If I saw a drowning Objectivist...
KRESSJA
Ayn Rand's larder:
"To illustrate this on [sic] the altruists' favorite example: the issue
of saving a drowning person. [sic] If the person to be saved is a stranger,
it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one's own life
is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it:
only a lack of self-esteem could permit one to value one's life no
higher than that of any random stranger."
This strikes me as an exemplary case of the pettiness I often find in
Objectivist doctrines. Such low calculations as to one's own safety
seem both cowardly and slavish. I submit that self-sacrifice does not
always stem from altruistic motivations: take the case of Socrates as
an example. Socrates chose death rather than to change his ways and
fawn before the Athenian jury. On the contrary, he provoked the
jury to sentence him to death by announcing that they, not he, were
on trial, and that he would judge them according to their display of
justice. Hence, he died.
It strikes me a quite obvious that a contempt for death and petty fears
of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
Zarathustra says it well:
"I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and returns
none: for he always gives away and does not want to preserve himself."
What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
to die well, and at the right time.
I expect that I will now be told that Objectivist's believe that perishing
for one's own values is not *sacrifice*; to head it off, I am aware of this
teaching. All I wish to bring attention to is the ignoble risk-assessment
that Objectivism preaches in the face of danger.
What do other a.p.o.'ers think?
-Kressja
P.S. I *have* actually saved the life of a drowning woman, so I can speak
to this issue from personal experience as well as philosophical rumination.
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "God is a gross answer, an indelicacy against us thinkers-- |
| | at bottom merely a gross prohibition for us: you shall not |
| | think!" |
| | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
Robert J. Kolker
Would you have jumped in to save the drowning women, if you
did not know how to swim?
Conan the Libertarian
--
"If you can't love the Constitution, then at least hate the Government"
Anders G|ransson
Zarathustra says it well:
"I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and returns
none: for he always gives away and does not want to preserve himself."
What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
to die well, and at the right time.
hear, hear! Follow Nietzsche and choose the right time and the
right way to die...eh, eh... well never mind...go see a Wagner opera
instead...or read a little Holderlin; "The god is near but hard
to grasp"...dream away...put on your imaginary helmet get a hold
on your Philological sword...we wont give in to a false
interpretation...we will fight to the last word ...the last
'etymologia'... the last academic argument...fear death by a poker
...ahhh there I was hit in the 'kardia'... Hail Nietzsche: we'll meat
in the last academic sunset...Twilight on the 'tomos' of
Holderlin...Gotterdammerung
--
'Wossat noise?'
The bleedin' wind under the door.
'Wossat noise now, squire? Wosse wind doing?'
Nuffink agint nuffink.
William Brocklehurst
Could you seriously watch someone drown ? I would not attempt only if
the situation meant CERTAIN death. I consider myself a rational being and
full of self-interest, but the risk would have to be extreme for me not to
attempt a rescue. No amount of rationalization and analysis would get the
image out of my head if I sat by and watched.
just my 2 cents un-backed by gold
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
You stay in your village, and I will stay in mine.
If your sheep come to eat our grass, we will kill you.
We may kill you anyway to get your grass for our sheep if we run short.
Anyone who tries to make us change our ways is a witch, and we will kill him.
Stay out of our village.
"The Neolithic Ethic" -- formulated by anthropologist Carleton S. Coon
quoted from "Confrontation in Space" by G. Harry Stine
William W. Brocklehurst wbro...@uceng.uc.edu
University of Cincinnati
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tyr...@maple.circa.ufl.edu
>Glancing at "The Ethics of Emergencies," I discovered this jewel from
>Ayn Rand's larder:
>
>"To illustrate this on [sic] the altruists' favorite example: the issue
>of saving a drowning person. [sic] If the person to be saved is a stranger,
>it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one's own life
>is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it:
>only a lack of self-esteem could permit one to value one's life no
>higher than that of any random stranger."
>
>This strikes me as an exemplary case of the pettiness I often find in
>Objectivist doctrines. Such low calculations as to one's own safety
>seem both cowardly and slavish.
Is the principle that one should not sacrifice one's own life
*petty*? Is the idea that the moral justification for one's life is not
based upon service to others *low*? If you think so, then you probably
accept the moral code of altruism.
Rand's conception of morality is virtually unprecedented in
history. Altruism is hard to rid onesself of. Work on it.
(Mr. Kress continues)
I submit that self-sacrifice does not
>always stem from altruistic motivations: take the case of Socrates as
>an example. Socrates chose death rather than to change his ways and
>fawn before the Athenian jury. On the contrary, he provoked the
>jury to sentence him to death by announcing that they, not he, were
>on trial, and that he would judge them according to their display of
>justice. Hence, he died.
The morality of a decision such as that which Socrates made
depends upon the achievments which are possible to one with the remainder
of one's life. Socrates was so old that he wouldn't have lived long had
he fled.
It is interesting to note that Aristotle faced a similar decision
and fled. Is their different morality mere coincidence?
(Mr. Kress continues)
>What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
>to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
>own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
>overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
>to die well, and at the right time.
There are two different issues in this paragraph. (1) To make *my
own life* te standard of value is to accept egoism. To make the lives
others ones standard of value is to accept altruism.
(2) One cannot resent a metaphysical fact. Death from old age is
to die well (as you say), but whether or not death while trying to save
a complete stranger is "at the right time" depends upon which moral code
you accept.
--Tyrone T. Bongard
Scott T. Schad
When you submit that 'self-sacrifice' does not always stem from altruism, you are counting on us to forget the definitions of altruism, self and sacrifice.
Self is the identity of a person, his personality. Sacrifice is the giving up of a higher value for a lesser value. Altruism is the sacrifice of self to others. Any sacrifice of self properly falls within the scope of the term altruism. You can not simply equate self=life, nor sacrifice=preservation, in order to put a different face on your argument.
The choice of death by Socrates was not a sacrifice: life on his own terms was of higher value to him than life on other's terms. The goal of Objectivism is also not life on any terms, but life consistent with rational, long-term, objective goals.
Your arguments rest on the premise that a person's worth can only be measured by his level of sacrifice to others. Your quote from Zarathustra makes this premise quite clear:
"I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and returns
none: for he always gives away and does not want to preserve himself."
--this is the ultimate sacrifice, the immolation of self, the pinnacle of altruism. If this is the ideal mindset, why even bring a drowning woman into the picture? Why not simply kill yourself and not bother others about it? The fact that you have to bring others into it starkly reveals a morality based purely on sacrifice, which is diametrically opposed to the basis of Objectivism.
There will forever be comparisons between Rand and Nietzsche. Some people will dismiss Rand as a dressed-up Nietzsche, others will dismiss Nietzsche as a less-sophisticated Rand. Both comparisons are in error because they ignore the opposite premises each philosopher starts from. Rand is not Nietzsche: her philosophy is rational.
<STS>
KRESSJA
>John,
>
> Would you have jumped in to save the drowning women, if you
> did not know how to swim?
No, because that wouldn't have presented itself to me a possibility of which
I was capable, no more than it would occur to me to attempt to undertake any
project which required a skill which I lack.
The question, it seems to me, is the following: when one grasps an
emergency situation, and grasps what one might do about it, then ought
one to engage in a little calculation to check whether one should do
anything?
It troubles me that Rand seems to think that courage and generosity (virtues
which are undoubtedly required to attempt such a rescue) stem from a
"lack of self-esteem." I'm sure that it would be of great comfort to the
friends and family of the drowned man, if one were to explain that one
could have saved him, but that one is an adherent of Objectivism and that
since one didn't know him, he wasn't of enough value to one's life to save.
It also troubles me that Rand has erected a situation in which virtue is
indistinguishable from cowardice.
-Kressja
KRESSJA
>In article <19FEB199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>, John Kress writes:
>
>>Glancing at "The Ethics of Emergencies," I discovered this jewel from
>>Ayn Rand's larder:
>>
>>"To illustrate this on [sic] the altruists' favorite example: the issue
>>of saving a drowning person. [sic] If the person to be saved is a stranger,
>>it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one's own life
>>is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it:
>>only a lack of self-esteem could permit one to value one's life no
>>higher than that of any random stranger."
>>
>>This strikes me as an exemplary case of the pettiness I often find in
>>Objectivist doctrines. Such low calculations as to one's own safety
>>seem both cowardly and slavish.
> Is the principle that one should not sacrifice one's own life
>*petty*?
In many circumstances, to live at all cost is indeed petty.
Is the idea that the moral justification for one's life is not
>based upon service to others *low*?
I didn't say it is.
>If you think so, then you probably
>accept the moral code of altruism.
I don't. Read closely my preachy little Objectivist.
> Rand's conception of morality is virtually unprecedented in
>history. Altruism is hard to rid onesself of. Work on it.
Try again Grasshopper: go read some Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Marcus
Aurelius, Machiavelli, Montaigne, and Nietzsche.
>(Mr. Kress continues)
>I submit that self-sacrifice does not
>>always stem from altruistic motivations: take the case of Socrates as
>>an example. Socrates chose death rather than to change his ways and
>>fawn before the Athenian jury. On the contrary, he provoked the
>>jury to sentence him to death by announcing that they, not he, were
>>on trial, and that he would judge them according to their display of
>>justice. Hence, he died.
> The morality of a decision such as that which Socrates made
>depends upon the achievments which are possible to one with the remainder
>of one's life. Socrates was so old that he wouldn't have lived long had
>he fled.
Gorgias the sophist lived to the age of 109. Socrates was 70. With luck,
that would give him 39 years: long enough for you?
> It is interesting to note that Aristotle faced a similar decision
>and fled. Is their different morality mere coincidence?
Aristotle was not an Athenian. His life was not bound to the _polis_ in
the same way the Socrates' was.
>(Mr. Kress continues)
>>What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
>>to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
>>own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
>>overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
>>to die well, and at the right time.
> There are two different issues in this paragraph. (1) To make *my
>own life* te standard of value is to accept egoism. To make the lives
>others ones standard of value is to accept altruism.
Bifurcation.
> (2) One cannot resent a metaphysical fact. Death from old age is
>to die well (as you say), but whether or not death while trying to save
>a complete stranger is "at the right time" depends upon which moral code
>you accept.
I refer you to Dostoyevski's _Notes from the Underground_ for a case in
point of the resentment of facts, "metaphysical" or otherwise.
-Kressja
Todd Hoff
Schad) writes:
|>
|> Self is the identity of a person, his personality. Sacrifice is the
|> giving up of a higher value for a lesser value. Altruism is the
|> sacrifice of self to others. Any sacrifice of self properly falls
|> self=life, nor sacrifice=preservation, in order to put a different face
|> on your argument.
Please sacrifice a little and turn off word wrap! That is, if netmanners
have
any value to you...
Your definition of sacrifice rests on the definition of value which is
dependent on ones identity/self. Each self defines what is of value
differently, unless you believe in some All-Self, oracle of correct
valuation.
Oh, I forgot that would be miss Anne herself... :-)
Without doubt a value system which encourages people not to save others
in trouble
is repugnant to just about every person i've talked to. It's likley
there is
an evolutionary basis for sacrifice, not your fabricated enemy of
Altruism.
Saying "altruism is the sacrifice of self to others" is an odd
characterization
of selfhood. It is life being sacrificed in the harmony of self, not the
self's destruction.
How can self-ness leak away as air in a punctured tire? Why must you
hoard
your self as a miser stashing money under a mattress? Perhaps if you
invested
your value the return would be more than you could ever lose through
a little sacrifice...
--
Todd Hoff
David N Monack
KRESSJA <kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> wrote:
>Glancing at "The Ethics of Emergencies," I discovered this jewel from
>Ayn Rand's larder:
>
>"To illustrate this on [sic] the altruists' favorite example: the issue
>of saving a drowning person. [sic] If the person to be saved is a stranger,
>it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one's own life
>is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it:
>only a lack of self-esteem could permit one to value one's life no
>higher than that of any random stranger."
>
>This strikes me as an exemplary case of the pettiness I often find in
>Objectivist doctrines. Such low calculations as to one's own safety
>seem both cowardly and slavish.
The important phrase in the above quote is "when danger is great".
That means, don't try to save a stranger if you will get killed yourself
in the process. This is not as controvertial a doctrine as you seem
to suggest. In fact, the Talmud recommends the same exact thing.
If someone is to die, let it be someone else. I lived by this belief
long before I ever heard of Rand. If you think I am a coward, so be it.
--
David Monack mon...@gas.uug.arizona.edu
"Literature is the memory of humanity." -Isaac Bishevis Singer
KRESSJA
>In article <19FEB199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>,
>KRESSJA <kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> wrote:
>>Glancing at "The Ethics of Emergencies," I discovered this jewel from
>>Ayn Rand's larder:
>>
>>"To illustrate this on [sic] the altruists' favorite example: the issue
>>of saving a drowning person. [sic] If the person to be saved is a stranger,
>>it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one's own life
>>is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it:
>>only a lack of self-esteem could permit one to value one's life no
>>higher than that of any random stranger."
>>
>>This strikes me as an exemplary case of the pettiness I often find in
>>Objectivist doctrines. Such low calculations as to one's own safety
>>seem both cowardly and slavish.
>
>The important phrase in the above quote is "when danger is great".
>
>That means, don't try to save a stranger if you will get killed yourself
>in the process. This is not as controvertial a doctrine as you seem
Do not equivocate "great danger" with "certain death." Rand does NOT say,
do not attempt to save another when it would result in one's death. I
would certainly consider that irrational. The question is one of one's
being able to make a difference, but not without some risk.
-Kressja
KRESSJA
Scott T. Shad needs to learn how to use his editor:
Since I can't reproduce your text, Mr. Shad, a few remarks:
1. slavery: I am sorry that you are unfamiliar with philosophical discourse,
and hence, with the notion of slavery as it applies to the condition of
the human soul.
2. The hierarchy of values: did I or did I not tell you in my post not to
tell me what you told me, since I know it? Ye gods. My point is that
there are a number of non-altruistic values which can cause one to risk
one's life, viz. courage and generosity.
3. Nietzsche as an ultimate expression of altruistic values: ROTFL!!!
HA HA HA HAHAHAHAHAHA!!!!!! I can't stand it! I suppose that you think
that Ayn Rand is also an advocate of altruism? I suggest knowing something
about that of which you speak. Nietzsche an altruist...heh heh heh...
-Kressja
Mark A. Peter
[...]
: It strikes me a quite obvious that a contempt for death and petty fears
: of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
: reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
: to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
Under what circumstances, by your argument, would it be morally proper to
not risk one's life? Or is risking one's life to be an end in itself, a
noble pursuit, such that one should relish any opportunity to do so?
Miss Rand makes her valuation clear: one's own life is worth more than
that of a stranger. What is yours? That dying for something that means
little to you is more valuble than living? Or that anything which
presents you with an opportunity for death is necessarily good? The
examples you give suggest that you equate placing value on one's own life
with petty fears *in all cases*.
I will point out that Miss Rand notes the possibility (and demonstrates
with examples in her fiction) that there are things worth dying
for--things without which the value of one's life is erased.
: Zarathustra says it well:
: "I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and returns
: none: for he always gives away and does not want to preserve himself."
And you agree with this? I submit that this quote is a distilled
statement of death worship and self-hatred.
: What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
: to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
: own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
: overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
: to die well, and at the right time.
: I expect that I will now be told that Objectivist's believe that perishing
: for one's own values is not *sacrifice*; to head it off, I am aware of this
: teaching. All I wish to bring attention to is the ignoble risk-assessment
: that Objectivism preaches in the face of danger.
And your view is that one should *not* assess the risk? That one should
regard one's life as a complete zero in such a situation?
: What do other a.p.o.'ers think?
: -Kressja
: P.S. I *have* actually saved the life of a drowning woman, so I can speak
: to this issue from personal experience as well as philosophical rumination.
I would do the same. I'm a good swimmer and I trust myself in the
water. Would you enter a burning building to save a stranger if you had
every reason to believe that the building would collapse and kill you
before you could make it back out?
--
Mark Peter
mpe...@netcom.com
S. Lacher
to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
Oh really? So, what you are saying is that, to you, one man's life is of
equal value to you as another? Including your own? EQUAL value? Does
that mean that if I had no place to live you would let me stay at your
place? If I were hungry I could eat your last piece of bread? That if I
was cold I could have your jacket?
The point Ayn Rand makes is this - your life, your OWN life, is the only
'right' you have - the only 'undeniable' you are born with. It belongs
to you. It is up to you to do with it as you choose. That is the price
of being an individual - you have the power and sole responsibility for
the quality of your own life.
Now does this mean that we shouldn't help that guy treading water in the
lake? The answer to that is also simple, and can be found in the Ethics
of Emergencies chapter in VOS. Generally speaking, where it doesn't harm
you it is 'nice' to be generous to people - to give directions to people
who are lost, etc. There's a term for this Rand uses that I don't recall
exactly, but it is something on the order of 'extending kindness in the
desire of cultivating a general conviviality among men'. What this DOES
also mean is that such decisions, to be moral, must be made by rational
judgement.
Some people are obviously of more value to a particualr person than
another - would you rather buy me lunch or your mother? Given the choice
between sitting in a movie theater with your best friend, or me, an
abject stranger - who would you pick? Just because I am human and alive
doesn't mean I have the same impact and value in your life as a close
friend or relative. Don't you see that such ideas as you have expressed
in your previous post are collectivist, and actually de-humanize man -
making us like bugs, all identical, of equal value to one another?
Yes, in an emergency where I can help without making the IMMORAL
sacrifice of my own life I will. But that's because I am a nice guy -
it's not a moral choice. Your life, and your choices belong to you, and
you alone.
Live for yourself, there's no one else more with living for - Rush
-Steven A. Lacher
William Brocklehurst
to collapse. What about firemen though ? They do it everyday. I don't
think their salary is high enough to say they do it for the money only and
I'm sure you (and I) would be quite thankful if the stranger in question
was you (or me). I am really asking a question and not arguing; I can't seem
to come to a conclusion. I don't think that I'm detached enough to say
"oh, yeah, thanks, but it's your job so what do you want: a medal ?" to the
fireman who saves me. I believe I would be kissing his boots.
Robert J. Kolker
>Glancing at "The Ethics of Emergencies," I discovered this jewel from
>Ayn Rand's larder:
>"To illustrate this on [sic] the altruists' favorite example: the issue
>of saving a drowning person. [sic] If the person to be saved is a stranger,
>it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one's own life
>is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it:
>only a lack of self-esteem could permit one to value one's life no
>higher than that of any random stranger."
>This strikes me as an exemplary case of the pettiness I often find in
>Objectivist doctrines. Such low calculations as to one's own safety
>seem both cowardly and slavish. I submit that self-sacrifice does not
>always stem from altruistic motivations: take the case of Socrates as
>an example. Socrates chose death rather than to change his ways and
>fawn before the Athenian jury. On the contrary, he provoked the
>jury to sentence him to death by announcing that they, not he, were
>on trial, and that he would judge them according to their display of
>justice. Hence, he died.
A similar occassion arose with R. Akiba who confronted and defied
Roman authority. The Roman's had outlawed the teaching of Torah
as an act of sedition. R. Akiba, for whom the Torah was the very
essence of his life, broke the ban and was flayed alive for it.
As he died, he said to his students that he was glad that he could
carry out the central commandment to love G-D with all ones strength.
From Akiba's point of view the confrontation and martyrdom was *not*
a sacrifice, it was an affirmation of R. Akiba's highest values.
Lest you think Akiba was an altruist (G-D forbid) in a dispute with
R. Ben Peturah about two men in the desert having only enought water
for one. If neither drinks both die. If both drink both die. If one
drinks, he lives the other dies. Ben Peturah argued niether
should drink. Akiba argued one should drink since the command was
to love your neighbor *as* one self, not more not less. Akiba said
"is your neighbor's blood redder than yours, let one drink and live.
Why should death have two, when it only requires one?"
R. Hillel also said:
If I am not for myself who is for me?
If I am only for myself what am I?
If not now, when?
....rest deleted.....
ming of mongo
would not trade mine for another. Risk, maybe, but not trade.
As a risk, I weighed the possibility of my death, against the pleasure I
would get by preserving life. (I did not debate this at the time, I
trained myself to react that way)
I do not value my life less than that of a stranger. Risking
death is not death.
Tom Radcliffe
|> In article <CLH40...@world.std.com>, r...@world.std.com (Robert J. Kolker) writes...
|> >John,
|> >
|> > Would you have jumped in to save the drowning women, if you
|> > did not know how to swim?
|>
|> No, because that wouldn't have presented itself to me a possibility of which
|> I was capable, no more than it would occur to me to attempt to undertake any
|> project which required a skill which I lack.
|>
What, you mean you would make a low, petty, ignoble calculation of whether
you possessed the skills to do the job, and then do it or not on that
basis? How crass! (If I used smileys, there would be one here.)
|> The question, it seems to me, is the following: when one grasps an
|> emergency situation, and grasps what one might do about it, then ought
|> one to engage in a little calculation to check whether one should do
|> anything?
|>
O, I see: your judgements are ``grasping'' in an intuitive flash,
and other people's judgements are ``calculation.'' How noble. (Ditto.)
|> It troubles me that Rand seems to think that courage and generosity (virtues
|> which are undoubtedly required to attempt such a rescue) stem from a
|> "lack of self-esteem." I'm sure that it would be of great comfort to the
|> friends and family of the drowned man, if one were to explain that one
|> could have saved him, but that one is an adherent of Objectivism and that
|> since one didn't know him, he wasn't of enough value to one's life to save.
|>
Look, I know perfectly well that Rand said and wrote a myriad of idiotic
things, but she did not say this. If I were to read your remarks with
uncharitable litteralness I would say, ``I'm sure one's family and friends
would be comforted to know that you died saving someone they didn't know
from a hole in the ground, and cared for no more than any stranger.'' They
might be mildly comforted if the stranger turned out to be a nice person,
but it is inconceivable, to my limited imagination at least, that such
a small gain in value could be more than trivial compared to their huge
loss. Note also that it is not necessarily the value of the stranger to
one's life that is involved in the calculation, but also the value of
living in a society where such spontaneous help is the norm.
It is fruitless to deny there is a calculus of values: your own argument
depends on it. You judge it more valuable to be ``noble'' (a word that
clearly means something different to you than me) than alive.
You seem to be making the statement that it is immoral to even consider
the consequences of your actions when someone is in danger. This is
precisely the kind of thinking that has us (I speak as a Canadian) mired
in an unsuportable welfare-state. Those who said, ten years ago and more,
``We can't keep throwing other people's money at every problem from
health care to poverty, the cost is much greater than the value gained,''
were told, ``These people need help, damn the consquences!'' Looking at
the mess this has got us in, you'll forgive me for doubting the
nobility of following gut reactions.
|> It also troubles me that Rand has erected a situation in which virtue is
|> indistinguishable from cowardice.
|>
On the contrary, the greatest cowardice of all is being afraid to make,
and trust, one's own judgements. And to live with the consequences --
including, in the case of not trying to save a drowning person whom you
believe cannot be saved but at the cost of your own live, the psychological
consequences of knowing you might have been wrong, and should have tried.
Tom Radcliffe
|>
|> Do not equivocate "great danger" with "certain death." Rand does NOT say,
|> do not attempt to save another when it would result in one's death. I
|> would certainly consider that irrational. The question is one of one's
|> being able to make a difference, but not without some risk.
|>
The question is whether is is moral or not to calculate the risk before
acting. ``Certain death'' is an extremum of risk, so if it is not
ignoble, crass, petty and cowardly to make the distinction between
great risk and certain death, I suggest that it is not ignoble, crass,
petty and cowardly to make the distinction between great risk and
less risk.
Tom Radcliffe
[deleted]
|>
|> of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
|> reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
|> to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
|>
One of the remarkable things about philosophy is the amount of it that
starts with the phrase, ``It strikes me as quite obvious....'' This
phrase is almost always followed by propositions that strike us low,
petty, calculating, crass and scheming mortals as bizzare and contrary
to our mean, slavish and materialistic experience.
To our unenlightened little minds, this advocacy of thoughtless,
uncalculated action, this claim that we should ``Just Do It,''
sounds like -- well -- advertising hype; designed, as most advertising
hype is, to distract from the questionable value of the product.
KRESSJA
>KRESSJA (kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu) wrote:
>
>[...]
>
>: It strikes me a quite obvious that a contempt for death and petty fears
>: of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
>: reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
>: to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
>Under what circumstances, by your argument, would it be morally proper to
>not risk one's life?
Yet another affinity with Kant which Rand displays is her tendency towards
moral legalism: she tries to distill universal principles of action applicable
to particular circumstances, i.e., "do not save the life of a strange when
there risk is great." I depart from Kant in a more Aristotelean direction,
and regard ethics as primarily something to do with character and virtue,
and not with rules and maxims.
>Or is risking one's life to be an end in itself, a
>noble pursuit, such that one should relish any opportunity to do so?
Oh you Objectivists, and you moral absolutism! I reject this when Kant does
as well as when Rand does it. To answer: I think that risk is often
praiseworthy--there is nothing dishonorable in making danger one's vocation;
I would make of this a prescriptive principle, however.
>Miss Rand makes her valuation clear: one's own life is worth more than
>that of a stranger. What is yours? That dying for something that means
>little to you is more valuble than living? Or that anything which
>presents you with an opportunity for death is necessarily good? The
>examples you give suggest that you equate placing value on one's own life
>with petty fears *in all cases*.
You're simply begging the question to give it an Objectivistic slant: I am
*not* advancing a Christian/altruistic position in this matter. I am
asserting that courage and generosity (which seem the two chief virtues in
play here) are good in themselves, and that their exercise should not
necessarily be relative to their object. How do I know what a stranger might
yet become to me, if I save him or her? And even if I never see him again,
won't I have done something noble? And again, if I die, what will it then
matter to me? I hope to live my life as someone not afraid to risk my life
if the situation calls for it; this is not indicative of a death wish--I
simply feel that it is base to live at all costs, or simply for my own.
>I will point out that Miss Rand notes the possibility (and demonstrates
>with examples in her fiction) that there are things worth dying
>for--things without which the value of one's life is erased.
I am aware of this, and actually asked not to have it pointed out to me in my
original post.
>: Zarathustra says it well:
>
>: "I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and returns
>: none: for he always gives away and does not want to preserve himself."
>
>And you agree with this? I submit that this quote is a distilled
>statement of death worship and self-hatred.
In which case I submit that you know little or nothing about Nietzsche.
Are you aware of the context of this quote? Or have you spoken without
determining the context?
>: What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
>: to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
>: own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
>: overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
>: to die well, and at the right time.
>
>: I expect that I will now be told that Objectivist's believe that perishing
>: for one's own values is not *sacrifice*; to head it off, I am aware of this
>: teaching. All I wish to bring attention to is the ignoble risk-assessment
>: that Objectivism preaches in the face of danger.
>And your view is that one should *not* assess the risk? That one should
>regard one's life as a complete zero in such a situation?
[Sarcasm mode on]
OF COURSE! ANY disagreement with Ayn Rand consitutes an endorsement of the
most contrary position, to the degree of a reductio ad absurdam! I think
that human beings should value others according to the distance: complete
strangers most, acquaintances next, friends very low, and no value at all
for the self!
[Sarcasm mode off]
The risk assessment is ignoble not because it assesses risks, but because
it makes this assessment contingent upon one's own in principle.
>: What do other a.p.o.'ers think?
>
>: -Kressja
>
>: P.S. I *have* actually saved the life of a drowning woman, so I can speak
>: to this issue from personal experience as well as philosophical rumination.
>I would do the same. I'm a good swimmer and I trust myself in the
>water. Would you enter a burning building to save a stranger if you had
>every reason to believe that the building would collapse and kill you
>before you could make it back out?
Of course not: but Rand, as I have pointed out, doesn't say "certain death,"
she says only "great danger."
Are firemen then immoral, according to Ms. Rand's doctrine? If not, why not?
It seems that they have chosen an irrational profession...
-Kressja
KRESSJA
>John - you have ENTIRELY missed the point. You say that - "that
>to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
>own life* the standard is quite another".
We'll see.
>Oh really? So, what you are saying is that, to you, one man's life is of
>equal value to you as another? Including your own? EQUAL value? Does
>that mean that if I had no place to live you would let me stay at your
>place? If I were hungry I could eat your last piece of bread? That if I
>was cold I could have your jacket?
Nope, that's not what I am saying. I think that some people are better
than others, and some worse, which is *exactly* why I object to making
one's own life the standard in all cases.
>The point Ayn Rand makes is this - your life, your OWN life, is the only
>'right' you have - the only 'undeniable' you are born with. It belongs
>to you. It is up to you to do with it as you choose. That is the price
>of being an individual - you have the power and sole responsibility for
>the quality of your own life.
And if I choose to pursue virtue, even in the face of death?
>Now does this mean that we shouldn't help that guy treading water in the
>lake? The answer to that is also simple, and can be found in the Ethics
>of Emergencies chapter in VOS. Generally speaking, where it doesn't harm
>you it is 'nice' to be generous to people - to give directions to people
>who are lost, etc. There's a term for this Rand uses that I don't recall
>exactly, but it is something on the order of 'extending kindness in the
>desire of cultivating a general conviviality among men'. What this DOES
>also mean is that such decisions, to be moral, must be made by rational
>judgement.
How 'nice.' Generosity is 'nice.' I submit to you the the characterization
of generosity as nice is a particularly low-minded way of thinking. Take
a look at Aristotle's _Nichomachean Ethics_ for a description of the
"great-souled man."
>Some people are obviously of more value to a particualr person than
>another - would you rather buy me lunch or your mother? Given the choice
>between sitting in a movie theater with your best friend, or me, an
>abject stranger - who would you pick? Just because I am human and alive
>doesn't mean I have the same impact and value in your life as a close
>friend or relative. Don't you see that such ideas as you have expressed
>in your previous post are collectivist, and actually de-humanize man -
>making us like bugs, all identical, of equal value to one another?
You are under the mistaken impression that not to discriminate according to
one's own contingent perspective is the same as to be unable to discriminate.
There are other ways of making distinctions between man and man.
>Yes, in an emergency where I can help without making the IMMORAL
>sacrifice of my own life I will. But that's because I am a nice guy -
>it's not a moral choice. Your life, and your choices belong to you, and
>you alone.
Whether such a sacrifice is IMMORAL is precisely the bone of contention.
-Kressja
KRESSJA
Well said. I concur. To risk is not to trade, and to risk death is not
to embrace death.
(Although I could conceive of certain circumstances in which I would give
my life to save the life of another--but that would depend on the context.)
-Kressja
KRESSJA
> Lest you think Akiba was an altruist (G-D forbid) in a dispute with
> R. Ben Peturah about two men in the desert having only enought water
> for one. If neither drinks both die. If both drink both die. If one
> drinks, he lives the other dies. Ben Peturah argued niether
> should drink. Akiba argued one should drink since the command was
> to love your neighbor *as* one self, not more not less. Akiba said
> "is your neighbor's blood redder than yours, let one drink and live.
> Why should death have two, when it only requires one?"
How does one decide between the two? How does an Objectivist decide?
The case is obviously a hypothetical reductio, since it presupposes that
the men *know* that the water will not sustain both long enough for a
rescue--in the actual circumstance, they would not know this, and the
best thing to do, it seems to me, is to split the water (although perhaps
not evenly) in the hope of a rescue.
-Kressja
Eric Johnson
> ... I am
> asserting that courage and generosity (which seem the two chief
> virtues in play here) are good in themselves, and that their
> exercise should not necessarily be relative to their object. How do
> I know what a stranger might yet become to me, if I save him or her?
> And even if I never see him again, won't I have done something
> noble? ...
Courage and generosity are good in themselves? I take it that you
mean that no values are to be acquired from those virtues. Or rather,
some values can be acquired from them, but that's not particularly
important? Or that the good comes not in the acquiring of some
values, but just in the doing? That virtue is its own reward?
-Eric
> KRESSJA (kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu)
--
Eric E Johnson
ejoh...@netcom.netcom.com
James F. Hranicky
|>
|> Could you seriously watch someone drown ? I would not attempt only if
|> the situation meant CERTAIN death. I consider myself a rational being and
|> full of self-interest, but the risk would have to be extreme for me not to
|> attempt a rescue. No amount of rationalization and analysis would get the
|> image out of my head if I sat by and watched.
|>
|> just my 2 cents un-backed by gold
I agree completely....
------------
Jim Hranicky (j...@beach.cis.ufl.edu) (8-{>
"We could always tax...thingy"
-- Monty Python
------------
Mark A. Peter
: In article <mpeterCL...@netcom.com>, mpe...@netcom.com (Mark A. Peter) writes...
: >KRESSJA (kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu) wrote:
: >
: >[...]
: >
: >: It strikes me a quite obvious that a contempt for death and petty fears
: >: of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
: >: reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
: >: to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
: >Under what circumstances, by your argument, would it be morally proper to
: >not risk one's life?
: Yet another affinity with Kant which Rand displays is her tendency towards
: moral legalism: she tries to distill universal principles of action applicable
: to particular circumstances, i.e., "do not save the life of a strange when
: there risk is great." I depart from Kant in a more Aristotelean direction,
: and regard ethics as primarily something to do with character and virtue,
: and not with rules and maxims.
And why, by your way of thinking, should one seek virtue? Is it a
mystical, undefinable, or ineffable edict? Or does it have something to
do with achieving values in real life? Miss Rand holds the latter, which
is why she relates character and virtue to real life situations. If you
think there is another way to establish character and virtue, I'd be
interested in knowing what it is.
: >Or is risking one's life to be an end in itself, a
: >noble pursuit, such that one should relish any opportunity to do so?
: Oh you Objectivists, and you moral absolutism! I reject this when Kant does
: as well as when Rand does it. To answer: I think that risk is often
: praiseworthy--there is nothing dishonorable in making danger one's vocation;
: I would make of this a prescriptive principle, however.
Read Miss Rand's novels if you want to see the taking of risks
glorified. What seems to bother you is that she has a *basis* for
determining under what circumstances a risk is worth it, and under what
circumstances it isn't--i.e., she has a hierarchy of values. Yes, it is
moral absolutism. And while it's interesting to know that you reject it,
it would be more intersting to know *why*.
: >Miss Rand makes her valuation clear: one's own life is worth more than
: >that of a stranger. What is yours? That dying for something that means
: >little to you is more valuble than living? Or that anything which
: >presents you with an opportunity for death is necessarily good? The
: >examples you give suggest that you equate placing value on one's own life
: >with petty fears *in all cases*.
: You're simply begging the question to give it an Objectivistic slant: I am
: *not* advancing a Christian/altruistic position in this matter. I am
: asserting that courage and generosity (which seem the two chief virtues in
: play here) are good in themselves, and that their exercise should not
: necessarily be relative to their object. How do I know what a stranger might
: yet become to me, if I save him or her? And even if I never see him again,
: won't I have done something noble? And again, if I die, what will it then
: matter to me? I hope to live my life as someone not afraid to risk my life
: if the situation calls for it; this is not indicative of a death wish--I
: simply feel that it is base to live at all costs, or simply for my own.
Yes, but *when* does the situation call for it? If you are not
advocating altruism, then why exactly is it base to not risk one's life
for a stranger?
: >I will point out that Miss Rand notes the possibility (and demonstrates
: >with examples in her fiction) that there are things worth dying
: >for--things without which the value of one's life is erased.
: I am aware of this, and actually asked not to have it pointed out to me in my
: original post.
Well, again, if you are aware that the Objectivist position is not "life
at any cost", then on what basis do you criticize it?
: >: Zarathustra says it well:
: >
: >: "I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and returns
: >: none: for he always gives away and does not want to preserve himself."
: >
: >And you agree with this? I submit that this quote is a distilled
: >statement of death worship and self-hatred.
: In which case I submit that you know little or nothing about Nietzsche.
: Are you aware of the context of this quote? Or have you spoken without
: determining the context?
Mr. Kress, *you* introduced the quote into *this* context. If it required
qualification, then good writing requires that you provide it, or more
likely, that you not use it as a stand-alone quote. When someone uses a
quote to demonstrate something or to sum up a point of view, it is
generally assumed that the quote can be taken at face value or that the
current context of discussion makes its meaning clear. Since you
selected a quote which is in all of its particulars distinctively
anti-self, I can only assume that that was the sentiment you intended to
convey.
: >: What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
: >: to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
: >: own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
: >: overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
: >: to die well, and at the right time.
: >
: >: I expect that I will now be told that Objectivist's believe that perishing
: >: for one's own values is not *sacrifice*; to head it off, I am aware of this
: >: teaching. All I wish to bring attention to is the ignoble risk-assessment
: >: that Objectivism preaches in the face of danger.
: >And your view is that one should *not* assess the risk? That one should
: >regard one's life as a complete zero in such a situation?
: [Sarcasm mode on]
: OF COURSE! ANY disagreement with Ayn Rand consitutes an endorsement of the
: most contrary position, to the degree of a reductio ad absurdam! I think
: that human beings should value others according to the distance: complete
: strangers most, acquaintances next, friends very low, and no value at all
: for the self!
: [Sarcasm mode off]
: The risk assessment is ignoble not because it assesses risks, but because
: it makes this assessment contingent upon one's own in principle.
Your sarcasm suggests that it was unreasonable for me to assume that by
"ignoble risk-assessment" you meant that assessing risks is ignoble.
Without some explanation as to *why* this particular risk-assessment is
ignoble, I am at a loss to imagine what else I should have assumed. Is
the above sentence (which I didn't have originally) supposed to provide the
answer? I can't make heads or tails of it. One's own what? One's own
assessment? Do you mean that the moral conclusion should be "above" such
petty concerns as the facts of the situation?
: >: What do other a.p.o.'ers think?
: >
: >: -Kressja
: >
: >: P.S. I *have* actually saved the life of a drowning woman, so I can speak
: >: to this issue from personal experience as well as philosophical rumination.
: >I would do the same. I'm a good swimmer and I trust myself in the
: >water. Would you enter a burning building to save a stranger if you had
: >every reason to believe that the building would collapse and kill you
: >before you could make it back out?
: Of course not: but Rand, as I have pointed out, doesn't say "certain death,"
: she says only "great danger."
: Are firemen then immoral, according to Ms. Rand's doctrine? If not, why not?
: It seems that they have chosen an irrational profession...
: -Kressja
: "ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
: ______________________________________________________________________________
: | | |
: | John Kress | "God is a gross answer, an indelicacy against us thinkers-- |
: | | at bottom merely a gross prohibition for us: you shall not |
: | | think!" |
: | | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
: |______________|_______________________________________________________________|
--
Mark Peter
mpe...@netcom.com
Stacy Prowell
|> Ayn Rand's larder:
|>
|> "To illustrate this on [sic] the altruists' favorite example: the issue
|> of saving a drowning person. [sic] If the person to be saved is a stranger,
|> it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one's own life
|> is minimal; when the danger is great, it would be immoral to attempt it:
|> only a lack of self-esteem could permit one to value one's life no
|> higher than that of any random stranger."
|>
|> This strikes me as an exemplary case of the pettiness I often find in
|> Objectivist doctrines. Such low calculations as to one's own safety
|> seem both cowardly and slavish.
I respectfully disagree. Such low calculations are
certainly worthwhile. For example, if I saw a drowning
person, I would *not* jump in to save them. The
calculation which would prevent me from doing this is
the realization that I cannot swim. I would look around
for something to extend/throw to them, provided I was
not in imminent danger. If I were (for example, if the
person was thrown in by someone now coming to throw *me*
in) I would first seek to escape such danger. Do you
consider this "slavish?" Cowardly?
|> I submit that self-sacrifice does not
|> always stem from altruistic motivations:
[Socrates example deleted]
An excellent example. But I do agree that Socrates'
choice was self-sacrifice for the following reasons.
Socrates chose between death and his highest value...
the life of the mind. Recalling the Phaedo supports
this assessment.
|> It strikes me a quite obvious that a contempt for death and petty fears
|> of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
|> reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
|> to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
For Rand's example, I must agree. Why should I sacrifice
all values to save a stranger? Why should my family suffer
my loss unnecessarily? I would save him or her *if* it were
practical. On the other hand, I would take any action to
save my wife. After all, if I throw my life away saving the
stranger, who is to protect my wife?
This evening, if I am "confronted with death" on the highway,
I will avoid it, not boldly face it. It is my life. I do
not choose to throw it away, or even risk it, casually.
[Nietzsche quotation and some discussion deleted]
|> - Kressja
--
-- _Stacy Prowell_________________...@utkcs.utk.edu_
| |
| "Clothes make the man. Naked people have little or no influence upon |
| society." - Mark Twain |
| |
| "2 + 2 = 5 for large values of 2." - Anonymous |
|_______________________________________________________________________|
Stacy Prowell
|> >
|> >The important phrase in the above quote is "when danger is great".
|> >
|> >That means, don't try to save a stranger if you will get killed yourself
|> >in the process. This is not as controvertial a doctrine as you seem
|>
|> Do not equivocate "great danger" with "certain death." Rand does NOT say,
|> do not attempt to save another when it would result in one's death. I
|> would certainly consider that irrational. The question is one of one's
|> being able to make a difference, but not without some risk.
Are you saying there *is* a computation to be performed?
|> -Kressja
Scott T. Shad
If the return from an action is greater than one loses through sacrifice,
then, again by definition, the action was not a sacrifice. It is your judgement
call at the time as to whether the benefits you might gain from an action
are worth the risk. You might make the wrong choice, you might make
the right one--but a reasoned choice is far from an altruistic mandate.
As to an evolutionary basis for sacrifice: evolution would operate to weed out
species dedicated to suicide.
<STS>
KRESSJA
>|> It troubles me that Rand seems to think that courage and generosity (virtues
>|> which are undoubtedly required to attempt such a rescue) stem from a
>|> "lack of self-esteem." I'm sure that it would be of great comfort to the
>|> friends and family of the drowned man, if one were to explain that one
>|> could have saved him, but that one is an adherent of Objectivism and that
>|> since one didn't know him, he wasn't of enough value to one's life to save.
>Look, I know perfectly well that Rand said and wrote a myriad of idiotic
>things, but she did not say this.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
(I assume you mean the phrase I enclose in scare-quotes)
"The Ethics of Emergencies," VOS, p.45:
"...when the danger is great it would be IMMORAL to ATTEMPT it: only a
LACK OF SELF-ESTEEM could permit one to value one's life no higher than
that of any random stranger..."
>If I were to read your remarks with
>uncharitable litteralness I would say, ``I'm sure one's family and friends
>would be comforted to know that you died saving someone they didn't know
>from a hole in the ground, and cared for no more than any stranger.'' They
>might be mildly comforted if the stranger turned out to be a nice person,
>but it is inconceivable, to my limited imagination at least, that such
>a small gain in value could be more than trivial compared to their huge
>loss. Note also that it is not necessarily the value of the stranger to
>one's life that is involved in the calculation, but also the value of
>living in a society where such spontaneous help is the norm.
>
>It is fruitless to deny there is a calculus of values: your own argument
>depends on it. You judge it more valuable to be ``noble'' (a word that
>clearly means something different to you than me) than alive.
I don't deny that there is a calculation involved: I dispute the locus of
calculation.
>You seem to be making the statement that it is immoral to even consider
>the consequences of your actions when someone is in danger. This is
>precisely the kind of thinking that has us (I speak as a Canadian) mired
>in an unsuportable welfare-state. Those who said, ten years ago and more,
>``We can't keep throwing other people's money at every problem from
>health care to poverty, the cost is much greater than the value gained,''
>were told, ``These people need help, damn the consquences!'' Looking at
>the mess this has got us in, you'll forgive me for doubting the
>nobility of following gut reactions.
I'm not advocating gut-reactions.
>|> It also troubles me that Rand has erected a situation in which virtue is
>|> indistinguishable from cowardice.
>On the contrary, the greatest cowardice of all is being afraid to make,
>and trust, one's own judgements. And to live with the consequences --
>including, in the case of not trying to save a drowning person whom you
>believe cannot be saved but at the cost of your own live, the psychological
>consequences of knowing you might have been wrong, and should have tried.
This isn't the subject of the discussion. We're not talking about trading
one's life for the life of another, but about *risking* one's life. The
situation is such that, if one does nothing, then one life is lost, but
if one acts, then two *might* be saved.
KRESSJA
Of course. Distinctions must always be made. One must be aware of what
the circumstances are with the utmost clarity. One who does nothing
when he could have with little or no risk is surely contempable; one who
risks his life in the face of great danger, aware he does so, seems
praiseworthy to me. What I object to is the pettiness of laying it down
as a principle that one ought to act in different case in the two
circumstances.
What about giving one's word? Do Objectivists affirm that one should keep
one's pledge of honor, but only when one does not stand to lose much by
doing so? What is the difference?
KRESSJA
>KRESSJA (kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu) wrote:
>
>> ... I am
>> asserting that courage and generosity (which seem the two chief
>> virtues in play here) are good in themselves, and that their
>> exercise should not necessarily be relative to their object. How do
>> I know what a stranger might yet become to me, if I save him or her?
>> And even if I never see him again, won't I have done something
>> noble? ...
>Courage and generosity are good in themselves? I take it that you
>mean that no values are to be acquired from those virtues. Or rather,
>some values can be acquired from them, but that's not particularly
>important? Or that the good comes not in the acquiring of some
>values, but just in the doing? That virtue is its own reward?
Yes, goods can be acquired from them, such as a good reputation, but virtue
is refuted if it still needs a reason beyond itself; although I tend to
agree with Aristotle, that such goods, though they are the ultimate goods
of man, are relative to man and his nature. (But perhaps I do not agree
with Aristotle as to what that nature is.)
KRESSJA
>And why, by your way of thinking, should one seek virtue? Is it a
>mystical, undefinable, or ineffable edict?
No, I think that one ought instead make a cult-concept out of "reason" and
then claim that everything one does is _a fortiori_ inarguably rational. :)
Don't sling jargon, it simply clouds the issues, and harms the chances for
a beneficial discussion.
>Or does it have something to
>do with achieving values in real life? Miss Rand holds the latter, which
>is why she relates character and virtue to real life situations. If you
>think there is another way to establish character and virtue, I'd be
>interested in knowing what it is.
If you really want to know, I think that Rand is simply another casuality
(one among many) of Nietzsche's re-definition of ethics into "values" such
that a thing is valuable only insofar as it is esteemed by someone who
values it. This ends up in an appalling subjectivism wrt one's "values."
>: >Or is risking one's life to be an end in itself, a
>: >noble pursuit, such that one should relish any opportunity to do so?
>
>: Oh you Objectivists, and you moral absolutism! I reject this when Kant does
>: as well as when Rand does it. To answer: I think that risk is often
>: praiseworthy--there is nothing dishonorable in making danger one's vocation;
>: I would make of this a prescriptive principle, however.
>Read Miss Rand's novels if you want to see the taking of risks
>glorified.
Sorry, I've got good books to read. :)
>What seems to bother you is that she has a *basis* for
>determining under what circumstances a risk is worth it, and under what
>circumstances it isn't--i.e., she has a hierarchy of values. Yes, it is
>moral absolutism. And while it's interesting to know that you reject it,
>it would be more intersting to know *why*.
It doesn't bother me that she has a basis--the arbitrariness and pettiness
of said basis is what bothers me.
I reject moral absolutism simply because I make distinctions between man
and man, and with respect to context; I do not think that the same
principle may be applied to all circumstances which are superficially
similar. (Socrates chose not to flee Athens; Aristotle fled; they both
did the right thing IMPO.)
>: >Miss Rand makes her valuation clear: one's own life is worth more than
>: >that of a stranger. What is yours? That dying for something that means
>: >little to you is more valuble than living? Or that anything which
>: >presents you with an opportunity for death is necessarily good? The
>: >examples you give suggest that you equate placing value on one's own life
>: >with petty fears *in all cases*.
>: You're simply begging the question to give it an Objectivistic slant: I am
>: *not* advancing a Christian/altruistic position in this matter. I am
>: asserting that courage and generosity (which seem the two chief virtues in
>: play here) are good in themselves, and that their exercise should not
>: necessarily be relative to their object. How do I know what a stranger might
>: yet become to me, if I save him or her? And even if I never see him again,
>: won't I have done something noble? And again, if I die, what will it then
>: matter to me? I hope to live my life as someone not afraid to risk my life
>: if the situation calls for it; this is not indicative of a death wish--I
>: simply feel that it is base to live at all costs, or simply for my own.
>Yes, but *when* does the situation call for it? If you are not
>advocating altruism, then why exactly is it base to not risk one's life
>for a stranger?
To calculate as Rand would have it is base; not to risk one's life may or
may not be, depending on the circumstances; to risk one's life for a
stranger may also be praiseworthy under some circumstances, and some not.
I do not like Rand's absolutist (almost Kantian) principles, and I do
not think highly of the way whereby she establishes them.
Let me post this to you: If one gives one's word of honor, should one
keep it only when the inconvenience is minimal, and break it when the
trouble is great? If not, how does this differ from the other
situation?
>: >I will point out that Miss Rand notes the possibility (and demonstrates
>: >with examples in her fiction) that there are things worth dying
>: >for--things without which the value of one's life is erased.
>
>: I am aware of this, and actually asked not to have it pointed out to me in my
>: original post.
>
>Well, again, if you are aware that the Objectivist position is not "life
>at any cost", then on what basis do you criticize it?
I should think that was clear from the beginning: I object to the way in
which Objectivism reckons up the values which it is willing to die for,
because it allows (it seems to me) one to rationalize a host of vices,
not by denying that they are vices, but by claiming in fact that they are
virtues, since "this situation is not of concern to my life."
"I'm really not a coward; I'm really courageous. The proof?--why I *didn't*
save that man that I could have, since he didn't matter to my life!"
>: >: Zarathustra says it well:
>: >
>: >: "I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and returns
>: >: none: for he always gives away and does not want to preserve himself."
>: >
>: >And you agree with this? I submit that this quote is a distilled
>: >statement of death worship and self-hatred.
>
>: In which case I submit that you know little or nothing about Nietzsche.
>: Are you aware of the context of this quote? Or have you spoken without
>: determining the context?
>Mr. Kress, *you* introduced the quote into *this* context. If it required
>qualification, then good writing requires that you provide it, or more
>likely, that you not use it as a stand-alone quote. When someone uses a
>quote to demonstrate something or to sum up a point of view, it is
>generally assumed that the quote can be taken at face value or that the
>current context of discussion makes its meaning clear. Since you
>selected a quote which is in all of its particulars distinctively
>anti-self, I can only assume that that was the sentiment you intended to
>convey.
It wasn't; I cannot be expected to explain Nietzsche to everyone on the
newsgroup; I wanted to show that my position in this regard is supported
by a greater anti-altruist than Rand, and I trust that those familiar
with Nietzsche will understand.
If you know nothing of Nietzsche, then you should refrain from commenting,
or at least qualify your remark with an "this *sounds* to me like..."
>: >: What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
>: >: to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
>: >: own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
>: >: overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
>: >: to die well, and at the right time.
>: >
>: >: I expect that I will now be told that Objectivist's believe that perishing
>: >: for one's own values is not *sacrifice*; to head it off, I am aware of this
>: >: teaching. All I wish to bring attention to is the ignoble risk-assessment
>: >: that Objectivism preaches in the face of danger.
>: >And your view is that one should *not* assess the risk? That one should
>: >regard one's life as a complete zero in such a situation?
>
>: [Sarcasm mode on]
>
>: OF COURSE! ANY disagreement with Ayn Rand consitutes an endorsement of the
>: most contrary position, to the degree of a reductio ad absurdam! I think
>: that human beings should value others according to the distance: complete
>: strangers most, acquaintances next, friends very low, and no value at all
>: for the self!
>
>: [Sarcasm mode off]
>
>: The risk assessment is ignoble not because it assesses risks, but because
>: it makes this assessment contingent upon one's own in principle.
>Your sarcasm suggests that it was unreasonable for me to assume that by
>"ignoble risk-assessment" you meant that assessing risks is ignoble.
Yes, the two phrases do not mean the same thing; consider:
"bad novel writing" = "writing novels is bad"
A world of difference.
>Without some explanation as to *why* this particular risk-assessment is
>ignoble, I am at a loss to imagine what else I should have assumed.
You could assume at least that I meant what I said, and not what I did not
say, according to the rules of English.
>Is
>the above sentence (which I didn't have originally) supposed to provide the
>answer? I can't make heads or tails of it. One's own what? One's own
>assessment? Do you mean that the moral conclusion should be "above" such
>petty concerns as the facts of the situation?
I presume that my posts to this thread will have clarified it by now? Or
are you still unclear?
>: >water. Would you enter a burning building to save a stranger if you had
>: >every reason to believe that the building would collapse and kill you
>: >before you could make it back out?
>
>: Of course not: but Rand, as I have pointed out, doesn't say "certain death,"
>: she says only "great danger."
>
>: Are firemen then immoral, according to Ms. Rand's doctrine? If not, why not?
>: It seems that they have chosen an irrational profession...
Well, are they?
Chris Auld
>This isn't the subject of the discussion. We're not talking about trading
>one's life for the life of another, but about *risking* one's life. The
>situation is such that, if one does nothing, then one life is lost, but
>if one acts, then two *might* be saved.
It appears the debaters here are arguing at cross-purposes. Mr. Kress
has already stated that if one surely loses one's life in the course of
saving another, then the attempt should not be made. Similarly, the
Objectivist position is that the attempt should not be made unless the
risk is ``minimal.'' Then both sides are really saying that there
exists some cutoff probability, say P*, such that if the risk to the
rescuer is greater than P*, don't attempt, and vice versa. Perhaps the
matter can be settled by taking a poll -- everyone can write in and
reveal their P*'s, and we'll call the mean the True, Moral limit.
Chris ``not entirely serious'' Auld
--
Chris Auld
Department of Economics
Queen's University at Kingston
au...@qed.econ.queensu.ca
KRESSJA
>If the return from an action is greater than one loses through sacrifice,
>then, again by definition, the action was not a sacrifice. It is your judgement
>call at the time as to whether the benefits you might gain from an action
>are worth the risk. You might make the wrong choice, you might make
>the right one--but a reasoned choice is far from an altruistic mandate.
Ah, cost-benefit analysis in ethics...
I don't think that even Objectivism maintains this extreme (although it
fails to do so only due to inconsistency); ethics is not about benefits,
except to Utilitarians.
Under your reasoning, no situation could exist in which one would voluntarily
give up his life: Objectivism doesn't agree with you, and neither do I.
>As to an evolutionary basis for sacrifice: evolution would operate to weed out
>species dedicated to suicide.
But it might use the self-sacrifice of *individual* organisms to further
the survival of the species. I am not about to defend an evolutionary
basis for self-sacrifice, but you should at least understand the argument
which you wish to challenge.
Mark A. Peter
[...]
: If you really want to know, I think that Rand is simply another casuality
: (one among many) of Nietzsche's re-definition of ethics into "values" such
: that a thing is valuable only insofar as it is esteemed by someone who
: values it. This ends up in an appalling subjectivism wrt one's "values."
It only "ends up in" subjectivism if you sever the values from facts. If
you don't think a proper ethics can be defined in terms of earthly goals,
then how do you suggest defining one?
[...]
: >What seems to bother you is that she has a *basis* for
: >determining under what circumstances a risk is worth it, and under what
: >circumstances it isn't--i.e., she has a hierarchy of values. Yes, it is
: >moral absolutism. And while it's interesting to know that you reject it,
: >it would be more intersting to know *why*.
: It doesn't bother me that she has a basis--the arbitrariness and pettiness
: of said basis is what bothers me.
: I reject moral absolutism simply because I make distinctions between man
: and man, and with respect to context; I do not think that the same
: principle may be applied to all circumstances which are superficially
: similar.
Nor do I. I think it must be applied to all circumstances which are
*essentially* similar, i.e., the similarity must be relevant to the
determination being made. When you decry moral absolutism, you attempt to
reject one error by endorsing another. The two broad categories of error
with regard to morality are: 1) endorsing moral principles in denial of
relevant facts (dogmatism); and 2) dealing with facts in denial of moral
principles (nihilism). If it is possible to *have* a morality (and thus
avoid 2), then it must be possible to determine moral principles in such a
way that they actually apply to real circumstances (and thus avoid 1).
: (Socrates chose not to flee Athens; Aristotle fled; they both
: did the right thing IMPO.)
I agree that there are circumstances in which different courses of action
are equally moral (though I don't agree that your example is such an
instance).
[...]
: Let me post this to you: If one gives one's word of honor, should one
: keep it only when the inconvenience is minimal, and break it when the
: trouble is great? If not, how does this differ from the other
: situation?
It differs in the nature of the relationship involved. Giving one's word
is a chosen obligation. One cannot *in principle* gain values from
others by lying and cheating; such activity subverts one's ability to
live among men. One can *in principle* give favors or refuse them in
accordance with one's values. (And saving a stranger is just that: a
favor.)
[...]
: >Well, again, if you are aware that the Objectivist position is not "life
: >at any cost", then on what basis do you criticize it?
: I should think that was clear from the beginning: I object to the way in
: which Objectivism reckons up the values which it is willing to die for,
: because it allows (it seems to me) one to rationalize a host of vices,
: not by denying that they are vices, but by claiming in fact that they are
: virtues, since "this situation is not of concern to my life."
: "I'm really not a coward; I'm really courageous. The proof?--why I *didn't*
: save that man that I could have, since he didn't matter to my life!"
In order to argue that "rationalizing a vice" is involved, you must first
establish that it is in fact a vice. I.e., you must show that the
stranger's life *is* worth the risk involved, and that the decision not
to take that risk is therefore cowardly. It is the absence of this
argument that has left me thinking that you glorify risk for its own sake.
: >: >: Zarathustra says it well:
: >: >
: >: >: "I love him whose soul squanders itself, who wants no thanks and returns
: >: >: none: for he always gives away and does not want to preserve himself."
: >: >
: >: >And you agree with this? I submit that this quote is a distilled
: >: >statement of death worship and self-hatred.
: >
: >: In which case I submit that you know little or nothing about Nietzsche.
: >: Are you aware of the context of this quote? Or have you spoken without
: >: determining the context?
: >Mr. Kress, *you* introduced the quote into *this* context. If it required
: >qualification, then good writing requires that you provide it, or more
: >likely, that you not use it as a stand-alone quote. When someone uses a
: >quote to demonstrate something or to sum up a point of view, it is
: >generally assumed that the quote can be taken at face value or that the
: >current context of discussion makes its meaning clear. Since you
: >selected a quote which is in all of its particulars distinctively
: >anti-self, I can only assume that that was the sentiment you intended to
: >convey.
: It wasn't; I cannot be expected to explain Nietzsche to everyone on the
: newsgroup; I wanted to show that my position in this regard is supported
: by a greater anti-altruist than Rand, and I trust that those familiar
: with Nietzsche will understand.
: If you know nothing of Nietzsche, then you should refrain from commenting,
: or at least qualify your remark with an "this *sounds* to me like..."
As much as I dislike disagreeing without giving reasons, I would prefer
to drop this particular dispute on the grounds that it is off the
subject. I don't agree with you, but I'll leave you with the last word.
[...]
: >: The risk assessment is ignoble not because it assesses risks, but because
: >: it makes this assessment contingent upon one's own in principle.
: >Your sarcasm suggests that it was unreasonable for me to assume that by
: >"ignoble risk-assessment" you meant that assessing risks is ignoble.
: Yes, the two phrases do not mean the same thing; consider:
: "bad novel writing" = "writing novels is bad"
: A world of difference.
: >Without some explanation as to *why* this particular risk-assessment is
: >ignoble, I am at a loss to imagine what else I should have assumed.
: You could assume at least that I meant what I said, and not what I did not
: say, according to the rules of English.
Same as above.
[...]
: >: >water. Would you enter a burning building to save a stranger if you had
: >: >every reason to believe that the building would collapse and kill you
: >: >before you could make it back out?
: >
: >: Of course not: but Rand, as I have pointed out, doesn't say "certain death,"
: >: she says only "great danger."
: >
: >: Are firemen then immoral, according to Ms. Rand's doctrine? If not, why not?
: >: It seems that they have chosen an irrational profession...
: Well, are they?
As I have said, the moral status of the risk depends on nature of what is
being sought. Firemen choose to take risks in the interests of engaging
in productive activity--they are practicing a trade. There is a
legitimate need for their services, and their compensation reflects the
risks involved. (And of course they utilize training and equipment to
minimize those risks.) Of course there are safer professions to choose,
but the existence of risk does not make that choice necessarily
irrational. It is one factor to be considered among many.
--
Mark Peter
mpe...@netcom.com
Tom Radcliffe
[deleted]
|>
|> As to an evolutionary basis for sacrifice: evolution would operate to weed out
|> species dedicated to suicide.
|>
Try looking up ``inclusive fittness'' in a good book on evolutionary
biology. Life may be the standard of value for Objectivists, but the
only thing evolution cares about is reproductive sucess. There may
be times when the survival -- and therefore likelyhood of reproductive
success -- of offspring or close kin may be made more probable by
the death of an individual.
Jeff Dalton
>As to an evolutionary basis for sacrifice: evolution would operate
>to weed out species dedicated to suicide.
At this point, I must remind you of the words of Kressja:
OF COURSE! ANY disagreement with Ayn Rand consitutes an endorsement
of the most contrary position, to the degree of a reductio ad
absurdam!
In fact, evolution is perfectly happy with some sorts of sacrifice,
since ones genes are shared to some extent with relatives.
Moreover, even a species dedicated to suicide might be ok, if the
suicide was after reproduction. (Consider e.g. all the species in
which reproduction means death for one or both.)
-- jd
KRESSJA
>
>[...]
>
>: If you really want to know, I think that Rand is simply another casuality
>: (one among many) of Nietzsche's re-definition of ethics into "values" such
>: that a thing is valuable only insofar as it is esteemed by someone who
>: values it. This ends up in an appalling subjectivism wrt one's "values."
>
>It only "ends up in" subjectivism if you sever the values from facts. If
>you don't think a proper ethics can be defined in terms of earthly goals,
>then how do you suggest defining one?
I prefer to speak in terms of virtues than of values; there are reasons to
believe that one entangles oneself in insuperable philosophical
difficulties when one engages in value talk (a good example--since both
'life' and 'reason' are only values, it is *in principle* possible for
others to hold other values, say altruistic ones, which you have no
basis to condemn, save from the perspective of your own values, which
critique they may quite legitimately deny).
>: >What seems to bother you is that she has a *basis* for
>: >determining under what circumstances a risk is worth it, and under what
>: >circumstances it isn't--i.e., she has a hierarchy of values. Yes, it is
>: >moral absolutism. And while it's interesting to know that you reject it,
>: >it would be more intersting to know *why*.
>
>: It doesn't bother me that she has a basis--the arbitrariness and pettiness
>: of said basis is what bothers me.
>
>: I reject moral absolutism simply because I make distinctions between man
>: and man, and with respect to context; I do not think that the same
>: principle may be applied to all circumstances which are superficially
>: similar.
>Nor do I. I think it must be applied to all circumstances which are
>*essentially* similar, i.e., the similarity must be relevant to the
>determination being made. When you decry moral absolutism, you attempt to
>reject one error by endorsing another.
And which error was that? I maintain that is Rand who goes too far by
laying it down that it is IMMORAL to attempt to save the life of a stranger
when the risk is great. That the person is a stranger is only one of a
host of contextual considerations.
>The two broad categories of error
>with regard to morality are: 1) endorsing moral principles in denial of
>relevant facts (dogmatism); and 2) dealing with facts in denial of moral
>principles (nihilism). If it is possible to *have* a morality (and thus
>avoid 2), then it must be possible to determine moral principles in such a
>way that they actually apply to real circumstances (and thus avoid 1).
Not necessarily; this is a false dichotomy. It is not clear that a viable
morality can be based on *principles*; I do not think that it can, in fact.
Ethics IMPO is a matter of character and virtue, rather than legalistic
principles and duties.
>: (Socrates chose not to flee Athens; Aristotle fled; they both
>: did the right thing IMPO.)
>I agree that there are circumstances in which different courses of action
>are equally moral (though I don't agree that your example is such an
>instance).
All I'm saying is that it could be; Rand says it NEVER can be.
>: Let me post this to you: If one gives one's word of honor, should one
>: keep it only when the inconvenience is minimal, and break it when the
>: trouble is great? If not, how does this differ from the other
>: situation?
>It differs in the nature of the relationship involved. Giving one's word
>is a chosen obligation. One cannot *in principle* gain values from
>others by lying and cheating; such activity subverts one's ability to
>live among men. One can *in principle* give favors or refuse them in
>accordance with one's values. (And saving a stranger is just that: a
>favor.)
If one can *in principle* give favors, then why does Rand say that it is
IMMORAL to do so? Or do you disagree with her on this point too?
>: >Well, again, if you are aware that the Objectivist position is not "life
>: >at any cost", then on what basis do you criticize it?
>
>: I should think that was clear from the beginning: I object to the way in
>: which Objectivism reckons up the values which it is willing to die for,
>: because it allows (it seems to me) one to rationalize a host of vices,
>: not by denying that they are vices, but by claiming in fact that they are
>: virtues, since "this situation is not of concern to my life."
>
>: "I'm really not a coward; I'm really courageous. The proof?--why I *didn't*
>: save that man that I could have, since he didn't matter to my life!"
>In order to argue that "rationalizing a vice" is involved, you must first
>establish that it is in fact a vice. I.e., you must show that the
>stranger's life *is* worth the risk involved, and that the decision not
>to take that risk is therefore cowardly. It is the absence of this
>argument that has left me thinking that you glorify risk for its own sake.
I cannot make such an argument simply because it *might* be worth the
risk, and *regardless of this* one *can* use Objectivism to rationalize
cowardice in this way. Note that I am not claiming that one *ought* to
risk one's life so, but only that doing so can be and most often would be
praiseworthy.
Agreed to disagree, although I heartily recommend Nietzsche to you. He is
better than Ayn Rand in every way--and I say that with complete sincerity
and considered judgement.
Hmmm. I would assert that their compenstation is in no way commensurable
with the risks they take (life is the *ultimate* value, isn't it?). At
any rate, is the existence of risk does not make an action irrational,
why cannot there *in principle* exist situations wherein saving the
life of a stranger is not irrational? Is a fireman irrational when he
does this or not? If not, then Rand is WRONG when she lays it down as
an absolute principle that it is IMMORAL to save the life of a stanger
when the risk is great.
Richard Wavle
-> voluntarily give up his life: Objectivism doesn't agree with you, and
-> neither do I.
Hello,
As a rather simple answer or truthfully an idea, the belief that ones
own life is more valuable than anything else first of all shows a
severe lack of morals, a lack of respect for others of the human
race and a huge false ego trip.
Richard.
P.S. Our history books are filled with those who gave their own
life for a better world. They did not sit back and think on such
things,ie are they moral! They knew they were moral and the highest
calling of man.
Richard Wavle
I know I will Be thrown off of here ( ignored ) but that is life.
If you all only knew that to serve others gives the greatest joy
of life, therefore the best life and most enjoyable then their
would be no discussion of this type. One would assist others
automatically as often as they think as (preserving ones own
life is centrist to the universe )
Think about it.
Richard
Tom Radcliffe
|> In article <CLJ45...@knot.ccs.queensu.ca>, t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca (Tom Radcliffe) writes...
|>
|> >|> It troubles me that Rand seems to think that courage and generosity (virtues
|> >|> which are undoubtedly required to attempt such a rescue) stem from a
|> >|> "lack of self-esteem." I'm sure that it would be of great comfort to the
|> >|> friends and family of the drowned man, if one were to explain that one
|> >|> could have saved him, but that one is an adherent of Objectivism and that
|> >|> since one didn't know him, he wasn't of enough value to one's life to save.
|>
|> >Look, I know perfectly well that Rand said and wrote a myriad of idiotic
|> >things, but she did not say this.
|> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|> (I assume you mean the phrase I enclose in scare-quotes)
|>
|> "The Ethics of Emergencies," VOS, p.45:
|>
|> "...when the danger is great it would be IMMORAL to ATTEMPT it: only a
|> LACK OF SELF-ESTEEM could permit one to value one's life no higher than
|> that of any random stranger..."
|>
Sorry, I have been unclear. I meant that Rand did not say ``one could have
saved him, but he wasn't valuable enough to one's life to save.'' To my
mind, the judgement of danger is also a judgement of probability of
success. Perhaps I am being overly charitable to Rand in this interpretation.
Here is a question to Objectivists, however: the implication of Rand's
remarks on saving a drowning man is that the following calculation
can be performed:
(value of stranger's life)*(probability of success) >
(value of own life)*(probability of own death)
When the inequality is true, you try to save the stranger, and when
it is false you let the poor guy drown. This is well and good, but
it is also, according to my understanding of Rand's claims about
values, impossible to perform this calculation. Rand claims that
values are measured ordinally, not cardinally, but the values in
the above equation must all be cardinals. So objectivism is not
consistent on this issue.
[deleted]
|>
|> >On the contrary, the greatest cowardice of all is being afraid to make,
|> >and trust, one's own judgements. And to live with the consequences --
|> >including, in the case of not trying to save a drowning person whom you
|> >believe cannot be saved but at the cost of your own live, the psychological
|> >consequences of knowing you might have been wrong, and should have tried.
|>
|> This isn't the subject of the discussion. We're not talking about trading
|> one's life for the life of another, but about *risking* one's life. The
|> situation is such that, if one does nothing, then one life is lost, but
|> if one acts, then two *might* be saved.
|>
Do you dispute the validity of the calculation outlined above? If so,
what is the calculation to be performed, in your view?
Tom Radcliffe
|> >In article <19FEB199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
|> >[deleted]
|> >|>
|> >|> Do not equivocate "great danger" with "certain death." Rand does NOT say,
|> >|> do not attempt to save another when it would result in one's death. I
|> >|> would certainly consider that irrational. The question is one of one's
|> >|> being able to make a difference, but not without some risk.
|> >|>
|> >
|> >The question is whether is is moral or not to calculate the risk before
|> >acting. ``Certain death'' is an extremum of risk, so if it is not
|> >ignoble, crass, petty and cowardly to make the distinction between
|> >great risk and certain death, I suggest that it is not ignoble, crass,
|> >petty and cowardly to make the distinction between great risk and
|> >less risk.
|>
|> Of course. Distinctions must always be made. One must be aware of what
|> the circumstances are with the utmost clarity. One who does nothing
|> when he could have with little or no risk is surely contempable; one who
|> risks his life in the face of great danger, aware he does so, seems
|> praiseworthy to me. What I object to is the pettiness of laying it down
|> as a principle that one ought to act in different case in the two
|> circumstances.
|>
I believe such a person is praiseworthy because of his obviously high
estimate of his own ability: I take his actions to indicate a belief
that he can do the job in the face of great danger and survive.
|> What about giving one's word? Do Objectivists affirm that one should keep
|> one's pledge of honor, but only when one does not stand to lose much by
|> doing so? What is the difference?
|>
Objectivists would claim -- and this is a case where I agree with them --
that one can never break one's word without losing a very great deal indeed.
J. Kyle Griffin
KRESSJA <kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> wrote:
Mr. Kress, please excuse any offense I may inadvertently cause.
: It strikes me a quite obvious that a contempt for death and petty fears
: of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
: reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
: to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
If death is a certainty, then to face it boldly is wise. If death is
not a certainty, than to chase it is often stupid.
We all face risk, and risk must be taken to accomplish things. The
truly virtuous task is to classify the risk as sufficient to stop me, or
not, and then act on that identification.
:Yet another affinity with Kant which Rand displays is her tendency towards
:moral legalism: she tries to distill universal principles of action applicable
:to particular circumstances, i.e., "do not save the life of a strange when
:there risk is great."
Yes, Rand did appear to look at her own...self-interested moral code as
if it were commands from God. She made a mistake.
:I depart from Kant in a more Aristotelean direction,
:and regard ethics as primarily something to do with character and virtue,
:and not with rules and maxims.
And we think...as did Rand in her more clear writings, that ethics has
primarily to do with values...which determine character, and rules. We
place life (our own life) as the standard by which we judge value.
If we are not talking about values...I have trouble understanding the
discussion as being about ethics.
State, if you don't mind, what value you hold such that your own life is
secondary...or tell me if I misinterpret you.
:Oh you Objectivists, and you moral absolutism! I reject this when Kant does
:as well as when Rand does it. To answer: I think that risk is often
:praiseworthy--there is nothing dishonorable in making danger one's vocation;
No, and there is nothing wrong with avoiding unnecessary danger either.
>You're simply begging the question to give it an Objectivistic slant: I am
>*not* advancing a Christian/altruistic position in this matter. I am
>asserting that courage and generosity (which seem the two chief virtues in
>play here) are good in themselves, and that their exercise should not
>necessarily be relative to their object.
I fail to understand...what do you mean by good in themselves?
>How do I know what a stranger might
>yet become to me, if I save him or her? And even if I never see him again,
>won't I have done something noble? And again, if I die, what will it then
>matter to me? I hope to live my life as someone not afraid to risk my life
>if the situation calls for it; this is not indicative of a death wish--I
>simply feel that it is base to live at all costs, or simply for my own.
And we feel that it is morally contemptable to live not specifically for your
own.
>>: What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
>>: to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
>>: own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
>>: overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
>>: to die well, and at the right time.
>>: I expect that I will now be told that Objectivist's believe that perishing
>>: for one's own values is not *sacrifice*; to head it off, I am aware of this
>>: teaching. All I wish to bring attention to is the ignoble risk-assessment
>>: that Objectivism preaches in the face of danger.
>The risk assessment is ignoble not because it assesses risks, but because
>it makes this assessment contingent upon one's own in principle.
Please clarify this statement. I honestly misunderstand. Are you
suggesting that one ought not to make this assessment contingent upon
one's own risks? Or am I missing the entire gist of what you are
saying?
:Are firemen then immoral, according to Ms. Rand's doctrine? If not, why not?
:It seems that they have chosen an irrational profession...
I believe you misinterpret the doctrine. A man is not obligated in any
way to save the life of a stranger...if they would have perished without
his existence. Furthermore, your values should be related to how they
advance your life. If you make a value judgement based on something
besides how it will affect you, you are usually wrong. But not in all
cases.
To be a fireman, granted, is more dangerous than to be a
secretary. But I do not believe Rand said/would have said that to do so
is irrational. There exists danger anywhere. The question is, how
much. From what I know of firemen, they are not supposed to expose
themselves to needless danger. They are supposed to face the danger
that they encounter, and to do what they can, so long as they can be
reasonably expected to return without serious injury.
Finally, your ex-.sig said something about goodwill towards man.
Indeed it is true that men who are happy with themselves are most likely
to be benevolent towards strangers.
With regard to the drowning stranger, I would, following
the lifeguard training, look to make sure I wouldn't be adding another
victim instead of a rescuer, and then do my best to rescue her.
However, the primary concern would be my own safety. That is what they
teach you in lifeguard training, or any First-Aid type class. Make sure
you are safe...then help someone else. Any other response seems to be a
knee-jerk reaction that could get more people hurt, whereas the 2
seconds to assess personal risk seems, at worst, a prudent thing to do.
Forgive the rambling nature of this post,
Cheers,
--
J. Kyle Griffin jkgr...@tuba.calpoly.edu
H. S. Novis -- hsn...@harlie.st.hmc.edu
-- -
I have no humble opinions
Robert Vienneau
>Objectivists would claim -- and this is a case where I agree with them --
>that one can never break one's word without losing a very great deal indeed.
Except, apparently, when the Objectivist is Mark Gardner, the person
to whom he gave his word is the "likes of Jimbo Wales," and the situation
where they were striving to get the other to adopt behavior to their
mutual benefit involves an IRC.
Or is there something I'm missing here?
--
The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Campus Office for Information
technology, or the Experimental Bulletin Board Service.
internet: laUNChpad.unc.edu or 152.2.22.80
Tom Radcliffe
|> In article <CLqMw...@knot.ccs.queensu.ca> t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca (Tom Radcliffe) writes:
|> >Objectivists would claim -- and this is a case where I agree with them --
|> >that one can never break one's word without losing a very great deal indeed.
|>
|> Except, apparently, when the Objectivist is Mark Gardner, the person
|> to whom he gave his word is the "likes of Jimbo Wales," and the situation
|> where they were striving to get the other to adopt behavior to their
|> mutual benefit involves an IRC.
|>
|> Or is there something I'm missing here?
I'd forgotten about that. There are two possibilities: a) Objectivism
is consistent with breaking your word when and as you please or b) Mark
Gardner is not an Objectivist. The first view is inconsistent with
what I know of Objectivism: a person's primary moral obligation is
*to himself* so it should not matter who you have given your word to,
merely that the value you gain by breaking it is greater than the
value you loose by breaking it. I find it hard to imagine that keeping
Jimmy Wales out of a discussion of Objectivism is a value sufficiently
great for anyone to commit the sort of self-inflicted moral wounding
that breaking one's word implies. Therefore, hypothesis b) seems more
likely.
But keep in mind that I am *not* an objectivist, and so the above is
an example of reasoning by an Enemy of Reason, and not to be relied
upon until one determines it is consistent with or dervivable from
the works of Ayn Rand.
KRESSJA
>I respectfully disagree. Such low calculations are
>certainly worthwhile. For example, if I saw a drowning
>person, I would *not* jump in to save them. The
>calculation which would prevent me from doing this is
>the realization that I cannot swim. I would look around
>for something to extend/throw to them, provided I was
>not in imminent danger. If I were (for example, if the
>person was thrown in by someone now coming to throw *me*
>in) I would first seek to escape such danger. Do you
>consider this "slavish?" Cowardly?
Of course not. The sort of calculation I'm complaining about doesn't have
to do with whether or not you can swim.
My point is, put simply, that if you are capable of saving someone
drowning by your action, in a situation where they will surely die if
you do nothing, *then* if you risk your life to save such a person, this
can be a virtuous act, worthy of respect and admiration. Note that I
do not say that it is always so, nor that one has a duty to so act.
>|> I submit that self-sacrifice does not
>|> always stem from altruistic motivations:
>[Socrates example deleted]
>An excellent example. But I do agree that Socrates'
>choice was self-sacrifice for the following reasons.
>Socrates chose between death and his highest value...
>the life of the mind. Recalling the Phaedo supports
>this assessment.
Yes. The life of virtue can sometimes require one to die for such a life.
Is this altruism? Is this a "lack of self-esteem"? I do not think so.
>|> It strikes me a quite obvious that a contempt for death and petty fears
>|> of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
>|> reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
>|> to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
>For Rand's example, I must agree. Why should I sacrifice
>all values to save a stranger?
To *risk* your life is not necessarily to sacrifice it.
>Why should my family suffer
>my loss unnecessarily?
Which is what Crito argued to Socrates.
>I would save him or her *if* it were
>practical. On the other hand, I would take any action to
>save my wife. After all, if I throw my life away saving the
>stranger, who is to protect my wife?
Again, the case specified is one of danger, but not of certain death. I
submit that it is little different from what firemen do.
>This evening, if I am "confronted with death" on the highway,
>I will avoid it, not boldly face it. It is my life. I do
>not choose to throw it away, or even risk it, casually.
I advocate neither.
KRESSJA
>In article <20FEB199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>,
>KRESSJA <kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> wrote:
>
>Mr. Kress, please excuse any offense I may inadvertently cause.
I'm quite hard to offend. Actually, sincerity never offends me. The only
things that offend me are stupidity and base conduct.
>: It strikes me a quite obvious that a contempt for death and petty fears
>: of death is a noble characteristic; which is the higher virtue: to be
>: reduced to a scheming slave whenever one's life might be in danger, or
>: to boldly face death, if such confronts one?
>If death is a certainty, then to face it boldly is wise. If death is
>not a certainty, than to chase it is often stupid.
>We all face risk, and risk must be taken to accomplish things. The
>truly virtuous task is to classify the risk as sufficient to stop me, or
>not, and then act on that identification.
There are cases when it is better to die than to choose life. Consider the
case of Socrates.
>:Yet another affinity with Kant which Rand displays is her tendency towards
>:moral legalism: she tries to distill universal principles of action applicable
>:to particular circumstances, i.e., "do not save the life of a strange when
>:there risk is great."
>Yes, Rand did appear to look at her own...self-interested moral code as
>if it were commands from God. She made a mistake.
I concur. This is almost all I wish to claim in this matter, but, as you
can see, there are many who will jump to her defense no matter how nutty,
idiosyncratic or arbitrary her view.
>:I depart from Kant in a more Aristotelean direction,
>:and regard ethics as primarily something to do with character and virtue,
>:and not with rules and maxims.
>And we think...as did Rand in her more clear writings, that ethics has
>primarily to do with values...which determine character, and rules. We
>place life (our own life) as the standard by which we judge value.
>If we are not talking about values...I have trouble understanding the
>discussion as being about ethics.
I do not mean to insult you when I say this, but I honestly urge you to do
some reading in the history of ethics. The term "value" was introduced into
ethics by Nietzsche, late lasy century, and he had a subversive reason for
doing so. It is part of his farsightedness to have foreseen the extent
to which his discourse would soon come to dominate all talk in ethics. I
nearly fall out of my chair laughing every time I hear a Christian
talking about "values," talking Nietzsche's language and not ever
realizing it.
Take a look at Aristotle's _Nichomachean Ethics_ or Plato's _Republic_.
>State, if you don't mind, what value you hold such that your own life is
>secondary...or tell me if I misinterpret you.
I believe that a certain kind of life is better than life as such. There
are, I maintian, things worth dying for. If I were to betray my friends
or my principles to save my life, then that life _eo ipso_ would not be
worth saving or living.
>:Oh you Objectivists, and you moral absolutism! I reject this when Kant does
>:as well as when Rand does it. To answer: I think that risk is often
>:praiseworthy--there is nothing dishonorable in making danger one's vocation;
>No, and there is nothing wrong with avoiding unnecessary danger either.
There can be, depending on how you define "necessary." If you would not
risk your life to save a dear friend or lover, then you are simply a
coward. It all depends on what is considered "necessary." No action, in
a certain sense, is necessary; there are certain things that must be done,
*if* you would live in a certain way.
>>You're simply begging the question to give it an Objectivistic slant: I am
>>*not* advancing a Christian/altruistic position in this matter. I am
>>asserting that courage and generosity (which seem the two chief virtues in
>>play here) are good in themselves, and that their exercise should not
>>necessarily be relative to their object.
>I fail to understand...what do you mean by good in themselves?
When a person displays true courage or generosity, we may call that good,
without adding to it, "because..."
>>How do I know what a stranger might
>>yet become to me, if I save him or her? And even if I never see him again,
>>won't I have done something noble? And again, if I die, what will it then
>>matter to me? I hope to live my life as someone not afraid to risk my life
>>if the situation calls for it; this is not indicative of a death wish--I
>>simply feel that it is base to live at all costs, or simply for my own.
>And we feel that it is morally contemptable to live not specifically for your
>own.
I know you do. That's what I am complaining about. Virtue is never only
"one's own."
>>>: What Rand never understood (and which Nietzsche very much grasped) is that
>>>: to make life the standard of valuation is one thing, but to make *my
>>>: own life* the standard is quite another; to love life is also to
>>>: overcome the resentment in the face of death and, as Nietzsche says,
>>>: to die well, and at the right time.
>
>>>: I expect that I will now be told that Objectivist's believe that perishing
>>>: for one's own values is not *sacrifice*; to head it off, I am aware of this
>>>: teaching. All I wish to bring attention to is the ignoble risk-assessment
>>>: that Objectivism preaches in the face of danger.
>
>>The risk assessment is ignoble not because it assesses risks, but because
>>it makes this assessment contingent upon one's own in principle.
>Please clarify this statement. I honestly misunderstand. Are you
>suggesting that one ought not to make this assessment contingent upon
>one's own risks? Or am I missing the entire gist of what you are
>saying?
Possibly you are.
I am (I trust) obviously not advocating taking risks without the
assessment of danger--that isn't courage, it's foolhardiness, the vice
of excess, and is not very praiseworthy.
I object to the locus of the calculation which Rand demands, which makes
one's intervention in this matter contingent on one's degree of
acquaintance with the drowning person. I argue that it is not immoral to
attempt to rescue a stranger, that risking one's life so may well be
consanant with a courageous and generous character, and can, contrary
to Rand, be positively praiseworthy.
>:Are firemen then immoral, according to Ms. Rand's doctrine? If not, why not?
>:It seems that they have chosen an irrational profession...
>I believe you misinterpret the doctrine. A man is not obligated in any
>way to save the life of a stranger...if they would have perished without
>his existence.
I do not follow this sentence. Who's existence?
I am not claim BTW that one *is* obligated to save the life of a stanger;
I am claiming that one is not obligated not to do so, which is what Rand
says.
>Furthermore, your values should be related to how they
>advance your life. If you make a value judgement based on something
>besides how it will affect you, you are usually wrong. But not in all
>cases.
In most cases, yes. In some cases, it is necessary to die to be true to
oneself. Again, this is why I put forward the example of Socrates.
> To be a fireman, granted, is more dangerous than to be a
>secretary. But I do not believe Rand said/would have said that to do so
>is irrational. There exists danger anywhere. The question is, how
>much. From what I know of firemen, they are not supposed to expose
>themselves to needless danger. They are supposed to face the danger
>that they encounter, and to do what they can, so long as they can be
>reasonably expected to return without serious injury.
A fireman cannot expect to enjoy a career without injury; nor can a
policeman. Why isn't this irrational, according to Rand's doctrine?
Why face any danger at all, if one can avoid it?
> Finally, your ex-.sig said something about goodwill towards man.
>Indeed it is true that men who are happy with themselves are most likely
>to be benevolent towards strangers.
I would say that it is a prerequisite of generosity, contrary to Kant.
> With regard to the drowning stranger, I would, following
>the lifeguard training, look to make sure I wouldn't be adding another
>victim instead of a rescuer, and then do my best to rescue her.
>However, the primary concern would be my own safety. That is what they
>teach you in lifeguard training, or any First-Aid type class. Make sure
>you are safe...then help someone else. Any other response seems to be a
>knee-jerk reaction that could get more people hurt, whereas the 2
>seconds to assess personal risk seems, at worst, a prudent thing to do.
You have misunderstood me, if you think I meant not to think about what
you are doing; this is what I would do as well.
Let me ask this: if you, upon assessing the situation, conclude that there
is a good change that you are capable of helping the person, but not without
some danger to yourself, then being to calculate how well you know this
person, and whether he or she is likely to be relevant to your life?
Eric Johnson
> ... the belief that ones own life is more valuable than anything
> else first of all shows a severe lack of morals, a lack of respect
> for others of the human race and a huge false ego trip.
> ... Our history books are filled with those who gave their own life
> for a better world. They did not sit back and think on such
> things,ie are they moral! They knew they were moral and the highest
> calling of man.
Apparently Richard Wavle believes that the highest calling of man is
to die for another. Regardless of my comment though, I'm quite
interested in seeing the advocates of moral relativism attempt to show
with some measure of moral certainty the evil in Richard's idea.
Is this asking for too much?
-Eric
KRESSJA
>Hello again,
>I know I will Be thrown off of here ( ignored ) but that is life.
Oh, I doubt you'll be ignored. What you say is, in fact, a lightning rod
for Objectivist flames.
>If you all only knew that to serve others gives the greatest joy
>of life, therefore the best life and most enjoyable then their
>would be no discussion of this type. One would assist others
>automatically as often as they think as (preserving ones own
>life is centrist to the universe )
I find servitude to be perhaps the most *unpleasant* thing imaginable; I
believe that most slaves historically agree with this accessment.
But perhaps you did not mean to claim that a slave, who exists only to
serve the wishes of others, is the happiest person? This seems to be the
implication of this position. Do you mean to say this, or not? Are we
to look to the institution of slavery to find "the best life and most
enjoyable"?
If you do mean this, then I certainly disagree. Slavery would seem to be
a paradigm for the worst life and most miserable, rather than the reverse.
If you don't mean this, then I am uncertain what you *do* mean.
Mike Hurben
it up again in the context of this discussion - After seeing the film
"Schindler's List" - what kind of assesment would an Oist make of Oskar
Schindler's character and motives? The man took *considerable* risks to
save the lives of *strangers.* To me, this man is an expression of the
ultimate goodness in humans. However, I can see Rand in the same position,
saying to herself, 'no, I have no duty to take these risks, and according
to my hierarchy, I need not do anything.' I'm not saying that one must do
what Schindler did, but he was certainly more virtuous in doing so...
John Kress has got really an interesting discussion going here... there
was a time when I thought ethics were Rand's strong suit, but the more I
look at it, the more I realize this is much deeper a subject than a couple
of her books could possibly cover.
Mike Hurben "a hostile and bitter ex-Objectivist"
mmi...@hmcvax.hmc.edu
> There are cases when it is better to die than to choose life. Consider the
> are, I maintian, things worth dying for. If I were to betray my friends
> or my principles to save my life, then that life _eo ipso_ would not be
You have to be careful when you pronounce this. What happens if you judge that
your life is so terrible that it is better to die and you actually lacked the
foresight to know that in fact it will get better? Suicides are caused by this
hopelessness, but we often think that it is a shame that the person would do
such a thing, because, in fact, their lives could have improved. Life is long
(usually) and people often forget this when they are considering suicide.
What
happens if an abused child, whose foresight is limited by the fact that they
haven't lived long and can not conceive of a life outside of their parent's
home decided to commit suicide? Yes, the abuse that the child undergoes is
horrific and no person should have to endure this.
Yes, the child has no reason (nor the capablity) to believe that life will not
always be that abusive. They know that running away would be sure death--there
is nowhere to go. They have tried telling people, but noone sees the
magnitude of the abuse and simply think that it is "punishment." So what are
their options? Their self-esteem is coroding, their sense that life is good
is being chipped away. They feel emotionally and physically drained and feel
that they can no longer fight. They learn to manipulate and lie and play games
in order to avoid the abuse. They can't understand why this is going on and
see no reason for it. So what are can they do?
Well, what if the child weighs their options and decides that they can not live
the heroic and "selfish" life that Objectivism argues is the only one worth
living and then kills themself? What would we say, "Oh, they should have only
waited. Couldn't they understand this?" But if this was a prisoner or some one
in slavery, or Socrates, or any other example, I bet you the argument would have
been that they were morally justified. "Some lives aren't worth living."
But do you claim to have omnicience? Is life in itself not worthy to even the
person who lacks self-esteem or the person who can not help but lack
self-esteem as the example I presented of the abused child?
If what you pronounce is true most of the people writing on this newsgroup
would not be alive today. We all feel at times that life isn't worth living.
Sometimes this feeling is irrational, while other times, according to what
Kressja calls Objectivism, this feeling is justified.
--Melissa
--Melissa
Mark A. Peter
: In article <2kitum$n...@samba.oit.unc.edu>, Robert....@launchpad.unc.edu (Robert Vienneau) writes:
: |> In article <CLqMw...@knot.ccs.queensu.ca> t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca (Tom Radcliffe) writes:
: |> >Objectivists would claim -- and this is a case where I agree with them --
: |> >that one can never break one's word without losing a very great deal indeed.
: |>
: |> Except, apparently, when the Objectivist is Mark Gardner, the person
: |> to whom he gave his word is the "likes of Jimbo Wales," and the situation
: |> where they were striving to get the other to adopt behavior to their
: |> mutual benefit involves an IRC.
: |>
: |> Or is there something I'm missing here?
: I'd forgotten about that. There are two possibilities: a) Objectivism
: is consistent with breaking your word when and as you please or b) Mark
: Gardner is not an Objectivist. The first view is inconsistent with
: what I know of Objectivism: a person's primary moral obligation is
: *to himself* so it should not matter who you have given your word to,
: merely that the value you gain by breaking it is greater than the
: value you loose by breaking it. I find it hard to imagine that keeping
: Jimmy Wales out of a discussion of Objectivism is a value sufficiently
: great for anyone to commit the sort of self-inflicted moral wounding
: that breaking one's word implies. Therefore, hypothesis b) seems more
: likely.
The precise view of honesty (towards others) that Objectivism holds is:
don't lie as a means to gain values from others. If you lie as a means
to protect what is already yours, that is proper. (A classic example
being that of Jewish parents being asked the whereabouts of their
children by members of the SS--they have every right to lie.) I don't
know the exact nature of ownership, rules, or etiquette of IRC channels.
I hope someone can enlighten me.
I do know that Mark Gardner has been actively administrating the channel
for some time now and has done most of the work (like programming the
"bot") to sustain it. It was his decision to not allow Mr. Wales to
participate. Mr. Wales apparently took advantage of a situation in which
the "bot", which among other things keeps those who are unwanted off the
channel, was not operative and jumped on the channel refusing to leave.
: But keep in mind that I am *not* an objectivist, and so the above is
: an example of reasoning by an Enemy of Reason, and not to be relied
: upon until one determines it is consistent with or dervivable from
: the works of Ayn Rand.
For the record, Mr. Radcliffe, the only times that I am inclined to
consider you an enemy (and not just someone with whom I disagree) are when
you use phrases like "Enemy of Reason" (thanks for leaving off the
extra-sarcastic TM this time) to take a jab at me and other Objectivists.
--
Mark Peter
mpe...@netcom.com
KRESSJA
> I know I brought this up in a previous thread, but I would like to bring
>it up again in the context of this discussion - After seeing the film
>"Schindler's List" - what kind of assesment would an Oist make of Oskar
>Schindler's character and motives? The man took *considerable* risks to
>save the lives of *strangers.* To me, this man is an expression of the
>ultimate goodness in humans. However, I can see Rand in the same position,
>saying to herself, 'no, I have no duty to take these risks, and according
>to my hierarchy, I need not do anything.' I'm not saying that one must do
>what Schindler did, but he was certainly more virtuous in doing so...
Actually, I'm glad that you bring this up again, because I've seen
"Schindler's List" since the first time you mentioned it. :)
Schindler is a good example of human goodness, because he was both clever
and quick-witted, but was by no means a *heroic* individual. He had the
courage to do what he could, when he realized that he was *responsible*
in some way for all those people, just because they were there and he was
there.
It seems to me that the situation he found himself in, through no fault of
his own, placed an implicit demand upon him; he could do what he did,
because of who he was and where he was. It was the situation that became
his test and his responsibility--this seems to me to be what ethics is
all about: however one lives, a time will come when one must meet a demand
from without, and the question is one of how one responds to such a
demand.
Of course, such situations may or may not occur to everyone, and do not
exhaust the matter of ethics.
KRESSJA
>
>> There are cases when it is better to die than to choose life. Consider the
>> case of Socrates...>
>> I believe that a certain kind of life is better than life as such. There
>> are, I maintian, things worth dying for. If I were to betray my friends
>> or my principles to save my life, then that life _eo ipso_ would not be
>> worth saving or living...
>You have to be careful when you pronounce this. What happens if you judge that
>your life is so terrible that it is better to die and you actually lacked the
>foresight to know that in fact it will get better? Suicides are caused by this
>hopelessness, but we often think that it is a shame that the person would do
>such a thing, because, in fact, their lives could have improved. Life is long
>(usually) and people often forget this when they are considering suicide.
I have no love or desire for suicide; all I am saying is that there are
situations wherein I would give my life. Since everyone keeps ignoring it,
I'll keep hammering it: consider the case of Socrates: he did not want to
die, but one would accurately call it suicide either, unless suicide is
defined as "refusing to do *everything* possible ot preserve one's life."
I (Kressja) am certainly not an Objectivist, nor do I wish to claim that any
*feeling* that life is not worth living is justified. My impulse is to
say that, in the scenario you suggest, the judgement that life is not
worth living is faulty, because it is based on an inaccurate assessment of
life, due to limited (and bad) experiences.
My paradigm in this thread has always been the death of Socrates, who *did
not* desire to die, but did not fear to do so either, and choose to be
true to justice, even at the cost of his life.
What I argue for is to live the virtuous life, which is necessary, but not
sufficient for the best and happiest life. If someone is abused in
childhood, or suffers from clinical depression, then this is certainly
detrimental to living well. People can be broken and damaged in their
formative years, and little can be done to prevent it--but someone who
never had the chance to live a virtuous life would not have the chance
to die a virtuous death.
Some, however, can overcome the sufferings and the abuses of their early
years, whereas some cannot, and some even go on to reproduce the abuse
in their own lives. This is why education and the proper raising of
children are so important. What you say above is not an objection to
the contention that one should live a virtuous life, but rather an
argument that children ought to be raise well--and according to virtue.
tony_d...@delphi.com
>: In article <2kitum$n...@samba.oit.unc.edu>,
>: Robert....@launchpad.unc.edu (Robert Vienneau) writes:
>: |> In article <CLqMw...@knot.ccs.queensu.ca> t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca
>: |> >Objectivists would claim -- and this is a case where I agree with them --
>: |> >that one can never break one's word without losing a very great deal
>: |> indeed.
>: |> Except, apparently, when the Objectivist is Mark Gardner, the person
>: |> ion where they were striving to get the other to adopt behavior to
>: |> their mutual benefit involves an IRC.
>for some time now and has done most of the work (like programming the
>"bot") to sustain it. It was his decision to not allow Mr. Wales to
>participate. Mr. Wales apparently took advantage of a situation in which
>the "bot", which among other things keeps those who are unwanted off the
>channel, was not operative and jumped on the channel refusing to leave.
entering posted property when the gate-lock is broken, and then refusing to
leave until the owner gives the tresspasser permission to return and use the
property when he pleases. As Mark Peter said, it was Mr. Gardner who went
through the trouble of establishing the #Aynrand channel, and Mr. Wales who
tried to cash in on his effort, unearned. And so far, Mr. Wales has not
challenged the *facts* of the case as Mr. Gardner described them. If this
description is correct (and I have no reason to suspect it is not), then
Mr. Wales' actions were utterly contemptable. This is a form of initiated
force, and a so-called "Objectivist" should know better.
As Ayn Rand put it: "Morality ends where a gun begins." This isn't a par-
ticularly violent example of the principle, but then neither is the tress-
passer example. According to Objectivism, one owes no debt of honesty to
those who eschew reason and instead attempt to gain what they want by force.
That was what Mr. Gardner was talking about, and I *applaud* his decision.
Tony Donadio
Tom Radcliffe
The difficulty I have is this: I suspect, with some justification, that
discussions amongst people on this IRC channel (whatever an IRC chanel is)
and discussions on OSG probably sometimes mention Mr. Wales in a very
unfavourable light. Thus, his desire to listen in -- or even participate
in -- these discussions strikes me as well-motivated. Although there is
nothing illegal going on here, it seems to me that one ought to have
the opportunity to defend oneself, to face one's accusers. It seems to
me dishonest and cowardly for people to maintain closed forums (fora?)
wherein individuals who are excluded from those forums may be discussed
in unflattering terms. So Mr. Wales attempt to gain access to this
IRC channel seems to me to be an act of justice, not trespass.
Perhaps if Mr. Gardner were to give Mr. Wales his word that Mr. Wales
would not be mentioned on Mr. Gardner's IRC channel without Mr. Wales
having the opportunity to respond, this matter could be settled. Of
course, no one, least of all me, would believe for a moment that Mr.
Gardner would *keep* his word in such a situation, having already
demonstrated that he is willing to break it when and as it suits him.
Or do ``Objectivists'' believe that it is right to maintain closed
discussions in which certain individuals or groups -- who are
excluded from those discussions by (non-initiated) force -- are referred
to as ``snarling wimps'' and in other, equally unflattering, terms? Do
``Objectivists'' dare to face those who disagree with them on the
level field of argument, or must they hide cowering behind the
battlements of dogma and closed doors?
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
one point:
>|> Mr. Wales' actions, as Mr. Gardner describes them, are exactly analagous to
>|> entering posted property when the gate-lock is broken, and then refusing to
>|> leave until the owner gives the tresspasser permission to return and use
>|> the property when he pleases.
This is not correct. The rules of IRC do not permit "ownership" of
channels. At any given time, if no one is on a channel, it does not
exist. Whoever starts a channel has "operator privileges" on the channel,
including the right (and ability via the software) to kick anyone off
the channel. On the day in question, channel #AynRand did not exist until
a friend of mine created it and invited me to join.
IRC is 'first come, first served', at all times. I was there first.
When Gardner arrived, he asked me to leave so that he could set up his
'bot'. (A 'bot' is a program which records conversations, kicks people
like me off the channel, etc.) I asked for his assurances that if I
left the channel (and thus let him get 'operator privileges') then I would
be allowed back on for the remainder of the evening. After some haggling
about the details, Gardner agreed. We made an explicit deal.
Gardner broke that deal, on the grounds that it is 'not necessary' to keep
a deal with the likes of me.
>|> As Mark Peter said, it was Mr. Gardner who
>|> went through the trouble of establishing the #Aynrand channel, and Mr.
>|> Wales who tried to cash in on his effort, unearned. And so far, Mr. Wales
>|> has not challenged the *facts* of the case as Mr. Gardner described them.
>|> If this
>|> description is correct (and I have no reason to suspect it is not), then
>|> Mr. Wales' actions were utterly contemptable. This is a form of initiated
>|> force, and a so-called "Objectivist" should know better.
His description I have not seen in detail. I do not believe he will
challenge any of what I have written above. Since the rules of IRC
are explicitly designed for 'first come, first served', I did not
'initiate force' in any way.
Tom Radcliffe writes:
>The difficulty I have is this: I suspect, with some justification, that
>discussions amongst people on this IRC channel (whatever an IRC chanel is)
>and discussions on OSG probably sometimes mention Mr. Wales in a very
>unfavourable light. Thus, his desire to listen in -- or even participate
>in -- these discussions strikes me as well-motivated. Although there is
>nothing illegal going on here, it seems to me that one ought to have
>the opportunity to defend oneself, to face one's accusers. It seems to
>me dishonest and cowardly for people to maintain closed forums (fora?)
>wherein individuals who are excluded from those forums may be discussed
>in unflattering terms. So Mr. Wales attempt to gain access to this
>IRC channel seems to me to be an act of justice, not trespass.
If the rules of IRC were as the previous poster thought, then I would
have been trespassing. That isn't the way it works, though.
As always, I'm willing to answer any and all questions about my conduct,
my ideas, etc. Just drop me an e-mail.
--Jimbo
Eric Johnson
> This is not correct. The rules of IRC do not permit "ownership" of
> channels. At any given time, if no one is on a channel, it does not
> exist. Whoever starts a channel has "operator privileges" on the channel,
> including the right (and ability via the software) to kick anyone off
> the channel. On the day in question, channel #AynRand did not exist until
> a friend of mine created it and invited me to join.
Your final sentence is misleading. The channel #AynRand had existed
before your friend created it that day. I should know, I had been on
it before then. Mark Gardner created a bot to protect the channel
when he and others were not around. The bot in which the machine
lived was rebooted, thus destroying the bot. I see this as a case of
a bolt of lighting destroying a lock on a gate, and someone coming in
to squat on the land.
Mark J. Gardner
1) There is no formal set of IRC 'rules', just as there are no formal
'rules' to Usenet (especially in the alt.* hierarchy). However, there is
a generally accepted set of guidelines, known collectively as
'Netiquette'. Netiquette covers such mundanities as NOT POSTING IN ALL
CAPS on Usenet, not uploading massive and useless files to an anonymous
FTP server, and respecting the policies of the administrators of machines
that you use (including IRC servers).
2) This is not about rules or Netiquette. Nor is this about why I or
others do not sanction the activities of Jimbo Wales, as that has already
been discussed and re-discussed. He can take issue with how unfairly he
believes he is being judged all he wants -- but not in any forum that I
provide. I am not interested in anything further he has to say save a
full repudiation of his destructive activities towards Ayn Rand's
philosophy of Objectivism, which is unlikely to occur. I have made up my
mind and am acting thusly.
3) Where there are no established rules in a medium, one simply applies
what principles one can. In the case of IRC, it is true I do not own the
#AynRand channel in any physical or legal sense. It exists much like an
email discussion list, Usenet newsgroup, or other distributed
discussion medium -- that is, it is not so much a place as it is an avenue
of communication established around a particular theme, made available to
its participants by the good graces of those who own and operate the
physical media of computer systems and telecommunications lines.
What defines the #AynRand channel is not its name, which anyone can co-opt for
their own purposes if there is no one using it. It is also not defined by
the fact that there is a particular user (be it a program like the Halley5
bot or an actual human) who keeps the channel in existence and enforces a
certain policy. There are many other IRC channels in which multiple bots
or users with operator privileges exert all sorts of influence, for all
sorts of reasons, kicking and banning and doling out privileges as they
see fit.
The #AynRand channel exists in its current form because of the work of one
person -- myself -- and my efforts to create and foster a forum for
live, immediate discussion of Objectivism and topics of interest to
Objectivists or students of the philosophy. It is precisely because of
this focus and my standards for the channel's use that the channel's
clientele continues to use it and enjoy it. These standards specifically
prohibit those who promote irrationality or promote efforts to destroy
Objectivism. Prohibited by whose judgment? *Mine* -- and if anyone feels
they can do better, they are welcome to create their own channel and
attempt to attract their own clientele.
I own the #AynRand channel, because it exists due to my effort and my
standards. With the Halley5 bot (and future measures currently being
implemented), I can enforce such ownership. What I own is not a bunch of
Internet packets shuttling across the globe, but an intellectual
marketplace devoted to a specific theme. And like any honest shopkeeper, I
don't allow counterfeit currency.
--M.
--
Mark J. Gardner <m...@netaxs.com>
"'There are no absolutes,' they chatter, blanking out the fact that
they are uttering an absolute." --Ayn Rand, _Atlas Shrugged_
Eric Daniels
I agree with Mr. Johnson. The channel had been created previously, and it had
been maintained by Mark Gardner. The means of perpetual existence of the
channel (the bot) had temporarily been disabled. The use of bots is perfectly
legitimate, and occurs on most established channels of any import.
The analogy I would consider in this case is as follows: There was previously
existing property, the specific channel #AynRand, which had been maintained
by the bot, much in the same way a farm is maintained as property by a fence.
Some temporary, and unpredictable circumstances, rebooting machines, disabled
the bot, much in the way a terrible storm could knock out an entire fence.
The rules initially were first come, first serve, as was possibly the case
with the farm land. The channel had been developed, much in the same way a
farmer must develop a soil in which to grow crops.
When the incident occurred, the channel being temporarily lost,
Jimbo was acting much like a man who might happen upon the fence-less farm.
He came onto the channel, after it had been inadventrantly formed by another
person. Jimbo knew that a fench had previously existed, in fact, he had
intimate knowledge about it--it had prevented him entrance times before.
However, he came to the channel and refused to leave, even though he knew the
property status (the bot) which had been set up was only temporarily
disabled.
The argument Jimbo seems to have given is that if one cannot maintain
one's claim to property continually and in the face of unpredictable
circumstances, one must have abandoned it. This, of course being subject to
Mr. Wales having anything further to say about what he thinks the status is.
My question is: Why was Jimbo so insistent on keeping his place on
#AynRand? Because of the inherent value of the name? Because no other channel
could be formed and maintained by his effort? No to both of these. Perhaps,
and I do not claim to have knowledge of Jimbo's consciousness [thank
god (sic)], it is because, like the random man happening upon a fruitful
farm, he saw something of value that could be taken without effort? Perhaps
not. Until and unless Jimbo reveals his motivations, I suppose it will
remain up to us to piece together the available evidence to form what would
seem a hasty conclusion, or would it?
--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Eric Daniels
edd...@acad.drake.edu
"Not to know what happened before one was born is to always be a child"
-Cicero
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Radcliffe
|> Regarding IRC and "rules":
|>
[irrelevant discussion of Netiquette deleted]
|>
|> 2) This is not about rules or Netiquette. Nor is this about why I or
|> others do not sanction the activities of Jimbo Wales, as that has already
|> been discussed and re-discussed. He can take issue with how unfairly he
|> believes he is being judged all he wants -- but not in any forum that I
|> provide. I am not interested in anything further he has to say save a
|> full repudiation of his destructive activities towards Ayn Rand's
|> philosophy of Objectivism, which is unlikely to occur. I have made up my
|> mind and am acting thusly.
|>
Ah, $Objectivity. ``I reserve the right to smear people behind their
backs, and to refuse them the opportunity to answer those smears on
the same forum. My mind is closed to anything he might say to justify
himself: I DON'T NEED NO STINKIN' FACTS.''
The most curious aspect of this whole dispute is the attitude toward
truth that it evinces: Rand's philosophy is held to be true, in a
sense even stronger than the sense that Newtonian physics is true.
But at the same time it is held to be incredibly delicate, unable
to sustain the most modest error or misrepresentation.
This attitude toward the truth as a delicate, fragile thing, unable
to withstand even the most mild confusion, is utterly at odds with
what we know about truth in science, and what one would infer about
the nature of the truth from objectivism itself. I find it very
peculiar that the people who proclaim most loudly that they are in
possession of the truth and nothing but the truth are the ones who
are most afraid to allow that truth to show in the public light of
day.
|> 3) Where there are no established rules in a medium, one simply applies
|> what principles one can. In the case of IRC, it is true I do not own the
|> #AynRand channel in any physical or legal sense.
[deleted]
|> I own the #AynRand channel, because it exists due to my effort and my
|> standards.
[deleted]
Well, that certainly is transparently clear, isn't it? Perhaps that should
be ``I $own the #AynRand channel...'' as apparently you are using the
notion of ownership in an entirely non-standard sense. But wait! Rand
defined ownership as ``The right to use and disposal of....'' So you
can't even claim to be using ownership in the Objectivist sense, but
must have created a personal definition that *disagrees with Rand's.*
So I guess you're not an Objectivist after all.
Tom Radcliffe
[deleted]
|> The argument Jimbo seems to have given is that if one cannot maintain
|> one's claim to property continually and in the face of unpredictable
|> circumstances, one must have abandoned it.
A fine example of $logic: construct a shakey analogy, then use it to
erroneously conclude that your opponent believes things explicitly
opposed to the things he says he believes. The property status of
an IRC channel appears, from what has been said in this forum about
them, to be the same as the property status of a table at a cafe':
it can be reserved, but in the absense of reservation it can be
used by anyone, and if you fail to reserve it, that's just too bad.
It may even be that you are a famous person, who is generally
known to reserve that table, thus enhancing its value to other
customers. But still, if you fail to reserve it, that's just too bad.
From this I conclude that Eric Daniels believes that eating at
a particular table in a cafe' a few times gives one a property
interest in it, which may be sold or used to prevent other
customers from sitting there, even when the table is not in use.
See, I can do $logic too....
Ray
I don't think objectivism forbids risking your life for someoneelse;
it just requires that you make a rational descision if risking
YOUR life is worth it to YOU.
It would preclude me forcing you to enter a burning building to save
someone, but it wouldn't prevent me from entering the building to
save someone importnat to me, i.e. my fiance. If, on the other hand,
the building was colapsing as we speak, and I decide (based on the
fear of losing her) to rush in and die, I shouldn't be hailed as a
hero, because I was a fool reacting to fear and not making a rational
decsion.
I think Objectivism(tm) handles this by saying that it's an extreme
situation and normal rules of life don't apply.
As for the joy of helping others, there is nothing anti-objectivist
about it. If the pleasure you recieve is greater than the effort
you but it, it was an action that doesn't violate objectivist morals.
If you are being forced to serve others, however, the same activity
is now immoral.
--
Ray (DJ) DeGennaro II
dege...@scf.usc.edu
tony_d...@delphi.com
>The #AynRand channel exists in its current form because of the work of one
>person -- myself -- and my efforts to create and foster a forum for
>live, immediate discussion of Objectivism and topics of interest to
>Objectivists or students of the philosophy. It is precisely because of
>this focus and my standards for the channel's use that the channel's
>clientele continues to use it and enjoy it. These standards specifically
>prohibit those who promote irrationality or promote efforts to destroy
>Objectivism. Prohibited by whose judgment? *Mine* -- and if anyone feels
>they can do better, they are welcome to create their own channel and
>attempt to attract their own clientele.
actions attempted to usurp and cash in on.
There are non-material forms of property. One of which, for example, which
Ayn Rand endorsed, was the right to one's reputation -- which she regarded
as the objective basis of libel and slander laws.
Mr. Wales' posting, which others are quoting, has still not appeared on my
newsreader, so I will defer further remarks until I see it.
Tony Donadio
chris wolf
then Mr. Wales' actions were utterly contemptable. This is a form of
initiated force, and a so-called "Objectivist" should know better.
And a 33 year old graduate student (Tony Donadio) should know better than to
call someone a "so-called Objectivist." It is term of pure insult, and
contributes nothing to the discusion.
I find it very strange that Mr. Donadio can make quite good arguments about
intellectual matters, but still finds it necessary to use insulting remarks
when referring to someone he really disagrees with. I am beginning to
suspect that Tony Donadio suffers from some severe personality disorder.
Chris Wolf
alle...@news.delphi.com
>Chris Wolf
>
Mr. Wolf, your cheap shots are getting more and more transparent. Tony
Donadio's entire post backs up his evaluation of Jim Wales--unlike your
psychologizing aside, which is so obviously a cheap shot as to deserve no
further comment.
You might as well take your strain of "Objectivism" to another forum,
because no one here is buying it.
Jay Allen
Paul A Vixie
few years ago (in my capacity as the moderator of the objec...@vix.com
mailing list), I predicted that it would degenerate into a high signal:noise
group with lots of name calling, accusations, and counter-accusations; I
predicted that lots of people would talk and folks would in general not
bother to read in detail what the other folks had said; I predicted, in
other words, Doom, and I refused to be a part of it.
Events of the past few days have led me to actually read this group. I see
that I was entirely accurate in my expectations and predictions about
alt.philosophy.objectivism. I can't believe that I actually volunteered to
moderate it, back then. What a mistake that would have been, since as
things have subsequently turned out, the half of the Objectivist population
whose position on the Piekoff/Kelley schism differs radically from mine
would long ago have accused me of the sorts of things I see you accusing
eachother of here daily.
My moderation policy for my objectivism mailing list is simple: every article
has to be about some aspect or application of objectivism, and no personal
attacks are permitted. (The second one is actually derivable from the first,
as almost noone here on this newsgroup will agree.) I often publish articles
with which I completely disagree, as long as those articles are on topic and
do not contain any flames.
As you read the daily thrashings and note the lack of any actual learning
or intellectual progress taking place here, keep in mind that there are
alternatives available.
--
Paul Vixie
Redwood City, CA Also: <comp-sou...@uunet.uu.net>, <vi...@bsdi.com>,
decwrl!vixie!paul <ftpmai...@pa.dec.com>, <vi...@sony.com>,
<pa...@vix.com> <{bind-workers,objectivism}-req...@vix.com>
tony_d...@delphi.com
>cwo...@delphi.com (chris wolf) writes:
>
>>>If this description is correct (and I have no reason to suspect it is not),
>>then Mr. Wales' actions were utterly contemptable. This is a form of
>>initiated force, and a so-called "Objectivist" should know better.
>>
>>>Tony Donadio
>>And a 33 year old graduate student (Tony Donadio) should know better than to
>>call someone a "so-called Objectivist." It is term of pure insult, and
>>contributes nothing to the discusion.
principles is quite properly described as a "so-called Objectivist."
Next.
Tony Donadio
Mike Hurben
>
>You might as well take your strain of "Objectivism" to another forum,
>because no one here is buying it.
>
>Jay Allen
This infighting is really quite entertaining, though. "I'm an Objectivist!"
"No, you're not!" "Piekoffian!" "Kellyite!"
Notice that those of us who do not run around attatching labels to ourselves
tend not to get into these types of 'debates.'
Just an observation that anyone who brands themselves with some "-ite,"
"-ist," or "-ian" is begging (rightly or wrongly) for an attack.
Mike Hurben, who is NOT a Randian, Kantian, Kellyite, Marxist, Atheist,
Aristotelian, Objectivist, Subjectivist, Moral Absolutist, Hegelian,
or anything but a bitter and hostile *ex-Objectivist* :)
Tom Radcliffe
Remarkable as it seems, I find myself moved to defend Mr. Donadio. While
he and his cohorts are obviously on the other side of the philosophical
fence from me, and I have been extremely annoyed by his apparent pig-
headedness in the past (as he no doubt has been by mine) I see no
evidence to impute any severe personality disorder to him.
Tom Radcliffe
[deleted]
|>
|> As you read the daily thrashings and note the lack of any actual learning
|> or intellectual progress taking place here, keep in mind that there are
|> alternatives available.
|> --
|> Paul Vixie
|> Redwood City, CA Also: <comp-sou...@uunet.uu.net>, <vi...@bsdi.com>,
|> decwrl!vixie!paul <ftpmai...@pa.dec.com>, <vi...@sony.com>,
|> <pa...@vix.com> <{bind-workers,objectivism}-req...@vix.com>
Despite the lousy SNR on this group it is surprisingly high compared
to some, particularly if you factor in the kind of flame-bait Rand's
work constitutes for many. Furthermore, it is the ONLY electronic
forum I am aware of that anyone can subscribe to without fear of
censure. Jimmy Wales' list is effectively closed to OSG members because
of OSG's litmus-test policy, and I believe the same is true
of Mr. Vixie's list (that is, it is closed to OSG members by OSG policy.)
Likewise, people of normal intelligence are generally not willing to pay
for OSG participation, nor -- in my understanding -- are they welcome
there. Jimmy Wales' list is at the moment going through the slightly
embarrassing excersize of discussing Kelley's vs. Peikoff's views on
toleration *in the absense of any serious representation of Peikoff's
side of the issue.* Because the participants on Jimmy's list are generally
fair-minded and concerned with good scholarship, they have tried
to present Peikoff's case as honestly and forcefully as possible before
they chop it into tiny little peices, but one senses their hearts
aren't really in it.
So a meeting place like this, in which anyone who wants to sound off
about anything, in which the rules of debate are lax and the audience
is broad (~32,000 readers as opposed to ~300 on Jimmy's list: check
out the group net.lists to find the readership of your favourite
group) serves a useful purpose. Sure the SNR is low. One reason
it is low is that so many sensible people, persumably Mr. Vixie amongst
them, choose to discuss their beliefs in relative private and quite.
But think of it as being in the great tradition of soapbox speakers
in Hyde Park: a place where any idea gets a wide, if not exactly fair,
hearing.
Moderated lists have their place. But they can't serve the kind of
function of bringing Rand's ideas to public attention that a.p.o does.
That those ideas sometimes invite public ridicule is all part of
the fun.
Andrew Southwick
from the presence of the cafe' itself, and for which no-one else can
claim property rights) would be some other public forum. A fountain in
the middle of the city? No- such a place is far to common. So let's
skip the analogies (although, I like the farm idea; initially,
first-come, first-serve; once the channel is started, property rights are
granted to the controller of the channel, which rights include the
exclusion of certain people at the owner's discretion; establishment of
reputation and character of the channel; ...).
#AynRand never existed until someone came and made it a place for
discussion, and acted to ensure the quality of that discussion. Mark
Gardner has worked hard at created a good atmosphere, and those of us
not directly involved in this dispute have looked towards it for
discussion of Objectivist ideas. Wales jumped in at an opportune time,
grabbed the channel, and refused to leave. Those of us who might have
expected a discussion of Objectivism might, instead, have found
anti-Objectivist ideas being discussed and *respected*. *WE* would have
been duped had Wales remained.
During normal operation of the channel, a bot is there to kick certain
people off. If #AynRand is really a free channel, then how can kicking
anyone off be justified? Mr. Wales *knowingly* grabbed the channel when
the bot was unfortunately disabled; he *knew* he was only there because
the bot was sick (at least, was quickly notified of the fact). #AynRand
became a moderated channel because of that bot. Mr. Wales and/or his
supporters are claiming that since the bot became inactive, all rights
to the channel were negated. All of Mr. Gardner's work can be ignored.
Now, I want to ask Mr. Wales intentions. Why did he want to take the
#AynRand channel? Merely to assert his right to be there (a right which
did not exist so long as the channel was moderated)? To use such
terrorism to be granted rights back to join the channel? I await a
response from Mr. Wales.
--
party hard, Techno, Gibson, Capitalism, 3DO, powder,
Andrew (and...@csgrad.cs.vt.edu) Bladerunner, rain, Ultima, Macs
sara lynn ruhmann
I have a question for Mr. Gardner (Mr. Wales is not the only one who
needs to be questioned...Has anyone considered that the fault may lie
elsewhere?). Mr. Gardner, how do you (or your bot) decide who can and
can't participate in #AynRand? I don't see how it could be benificial to
cut people out, unless the majority of thier activity is disruptive.
(Disruptive being considered flaming or attacking instead of making an
attempt at reasonable discussion) Was Mr. Wales disruptive? Or, is your
idea of disruptive behavior different from my own. Please explain.
Thanks
Sara
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>>If this description is correct (and I have no reason to suspect it is not),
>>then Mr. Wales' actions were utterly contemptable. This is a form of
>>initiated force, and a so-called "Objectivist" should know better.
Chris Wolf writes:
>>>And a 33 year old graduate student (Tony Donadio) should know better than to
>>>call someone a "so-called Objectivist." It is term of pure insult, and
>>>contributes nothing to the discusion.
Tony Donadio writes:
>A person who professes to be an Objectivist and flagrantly violates its
>principles is quite properly described as a "so-called Objectivist."
>
>Next.
Until just now, I have always defended Tony Donadio for his good
judgment. But he's making a serious mistake here. I entirely agree
with his remark that a person who professes to be an Objectivist but
who flagrantly violates its principles is quite properly described
as a "so-called Objectivist". I, however, am a person who never
violates any Objectivist principles whatsoever.
Perhaps none of you has ever seen the man who is willing to
identify the facts of reality, and to act on them consistently.
I am that man. I am willing -- and able -- to defend with reason
all of my actions and ideas.
Tom Radcliffe has come up with an adequate analogy for the workings
of IRC. It is like a cafe. The software enforces certain rules.
Here's how it works. Whenever someone is on a channel, it exists.
The first person on a channel has operator privileges and gets to
say who can be there. This is like in a cafe, where the first
person at a table gets to say who can sit there. On IRC, you can
stay on a channel as long as you like. If you have a bot program
running, you might stay for days.
However, if everyone leaves a channel, it no longer exists. This is
like getting up from your favorite table at a restaurant. It doesn't
matter if you usually sit there or not, you don't have the right to
kick someone out of your favorite seat if you didn't get there first.
Why? The restaurant does not belong to you! The owners of the
restaurant, the people who make it available, set the terms for
the use! The people who make IRC available (which means all the
owners of the computers and networks involved) set the rules for
its use via the software. That's that, and if you don't like it,
you can't just arbitrarily legislate it away.
Having said all that, I have adequately justified my moral right
to be on the IRC channel. But I would like to say the following.
I am entirely uninterested in IRC. I popped on there on the night
in question at the request of a friend. I was engaged in discussions
with a couple of people. Mark Gardner showed up and asked me to
leave so that he could set up his bot. I was amenable to this, and
merely asked for assurances that I would not be kicked off for the
remainder of the evening, so long as I behaved myself. After some
discussion of the details, Gardner agreed, unconditionally. He
made an explicit deal with me. He then broke that deal, on the grounds
that it is not necessary to keep a deal with the likes of Jimbo Wales.
Notice that on the night in question, he never asserted a property
right in the channel. He knows that to do so would be absurd.
And he did not use my being on "his" channel as an excuse for
breaking his promise to me. Instead, he claimed that my advocacy
of David Kelley's position on tolerance, as against Leonard Peikoff's
perversion of Objectivism, was sufficient to brand me as immoral.
This is the last thing I'll have to say on this topic.
I'd appreciate it, Tony, if you will do the right thing and write
to me privately if you have any further questions about this or
any other matter.
--Jimbo
Anders G|ransson
(...text omitted...)
Perhaps none of you has ever seen the man who is willing to
identify the facts of reality, and to act on them consistently.
I am that man. I am willing -- and able -- to defend with reason
all of my actions and ideas.
(...text omitted...)
For a while I thought Mr. Wales was making a little joke, but he wasn't,
was he?
Please tell me if you have evidence on this matter.
best regards Anders
--
'Wossat noise?'
The bleedin' wind under the door.
'Wossat noise now, squire? Wosse wind doing?'
Nuffink agint nuffink.
chris wolf
>A person who professes to be an Objectivist and flagrantly violates its
>principles is quite properly described as a "so-called Objectivist."
>
Gosh. I never really thought of it that way before. Nobody cuts to the
truth like Tony Donadio.
Okay! I'm convinced. I hereby adopt Tony's principle as my own.
From now on, I will refer to Tony as a "so-called man."
Chris Wolf
Jeff Dalton
>Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales (jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu) wrote:
>
>> This is not correct. The rules of IRC do not permit "ownership" of
>> channels. At any given time, if no one is on a channel, it does not
>> exist. Whoever starts a channel has "operator privileges" on the channel,
>> including the right (and ability via the software) to kick anyone off
>> the channel. On the day in question, channel #AynRand did not exist until
>> a friend of mine created it and invited me to join.
>
>Your final sentence is misleading. The channel #AynRand had existed
>before your friend created it that day. I should know, I had been on
>it before then. Mark Gardner created a bot to protect the channel
>when he and others were not around.
What right did he have to use this bot?
> The bot in which the machine
>lived was rebooted, thus destroying the bot. I see this as a case of
>a bolt of lighting destroying a lock on a gate, and someone coming in
>to squat on the land.
Only if he had a right to lock the gate in the first place.
-- jd
chris wolf
>|> I find it very strange that Mr. Donadio can make quite good arguments
>|>about intellectual matters, but still finds it necessary to use insulting
>|>remarks when referring to someone he really disagrees with. I am
>|>beginning to suspect that Tony Donadio suffers from some severe
>|>personality disorder.
Tom Radcliff responded:
>Remarkable as it seems, I find myself moved to defend Mr. Donadio. While
>he and his cohorts are obviously on the other side of the philosophical
>fence from me, and I have been extremely annoyed by his apparent pig-
>headedness in the past (as he no doubt has been by mine) I see no
>evidence to impute any severe personality disorder to him.
After I had sent my original post, I realized that I should have eliminated
the paragraph Tom Radcliff refers to (regarding personality disorder). Tom's
point is a valid one. I was making a strong claim that really required a
stronger context to support it. However, since it's too late to take back
that particular paragraph, permit me to develop the point more fully, as I
should have done in the original.
The following is psychological, rather than philosophical, and since I am
not a psychologist, it should be regarded merely as my opinion, born of my
own personal experience.
I think that anyone who repeatedly engages in insulting behavior (and
refuses to apologize for it) has some sort of personality disorder. This is
based on many years of experience, and meeting many Objectivists (who seem
particularly prone to such behavior; I think the philosophy attracts such
people). In every case, when I have encountered someone who regularly
engaged in insulting behavior, they always turned out to have other
psychological problems, such as chronic dishonesty.
It has been my experience that repeated insulting behavior is a reliable
channel marker for disturbed personalities, and is merely the most-visible
facet of such personalities. Such people seem to lack self-esteem, and to
show litle consideration for their fellow human beings. Like vandals,
they seem to take perverse pleasure in tearing down others with their
insults. What is even worse, such people almost never seem to even *know*
that they are engaging in insulting behavior. When their insulting behavior
is challenged, they refuse to apologize, and instead become defensive and
hostile. When I told one such individual that I would not tolerate her
insulting behavior, she responded by claiming that I just didn't know how to
get along with other people. By the same reasoning, I guess the Jews just
didn't know how to get along with the Nazis.
Nothing poisons intellectual debate and exchange like insulting behavior.
Anyone over the age of 18 is old enough to know that he should not piss on
carpets, carve his initials in desktops, or substitute insult for argument.
I think there is something very wrong with anyone who practices such
behavior on a regular basis.
Chris Wolf
chris wolf
>Moderated lists have their place. But they can't serve the kind of
>function of bringing Rand's ideas to public attention that a.p.o does.
>That those ideas sometimes invite public ridicule is all part of
>the fun.
scholarship, for sheer, unadultered fun, it's hard to beat a.p.o. It's as
much fun as a box of puppies. I love it.
Heck, if we didn't have guys like Tony Donadio, Mark Peter, and Betsy
Speicher to kick around, we'd have to invent them.
Chris Wolf
Mark J. Gardner
Jeff Dalton (je...@aiai.ed.ac.uk) wrote in alt.philosophy.objectivism on Fri, 4 Mar 1994 18:49:46 GMT:
: >Your final sentence is misleading. The channel #AynRand had existed
: >before your friend created it that day. I should know, I had been on
: >it before then. Mark Gardner created a bot to protect the channel
: >when he and others were not around.
: What right did he have to use this bot?
The right from paying US$15 a month to netaxs.com to use my Unix dialup
account as I please, within the terms of my subscription with them and
within the netiquette and other guidelines of IRC. Or did you think that
perhaps I was the first to ever put a bot on a channel?
: > The bot in which the machine
: >lived was rebooted, thus destroying the bot. I see this as a case of
: >a bolt of lighting destroying a lock on a gate, and someone coming in
: >to squat on the land.
: Only if he had a right to lock the gate in the first place.
Folks, if you have no clue as to common practices on IRC, don't argue this
point. It grows silly.
- --
Mark J. Gardner <m...@netaxs.com>
"My philosophical views are not part of the
history of philosophy yet. But they will be."
--Ayn Rand, in a statement to her philosophy professor in 1922
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