Kelley vs. epiphenomenalism
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
permit myself. Bear with me, it is late at night and I'm getting
tired.
------
It has recently been argued in this forum that the Objectivist philosopher
David Kelley endorses epiphenomenalism. In this post I will examine the
arguments offered for that claim and show that they are not valid. I will
then go further and present evidence from Kelley's writings to show that
he does not endorse such a view, but instead is in agreement with Ayn
Rand, Leonard Peikoff, and other Objectivists on this issue. I am
assuming here considerable familiarity with the Objectivist epistemology,
including a detailed understanding of Ayn Rand's theory of free will.
I have divided this article into sections along these lines. In section
I, I will discuss briefly what 'epiphenomenalism' is, and why it is
inconsistent with Objectivism. In section II, I will examine Jay Allen's
argument the Kelley endorses epiphenomenalism and show that his argument
is flawed and reaches false conclusions. In section III, I will pick a
few quotes from Kelley's _Truth and Toleration_ (T&T) and show that they are
sufficient evidence that Kelley does not endorse epiphenomenalism. And
in the concluding section IV, I will make a few casual remarks on what
it means to take ideas seriously.
I. What is epiphenomenalism?
Epiphenomenalism is a theory about the relationship between mind and
body. In Jay Allen's words, it is the theory that "ideas do not have
efficacy with regards to action." Another way this is sometimes put
is that "consciousness does not affect the body but exists as a powerless
neutral state." (_Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd. Ed.,
p. 88, referred to hereafter as HCDict)
"The usual analogies given in epiphenomenalism: Just as the body causes
its shadow and the shadow has no causal efficacy on the body or on other
shadows, so the brain causes consciousness, but consciousness cannot
affect the brain. Just as a locomotive produces steam or smoke, which
do not causally affect the locomotive, so the body produces consciousness
that has no causal connection with its source in brain processes."
(HCDict, 88-89.)
This view was popular in the nineteenth century, primarily because it
fit well with the mechanistic view of efficient causation that was
widely held at the time. If we take a wholesale reductionist view of
causality, it seems compelling to identify the cause of physical actions
with some other physical event, such as the firing of neurons, and to
attempt to either eliminate consciousness altogether, or (as in the
epiphenomenalist approach) to view it as a mere by-product of physical
events, not itself causally efficacious.
In the words of Thomas Henry Huxley, "Our mental conditions are simply
the symbols in the consciousness of the changes which take place
automatically in the organism... The feeling we call volition is not
the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the
brain which is the immediate cause of that act." ("On the Hypothesis
that Animals are Automata and Its History," in _Methods and Results_,
quoted in John Hospers's _Introduction to Philosophical Analysis_,
1988.)
It should be clear by now that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with
Objectivism. Objectivism claims that humans have free will, that our
ideas and mental states have causal efficacy. One of the most striking
features of Ayn Rand's philosophy is her radically new theory of free
will, a view which solves the problems that plagued her predecessors.
In short, the problem of free will consists of determining the proper
locus of free will so that we can integrate the facts obtained from our
internal perspective as agents acting in the world with the facts obtained
from our treatment of the world as object, i.e. with our scientific and
other knowledge.
Harry Binswanger has argued that other theories of free will fail because
it can be shown "that what was asserted to be directly volitional --
actions, motives, or ideas -- in fact depended on the more basic issue
of the rationality of one's cognition." Ayn Rand, in her characteristically
original fashion, places the locus of direct volitional control in a single
choice: to focus or not. Binswangers shows how this view avoids the
criticisms to which the other views are subject.
In short, Objectivism holds that the primary choice is NOT a choice
about what particular ideas to hold, but the choice to focus on reality
or to evade reality. This fundamental choice is not one which can
ever be made automatic. But focussing in the future can be made
easier or more difficult by the ideas one holds. A person who believes
that reason is not a useful way to deal with the world, and who
characteristically evades, will find emotional pressures against
focussing (although, even in the face of pressure, the choice always
remains). And the person who chooses to focus on reality as a basis
for living will find it easier to do in the future.
Once a person focusses, then, he will correctly or incorrectly identify
various facts of reality and act upon them. His philosophical context
will in large part determine how he interprets the various physical
and social conditions he is subject to. His most fundamental ideas
will, in a very real sense, directly cause him to act in this way or
that.
II. Jay Allen's argument about Kelley and epiphenomenalism
Does David Kelley accept epiphenomenalism and thus reject the Objectivist
view of free will? Jay Allen has produced a brief argument which
purports to show this:
>In "A Question of Sanction," Kelley writes:
>
>"Bad ideas can be dangerous; that's one reason we shouldn't endorse them.
>But they are dangerous because _people_ use them to perpetrate evil.
>
>Notice the phrasing: People are not motivated to commit evil because of their
>ideas, they just "use" their ideas as rationalizations for evil. A Marxist
>isn't evil because he sacrifices the individual to the "public good," but
>because he uses this doctrine as an excuse to commit mass murder. This view
>of ideas is epiphenominalism, or the view that ideas do not have efficacy
>with regards to action. This idea is explicitly rejected by Objectivism.
Jay is objecting to Kelley's use of the word "use". He claims that
this shows that Kelley does not believe that ideas have motivational
power for our actions. But Allen's interpretation of Kelley is wrong.
Why do you suppose that Kelley says that bad ideas can be dangerous?
It is precisely because they may motivate people to do bad things.
That's what it means to 'use' an idea! I have an idea that studying
philosophy is a good thing to do. I use this idea to help me shape
my days. Whenever I have significant free time, I spend it studying
philosophy. The idea motivates me to take action.
But even if Allen's first interpretation of Kelley was correct, there
are certainly cases in which this claim would not be an endorsement
of epiphenomenalism but instead a valid empirical claim about the
chief danger of at least some bad ideas.
Let's consider the case of Benito Mussolini. There are ample historical
reasons to believe that he was insincere, a pragmatist thug advocating a
particular set of ideas _in order to_ delude people into following him.
Mussolini wrote "Fascism reaffirms the State as the only true expression of
the individual" and "[Fascism] is for the only kind of liberty that
is serious -- the liberty of the State..." and "all is comprised
in the State and nothing spiritual or human exists -- much less has
any value -- outside the State." It is likely that Mussolini did
not believe any of these things, but that he relied upon these bad
and dangerous ideas to _motivate_ others, ordinary people, to perform
evil actions. (Mussolini quotes from an article written by Mussolini
for Enciclopedia Italiania, reprinted in _Readings on Fascism and National
Socialism_, 1952.)
But this story is a ringing endorsement of the Objectivist principle
that ideas play a crucial role in the determination of history. It is
precisely because people can choose to accept and act upon bad ideas
that they are dangerous.
Clearly, then, the notion of 'using' an idea does not commit Kelley to
epiphenomenalism. Indeed, ideas only become useful to the extend that
they are efficacious with regard to action.
III. What view of the relationship betwen mind and body does Kelley endorse?
Throughout Kelley's work, we see that he endorses the Objectivist view
of the relationship between mind and body, and the Objectivist view on
free will which constitutes (among other things) a rejection of
epiphenomenalism. The best examples of this can be seen in his taped
lectures on epistemology. In particular, his discussion of free
will very clearly and uncontroversially presents the Objectivist theory.
But because this particular discussion is within the context of the
"sanction" debate, I'll rely on Kelley's primary work about this
dispute, T&T. T&T expands upon and explains the positions that Kelley
takes in "A Question of Sanction". As I have mentioned before, I think
that QoS can be misleading. It is a very short piece and contains
formulations that might have ambiguous interpretations. Kelley's
seminal work should therefore be considered to be T&T, his explicit
response to Peikoff's "Fact and Value".
In this work, Kelley takes great pains to distinguish the Objectivist
view of ideas from what he terms a 'Hegelian' view. I don't think that
Kelley means to say that Peikoff directly endorses Hegel's views on
ideas, only that there are Hegelian aspects to this view. One major
theme of Hegel's work is that "the basic principles of morality,
ethics, law, and social institutions are interconnected phases in
a logical progression of a universal, rational mind (or will)."
(HCDict, 124.) This is the notion that 'ideas enact themselves'.
(As an interesting side note, Peikoff does endorse Hegel's theory
of truth, or one aspect of it in OPAR. For a critique of Peikoff
on this passage, see my essay with Will Thomas published in _Full
Context_, I forget the exact cite, let me know if you need it.)
Quoting Kelley: "When we attribute such large scale effects as
the American Revolution or the Nazi death camps to a set of ideas,
we are speaking of a causal chain involving the actions of millions
of people over the span of centuries -- including not only the
originators of the ideas, but all those who promulgate them, who
develop and modify them, or who put them into practice. The
individuals involved act *as* individuals, not as passive vehicles
of a Hegelian spirit that exists apart from them. Without their
actions, ideas would have no effect; and the particular nature of
the effect depends on the manner in which they exercise their
iniative." (Kelley, T&T, 33)
Kelley's position is clear. Ideas play a crucial role in history.
We can attribute large scale effects such as wars to ideas. There
is a causal connection between the ideas originated, promulgated,
developed and modified, and these large scale actions. The crucial
point here is that this is a process which is not carried out in
denial of free will. Individuals may always choose to focus thier
minds on reality and thus rid themselves over time of false ideas.
This is just one quote of many. I'll finish this section by taking
a quick look at Kelley's basic position on the virtue of tolerance.
Tolerance is a virtue, Kelley says, primarily because consciousness
has identity. If we wish to persuade others, we must respect the
fact that they may be honestly in error. We must be willing to enter
into sometimes difficult debate in order to show why our ideas are
true. And we should not get frustrated too quickly if people refuse
to change their minds overnight. Philosophical views are formed over
a lifetime of experience, and it would be irrational to drop a long
held belief everytime someone presented some argument which seems to
contradict something we think he know. In such cases, the rational
thing to do is to take some time to chew on it, to examine the new
evidence or argument.
Suppose that Kelley were really an epiphenomenologist, believing that
ideas have no causal efficacy? Then, why would he hold that tolerance
is a _virtue_? How could an epiphenomenologist hold that any primarily
mental activity is a virtue? If holding ideas can not affect our actions,
then there is no sense in which holding one idea as opposed to another
can affect the course of our life. Clearly, Kelley DOES think that
holding certain ideas can affect the course of our life. In particular,
he thought highly enough of his own ideas to go out and become a
philosophical entrepreneur with his _Institute for Objectivist Studies_.
Clearly then, Kelley does not endorse epiphenomenalism in his
T&T. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, there exists
ample other evidence that Kelley explicitly rejects the view which
Allen would attribute to him. But even within the confines of
T&T, an essay primarily about the ethics of dealing with people
with whom we disagree, as opposed to mind-body problems, we have
adequate evidence.
Thus, Allen was mistaken about Kelley and epiphenomenalism.
IV. What it means to be serious about ideas
Ideas matter. To your life, to my life, to the future of the world.
To claim that someone holds a view that would make free will an
illusion, when he actually holds the Objectivist position, is a very
serious charge. Before making such charges, there is a moral responsibility
to seek to back up one's interpretation with evidence. The virtue of
justice demands no less.
To take ideas seriously means to never accept a half-understanding of
any issue of this importance. To take ideas seriously means to never claim,
when one has not even completely read the whole works involved in some issue
that one is "not interested in discussing this issue anymore for the sake
of clarifying if illuminating my own ideas." Such is a default on
one's only means of survival: reason.
-------
I invite responses to this essay from Jay Allen and others. There
is no dishonor in admitting 'defeat' when you are shown an error
in your thinking. I have conclusively shown that Kelley does not
endorse epiphenomenalism.
If necessary, I will answer the other objections
that have been offered here in similar detail. But the thoughtful
person will first realize that the Peikovians in this forum have
been so wildly inaccurate in this case that their other allegations
can't be accepted on their say-so. Frankly, the other accusations
against Kelley are just as completely worthless.
James F. Hranicky
Kelley is saying that when someone says "ideas have consequences," the
proper context of this statement should be:
"Ideas, because a person freely chooses to focus, accept, and act upon
them, can have consequences, however, an idea which is not focused upon,
accepted, and acted upon will not have consequences. Hence, an idea is
not a causal agent in and of itself--it requires the focus, acceptance and
action of a human consciousness which has the property of free will.
Thus, an idea cannot have consequences apart from a volitional being's
accptance."
Given the Objectivist position of the relationship of consciousness to
existence, that seems pretty durn objective to me.
How's that?
---------------
Jim Hranicky (j...@beach.cis.ufl.edu)
"The real destroyer of liberties of any people is he who spreads among them
bounties, donation, and largess"
-- Plutarch
---------------
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>Kelley is saying that when someone says "ideas have consequences," the
>proper context of this statement should be:
>
>"Ideas, because a person freely chooses to focus, accept, and act upon
>them, can have consequences, however, an idea which is not focused upon,
>accepted, and acted upon will not have consequences. Hence, an idea is
>not a causal agent in and of itself--it requires the focus, acceptance and
>action of a human consciousness which has the property of free will.
>
>Thus, an idea cannot have consequences apart from a volitional being's
>accptance."
>
>Given the Objectivist position of the relationship of consciousness to
>existence, that seems pretty durn objective to me.
>
>How's that?
Exactly right.
Contrast with Peikoff's historical determinism:
"Without the historical climate Kant and his followers created, none
of these disasters [Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, etc.] could have
occured; given that climate, none could have been averted." (F&V, 4.)
--Jimbo
alle...@news.delphi.com
think I disagree with the view of free will involved. Jimbo talks about
"enacting an idea" as if it were something bove and beyond aceepting that
idea, and this is patently false.
Jay Allen
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>After a brief look at this MONSTROUSLY long essay, I can only say I
>think I disagree with the view of free will involved.
Then I advise you to consult Chris Walker's FAQ file. If you endorse
the view of Objectivism expressed in that document, then surely you will
agree that rejecting Ayn Rand's view of free will is sufficient reason
for you to stop calling yourself an Objectivist.
If you would like to learn more about Ayn Rand's view of free will,
you might want to consult Peikoff's OPAR, pp. 55-62, and the Binswanger
essay cited earlier. David Kelley's taped lectures are another good
source, albeit a bit harder to come by. I'm sure that Peikoff has some
taped lectures on the subject, but given his track record and the fact
that I've not heard him on this topic, I can't in good faith recommend
his work.
>Jimbo talks about
>"enacting an idea" as if it were something bove and beyond aceepting that
>idea, and this is patently false.
Well, you'll have to explain what you mean. Conceptual thought is
very powerful, and it is quite obvious that we can grasp the difference
between accepting the ideas of construction engineering on the one hand
and going out to build a bridge on the other. The same sort of distinction
can be drawn between accepting and enacting any idea or set of ideas.
It is in precisely this sense that the academic Marxist and Stalin
are different. The academic Marxist holds ideas that, if enacted,
would lead to widespread death and destruction. But for now, he has
not killed anyone. Stalin murdered millions. The academic Marxist
may be a potential killer, but as Ayn Rand has said, "to equate a
_potential_ with an _actual_, is vicious." ("A Last Survey", ARL,
IV, 2, 3).
--Jimbo
alle...@news.delphi.com
will reply in length when I have the time.
A quick comment: How can you say that the Marxist professor doesn't put
his ideas into action? It is through his academic work--and through the
work of his minions who spread Marxism throughout the culture--that peopl
like Stalin come to exist?
I would also like to add that Jombo's essay seems to deny the existence of
the subconscious. Are you saying, Jimbo, that someone who does not choose
to focus on an idea will not be motivated to act on it? If so, I have to
disagree completely. You are ignoring the fact that the subconscious is a
powerful integrating mechanism, and that it will continue to work whether
or not you pay conscious attention to it. This is not Hegelianism, but
psychological fact.
Jay Allen
P.S. I have read all the material on free will, and I have no problem with
any of it--my problem is with your use of the principle of free will to
refute Peikoff's supposed "psychological determinism." I'll have more on
that when I'm not working 16 hours a day.
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>That quick comment of mine was all too brief to stand on its own, so I
>will reply in length when I have the time.
Take your time. I'll be here when you are ready.
>A quick comment: How can you say that the Marxist professor doesn't put
>his ideas into action? It is through his academic work--and through the
>work of his minions who spread Marxism throughout the culture--that peopl
>like Stalin come to exist?
I don't say that the Marxist professor doesn't put his ideas into
action. I merely claim that 'academic work', i.e. the attempt to
persuade people through argument, is not the same thing as mass
murder. The people to whom the Marxist preaches are always free
to focus on reality and reject his ideas; the people whom Stalin
murdered had thier rights violated in the most horrible way possible.
These are both instances of evil. But they are different. Keep
in mind that I agree with Ayn Rand that Kant is the most immoral
person in history. (I don't know if Kelley agrees with this or
not. It is a judgment about a specific person about which people
may properly disagree based on their own knowledge.)
>I would also like to add that Jombo's essay seems to deny the existence of
>the subconscious. Are you saying, Jimbo, that someone who does not choose
>to focus on an idea will not be motivated to act on it?
Slow down, sparky. I do not deny the existence of the subconscious.
I am NOT saying that someone who does not choose to focus on an idea
will not be motivated to act on it. Go back and read Binswanger's
essay on this point. I am in full agreement with him. The person who
chooses a philosophy which encourages the avoidance of focus (e.g.,
Christianity) will feel psychological pressure to not focus.
--Jimbo
p.s. I think it is clear that Allen is grasping at straws. Be a
man, Allen. You lost the argument.
Anders G|ransson
I would also like to add that Jombo's essay seems to deny the existence of
the subconscious. Are you saying, Jimbo, that someone who does not choose
to focus on an idea will not be motivated to act on it? If so, I have to
disagree completely. You are ignoring the fact that the subconscious is a
powerful integrating mechanism, and that it will continue to work whether
or not you pay conscious attention to it. This is not Hegelianism, but
psychological fact.
Jay Allen
The question poses itself: Can you pay conscious attention to
your subconscious?
hmmm
best regards to the file
--
'Wossat noise?'
The bleedin' wind under the door.
'Wossat noise now, squire? Wosse wind doing?'
Nuffink agint nuffink.
Chris Walker
want to reconcile Kelley's statements that he made in 1987 at the
University of Texas that Objectivism was a form of Nominalism and
Empiricism with this.
Jay Allen writes:
>P.S. I have read all the material on free will, and I have no problem with
>any of it--my problem is with your use of the principle of free will to
>refute Peikoff's supposed "psychological determinism." I'll have more on
>that when I'm not working 16 hours a day.
Same here. The trial of the decade is happening right under our noses.
I'm witnessing the most massive sense of life reaction to the current
trends of American culture in decades. Everyone wants to have a voice
in it. I find it absolutely important that I spend as much time as possible
on it. It happened right here in *Texas* and that is where my efforts
are focused.
Jimbo Wales writes:
>Jay offered positive evidence, and I proved him wrong.
>I remember doing the same thing a few weeks back for Chris Walker.
My argument did not approach your context Jimbo. It approached a more
general context. I still stand by my statement that I made before
on Kelley.
I wanted to indicate original assertion that set this all going in the
first place, that of the divergence of Kelley's views on evil from
those of Rand. Jimbo then responded to the effect that I had
misinterpreted him.
From a previous posting weeks ago Rand said:
"Thinking is man's only basic virtue, from which all the others proceed.
And his basic vice, the source of all his evils: the act of blanking
out, the willful suspension of one's consiousness, the refusal to think..."
(TOL, p154, from Galt's speech, pb127)
Kelley said in "A Question of Sanction:"
"The concept of evil applies primarily to actions, and to the people who
perform them."
And Kelley on evasion:
"It is also true that a given person may adopt false ideas through
evasion, which is morally wrong.
This is an aside! Peikoff uses a premise here in F&V as I recall.
He indicated that Kelley's "A Question of Sanction" is "articulate."
If this premise is true, then I must take the statement of the primacy
of actions for the nature of evil in Kelley's view as true.
However, upon reflection, he does concede them as being parallel
in "Truth and Toleration":
"An idea is good or bad, by contrast, in virtue of its relation to
some action. (p27) ...there are two categories of relevant action.
We can evaluate an idea by its effects--the actions it leads people
to take--as measured by the standard of human life. And we can evaluate
an idea by the ***mental actions that produced it***, as measured by the
standard of rationality. In either case, the value significance of
the idea is a derivative property, which depends not only on the
content of the idea but on the nature of the relevant action."
Kelley here has had an opportunity to consider Peikoff's premises
of judgement of both thought and action from "Fact and Value."
Omitting the judgement of ideas apart from action, Kelley concedes
the importance of judging "mental actions." This is in no fundamental
sense different from his idea of terminating toleration in the face of
"willful irrationality." However, the phrasing does come from Peikoff
in my view.
With regard to my evaluation of the truth or falsehood of Kelley's
statement, I believe that _as I quoted it_, Kelley implies here that
ideas are value-free in the realm of physical action until they are
acted upon. This applies the same to his evaluation of an idea according
to the processes by which an individual arrives at. I agree with the
former but not the latter. An idea is not only evaluated by virtue of
its actualization but its potential actualization by means of its
correspondence to reality. If an idea is false, it is *wrong* too.
If the idea is produced not as a mere mistake but by means of evasion,
then it is *evil*. Peikoff succinctly states this idea as the true is the
good, the false is the evil. This can only be understood in light of
what Rand holds to be the source of evil: evasion.
There is another premise that I obtained from Peikoff. He states
in his "Moral Virtue" speech that he is not interested in reading
T&T due to the possibility that Kelley might "cover up" his errors in
the previous article.
Now, I do have a big problem with the current discussion. I am glad that
there are people who are discussing this issue at length. However, tuning
in and out, I cannot for the life of me determine where the discussion
is going. Without a goal, participating in a discussion, despite the
long essays, becomes a time-consuming and destructive chore as already
indicated by another poster.
What are the goals of this discussion?
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Chris Holt
>Jim Hranicky writes:
>>Kelley is saying that when someone says "ideas have consequences," the
>>proper context of this statement should be:
>>
>>"Ideas, because a person freely chooses to focus, accept, and act upon
>>them, can have consequences, however, an idea which is not focused upon,
>>accepted, and acted upon will not have consequences. Hence, an idea is
>>not a causal agent in and of itself--it requires the focus, acceptance and
>>action of a human consciousness which has the property of free will.
>>
>>Thus, an idea cannot have consequences apart from a volitional being's
>>accptance."
>>
>>Given the Objectivist position of the relationship of consciousness to
>>existence, that seems pretty durn objective to me.
>>
>>How's that?
>Exactly right.
You had better be careful to allow for a lot of fuzziness here.
An idea can be absorbed by seeing it manifested in many situations,
without any direct conscious mediation. [Think of being told
of a rule of human behaviour, and thinking to yourself "Aha!
So *that's* why people do such things so often! In fact,
thinking back, that's why *I* did such things!"] The point
being that people can accept and act on ideas without having
chosen to focus on them; this is why the idea of subliminal
brainwashing resonates so strongly. :-)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Science, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
To resolve not to resolve is to leave the prison of certain decision.
Mark A. Peter
: Contrast with Peikoff's historical determinism:
: "Without the historical climate Kant and his followers created, none
: of these disasters [Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, etc.] could have
: occured; given that climate, none could have been averted." (F&V, 4.)
You consider this deterministic, i.e., a denial of free will? This is not
a statement about an individual person, but rather the direction of a
culture. What is your opinion of Ayn Rand's view that government is
necessary as a means of bringing the use of retaliatory force under
objective control and that without it, society would quickly degenerate
into mob warfare? Do you consider this view deterministic? It does
after all, claim to predict what the actions of many people would be,
were there no government.
--
Mark Peter
mpe...@netcom.com
Mark A. Peter
: (As an interesting side note, Peikoff does endorse Hegel's theory
: of truth, or one aspect of it in OPAR. For a critique of Peikoff
: on this passage, see my essay with Will Thomas published in _Full
: Context_, I forget the exact cite, let me know if you need it.)
Are you talking about Dr. Peikoff's use of the quote from Hegel: "The
true is the whole"? I'll wait for an answer to this question before
taking the time for a refutation.
--
Mark Peter
mpe...@netcom.com
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
that David Kelley does not endorse epiphenomenalism, and toward a pair
of side-comments that I made about Peikoff. I'll take this as a concession
that I'm right about Kelley, and that all parties concede that the earlier
charge was in error.
My complaints against Peikoff's other errors are a different matter, one
which I would like to treat separately. It is important to recognize that
Peikoff being wrong, and Kelley being right, are issues that we can treat
separately, particularly when Peikoff makes mistakes in areas that Kelley
has not addressed.
I think that the best way to treat Peikoff is in the manner suggested
by Ayn Rand in her essay "Philosophical Detection," in _Philosophy:
Who Needs It_: "You must not take a catch phrase -- or any abstract
statement -- as if it were approximate. Take it literally. Don't
translate it, don't glamorize it, don't make the mistake of thinking,
as many people do: 'Oh, nobody could possibly mean this!' and then
proceed to endow it with some whitewashed meaning of your own. Take
it straight, for what it _does_ say and mean." (p. 19)
My point is _not_ that Peikoff is a Hegelian, he is not. My point is
_not_ that Peikoff is a determinist, he is not. My point is merely
that he is a bad writer and a weak philosopher, that F&V is riddled
with errors and that his book OPAR contains some glaring mistakes.
I am quite sure that Peikoff does not really endorse the errors he
presents in those works. What he does endorse, I cannot say.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>You consider this deterministic, i.e., a denial of free will? This is not
>a statement about an individual person, but rather the direction of a
>culture. What is your opinion of Ayn Rand's view that government is
>necessary as a means of bringing the use of retaliatory force under
>objective control and that without it, society would quickly degenerate
>into mob warfare? Do you consider this view deterministic? It does
>after all, claim to predict what the actions of many people would be,
>were there no government.
I agree with Ayn Rand. Note that predicting the outcome of a historical
process, even by reference to the causal process of acceptance and
implementation of ideas, is not the same thing as asserting that
such-and-such a bad thing could not have been averted.
If it will help to move us along to more substantive issues, I'm willing
to retract my comment about Peikoff's historical determinism. It is not
essential, and I do not think that Peikoff is generally a historical
determinist. My remark as a side-comment and a complaint about one
poorly worded remark. We can drop it. I have substantive complaints
against Peikoff planned for this weekend.
--Jimbo
Mark Peters
>Mark Peters asks:
>>You consider this deterministic, i.e., a denial of free will? This is not
>>a statement about an individual person, but rather the direction of a
>>culture. What is your opinion of Ayn Rand's view that government is
>>necessary as a means of bringing the use of retaliatory force under
>>objective control and that without it, society would quickly degenerate
>>into mob warfare? Do you consider this view deterministic? It does
>>after all, claim to predict what the actions of many people would be,
>>were there no government.
I did not write this. Just to clarify for the non-OSG members in this
newsgroup: Mark A. Peter wrote the paragraph above, not Mark A. Peters
(that's me). Confusing, yes, but it's all Mark's fault: he refuses to
change his name. :-)
Mark Peters
--
Mark A. Peters ****** ======================
Control Data Systems, Inc. ****** == "What a save!!!" ==
Internet: mark.a...@cdc.com ****** == "What an idea!!" ==
Mark A. Peter
Just to clarify, my last name is Peter, not Peters. The only reason I'm
nitpicking is that there is another Objectivist named "Mark Peters", and
he has even posted on this thread! (Is the world getting smaller, or is
Objectivism getting larger?) :)
: >You consider this deterministic, i.e., a denial of free will? This is not
: >a statement about an individual person, but rather the direction of a
: >culture. What is your opinion of Ayn Rand's view that government is
: >necessary as a means of bringing the use of retaliatory force under
: >objective control and that without it, society would quickly degenerate
: >into mob warfare? Do you consider this view deterministic? It does
: >after all, claim to predict what the actions of many people would be,
: >were there no government.
: I agree with Ayn Rand. Note that predicting the outcome of a historical
: process, even by reference to the causal process of acceptance and
: implementation of ideas, is not the same thing as asserting that
: such-and-such a bad thing could not have been averted.
I think that Miss Rand would argure that without government, mob-warfare
could not be averted.
: If it will help to move us along to more substantive issues, I'm willing
: to retract my comment about Peikoff's historical determinism. It is not
: essential, and I do not think that Peikoff is generally a historical
: determinist. My remark as a side-comment and a complaint about one
: poorly worded remark. We can drop it. I have substantive complaints
: against Peikoff planned for this weekend.
I accept your retraction, but I'd like to make it clear that I don't
think the remark was poorly worded. I thought it rather eloquent,
actually.
--
Mark Peter
mpe...@netcom.com
Mark A. Peter
: In <CJJ23...@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
: I did not write this. Just to clarify for the non-OSG members in this
: newsgroup: Mark A. Peter wrote the paragraph above, not Mark A. Peters
: (that's me). Confusing, yes, but it's all Mark's fault: he refuses to
: change his name. :-)
I agree. It's all Mark's fault: he refuses to change his name. :-)
In fact, he's getting dangerously close to violating my identity, which
is not only impossible, but downright evil, and also not very nice.
There are, after all, many reasonable names you chould choose, Mark. How
about Brian Yoders? Or Tony Donadios?
: Mark Peters
Mark Peter
--
Mark Peter
mpe...@netcom.com
Jeremy Caplan
Chris Walker <c...@zycor.lgc.com> wrote:
>I wanted to indicate original assertion that set this all going in the
>first place, that of the divergence of Kelley's views on evil from
>those of Rand. Jimbo then responded to the effect that I had
>misinterpreted him.
>
>From a previous posting weeks ago Rand said:
>
> "Thinking is man's only basic virtue, from which all the others proceed.
>And his basic vice, the source of all his evils: the act of blanking
>out, the willful suspension of one's consiousness, the refusal to think..."
>(TOL, p154, from Galt's speech, pb127)
>
>Kelley said in "A Question of Sanction:"
>
> "The concept of evil applies primarily to actions, and to the people who
>perform them."
>
>And Kelley on evasion:
>
> "It is also true that a given person may adopt false ideas through
>evasion, which is morally wrong.
>
Evasion is an action. It is acting on the idea "I shouldn't think about X."
Would you say that Peikoff is guilty of evasion?
>[deletia]
>--
>Chris Walker
>cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
$ "Man by nature wants to know." | Jeremy Caplan j...@casbah.acns.nwu.edu $
$ ARISTOTLE | Northwestern University $
$ "We are born unarmed. Our mind is our only weapon." Ayn Rand $
Jeremy Caplan
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu> wrote:
>It seems that the conversation is turing away from my demonstration
>that David Kelley does not endorse epiphenomenalism, and toward a pair
>of side-comments that I made about Peikoff. I'll take this as a concession
>that I'm right about Kelley, and that all parties concede that the earlier
>charge was in error.
>
>My complaints against Peikoff's other errors are a different matter, one
>which I would like to treat separately. It is important to recognize that
>Peikoff being wrong, and Kelley being right, are issues that we can treat
>separately, particularly when Peikoff makes mistakes in areas that Kelley
>has not addressed.
[deletia]
>My point is _not_ that Peikoff is a Hegelian, he is not. My point is
>_not_ that Peikoff is a determinist, he is not. My point is merely
>that he is a bad writer and a weak philosopher, that F&V is riddled
>with errors and that his book OPAR contains some glaring mistakes.
You're going to get numerous accusations of being a 'name caller' and
complaints that you haven't shown any evidence. From the quality of your
previous postings, I'll just politely ask that you provide some detailed
examples, in order to satisfy my own curiosity. Thank you.
>I am quite sure that Peikoff does not really endorse the errors he
>presents in those works. What he does endorse, I cannot say.
>
>--Jimbo
$ "Man by nature wants to know." | Jeremy Caplan j...@casbah.acns.nwu.edu $
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>>which I would like to treat separately. It is important to recognize that
>>Peikoff being wrong, and Kelley being right, are issues that we can treat
>>separately, particularly when Peikoff makes mistakes in areas that Kelley
>>has not addressed.
>You're going to get numerous accusations of being a 'name caller' and
>complaints that you haven't shown any evidence. From the quality of your
>previous postings, I'll just politely ask that you provide some detailed
>examples, in order to satisfy my own curiosity. Thank you.
No, thank YOU. This is a perfectly reasonable request. I'm planning
to write some stuff about this on Saturday.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
the good will I hope that I have built up with the readers of this
newgroup and spend a dozen or so lines in a passionate screeching
denunciation. I consider his response to be absolutely worthless.
However, upon a moment's reflection, I see that to do so would not be
in my self-interest. On the other hand, responding to him as though
he has something interesting to say might give people the impression
that I have not completely dismantled his claim. I have proven my
case, I believe, beyond any reasonable doubt. Therefore, I don't at
all mind letting him have the last word. The final decision rests
with the jury: you, the readers of this newsgroup.
So I'll just close with this offer. If any of you (I'm thinking
particularly of those who were inclined to agree with Allen before
this began, and who still have questions -- Tony Donadio?) have
further questions, or think that Jay is right (or even honest) in
his remarks, please respond to them publicly and I'll be happy to
make comments or clarifications as necessary.
--Jimbo
Charles Dlhopolsky
In article <CJHDz...@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
Keep in mind that I agree with Ayn Rand that Kant is the most immoral
person in history.
I don't understand how people say this. Is he REALLY the most immoral
person ever, or was he JUST a nice philosopher who was _wrong_. He
made a mistake for goodness sake. Perhaps the consequences of
what he did were terrible, but still!
Do you claim that he really knew what was right, and purposely
chose to derive an incorrect philosophy in order to destroy all
the good in the world? I find this _very_ hard to believe.
-charlie
James F. Hranicky
>Do you claim that he really knew what was right, and purposely
>chose to derive an incorrect philosophy in order to destroy all
>the good in the world? I find this _very_ hard to believe.
So do I, but one must remember the redefinition of "evil." "Evil" is
"that which is bad for man," not "purposeful love of destruction," or
"intent to do harm," as far as the Objectivist dictionary goes.
In other words, as far as I can tell, the statement "Kant was the most evil
person in history" should be translated as "Kant was the figure in history
who caused the most harm."
Intent apparently has nothing to do with it anymore, according to the
Objectivists...or does it?
The responses I have received on this net leave me questioning...
How about a test: Is this person evil?
A person who generally stays in focus, knows what he wants from life and
has a high rate of success, takes care of his family, etc...generally moral
for the most part, yet on certain occasions he blanks out--he refuses to
think about one small part of his life--for the most part, it doesn't
affect him, but on certain occasions it does--yet he refuses to think about
it. He manages to live a pretty happy life anyway, although less so than
if he confronted his problem. Also, throughout his life he was a champion of
freedom and individual rights. (I personally don't find this scenario
implausible....)
Is this person "evil?" Does his status as "evil" depend on the situation
about which he refuses to think or not...is there any degree?
Another test:
Was Ludwig von Mises evil? He had a chance to be exposed to Rand's ideas,
yet never changed his mind on the idea of natural rights or natural law
(as far as I know.) He certainly had a mind powerful enough to do so...yet
he advocated false ideas...
Rmember, "There is right and there is wrong, but the middle is always evil."
Just wondering,
alle...@news.delphi.com
answer any timely and honest questions about what I have written.
In a way, I am *very* glad to see this discussion end. It became clear
rather quickly that Jimbo and I were arguing for completely different
reasons. While my goal has been to inform others who do not have much
knowledge about this issue, and to sharpen my own views on this
complicated subject--Jimbo's goal has been to convert me to Kelleyism.
I am glad that he finally realizes that any such attempt will fail utterly.
As for my argument being a "resurrection" of something that has been
"amply refuted"--I can only say: read my post again. I have raised
considerable doubt as to Kelley's stance on the relation of ideas to
actions. Any alleged "counter-evidence" which shows how much Kelley
endorses mind-body unity in his other writings merely shows that there are
contradictions in Kelley's thought. But then, that's what I've been
arguing all along.
Jay Allen
Betsy Speicher
: : Mark Peters
Just don't use mine. It's copyrighted!
Betsy Speicher
Chris Walker
>A person who generally stays in focus, knows what he wants from life and
>has a high rate of success, takes care of his family, etc...generally moral
>for the most part, yet on certain occasions he blanks out--he refuses to
>think about one small part of his life--for the most part, it doesn't
>affect him, but on certain occasions it does--yet he refuses to think about
>it. He manages to live a pretty happy life anyway, although less so than
>if he confronted his problem. Also, throughout his life he was a champion of
>freedom and individual rights. (I personally don't find this scenario
>implausible....)
One deals with someone on the basis of his virtues. This applies
especially to cooperation with someone else. If a person has a vice that
has a direct bearing on the common basis of cooperation with someone,
then one should not deal with him. This is even if a person engages in
otherwise exemplary behavior.
Let me take a simple example, taking a trip with someone who habitually
carries a joint with him. In most states, Marijuana is illegal, though
the penalties vary widely. In Austin, the most that one will get for
one joint is a Class C Misdemeanor but in other parts of Texas, it could
be up to a Class B. This means that in general, to be found with a joint
amounts to getting a traffic ticket if caught in Austin. However, in
some jurisdictions that one might travel through, they may not only issue
tickets but *sieze* my automobile. For a nickle of pot, my $14000 car
could be impounded, possessions within it rifled through and to add insult
to injury, I would have to pay for the privilege of the police keeping my
car. This is not to mention the bond that I might have to post to get it
back which could be a significant percentage of the value of my car.
Though we might have decided to cooperate in our drive to some far-off
destination, the vice that my friend has has direct bearing on our
cooperation. Though it is fine for me to meet that person somewhere
or for that matter fly with him or her, to involve my property in that
person's activities threatens my values.
>Is this person "evil?" Does his status as "evil" depend on the situation
>about which he refuses to think or not...is there any degree?
The evil on my part would be to cooperate with my friend's vices.
Another test:
>Was Ludwig von Mises evil? He had a chance to be exposed to Rand's ideas,
>yet never changed his mind on the idea of natural rights or natural law
>(as far as I know.) He certainly had a mind powerful enough to do so...yet
>he advocated false ideas...
Perhaps Rand never convinced him. Consider that he was also religious
(as I recall) but that they were also friends. Rand only sanctioned those
aspects of his work which were *true*. Because of the way she dealt with
him publically, his vices had no bearing on her endorsement of his work.
What of Kelley?
I would point out that Kelley did engage in activities that had bearing on
ARI activities. He did present Objectivism in a different form from other
members of the ARI, attempting to integrate it into the wider field of
modern philosophy. I believe that it would have been possible to identify
and correct any errors that he made in these efforts. However, with
regard to two major areas, the sanction of Barbara Branden's biography
and cooperating with Libertarians, he threatened the reputation of ARI.
Shortly after Barbara Branden wrote her biography, Bob Bidinotto wrote
a review of the biography that focused on the content of the book and
and assumed that what Branden wrote was generally true. Though Bidinotto
slammed the psychologizing of Branden towards Rand, the review was
positive. Kelley, being a participant of the publication run by Ron Paul
at the time was given the opportunity to veto the article. He did
not change his views when confronted on this stating that this was
not "beyond the pale" as I recall Bidinotto telling me. As a consequence,
Kelley told me that he was soon "disinvited" from ARI activities such as
parties and other events. When Peikoff came out with a statement in the
Objectivist forum slamming the biography, this caused a furor. However,
Kelley remained a member of ARI.
There might have been other incidents which caused Kelley grief with ARI
or more properly vis-a-vis, but the most public is that of his speaking
before the Laissez Faire Book Club supper in late 1988 or early 1989. It
was at this time that he directly participated in a function for a group
that supported anti-Objectivist and Libertarian literature. Indeed he
did point out the fallacies of libertarianism before his audience in his
speech and why Objectivism was the proper foundation for freedom. However,
to tailor the speech in this format shows that his intended audience was
Libertarians in *their* forum. The latter point has stood in contention
over the years as Laissez-Faire books has shifted its affiliations over
time, but at least once I've seen the catalog make a direct connection with
this party. Even then, Keley remained a member of the ARI.
But then, as Ridpath recounted to me and as I read, this caused a furor
among Objectivists wondering what Kelley was doing speaking for this group.
Peter Schwartz wrote a short letter addressing Kelley in "The Intellectual
Activist" but not by name indicating (as I recall) the evil of
Libertarianism and those who support it. Since Schwartz had already
written "Libertarianism: The Perversion of Liberty," he had identified
the principle of Libertarianism and took this judgement as his criteria
for judging Kelley's actions. However, even then, Kelley remained a member
of the ARI.
For some time after this, Kelley was unreachable according to Ridpath's
account to me in late 1993 during a speaking trip to the University of
Texas. This was subsequent to April 1989 because at that time, I saw
Ridpath and Kelley as friends at a Dallas conference.
Then, Kelley released "A Question of Sanction" defending his actions
at the Supper Club. At such time, he gave his true beliefs of the
participants of the ARI and demonstrated his willingness to cooperate with
Libertarians in some forums. In order to justify this, as already addressed
by Jay Allen's and my articles on USENET, he had to modify the Objectivist
notion of evil. It was on all three points and more that Peikoff attacked
Kelley in his article "Fact and Value" and ejected Kelley from the ARI.
When Ridpath confronted Kelley on the his article, Ridpath indicated that
Kelley acted as if they had never really been friends after all. I will
not repeated what Ridpath said literally because Kelley can deny it. Kelley's
actions speak the most loudly here. I *can* guarantee that Ridpath's story
won't change.
The war continued with the release of "Facts, Values and Moral Sanctions"
by Bidinotto and then Kelley's "Truth and Toleration." All of these
documents are publically available and I refer you to them. Yet to this
day, Kelleyites, ignoring the principle of Kelley's philosophy and of
libertarianism, *demand* participation in their discussions. Just *who*
needs *who*?
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Al Date
>
>So do I, but one must remember the redefinition of "evil." "Evil" is
>"that which is bad for man," not "purposeful love of destruction," or
>"intent to do harm," as far as the Objectivist dictionary goes.
And this illustrates the hopeless quandaries that arise from such
definitions.
>In other words, as far as I can tell, the statement "Kant was the most evil
>person in history" should be translated as "Kant was the figure in history
>who caused the most harm."
Both statements are unworthy of supposed realists. In the first place, Kant
had no control over anyone else who followed him who may have applied
or misapplied his ideas. In the second place, there is no evidence
that Kant intended to plant harmful memes in human minds--to the contrary,
in fact.
>Intent apparently has nothing to do with it anymore, according to the
>Objectivists...or does it?
It certainly should! An Alzheimer's victim who wanders into an
intersection and causes a massive pile-up has certainly caused "harm to
mankind," but how can he be held responsible (without volition),
or called evil (without rational volition)?
>The responses I have received on this net leave me questioning...
There is some hope for you, then.
>How about a test: Is this person evil?
>
>A person who generally stays in focus, knows what he wants from life and
>has a high rate of success, takes care of his family, etc...generally moral
>for the most part, yet on certain occasions he blanks out--he refuses to
>think about one small part of his life--for the most part, it doesn't
>affect him, but on certain occasions it does--yet he refuses to think about
>it. He manages to live a pretty happy life anyway, although less so than
>if he confronted his problem. Also, throughout his life he was a champion of
>freedom and individual rights. (I personally don't find this scenario
>implausible....)
I agree, not implausible at all--perhaps even common (deleting the champion
of liberty part).
>
>Is this person "evil?" Does his status as "evil" depend on the situation
>about which he refuses to think or not...is there any degree?
Unless he chooses to harm others, and acts on it, he is not evil to
any degree. (according to a volitional model of man)
>
>Another test:
>
>Was Ludwig von Mises evil? He had a chance to be exposed to Rand's ideas,
>yet never changed his mind on the idea of natural rights or natural law
>(as far as I know.) He certainly had a mind powerful enough to do so...yet
>he advocated false ideas...
This gives me a good laugh. Mises handed Rand a rational
justification for capitalism, which she subjectively decided was
insufficient, because it lacked a moral justification. [I would
argue that this is a character-flaw on her part]. She then
proceeds to build up a philosophy to put moral underpinnings under
the economic system which already stands on utilitarian grounds!
Is dis any way to build a philosophy? It reminds me of some bizarre
architectural art-project!
In the process, she has to invent an objective concept of man which
turns out to be equivalent to a Western rational adult (and very male)!
What could be farther from objective truth? What percent of homo sapiens is
in that category?
Indeed, I might make the claim that since Rand planted such garbage in
people's minds, making it difficult for some of them to see reality, that
she was "evil," but Objectivism has so few serious followers, she could
hardly gain "Kantian" status.
But, no, I dont think Rand was evil. She was a brilliant
person, whose horrible experiences in early life shaped her volition
in such a way that she ultimately sought a way to "get even."
And Mises is one of the great heroes of our time.
--Al Date
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>In order to justify this, as already addressed
>by Jay Allen's and my articles on USENET, he had to modify the Objectivist
>notion of evil.
False. I have answered eloquently and in detail all of the charges
you and Allen have made against Kelley's position. I have shown that
he does not hold the position you have attributed to him, and that
your arguments are invalid.
David Kelley is in full agreement with the Objectivist notion of evil.
>Yet to this
>day, Kelleyites, ignoring the principle of Kelley's philosophy and of
>libertarianism, *demand* participation in their discussions. Just *who*
>needs *who*?
This is incomprehensible. Ignoring what principle? Demanding
participation in what sense?
My goals for this discussion are simple. I know that David Kelley
is right, and I can prove it. And I will do so -- to you, to Allen,
and -- more importantly -- to those on the sidelines who are willing
to face the issue honestly and THINK. I do not demand or need your
participation in order to do this. However, you do serve a useful purpose
to me: you illustrate to all the level of intellectual dishonesty
required to endorse Peikoff's denunciation of Kelley, once all the
facts are known.
--Jimbo
James F. Hranicky
|> >How about a test: Is this person evil?
[not cooperating with the immoral parts deleted...]
|> >Is this person "evil?" Does his status as "evil" depend on the situation
|> >about which he refuses to think or not...is there any degree?
|>
|> The evil on my part would be to cooperate with my friend's vices.
Please answer the question, Mr. Walker...*Is this person *evil**??????
|> Another test:
|>
|> >Was Ludwig von Mises evil? He had a chance to be exposed to Rand's ideas,
|> >yet never changed his mind on the idea of natural rights or natural law
|> >(as far as I know.) He certainly had a mind powerful enough to do so...yet
|> >he advocated false ideas...
|>
|> Perhaps Rand never convinced him. Consider that he was also religious
|> (as I recall) but that they were also friends. Rand only sanctioned those
|> aspects of his work which were *true*. Because of the way she dealt with
|> him publically, his vices had no bearing on her endorsement of his work.
You are not answering my question. I am interested in a moral evaluation
of the person as a whole.
1) Do you not make sweeping evaluations?
2) *Do* you make sweeping evaluations?
If it is (1), fine. If it is (2), *what* is it?
I am interested in your evaluation of the middle ground, Mr. Walker--is there
one, or is there a listing of virtues and vices?
|> What of Kelley?
[Kelly's actions deleted]
Fine, Mr. Walker. You have made your case. However, I do not approach the
subject as an Objectivist, because I am not. Therefore, I am not in the least
interested in the Objectivist notion of "evil." As I understand it, both
are flawed.
I, personally, do not care what or what not constitutes Objectivism. I care
about what constitutes the truth. If, after I am finished with my evaluation
of either camp, I decide on one, fine. If I do not, so be it. I think I can
safely say I agree with much of either camp, however.
|> The war continued with the release of "Facts, Values and Moral Sanctions"
|> by Bidinotto and then Kelley's "Truth and Toleration." All of these
|> documents are publically available and I refer you to them. Yet to this
|> day, Kelleyites, ignoring the principle of Kelley's philosophy and of
|> libertarianism, *demand* participation in their discussions. Just *who*
|> needs *who*?
Mr. Walker, those who would fight for a free society all need each other.
However, many on this list do not seem to recognize this.
Just who is *demanding* participation? I find it odd that many on this list
don't seem to hold rigorous defense of their veiwpoint to be a virtue. I under-
stand time constraints, but I always try my best to make my case as airtight
as possible. It seems not everyone feels this way...I think that is the source
of any "demands."
Chris Walker
>You are not answering my question. I am interested in a moral evaluation
>of the person as a whole.
>1) Do you not make sweeping evaluations?
>2) *Do* you make sweeping evaluations?
>If it is (1), fine. If it is (2), *what* is it?
>I am interested in your evaluation of the middle ground, Mr. Walker--is there
>one, or is there a listing of virtues and vices?
It is always evil to appease evil, no matter the form. To concede my
friend's carrying of illegal drugs on my car in order not to offend him/her,
for Rand to have praised Mises' religious views in order for Mises to
do a favor for her or to take money from someone for doing the same constitutes
evil. With regard to a person being evil, it is the fundamentality of the
act which determines whether or not a person should be judged to be evil.
I thought that that was obvious. It is one thing for me to have a neighbor
who drinks and philanders around but who is a good shooting range buddy
and another for me to cavort with my otherwise exemplary neighbor who
happens to be a hitman.
Judgement of a person is based upon his ideas, level of knowledge, education,
past actions, correspondence between professed views and actions, etc. The
degree of the evil is a measure of the degree of the dishonesty required to
hold a view in the face of contrary evidence, the destructiveness of
an individual's actions and what virtues are negated and how consistently.
For acts that result in the loss of life, once is enough; once a murderer
always a murderer. Peikoff's example of what constitues a liar in one
of his speeches is excellent: All it takes is a few good whoppers.
--
Chris Walker
cwa...@zycor.lgc.com
Tom Radcliffe
|>
|> Yet to this
|> day, Kelleyites, ignoring the principle of Kelley's philosophy and of
|> libertarianism, *demand* participation in their discussions. Just *who*
|> needs *who*?
|>
I am not aware of anyone in this forum, at least, demanding that anyone
else particpate in discussions of David Kelley's work or any other topic.
As a non-objectivist participating in this thread I am struck by how
willing the Peikovians are to invent facts, make wild and baseless
accusations, and engage in creative interpretations of people's work. I
have pointed out in the past that Rand's standard of scholarship was
inadequate to say the least, and that many of the people whose lives
she touched have standards that are apparently even lower than hers.
The split between Peikoff and Kelley breaks down rather cleanly along
lines of good and bad scholarship: people who are capable of reading
and understanding a simple declarative English sentence tend to side
with Kelley. Those who are not, tend to side with Peikoff.
I see the treatment accorded to Kelley here as being on par with the
treatment we have seen accorded Godel, Heisenberg and Kant in months
past. Heady company indeed for a philosopher who is still alive!
[Note: that should be ``Just *who* needs *whom*'' ]
Chris Holt
>:Jimbo's response is fine with me. I consider MY case proved, and I will
>answer any timely and honest questions about what I have written.
Good for you.
>In a way, I am *very* glad to see this discussion end. It became clear
>rather quickly that Jimbo and I were arguing for completely different
>reasons. While my goal has been to inform others who do not have much
>knowledge about this issue, and to sharpen my own views on this
>complicated subject--Jimbo's goal has been to convert me to Kelleyism.
>I am glad that he finally realizes that any such attempt will fail utterly.
As someone who disagrees with you both, I can but suggest that
you're mischaracterizing Jimbo's motives. [Not that I expect
you to care.]
Chris Holt
> ... With regard to a person being evil, it is the fundamentality of the
>act which determines whether or not a person should be judged to be evil.
>I thought that that was obvious. It is one thing for me to have a neighbor
>who drinks and philanders around but who is a good shooting range buddy
>and another for me to cavort with my otherwise exemplary neighbor who
>happens to be a hitman.
I just thought I'd stick my neck out (in this salubrious company) and
note that for most people, most of the time, this "one thing or the
other" is really quite difficult to apply/decide. Now, perhaps
objectivists are really so in touch with reality that they can
decide questions of others' value easily and with little additional
information; but most people can't. If you have a friend who you
think is basically a good person, but who got done for a crime,
should you turn them in? The slippery slopes (in any direction)
are frightening.
Gerry Kalafut
> I would point out that Kelley did engage in activities that had bearing on
> ARI activities. He did present Objectivism in a different form from other
> members of the ARI, attempting to integrate it into the wider field of
> modern philosophy. I believe that it would have been possible to identify
> and correct any errors that he made in these efforts. However, with
> regard to two major areas, the sanction of Barbara Branden's biography
> and cooperating with Libertarians, he threatened the reputation of ARI.
> There might have been other incidents which caused Kelley grief with ARI
> or more properly vis-a-vis, but the most public is that of his speaking
> before the Laissez Faire Book Club supper in late 1988 or early 1989. It
> was at this time that he directly participated in a function for a group
> that supported anti-Objectivist and Libertarian literature.
First it should be noted that Laissez Faire Books also sells very
pro-Objectivist books, most notably all of Rand's and Peikoff's.
(In fact, it was both their and Libertarian Party members reverence for
the very material that prompted me to go out and read Atlas Shrugged.)
The Laissez-Faire Catalog does in fact offer books that are critical
of the Objectivist movement. So do most universities and libraries.
Should we then condemn Objectivists who lecture at their forums?
> Indeed he did point out the fallacies of libertarianism before his
> audience in his speech and why Objectivism was the proper foundation
> for freedom. However, to tailor the speech in this format shows that
> his intended audience was Libertarians in *their* forum.
Good! More power to him. I hope he converts them in the thousands!
> The latter point has stood in contention over the years as Laissez-Faire
> books has shifted its affiliations over time, but at least once I've seen
> the catalog make a direct connection with this party. Even then, Keley
> remained a member of the ARI.
Don't tell me you read that "unsanctified" rag. Tsk, tsk , tsk. ;^)
> Then, Kelley released "A Question of Sanction" defending his actions
> at the Supper Club. At such time, he gave his true beliefs of the
> participants of the ARI and demonstrated his willingness to cooperate with
> Libertarians in some forums. In order to justify this, as already addressed
> by Jay Allen's and my articles on USENET, he had to modify the Objectivist
> notion of evil. It was on all three points and more that Peikoff attacked
> Kelley in his article "Fact and Value" and ejected Kelley from the ARI.
> When Ridpath confronted Kelley on the his article, Ridpath indicated that
> Kelley acted as if they had never really been friends after all. I will
> not repeated what Ridpath said literally because Kelley can deny it.
Define "cooperation." Do you mean giving speeches and lectures, or
helping them elect candidates? (And I might add that no one has
yet made such an accusation. If he did that, he would have compromised
his principles, and you would be justified in your criticisms.)
However, if you mean just lecturing, I would like to know in what way
addressing a group, in an attempt to change members of that groups
opinions, infers compromise or abandonment of the speakers principles?
Or for that matter, sanction of that groups actions???
Whether Libertarians are evil or honestly mistaken is not the question.
The question is : Must an objectivist modify his notion of evil to
openly address and *criticize* a group that holds irrational premises,
and whether or not that amounts to a sanction of that groups beliefs.
I say no!
If Kelley started on a lecture circuit of MARXIST groups, I would
support it. So long as he intelligently presented and defended our
philosophy, and pointed out the fallacies intrinsic to their ideology,
the worst that would happen is that they would evade, and fail to be
convinced.
[ Unless of course, they decided to lynch him... ;^b ]
> Kelley's actions speak the most loudly here. I *can* guarantee that
> Ridpath's story won't change.
Yes, Kelley's described actions do speak the most loudly. They in
particular speak loudly of someone trying to reason with a seemingly
unreasonable institution.
If Kelley did anything wrong, it was sticking around "sanctioning"
ARI and its irrational position on this.
P.S., Libertarianism is not a monolithic, single-minded monstrousity.
The Libertarian Party is made up of individuals. Some of whom may well
be evil, and some of whom are simply honestly mistaken. In any case most
can be rationally dealt with in a manner that could lead to their
eventual abandonment of irrational and contradictory beliefs.
It's hard to evade when an Objectivist directly questions your beliefs,
and that questioning needs to take place.
Ignoring and scorning LPers will not get them to change their minds.
Only open direct ideological confrontation can do that, and your and
ARI's position, from what this post says, seem to oppose that.
They *can* be converted. I am proof.
---
|\ Mettalica, "the Unforgiven" (from the self titled album)
----|/--------------------------------------------------------------------||
---/|--"Deprived of all his thoughts,-------------------------------------||
--//|\---the young man struggles on and on.--He's known.------------------||
--\\|-|-A vow unto his own.--That never from this day,--------------------||
---'|'---His will they'll take away!"-------------------------------------||
---/|-----------------------------------------<kal...@emunix.emich.edu>--||
A T Furman
>First it should be noted that Laissez Faire Books also sells very
>pro-Objectivist books, most notably all of Rand's and Peikoff's.
>
>(In fact, it was both their and Libertarian Party members reverence for
>the very material that prompted me to go out and read Atlas Shrugged.)
Same here.
>[...]
>
>Good! More power to [David Kelley]. I hope he converts them in the
>thousands!
If you have not yet done so, I strongly recommend that you check out
the Institute for Objectivist Studies. Membership information
inquires can be sent by email to 588-...@mcimail.com, and give a
snailmail address.
Erich Schwarz
Radcliffe) wrote:
> I see the treatment accorded to Kelley here as being on par with the
> treatment we have seen accorded Godel, Heisenberg and Kant in months
> past. Heady company indeed for a philosopher who is still alive!
What? Somebody on this newsgroup has actually *rigorously disproved*
Goedel's incompleteness theorem? Why have they not bothered to publish
their disproof?
If anybody out there *has* a rigorous disproof, a lot of people out
there want to read it. Get it published!
--Erich Schwarz / schwarze...@starbase1.caltech.edu
TONY_D...@delphi.com
>Kelley is saying that when someone says "ideas have consequences," the
>proper context of this statement should be:
>
>"Ideas, because a person freely chooses to focus, accept, and act upon
>them, can have consequences, however, an idea which is not focused upon,
>accepted, and acted upon will not have consequences. Hence, an idea is
>not a causal agent in and of itself--it requires the focus, acceptance and
>action of a human consciousness which has the property of free will.
>
>Thus, an idea cannot have consequences apart from a volitional being's
>accptance."
It seems to me that many people do not choose to focus, but rather to drift
through life out of focus. These people are not immune from the influence
of ideas on their actions -- in fact, they are even more vulnerable to it,
because they have no control over their cognitive functioning (which is what
focus *gives* you). To quote Ayn Rand:
"You have no choice about the necessity to integrate your observations,
your experiences, your knowledge into abstract ideas, ie, into princip-
les. Your only choice is whether these principles are true or false,
whether they represent your conscious, rational convictions [in other
words -- you *focused* when arriving at them] -- or a grab-bag of not-
ions snatched at random, whose sources, validity, context and conseq-
uences you do not know.." [Philosophy Who Needs it, p. 5 - bracketed
comments mine.]
Focus is not a requirement for action, especially not in the cognitive
realm. One can act on the basis of automatized habits without the need
to focus (an issue Dr. Peikoff elaborates in the section on volition in
his lecture course, _Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_). If focus
were a requirement for any action, then most people would be catatonic.
Tony Donadio
Mike Hurben
No, none of these Oists have proven or disproven ANYthing, outside of the
definitions of Oism itself. They talk as if they had the upper hand in
knowledge when it comes to science or math or philosophy, but they dont.
Ask yourself why there are no world class scientists who are Oists.
Ask yourself why Oists perspectives are never explicitly published in
scholarly journals.
Realize that Oism has never made any contributions to science.
Ive been waiting for months and months for an Oist interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics - I keep waiting for it to pop up in 'Physical Review
Letters.' But it never does. Go figure.
Mike Hurben
Dept of Physics
Colorado State University
Tom Radcliffe
Of course no one here has done any such thing, nor did I suggest they have.
All they have done is misrepresent people, and then attack the
misrepresentation.
James F. Hranicky
|> James F. Hranicky <j...@beach.cis.ufl.edu> writes:
|>
|> >Kelley is saying that when someone says "ideas have consequences," the
|> >proper context of this statement should be:
|> >
|> >"Ideas, because a person freely chooses to focus, accept, and act upon
|> >them, can have consequences, however, an idea which is not focused upon,
|> >accepted, and acted upon will not have consequences. Hence, an idea is
|> >not a causal agent in and of itself--it requires the focus, acceptance and
|> >action of a human consciousness which has the property of free will.
|> >
|> >Thus, an idea cannot have consequences apart from a volitional being's
|>
|>
|> >accptance."
|> Focus is not a requirement for action, especially not in the cognitive
|> realm. One can act on the basis of automatized habits without the need
|> to focus (an issue Dr. Peikoff elaborates in the section on volition in
|> his lecture course, _Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_). If focus
|> were a requirement for any action, then most people would be catatonic.
It seems that even if people do not *consciously* focus, they must do some
sort of focusing, even if subconscious...
So when I say "Thus an idea cannot have consequences apart from a volitional
being's acceptance," it would be important to point out that a person can
accept an idea without explicitly choosing to focus on it...
Perhaps....I would have to focus on it some more....:)
alle...@news.delphi.com
The men who walk through life in a seeming daze still focus to _some_ degree.
(If they didn't, they would be dead.) But for most of them, there is a spe-
cifically delimited area--a an area with a borderline marked off by fog,
doubt, and fear--beyond which they will not think. They clearly see that
there is a _need_ to think, but they refuse to fulfill it; they would
rather remain "blissfully ignorant" than bring their minds into _full_
focus.
When a man sees the need to think, but refuses to do so--when he denies
the existence of some fact of reality--then he is committing an act of
evasion. Since such an act can in principle lead only to disastrous con-
sequences, an act of evasion is an act of evil. If a man habitually
practices evasion, so that nothing in reality is absolute except his own
whim, that is when he is pronounced to be evil in character. Any ideas
which spring from such a character must necessarily lead to evil
consequences--_unless_ held in check by some other, rational idea, some
remnant of a better past. Otherwise, the idea is the man's only guide to
action--and there is nothing to prevent him from putting it into practice.
A man CAN choose to act contrary to an evil idea--but ONLY if he has
another idea holding it in check. This is not to say that the idea
"automatically" must lead to an action, but that any action which results
from the idea MUST have disastrous long-range consequences.
Jay Allen
TONY_D...@delphi.com
As with most other issues like this, most Objectivists (who know anything
about Godel's theorem) don't attack the theorm itself, taken in its proper
context. It's pseudo-philosophers who try to extend Godel's results from
a closed axiomatic system into a paradigm for all knowledge, claiming that
he proved that "logic is limited," or some such drivel, when he did nothing
of the sort.
I remember when we got to Godel's theorem in my math foundations course. I
was surprised to find out that it didn't say what fashionable commentators
like Hofstadter were claiming at all, and impressed with my professor's
indignation when I asked him about what these people were saying. It just
goes to show that good science and good math can be taken out of context
by people with an agenda to discredit human knowledge, any way they can.
Tony Donadio
Chris Holt
Hooray! [Increment estimate of awareness of objectivists, on average.
Unfortunately, Tony, you've got a lot to fight against; but that's
what the Myth of Sisyphus is all about, right? :-] My only complaint
would be that "logic is limited" is not an unreasonable translation
of what he said, it's just that it doesn't mean what most people
seem to think it means.
Erich Schwarz
wrote:
>
>
> As with most other issues like this, most Objectivists (who know anything
> about Godel's theorem) don't attack the theorm itself, taken in its proper
> context. It's pseudo-philosophers who try to extend Godel's results from
> a closed axiomatic system into a paradigm for all knowledge, claiming that
> he proved that "logic is limited," or some such drivel, when he did nothing
> of the sort.
No, but what it does establish, as far as I can tell, is that truth is a
stronger concept than provability. An axiomatic system, to generate all
true statements, must either have an infinite number of axioms or have
mutually contradictory axioms.
This does not bode well for ideologies that claim to be able to
explain/predict all important phenomena from a finite, non-contradictory
number of axioms, plus logic.
--Erich Schwarz / schwarze...@starbase1.caltech.edu
Erich Schwarz
> was surprised to find out that it didn't say what fashionable commentators
> like Hofstadter were claiming at all, and impressed with my professor's
> indignation when I asked him about what these people were saying.
You've piqued my curiosity. Exactly what errors of fact were there in
Hofstadter's explanation of Goedel's theorem?
--Erich Schwarz / schwarze...@starbase1.caltech.edu
Erich Schwarz
> It's pseudo-philosophers who try to extend Godel's results from
> a closed axiomatic system into a paradigm for all knowledge...
OK, I'm just an addict for knowledge tonight. Is there a reliable way
to distinguish philosophers from psuedo-philosophers, that can be defined
in words?
Or is it just the way they part their hair, or something equally
inexplicable in logical terms?
--Erich Schwarz / schwarze...@starbase1.caltech.edu
Charles Dlhopolsky
>When a man sees the need to think, but refuses to do so--when he denies
>the existence of some fact of reality--then he is committing an act of
>evasion. Since such an act can in principle lead only to disastrous con-
>sequences, an act of evasion is an act of evil. If a man habitually
>practices evasion, so that nothing in reality is absolute except his own
>whim, that is when he is pronounced to be evil in character. Any ideas
>which spring from such a character must necessarily lead to evil
>consequences--_unless_ held in check by some other, rational idea, some
>remnant of a better past. Otherwise, the idea is the man's only guide to
>action--and there is nothing to prevent him from putting it into practice.
>
>A man CAN choose to act contrary to an evil idea--but ONLY if he has
>another idea holding it in check. This is not to say that the idea
>"automatically" must lead to an action, but that any action which results
>from the idea MUST have disastrous long-range consequences.
>
>Jay Allen
>
You've forgotten the method that most (exaggeration?) of the people in
world use in order to survive. They do what they are told to do.
Children adopt the morality of their parents, and just follow
whatever their parents told them. They often think that their
morality is intrinsically true and don't ever question it.
This actually WORKS for SOME people. In fact most "normal" people are
exactly like this. Their parents were fairly normal, brought them up
fairly well and shoved morality down their throat every day! The
morality, though ungrounded in _anything_ has enough value in itself
to make the person happy and mostly harmless.
The solution that the polititians today would like to use to
save the world is to have more 'family values' which means to
take a fairly arbitrary but workable morality and shove it down
everyone's throat's until they really believe it and act on it.
Is this bad? Well yes and no. I like to think about what is right and
ground it in reality. I know that this is the only way in which I can
be truly sure that my morals coincide with my happiness.
Yeah maybe other people aren't living the best life posssibe, maybe
their ego's aren't bursting out of their skulls like a good
objectivist's should be, but so what? Maybe they don't want nor need
that 'I know everything' 'Im supurb' 'Ive achieved rational values'
head trip. (yes this is an attack)
On the other hand when running a country a 'given' morality isn't very
effective.
Many people do not think, _cannot_ think, and do not _want_ to think.
For these people one can only hope that the person who gave them their
morality had a clue.
Often they do not.
Our society is in trouble because most peoples moralities are given to
them, either by their parents or their friends or society in general
(Oprah!!!!). These moralities aren't grounded in anything useful and
often are grounded in silly things. (god for example)
-charlie
TONY_D...@delphi.com
> No, but what it does establish, as far as I can tell, is that truth is a
>stronger concept than provability. An axiomatic system, to generate all
>true statements, must either have an infinite number of axioms or have
>mutually contradictory axioms.
>
> This does not bode well for ideologies that claim to be able to
>explain/predict all important phenomena from a finite, non-contradictory
>number of axioms, plus logic.
axiomatic system. Formal systems (of the type to which Godel's theorem
applies) are fundamentally deductive in nature. Rational knowledge is
fundamentally *inductive*. And logic is not just deductive inference,
although most of us were educated to think of it in those narrow terms
by the somewhat rationalistic tradition modern philosophy grew out of.
By the way -- Godel's theorem, as I understand it, applies as well to
systems with infinite numbers of axioms as well as finite sets of axioms.
Tony Donadio
Erich Schwarz
wrote:
> The point is that human knowledge is not a closed, formal, deductive,
> axiomatic system. Formal systems (of the type to which Godel's theorem
> applies) are fundamentally deductive in nature. Rational knowledge is
> fundamentally *inductive*. And logic is not just deductive inference,
> although most of us were educated to think of it in those narrow terms
> by the somewhat rationalistic tradition modern philosophy grew out of.
True, but induction itself is a philosophical blob of molasses-covered
worms. See Hume. Or (I say this at risk of flamage) Pirsig's commentaries
on Poincare in _Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance_.
Not only is there no way to "prove" that induction is valid, and not
only is there no real way to be sure just how lasting a temporarily
successful induction will be in the future, *but* you have to make a
powerfully intuitive decision about what to induct!!! Knowing how to do
induction sounds, to me, like the sort of thing that come pre-programmed in
our brains, *not* the sort of knowledge (explicit, deductive knowledge)
that Ayn Rand considered respectable...
Nor is it clear to me that induction saves us from the sort of problem
that people like Hofstadter commented on: at any given moment, we can most
concisely describe our *existing* knowledge of the world deductively; yet
deductive structures are provably less complete than reality.
> By the way -- Godel's theorem, as I understand it, applies as well to
> systems with infinite numbers of axioms as well as finite sets of axioms.
You may very well be right, given that your knowledge is probably first-
or second-hand (mine is necessarily third-hand, although I hope to improve
that someday.) Thanks for the correction.
--Erich Schwarz / schwarze...@starbase1.caltech.edu
TONY_D...@delphi.com
> Not only is there no way to "prove" that induction is valid, and not
>only is there no real way to be sure just how lasting a temporarily
>successful induction will be in the future, *but* you have to make a
>powerfully intuitive decision about what to induct!!! Knowing how to do
>induction sounds, to me, like the sort of thing that come pre-programmed in
>our brains, *not* the sort of knowledge (explicit, deductive knowledge)
>that Ayn Rand considered respectable...
to be respectable? That's patently untrue. Objectivism stresses deduction
as the primary form of logic, as has been discussed here before.
I have a simple counter-argument to this. If only deductive inference is
reliable, then where did you get the premises from which you are making
your deductions? Where did you get your axioms? Surely not -- shudder! --
from *inductive* inference, now, did you, since induction is so unreliable
and molasses-ridden?
Deductive conclusions are only as good as their premises -- which are only
as good as the inductions which formed them. If induction is unsound then
all your knowledge is wiped out.
Tony Donadio
Erich Schwarz
wrote:
> Where do you get the idea that Ayn Rand only considered deductive knowledge
> to be respectable? That's patently untrue. Objectivism stresses deduction
> as the primary form of logic, as has been discussed here before.
Watching the way in which she approached issue after issue in her
essays and novels--by pure deduction from premises whose invariable
applicability is never seriously questioned.
Look, folks, maybe it's just me, but a few years trying to study a
*very tiny* system--the workings of the Drosophila eye--has convinced me
that Rand's approach in general is rather feeble. It's relatively
straightforward (though, I agree, not easy or trivial) to generate
axiomatic schemes that purport to let one make powerful statements about
reality. But it's way harder to be *right*. Reality and Nature are just a
lot brighter than humans are, and have infinite ways to baffle us. I'm not
going to waste time trying to convince the infallible armchair philosophers
out there of this, but any experimentalists out there reading this are
likely to agree.
In practice, what keeps physical scientists honest is that they can
only fool themselves into thinking their scheme is correct for a very brief
time, then the experiments come back with data that explode the scheme and
force one to actually rethink it.
Rand made statements about a vastly more complicated issue than fly
vision--the proper governance of all of society--with what struck me as
very little interest in the empirical data (i.e., the actual
economic/political history of the actual United States.) Her implicit
claim was that somehow she could do with the socioeconomic structure of
America what I and my colleagues have long since given up trying to do with
much simpler entities.
In general, I distrust this. I've seen *both* anarcho-capitalists
*and* social-democrats *and* everybody else use Rand's approach, and, while
one is actually reading them, they are convincing. The ONLY way one cuts
the Gordian knot of dialectic is to go out and look at things as they
really are, which demands induction.
> I have a simple counter-argument to this. If only deductive inference is
> reliable, then where did you get the premises from which you are making
> your deductions? Where did you get your axioms? Surely not -- shudder! --
> from *inductive* inference, now, did you, since induction is so unreliable
> and molasses-ridden?
Hey, I'm a research scientist. I'm arguing in favor of induction. I
just don't think most people realize that it is, philosophically, terribly
disreputable. We use it because it works. We can't, philosophically,
construct a rigorous theory of why it works or how to use it infallibly.
> Deductive conclusions are only as good as their premises -- which are only
> as good as the inductions which formed them. If induction is unsound then
> all your knowledge is wiped out.
The terrible problem is that *you are right*, yet just try to
construct a philosophical theory that will in fact make induction totally
reliable.
Of course David Hume pointed this out a long time ago...
--Erich Schwarz / schwarze...@starbase1.caltech.edu
Tom Radcliffe
[deleted]
|> Look, folks, maybe it's just me, but a few years trying to study a
|> *very tiny* system--the workings of the Drosophila eye--has convinced me
|> that Rand's approach in general is rather feeble. It's relatively
|> straightforward (though, I agree, not easy or trivial) to generate
|> axiomatic schemes that purport to let one make powerful statements about
|> reality. But it's way harder to be *right*. Reality and Nature are just a
|> lot brighter than humans are, and have infinite ways to baffle us. I'm not
|> going to waste time trying to convince the infallible armchair philosophers
|> out there of this, but any experimentalists out there reading this are
|> likely to agree.
It's not just you. As a fellow-experimentalist, although in a
very different field, I agree 100%. Philosophers frequently do not
seem to realize that the truth dwells in the details, and spend a
lot of time building intellectual castles on foundations of
unstable generalizations.
Robert J. Kolker
.....snip......
: It's not just you. As a fellow-experimentalist, although in a
: very different field, I agree 100%. Philosophers frequently do not
: seem to realize that the truth dwells in the details, and spend a
: lot of time building intellectual castles on foundations of
: unstable generalizations.
Yup! In the physics department they have laboratories, blackboards &
computers. In the math department they have blockboards & computers.
In the philosophy department, they have armchairs and no wastebaskets.
God and the Devil are in the details, and no amount of metaphysical
vapourosity are going to deal with them adequately.
Conan the Libertarian
--
"If you can't love the Constitution, then at least hate the Government"
TONY_D...@delphi.com
>> Where do you get the idea that Ayn Rand only considered deductive knowledge
>> to be respectable? That's patently untrue. Objectivism stresses deduction
>> as the primary form of logic, as has been discussed here before.
>
> Watching the way in which she approached issue after issue in her
>essays and novels--by pure deduction from premises whose invariable
>applicability is never seriously questioned.
Have you been reading the same Rand books I have? Maybe you'd like to back
this preposterous claim up with an example or two. Rand's approach is to
look for general patterns in a phenomenon, then ask what in the nature of
the entities involved explain the observed patterns.
> Rand made statements about a vastly more complicated issue than fly
>vision--the proper governance of all of society--with what struck me as
>very little interest in the empirical data (i.e., the actual
>economic/political history of the actual United States.) Her implicit
>claim was that somehow she could do with the socioeconomic structure of
>America what I and my colleagues have long since given up trying to do with
>much simpler entities.
governance of society" were based on her study precisely of the data you
accuse her of slighting. (Perhaps you didn't know that her major field of
study in college was history -- with a minor in philosophy?) She's gone
on record as to the fact that she would never have been able to develop her
political theory before the industrial revolution, and the clear-cut hist-
orical example it presented as to the role of the mind in the furtherance
of human life.
Tony Donadio
Bill Clark
> Hey, I'm a research scientist. I'm arguing in favor of induction. I
>just don't think most people realize that it is, philosophically, terribly
>disreputable. We use it because it works. We can't, philosophically,
>construct a rigorous theory of why it works or how to use it infallibly.
> The terrible problem is that *you are right*, yet just try to
>construct a philosophical theory that will in fact make induction totally
>reliable.
> Of course David Hume pointed this out a long time ago...
>--Erich Schwarz / schwarze...@starbase1.caltech.edu
I just want to point out that there are two different interpretations
of what the word "induction" means. When I first read this thread, I thought
you all were talking about Mathematical Induction, which has a FIRM basis
of proof and is pretty much as accepted as deductive methods (again, in
mathematics). Regular induction is apparently what you guys meant, and
I'll have to agree that, while extremely useful and accepted, regular induction
has no firm philosophical standing. My comment to any scientists out there
are that most of the time, you use Mathematical induction if you're a
theorist, and regular induction if you're an experimentor. Philosophers, as
I see it, use Mathematical (or logical, I guess) induction much more
frequently, and so base their lines of reasoning on very firm ground. The only
time they use regular induction is to make observations that justify their
initial axioms. Since the point of philosophy is more along the lines of
reasonging than on simply observing (without comment), philosophers should
make sure they're talking about the right kind of induction before they
start claiming it to be wrong.
bill clark.
rutgers university.
TONY_D...@delphi.com
>has no firm philosophical standing. My comment to any scientists out there
>are that most of the time, you use Mathematical induction if you're a
>theorist, and regular induction if you're an experimentor. Philosophers, as
>I see it, use Mathematical (or logical, I guess) induction much more
>frequently, and so base their lines of reasoning on very firm ground. The only
>time they use regular induction is to make observations that justify their
>initial axioms. Since the point of philosophy is more along the lines of
>reasonging than on simply observing (without comment), philosophers should
>make sure they're talking about the right kind of induction before they
>start claiming it to be wrong.
ivism), not mathematical induction. Mathematical induction is actually a
species of deduction, in which you are *deducing* the properties of a class
from certain mathematical principles. The fifth Peano postulate is the
"axiom" which, according to the traditional development, allows for math-
ematical induction.
This is an excellent example of what I was talking about. The validity of
the fifth Peano postulate [P(x) and P(successor(x)) => P(x) for all x)
is not something you can just "assume," and say "if we assume this, then
the following stuff (mathematics) follows." You observe instances of this
principle, form it as a generalization, and then show how it follows logic-
ally from the nature of the relevant entities (numbers).
Objectivism has its own view of whether *philosophical* induction is
reliable. In principle, it IS. But that I'll have to come back to later.
Tony Donadio
>
P.S.
Sorry, I meant "the relevant facts." Numbers are concepts, not entities.
Tony
Erich Schwarz
wrote:
> Have you been reading the same Rand books I have?
_Atlas Shrugged_; _The Fountainhead_; several anthologies of her
essays; both of her biographies.
> Maybe you'd like to back
> this preposterous claim up with an example or two.
I'd like to have the time to write a book about this. I don't. Like
Larry Sanger, I have limited time. Sorry.
> Rand's approach is to
> look for general patterns in a phenomenon, then ask what in the nature of
> the entities involved explain the observed patterns.
When I read Ayn Rand, I found myself reacting the same way to her
account of socialism that I reacted to Catholic accounts of the sin of
Adam.
Adam, as you recall, ate the Fruit of the Tree of Good and Evil, thus
bringing mortality, pain in childbirth, dysfunctional sexual codependency,
and back-breaking labor upon all his descendants (Genesis). When I read
this account, I always found myself wondering: why? Why didn't God just
blast Adam and Eve, and keep trying--flipping a coin, really--with new
couples until one made the right choice...so that all those progeny
wouldn't just *inherit* all that crap?
As Voltaire pointed out in his commentary on Leibnitz, all lapsarian
accounts of human history sound, well, *dumb*. Why didn't Adam just not
eat the apple? Why (in the Persian mythos) couldn't the couple have *not*
been confined to the privy of the universe (i.e. Earth)?
When I read Rand, I get *absolutely no sense* of history at all. I get
*no* understanding of why *anybody* would have ever chosen to not be Henry
Ford. I invite anybody else out there who has read _AS_ or _TF_ to chime
in here, but it's not really necessary; just *ask* anybody who has read
them who is *not* an Oist whether they agree with this or not. I'll think
you'll find it's a very common reaction among people whose reading of
history is not confined to Rand herself, but who have actually read
historians who make an effort to get past just condemning everybody who
wasn't James J. Hill or his homolog.
Rand's universe is like the Catholic Church's, except this time, the
inexplicable fall from grace consists of not totally agreeing with her
rather narrow set of tastes about what is "life-affirming." Somebody
elsewhere pointed out the absurdity of Shakespeare being condemned as "not
life-affirming", but she indeed seems to have made that claim. There is as
narrow a path to righteousness in Objectivism as in
pre-Vatican-II-Catholicism. And, as in p-V-2-C, anybody not within the
Oist fold is damned.
It seems to me that a genuine inductive and empiricist view of human
history would tend to imbue one with a greater compassion and tolerance for
the actual choices of actual human beings who actually inhabited this
planet. Instead, we get offered, as role models, creatures like John Galt,
who are unquestionably admirable if taken at face value, but who show none
of the frailties that actually delimit the characters of those funny
creatures called _Homo sapiens_. The command "Be ye perfect", though meant
well, is the path that both Catholics and Oists strike me as following to
hatred and madness.
> That's a laugh. Rand was a historian, and her ideas regarding the "proper
> governance of society" were based on her study precisely of the data you
> accuse her of slighting. (Perhaps you didn't know that her major field of
> study in college was history -- with a minor in philosophy?)
I knew. I know that, in fact, she lived up to her own ideals to an
amazing degree. Nobody is going to make me disagree with that.
But it seems to me that those same ideals, in the end, corroded and
destroyed her. The internal command to be perfect and indestructible gave
her the strength to escape Soviet Russia and publish a philosophical
best-seller against the current of her time. But it seems to have left her
with so little understanding of human life that her personal and emotional
lives eventually imploded. Works without love are vain.
> She's gone
> on record as to the fact that she would never have been able to develop her
> political theory before the industrial revolution, and the clear-cut hist-
> orical example it presented as to the role of the mind in the furtherance
> of human life.
Marx would almost certainly have said the same thing--if, in fact, he
didn't indeed do so.
--Erich Schwarz / schwarze...@starbase1.caltech.edu
Anders G|ransson
(..text omitted..)
We're talking about *philosophical* induction (this is alt.PHILOSOPHY.object-
ivism), not mathematical induction. Mathematical induction is actually a
species of deduction, in which you are *deducing* the properties of a class
from certain mathematical principles. The fifth Peano postulate is the
"axiom" which, according to the traditional development, allows for math-
ematical induction.
This is an excellent example of what I was talking about. The validity of
the fifth Peano postulate [P(x) and P(successor(x)) => P(x) for all x)
is not something you can just "assume," and say "if we assume this, then
the following stuff (mathematics) follows." You observe instances of this
principle, form it as a generalization, and then show how it follows logic-
ally from the nature of the relevant entities (numbers).
Objectivism has its own view of whether *philosophical* induction is
reliable. In principle, it IS. But that I'll have to come back to later.
Jeesus Christ Mr. Donadio, why bother to post on topics such
as this when you cannot even get the induction axiom correct?
(But don't take my word for it, check it out for yourself!)
The philosophical content of the article is so utterly strange
that it actually leaves me speechless (something I'm quite
content with in this case)!
So call me an enemy of reason and carry on with your
"philosophy"!
best regards Anders
--
'Wossat noise?'
The bleedin' wind under the door.
'Wossat noise now, squire? Wosse wind doing?'
Nuffink agint nuffink.
alle...@news.delphi.com
and "flawless," we see again the rationalistic interpretation of Objectivism.
According to Objectivism, it is immoral to _indulge_ in one's flaws, to
take them as a given and "live with them" instead of trying to work to
correct them. This does not mean that everyone must act "perfectly" every
minute of every day. Knowledge is objective, after all; it is gained by a
_process_ of thought, which means that people can be mistaken if they do
not have all the facts.
The choice is not between demanding absolute "perfection" and "tolerating"
immorality. There is a third choice: distinguishing between the honestly
mistaken and the willfully evasive. This was the choice advocated by Ayn Rand.
Jay Allen
TONY_D...@delphi.com
>Jeesus Christ Mr. Donadio, why bother to post on topics such
>as this when you cannot even get the induction axiom correct?
>(But don't take my word for it, check it out for yourself!)
>The philosophical content of the article is so utterly strange
>that it actually leaves me speechless (something I'm quite
>content with in this case)!
>So call me an enemy of reason and carry on with your
>"philosophy"!
from my Math Foundations course and took my statement directly from them.
If they're wrong in any fundamental way, correct me or shut up.
Tony Donadio
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>The choice is not between demanding absolute "perfection" and "tolerating"
>immorality. There is a third choice: distinguishing between the honestly
>mistaken and the willfully evasive. This was the choice advocated by Ayn Rand.
Just a brief comment because this may confuse people who have been
following the recent Kelley debate. David Kelley does not advocate
tolerating immorality. He agrees with Ayn Rand here. The choice is
not between intrinsicism (demanding some absolute out-of-context
"perfection") and subjectivism (anything goes). There is a middle
choice: Objectivism. The virtue of tolerance consists primarily in
recognizing that objectivity demands that we take careful efforts
to judge whether or not people are honestly mistaken or not, that it
is dangerous and foolish to adopt that intrinsicist position that
belief in some ideas is sufficient evidence to convict someone of
immorality. We always need to make the effort to distinguish between
the honestly mistaken and the willfully evasive.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
I wrote:
>The choice is
>not between intrinsicism (demanding some absolute out-of-context
>"perfection") and subjectivism (anything goes). There is a middle
>choice: Objectivism.
This should read "There is a third choice: Objectivism." It doesn't
really fit the conceptual space of this troika to posit O'ism as some
half-way or compromise position. O'ism identifies the common premise
shared by the other two, and rejects that premise.
In a more general context that premise is that knowledge is not valid
whenever it is held or acquired in some form, that is, the view that
knowledge is invalidated by the fact of the identity of consciousness.
--Jimbo
Steve Butcher
Without involving myself in any other aspect of this dialogue, I would
like to point out that
[P(x) and P(successor(x))=>P(x) for all x] is not a correct formulation
of the induction principle. Depending on whether you count 0 or 1 as
the first natural number correct formulations would be
[P(1) and (for all x(P(x)=>P(successor(x))))]=>(P(x) for all x)
or
(same as above but with 1 replaced with 0).
Anders G|ransson
Tony Donadio
Since there is a correct version of the induction
schema posted I might instead make some comments on the formula you
proposed.It was Px & Px' implies xPx. This is strange since in
the domain of natural numbers it would be false for e.g. the
interpretation {P = (x=10 v x=11),x'=x+1, x=10}. This property is
obviously true for 10 and for its successor 11 but then is every
number either 10 or 11? No, so the implication will be false.
Supposing that you meant x(Px & Px') implies xPx?
Why yes, but does that have anything to do with induction? No.
Perhaps now you will call me an enemy of reason?
Robert Vienneau
>Since there is a correct version of the induction
>schema posted I might instead make some comments on the formula you
>proposed.It was Px & Px' implies xPx. This is strange since in
>the domain of natural numbers it would be false for e.g. the
>interpretation {P = (x=10 v x=11),x'=x+1, x=10}. This property is
>obviously true for 10 and for its successor 11 but then is every
>number either 10 or 11? No, so the implication will be false.
>Supposing that you meant x(Px & Px') implies xPx?
>Why yes, but does that have anything to do with induction? No.
>Perhaps now you will call me an enemy of reason?
I presume another example that has nothing to do with induction
is
[ for all x, ( Px & Qx ) ] implies [ for all x, Px ].
Can I be an enemy of reason also?
Robert Vienneau
--
The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
internet: laUNChpad.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
Anders G|ransson
References: <AG.94Jan...@anhur.sics.se> <19940127.104648...@delphi.com> <AG.94Jan...@anhur.sics.se>
NNTP-Posting-Host: lambada.oit.unc.edu
In article <AG.94Jan...@anhur.sics.se> a...@sics.se (Anders G|ransson) writes:
>Since there is a correct version of the induction
>schema posted I might instead make some comments on the formula you
>proposed.It was Px & Px' implies xPx. This is strange since in
>the domain of natural numbers it would be false for e.g. the
>interpretation {P = (x=10 v x=11),x'=x+1, x=10}. This property is
>obviously true for 10 and for its successor 11 but then is every
>number either 10 or 11? No, so the implication will be false.
>Supposing that you meant x(Px & Px') implies xPx?
>Why yes, but does that have anything to do with induction? No.
>Perhaps now you will call me an enemy of reason?
I presume another example that has nothing to do with induction
is
[ for all x, ( Px & Qx ) ] implies [ for all x, Px ].
Can I be an enemy of reason also?
Robert Vienneau
If you ask me, yes of course!!
But to be of real worth this title has to be earned from one of
the leading objectivists and then judge of my chagrin when I am being
denied this title from the very epitome of reason and rationality
of objectivism Mr. Donadio (that is when he has the right set of
notes to copy from...).
Now I expect nothing from him but the usual dead silence of the
objectivist faced by an objection.
--
The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
Technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
internet: laUNChpad.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
TONY_D...@delphi.com
correct. It did contain the right idea, though; I just didn't take the time
to formulate it with full rigor.
Tony Donadio
Anders G|ransson
Tony Donadio
What a lame excuse, as if it should take longer time to
formulate it correctly!
What Mr. Donadio called the induction axiom had nothing to do with the
induction schema of Peano arithmetic. This is not a question of
rigour.
Reason, do you really need any enemies?
best regards Anders
Jay Allen
>David Kelley does not advocate
>tolerating immorality. He agrees with Ayn Rand here. The choice is
>not between intrinsicism (demanding some absolute out-of-context
>"perfection") and subjectivism (anything goes). There is a middle
>choice: Objectivism. The virtue of tolerance consists primarily in
>recognizing that objectivity demands that we take careful efforts
>to judge whether or not people are honestly mistaken or not, that it
>is dangerous and foolish to adopt that intrinsicist position that
>belief in some ideas is sufficient evidence to convict someone of
>immorality. We always need to make the effort to distinguish between
>the honestly mistaken and the willfully evasive.
Actually, Kelley's epistemological doctrine of "reintroducing the
measurements" takes him much farther than this. According to Kelley,
when we make a judgement about a particular existent, we must "reintroduce
the relevant measurements." Jimbo and others have interpreted this to mean
that we must not treat all concretes as though they existed the same degree.
An individual Libertarian and Lenin may both be evil, but they are certainly
not evil in the same degree, so therefore they should be treated differently.
But this is not what Kelley means. In "A Question of Sanction," Kelley grants
the premise that Libertarianism as such may be a vice, and then insists that
there would still be a vast difference between Libertarians and the Soviet
Union. While this is true, what does Kelley take this to mean? Does it mean
that our refusal to sanction Libertarianism must come in a radically different
form than it does when we apply this moral principle to the Soviets? No. What
it means is that _we_can_treat_Libertarianism_as_if_we_do_not_need_to_refuse_
_it_sanction_, i.e., we can treat it as if it were _not_ evil. We can attend
Libertarian supper clubs and sign books at Libertarian stores, without any
need to worry about the repercussions of sanction.
By this standard, the concepts of "good" and "evil" become useless
abstractions, and cease to be guides to action. There is no essential action
we can take towards all evil, because we can arbitrarily decide that something
is so less evil than something else that we can consider it not evil.
We are left with nothing to guide our actions but a pragmatic cost-benefit
analysis--which ultimately means that our decisions are dictated by our emo-
tions.
This is Kelley's position--in BOTH AQOS and TandT. It is NOT the position of
Objectivism. While recognizing that there are differences of degrees of evil,
and that the form in which we apply a moral principle has to adjust to the
particular situation, Objectivism holds that all instances of evil share an
essential similiarity, and that we can perform the same essential action
with regards to all of them. To treat particular evils as if they were sui
generis is to declare concepts useless for the living of human life.
--
$$$$ $$$$ $$$$ $$$$ $$$$
Jay Andrew Allen ra...@maestro.com
"When money ceases to be the tool by which men deal with one another,
then men become the tools of men."--Ayn Rand, ATLAS SHRUGGED
Eric Daniels
> Jay Allen recently made a long post in which he attacked David Kelley's
> point that to apply principles to concrete situations we must
> ``re-introduce the measurements.'' Allen claims his own position is that
> we must treat all concretes as though they exist to the same degree,
> and concludes that there is no difference in kind between the proper
> response to a charging elephant and a charging mouse. He goes on to
> claim that this still means we can distinguish between the two based on
> the particular measurements.
I think this is mistaken. In my understanding the problem with Kelley's
position is that he thinks one must re-introduce measurements of evil,
which is an evaluation, not a perceptual concrete. The similarity between
Stalin and an academic Marxist (outside of their presumed common beliefs
in Marxism) is their status as evil. Both are evil, in different degrees,
but through the process of concept formation, I omit that measurement. In
dealing with the abstraction evil, I act in a particular way. I don't
re-introduce the measurements because to do so would break apart the process
of abstarction that I made through developing my concept of evil.
The reason Tom Randcliffe's analogy about the mouse and the elephant
is not apt is because the similarities there are only physical. When I
evaluate the status of both concretes, they happen to be different, one is
dangerous and the other is not. This is the distinguishing characteristic
in the quasi-analogy. In the case of Stalin and an academic Marxist, both
are evaluated, and in the end one comes up with the same evaluation, evil.
We cannot only distinguish between the mouse and elephant by their
measurements of size, color, speed, ad infinitum, but they also represent
different evaluations. This is what is key.
To indulge in the analogy provided, take this example. If I were
in New York city, and I saw a man running me in a dark alley, I would
evaluate him as dangerous. If I saw a man stab someone in an alley, and then
run at me with the knife, I would evaluate him as dangerous. Either way, I will
act the same way. Both men are dangerous, albeit in different degrees, but
dangerous nonetheless. What then is the link? The link is that both men are
dangerous, and to form the concept dangerous, I omit the measurement of
degree; much in the same way as I do when I form the concept evil.
Obviously, I could evalute the two entities differntly; one as
life-threatening, and one as indifferent (the man w/o the knife, presumably
a jogger). In this case, I would deal with them differently, much as I
would with the mouse and the elephant. In the case of Stalin and the
academic Marxist, it is *possible* to evaluate them differently. As such, this
would be the only rational case for treating them differently. *However*, to
do so would be an abomination of justice.
What is important here is not that there is no rational way to argue
for treating them differently--to do so one would have to argue for a different
evaluation of the acadmeic Marxist, i.e., other than evil. The point is that
once one evaluates them as the same status, evil, one cannot possibly make
a case for treating them differently. If someone wanted to make the case
that academic Marxists were not evil, fine, let him try. I think he would
flounder. To suggest that an acadmeic Marxist ought to be treated differently
based on his status as being evil *in a different degree* is a abnegation
of concept formation. It is precisely degree as a measurement that one omits
in forming the concept evil. To re-introduce it is to destroy the
epistemological function of the concept.
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Eric Daniels
edd...@acad.drake.edu
"Not to know what happened before one was born is to always be a child"
-Cicero
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>But this is not what Kelley means.
I am quite sure that no one in this forum will be willing any longer
to accept on Jay Allen's authority any interpretation of what Kelley
means.
>What
>it means is that _we_can_treat_Libertarianism_as_if_we_do_not_need_to_refuse_
>_it_sanction_, i.e., we can treat it as if it were _not_ evil. We can attend
>Libertarian supper clubs and sign books at Libertarian stores, without any
>need to worry about the repercussions of sanction.
False. Kelley does not think this at all. You miss a crucial point
of QOS. Kelley was not an "after diner speaker at a Libertarian
function"... he WAS the function. He went to speak to Libertarians
about why only Objectivism can offer a valid basis for individual
rights. The text of the speech is available.
Kelley also does not sanction Laissez-Faire books, except insofar as
regarding them as a legitimate commercial enterprise. Keep in mind
that he signed copies of HIS OWN books, and that doing so does OF
COURSE not constitute endorsing the other works sold by the store,
ANY MORE THAN Peikoff allowing Rand's works to be sold alongside
those of Kant's down at Waldenbooks constitutes a sanction of his
ideas.
What does it mean to sanction? Well, the chief dangers involved
here are the possibility that our ideas will be mistaken for those
of others, or that the format of our appearance will suggest that
we think that the doctrines promoted by others are acceptable.
If you differ with Kelley and somehow think that going to tell people
that they are wrong is implicitly somehow saying that they are right...
If you differ with Kelley and think that signing your own books at
a bookstore devoted to all sorts of works dealing with the history
of individual liberty and free markets constitutes some kind of
indication of agreement with those works...
Then it is incumbent upon you to produce an argument to show that
this is the case, and TO NOT ENGAGE IN ARBITRARY FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT
EPISTEMOLOGY.
--Jimbo
Erich Schwarz
Allen) wrote:
> But this is not what Kelley means. In "A Question of Sanction," Kelley grants
> the premise that Libertarianism as such may be a vice, and then insists that
> there would still be a vast difference between Libertarians and the Soviet
> Union. While this is true, what does Kelley take this to mean? Does it mean
> that our refusal to sanction Libertarianism must come in a radically different
> form than it does when we apply this moral principle to the Soviets? No. What
> it means is that _we_can_treat_Libertarianism_as_if_we_do_not_need_to_refuse_
> _it_sanction_, i.e., we can treat it as if it were _not_ evil. We can attend
> Libertarian supper clubs and sign books at Libertarian stores, without any
> need to worry about the repercussions of sanction.
Why does this thread remind me of the mighty struggle between the
"Judean People's Liberation Front" and the "People's Liberation Judean
Front" in Monty Python's _Life of Brian_?
Let me assure you that if you really can't see any difference between
the American Libertarian Party and the (now-defunct) Soviet Union, there is
little hazard that you will be called upon to deal with any more
substantive issues in the course of your political life. Just call it a
wild non-Oist hunch.
--Erich Schwarz
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
I believe that you may want to reread the essay "The Cult of Moral
Grayness," in _The Virtue of Selfishness_. Ayn Rand argues correctly
against the fallacy of failing to reintroduce measurements in the
application of a concept.
Eric writes:
> In my understanding the problem with Kelley's
>position is that he thinks one must re-introduce measurements of evil,
>which is an evaluation, not a perceptual concrete. The similarity between
>Stalin and an academic Marxist (outside of their presumed common beliefs
>in Marxism) is their status as evil. Both are evil, in different degrees,
>but through the process of concept formation, I omit that measurement. In
>dealing with the abstraction evil, I act in a particular way. I don't
>re-introduce the measurements because to do so would break apart the process
>of abstarction that I made through developing my concept of evil.
This is correct, until the last step. Rand points out that "unless one
is prepared to dispense with morality altogether and to regard a petty
chiseller and a murderer as morally equal, one still has to judge and
evaluate the many shadings of 'gray' that one may encounter in the
characters of individual men."
Eric continues:
>In the case of Stalin and an academic Marxist, both
>are evaluated, and in the end one comes up with the same evaluation, evil.
Agreed. But do you advocate going to war to stop the academic Marxist?
Unless you are prepared to advocate killing people for advocating false
ideas, you must be prepared to reintroduce the relevant measurements in
order to distinguish between various degrees of evil.
> What is important here is not that there is no rational way to argue
>for treating them differently--to do so one would have to argue for a
>different evaluation of the acadmeic Marxist, i.e., other than evil. The
>point is that once one evaluates them as the same status, evil, one cannot
>possibly make a case for treating them differently.
I disagree, and Rand disagrees.
This is the primary reason why this whole 'reintroducing the measurements'
thing is nonsense. Have you read Bennet Karp's article? If not, I hope
that you will. Seeing this argument against reintroducing the measurements
presented carefully is sufficient to see why it is absurd. Karp's article
is worthless for any other purpose.
--Jimbo
Tom Radcliffe
point that to apply principles to concrete situations we must
``re-introduce the measurements.'' Allen claims his own position is that
we must treat all concretes as though they exist to the same degree,
and concludes that there is no difference in kind between the proper
response to a charging elephant and a charging mouse. He goes on to
claim that this still means we can distinguish between the two based on
the particular measurements.
But this is not what Allen means. Does his position mean we can treat
a charging mouse and a charging elephant differently? Allen grants the
premise that mice as such are small four-legged mammals, and then insists
that there is no difference between them an elephants. This means
Allen believes that _we_can_treat_a_charging_elephant_as_if_we_do_not_
need_to_run_from_it.
By this standard, concepts such as ``large'' and ``small'' become useless
abstractions, and Objectivists become small splats of red in the wake
of a charging pachyderm. There is no essential action we can take toward
all charging mammals, because some are big and some are small,
and Objectivists can't tell the difference. We are left with nothing to
guide our actions but the urging of our pre-rational hindbrains.
This is Allen's postion. He maintains that all instances of charging
mammals share an essential similarity, and we can perform the same
essential action towards all of them. To treat particular mammals as if
they were essentially identical is to declare concepts useless for
the living of human life.
[Note to the humour-impaired: the above is supposed to be a parody of
Allen's position, much as Allen parodies Kelley's position. -- tjr]
TONY_D...@delphi.com
> I think this is mistaken. In my understanding the problem with Kelley's
>position is that he thinks one must re-introduce measurements of evil,
>which is an evaluation, not a perceptual concrete. The similarity between
>Stalin and an academic Marxist (outside of their presumed common beliefs
>in Marxism) is their status as evil. Both are evil, in different degrees,
>but through the process of concept formation, I omit that measurement. In
>dealing with the abstraction evil, I act in a particular way. I don't
>re-introduce the measurements because to do so would break apart the process
>of abstarction that I made through developing my concept of evil.
for his criticisms of Kelley's position, and I'm glad to see *someone*
focusing on the issue he raised instead of trying to sidestep it.
My question for Kelley's supporters here is direct: CAN WE or CAN WE NOT
evaluate things which are fundamentally similar in a fundamentally similar
way? No one is arguing that the murderer and petty chiseler be evaluated
*identically*, but just as they are both evil, but in differing degree, so
too should you take the same *fundamental* kind of response to them -- ie,
not sanction them.
Objectivists uphold the principle that it is wrong to sanction evil -- which
means, to help it survive or grow by giving or trading values with it. Now,
should we apply that same fundamental principle in responding to evil of
*all* degrees, or not? If not, then what do you think warrants the original
classification of all these examples as evil to begin with? And if so, then
what is the purpose of Kelley's remarks on the subject?
Tony Donadio
Tom Radcliffe
|> t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca (Tom Radcliffe) writes:
[A parody. Get it? A parody. A joke. Designed to make Allen look silly (see
below.)]
|>
|> I think this is mistaken. In my understanding the problem with Kelley's
|> position is that he thinks one must re-introduce measurements of evil,
|> which is an evaluation, not a perceptual concrete. The similarity between
|> Stalin and an academic Marxist (outside of their presumed common beliefs
|> in Marxism) is their status as evil. Both are evil, in different degrees,
|> but through the process of concept formation, I omit that measurement. In
|> dealing with the abstraction evil, I act in a particular way. I don't
|> re-introduce the measurements because to do so would break apart the process
|> of abstarction that I made through developing my concept of evil.
Both a mouse and an elephant are mammals, of different sizes. But through
the process of concept formation, I omit that particular measurment. In
dealing with the abstraction of mammal, I act in a particular way. I don't
re-introduce the measurements because to do so would break apart the
process of abstraction that I made through developing my concept of mammal.
|> The reason Tom Randcliffe's analogy about the mouse and the elephant
^^^^
Very funny.
[Rest deleted. Go read about abstraction from abstractions, and then
tell me you don't have to re-introduce the measurements when dealing
with a particular instance of an abstract quality.]
James F. Hranicky
|> Eric Daniels <edd...@acad.drake.edu> writes:
|> Objectivists uphold the principle that it is wrong to sanction evil -- which
|> means, to help it survive or grow by giving or trading values with it. Now,
|> should we apply that same fundamental principle in responding to evil of
|> *all* degrees, or not? If not, then what do you think warrants the original
|> classification of all these examples as evil to begin with? And if so, then
|> what is the purpose of Kelley's remarks on the subject?
Given the fact that Second Renaissance books regularly sells books by
non-Objectivists, and points out all the problems in the books (except for the
fact that some are dyed-in-the-wool Libertarians); given the fact that Reisman
still has traffic with Hans Sennholz, devout Christian that he is (at least
he still did in September, according to _The Freeman_); given that Rand was
friends with Isabel Patterson...
"To be evil sometimes *is* to be evil." -- Leonard Peikoff.
Given all of the above, I have no idea what Objectivists are supposed to do
with evil...the above are examples of trafficking with it in one way or
another. On the one hand, whatever is a little evil is evil, yet here we
see SRB helping out these "a little evil" people by helping to generate
income for them.
I'm totally lost on where you guys are coming from. You tell me.
---------------
Jim Hranicky (j...@beach.cis.ufl.edu)
"You may be right, it's all a waste of time
I guess that's just a chance I'm prepared to take
A danger I'm prepared to face
Cut to the chase"
-- Rush
---------------
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>My thanks to Eric for this. Jay has been getting a lot of undeserved abuse
>for his criticisms of Kelley's position, and I'm glad to see *someone*
>focusing on the issue he raised instead of trying to sidestep it.
I have not sidestepped this issue, I have faced it head-on. Kelley
does not endorse the position attributed to him, and this is really
as much a non-issue as the claim that Kelley "endorses epiphenomenalism".
>My question for Kelley's supporters here is direct: CAN WE or CAN WE NOT
>evaluate things which are fundamentally similar in a fundamentally similar
>way?
Yes, we can.
> No one is arguing that the murderer and petty chiseler be evaluated
>*identically*, but just as they are both evil, but in differing degree, so
>too should you take the same *fundamental* kind of response to them -- ie,
>not sanction them.
Agreed, no one is arguing this, not Kelley, not me, not anyone. The
only argument here is a false attribution of this position to Kelley.
>Objectivists uphold the principle that it is wrong to sanction evil -- which
>means, to help it survive or grow by giving or trading values with it. Now,
>should we apply that same fundamental principle in responding to evil of
>*all* degrees, or not?
Yes, we do. We must not sanction evil.
> If not, then what do you think warrants the original
>classification of all these examples as evil to begin with? And if so, then
>what is the purpose of Kelley's remarks on the subject?
The purpose is precisely the same as Rand's purpose in her remarks on
the petty chiseller and the murderer. To point out that in applying
concepts, we may re-introduce measurements. And that to do so with
respect to moral issues is required. Therefore, there is a vast
degree of difference between a libertarian and Stalin.
This is a non-issue.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
following post, which was not precise at all. Here are some
corrections:
Tony Donadio writes:
>>My thanks to Eric for this. Jay has been getting a lot of undeserved abuse
>>for his criticisms of Kelley's position, and I'm glad to see *someone*
>>focusing on the issue he raised instead of trying to sidestep it.
I wrote:
>I have not sidestepped this issue, I have faced it head-on. Kelley
>does not endorse the position attributed to him, and this is really
>as much a non-issue as the claim that Kelley "endorses epiphenomenalism".
Tony:
>>My question for Kelley's supporters here is direct: CAN WE or CAN WE NOT
>>evaluate things which are fundamentally similar in a fundamentally similar
>>way?
Me:
>Yes, we can.
Tony:
>> No one is arguing that the murderer and petty chiseler be evaluated
>>*identically*, but just as they are both evil, but in differing degree, so
>>too should you take the same *fundamental* kind of response to them -- ie,
>>not sanction them.
Me:
>Agreed, no one is arguing this, not Kelley, not me, not anyone. The
>only argument here is a false attribution of this position to Kelley.
Ack! I was very unclear here. It is falsely said of Kelley that he
holds that we cannot take the same _fundamental_ kind of response to
various degrees of evil. We must not sanction evil. The only dispute
I am aware of here is that some people accuse Kelley of a position
he does not hold.
The only person I've seen fully endorse the position that murderers
and petty chisellers be evaluated identically was some poster a couple
of days ago, but I suspect that he was just unclear.
Tony:
>>Objectivists uphold the principle that it is wrong to sanction evil -- which
>>means, to help it survive or grow by giving or trading values with it. Now,
>>should we apply that same fundamental principle in responding to evil of
>>*all* degrees, or not?
Me:
>Yes, we do. We must not sanction evil.
Yes, we do? Ack. You didn't here as a 'do we or do we not' question,
so again I must chastize myself for being unclear. We should apply the
same fundamental principle in responding to evil of *all* degrees. (I.E.
not act to give evil aid and comfort.)
This does not mean that we can ever avoid the responsibility of making
more specific judgment about different degrees of evil. For example,
if my friend doesn't watch his health carefully, I should (using good
judgment and tact) let him know that I think he ought to do so. I
don't give aid and comfort to his bad habits in this way, and can still
deal with him in other contexts.
Tony:
>> If not, then what do you think warrants the original
>>classification of all these examples as evil to begin with? And if so, then
>>what is the purpose of Kelley's remarks on the subject?
Me:
>The purpose is precisely the same as Rand's purpose in her remarks on
>the petty chiseller and the murderer. To point out that in applying
>concepts, we may re-introduce measurements. And that to do so with
>respect to moral issues is required. Therefore, there is a vast
>degree of difference between a libertarian and Stalin.
>
>This is a non-issue.
I hope I caught this quickly enough to avoid too much confusion.
--Jimbo
Tom Radcliffe
|>
|> My question for Kelley's supporters here is direct: CAN WE or CAN WE NOT
|> evaluate things which are fundamentally similar in a fundamentally similar
|> way? No one is arguing that the murderer and petty chiseler be evaluated
|> *identically*, but just as they are both evil, but in differing degree, so
|> too should you take the same *fundamental* kind of response to them -- ie,
|> not sanction them.
|>
There are two different questions here, nicely conflated. One is: ``Can
we evaluate things which are fundamentally similar in a fundamentally
similar way?'' The other is: ``If we evaluate two things to be
fundamentally similar, does it follow that there must be an equally
fundamentally similar response to them?''
The answer to the first question is clearly yes (chorus: ``A is A.'') The
answer to the second question involves a degree of subtlety that is perhaps
overtaxing to the average Objectivist, but the answer is quite clearly no.
The difficulty here is with the notion of ``fundamental.'' Although I
think Rand often used the term ``fundamental'' with careful ambiguity,
to objectivists ``fundamentality'' is an epistemological quality, not
a metaphysical one. Thus, the degree to which we can say two things are
fundamentally similar depends on -- you guessed it -- context. A biologist,
contemplating a mouse and an elephant, may have good reason to treat them
as fundamentally similar things: mammals. And in that context she may
be justified in treating them in a fundamentally similar way: as objects
of study. But to someone being charged by an elephant the context is
quite different. To claim in this context that the biologist's fundamental
similarity holds, and that one can respond in a way fundamentally similar
to the way one would respond to a charging mouse, is to engage in context-
dropping of the worst kind. It leaves one in the grip of a particularly
bouyant floating abstraction.
ALLE...@delphi.com
the measurements." As Eric Daniels pointed out, measurement-omission is what
allows us to form a concept in the first place. So if we put the measure-
ments back in, we no longer have a concept. This is not a "false attribution"
of Kelley's position, but a literal interpretation.
Of course we still take the degree in which existents exist into account
when applying moral principles. But to call this "measurement re-introduction"
is, at best, a severe abuse of terminology--and it suggests to me that Kelley
doesn't know what he's talking about.
I ask Jimbo: Why are you clinging to this phrase with such veracity? Are either
you--or Kelley, for that matter--prepared to drop it in light of these
criticisms? And if so, why not?
Jay Allen
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
You answer your own question. To cling to a phrase with veracity is
to cling to it with truthfulness. I cling to it because it is correct,
and I am an honest man.
Did you mean tenacity? And what sort of motive did you SUPPOSE that
I have for it?
--Jimbo
ALLE...@delphi.com
and some answers to the objections I raised in my last post.
One last time: When one deals with particular things, one is not "reintro-
ducing the measurements." "Measurement-omission" refers to the act of
human consciousness which allows you to regard certain entities as units.
This allows you to form concepts.
WITHOUT MEASUREMENT-OMISSION, THERE IS NO CONCEPT.
One last time: NO ONE is saying that we do not take regard of degrees when
applying judgements. What I AM denying is that this can be labeled "reintro-
ducing the measurements." Tp literally "put the measurements back in"
is to lose the human perspective on concretes, and to eradicate the
conceptual level of consciousness. This is all made rather plain in
Bennett Karp's "ridiculous" article--I suggest that you read it.
Judging the particular identities of objects is not "reintroducing the
measurements"--it is _judgement_based_upon_the_perception_of_concretes_.
The most technical name you could possibly give to this is: looking at
reality.
Jay Allen
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
through it again.
Jay Allen writes:
>One last time: When one deals with particular things, one is not "reintro-
>ducing the measurements." "Measurement-omission" refers to the act of
>human consciousness which allows you to regard certain entities as units.
>This allows you to form concepts.
This is not accurate. According to Rand's theory, the regarding of
certain entities as units is a step in the process of concept formation
which is prior to measurement-omission. It would be more accurate to
say that the act of human consciousness in regarding certain entities
as units is what makes measurement omission possible.
See ITOE, pp. 5-18. See also OPAR, pp. 75-87.
Measurement omission is not, contrary to Jay's claim, the regarding of
entities from the unit perspective. Measurement-omission refers to
our mental process of retaining the characteristics, but omitting
their measurements on the 'some but any within a range' principle.
Jay, the fact that you are poorly versed in the Objectivist epistemology
is not in itself a problem. The only problem here is that you are willing
to make bold claims about the supposed errors of the greatest living
Objectivist philosopher, while simultaneously making novice mistakes
in your own presentation. If you wish to see Kelley's position attacked
effectively, I suggest that you leave this work to those who are more
capable.
Jay writes:
>One last time: NO ONE is saying that we do not take regard of degrees when
>applying judgements. What I AM denying is that this can be labeled "reintro-
>ducing the measurements." Tp literally "put the measurements back in"
>is to lose the human perspective on concretes, and to eradicate the
>conceptual level of consciousness. This is all made rather plain in
>Bennett Karp's "ridiculous" article--I suggest that you read it.
By all means, read Karp's article. His claims are false, but it should
be instructive to see the claims that he makes, and how he makes them.
I produce the relevant quote from ITOE:
"Thus, we he has formed or grasped the concept 'man,' he does not have to
regard every man he meets as a new phenomenon to be studied from scratch:
he identifies him as 'man' and applies to him knowledge he has acquired
about man (which leaves him free to study the particular, individual
characteristics of the newcomer, i.e., the individual measurements within
the categories established by the concept 'man')" (ITOE, 27-28.)
It is this last parenthetical phrase that Kelley refers to as
're-introducing the measurements'. Why is this appropriate terminology?
Read the following carefully:
When we form the concept 'chair' we omit certain measurements using
the some-but-any principle. (Relevant measurements omitted include
the kind of material the chair is made from, the exact shape of the
chair, etc.) In this way 'chair' refers to all items which meet a
set of criteria, i.e. whose measurements fall within a certain range.
When we apply a concept, we observe that some new phenomenon (a
'newcomer' in the Rand quote above) falls within the relevant range
of measurements. As such, we know a great deal about the existent
qua instance of the concept. Measurement omission refers to the
'some but any' nature of conceptual identifications. Measurement
reintroduction refers to taking note of the "particular, individual
characteristics of the newcomer, i.e., the individual measurements
within the categories established by the concept 'man.'"
I want to quote a passage from Karp's essay here, and then apply
exactly the same technique Karp uses to a passage from Rand.
"Observe Kelley's application of this idea to moral judgment. 'Even
if we accepted the premise that libertarianism as such is a vice,
there would be a vast difference of degree betwen libertarians and
a regime that has the blood of millions on its hands.' (Kelley,
QOS.) Having identified two instances of evil, libertarianism and
communism, we are, according to Kelley, unable to apply anything that
we know about one to the other." (Bennet Karp, "Reintroducing the
Measurements: An Old Fallacy with a New Name")
O.k., let's give the same treatment to Rand. "Unless one is...
willing to regard a petty chiseller and a murderer as morally
equal, one still has to judge and evaluate the many shadings of
'gray' that one may encounter in the characters of individual
men." ("The Cult of Moral Grayness, VOS, 76.) Using Karp's
method: 'Having identified two instances of evil, petty chiselling
and murder, we are, according to Rand, unable to apply anything
that we know about one to the other.'
Obviously, this is not what Rand is saying, and there is nothing in
her words to justify such a claim. Similarly, Kelley has NEVER
asserted in ANY FORM that "any knowledge about the class need not
apply to the concretes" and furthermore the very best evidence that
Karp is able to produce does not even begin to support his claim.
Therefore, his essay contains an arbitrary leap that is unjustified.
This is a non-issue, and may be properly dismissed. I put it at the
same level of reasonability as Jay Allen's now thoroughly discredited
false claim that Kelley is an epiphenomenalist.
--Jimbo
Tom Radcliffe
|> t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca (Tom Radcliffe) writes:
|> >
|> > the context in which that particular is being evaluated determines what
|> > measurements are appropriate to re-introduce. Evil is an abstraction: no
|> > one simply commits ``evil'' (except in fairy tales.) They commit some
|> > specific action, and it is THAT ACTION that we must evaluate.
|>
|> Tom, (or Jimbo, as this might apply equally to your post)
|> How then do you evaluate the character of the person committing the
|> act, or do you? What about evasion? You are very clear about evil actions
|> (by which I must assume you mean physical acts), but what about intellectual
|> evil? Do you or do you not consider evasion itself to be evil? Is it the
|> source of the evil actions or not? (assuming you do think that it is ideas
|> that precede actions)
|>
Someone who sits about thinking nasty thoughts may well be evil in an
as-yet-to-be-defined technical sense, but they are of no interest to
me. I need not judge them and I do not know how I would. Ever see the
film ``Witness''? There is a scene in which and old Amish man asks
his grandson how he proposes to tell good men from evil, can he look
into their hearts? The little boy replies, ``I know what they do.''
There is a conection between ideas and actions, and I agree one should
try to factor in intent (i.e. evasion vs. honest error) but for the most
part I just don't get this fascination with trying to judge people according
to the inner workings of their minds, which are by-and-large inaccessible,
at least to me. Perhaps members of the herd are mind-readers.
|> > Simply evaluting it as evil tells us very litte about what we should do,
|>
|> Doesn't it tell us not to sanction the evil person? I thought I
|> covered this in my last post, to which neither you nor Jimbo has responded.
|> If this is something you contend, please address the questions I raised in
|> my previous post.
|>
|> > any more than evaluating a charging animal as a mammal tells us much about
|> > what we should do.
|>
|> Why do you persist to use this analogy? One does not *evaluate*
|> something as a mammal, one *identifies* it. To subsume a new concrete under
|> an established concept is not evaluation, it is identification. As such, the
|> evaluating involved in the mouse/elephant example is of the potential harm,
|> from which I yield two very different evaluations. In evaluating the
|> academic Marxist and Stalin I evaluate both as evil; the same evaluation.
|> I also evaluate certain Libertarians as the same, evil. All three are guilty
|> of the same *fundamental* error, evasion. All three advocate a political system
|> which is arrived at *in spite of the facts*, that is, through evasion. As
|> such, I deal with each in the same manner, I refuse sanction, whether it be
|> monetary, political, or especially *intellectual*.
|> Because Stalin took particular actions which were in violation of
|> individual rights, it was proper to take specific action against him, which
|> would not be necessitated in the case of the academic Marxist. However, even
|> if Stalin had not murdered thousands, and instead had simply advocated a
|> political system by which such action would be taken, he is equally guilty
|> of evasion, and thus would have been evil all the same. If this were the case,
|> I would still refuse him sanction.
I persist in this analogy because it makes people like Allen look stupid,
which is surely an act of justice. I don't see that the distinction you
are trying to draw between indentification and evalution is a valid one,
and I disagree with the claim that we can *respond* in a similar way to
things that are similar *at some level of abstraction*, unless that
response understood to be at the *same* level of abstraction. We are
arguing here about the specific acts of a specific human being: David
Kelley. He gave a talk to some libertarians, and for this was kicked
out of the herd. To many of us, this clearly demonstrates that the people
responsible for excomunicating him are living in a world of floating
abstractions, unable to apply the principle of non-sanction intelligently
to the real, concrete world. I am not an objectivist of *any* kind, but
I admire Kelley and have been influence by some of his work on abstraction,
and that any organization purporting to be interested in furthering our
understanding of philosophy should refuse to deal with him strikes me
as ridiculous.
Furthermore, like Jimmy, I am getting more than a little fed up with
arguing these issues with people who seem to be either mentally deficient
or willfully ignorant. If this post seems hostile, I ask Mr. Daniels
to not take it too personally, as most of my hostility is directed towards
others.
|>
|> *******
|> (from here, I will try to flesh out what I think is the fundamental problem
|> in this issue. This is not by any means an official statement of any
|> position but my own. Since I do not claim omniscience, I leave open the
|> possibility that some of this may need revision. I am putting this out in
|> the hopes that it will illuminate some issues and give rise to a more
|> fruitful discussion. ED)
|>
|> I think some confusion may be arising from the difference between
|> evaluation and identification. When one encounters a particular concrete,
|> it is necessary to identify it, which is a purely epistemological endeavor.
|> Evil, as Jimbo I think points out, is not as such an epistemological concept,
|> it is a moral concept. However, this is where the confusion begins. Once one
|> has identified a concrete, one must also evaluate it. This is a moral
|> endeavor, and it is where good and evil come in. After subsuming enough
|> instances of actions that are contrary to the process by which man survives,
|> whether or not I have at this point identified that it is man's mind that
|> is his tool of survival, I can still see the dramatic consequences of many
|> actions, and it is possible to form the concept evil, as a tool for evaluating.
This strikes me as simply unintelligable. What is the difference between
identification and evaluation? What is evalution but identification at
a different level of abstraction than the original one? Is there any
valid basis for treating discrimination at one level of abstraction as
different from discrimination at any other, for that is what your claims
seem to entail?
Identification of actions along axes of moral measurment might be worth
its own term, I suppose, but it is important to remember there is no
difference in kind between the actions you propose above as being in
the two categories of identification and evaluation. As such, I see
no real need to distinguish between the two, the question we've been
discussing lately -- re-introduction of measurements -- is equally
relevant to all axes is of similarity. If you understood that, you
would understand the relevance of my mouse vs. elephant example.
alle...@news.delphi.com
>--Jimbo
I will post the message to which Jimbo has replied below, so that you
may judge for yourself how well he has answered my objection. Since
Jimbo's position on this question seems to be, "I can use words in
whatever way I want," I will no longer diligantly seek an answer from
him.--JAA
***********
alle...@news.delphi.com
passage from OPAR:
"As far as perceptual awareness is concerned, there may be nothing the
same in the concretes of a given concept. Individual men, for instance,
vary, or can vary, in every respect one can name: height, weight, color,
fingerprints, intelligence, and so on. We perceive many similiarities
among men, but nothing identical in all cases. Yet, when we reach the
concept 'man,' we are treating men not asmore or less similiar, but in
some way as identical: as equally, interchangeably, members of the group.
This is inherent in creating a single unit to denote every member of the
species. How is this possible? Exactly what and where is the 'manness'
that is alleged to inhere in all of us?" (80)
The basic level on which we recognize similiarity--the level which makes
the rest of concept-formation possible--is the unit-perspective. It allows
us to recognize the similiarities in objects by allowing us to _abstract_
_attributes_from_their_measurements_. Without this, our mind would be
bogged down by the innumerable differences existing between concrete
things, and no identification of similiars would be possible.
You do not need measurement-omission just to make concepts open-ended--you
need it in order to have concepts _at_all_. THIS is Ayn Rand's
revolutionary defense of the conceptual level of consciousness. Without
it, human knowledge is open to attack by mystics and subjectivists from
all corners.
This is the context that Bennett had when he wrote his article on Kelley-
-and it the context that Wales lacks when he rails against my "now
thoroughly discredited false ideas" about Objectivist epistemology. Check
your premises, Mr. Wales.
Jay Allen
Eric Johnson
>Jimbo, quoting Kelley:
>>> [...] there is a vast degree of difference between a libertarian and
>>> Stalin.
>Eric Johnson:
>>I'm curious. Does Jimmy see them as similar in any way? And if so,
>>in what way are they similar? I believe the answer to this might be
>>quite interesting.
>Some libertarians (Murry Rothbard comes to mind) give an essentially
>subjectivist argument for free markets.
I did not ask what similarity there was between some libertarians and
Stalin. I asked what the similarity is between a libertarian, a
libertarian as such, and Stalin.
-Eric
--
Eric E Johnson
ejoh...@netcom.netcom.com
Jack R. Tallent
>
>Given the fact that Second Renaissance books regularly sells books by
>non-Objectivists, and points out all the problems in the books (except for the
>fact that some are dyed-in-the-wool Libertarians); given the fact that Reisman
>still has traffic with Hans Sennholz, devout Christian that he is (at least
>he still did in September, according to _The Freeman_); given that Rand was
>friends with Isabel Patterson...
>
A person or work can be good without being perfect.
Jack Tallent
alle...@news.delphi.com
>In article <19940204.202731...@delphi.com>,
>TONY_D...@delphi.com wrote:
>> The regarding of entities from a unit-perspective (not "as units") is NOT
>> prior to measurement-omission; measurement omission is the *means* by which
>> we regard them so. This is an absolutely *crucial* point. Without it, Ob-
>> jectivism would simply reduce to a form of subjectivism; what then would be
>> the Objective basis warranting our classifications in the first place?
>>
>> We form concepts on the basis of observing similarities and differences
>> among concretes -- or integration and differentiation, respectively.
>> Measurement omission is an integral part of this process, which would not
>> be possible without it. When we regard two sticks, say, as *similar* in
>> length (in contrast to a third), we are performing a process of measure-
>> ment omission by that very act; if we were not, we would have no objective
>> grounds on which to regard them as similar to begin with.
>I could be just being hasty, but you appear to contradict yourself.
>"When we regard two sticks..." Two what? Two units, right? Two units of the
>concept stick. This is observed first, and then their similarity comes
>later. You say, "Look, two sticks. I see they are similar in length." You
>don't very well say, "Ah, I perceive similarity in length here...let me
>see...ah, I see it's two sticks." The units are prior to an abstraction
>regarding them. I think you and Jimbo both agree on this, you're just
>misreading him. This is why it's a non-issue, and it's gone on long enough.
When Tony calls the objects "two sticks," he is doing so out of
convenience. We already know they are two sticks--we have a;lready formed
the concept--so why not call a spade a spade? Tony's--and
Objectivism's--wider point is that, if measurement-omission is not the
means to the unit--perspective, then the unit-perspective is some mystical
method of just "intuiting" similiarities. To leave the base of
concept-formation so blatantly unexplained and undefended opens up human
knowledge to attacks by mystics and subjectivists from all corners.
When people blithely say that measurement-omission does not refer to the
unit-perspective, it is evidence that they have not yet grasped the
radical importance of Ayn Rand's theory of concept-formation.
>Also, you ask what would be the objective basis warranting our
>classifications in the first place. Objectivity is always contextual. There
>is no "best" way to integrate the universe, that's intrinsicism and a
>Platonic fallacy. My art definition can be different than yours, but they
>may be the best for our individual existential context. There is
>objectively more than one way to skin a cat (credit Will Wilkinson there).
>This is why demands for conformity to an official Objectivist(tm) position
>are silly and in contradiction with many underlying principles in ITOE.
I can't hold back here. THIS is the crux of the entire issue. THIS is why
Kelleyism often seems so attractive to many: because Kelley and his crew
do such a fantastic job of distorting and misinterpreting Objectivist
philosophers. While there are such things as objective definitions for man
_qua_ man, it is also true that definitions must change with context. But
this isn't a Kelleyite discovery! This is covered EXTENSIVELY by Peikoff
in his course "Understanding Objectivism," and it is also hinted at in
Chapter Three of OPAR.
Also, the phrase "official Objectivist position" is a complex strawman
courtesy of the Kelleyites. In a sense, there is an official Objectivist
position: it is the philosophy of Ayn Rand, in all its integrated
splendor. But does this mean that, to be an Objectivist, you have to like
the same foods, music, colors, and people that Ayn Rand liked? Of course
not! Again, Peikoff covers this in-depth in "Understanding Objectivism,"
even offering examples of the many things that he and Ayn Rand disagreed on.
For some random Kelleyite to pass this off as his "discovery" is the
height of intellectual dishonesty.
Betsy Speicher has had a lot to say about "Randroids"--those people whose
religious view of values makes them accept Objectivism on faith. Randroids
always end up rejecting Objectivism because, not having taken the time to
understand it, they find it "constraining" and "dogmatic." The numerous
intrincicist (read: religious) Kelleyite misinterpretations of Peikoff and
Schwartz suggests a similiarity: it suggests that most Kelleyites were at
one point Randroids. At bare minimum, it is certain proof that Kelley and
his ilk have never grasped the concept "objectivity."
Jay Allen
Tom Radcliffe
[deleted]
|>
|> Betsy Speicher has had a lot to say about "Randroids"--those people whose
|> religious view of values makes them accept Objectivism on faith. Randroids
|> always end up rejecting Objectivism because, not having taken the time to
|> understand it, they find it "constraining" and "dogmatic." The numerous
|> intrincicist (read: religious) Kelleyite misinterpretations of Peikoff and
|> Schwartz suggests a similiarity: it suggests that most Kelleyites were at
|> one point Randroids. At bare minimum, it is certain proof that Kelley and
|> his ilk have never grasped the concept "objectivity."
|>
The difficulty with this particular inference (most people associated
with David Kelley and the IOS were at one point ``Randroids'' -- people
who believe Rand dogmatically in all things) is that if you look at
on-line discussions of objectivism, the most open, critical and
intelligent one is run by Jimmy Wales, who is associated with IOS.
Not at all the behaviour you would expect from blinkered dogmatists,
now, is it?
Perhaps the Latin scholars out there can find some etemological
conection between ``Objectivism'' and ``non sequitar.'' They seem
quite closely related here.
cwo...@delphi.com
>Betsy Speicher has had a lot to say about "Randroids"--those people whose
>religious view of values makes them accept Objectivism on faith. Randroids
>always end up rejecting Objectivism because, not having taken the time to
>understand it, they find it "constraining" and "dogmatic." The numerous
>intrincicist (read: religious) Kelleyite misinterpretations of Peikoff and
>Schwartz suggests a similiarity: it suggests that most Kelleyites were at
>one point Randroids. At bare minimum, it is certain proof that Kelley and
>his ilk have never grasped the concept "objectivity."
>
>Jay Allen
is NOT a chimpanzee...