in the ponderings,
>>>>> so
>>>>> if you feel it's important you
>>>>> might spell it out for the simpletons
>>>>> (hand raised).

>>>> The burden:
>>>>> Your attribution of selfhood or
>>>>> individuality to what is there when
>>>>> thought stops isn't universally
>>>>> shared and may not be necessary.

>>>> Elaboration of burden:
>>>>> Experience is individualised, but what
>>>>> is experienced may not be.

>>> Thank you for the clarification, I did
>>> apparently misunderstand; I thought you
>>> were saying that (a) experiences are
>>> individualized, but (b) what it is that
>>> experiences might not be individualized.

>>> Yes, experiencing is individual, and
>>> some
>>> experiences are "universal", or at least
>>> commonly experienced by many
>>> individuals.

>>> Either that which experiences is itself
>>> an
>>> individual, or it is simply a delusion
>>> in
>>> the mind of a lonely "God".  Applying a
>>> usefulness razor eliminates the
>>> possibility that what experiences is
>>> simply a schizoid personality segment in
>>> the mind of a mad deity, because if that
>>> case is true then everything is
>>> pointless
>>> and without value superior to the state
>>> of
>>> non-existence commonly known as "death"

>>>> Because we are persons, manifest,
>>>> incarnate etc, one can point to a place
>>>> and time where a
>>>> particular realization or whatever
>>>> occurs, but these (in the kind of case
>>>> we're talking about)
>>>> aren't intrinsic to the content of the
>>>> experience.

>>> Sorry, you lost me with "these aren't
>>> intrinsic to the content of the
>>> experience".

>>>> To assume that what is experienced (the
>>>> Unthought) in some way *belongs* to the
>>>> one having the experience, such as
>>>> revealing an essence or a
>>>> hitherto hidden part, may be an
>>>> assumption too far.

>>> I think it is not, in itself, though the
>>> presumption that an experience is a
>>> material property of something that must
>>> therefore be material in order to own it
>>> would be going too far.

>>>> Amplification on the elaboration, left
>>>> hanging:
>>>>> The question seems to revolve around
>>>>> what it is that experiences and what
>>>>> it
>>>>> is to experience.

>>>> There is a natural, native, possibly
>>>> naive assumption that *I* experience,
>>>> but
>>>> that is open to
>>>> question. For example, "I" may simply
>>>> be
>>>> a by-product of the recording of an
>>>> event
>>>> in memory.

>>> Here we arrive at the difference between
>>> an accreted ego and the true self around
>>> which it accretes, and by accreting,
>>> occluding the true self which has
>>> permitted fear to cover it with
>>> delusion.

>>>> The Turn:
>>>>> But
>>>>> does it matter? Does it matter whether
>>>>> one refers to 'the unthinking mind',
>>>>> or
>>>>> 'no-mind', or 'the
>>>>> unthinking self'? What's in a name?

>>>> A shift in perspective, a different
>>>> angle. Do any of these definitions and
>>>> markers, such as 'self',
>>>> 'no-self', 'Mind', 'no-mind' and so on,
>>>> refer to things, objects, which can be
>>>> materially and
>>>> significantly distinguished from one
>>>> another in the course of the living
>>>> moment? Are they helpful?
>>>> Why should weight be put on them?

>>>> THAT is the question...

>>> The answer is yes, although liberation
>>> from suffering can be attained through
>>> the
>>> simple expedient of suicide, it is only
>>> the true liberated self which has the
>>> capacity to do.

>> what?

> WHUT?

>>>>>> In any case, the humble goal of Buddhism is liberation from
>>>>>> suffering,
>>>>>> is it not?  Is this a
>>>>>> fleeting liberation or a permanent liberation from suffering?  If it
>>>>>> is a permanent liberation from
>>>>>> suffering it implies a permanent non-suffering "self", and if it is
>>>>>> fleeting and occasional it is
>>>>>> useless.

>>>>> Whatever the value of such arguments, that logic is flawed.

>>>> That is not obvious to me.  When you say "whatever its value, it is
>>>> flawed", that sounds like
>>>> religious dogma... it seems like saying that no matter how true
>>>> something is, it's false.

>>> It just means that I'm not addressing the issue of the value of
>>> such arguments.  The logic itself was flawed; that's not too
>>> complicated, and it doesn't involve dogma.

>> If you have a reason for considering that logic flawed, I would like to
>> understand what it is.

> Your premise was flawed, in an obvious way, which I pointed
> out.  You left out a case in your implied "case analysis."
> One could also drop the self-concept.  That's a rather important
> case, in a Buddhist-related context.

>>>>> Why
>>>>> does "permanent liberation from suffering" imply "a permanent
>>>>> non-suffering 'self'"?  To "solve the problem" of a suffering
>>>>> self one can either eliminate the suffering *or* eliminate the
>>>>> sense of self itself.

>>>> That is reasonable logic, but eliminating "the sense of" self is
>>>> delusion if self has not been
>>>> eliminated.

>>> And *creating* "the sense of" self is delusion if there is no
>>> "real" abiding self.

>> Yes, it would be; it would be interesting to hear how you think something
>> which does not exist can
>> delude itself.

> Your thinking patterns seem to be based very much on the
> surface structure of the English.  Subject-object dichotomy
> assumed.

>>>>> According to Buddhist teachings,

>>>> Here we run into difficulty.  "Buddhist teachings" does not
>>>> necessarily mean what Gautama Buddha
>>>> taught.  Buddhist teachings is equivalent to "Christian teachings"
>>>> which include the apostles' views
>>>> and the Pope's latest opinion in addition to what is written in red
>>>> letters.

>>> It goes back to the earliest recorded teachings, and
>>> interpretations over thousands of years.

>> It is "interpretations" by people who have inhaled the catechism without
>> experiencing what it
>> represents that are problematic.

>>> You can think what you want, obviously.  But don't imagine
>>> that you can call something else "Buddhism" and people will
>>> just accept it as such (for whatever reason you feel the
>>> need to label it that way).

>> I am not a "Buddhist", nor a "Taoist" or "Christian" or anything else
>> that requires me to be what
>> the organization wants me to be.

>>>>> eliminating the sense of an
>>>>> abiding self is the only truly effective way (although
>>>>> intermediate steps can nevertheless be helpful).

>>>> Suffering is eliminated through the withering of attached desire, not
>>>> by convincing oneself that it
>>>> is some imaginary person who is suffering.

>>>> And although Gautama Buddha set liberation from suffering as the
>>>> humble goal of Buddhism,

>>> He "set that as the goal" as skillful means.

>> "Skillful means" is a Buddhist cantrip lacking intrinsic value;
>> liberation can be understood by the
>> masses and realized by some of them, which is better than nothing.

>>>> it is not
>>>> by any means the end of the way; it is rather a goal which is
>>>> teachable, a reachable destination
>>>> from which to begin.  Liberation which requires the death of the
>>>> individual prevents one from
>>>> continuing on the way.

>>> I guess you know better than Buddhist sages over the centuries.

>> That is unknowable to me, but I am certainly not about to abandon myself
>> to their desired beliefs
>> and pour gasoline on myself while smoking.

>>> But you've introduced another logical fallacy, where you are now
>>> equating dropping the illusion of self with death.

>> If there is no real abiding self, what is there to die?

> Why must there be "something to die," in the deepest sense
> rather than in the everyday sense?  We all know what physical
> death is in a practical sense, but that doesn't necessitate
> some abiding Platonic self-concept.  Temporary forms can
> cease to apply.  Do you need an abiding lap-concept in order
> for your lap to go away when you stand up?

> > Tang Huyen:
> >> <<In the absence of thought, though --I mean
> >> its complete cessation-- do these notions
> >> have any existence? Is there any involvement
> >> with them? If not, and if the cessation of
> >> thought is the destination, perhaps one
> >> should agree to lessen one's dependence on
> >> them. The zen masters advise us to give rise
> >> to not a single thought of good or bad, is
> >> or is-not, which is laughable really if they
> >> are the basis of thought itself, but that's
> >> zen for you.>>

> >> That's Madame Guyon for you, dear.
> > Saved from having to learn to read French!

> She is the closest in a moderately recent
> European language to Buddhism and Daoism.
> Nobody else comes close.

> By the way, the rejection of good and bad,
> being and non-being is part of the
> antinomianism in Buddhism, and she does a
> fair job of replicating it.

> Tang Huyen

>>>>>> In any case, the humble goal of Buddhism is liberation from
>>>>>> suffering,
>>>>>> is it not?  Is this a
>>>>>> fleeting liberation or a permanent liberation from suffering?  If it
>>>>>> is a permanent liberation from
>>>>>> suffering it implies a permanent non-suffering "self", and if it is
>>>>>> fleeting and occasional it is
>>>>>> useless.

>>>>> Whatever the value of such arguments, that logic is flawed.

>>>> That is not obvious to me.  When you say "whatever its value, it is
>>>> flawed", that sounds like
>>>> religious dogma... it seems like saying that no matter how true
>>>> something is, it's false.

>>> It just means that I'm not addressing the issue of the value of
>>> such arguments.  The logic itself was flawed; that's not too
>>> complicated, and it doesn't involve dogma.

>> If you have a reason for considering that logic flawed, I would like
>> to understand what it is.

> Your premise was flawed, in an obvious way, which I pointed
> out.  You left out a case in your implied "case analysis."
> One could also drop the self-concept.  That's a rather important
> case, in a Buddhist-related context.

>>>>> Why
>>>>> does "permanent liberation from suffering" imply "a permanent
>>>>> non-suffering 'self'"?  To "solve the problem" of a suffering
>>>>> self one can either eliminate the suffering *or* eliminate the
>>>>> sense of self itself.

>>>> That is reasonable logic, but eliminating "the sense of" self is
>>>> delusion if self has not been
>>>> eliminated.

>>> And *creating* "the sense of" self is delusion if there is no
>>> "real" abiding self.

>> Yes, it would be; it would be interesting to hear how you think
>> something which does not exist can
>> delude itself.

> Your thinking patterns seem to be based very much on the
> surface structure of the English.  Subject-object dichotomy
> assumed.

>>>>> According to Buddhist teachings,

>>>> Here we run into difficulty.  "Buddhist teachings" does not
>>>> necessarily mean what Gautama Buddha
>>>> taught.  Buddhist teachings is equivalent to "Christian teachings"
>>>> which include the apostles' views
>>>> and the Pope's latest opinion in addition to what is written in red
>>>> letters.

>>> It goes back to the earliest recorded teachings, and
>>> interpretations over thousands of years.

>> It is "interpretations" by people who have inhaled the catechism
>> without experiencing what it
>> represents that are problematic.

>>> You can think what you want, obviously.  But don't imagine
>>> that you can call something else "Buddhism" and people will
>>> just accept it as such (for whatever reason you feel the
>>> need to label it that way).

>> I am not a "Buddhist", nor a "Taoist" or "Christian" or anything else
>> that requires me to be what
>> the organization wants me to be.

>>>>> eliminating the sense of an
>>>>> abiding self is the only truly effective way (although
>>>>> intermediate steps can nevertheless be helpful).

>>>> Suffering is eliminated through the withering of attached desire, not
>>>> by convincing oneself that it
>>>> is some imaginary person who is suffering.

>>>> And although Gautama Buddha set liberation from suffering as the
>>>> humble goal of Buddhism,

>>> He "set that as the goal" as skillful means.

>> "Skillful means" is a Buddhist cantrip lacking intrinsic value;
>> liberation can be understood by the
>> masses and realized by some of them, which is better than nothing.

>>>> it is not
>>>> by any means the end of the way; it is rather a goal which is
>>>> teachable, a reachable destination
>>>> from which to begin.  Liberation which requires the death of the
>>>> individual prevents one from
>>>> continuing on the way.

>>> I guess you know better than Buddhist sages over the centuries.

>> That is unknowable to me, but I am certainly not about to abandon
>> myself to their desired beliefs
>> and pour gasoline on myself while smoking.

>>> But you've introduced another logical fallacy, where you are now
>>> equating dropping the illusion of self with death.

>> If there is no real abiding self, what is there to die?

> Why must there be "something to die," in the deepest sense
> rather than in the everyday sense?  We all know what physical
> death is in a practical sense, but that doesn't necessitate
> some abiding Platonic self-concept.  Temporary forms can
> cease to apply.  Do you need an abiding lap-concept in order
> for your lap to go away when you stand up?

>> It appears that my comments are unintentionally attacking your deeply
>> held beliefs and that is
>> giving rise to catechismic retaliation; I apologize for providing you
>> with an opportunity to take
>> the shells off peanuts you have apparently already eaten.

> A grandiose presumption that somehow I feel that my "deeply
> held beliefs" are being attacked, and therefore I must
> counterattack against poor noname and his hallowed teachings.

> Your comments were simply grating on my basic sense of good
> reasoning (which you introduced, don't try that one).  But
> I give up.

>>>>>> On 07/21/2012 12:53 PM, brian mitchell
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> noname  wrote:

>>>>>>>> Some experiences will stop the mind,
>>>>>>>> most will not; when it is stopped
>>>>>>>> we have an opportunity to experience
>>>>>>>> the unthinking self...

>>>>>>> Your attribution of selfhood or
>>>>>>> individuality to what is there when
>>>>>>> thought stops isn't universally
>>>>>>> shared and may not be necessary.
>>>>>>> Experience is individualised, but
>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>> is experienced may not be.
>>>>>>> The question seems to revolve around
>>>>>>> what it is that experiences and what
>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>> is to experience. But
>>>>>>> does it matter? Does it matter
>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>> one refers to 'the unthinking mind',
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> 'no-mind', or 'the
>>>>>>> unthinking self'? What's in a name?

>>>>>> You post seems to qualify as a
>>>>>> soliloquy.  Eating too many Ham-lettes
>>>>>> can do that I suppose. <g>  If you had
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> specific point you wanted to
>>>>>> make, I missed it in the ponderings,
>>>>>> so
>>>>>> if you feel it's important you
>>>>>> might spell it out for the simpletons
>>>>>> (hand raised).

>>>>> The burden:
>>>>>> Your attribution of selfhood or
>>>>>> individuality to what is there when
>>>>>> thought stops isn't universally
>>>>>> shared and may not be necessary.

>>>>> Elaboration of burden:
>>>>>> Experience is individualised, but what
>>>>>> is experienced may not be.

>>>> Thank you for the clarification, I did
>>>> apparently misunderstand; I thought you
>>>> were saying that (a) experiences are
>>>> individualized, but (b) what it is that
>>>> experiences might not be individualized.

>>>> Yes, experiencing is individual, and
>>>> some
>>>> experiences are "universal", or at least
>>>> commonly experienced by many
>>>> individuals.

>>>> Either that which experiences is itself
>>>> an
>>>> individual, or it is simply a delusion
>>>> in
>>>> the mind of a lonely "God".  Applying a
>>>> usefulness razor eliminates the
>>>> possibility that what experiences is
>>>> simply a schizoid personality segment in
>>>> the mind of a mad deity, because if that
>>>> case is true then everything is
>>>> pointless
>>>> and without value superior to the state
>>>> of
>>>> non-existence commonly known as "death"

>>>>> Because we are persons, manifest,
>>>>> incarnate etc, one can point to a place
>>>>> and time where a
>>>>> particular realization or whatever
>>>>> occurs, but these (in the kind of case
>>>>> we're talking about)
>>>>> aren't intrinsic to the content of the
>>>>> experience.

>>>> Sorry, you lost me with "these aren't
>>>> intrinsic to the content of the
>>>> experience".

>>>>> To assume that what is experienced (the
>>>>> Unthought) in some way *belongs* to the
>>>>> one having the experience, such as
>>>>> revealing an essence or a
>>>>> hitherto hidden part, may be an
>>>>> assumption too far.

>>>> I think it is not, in itself, though the
>>>> presumption that an experience is a
>>>> material property of something that must
>>>> therefore be material in order to own it
>>>> would be going too far.

>>>>> Amplification on the elaboration, left
>>>>> hanging:
>>>>>> The question seems to revolve around
>>>>>> what it is that experiences and what
>>>>>> it
>>>>>> is to experience.

>>>>> There is a natural, native, possibly
>>>>> naive assumption that *I* experience,
>>>>> but
>>>>> that is open to
>>>>> question. For example, "I" may simply
>>>>> be
>>>>> a by-product of the recording of an
>>>>> event
>>>>> in memory.

>>>> Here we arrive at the difference between
>>>> an accreted ego and the true self around
>>>> which it accretes, and by accreting,
>>>> occluding the true self which has
>>>> permitted fear to cover it with
>>>> delusion.

>>>>> The Turn:
>>>>>> But
>>>>>> does it matter? Does it matter whether
>>>>>> one refers to 'the unthinking mind',
>>>>>> or
>>>>>> 'no-mind', or 'the
>>>>>> unthinking self'? What's in a name?

>>>>> A shift in perspective, a different
>>>>> angle. Do any of these definitions and
>>>>> markers, such as 'self',
>>>>> 'no-self', 'Mind', 'no-mind' and so on,
>>>>> refer to things, objects, which can be
>>>>> materially and
>>>>> significantly distinguished from one
>>>>> another in the course of the living
>>>>> moment? Are they helpful?
>>>>> Why should weight be put on them?

>>>>> THAT is the question...

>>>> The answer is yes, although liberation
>>>> from suffering can be attained through
>>>> the
>>>> simple expedient of suicide, it is only
>>>> the true liberated self which has the
>>>> capacity to do.

>>> what?

>> WHUT?

> some people can't walk on hot coals without
> burning their feet, and some people can't
> kill themselves properly?

> i'm keeping my shoes on, do you want me to
> write a verucca note from my mom?

> possum

>>>>>>> On 07/21/2012 12:53 PM, brian
>>>>>>> mitchell
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> noname  wrote:

>>>>>>>>> Some experiences will stop the
>>>>>>>>> mind,
>>>>>>>>> most will not; when it is stopped
>>>>>>>>> we have an opportunity to
>>>>>>>>> experience
>>>>>>>>> the unthinking self...

>>>>>>>> Your attribution of selfhood or
>>>>>>>> individuality to what is there when
>>>>>>>> thought stops isn't universally
>>>>>>>> shared and may not be necessary.
>>>>>>>> Experience is individualised, but
>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>> is experienced may not be.
>>>>>>>> The question seems to revolve
>>>>>>>> around
>>>>>>>> what it is that experiences and
>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>> is to experience. But
>>>>>>>> does it matter? Does it matter
>>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>>> one refers to 'the unthinking
>>>>>>>> mind',
>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> 'no-mind', or 'the
>>>>>>>> unthinking self'? What's in a name?

>>>>>>> You post seems to qualify as a
>>>>>>> soliloquy.  Eating too many
>>>>>>> Ham-lettes
>>>>>>> can do that I suppose. <g>  If you
>>>>>>> had
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> specific point you wanted to
>>>>>>> make, I missed it in the ponderings,
>>>>>>> so
>>>>>>> if you feel it's important you
>>>>>>> might spell it out for the
>>>>>>> simpletons
>>>>>>> (hand raised).

>>>>>> The burden:
>>>>>>> Your attribution of selfhood or
>>>>>>> individuality to what is there when
>>>>>>> thought stops isn't universally
>>>>>>> shared and may not be necessary.

>>>>>> Elaboration of burden:
>>>>>>> Experience is individualised, but
>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>> is experienced may not be.

>>>>> Thank you for the clarification, I did
>>>>> apparently misunderstand; I thought
>>>>> you
>>>>> were saying that (a) experiences are
>>>>> individualized, but (b) what it is
>>>>> that
>>>>> experiences might not be
>>>>> individualized.

>>>>> Yes, experiencing is individual, and
>>>>> some
>>>>> experiences are "universal", or at
>>>>> least
>>>>> commonly experienced by many
>>>>> individuals.

>>>>> Either that which experiences is
>>>>> itself
>>>>> an
>>>>> individual, or it is simply a delusion
>>>>> in
>>>>> the mind of a lonely "God".  Applying
>>>>> a
>>>>> usefulness razor eliminates the
>>>>> possibility that what experiences is
>>>>> simply a schizoid personality segment
>>>>> in
>>>>> the mind of a mad deity, because if
>>>>> that
>>>>> case is true then everything is
>>>>> pointless
>>>>> and without value superior to the
>>>>> state
>>>>> of
>>>>> non-existence commonly known as
>>>>> "death"

>>>>>> Because we are persons, manifest,
>>>>>> incarnate etc, one can point to a
>>>>>> place
>>>>>> and time where a
>>>>>> particular realization or whatever
>>>>>> occurs, but these (in the kind of
>>>>>> case
>>>>>> we're talking about)
>>>>>> aren't intrinsic to the content of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> experience.

>>>>> Sorry, you lost me with "these aren't
>>>>> intrinsic to the content of the
>>>>> experience".

>>>>>> To assume that what is experienced
>>>>>> (the
>>>>>> Unthought) in some way *belongs* to
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> one having the experience, such as
>>>>>> revealing an essence or a
>>>>>> hitherto hidden part, may be an
>>>>>> assumption too far.

>>>>> I think it is not, in itself, though
>>>>> the
>>>>> presumption that an experience is a
>>>>> material property of something that
>>>>> must
>>>>> therefore be material in order to own
>>>>> it
>>>>> would be going too far.

>>>>>> Amplification on the elaboration,
>>>>>> left
>>>>>> hanging:
>>>>>>> The question seems to revolve around
>>>>>>> what it is that experiences and what
>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>> is to experience.

>>>>>> There is a natural, native, possibly
>>>>>> naive assumption that *I* experience,
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> that is open to
>>>>>> question. For example, "I" may simply
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> a by-product of the recording of an
>>>>>> event
>>>>>> in memory.

>>>>> Here we arrive at the difference
>>>>> between
>>>>> an accreted ego and the true self
>>>>> around
>>>>> which it accretes, and by accreting,
>>>>> occluding the true self which has
>>>>> permitted fear to cover it with
>>>>> delusion.

>>>>>> The Turn:
>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>> does it matter? Does it matter
>>>>>>> whether
>>>>>>> one refers to 'the unthinking mind',
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> 'no-mind', or 'the
>>>>>>> unthinking self'? What's in a name?

>>>>>> A shift in perspective, a different
>>>>>> angle. Do any of these definitions
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> markers, such as 'self',
>>>>>> 'no-self', 'Mind', 'no-mind' and so
>>>>>> on,
>>>>>> refer to things, objects, which can
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> materially and
>>>>>> significantly distinguished from one
>>>>>> another in the course of the living
>>>>>> moment? Are they helpful?
>>>>>> Why should weight be put on them?

>>>>>> THAT is the question...

>>>>> The answer is yes, although liberation
>>>>> from suffering can be attained through
>>>>> the
>>>>> simple expedient of suicide, it is
>>>>> only
>>>>> the true liberated self which has the
>>>>> capacity to do.

>>>> what?

>>> WHUT?

>> some people can't walk on hot coals
>> without
>> burning their feet, and some people can't
>> kill themselves properly?

>> i'm keeping my shoes on, do you want me
>> to
>> write a verucca note from my mom?

>> possum

> The dead don't suffer so suicide is one
> method of liberation.

> Doesn't matter whether you wear shoes or
> not, only matters whether your feet stink.

> 35.

> "Why now do you assume 'a being'?
> Mara, have you grasped a view?
> This is a heap of sheer constructions:
> Here no being is found. "

> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bl143.html

>> I can see how 'good and bad' can be read in a moral sense, though I
>> read it as
>> desirable/undesirable.

>> Then, I wrote "Is and Is-not", which you have changed to being and
>> non-being. I don't know if the
>> difference is significant, although if one refers to the non-being of
>> persons, I can see how that
>> could be used as a justification for discounting any effects one's
>> acts might have on them.

>> Antinomianism isn't peculiar to Buddhism, and if it didn't creep in by
>> one door it would arrive by
>> another. But are you saying that Mme Guyon was an Antinomianist? That
>> wouldn't go down very well
>> with the Church.

> Antinomianism is used here as the renunciation
> of all supports of mind, all stations of mind,
> like being and non-being, good or evil, etc.,
> whatever the wording is. It does not mean
> Antinomianism as in the Christian Church, but
> it can be interpreted as such. (In Buddhism,
> antinomianism in mental attitude sometimes
> spills over to antinomianism in morals). The
> Buddha and the Buddhist tradition forsake all
> supports of mind, all stations of mind,
> including the Law (Dharma) taught by the
> Buddha, but only after having used it to
> cross over to the other shore. It is not
> libertinism.

> Madame Guyon has good morals and cannot be
> attacked from that angle. She teaches the
> gradual path of following the precepts and
> gradually abandoning all supports of mind,
> all stations of mind, and some passages from
> her suggest that God is also to be forsaken,
> though her God is the Stoic God (the whole,
> the One) and not the Jewish Yahweh. If all
> dwellings of mind are forsaken (which is
> what she teaches), God as a dwelling of mind
> is a good candidate also. The interesting
> thing is that she has some passages that are
> close to the "all allowing, all forgiving"
> path of the left hand. She singlehandedly
> reinvents much of Buddhism and Daoism,
> including Buddhist antinomianism, and all
> that is quite some feat, even if she is
> realist and literalist, but because of her
> lack of education and lack of a tradition,
> she is limited in what she has to say. It
> is a pity that she has so few fans, and of
> them, some try hard to push her back into
> Catholic orthodoxy. She is as much of a
> rogue (in thought, but not in morals) as
> Catholic France can take, probably much
> more, which is why she spends eight years
> and a half in gaol.

> Tang Huyen

> > On 7/24/2012 5:29 PM, brian mitchell wrote:

> >> I can see how 'good and bad' can be read in a moral sense, though I
> >> read it as
> >> desirable/undesirable.

> >> Then, I wrote "Is and Is-not", which you have changed to being and
> >> non-being. I don't know if the
> >> difference is significant, although if one refers to the non-being of
> >> persons, I can see how that
> >> could be used as a justification for discounting any effects one's
> >> acts might have on them.

> >> Antinomianism isn't peculiar to Buddhism, and if it didn't creep in by
> >> one door it would arrive by
> >> another. But are you saying that Mme Guyon was an Antinomianist? That
> >> wouldn't go down very well
> >> with the Church.

> > Antinomianism is used here as the renunciation
> > of all supports of mind, all stations of mind,
> > like being and non-being, good or evil, etc.,
> > whatever the wording is. It does not mean
> > Antinomianism as in the Christian Church, but
> > it can be interpreted as such. (In Buddhism,
> > antinomianism in mental attitude sometimes
> > spills over to antinomianism in morals). The
> > Buddha and the Buddhist tradition forsake all
> > supports of mind, all stations of mind,
> > including the Law (Dharma) taught by the
> > Buddha, but only after having used it to
> > cross over to the other shore. It is not
> > libertinism.

> > Madame Guyon has good morals and cannot be
> > attacked from that angle. She teaches the
> > gradual path of following the precepts and
> > gradually abandoning all supports of mind,
> > all stations of mind, and some passages from
> > her suggest that God is also to be forsaken,
> > though her God is the Stoic God (the whole,
> > the One) and not the Jewish Yahweh. If all
> > dwellings of mind are forsaken (which is
> > what she teaches), God as a dwelling of mind
> > is a good candidate also. The interesting
> > thing is that she has some passages that are
> > close to the "all allowing, all forgiving"
> > path of the left hand. She singlehandedly
> > reinvents much of Buddhism and Daoism,
> > including Buddhist antinomianism, and all
> > that is quite some feat, even if she is
> > realist and literalist, but because of her
> > lack of education and lack of a tradition,
> > she is limited in what she has to say. It
> > is a pity that she has so few fans, and of
> > them, some try hard to push her back into
> > Catholic orthodoxy. She is as much of a
> > rogue (in thought, but not in morals) as
> > Catholic France can take, probably much
> > more, which is why she spends eight years
> > and a half in gaol.

> > Tang Huyen

> Schopenhauer liked her.

snip>
> You (st) presumably speak an
> Indo-European language and are
> therefore presumably unaware of how
> strange the Indo-European attachment
> to the verb "to be" and its
> derivatives (including the word
> ontology, invented in Germany in the
> sixteenth century) is. Hinduism, Plato,
> Aristotle, Hegel, etc. are hugely
> attached to it. The Buddha, presumably
> not an Indo-Aryan (but a Nepalese),
> criticised all attachments, including
> the attachment to "to be".

>> the rejection of good and bad as antinomianism i can understand, if
>> buddhism is a method to end suffering. Obviously such a concept of no
>> good and no bad, can be used to justify even atrocities and the
>> infliction of extreme suffering in the name of Buddhism,  but that it
>> follows that a rejection of being and non being ( without putting
>> anything else in its place) is antinomianism as well, I dont
>> understand. I keep coming back to this verse as it discards with both
>> being an no being in a very convincingly manner to me, so if you dont
>> mind, in what sense is this antinomianism,  if at all?

>> 35.

>> "Why now do you assume 'a being'?
>> Mara, have you grasped a view?
>> This is a heap of sheer constructions:
>> Here no being is found. "

>> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bl143.html

> Being here is a concept in your mind, not
> reality out there. The ending of suffering
> requires the dropping of all supports of
> mind, all stations of mind, and the most
> common of them are being and non-being,
> good and bad, merit and demerit, male and
> female, etc., so the Buddha taught to drop
> all of them. All that is (in modern lingo)
> antinomianism, and it is explicit (without
> that word, namely antinomianism), in the
> early canon, in Pali and Chinese. The
> Perfection of Wisdom scriptures expanded
> on such antinomianism, but did not invent
> it.

> In the Scripture on the Analysis of the
> Six Modalities, at the fourth form
> meditation, after concentrating on
> equanimity, the meditator can reflect:
> "If I move this equanimity, purified thus,
> into the place of infinite space [and so
> on for each of the other three formless
> attainments] and should develop my
> thought in accordance with it, leaning
> on it, supported by it, standing on it,
> taking it as object, attached to it,
> this equanimity, purified thus, leaning
> on the place of infinite space, is
> therefore composed (sankhatam etam).
> What is composed is impermanent, what is
> impermanent is suffering; if it is
> suffering, I know suffering; after
> knowing suffering, from the equanimity
> I do not move into the place of infinite
> space [and so on for each of the other
> three formless attainments]." If the
> monk with regard to the four places
> contemplates them with wisdom as they
> are, he does not accomplish them, does
> not move into them. He therefore neither
> composes nor wills out-mentates (n'eva
> abhisankharoti nabhisa�cetayati) for
> becoming (bhava) or un-becoming
> (vi-bhava). "[I] am" (asmiti) is a
> thought (ma��ita, Skt. manyita), "I am
> this" (ayam aham asmiti) is a thought,
> "I will be" is a thought, "I will
> neither be nor not be" is a thought, "I
> will be with form" is a thought, "I
> will be without form" is a thought, "I
> will be with notion" is a thought, "I
> will be without notion" is a thought,
> "I will be neither with notion nor
> without notion" is a thought; the monk
> thinks: "If there is none of these
> thoughts, agitations, etc., the mind is
> quiesced." The Pali says: "when he is
> gone beyond all thoughts, the sage is
> said to be at peace" (sabba-ma��itanam
> tveva samatikkama muni santo ti
> vuccati). Chinese Madhyama-Agama, 162,
> 692a, MN, III, 246 (140).

> The Buddha says that "whatever
> innumerable views are leaned onto by
> recluses and brahmans, all of them [in
> turn] lean on two views, namely the
> view of existence (bhava-drsti) and the
> view of non-existence (vibhava-drsti).
> MA, 103, 591a6-8, Maha-vibhasa, T, 27,
> 1545, 38a, 1002b c, partially in MN, I,
> 65 (11).

> You (st) presumably speak an
> Indo-European language and are
> therefore presumably unaware of how
> strange the Indo-European attachment
> to the verb "to be" and its
> derivatives (including the word
> ontology, invented in Germany in the
> sixteenth century) is. Hinduism, Plato,
> Aristotle, Hegel, etc. are hugely
> attached to it. The Buddha, presumably
> not an Indo-Aryan (but a Nepalese),
> criticised all attachments, including
> the attachment to "to be".

> The two quotes above use the verb
> "bhu" "to become, to develop" (as in
> physics), but the meaning is clear.
> The usual equivalents based on "to be"
> are sat and a-sat. The Buddha wanted
> to drop all attachments, especially
> attachment to the basic supports or
> stations of mind. The mind tends to
> congeal and agglutinate into
> relatively stable units of mental
> bricks for quick and easy
> manipulation, and antinomianism
> uncongeals and unagglutinates them
> all and returns everything to free
> flow. Nomos means law, and
> antinomianism means that all such
> laws (supports of mind, stations of
> mind) are forsaken. This renunciation
> extends to the Law (Dharma) taught
> by the Buddha, so that it serves to
> help cross us over to the other
> shore, and once it has done its job,
> it should be forsaken. This is in
> stark contrast to the permanentism
> of Jewish mythology, where all that
> is revealed by the Jewish Yahweh is
> good forever, and never goes away.
> There is no way that his history of
> salvation is going to be forsaken.

> Tang Huyen

> snip>
>> You (st) presumably speak an
>> Indo-European language and are
>> therefore presumably unaware of how
>> strange the Indo-European attachment
>> to the verb "to be" and its
>> derivatives (including the word
>> ontology, invented in Germany in the
>> sixteenth century) is. Hinduism, Plato,
>> Aristotle, Hegel, etc. are hugely
>> attached to it. The Buddha, presumably
>> not an Indo-Aryan (but a Nepalese),
>> criticised all attachments, including
>> the attachment to "to be".

> This is very true, i can't really imagine
> thinking without 'to be', it leaves me even
> more confused than usual... woo.

> possum

>> I can see how 'good and bad' can be read in a moral sense, though I
>> read it as
>> desirable/undesirable.

>> Then, I wrote "Is and Is-not", which you have changed to being and
>> non-being. I don't know if the
>> difference is significant, although if one refers to the non-being of
>> persons, I can see how that
>> could be used as a justification for discounting any effects one's
>> acts might have on them.

>> Antinomianism isn't peculiar to Buddhism, and if it didn't creep in by
>> one door it would arrive by
>> another. But are you saying that Mme Guyon was an Antinomianist? That
>> wouldn't go down very well
>> with the Church.

> Antinomianism is used here as the renunciation
> of all supports of mind, all stations of mind,
> like being and non-being, good or evil, etc.,
> whatever the wording is. It does not mean
> Antinomianism as in the Christian Church, but
> it can be interpreted as such. (In Buddhism,
> antinomianism in mental attitude sometimes
> spills over to antinomianism in morals). The
> Buddha and the Buddhist tradition forsake all
> supports of mind, all stations of mind,
> including the Law (Dharma) taught by the
> Buddha, but only after having used it to
> cross over to the other shore. It is not
> libertinism.

> Madame Guyon has good morals and cannot be
> attacked from that angle. She teaches the
> gradual path of following the precepts and
> gradually abandoning all supports of mind,
> all stations of mind, and some passages from
> her suggest that God is also to be forsaken,
> though her God is the Stoic God (the whole,
> the One) and not the Jewish Yahweh. If all
> dwellings of mind are forsaken (which is
> what she teaches), God as a dwelling of mind
> is a good candidate also. The interesting
> thing is that she has some passages that are
> close to the "all allowing, all forgiving"
> path of the left hand. She singlehandedly
> reinvents much of Buddhism and Daoism,
> including Buddhist antinomianism, and all
> that is quite some feat, even if she is
> realist and literalist, but because of her
> lack of education and lack of a tradition,
> she is limited in what she has to say. It
> is a pity that she has so few fans, and of
> them, some try hard to push her back into
> Catholic orthodoxy. She is as much of a
> rogue (in thought, but not in morals) as
> Catholic France can take, probably much
> more, which is why she spends eight years
> and a half in gaol.

> Tang Huyen

>>> the rejection of good and bad as
>>> antinomianism i can understand, if
>>> buddhism is a method to end suffering.
>>> Obviously such a concept of no
>>> good and no bad, can be used to justify
>>> even atrocities and the
>>> infliction of extreme suffering in the
>>> name of Buddhism,  but that it
>>> follows that a rejection of being and
>>> non being ( without putting
>>> anything else in its place) is
>>> antinomianism as well, I dont
>>> understand. I keep coming back to this
>>> verse as it discards with both
>>> being an no being in a very convincingly
>>> manner to me, so if you dont
>>> mind, in what sense is this
>>> antinomianism,  if at all?

>>> 35.

>>> "Why now do you assume 'a being'?
>>> Mara, have you grasped a view?
>>> This is a heap of sheer constructions:
>>> Here no being is found. "

>>> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bl143.html

>> Being here is a concept in your mind, not
>> reality out there. The ending of
>> suffering
>> requires the dropping of all supports of
>> mind, all stations of mind, and the most
>> common of them are being and non-being,
>> good and bad, merit and demerit, male and
>> female, etc., so the Buddha taught to
>> drop
>> all of them. All that is (in modern
>> lingo)
>> antinomianism, and it is explicit
>> (without
>> that word, namely antinomianism), in the
>> early canon, in Pali and Chinese. The
>> Perfection of Wisdom scriptures expanded
>> on such antinomianism, but did not invent
>> it.

>> In the Scripture on the Analysis of the
>> Six Modalities, at the fourth form
>> meditation, after concentrating on
>> equanimity, the meditator can reflect:
>> "If I move this equanimity, purified
>> thus,
>> into the place of infinite space [and so
>> on for each of the other three formless
>> attainments] and should develop my
>> thought in accordance with it, leaning
>> on it, supported by it, standing on it,
>> taking it as object, attached to it,
>> this equanimity, purified thus, leaning
>> on the place of infinite space, is
>> therefore composed (sankhatam etam).
>> What is composed is impermanent, what is
>> impermanent is suffering; if it is
>> suffering, I know suffering; after
>> knowing suffering, from the equanimity
>> I do not move into the place of infinite
>> space [and so on for each of the other
>> three formless attainments]." If the
>> monk with regard to the four places
>> contemplates them with wisdom as they
>> are, he does not accomplish them, does
>> not move into them. He therefore neither
>> composes nor wills out-mentates (n'eva
>> abhisankharoti nabhisañcetayati) for
>> becoming (bhava) or un-becoming
>> (vi-bhava). "[I] am" (asmiti) is a
>> thought (maññita, Skt. manyita), "I am
>> this" (ayam aham asmiti) is a thought,
>> "I will be" is a thought, "I will
>> neither be nor not be" is a thought, "I
>> will be with form" is a thought, "I
>> will be without form" is a thought, "I
>> will be with notion" is a thought, "I
>> will be without notion" is a thought,
>> "I will be neither with notion nor
>> without notion" is a thought; the monk
>> thinks: "If there is none of these
>> thoughts, agitations, etc., the mind is
>> quiesced." The Pali says: "when he is
>> gone beyond all thoughts, the sage is
>> said to be at peace" (sabba-maññitanam
>> tveva samatikkama muni santo ti
>> vuccati). Chinese Madhyama-Agama, 162,
>> 692a, MN, III, 246 (140).

>> The Buddha says that "whatever
>> innumerable views are leaned onto by
>> recluses and brahmans, all of them [in
>> turn] lean on two views, namely the
>> view of existence (bhava-drsti) and the
>> view of non-existence (vibhava-drsti).
>> MA, 103, 591a6-8, Maha-vibhasa, T, 27,
>> 1545, 38a, 1002b c, partially in MN, I,
>> 65 (11).

>> You (st) presumably speak an
>> Indo-European language and are
>> therefore presumably unaware of how
>> strange the Indo-European attachment
>> to the verb "to be" and its
>> derivatives (including the word
>> ontology, invented in Germany in the
>> sixteenth century) is. Hinduism, Plato,
>> Aristotle, Hegel, etc. are hugely
>> attached to it. The Buddha, presumably
>> not an Indo-Aryan (but a Nepalese),
>> criticised all attachments, including
>> the attachment to "to be".

>> The two quotes above use the verb
>> "bhu" "to become, to develop" (as in
>> physics), but the meaning is clear.
>> The usual equivalents based on "to be"
>> are sat and a-sat. The Buddha wanted
>> to drop all attachments, especially
>> attachment to the basic supports or
>> stations of mind. The mind tends to
>> congeal and agglutinate into
>> relatively stable units of mental
>> bricks for quick and easy
>> manipulation, and antinomianism
>> uncongeals and unagglutinates them
>> all and returns everything to free
>> flow. Nomos means law, and
>> antinomianism means that all such
>> laws (supports of mind, stations of
>> mind) are forsaken. This renunciation
>> extends to the Law (Dharma) taught
>> by the Buddha, so that it serves to
>> help cross us over to the other
>> shore, and once it has done its job,
>> it should be forsaken. This is in
>> stark contrast to the permanentism
>> of Jewish mythology, where all that
>> is revealed by the Jewish Yahweh is
>> good forever, and never goes away.
>> There is no way that his history of
>> salvation is going to be forsaken.

>> Tang Huyen

> Antinomianism is a big word.

> Oxtail likes to say "case by case,
> always"; I wonder if he realizes that he's
> saying "no rules".

> Take either statement and examine it in
> the nude, you'll find something society
> thinks lewd: the modern world worships
> "rule by law", the giving over of all
> judgement to government for the greater
> good, and anarchy is its antichrist.
> There is no greater good, only the good of
> those with greater material power; by
> believing there is a greater good, it is
> given to them.

> You use a lot of big words, Tang; let me
> know if I can help you heal that lesion.

> One technique for understanding the middle
> is to examine the extremes.

>> snip>
>>> You (st) presumably speak an
>>> Indo-European language and are
>>> therefore presumably unaware of how
>>> strange the Indo-European attachment
>>> to the verb "to be" and its
>>> derivatives (including the word
>>> ontology, invented in Germany in the
>>> sixteenth century) is. Hinduism, Plato,
>>> Aristotle, Hegel, etc. are hugely
>>> attached to it. The Buddha, presumably
>>> not an Indo-Aryan (but a Nepalese),
>>> criticised all attachments, including
>>> the attachment to "to be".

>> This is very true, i can't really imagine
>> thinking without 'to be', it leaves me
>> even
>> more confused than usual... woo.

>> possum

> Existence is a binary universal; try
> not-thinking and if you succeed you will
> find that "to be" is irrelevant when you
> truly are.

>> (Thus have I heard) in true attention there is no
>> attender, only the attended to. If there is even a
>> smidgeon of consciousness that attention is being
>> paid, that isn't full attention. Consciousness is
>> implicit in your "conceptual difference" above.

><<Appliquez-vous donc directement à Dieu dans tous
>vos exercices de piété, pratiquant ainsi l'attention
>la plus facile et la plus pure; mais faites-le avec
>la même liberté qui se doit garder dans l'oraison;
>je veux dire, sans vous gêner à aucune pensée
>déterminée, mais vous tenant seulement attentif à
>Dieu avec un coeur libre et vide de toute propre
>provision, pour laisser à Dieu la liberté de
>l'occuper à son gré.>> Madame Guyon.

>It seems to me that you are incredibly rigid in
>your boxes (I have said so several times). Freedom
>is not in closing down, especially with dead
>certainty, but in opening up, and in such attitude,
>what occurs is fine. If Nirvana comes, fine, if
>Samsara comes, fine, one welcomes them equally.

>> On 7/22/2012 3:49 PM, brian mitchell wrote:

>>> (Thus have I heard) in true attention there is no
>>> attender, only the attended to. If there is even a
>>> smidgeon of consciousness that attention is being
>>> paid, that isn't full attention. Consciousness is
>>> implicit in your "conceptual difference" above.

>> <<Appliquez-vous donc directement à Dieu dans tous
>> vos exercices de piété, pratiquant ainsi l'attention
>> la plus facile et la plus pure; mais faites-le avec
>> la même liberté qui se doit garder dans l'oraison;
>> je veux dire, sans vous gêner à aucune pensée
>> déterminée, mais vous tenant seulement attentif à
>> Dieu avec un coeur libre et vide de toute propre
>> provision, pour laisser à Dieu la liberté de
>> l'occuper à son gré.>> Madame Guyon.

>> It seems to me that you are incredibly rigid in
>> your boxes (I have said so several times). Freedom
>> is not in closing down, especially with dead
>> certainty, but in opening up, and in such attitude,
>> what occurs is fine. If Nirvana comes, fine, if
>> Samsara comes, fine, one welcomes them equally.

> "[I] am" (asmiti) is a
> thought (maññita, Skt. manyita)

> "I am" is surely the basis --if not the whole-- of (self) consciousness.

> It's a delicate balance, isn't it? How does one apply oneself to God (if that's what was said above)
> without any degree of steering? Openness is not laxity. I remember some years ago you took a break
> from Usenet saying you were going to storm the gates of Heaven. Would Madame Guyon have approved?

> "I am" is surely the basis --if not the whole-- of
> (self) consciousness.

> It's a delicate balance, isn't it? How does one
> apply oneself to God (if that's what was said above)
> without any degree of steering? Openness is not
> laxity. I remember some years ago you took a break
> from Usenet saying you were going to storm the gates
> of Heaven. Would Madame Guyon have approved?