LIVE TALK AT YORK UNIVERSITY
Lindsay Joseph
YOUR PROFESSORS' WAR AGAINST YOUR MIND:
The Black Hole of Post-Modernism and Multiculturalism
York Students of Objectivism presents a live talk by Dr. Gary Hull on
Monday March 20 at 7:30 pm in Curtis Lecture Hall I (Keele Campus).
Admission is $4 for students and faculty, $8 for guests.
In this talk, Dr. Hull argues that deconstruction and multiculturalism
are destroying students' ability to think and to value. Dr. Hull
exposes the subjective and irrational nature of these movements, and
shows how they lead to destructive ends such as racism.
There will be a Q & A session following the talk.
All are welcome.
Zichi
: YOUR PROFESSORS' WAR AGAINST YOUR MIND:
I forwarded a copy of this to alt.postmodern.
Let the carnage begin...
HAVE A NICE DAY
"Ayn Rand cannot even spell `Jacques Derrida'"
NS Brown
[Quoting Lindsay Joseph:]
: : York Students of Objectivism presents a live talk by Dr. Gary Hull on
: : Monday March 20 at 7:30 pm in Curtis Lecture Hall I (Keele Campus).
: : Admission is $4 for students and faculty, $8 for guests.
: : In this talk, Dr. Hull argues that deconstruction and multiculturalism
: : are destroying students' ability to think and to value. Dr. Hull
: : exposes the subjective and irrational nature of these movements, and
: : shows how they lead to destructive ends such as racism.
[Zichi adds, editorially:]
: I forwarded a copy of this to alt.postmodern.
: Let the carnage begin...
What carnage? If Dr. Hull wants to come argue his points here,
then there might be spirited discussion. As things stand, it'd
be a matter of 'preaching to the choir' and thus pointless.
Just an opinion, worth what you paid for it. :)
Cris
Bryce Wilcox
NS Brown <nsb...@news.IntNet.net> wrote:
>[Zichi adds, editorially:]
>: I forwarded a copy of this to alt.postmodern.
>
>: Let the carnage begin...
>
>What carnage? If Dr. Hull wants to come argue his points here,
>then there might be spirited discussion. As things stand, it'd
>be a matter of 'preaching to the choir' and thus pointless.
Hey, if Dr. Hull *does* get onto UseNet and argue with alt.postmodern,
somebody please let me know so that I can watch, ok?
I'm afraid there wouldn't be much common ground from which to argue, though.
Some people on alt.philosophy.objectivism have had a very long and apparently
substantive argument over metaphysical reality versus language or something,
but I didn't really pay too much attention and the argument seems to have
faded.
One fellow from CU Boulder named Brian somethingorother was claiming that we
have no grasp upon real things, but only upon our language-representations of
them. Is that an example of a post-modern viewpoint? The last fusillade that
I observed was when the objectivists told him that if his hypothesis was true,
then we would have no grasp upon the real thing called language either, in
which case his argument was self-defeating. :-) I thought that was a nifty
move on the part of Tom Radcliffe, if I remember correctly.
Bryce
"Faith" == "Unreason" | There are only 2 * 10^207 possible two-line
Bryce....@colorado.edu | signatures and I have dibs on this one.
jle...@utdallas.edu
[in response to the flame-bait about Dr. Hull]
> Hey, if Dr. Hull *does* get onto UseNet and argue with alt.postmodern,
> somebody please let me know so that I can watch, ok?
[snip]
> One fellow from CU Boulder named Brian somethingorother was claiming
> that we have no grasp upon real things, but only upon our
> language-representations of them. Is that an example of a post-modern
> viewpoint?
Perhaps, but that statement is a mere reflection of p-m thought.
The point concerns whether there is any sense to the notion of
"real things" in the ontological/epistemological sense. Perhaps,
there is a "real" world in which there "are" "things-in-themselves".
On the other hand, perhaps not. The question is undecidable. Of
course it can be objected that it is "self-evident" that there "is"
a "real" world. However, this may only reflect a necessary 'error'
from the perspective of our particular forms of life. It appears
that Brian was expressing something similar to Nietzsche's thesis on
the 'metaphorical' 'nature' of language in "On Truth and Lies in
a Non-Moral Sense."
> The last fusillade that I observed was when the objectivists
> told him that if his hypothesis was true, then we would have no grasp
> upon the real thing called language either, in which case his argument
> was self-defeating. :-) I thought that was a nifty move on the part of
> Tom Radcliffe, if I remember correctly.
A clever rhetoric move on Radcliffe's part. However, why does he
conflate language with things? In what manner has he dissolved the
mind/body duality built into our culture? What type of ontology is
he employing which can adequately reconcile/assimalte physical object
ontology, "things", with event/process/mental ontologies? Moreover,
is he consistent in employing such an ontology, or was he simply
attempting to dismiss Brian's remarks in an out-of-hand manner?
--
============================================================================
James L Elson: |<o When you stare into the abyss too long o>|
School of Arts & Humanities |<o the abyss stares back into you. o>|
University of Texas-Dallas | --Nietzsche-- |
Russell Turpin
-*-----
At least it will be a fair fight.
Russell
--
"Why does our innate subjective spacing of qualities accord so well with the
functionally relevant groupings in nature as to make our inductions come out
right? ... Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic
but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing." -- W. V. O. Quine
NS Brown
[Bryce wrote:]
: One fellow from CU Boulder named Brian somethingorother was claiming
: that we have no grasp upon real things, but only upon our language-
: representations of them. Is that an example of a post-modern viewpoint?
"A" postmodern viewpoint? Yes. "The" postmodern viewpoint?
No. "The most commonly held" postmodern viewpoint? Perhaps,
though I wouldn't bet on it.
Gordon Fitch
| At least it will be a fair fight.
I don't think so. Postmodernism doesn't exist in the same
sense as Objectivism. You'd think this would give
Objectivism the advantage, because the Objectivist champion
could make up his own Postmodernism as he pleased, and in
doing so make sure to soundly defeat it in advance.
However, it is tiring enough to strike at shadows, and no
matter how many times one knocks them down there seem to be
always more.
Eventually, the shadows prevail. Better to have left them
alone.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
Bryce Wilcox
Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
<someone else wrote>
>| At least it will be a fair fight.
>
>I don't think so. Postmodernism doesn't exist in the same
>sense as Objectivism. You'd think this would give
>Objectivism the advantage, because the Objectivist champion
>could make up his own Postmodernism as he pleased, and in
>doing so make sure to soundly defeat it in advance.
>However, it is tiring enough to strike at shadows, and no
>matter how many times one knocks them down there seem to be
>always more.
>
>Eventually, the shadows prevail. Better to have left them
>alone.
Yes, despite our resident Troll's best efforts there seems to be a resounding
lack of enthusiasm on the part of the would-be combatants. As a general rule,
objectivists have little interest in battling with insubstantial things (see
Roark re Toohey: "I don't think of you.")
I would, of course, disagree with your prediction that shadows prevail.
Bryce
,
In the name of the best /. island Life in a chaos sea
that is within us. -AR / Bryce....@colorado.edu
---*
Tom Radcliffe
|>
[deleted]
|>
|> Some people on alt.philosophy.objectivism have had a very long and apparently
|> substantive argument over metaphysical reality versus language or something,
|> but I didn't really pay too much attention and the argument seems to have
|> faded.
|> One fellow from CU Boulder named Brian somethingorother was claiming that we
|> have no grasp upon real things, but only upon our language-representations of
|> them. Is that an example of a post-modern viewpoint? The last fusillade that
|> I observed was when the objectivists told him that if his hypothesis was true,
|> then we would have no grasp upon the real thing called language either, in
|> which case his argument was self-defeating. :-) I thought that was a nifty
|> move on the part of Tom Radcliffe, if I remember correctly.
|>
NOTE: I AM NOT AN OBJECTIVIST! I have many profound disagreements
with Rand on everything from metaphysics to politics (and don't even ask about her
theory of sex and love....) I think a number of Rand's epistemological approaches are
interesting and potentially useful, and that is all. And I don't think the recent
dust-up with Brian Artese was particularly representative of how post-modernists and
objectivists (or anyone else) should interact. I am fairly ignorant of post-modernism, but
my impression is that it has more in common with objectivism than either side might realize.
The emphasis on the contextuallity of meaning and the role of a dynamic consciousness are
two possible points of contact. But if Brian is a fair example of post-modernists, then I
think they take the notion of absolute truth far too seriously, and worry far too much about
its demise. And again, if Brian is a representative example of PM, no one in his right
mind would bother to argue with them, as he allowed himself huge liberties with the
use of language that he did not allow anyone else, which got more than a little
tiresome after a while (when I mentioned an abstract category I was committing all
kinds of terrible metaphysical mayhem in his eyes, when he mentioned an abstract
category, he was merely in the irrestible grip of English grammar. I've seen
intellectual cowardice before, but ``The grammar made me do it'' has to be some
kind of record.) And I could never communicate to him the point that Bryce has so
nicely summarized above: language is a real thing, and any claims about reality and
our knowledge of it must apply equally well to language and to rocks.
-- Tom Radcliffe
Phil Oliver
Gordon Fitch wrote:
[Comments on nature of Postmodernism]
> alone.
societies that choose to stay shivering and screaming in the
dark, but the successful ones will be those where enough
individuals in them accept rationality as their guiding light.
Rats and cockroaches only seem significant when the society
is irrational enough to employ them in universities. In the
words of Rand, as memory serves, those creatures will scurry
away at the first sound of *human* footsteps.
-- Phil Oliver
John Enright
: "Why does our innate subjective spacing of qualities accord so well with the
: functionally relevant groupings in nature as to make our inductions come out
: right? ... Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic
: but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing." -- W. V. O. Quine
Interesting Quine quote.
Out of curiosity, is this an anticipation of what is lately called
evolutionary epistemology?
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Enright from address: jenr...@home.interaccess.com
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gordon Fitch
| > Eventually, the shadows prevail. Better to have left them
| > alone.
Phil Oliver <ph...@indy.net>:
| Objectivism is turning on the lights....
Yes, of course. Better to light a candle than curse the
darkness. Better to turn on a light than _fight_with_
_shadows_. After all, one becomes like one's enemies.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
Lee Rudolph
>| [Comments on nature of Postmodernism]
>| > Eventually, the shadows prevail. Better to have left them
>| > alone.
Phil Oliver <ph...@indy.net>:
>| Objectivism is turning on the lights....
gcf:
>Yes, of course. Better to light a candle than curse the
>darkness. Better to turn on a light than _fight_with_
>_shadows_. After all, one becomes like one's enemies.
Touch not pitch, lest ye become a torch.
Lee Rudolph
brian artese
>|> One fellow from CU Boulder named Brian somethingorother was claiming that we
>|> have no grasp upon real things, but only upon our language-representations of
>|> them. Is that an example of a post-modern viewpoint? The last fusillade that
>|> I observed was when the objectivists told him that if his hypothesis was true,
>|> then we would have no grasp upon the real thing called language either, in
>|> which case his argument was self-defeating. :-) I thought that was a nifty
>|> move on the part of Tom Radcliffe, if I remember correctly.
Yes, it was nifty. But equally interesting was the profound silence that
greeted my repeated distinction between language as sound or ink (which is
the material reality of language) and language as something which
supposedly has the power to refer, or which has the power to "represent"
reality -- those things are _claims_, things which have little to do with
the material reality of language. Most of the people I was arguing with
on alt.philosophy.objectivism couldn't really understand the difference
between "meaning" and text -- they just assumed they were the same thing,
so further discussion was pretty pointless.
By the way, I didn't want to imply that I was acting as a spokesperson
for postmodernism. Personally, I think the term "postmodern" is pretty
silly.
-- brian
Tom Radcliffe
|> Bryce Wilcox (wil...@cs.colorado.edu) wrote:
|>
|> [in response to the flame-bait about Dr. Hull]
|>
|> > Hey, if Dr. Hull *does* get onto UseNet and argue with alt.postmodern,
|> > somebody please let me know so that I can watch, ok?
|>
|> [snip]
|>
|>
|> > The last fusillade that I observed was when the objectivists
|> > told him that if his hypothesis was true, then we would have no grasp
|> > upon the real thing called language either, in which case his argument
|> > was self-defeating. :-) I thought that was a nifty move on the part of
|> > Tom Radcliffe, if I remember correctly.
|>
|> A clever rhetoric move on Radcliffe's part. However, why does he
|> conflate language with things?
Whatever leads you to believe I conflate language with things? Nothing I have
said, nor anything in Bryce's discription of it, could possibly be construed as
an attempt to do such a thing.
|>In what manner has he dissolved the
|> mind/body duality built into our culture?
Whose culture? And how do you know I'm a member of it? What is a culture,
anyway, and how do you know? And while you're at it, can you explain that
other great cultural artifact, the wind/air duality?
|> What type of ontology is
|> he employing which can adequately reconcile/assimalte physical object
|> ontology, "things", with event/process/mental ontologies?
It isn't an ontology, it's an epistemology. Phenomenological particulars are
grasped actively by consciousness into abstract purely mental classes that
exist themselves only as activities of the same active consciousness, which
is itself best understood (by itself) as a process rather than an entity.
|>Moreover,
|> is he consistent in employing such an ontology, or was he simply
|> attempting to dismiss Brian's remarks in an out-of-hand manner?
|>
I try for consistency. But I agree with the post-moderns that there is something
wrong with the way we use language. I just don't agree with how significant
this is in limiting what we think, or how we think. The distinction we
routinely make between things and actions is simply one of convenience
(and like many conveniences, it can get you into deep trouble if you forget
that there is an active division going on that is functional for understanding,
but not necessarily reflecting anything about the world of phenomenological
particulars.)
Tom Radcliffe
|
> t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca (Tom Radcliffe) DID NOT write:
NOTE: I DID NOT WRITE THE FOLLOWING. I think Bryce Wilcox did.
|>
|> >|> One fellow from CU Boulder named Brian somethingorother was claiming that we
|> >|> have no grasp upon real things, but only upon our language-representations of
|> >|> them. Is that an example of a post-modern viewpoint? The last fusillade that
|> >|> I observed was when the objectivists told him that if his hypothesis was true,
|> >|> then we would have no grasp upon the real thing called language either, in
|> >|> which case his argument was self-defeating. :-) I thought that was a nifty
|> >|> move on the part of Tom Radcliffe, if I remember correctly.
|>
|> Yes, it was nifty. But equally interesting was the profound silence that
|> greeted my repeated distinction between language as sound or ink (which is
|> the material reality of language) and language as something which
|> supposedly has the power to refer, or which has the power to "represent"
|> reality -- those things are _claims_, things which have little to do with
|> the material reality of language. Most of the people I was arguing with
|> on alt.philosophy.objectivism couldn't really understand the difference
|> between "meaning" and text -- they just assumed they were the same thing,
|> so further discussion was pretty pointless.
|>
That is, the argument went something like this:
BRIAN: Language can't refer to anything.
ME: Didn't you just use language to refer to language? What makes these marks
on the screen different from rocks?
BRIAN: HA! I've caught you using an ABSTRACT CATEGORY! You silly
realist. There are no rocks. Language is just a grid we lay on our experiences, it
is not the experiences themselves.
ME: You still haven't answered my question, and you have again refered to
language, as if what you were refering to somehow relates to my phenomological
experiences of words and such.
BRIAN: Language isn't make up of words, but of phonemes, or memes if
we're talking semiotics.
ME: How come you can talk about memes, but I can't talk about rocks?
And so on. We were really quite impolite to each other, and I would not be
surprised if I tried Brian's patience as much as he tried mine. We never really
got into a discussion of meaning vs. text (something that is obviously
important -- for instance, there are objectivists who believe that truth is a
property of propositions rather than a property of the meaning of propositions.)
I was trying to get Brian to acknowlege that his claims, regarded as ordinary
phenomenological claims (be the phenomenon in question rocks or memes or
marks on paper) shattered all of the rules he was trying to impose on my use of
language to make similarly ordinary phenomenological claims.
One of the reasons Brian's points about the distinction of meaning and text
were met with profound silence (from me, anyway) is that they simply weren't
related to the point I was trying to get across to him, and in any case, I know
already that meaning and text are only loosely related (for some of us more
loosely than others.)
brian artese
>I was trying to get Brian to acknowlege that his claims, regarded as ordinary
>phenomenological claims (be the phenomenon in question rocks or memes or
>marks on paper) shattered all of the rules he was trying to impose on my use of
>language to make similarly ordinary phenomenological claims.
The only time I want to impose "rules on the use of language" is when
somebody wants to make an explicitly ontological claim. Objectivism, as
far as I know, does involve the notion that we can "discover" through
reason the ultimate _articulatable_ map of reality (or "being", whatever)
If you (Tom) don't share that assumption, or if you and I agree that
descriptions of the world can only have the status of "phenomenological
claims", then we have nothing to argue about.
The response on alt.phi.obj was "no, no, objectivism does not rely on such
a naive metaphysics." So I took a different route to show how that
naivete is embedded in another o'ist assumption, the assumption that
language can "refer" to something that is not language. Reference would
have to be conceived of as a process by which something nonverbal --
something that had formerly "escaped" language -- was now captured and
made "present" to us via the referential power of language. The fact
that all statements can only have meaning in relation to other
statements, i.e., the fact that all statements can refer only to
language, is obliterated by that notion.
In other words, language is a process figuration, not reference.
Figuration (or metaphor) is an attempt to offer a description that will
act as a substitute for something. A substitute for what? "Reality". So
language tells us what reality is "like". How are we able to apprehend
that likeness? Because we recognize the words, the description, the
metaphor -- not because we recognize whatever supposedly stands "behind"
them. Language is not transparent; it does not act as a window that
reveals the landscape of reality as it "ultimately is".
Nietzsche says it better than I can. This is from Paul de Man's
translation of part of a collection of N's notes published as _Gesammelte
Werke_; keep in mind that that, here, in order to make a point, he
conflates "rhetoric" with figural or metaphorical language:
"It is not difficult to demonstrate that what is called 'rhetorical,' as
the devices of a conscious art, is present as a device of unconscious art
in language and its development [i.e, it happens whenever you speak, even
when you're not "trying" to be rhetorical -- b]. We can go so far as to
say that rhetoric is an extension of the devices embedded in language...
No such thing as an unrhetorical, 'natural' language exists that could be
used as a point of reference: language is itself the result of purely
rhetorical tricks and devices ... Language is rhetoric, for it only
intends to convey a _doxa_ (opinion), not an _episteme_ (truth) ... Tropes
are not something that can be added or subtracted from language at will;
they are its truest nature. There is no such thing as a proper meaning
that can be communicated only in certain particular cases."
> ... there are objectivists who believe that truth is a
>property of propositions rather than a property of the meaning of propositions.)
_This_ is the kind of thing we should be arguing about, since I would say
that there's no difference at all between those two things. There _is_ no
"meaning" that can be distinguished from the text itself and which exists
"simultaneously" "with" that text. Take, for example, a given passage in
a philosophy book in front of you. You haven't read it yet, but somebody
asks you, "what does the passage mean?" You'd say, I don't know, I
haven't read it yet. If you were asked the question "_Where_ would you
find the meaning of the passage," you might answer, "it's in the book, in
the passage." So then you open the book and read the passage. You're
asked again, "what is the meaning of the passage?" so you go on to
paraphrase the passage as best as you can, and let's say you write your
paraphrase down on a pad next to the book. But now -- with the book open
in front of you -- where is the meaning? It's no longer in the book. The
passage is now understood as an opaque code that needs interpretation, and
we have to reach "outside" the text of the passage in order to find the
meaning. But of the passage _you_ wrote in order to provide the meaning I
can now ask, what does _that_ passage mean? To answer that, you'd have to
give another paraphrase and write it down. But what does _that_ passage
mean?
What status do we give a term like "meaning" if it is something that is
always out of reach? In fact, in order for something to _be_ meaning it
has to be perpetually "beyond". It seems obvious that "meaning" as
something that exists concurrently "with" a given statement is something
that just doesn't exist. All there _is_ is text. Any given statement, as
de Man says, is not oriented toward a "meaning" -- it is only oriented
toward its re-articulation in the future, toward its own paraphrase.
-- brian
jle...@utdallas.edu
> In article <3kq3df$j...@utdallas.edu>, jle...@utdallas.edu writes:
> |>
> |> > The last fusillade that I observed was when the objectivists
> |> > told him that if his hypothesis was true, then we would have no grasp
> |> > upon the real thing called language either, in which case his argument
> |> > was self-defeating. :-) I thought that was a nifty move on the part of
> |> > Tom Radcliffe, if I remember correctly.
> |>
> |> A clever rhetoric move on Radcliffe's part. However, why does he
> |> conflate language with things?
> Whatever leads you to believe I conflate language with things? Nothing I
> have said, nor anything in Bryce's discription of it, could possibly be
> construed as an attempt to do such a thing.
Look again at Bryce's quote: "the real thing called language"
^^^^^^^^^^
That statement directly suggests that language is a "thing". That may
not be what YOU said, but that IS the statement Bryce attributed
to you.
>
> |>In what manner has he dissolved the
> |> mind/body duality built into our culture?
> Whose culture? And how do you know I'm a member of it? What is a culture,
> anyway, and how do you know? And while you're at it, can you explain that
> other great cultural artifact, the wind/air duality?
Please, no need to get hostile. I'm not at all interested in
that sort of exchange though it is lamentably popular on
USENET. "our culture" = Western culture. We can get very precise
if you want, but then our posts will need to be very, very long.
> |> What type of ontology is
> |> he employing which can adequately reconcile/assimalte physical object
> |> ontology, "things", with event/process/mental ontologies?
> It isn't an ontology, it's an epistemology. Phenomenological particulars are
> grasped actively by consciousness into abstract purely mental classes that
> exist themselves only as activities of the same active consciousness, which
> is itself best understood (by itself) as a process rather than an entity.
I don't think you understand what I'm asking.
> |>Moreover,
> |> is he consistent in employing such an ontology, or was he simply
> |> attempting to dismiss Brian's remarks in an out-of-hand manner?
> |>
> I try for consistency. But I agree with the post-moderns that there is
> something wrong with the way we use language. I just don't agree with
> how significant this is in limiting what we think, or how we think.
This is a very complex issue. Frankly, I haven't seen it adequately
addressed except in very few instances. You might be surprised by
the degree to which we might be in agreement. I'm something of
a heretic, especially as concerns the "popular" notion of
post-modern thought.
BTW, would you consider limiting your lines to 60 characters,
otherwise, when quoted they word-wrap badly. Thanks
Tom Wetzel
---
brian artese writes:
> the assumption that
>language can "refer" to something that is not language. Reference would
>have to be conceived of as a process by which something nonverbal --
>something that had formerly "escaped" language -- was now captured and
So, the idea is that a language-to-non-linguistic relationship, of
the sort called referring, cannot be set up to something where it had
been set up before. How, then, can a newborn acquire a name?
>made "present" to us via the referential power of language. The fact
No, just the other way around. The ability to refer to items in
the world, in at least many central cases, is parasitic on the
introduction of those items into our experience. Thus, I can say
to a store clerk
I want a jacket with *that* color
(pointing to a person's shirt as they walk by)
The presentation of that shade of color in my field of vision was
a precondition of my ability to designate it on that occasion.
>that all statements can only have meaning in relation to other
>statements, i.e., the fact that all statements can refer only to
>language, is obliterated by that notion.
This is a non-sequitur. From the fact that the meanings that people
attach to pieces of language cannot be considered in isolation
from the cognitive context and the context of social practice, it
does not follow that language refers to language. The conclusion
is absurd.
>In other words, language is a process figuration, not reference.
>Figuration (or metaphor) is an attempt to offer a description that will
>act as a substitute for something. A substitute for what? "Reality". So
>language tells us what reality is "like". How are we able to apprehend
No, people tell people what particular parts of reality are "like".
>that likeness? Because we recognize the words, the description, the
>metaphor -- not because we recognize whatever supposedly stands "behind"
>them. Language is not transparent; it does not act as a window that
>reveals the landscape of reality as it "ultimately is"
Tom Wetzel
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
thomas...@eng.sun.com
Tom Radcliffe
|>
|> >I was trying to get Brian to acknowlege that his claims, regarded as ordinary
|> >phenomenological claims (be the phenomenon in question rocks or memes or
|> >marks on paper) shattered all of the rules he was trying to impose on my use of
|> >language to make similarly ordinary phenomenological claims.
|>
|> The only time I want to impose "rules on the use of language" is when
|> somebody wants to make an explicitly ontological claim. Objectivism, as
|> far as I know, does involve the notion that we can "discover" through
|> reason the ultimate _articulatable_ map of reality (or "being", whatever)
|> If you (Tom) don't share that assumption, or if you and I agree that
|> descriptions of the world can only have the status of "phenomenological
|> claims", then we have nothing to argue about.
|>
Assuming we agree what the meaning of ``phenomenological claims'' is, we
have nothing to argue about. So far as I understand it, objectivism makes no
claim about the possibility of discovering the ``ultimate articulatable map of
reality.'' For instance, one of the neat features of the objectivist epistemology
is that it allows for multiple, equally legitimate, conceptual heirarchies or
schemes, without leaving them totally unconstrained by phenomenology.
The whole idea of ``reality'' or ``being'' as I think you are using it is one
that I would simply dispense with for the same reason we have dispensed
with notions of absolute space and perfect measurement. It does not reduce
to anything in the phenomenological world, and there is good reason to
beleive that it cannot ever be so reduced. But just as dispensing with
absolute space does not preclude talking in a perfectly coherent way about
space, so disposing of absolute truth does not prevent us from talking about
truth in a perfectly coherent way. It is just that what we mean by truth
is somewhat different from what we meant before, and this will sometimes
have empirical consquences. But not all that often.
|> The response on alt.phi.obj was "no, no, objectivism does not rely on such
|> a naive metaphysics." So I took a different route to show how that
|> naivete is embedded in another o'ist assumption, the assumption that
|> language can "refer" to something that is not language. Reference would
|> have to be conceived of as a process by which something nonverbal --
|> something that had formerly "escaped" language -- was now captured and
|> made "present" to us via the referential power of language. The fact
|> that all statements can only have meaning in relation to other
|> statements, i.e., the fact that all statements can refer only to
|> language, is obliterated by that notion.
|>
And the thing you still don't get is that language, considered phenomenologically
at any level, is not different from any other phenomenon. So if you want your
remarks to refer to language *as a phenomenon* then they are self refuting. If
you don't want them to refer to language as a phenomenon, then they are
uninteresting.
|> In other words, language is a process figuration, not reference.
|> Figuration (or metaphor) is an attempt to offer a description that will
|> act as a substitute for something. A substitute for what? "Reality". So
|> language tells us what reality is "like". How are we able to apprehend
|> that likeness? Because we recognize the words, the description, the
|> metaphor -- not because we recognize whatever supposedly stands "behind"
|> them. Language is not transparent; it does not act as a window that
|> reveals the landscape of reality as it "ultimately is".
|>
We appear to be using ``reference'' in radically different ways. The way I
use ``reference'' no ultimate reality (in the sense I think you are using that
ultimately incoherent term) is required or implied. The difficulty with
putting this in terms of metaphor is that metaphor is only possible when
there is an underlying layer of non-metaphorical reference. And it is
not clear that language necessarily involves the task of substitution you
think it does. Language, in my view, is a tool used by an active consciousness
of a particular type to aprehend reality. That aprehension is not necessarily
analyzable into familiar components like substitution.
|> Nietzsche says it better than I can. This is from Paul de Man's
|> translation of part of a collection of N's notes published as _Gesammelte
|> Werke_; keep in mind that that, here, in order to make a point, he
|> conflates "rhetoric" with figural or metaphorical language:
|>
|> "It is not difficult to demonstrate that what is called 'rhetorical,' as
|> the devices of a conscious art, is present as a device of unconscious art
|> in language and its development [i.e, it happens whenever you speak, even
|> when you're not "trying" to be rhetorical -- b]. We can go so far as to
|> say that rhetoric is an extension of the devices embedded in language...
|> No such thing as an unrhetorical, 'natural' language exists that could be
|> used as a point of reference: language is itself the result of purely
|> rhetorical tricks and devices ... Language is rhetoric, for it only
|> intends to convey a _doxa_ (opinion), not an _episteme_ (truth) ... Tropes
|> are not something that can be added or subtracted from language at will;
|> they are its truest nature. There is no such thing as a proper meaning
|> that can be communicated only in certain particular cases."
|>
I'm need to think about this a little, but I'll just point out that it is probable
that N. is referring (there's that word again -- how do you suppose he does
it?) to a notion of truth that I reject.
|> > ... there are objectivists who believe that truth is a
|> >property of propositions rather than a property of the meaning of propositions.)
|>
|> _This_ is the kind of thing we should be arguing about, since I would say
|> that there's no difference at all between those two things. There _is_ no
|> "meaning" that can be distinguished from the text itself and which exists
|> "simultaneously" "with" that text. Take, for example, a given passage in
|> a philosophy book in front of you. You haven't read it yet, but somebody
|> asks you, "what does the passage mean?" You'd say, I don't know, I
|> haven't read it yet. If you were asked the question "_Where_ would you
|> find the meaning of the passage," you might answer, "it's in the book, in
|> the passage."
Well, you might answer that way, but I wouldn't. I would answer, ``What do
you mean? I don't understand what you're asking?'' Because on my construal
of meaning the question is incoherent: until I've read the passage it does not
have a meaning, as meaning is a relational property between an active consciousness
and the world of sensory/perceptual experience.
|>So then you open the book and read the passage. You're
|> asked again, "what is the meaning of the passage?" so you go on to
|> paraphrase the passage as best as you can, and let's say you write your
|> paraphrase down on a pad next to the book. But now -- with the book open
|> in front of you -- where is the meaning? It's no longer in the book. The
|> passage is now understood as an opaque code that needs interpretation, and
|> we have to reach "outside" the text of the passage in order to find the
|> meaning. But of the passage _you_ wrote in order to provide the meaning I
|> can now ask, what does _that_ passage mean? To answer that, you'd have to
|> give another paraphrase and write it down. But what does _that_ passage
|> mean?
|>
Again, you seem to be assuming that meaning exists in the text. Surely the
Chinese room argument makes this position passe'?
|> What status do we give a term like "meaning" if it is something that is
|> always out of reach?
It is not at all out of reach. It is just not where you are looking for it, nor
is it the kind of thing you seem to expect it to be.
|>In fact, in order for something to _be_ meaning it
|> has to be perpetually "beyond". It seems obvious that "meaning" as
|> something that exists concurrently "with" a given statement is something
|> that just doesn't exist. All there _is_ is text. Any given statement, as
|> de Man says, is not oriented toward a "meaning" -- it is only oriented
|> toward its re-articulation in the future, toward its own paraphrase.
|>
It may seem obvious, but as your examples show, there is a great deal more
than text: there are also knowing subjects, who read and understand the
text. The meaning lies in the relationship between the knowing subject
and the text. If you, for some reason I don't understand, choose to arbitrarily
restrict your search for meaning to the text, you will of course find it there.
Tom Radcliffe
|> Tom Radcliffe (t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca) wrote:
|> > In article <3kq3df$j...@utdallas.edu>, jle...@utdallas.edu writes:
|> > |>
|> > |> > The last fusillade that I observed was when the objectivists
|> > |> > told him that if his hypothesis was true, then we would have no grasp
|> > |> > upon the real thing called language either, in which case his argument
|> > |> > was self-defeating. :-) I thought that was a nifty move on the part of
|> > |> > Tom Radcliffe, if I remember correctly.
|> > |>
|> > |> A clever rhetoric move on Radcliffe's part. However, why does he
|> > |> conflate language with things?
|>
|> > Whatever leads you to believe I conflate language with things? Nothing I
|> > have said, nor anything in Bryce's discription of it, could possibly be
|> > construed as an attempt to do such a thing.
|>
|> Look again at Bryce's quote: "the real thing called language"
|> ^^^^^^^^^^
|>
|> That statement directly suggests that language is a "thing". That may
|> not be what YOU said, but that IS the statement Bryce attributed
|> to you.
|>
Language is a thing, just a rock is a thing. Both are phenomena.
But to say this is utterly different from saying language is *conflated*
with things (plural.) I'm not even sure what the latter means, but none
of the ways I can think of construing it resolve themselves into the
claim that language is a real thing (singular.)
|> >
|> > |>In what manner has he dissolved the
|> > |> mind/body duality built into our culture?
|>
|> > Whose culture? And how do you know I'm a member of it? What is a culture,
|> > anyway, and how do you know? And while you're at it, can you explain that
|> > other great cultural artifact, the wind/air duality?
|>
|> Please, no need to get hostile. I'm not at all interested in
|> that sort of exchange though it is lamentably popular on
|> USENET. "our culture" = Western culture. We can get very precise
|> if you want, but then our posts will need to be very, very long.
|>
That wasn't hostility, just sarcasm. Post-modernists very often seem
to be wearing logical Seven-League Boots (as do objectivists) that
lead them to make sweeping empirical claims that take just a
little work to swallow. The thing about Western culture is that
it subsumes a range of beliefs that is at least as great as the range
between Western and, say, Oreintal culture. The best way I
can think to explain it is to compare cultures with lines in two
dimensions, thus:
=====A================================B=======
+++++++++++C++++++++++++++++++++++D++++++++++++
Although points A and B are both on the first line, they are
further from each other than A is from C or B is from D.
So while all the Westerners may differ from all Orientals in
a similar way, they also differ from each other along other
axes. And one of those axes is certainly the status of the
relationship between mind and body. So I find it mildly
preposterous that you would suggest that being a member
of Western culture constrains one to a particular belief
with regard to the mind/body relationship. And, if pressed,
I will claim to have resigned from Western culture some
years ago, which makes me ... uh ... uncultured, I guess.
|> > |> What type of ontology is
|> > |> he employing which can adequately reconcile/assimalte physical object
|> > |> ontology, "things", with event/process/mental ontologies?
|>
|> > It isn't an ontology, it's an epistemology. Phenomenological particulars are
|> > grasped actively by consciousness into abstract purely mental classes that
|> > exist themselves only as activities of the same active consciousness, which
|> > is itself best understood (by itself) as a process rather than an entity.
|>
|> I don't think you understand what I'm asking.
|>
I'm willing to believe that.
|> > |>Moreover,
|> > |> is he consistent in employing such an ontology, or was he simply
|> > |> attempting to dismiss Brian's remarks in an out-of-hand manner?
|> > |>
|>
|> > I try for consistency. But I agree with the post-moderns that there is
|> > something wrong with the way we use language. I just don't agree with
|> > how significant this is in limiting what we think, or how we think.
|>
|> This is a very complex issue. Frankly, I haven't seen it adequately
|> addressed except in very few instances. You might be surprised by
|> the degree to which we might be in agreement. I'm something of
|> a heretic, especially as concerns the "popular" notion of
|> post-modern thought.
|>
As I said, although I'm quite adamantly not an objectivist, I think the
objectivist epistemology has some very interesting bits, and they don't
seem totally dissimilar to the more interesting bits of post-modernism.
One could stretch the point a bit and claim that objectivism can be
understood as part of the general (very diffuse) post-modern
movement. It would be kind of fun to see someone who understood
both defend this thesis at length, as it would be bound to annoy
everyone on both sides of the issue.
|>
|> BTW, would you consider limiting your lines to 60 characters,
|> otherwise, when quoted they word-wrap badly. Thanks
|>
I've tried to do that. I'm using a new front-end on my newsreader
that has its own ideas about page width.
|>
|> --
|> ============================================================================
|> James L Elson: |<o When you stare into the abyss too long o>|
|> School of Arts & Humanities |<o the abyss stares back into you. o>|
|> University of Texas-Dallas | --Nietzsche-- |
Personally, I've always found that when I stare into the abyss too long
I get these really cool swirlly patterns in front of my eyes....
I'm hopelessly busy right now, and will probably let this discussion
drop. Its been fun.
jle...@utdallas.edu
> In article <3l3hpp$a...@utdallas.edu>, jle...@utdallas.edu writes:
> |>
> |> Look again at Bryce's quote: "the real thing called language"
> |> ^^^^^^^^^^
> |>
> |> That statement directly suggests that language is a "thing". That may
> |> not be what YOU said, but that IS the statement Bryce attributed
> |> to you.
> |>
> Language is a thing, just a rock is a thing. Both are phenomena.
> But to say this is utterly different from saying language is *conflated*
> with things (plural.) I'm not even sure what the latter means, but none
> of the ways I can think of construing it resolve themselves into the
> claim that language is a real thing (singular.)
OK, a lot depends upon the primary ontology one employs. From a
phenomenological approach, your point is well taken. However, I
must agree with Quine that the "physical object" variety is our
primary ontology.
> |> Please, no need to get hostile. I'm not at all interested in
> |> that sort of exchange though it is lamentably popular on
> |> USENET. "our culture" = Western culture. We can get very precise
> |> if you want, but then our posts will need to be very, very long.
> |>
> That wasn't hostility, just sarcasm. Post-modernists very often seem
> to be wearing logical Seven-League Boots (as do objectivists) that
> lead them to make sweeping empirical claims that take just a
> little work to swallow. The thing about Western culture is that
> it subsumes a range of beliefs that is at least as great as the range
> between Western and, say, Oreintal culture.
I see your point, and it's well taken. I speak of Westen culture
in regards to the fundamental assumptions/premises and ways of
conceptualizing our experiences. It is these aspects/factors
which give Western culture its cohesion despite the tensions
that exist between the various belief/thought 'systems' which
one can find within it.
> [snip] So I find it mildly
> preposterous that you would suggest that being a member
> of Western culture constrains one to a particular belief
> with regard to the mind/body relationship.
Agreed, but that is not what I was saying/suggesting. The
"mind/body" duality is a problem in that this sort of
dichotomy, as well as others, are inherent in the ways
we have learned to think. (We can go back to Plato's
dichotomy between the "real" and "appearances", read
the "one" and the "many".
> |>> I try for consistency. But I agree with the post-moderns that there is
> |>> something wrong with the way we use language. I just don't agree with
> |>> how significant this is in limiting what we think, or how we think.
> |>
> |> This is a very complex issue. Frankly, I haven't seen it adequately
> |> addressed except in very few instances. You might be surprised by
> |> the degree to which we might be in agreement. I'm something of
> |> a heretic, especially as concerns the "popular" notion of
> |> post-modern thought.
> |>
> As I said, although I'm quite adamantly not an objectivist, I think the
> objectivist epistemology has some very interesting bits, and they don't
> seem totally dissimilar to the more interesting bits of post-modernism.
> One could stretch the point a bit and claim that objectivism can be
> understood as part of the general (very diffuse) post-modern
> movement. It would be kind of fun to see someone who understood
> both defend this thesis at length, as it would be bound to annoy
> everyone on both sides of the issue.
That would be interesting. I suspect there will be sympathies
to be found at the points where both deeply question assumptions/
premises that we have traditionally considered "self-evident".
>============================================================================
> James L Elson: |<o When you stare into the abyss too long o>|
> School of Arts & Humanities |<o the abyss stares back into you. o>|
> University of Texas-Dallas | --Nietzsche-- |
> Personally, I've always found that when I stare into the abyss too long
> I get these really cool swirlly patterns in front of my eyes....
Hahahahahaha.
> I'm hopelessly busy right now, and will probably let this discussion
> drop. Its been fun.
Sorry to hear that. Visit alt.p-m again when you have time. I'd
be interested in hearing about the ways in which "objectivism"
'barbeques' any of the traditions "sacred cows". :)