Ayns Metaphysics
S. Joel Katz
>Do any of you Objectivists out there believe in god? Rand's ethics stem
>directly from her metaphysics, which state that there is no god, so a
>god-believing Objectivist is a bit of an oxymoron. I know a few Religious
>Objectivists, but am wondering if there are any of you out there that would
>like to discuss the subject.
> -Blake Mills
I have had discussions with more than one 'religious
objectivist'. They always turn out to be religious non-objectivists on
closer analysis. They tend to break with Objectivism right at its
metaphysics and the break continues all the way up the line.
--
S. Joel Katz Information on Objectivism, Linux, 8031s, and atheism
Stim...@Panix.COM is available at http://www.panix.com/~stimpson/
Blake D Mills IV
Stephen Kirschner
>I hesitated writing this, because the last thing I want to do is to give
>any ammunition to Christians and other religious types in their battle
>against reason, but I decided that I didn't need to let the irration-
>ality of some dictate my actions. I'm not responsible for them.
Unreasonable prejudice, Brad. I know of no christian writer or spokesperson
overtly carrying on any "battle against reason." On the contrary, many
specifically begin their homilies with words to the effect of "let us reason
together," and ask in their discussions, "[regarding finer points of some moral
issue] what whould any reasonable person think about this?"
I consider myself an objective christian. I agree with your assertion
concerning Mt. Sinai. There is more objective evidence something out
of this world happened there, than anything we have concerning the history
of ancient Greece. I also see no similarity between myself and compatriots,
and the "witch doctors" Ayn Rand wrote about. For example, my behaviour is
not governed by some expectation of after life. You might also be interested
to know that I do not expect you to go to hell if you don't adopt my belief
system.
Am I an objectivist? I believe so. I certainly agree with the philosophy
of Ayn Rand, though I don't care whether or not I get any kind of recognition
from the objectivist community. []
Brad Aaronson
> -Blake Mills
A) I wouldn't use the word believe, unless you "believe" that A is A.
B) A religious person does "believe" in God, because religion is a type
of mysticism, which demands that adherents put their minds in cold
storage and accept unsupported claims.
With that understood, there are Objectivists who do not (with apologies
to Mr. Katz) see a conflict between Ayn Rand's metaphysics and the
existence of God.
Recall that there are three ways of looking at the world, and at
everything in it: subjectively, intrinsically and objectively. Here
are the most representative arguments, according to all three of these
world views, for and against God:
Subjective:
-----------
Con: God doesn't exist because that would legitimize irrational, mystic
religions such as Christianity. Can't do that.
Pro: God exists because I can *feel* His love for me.
Intrinsic:
----------
Con: Theism is evil. That's all. It's just evil.
Pro: Atheism is evil. That's all. It's just evil.
Objective:
----------
Con: There is simply no evidence for God, and no "God-sized hole in
reality" that requires us to hypothesize God.
Pro: Both the "argument from design" and the fact that over three
million individuals experienced the Exodus and the revelation at
Sinai are evidence for God.
I think that Ayn Rand's assertation of the non-existence of God was
simply based on a lack of knowledge, which is understandable considering
that her family was not Orthodox (though even if it had been, the
Orthodox Jews who really understand what is going on is very small).
The only place I would - maybe - disagree with her altogether is where
she wrote that the primacy of existence means that existence can never
be created or destroyed. Within the context of existence, this is true.
But it cannot, by definition, relate to anything outside that context.
Man could never have deduced anything about what is outside of exist-
ence. Through the "argument from design" he could have hypothesized
that there was something, but any details would have had no validity
whatsoever. As it happens, though, God could, and did, initiate
communication. The rest is history.
I hesitated writing this, because the last thing I want to do is to give
any ammunition to Christians and other religious types in their battle
against reason, but I decided that I didn't need to let the irration-
ality of some dictate my actions. I'm not responsible for them.
******************************************************************
Brad Aaronson, Objectivist in Training
************************************************
* Judaeo/Christian *anything* is an oxymoron *
******************************************************************
Stephen Grossman
>
[of Rand]
>she wrote that the primacy of existence means that existence can never
>be created or destroyed. Within the context of existence, this is true.
>But it cannot, by definition, relate to anything outside that context.
>
********************************************************************************
"The existential atmosphere of [the pre-WW1 West] (which was then being
destroyed by Europe's philosophical trends and political systems) still held a
benevolence that would be incredible to the men of today, i.e., a smiling
confident good will of man to man, and of man to life." [Ayn Rand]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHEN GROSSMAN SGRO...@UMASSD.EDU
********************************************************************************
The Iconoclast
do not* mean, "come, let us jettison every prejudice, identify all our
premises, be completely non-contradictory and non-arbitrary, and be as
objective as possible." They mean that we should accept, like Kant in
the quote below, some things as clearly true because we want* them to be
true, nevermind the lack of evidence. The Christian "reason" is a
rejection* of the mind, in many instances.
--
"I cannot even make the assumption -- as the practical requirements of
morality require -- of God, freedom, and immortality, if I do not deprive
speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. ... I must
therefore abolish knowledge to make room for belief." -- Immanuel Kant,
2d Preface, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1787, J.M.D. Mieklejohn, trans.
"I can't bear not* to believe it, but I'm not bright enough to prove it, so
I'll just guess, okay? No, really, this is perfectly logical! First,
it's beyond our ability to understand, see, because it's transcendental*...."
-- Immanuel Kant, mikey, trans.
The Iconoclast
The Iconoclast
"Argument from Ignorance." Translated, it says: I don't know, ergo
God. It is, in short, an arbitrary assertion posing as logical
necessity.
It was necessary for Aristotle, if he was going to try to follow that
thread (cause-effect) backwards, to either admit that he'd hit an
intellectual brick wall, or to postulate a non-physical cause (in a
non-physical universe), to which he attributed ultimate cause of all our
physical effects. The first would have been intellectually honest. The
second is a wild guess. He opted for the wild guess, and called the
object of his guess the "Prime Mover."
Tony Donadio
: A) I wouldn't use the word believe, unless you "believe" that A is A.
: B) A religious person does "believe" in God, because religion is a type
: of mysticism, which demands that adherents put their minds in cold
: storage and accept unsupported claims.
: With that understood, there are Objectivists who do not (with apologies
: to Mr. Katz) see a conflict between Ayn Rand's metaphysics and the
: existence of God.
No, there are not. Such individuals are not Objectivists; they do not
understand Rand's metaphysics AT ALL. Rand's metaphysics is based on the
*primacy of existence*; theism is based on the primacy of (a supernatural)
consciousness.
: Recall that there are three ways of looking at the world, and at
: everything in it: subjectively, intrinsically and objectively. Here
: are the most representative arguments, according to all three of these
: world views, for and against God:
: Objective:
: ----------
: Con: There is simply no evidence for God, and no "God-sized hole in
: reality" that requires us to hypothesize God.
: Pro: Both the "argument from design" and the fact that over three
: million individuals experienced the Exodus and the revelation at
: Sinai are evidence for God.
Objectivism rejects the argument from design ROOT AND BRANCH. Causality
and the law of identity are all that is required to explain the so-called
"complexity" of nature. The reference to the Exodus and Siani is too
transparently non-objective to require comment.
: Man could never have deduced anything about what is outside of
: existence.
There is nothing "outside" of existence. By definition, existence is "all
that which exists."
Ladies and gentlemen, it is bogus arguments like the ones offered in this
posting that give Objectivism a bad name. Objectivism is incompatible
with religion all the way down to its metaphysics.
--
* Money is the material shape of the principle that men who wish
Tony Donadio * to deal with one another must deal by trade and give value for
* value. - Francisco D'Anconia, in ATLAS SHRUGGED, by Ayn Rand
S. Joel Katz
>Brad Aaronson <da...@elron.net> writes:
>
>>I hesitated writing this, because the last thing I want to do is to give
>>any ammunition to Christians and other religious types in their battle
>>against reason, but I decided that I didn't need to let the irration-
>>ality of some dictate my actions. I'm not responsible for them.
>
>Unreasonable prejudice, Brad. I know of no christian writer or spokesperson
>overtly carrying on any "battle against reason." On the contrary, many
>specifically begin their homilies with words to the effect of "let us reason
>together," and ask in their discussions, "[regarding finer points of some moral
>issue] what whould any reasonable person think about this?"
I always get scared when people start asking "what would any
reasonable person think about this" rather than asking, "What is the
evidence?" There is a big difference between polling others and thinking.
Worrying about what other people think and the conclusions they
have drawn when the evidence is equally accessible to you and these
others is the mark of the follower, the epistemological second-hander.
They are out interviewing potential rulers. The word "reasonable" is just
a ruse. Who can I follow? Who will lead?
>I consider myself an objective christian. I agree with your assertion
>concerning Mt. Sinai. There is more objective evidence something out
>of this world happened there, than anything we have concerning the history
>of ancient Greece.
Read my essay, "Miracles Prove the Existence of God" accessible
from my home page (part of my _Introduction to Atheism_). Your
epistemological assumptions show right through.
>I also see no similarity between myself and compatriots,
>and the "witch doctors" Ayn Rand wrote about. For example, my behaviour is
>not governed by some expectation of after life. You might also be interested
>to know that I do not expect you to go to hell if you don't adopt my belief
>system.
Well, fine. Create god in exactly the image that makes you happy
and think that that is the way things are. But, if you are not omnipotent
(and I doubt you are) then you are wrong. This is the problem with
everyone who thinks he can pick and choose the parts of religion he
likes. Truth is the first victim.
>Am I an objectivist? I believe so. I certainly agree with the philosophy
>of Ayn Rand, though I don't care whether or not I get any kind of recognition
>from the objectivist community. []
Are you an objectivist? Do you believe that, for example, all of
reality is knowable to man? Do you believe that reason is man's only
method of obtaining knowledge? Do you believe that existence has primacy
over consciousness and needs no explanation?
S. Joel Katz
>
>In article <3i6pb0$q...@panix3.panix.com>, Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) writes:
>>Objectivism rejects the argument from design ROOT AND BRANCH. Causality
>>and the law of identity are all that is required to explain the so-called
>>"complexity" of nature. The reference to the Exodus and Siani is too
>>transparently non-objective to require comment.
>>
>>
>I know that I'm in Mr. Donadio's killfile; I'm using his paragraph
>as a illustration of a point about which I need clarification.
>In Objectivism, what does the axiom "existence exists" refer to?
>Does it mean only the reality that physics studies, or does it
>include biology?
See my essay _Existence and Cosmology: Part I_ which is available
form my home page. I'll summarize below.
Mr. Donadio is not suggesting that "existence exists" is
sufficient to explain the full complexity and nature of everything that
exists. What he (I assume) is suggesting is that the totality of
existence requires no explanation becuase, literally, there would be no
where to find one.
As far as complexity goes, Mr. Donadio is quite clear that it is
causality and identity (not existence) that explain complexity. I deal
with this directly in my essay on the argument from design (part of my
_Introduction to Atheism_ which can be found from my home page). For a
clear discussion of an Objectivism-compatible refutation of the argument
from design, see Smith's _Atheism: The Case Against God_.
But, simply put, the only time humans do _in_fact_ infer design
is when they see things that they know are found nowhere in nature.
>In the paragraph above, the implication is that life is not
>considered as part of metaphysics. Using the formualtion "the
>so-called 'complexity' of nature" implies, to me at least, that
>life is excluded from this idea of nature, for biology is nothing
>if not complex. Mr. Donadio is not the only one who has used
>"existence" or "reality" in this way. Several others who post here
>have left me with that same impression.
>Someone, please clarify! Thanks.
I'm genuinely uncertain what it is you are talking about. Biology
is complex, but there is nothing mysterious about complexity. Complexity
is a natural result of the operation of simple laws. The reason for the
tick marks around "complexity" is because the word is used in an unclear
sense. The word "complex" is being used because it conveys connotations
of contrivance and mental effort to design.
However, when we say nature is "complex" we simply mean it that is
shows order as a direct result of natural laws. By this definition,
everything is "complex", and it is unclear what a "simple" universe would
be like. Presumably, this use of "complex" has as its opposite not
"simple" but "chaotic". Clearly a chaotic universe would not be simple.
And what is meant is not truly "complex" but regular. As Mr. Donadio
properly points out, identity and causality are responsible for
regluarity, not conscious intent.
S. Joel Katz
>
>tdon...@panix.com (Tony Donadio) wrote
>
>> Reason and faith are fundamentally incompatible and mutually exclusive.
>
>I have faith based on reason the sun will shine tomorrow.
Why don't you just say, "I have _reason_ to believe that the sun
will shine tomorrow"? You seems to be using a definition of "faith" that
makes it synonymous with reason. If so, you are making the word useless
to all of those who employ it. There is only one use for the "concept"
faith, and that is to slide claims through that cannot meet reason's
criteria.
Tony Donadio
: Rand's metaphysics is based on
: >the *primacy of existence*; theism is based on the primacy of (a
: >supernatural) consciousness.
: A package deal? From you? Yes, most theisms are based on the primacy of God
: (let's call a spade a spade). So? These are called religions. We aren't
: talking about religions.
Theism is "the belief in god." Look it up in the dictionary. The belief
in god is primacy of consciousness. It is the assertion that a
supernatural consciousness, NOT EXISTENCE, has metaphysical primacy.
: I accept the existence of God based on phenomena *in* *reality*. They
: are *part* *of* *existence*. Their most rational explanation is God.
That is absurd. What phenomena?
: >Objectivism rejects the argument from design ROOT AND BRANCH. Causality
: >and the law of identity are all that is required to explain the
: >so-called "complexity" of nature. The reference to the Exodus and Siani
: >is too transparently non-objective to require comment.
: Causality doesn't help, since causality requires a cause for every
: effect.
No, it does not. The Objectivist conception of causality is that entities
act in accordance with their natures. Only _actions_ require a causal
explanation, and their causes are the entities that acted. Period.
: Evading the need for a (chronologically) first cause can only
: be done with verbal gymnastics.
First of all, this is the argument from the first cause, NOT the
argument from design. Let's keep the arguments straight.
Second: cause of what? Objectivism's FIRST AXIOM is that EXISTENCE
EXISTS. That is not just an empty phrase; it means is that existence is
the starting point, to which all explanation reduces.
The argument from the first cause runs as follows:
1. Everything must have had a cause.
2. But we cannot have an infinite regress of causes -- so there must have
been a "first cause" that caused everything else.
3. That is God.
The fallacy is easy to spot: given premise 1, GOD ALSO must have had a
cause. So who created him? Immediately, you get into another infinite
regress; postulating God gains you nothing. If you say: well, God had no
cause, he "just is," then the whole pretext for the argument is dissolved.
Why not just say _existence_ "just is?" That's what Objectivism does.
The whole argument is based on the premise that EXISTENCE _can't_ "just
be," that it can't be the starting point -- that a (supernatural)
CONSCIOUSNESS of some form has to be the starting point.
As for the rest: treating three thousand year old myths as though they
are reliable evidence is not objectivity.
P.S. How does one "yell" in a posting?
Paul Martin
: [snip]
: Reason and faith are fundamentally incompatible and mutually exclusive.
: To go by reason means: to admit NOTHING but logic and evidence as valid
: guides to knowledge. Reason leaves NO room for faith. ZERO.
So rational belief goes by way of appropriate evidence -- i.e.,
(*) A person is rational in believing p only if she has adequate
reasons for thus believing p.
And since (I gather) you, Tony, apportion your believings according to
reason (as against faith), let me ask you this: what reason(s) do you have
for believing (*)?
_____________________________ ___ ____________________________
pma...@csulb.edu Philosophy \\\ What we can't say we can't
California State University /// say, and we can't whistle it
Long Beach, CA 90840 \\\ either.
(310) 985-4331, -7135 (fax) /// -- Frank Plumpton Ramsey
_____________________________ ___ ____________________________
Tony Donadio
the basis of evidence. I say again: the two are mutually exclusive.
There is no "space" in a rational epistemology to be taken up by faith.
If someone has conclusive evidence of something, then in reason he accepts
it as knowledge. If he does not, if he has inconclusive evidence, then he
does not properly treat it as _knowledge_.
Finally, it is a non-sequitur to say that the fact that two rational men
can disagree (which certainly true) means that any part of their beliefs
are based on faith. Reason is not a guarantee of infallibility.
Tony Donadio
transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
about the allegedly unknowable.
S. Joel Katz
>One point I want to make.
>Rationality is not defined by acting on the so-called objective truth. We
>are humans with limitd perceptions. We have limited knowledge and
>resources to improve upon our knowledge. Two ultra rational people can
>have two completely different ideas on the same thing because of
>differences in perspective. Of course, one will be right and the other
>wrong... but both are rational.
>To say that reason does not allow for faith is false. Faith is a
>filler... the stuff between 100% certain and not sure at all.
No. Reason is the filler. When we are 98% certain we should _act_
in a manner appropriate to that level of certainty. Not materialize a
magic cutoff with faith 'completing' the proof.
>There is no magic number that says 98% sure is okay while 50% sure isn't.
>A common misconception is that 51% sure is the cutoff between belief and
>disbelief.
So why do you let faith fill that gap. The gap _belongs_. If we
aren't certain but act like we are, we will prevent ourselves from
finding the truth -- which may not be what we elected to have faith in.
How is faith different from guessing and how is defending faith different
from defending guessing?
>Well, it could be. But your actions should be determined not only by the
>probabilities but the values associated with it.
This is vacuous. The word should _means_ in accord with one's values.
>For this reason, I believe that certain religious people are rational.
Drawing such a ludicrous conclusion from a tautology. Shame, shame.
S. Joel Katz
>The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
>transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
>about the allegedly unknowable.
Unless, of course, the speaker is not a man.
S. Joel Katz
>zi...@stripe.Colorado.EDU (ZICHI DOMINIC A) wrote,
>
>>L. Ron Hubbard... Scientology and objectivsm go together like bacon and
>>eggs... Are you clear? ;-)
>
>Objectivism has no society asking you to give geometrically growing
>dollar amounts for further support.
>
>You must be thinking of MicroSoft. (-;
But, of course, if anyone's offering, you can find my address in
my home page.
S. Joel Katz
>To: stim...@panix.com (S. Joel Katz)
>
>>>I have faith based on reason the sun will shine tomorrow.
>>
>> Why don't you just say, "I have _reason_ to believe that the sun
>>will shine tomorrow"? [ . . . ]
>
>Thanks for your thoughtful, concise response, Joel.
>
>Surely, your statement is as fair as just saying, "I have _faith_ the sun
>will shine tomorrow." To say "I have reason to believe" however, brings to
>my mind thinking about something. Surely if I stop to think about why I
>should set my alarm clock, I do have reason to believe the sun will shine.
>
>But when I set my alarm clock, I usually don't think about it. For good or
>bad, I just act on a feeling, a trust, a confidence, a . . . faith. Some
>habits are alright, reasonable, perhaps useful, even theraputic. No? []
So you continue to redefine and redefine "faith" hoping
desperately to salvage some respite from reason's cold, hard light. Now
"faith" is when you have reason to believe something but don't bother to
find the reason and believe it anyway.
So what about things that you don't have reason to believe but
believe without reason, are they inside your new definition of "faith" or
not. If they aren't faith is now just a lucky guess (and guessing is never
a reliable way to separate truth from falsehood) If they are, faith is now
an excuse for belief without justification. You could just as well have
faith the sun won't shine tomorrow. Either way this new "faith" is useless
in distinguishing truth from falsehood.
So, since your new definition of faith has now potency
insparating a truth from a falsehood, it isn't a method of epistemology
-- that is, it cannot tell us what we should believe. So, what is it good
for other than justifying laziness.
Reason, or rational demonstration, applies both to content and to
justification. See George Smith's excellent discussion of this argument in
Atheism: The Case Against God.
Dorothy E. Fanyo
>In <5...@teekay.win.net> de...@teekay.win.net (Dorothy E. Fanyo) writes:
>>In the paragraph above, the implication is that life is not
>>considered as part of metaphysics. Using the formualtion "the
>>so-called 'complexity' of nature" implies, to me at least, that
>>life is excluded from this idea of nature, for biology is nothing
>>if not complex. Mr. Donadio is not the only one who has used
>>"existence" or "reality" in this way. Several others who post here
>>have left me with that same impression.
>
>>Someone, please clarify! Thanks.
>
> I'm genuinely uncertain what it is you are talking about.
Upon rereading my paragraph, I can certainly understand why! :-)
Let me try again. In Objectivist philosophy, what does "existence
exists" encompass? Does the term "existence" refer only the physical
world, that which is the study of physics?
OR is the term used to encompass _all_ that exists, up including the
mental processess of a human being?
I'm no philosopher, and I think of the term in its latter sense --
as including everything you can think of that actually exists,
mental processes too.
I've read several posts that by implication refer only to the
objects studied by physics when speaking of the axiom. Hence my
confusion; hence my questions.
By the way, I'm not trying to argue a point. I always think of
"existence" as meaning *everything* -- you and me and
consciousness, ladybugs and yellow maples, red apples and red cars,
boulders and galactic clusters. If, in philosophy, the meaning of
the term is restricted to the world physics, so be it. I simply
want to know.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DEFanyo O brave new world,
de...@teekay.win.net That has such people in't.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
======================
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
: >There is no magic number that says 98% sure is okay while 50% sure isn't.
: >disbelief.
: So why do you let faith fill that gap. The gap _belongs_. If we
: aren't certain but act like we are, we will prevent ourselves from
: finding the truth -- which may not be what we elected to have faith in.
: How is faith different from guessing and how is defending faith different
: from defending guessing?
I am not talking about religious faith here. I am talking about believing
something in the absence of certainty (or relative confidence levels).
: >Well, it could be. But your actions should be determined not only by the
: >probabilities but the values associated with it.
: This is vacuous. The word should _means_ in accord with one's values.
Possibly. The point that I was trying to make is not a redundancy.
When I meant value, I was talking of an expected value (statistical
decision theory), not ethical value. If you are 1% sure of one outcome,
but the value associated with this outcome are VERY high, you should
assign much more weight to this 1%.
: >For this reason, I believe that certain religious people are rational.
: Drawing such a ludicrous conclusion from a tautology. Shame, shame.
Let me give you an example then. I have a very, strict religious friend
(who used to be a staunch objectivist before his conversion). He bases
his faith on the historical accuracy of the old testament, the acceptance
of Mt. Sinai by an entire nation of people, and personal miracles.
He is not 100% convinced of God's existence. He is, however, practices
the strictest orthodoxy of this religion because the value associated
with it (his eternal soul) is associated with the slim probability that
God is alive.
-Jim
S. Joel Katz
>Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
>: The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
>: transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
>: about the allegedly unknowable.
>I do not know what will happen at 5:00 tomorrow.
True, but you understand what it would mean to know what would
happen at 5:00 tomorrow. All of the concepts involved are well defined
and you can conceive of means of obtaining that knowledge, such as being
there at 5:00 tomorrow. Thus the knowledge in question is _potentially_
human knowledge.
>True, I DO know something about the future. In order for me to make this
>statement, I must know that 5:00 tomorrow exists.
And you must know what it would be like to know what will happen
at 5:00 tomorrow. And you must know how that information could be
presented to human senses to understand how you could know what will
happen at 5:00 tomorrow.
>But this is a long way from the implication that since I know something
>about the future, I should theoretically be able to know everything about it.
No one said that. We must be careful when we talk of "knowing
everything" that we not get sloppy. For example, radioactive decay
appears to be a truly random phenomenon. It seems that no one could know
(in principle) which of two Uranium atoms will decay first.
So, for now, neither the statment "Atom A will decay first" or
the statement "Atom B will decay first" is capable of fact status.
However, in the future, this can change. It is hard to see why, and so we
must make a slight detour into epistemology.
For a person to say, for example, "Atom A will decay first",
requires that he understand the terms involved and have sufficient cause
to make the assertion -- humans can do nothing else. Else he speaks not a
sentence but a sequence of meaningless sounds.
Hence, NOW, neither of those statements is potential knowledge --
neither is even meaningful. However, at a later date, the context changes
and hence the statements change though their words are the same. For
example, when you say, "I am Hamlet" and when I say, "I am Hamlet" the
sentences are different. Ditto for the Atom statements because they occur
in the context of the universe at the time they are spoken.
>The fact still remains, I do no know what will happen at 5:00.
But you will, and then the claims do become meaningful. See my
essay on Epistemology -- available from my home page.
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
: The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
: transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
: about the allegedly unknowable.
I do not know what will happen at 5:00 tomorrow.
True, I DO know something about the future. In order for me to make this
statement, I must know that 5:00 tomorrow exists.
But this is a long way from the implication that since I know something
about the future, I should theoretically be able to know everything about it.
The fact still remains, I do no know what will happen at 5:00.
-Jim
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
: >: The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
: >: transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
: >: about the allegedly unknowable.
: No one said that. We must be careful when we talk of "knowing
: everything" that we not get sloppy. For example, radioactive decay
: appears to be a truly random phenomenon. It seems that no one could know
: (in principle) which of two Uranium atoms will decay first.
Hmmm. True. No one said that all things are knowable.
However, the implication is there, no? One cannot make the fallacy of
saying that some things are unknowable to mankind since this is an
impossibility as Tony pointed out. Wouldn't the conclusion be then that
all things are knowable? Or to put it in your terms, potentially knowable?
If this is true, then you are expressing knowledge of the absence of the
unknowable since you know the unknowable is knowable. This is a fallacy
as well since by its very definition, you have no clue whether the
unknowable is potentially knowable or not.
The conclusion then is that there is no way of knowing anything about the
unknowable. But this would mean that I know that the unknowable is
unknowable. But this negates itself due to the Tony Theorem. ARG! Back to
square one. *grin*
-Jim
Samantha Atkins
Brad Aaronson <da...@elron.net> wrote:
.>
.>>Do any of you Objectivists out there believe in god? Rand's ethics
.>>stem directly from her metaphysics, which state that there is no god,
.>>so a god-believing Objectivist is a bit of an oxymoron. I know a few
.>>Religious Objectivists, but am wondering if there are any of you out
.>> -Blake Mills
.>
.>A) I wouldn't use the word believe, unless you "believe" that A is A.
.>
.>B) A religious person does "believe" in God, because religion is a type
.> of mysticism, which demands that adherents put their minds in cold
.> storage and accept unsupported claims.
.>
.>With that understood, there are Objectivists who do not (with apologies
.>to Mr. Katz) see a conflict between Ayn Rand's metaphysics and the
.>existence of God.
.>
.>Recall that there are three ways of looking at the world, and at
.>everything in it: subjectively, intrinsically and objectively. Here
.>are the most representative arguments, according to all three of these
.>world views, for and against God:
.
There may be three ways of relating to the existence speaking somewhat
loosely but only by relating objectively can one be said to be looking
at the world.
<subjective and intrinsic position characterizations not quoted>
.>Objective:
.>----------
.>Con: There is simply no evidence for God, and no "God-sized hole in
.> reality" that requires us to hypothesize God.
.>
.>Pro: Both the "argument from design" and the fact that over three
.> million individuals experienced the Exodus and the revelation at
.> Sinai are evidence for God.
.>
.>I think that Ayn Rand's assertation of the non-existence of God was
.>simply based on a lack of knowledge, which is understandable considering
.>that her family was not Orthodox (though even if it had been, the
.>Orthodox Jews who really understand what is going on is very small).
.
Where on earth do you get this incredible assumption from? The form
of religion practicised by any particular sect is quite irrelevant to
the question of whether there is any objective basis for the belief in
God.
The "argument from design" has been exploded many, many times. The
fallacy is that the complexity of the world can only be explained by
positing a being even more complex that created it. This clearly is
circular in that one would then ask where "God" came from. Answering
that "God" just was, is and ever will be is no better than answering
that the universe just was, is and ever will be.
I question your "facts" about the Exodus etc. Please present your
proof of these facts and show how they are evidence.
.>The only place I would - maybe - disagree with her altogether is where
.>she wrote that the primacy of existence means that existence can never
.>be created or destroyed. Within the context of existence, this is true.
.>But it cannot, by definition, relate to anything outside that context.
.>
What can possibly be outside of that which exists? The very concept
of being presumes that that which is is part of existence - that it exists.
There is no "anything" in a realm that is "outside" the context of existence
simply because it would then not exist.
That you posit such an argument shows a very deep irrationality and missing
of the point of "existence exists".
- Samantha
S. Joel Katz
>Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
>: Faith is belief in the absence of evidence. Reason is belief _only_ on
>: the basis of evidence. I say again: the two are mutually exclusive.
>To endorse this view is (at least) to adopt the epistemic principle that
>rational belief goes by way of appropriate (if perhaps inconclusive)
>evidence; more perspicuously:
> (*) A person is rational in believing p only if she has adequate
> reasons for thus believing p.
>And (again) I ask: What reasons are there for believing (*)?
The major flaw in your reasoning is to equate rational conviction
with belief. This is the reason you run into the above platform problem.
No matter what answer a person has to the question, "What is
fundamental?" You can always ask, "Why that and not something else?" To
accept the legitimacy of that question is to accept that nothing can be
fundamental because an explanation of something must precede acceptance
of that something.
So how do humans solve the platform problem? Any Objectivist will
tell you -- we are directly connected with reality. We have _senses_. So
long as we can trace all of our concepts back to sensory evidence, we
never have a platform problem. This _is_ what is meant by reason --
prediction, demonstration, consistency with observed reality, and all the
rest.
So, to defend faith, you will either have to attack reason
wholesale (as you have done -- ironically through an appeal to reason --
to the circular argument fallacy) or attack the senses.
If you continue to attack reason the way you have, you cut
yourself off from the tools you need to make your arguments. If I accept
the platform problem, why should that convince me my position is wrong if
I have rejected the need for _reasons_ for beliefs? Anyone can play it
aces wild -- thus, if you are right that reasons are not necessary for
beliefs, you have no tools for communication or persuasion.
I strongly suggest you read my articles on Metaphysics and
Epistemology before it is too late. Thay are accessible from my home page.
S. Joel Katz
>S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) wrote:
>: >There is no magic number that says 98% sure is okay while 50% sure isn't.
>: >A common misconception is that 51% sure is the cutoff between belief and
>: >disbelief.
>: So why do you let faith fill that gap. The gap _belongs_. If we
>: aren't certain but act like we are, we will prevent ourselves from
>: finding the truth -- which may not be what we elected to have faith in.
>: How is faith different from guessing and how is defending faith different
>: from defending guessing?
>I am not talking about religious faith here. I am talking about believing
>something in the absence of certainty (or relative confidence levels).
There you go again confusing what the word "belief" means. If I
believe something probably or likely because I have rational evidence to
do so, we are not talking about faith at all.
In the absence of certainty, one should believe something
uncertain. In the presence of certainty, one should believe something
certain. In short, one's belief status should be in accord with the
rational evidence one has access to. That is _reason_. That isn't faith
and that isn't "belief".
>: >Well, it could be. But your actions should be determined not only by the
>: >probabilities but the values associated with it.
>: This is vacuous. The word should _means_ in accord with one's values.
>Possibly. The point that I was trying to make is not a redundancy.
>When I meant value, I was talking of an expected value (statistical
>decision theory), not ethical value. If you are 1% sure of one outcome,
>but the value associated with this outcome are VERY high, you should
>assign much more weight to this 1%.
Okay.
>: >For this reason, I believe that certain religious people are rational.
>: Drawing such a ludicrous conclusion from a tautology. Shame, shame.
>Let me give you an example then. I have a very, strict religious friend
>(who used to be a staunch objectivist before his conversion). He bases
>his faith on the historical accuracy of the old testament, the acceptance
>of Mt. Sinai by an entire nation of people, and personal miracles.
So, he is a second hander.
>He is not 100% convinced of God's existence. He is, however, practices
>the strictest orthodoxy of this religion because the value associated
>with it (his eternal soul) is associated with the slim probability that
>God is alive.
He is no objectivist. If he has accepted Pascal's Wager, he is a
nut. See my essay on Pascal's Wager accessible from my home page.
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
believe faith and reason to be mutually exclusive. I believe them to be
complementary. I think we are talking about two different animals then.
S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) wrote:
: >Let me give you an example then. I have a very, strict religious friend
: >(who used to be a staunch objectivist before his conversion). He bases
: >his faith on the historical accuracy of the old testament, the acceptance
: >of Mt. Sinai by an entire nation of people, and personal miracles.
: So, he is a second hander.
If you mean second hander in the sense that he is using second hand
information, yes. Aren't we all?
However, I must point out that he has made extensive attempts to confirm
the evidence that he has through his own research. He was a strong
believer in Objectivism before his conversion and he tried very hard to
refute the so-called evidence.
: >He is not 100% convinced of God's existence. He is, however, practices
: >the strictest orthodoxy of this religion because the value associated
: >with it (his eternal soul) is associated with the slim probability that
: >God is alive.
: He is no objectivist. If he has accepted Pascal's Wager, he is a
: nut. See my essay on Pascal's Wager accessible from my home page.
: --
He is no objectivist anymore, you are correct. He has turned 180 degrees
in his metaphysics due to his conversion.
Do you think you can post a brief of your arguments against Pascal's
wager when you have the time? This would be interesting since Pascal's
wager (as I understand it) follows the rules of basic decision making
under conditions of uncertainty.
-Jim
David J. Rodman
: appears to be a truly random phenomenon. It seems that no one could know
: (in principle) which of two Uranium atoms will decay first.
All that is so is knowable. "Which of two Uranium atoms will decay
first" is not so, and therefore does not violate the original statement.
Rand (and other rational people) observe that all facts are, in principle,
knowable - that there is nothing which is simultaneously true and
unavailable _in principle_ to man's mind. There are countless examples
of events which have not yet occurred and which cannot be predicted with
perfect accuracy. These are not examples of facts which are unkowable,
they are examples of future events which have not yet occurred - they are
not yet facts.
========================================================================
David J. Rodman 808-334-4000 d...@ILHawaii.net
InterLink Hawaii, Inc. http://www.ILHawaii.net
The Big Island's Local Internet Provider
Visit Hawaii on the World Wide Web!
========================================================================
S. Joel Katz
>
>In article <3i9eb4$i...@panix3.panix.com>, S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) writes:
>>In <5...@teekay.win.net> de...@teekay.win.net (Dorothy E. Fanyo) writes:
>>>In the paragraph above, the implication is that life is not
>>>considered as part of metaphysics. Using the formualtion "the
>>>so-called 'complexity' of nature" implies, to me at least, that
>>>life is excluded from this idea of nature, for biology is nothing
>>>if not complex. Mr. Donadio is not the only one who has used
>>>"existence" or "reality" in this way. Several others who post here
>>>have left me with that same impression.
>>
>>>Someone, please clarify! Thanks.
>>
>> I'm genuinely uncertain what it is you are talking about.
>Upon rereading my paragraph, I can certainly understand why! :-)
>Let me try again. In Objectivist philosophy, what does "existence
>exists" encompass? Does the term "existence" refer only the physical
>world, that which is the study of physics?
No. "Existence" means just that -- all that exists.
>OR is the term used to encompass _all_ that exists, up including the
>mental processess of a human being?
Yes.
>I'm no philosopher, and I think of the term in its latter sense --
>as including everything you can think of that actually exists,
>mental processes too.
>I've read several posts that by implication refer only to the
>objects studied by physics when speaking of the axiom. Hence my
>confusion; hence my questions.
>By the way, I'm not trying to argue a point. I always think of
>"existence" as meaning *everything* -- you and me and
>consciousness, ladybugs and yellow maples, red apples and red cars,
>boulders and galactic clusters. If, in philosophy, the meaning of
>the term is restricted to the world physics, so be it. I simply
>want to know.
No, you are right. Existence means just that. There are many
philosophical groups _other_than_Objectivism_ that seek to read
consciousness out of reality. There are some great discussions of this
subject in several Objectivist periodicals, for example, _Biology Without
Consciousness and its Consequences_.
Objectivism asserts primacy of existence by three axioms,
existence, identity, and consciousness. "Consciousness" refers to a
special piece of the identity of some existent entities.
S. Joel Katz
>Obviously, we have begun to disagree on the definition of faith. You
>believe faith and reason to be mutually exclusive. I believe them to be
>complementary. I think we are talking about two different animals then.
Well then, the onus is upon you to provide some definition other
than the religious one. Simply put, reason means accepting concepts or
propositions only when accompanied with the necessary evidence to justify
the particular 'belief' position you wish to hold.
Either faith allows beliefs that don't meet that criteria, in
which case it's unreliable, an excuse for wishful thinking, and
irrational, or it doesn't, in which case, what does it do?
>S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) wrote:
>: >Let me give you an example then. I have a very, strict religious friend
>: >(who used to be a staunch objectivist before his conversion). He bases
>: >his faith on the historical accuracy of the old testament, the acceptance
>: >of Mt. Sinai by an entire nation of people, and personal miracles.
>: So, he is a second hander.
>If you mean second hander in the sense that he is using second hand
>information, yes. Aren't we all?
No, I mean that he accepts the evidence of others as AGAINST the
evidence of his senses.
>However, I must point out that he has made extensive attempts to confirm
>the evidence that he has through his own research. He was a strong
>believer in Objectivism before his conversion and he tried very hard to
>refute the so-called evidence.
Again, the notion of a "historical miracle" is oxymoronic. See
the essay I already referred you yo.
>: >He is not 100% convinced of God's existence. He is, however, practices
>: >the strictest orthodoxy of this religion because the value associated
>: >with it (his eternal soul) is associated with the slim probability that
>: >God is alive.
>: He is no objectivist. If he has accepted Pascal's Wager, he is a
>: nut. See my essay on Pascal's Wager accessible from my home page.
>: --
>He is no objectivist anymore, you are correct. He has turned 180 degrees
>in his metaphysics due to his conversion.
>Do you think you can post a brief of your arguments against Pascal's
>wager when you have the time? This would be interesting since Pascal's
>wager (as I understand it) follows the rules of basic decision making
>under conditions of uncertainty.
You really should read
http://www.panix.com/~stimpson/atheism/hell.html. Pascal's Wager is just a
fancy version of the contemporary, "Believe in God or you'll go to Hell."
It isn't even reasoning, it's simple psychological intimidation.
Chris Wolf
>reinforce them by contradicting the quoted statement directly.
>Every Christian writer/spokesman is indeed carrying on a battle
>against reason.
>-- Phil Oliver
This is the sort of overblown nonsense that gives Objectivism a bad name.
'Belief in God' does not equal 'attack on reason.'
/**************************************************************************\
| "This does not mean that all errors are honest. People |
|Chris Wolf subscribe to mistaken views, in philosophy as elsewhere,|
|cwo...@delphi.com for any number of bad motives. But it does mean that |
| we cannot judge a person's rationality solely by |
| reference to the content of his ideas." -David Kelley- |
\**************************************************************************/
S. Joel Katz
>S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) wrote:
>: >Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
>: >: The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
>: >: transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
>: >: about the allegedly unknowable.
>: No one said that. We must be careful when we talk of "knowing
>: everything" that we not get sloppy. For example, radioactive decay
>: appears to be a truly random phenomenon. It seems that no one could know
>: (in principle) which of two Uranium atoms will decay first.
>Hmmm. True. No one said that all things are knowable.
>However, the implication is there, no? One cannot make the fallacy of
>saying that some things are unknowable to mankind since this is an
>impossibility as Tony pointed out. Wouldn't the conclusion be then that
>all things are knowable? Or to put it in your terms, potentially knowable?
Again, you have to be careful. What do you mean by "things".
Because we call soething a "thing" when and only when we perceive it or
observe its consequences. You are confusing very basic principles with
much more advanced principle that already have the basics built in, and
then you try to see have the advanced principle applies by looking for a
counter-example and you can't do it.
The _concept_ "thing" already has knowability built into it.
Something unknowable (if you will excuse the sloppiness -- an unknowable
"something" could never be labelled "something" because how could I refer
to it if I didn't know anything about it?) would be incapable of being
referred to by those to whom it is unknowable.
>If this is true, then you are expressing knowledge of the absence of the
>unknowable since you know the unknowable is knowable. This is a fallacy
>as well since by its very definition, you have no clue whether the
>unknowable is potentially knowable or not.
You are confusing multiple levels of reasoning. It's easy to do
this in Metaphysics and Epistemology because so much of the reasoning
builds on what is prior and the sequence is crucial.
>The conclusion then is that there is no way of knowing anything about the
>unknowable. But this would mean that I know that the unknowable is
>unknowable. But this negates itself due to the Tony Theorem. ARG! Back to
>square one. *grin*
You don't really know "that the unkowable is unknowable", because
"unknowable" is a word like "nothing". It is a special type of word that
doesn't refer to a thing and so the normal rules don't apply. When I say,
"I have nothing in my pocket", "nothing" server as a marker which could
stand for anything in my pocket but doesn't stand for anything. Ditto for
"the unknowable" in your formulation above.
One could say, to be more precise: The concept "unknowable" does
assuming it does leads to a contradiction. I would be refer to a set of
things that are supposed to be beyond my capability to refer to.
Obviously I cannot do that. Thus nothing (nothing that I could ever refer
to or employ in any way) can ever be in the "class of things"
"unknowable".
Because existence is the standard of entry into the class
"entities", in Metaphysics, there are no "non-existent entities". In
Epsitemology, the standard of truth is demonstration, so there are no
"un-demonstrable truths".
S. Joel Katz
>: For example, radioactive decay
>: appears to be a truly random phenomenon. It seems that no one could know
>: (in principle) which of two Uranium atoms will decay first.
>All that is so is knowable. "Which of two Uranium atoms will decay
>first" is not so, and therefore does not violate the original statement.
>Rand (and other rational people) observe that all facts are, in principle,
>knowable - that there is nothing which is simultaneously true and
>unavailable _in principle_ to man's mind. There are countless examples
>of events which have not yet occurred and which cannot be predicted with
>perfect accuracy. These are not examples of facts which are unkowable,
>they are examples of future events which have not yet occurred - they are
>not yet facts.
And they are not yet known. And as soon as they "become" facts,
they can become known. Thanks for the clarification.
S. Joel Katz
>> Tony already replied and I agree 100% with his comments. I would
>>reinforce them by contradicting the quoted statement directly.
>>Every Christian writer/spokesman is indeed carrying on a battle
>>against reason.
>
>>-- Phil Oliver
>
>This is the sort of overblown nonsense that gives Objectivism a bad name.
>'Belief in God' does not equal 'attack on reason.'
Does "crusade for God" equal "crusade against reason"? Does
"belief in god" equal "belief against reason"?
Paul Martin
: Faith is belief in the absence of evidence. Reason is belief _only_ on
To endorse this view is (at least) to adopt the epistemic principle that
rational belief goes by way of appropriate (if perhaps inconclusive)
evidence; more perspicuously:
(*) A person is rational in believing p only if she has adequate
reasons for thus believing p.
And (again) I ask: What reasons are there for believing (*)?
_____________________________ ___ ____________________________
pma...@csulb.edu Philosophy \\\ Logical consequences are the
California State University /// scarecrows of fools and the
Long Beach, CA 90840 \\\ beacons of wise men.
(310) 985-4331, -7135 (fax) /// -- T. H. Huxley
_____________________________ ___ ____________________________
Dorothy E. Fanyo
>These are not examples of facts which are unkowable,
>they are examples of future events which have not yet occurred - they are
>not yet facts.
>
Hello, David! Good to see you! :-)
Just to get you right into the swing of things, how could you know
that there existed a fact that was unknowable?
---Dorothy
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
: So, gamblers, insurance companines and stock investers are all the
: most truely religously faithfull people? Their cold calculated
: risks are the ultimate example of warm accepting faith? (I wish
: my insurance company had more faith in me.)
No. Insurance companies are not religious. My contention is that they
have faith that their past evidence will lead to their expected results
in the future.
I am not saying that insurance companies are irrational. I am saying that
they are not assured of the outcome.
Certain religious people base their beliefs on the evidence presented to
them. I am saying that they are rational people. Why is this a non-sequiter?
Maybe it is because you are assuming the non-existence of god. There is
no rational reason to believe this. It is only an assumption. You cannot
rationally disprove the non-existence of something.
Why? Because all cognition is based on the 5 senses and the mind. When we
say something is non-existent we are saying that we are not able to
perceive it. So disproving god on a rational level is a joint hypothesis:
1) that god does not exist 2)Our perceptions are aware of everything that
exists. This hypothesis is impossible to prove.
: Different contexts require different standards of justification.
: On the evning news the forcaster predicts that there is 80% chance
: of good weather tomorrow. If I am deciding whether or not to carry
: an umbrella, this will probably satisfy me. If I am trying to decide
: whether or not to cross the puget sound on my small sailboat, I will
: probably look for more evidence and more certainty before I am
: satisfied.
I see the point you are trying to make. Unfortunately, the second analogy
does not apply. We are not *given* the choice to delay our life in search
of more evidence. We must make decisions on what we have.
A better analogy would be sailing to a distant land. One path leads to a
rumored paradise but the waters are rough. The other leads to nothing,
but the waters are smooth. Which path do you take assuming you are forced
to make a decision *now*?
: >For this reason, I believe that certain religious people are rational.
: I don't get this.
Please reply if I am still inconsistent. Btw, I am agnostic.
-Jim
Chris Nielsen
>I always think of "existence" as meaning *everything* -- you and me and
>consciousness, ladybugs and yellow maples, red apples and red cars,
>boulders and galactic clusters.
I think this is correct.
Chris =)
Chris Nielsen
>
> Are you an objectivist? Do you believe that, for example, all of
>>reality is knowable to man? Do you believe that reason is man's only
>>method of obtaining knowledge? Do you believe that existence has primacy
>>over consciousness and needs no explanation?
>>
>Oops, I just hit a bump! I must believe that all of reality is
>knowable to man in order to be a bona fide Objectivist?
'All of reality is knowable' probably doen't mean that any one
person or group of people will in fact know it all. What I
usually take it to mean is that any given aspect of reality is
knowable. In other words, there are no miricles, hidden forces,
etc... Everything obeys the law of causality and thus is in
principle open to emperical investigation. This is not to say
that such investigation will always be practical.
Chris =)
>How could one man ever know that he knows all of reality? Or are
>you speaking collectively here? If so, how could all men put
>together come to the sure realization that man knows all of
>reality?
>
>If these questions, asked in all seriousness, are ignored, I will be
>very disappointed.
Dorothy E. Fanyo
In article <3ict4e$f...@panix3.panix.com>, S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) writes:
>In <5...@teekay.win.net> de...@teekay.win.net (Dorothy E.Fanyo)
>>In article <3i75im$2...@panix3.panix.com>, S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) writes:
>
>> Are you an objectivist? Do you believe that, for example, all of
>>>reality is knowable to man? Do you believe that reason is man's only
>>>method of obtaining knowledge? Do you believe that existence has primacy
>>>over consciousness and needs no explanation?
>>>
>>Oops, I just hit a bump! I must believe that all of reality is
>>knowable to man in order to be a bona fide Objectivist?
>
>>you speaking collectively here? If so, how could all men put
>>together come to the sure realization that man knows all of
>>reality?
>
>reality? What a ridiculous non sequiter. Try reading what I wrote one
>more time.
Hey, slow down. Neither did _I_ say that man _has_ to know when he
knows all of reality!! Try reading what I wrote one more time. I
asked *how he would know* he knows all about reality..
This is the statement you made which I question: "...all of
reality is knowable to man." If the English language carries
meaning, those seven words mean:
It is possible for man to know everything about reality.
1) Since you don't know how man would know when he had reached that
exalted state, I see no reason for making the statement in the first
place. To get very convoluted, if he doesn't know that he knows it
all when he does know it all, then he doesn't know a part of
the reality of that time, and therefore he doesn't know it all. In
everyday English that's known as talking in circles.
2) Besides -- and again I ask a serious question -- does that
statement not imply that omniscience is possible to man?
3) And isn't "...all of reality is knowable to man" a collectivist
statement? Since it's obvious that one man alone can't know all
there to know, that statement _must_ mean man collectively.
[snip reference to essays which are unavailable to me]
> Knowability in principle simply means that man's method of
>cognition is the standard of truth.
Ah, now you've changed horses in mid-stream; the above sentence is
_not_ equivalent to "...all reality is knowable to man."
>If you don't understand this, there is no way you could dream of
>calling yourself an Objectivist -- you don't even understand what
>they _mean_ by epistemology.
Since "they" has no referent, I don't know who "they" are;
therefore, how could I understand what "they" mean by epistemology?
What I might dream of calling myself in no way depends on your what
you might think. Sorry to sound snippy, but your last statement is
totally uncalled for.
Dorothy E. Fanyo
In article <D4C3B...@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>, S. Wyshynski (vi...@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca) writes:
>In article <5...@teekay.win.net>, Dorothy E. Fanyo <de...@teekay.win.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Are you an objectivist? Do you believe that, for example, all of
>>>reality is knowable to man? Do you believe that reason is man's only
>>>method of obtaining knowledge? Do you believe that existence has primacy
>>>over consciousness and needs no explanation?
>>>
>>Oops, I just hit a bump! I must believe that all of reality is
>>knowable to man in order to be a bona fide Objectivist?
>>
>>How could one man ever know that he knows all of reality? Or are
>>you speaking collectively here? If so, how could all men put
>>together come to the sure realization that man knows all of
>>reality?
>Let's not confuse the potential with the actual, here.
>
>Even if we leave aside the issue of exactly how one could store all that
>knowledge in one brain, the fact that the universe is 100% knowable only
>means that every single aspect of the universe can be known -- nothing
>is 'unknowable'. This refers to a potential only, and does not make claims
>about any actualities at all (as questions about knowing "Do I know everything
>yet?"
I am questioning the statement "...all of reality is knowable to
man." That does not express a potential, but is couched in the
form of fact. If you want to assert that it expresses a potential,
feel free. I would only consider it a pontential in the exact
meaning of "potential" which means "possibility", not a actual
knowable fact.
In a way, you could say that a positing a potential is only
indulging in an educated guess. If we say that every human baby
has great potential, we can only reasonably say so because we have
known that some humans to indeed reach some state that we can agree
is actually fulfilling his great potential -- but we also know
darned well that it's a far cry from a 100% surity that he'll
actualize whatever we may have had in mind as "great potential". A
very iffy sort of thing.
It's even iffier to say "...all of reality is knowable to man."
Since that state has never been reached, it's really speculation to
state that it's fact.
[snip elementary discussion of earth's surface]
>So, I would say that yes, this principle (which, expressed in another way,
>is that reason is unlimited in what it may know, by anything other than
>existence itself) is part and parcel of the Objectivist package.
So existence itself can limit what man may know. Then you are
saying that "...all of reality is knowable to man" is not a true
statement. Is that right?
>Consider
>that the alternative (reason is 'limited' and is useless in 'certain'
>places) is a fundamental tenet of mysticism.
I'm not sure what you mean. Mysticism posits some form of the
supernatural and then says that only faith can know it (speaking
very broadly), but what does that have to do with a question about
reality?
>
>Reason does not limit itself;
I don't know what this means.
>it is ALWAYS rational to use reason.
Well, yes. What else could it be? Not that there's any guarantee
that you'll reach a rational answer...that's a separate question.
Chris Nielsen
<cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu> wrote:
>One point I want to make.
>
>Rationality is not defined by acting on the so-called objective truth. We
>are humans with limitd perceptions. We have limited knowledge and
>resources to improve upon our knowledge. Two ultra rational people can
>have two completely different ideas on the same thing because of
>differences in perspective. Of course, one will be right and the other
>wrong... but both are rational.
>
>To say that reason does not allow for faith is false. Faith is a
^^^^^^^^^^
>filler... the stuff between 100% certain and not sure at all.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
So, gamblers, insurance companines and stock investers are all the
most truely religously faithfull people? Their cold calculated
risks are the ultimate example of warm accepting faith? (I wish
my insurance company had more faith in me.)
>There is no magic number that says 98% sure is okay while 50% sure isn't.
>A common misconception is that 51% sure is the cutoff between belief and
>disbelief.
Different contexts require different standards of justification.
On the evning news the forcaster predicts that there is 80% chance
of good weather tomorrow. If I am deciding whether or not to carry
an umbrella, this will probably satisfy me. If I am trying to decide
whether or not to cross the puget sound on my small sailboat, I will
probably look for more evidence and more certainty before I am
satisfied.
>Well, it could be. But your actions should be determined not only by the
>probabilities but the values associated with it.
I guess this is what I just said above.
>For this reason, I believe that certain religious people are rational.
I don't get this.
>
>-Jim
Bryce Wilcox
<cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu> wrote:
>
>
>Do you think you can post a brief of your arguments against Pascal's
>wager when you have the time? This would be interesting since Pascal's
>wager (as I understand it) follows the rules of basic decision making
>under conditions of uncertainty.
The problem with Pascal's Wager is that it fails to take into account the
*probability* of a reward or cost the same way that it takes into account the
*magnitude* of the reward or cost. Also it neglects the most important cost--
the cost of deliberately choosing to believe in something which you know the
evidence does not warrant (i.e. having faith). The result is that Pascal's
Wager is so ridiculously irrational that I have a hard time believing that a
smart guy like Blaise Pascal could have *honestly* believed it. (sotto voco:
"But that is another subject entirely...")
Consider: If I came to you and said "I'll give you a 1 in 10,000,000 chance
to win 1,000,000 dollars if you give me a dollar." you would quickly
calculate: chance of winning: 1/10,000,000. reward: 1,000,000 dollars.
cost: 1 dollar. And tell me "No." Right?
If I came to you and said "I'll give you a 1 in 1,000,000 chance to win
10,000,000 dollars if you give me one dollar." then, assuming that you trusted
me or could enforce our contract, and had the money to invest, you would do
it, right?
But if I were Blaise Pascal, I would come to you and say "I will give you a
chance to win an infinite amount of money. It doesn't matter what your chance
of winning is, nor does it matter how much you have to give me, since the
amount you stand to gain is infinite."
This would just be stupid. If enough people fell for this kind of trick, then
I could go around making contracts in which people give me $10,000, and then
they have a 1 in 2^10,000,000,000,000,000 chance of winning, and if they win
I owe them infinite dollars. I would never have to pay up (in all probability)
but would make a nice living off their stupidity.
Now normally the process of rational, critical thought will prevent most
people from falling for this trick, but if they choose, for some reason, to
suspend their rational judgement from making certain decisions, and instead
make those decisions based on some arbitrary criterion, then they become easy
pickings. Note that "faith", by definition, involves suspending one's
rational judgement in favor of some other criterion. See how it all comes
together? T.V. preachers *love* Pascal's Wager...
P.S. Since I apparently have a different moral framework than the T.V.
preachers do, I would never participate in a scam such as the one outlined
above. I used first person when describing it only for narrative purposes.
Chris Nielsen
Tony Donadio <tdon...@panix.com> wrote:
>Faith is belief in the absence of evidence. Reason is belief _only_ on
>the basis of evidence. I say again: the two are mutually exclusive.
Agreed.
>There is no "space" in a rational epistemology to be taken up by faith.
>If someone has conclusive evidence of something, then in reason he accepts
>it as knowledge. If he does not, if he has inconclusive evidence, then he
>does not properly treat it as _knowledge_.
I don't think that this is what Objectivism says.
I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the context
of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
>Finally, it is a non-sequitur to say that the fact that two rational men
>can disagree (which certainly true) means that any part of their beliefs
>are based on faith. Reason is not a guarantee of infallibility.
I agree with this claim.
>
>--
> * Money is the material shape of the principle that men who wish
>Tony Donadio * to deal with one another must deal by trade and give value for
> * value. - Francisco D'Anconia, in ATLAS SHRUGGED, by Ayn Rand
Blake D Mills IV
question. Ayn Rand's philosophy stems directly from her metaphysics
which states that there is no supernatural entity, this life is all we've
got, and when we die we merely become plant food. From this belief one
can make a weak claim for hedonism, claiming that there is no absolute
good or evil, thus we should maximize our pleasure. Objectivism is
merely a twisted form of hedonism which claims that by maximizing my own
happiness I will essentially help to maximize everyonelse's happiness,
therefore hedonism is good. This is barbaric, silly, and the mindset of
an eight year old. I am tired of "discussing" things on this group,
because no one "listens." People merely flame each other as if it were a
playground spat. I suppose it goes along with that eight year old
mentality of thinking that hoarding all the toys is good for everyone. I
can say this: Please do not become so polarized by Objectivism (or any
view point for that matter) that you are not able to give other ideas a
chance. This is why I compare Objectivism to a cult. From what I've
read and experianced Objectivists are very close minded people. They
worship AS and even discuss the posibility that it could be a less than
perfect book. Ayn Rand is like a security blanket. If a doctor came out
and said that "tasty fatty things are good for you" it would have much
the same effect. Objectivists want selfishness to be good so badly that
they will believe anything that someone says to support their selfish
desires. C'mon people, we are humans we are above that. We dont have to
live in a Hobbesian world. And as I sign off I ask you all to reevaluate
why you believe Ayn Rand? Because she is right, or Because you want to
believe.
Reminds me of Religions who want so dearly to believe that a loved one
hasn't died they will believe anything.
\\|//
/ o o \
______________oo0_(_)_0oo______________
. | Blake D. Mills IV | .
/ )| bla...@eniac.seas.upenn.edu |( \
/ / | | \ \
_(=(, | .ooo0 | ,)=)_
(((\ \>|_/`>__________(~~~)_0ooo.__________<'\_|</ /)))
(\\\\ \_/ / \ ( (~~~) \ \_/ ////)
\ / \_) ) / \ /
) _/ (_/ \_ (
/ / Those who argue for their limitations \ \
/____/ Are doomed to be right. \____\
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
: This would just be stupid. If enough people fell for this kind of trick, then
: I could go around making contracts in which people give me $10,000, and then
: they have a 1 in 2^10,000,000,000,000,000 chance of winning, and if they win
: I owe them infinite dollars. I would never have to pay up (in all probability)
: but would make a nice living off their stupidity.
I think you may be confusing Pascal's wager with Bernoulli's paradox. It
is rational to maximize the expected value of a given action. Let me give
you the example that Bernoulli used:
We flip a coin. Heads we end the games and I pay you 1 dollar.
Tails we flip again. On the second toss, heads we end and I
pay you $2. Tails we flip again. On the third, heads we end
and I pay you $4. Tails we flip again and so on building the
dollar value exponentially.
How much would you pay to play this game? The expected value of the
dollar payoff from this game is infinity. But people generally give
answers between $4 - $15 dollars.
This does not mean that people are more rational than the person who bets
$1,000,000 to play the same game. It just means that most people assign a
negative value to risk... people are generally risk averse.
Does this mean that risk averse people are more rational than
risk-neutral people? Maybe... but how would you prove such a thing? You
are making judgements on personal utility curves and risk aversion. In
order for you to judge people's risk preferences to be irrational, you
would have to explain why the level you choose is the most rational one.
Let me point out that expected value theory is not the only way to make
decisions. It is one of the worst, actually. The assumption of expected
value theory is that you know with certainty all outcomes and associated
probabilities.
Another theory that works for me is "mini-max" theory. Minimize the
maximum loss you can take. For example, say you are playing a game. You
have two options: A) You have a chance of losing 1million dollars, or a
chance of winning 10million dollars. B) You have a chance of losing 1
dollar or winning 10 dollars. Mini-max theory would say choose option B
since you are minimizng the maximum amount you will lose.
Pascal's argument is a bit different. The assumption is that 1 option
leads to a extremely great payoff with low probability and the other
leads to a slight, negative one. In this case, he says to fo for the
extreme payoff since you have very little to lose.
Again, the use of a certain decision theory is a matter of personal
utility and risk preferences. You cannot automatically assume someone
else's decision process is irrational because it does not match yours.
: Now normally the process of rational, critical thought will prevent most
: people from falling for this trick, but if they choose, for some reason, to
: suspend their rational judgement from making certain decisions, and instead
: make those decisions based on some arbitrary criterion, then they become easy
: pickings. Note that "faith", by definition, involves suspending one's
: rational judgement in favor of some other criterion. See how it all comes
: together? T.V. preachers *love* Pascal's Wager...
-Jim
S. Wyshynski
<cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu> wrote:
>Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
>: The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
>: transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
>: about the allegedly unknowable.
>
>I do not know what will happen at 5:00 tomorrow.
Where? You have only given one co-ordinate (out of four).
>True, I DO know something about the future. In order for me to make this
>statement, I must know that 5:00 tomorrow exists.
>
>But this is a long way from the implication that since I know something
>about the future, I should theoretically be able to know everything about it.
There is no such implication. That the entire universe is knowable to man
does not mean that man can 'theoretically' know everything (such would be
a bad theory, as it wouldn't account for the limited size of the human brain
as well as other factors); it merely implies that it is possible for man to
know _anything_, NOT _everything_. There is no particular that is out of
bounds.
>The fact still remains, I do no know what will happen at 5:00.
>
>
>-Jim
Given a place (the other three co-ordinates), it is possible for me to
make such predictions, depending on the place. It is extremely likely that
tomorrow at 5:00 PM EST (yeah, what time zone BTW?) there will still be
people working at the Vivid office.
Jim May, Practicing Objectivist
S. Wyshynski
<cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu> wrote:
>S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) wrote:
>: >Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
>: >: The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
>: >: transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
>: >: about the allegedly unknowable.
>
>: No one said that. We must be careful when we talk of "knowing
>: everything" that we not get sloppy. For example, radioactive decay
>: appears to be a truly random phenomenon. It seems that no one could know
>: (in principle) which of two Uranium atoms will decay first.
>
>Hmmm. True. No one said that all things are knowable.
>
>However, the implication is there, no? One cannot make the fallacy of
>saying that some things are unknowable to mankind since this is an
>impossibility as Tony pointed out. Wouldn't the conclusion be then that
>all things are knowable? Or to put it in your terms, potentially knowable?
Yes, but see my last post; ANYTHING, not EVERYTHING AT ONCE.
>If this is true, then you are expressing knowledge of the absence of the
>unknowable since you know the unknowable is knowable. This is a fallacy
>as well since by its very definition, you have no clue whether the
>unknowable is potentially knowable or not.
If one expresses knowledge of the absence of the unknowable, it is due to the
fact that no evidence exists for the proposition of its existence; you
cannot know the absence or negation of something BEFORE you know its presence.
Can you tell me about all the alien artifacts that are NOT in your room?
Can you tell me what of my possessions are not in your room? NO; to do that,
you would need to know what my possessions (or the alien artifacts) WERE;
you would need to know their EXISTENCE (positive) FIRST before you can know
their absence (negative). For a negative to be valid, there must be
something (a positive) to negate.
Metaphysically, consider the following: If some thing or aspect of the
universe is truly unknowable to man, this means that it cannot possibly
bear any kind of connection to the part of the universe that is knowable.
It cannot manifest itself, it cannot cause events, it cannot be caused by
something (since for that to happen it would need to be a necessary
consequence of something (as per causality)), it cannot GIVE ANY HINT of
its existence! Not only no evidence of its existence, but no telltale
holes, either; no shadows, hollows out of something else, perturbations,
gravity lenses, emissions, reflections -- nothing!
In other words, it cannot have any relation to knowable things! It causes
nothing, it is not caused by anything, it does not affect the knowable
universe. Its presence and absence, therefore, are identical.
Why postulate such a thing? Why worry? How can it possibly affect us?
(Oh, wait, it can't; we would know about it, then.) I do believe a fellow
named Occam had something to say about theories of such unknowables.
"Here is The Thing. You can't see it, smell it, hear it, touch it or taste
it; it has no weight, no mass, no structure . Therefore, it's absolutely
safe, it doesn't need to be housebroken, and you don't need to feed it.
Wanna buy it?" (Alan Gotthelf, I think, some years ago at York University.)
BTW, if we think that the unknowable is knowable, we empty the term
"unknowable" of any meaning; now it's just a "schtroumpf".
For the advocate of faith, back to square one. The rest of us have (knowable)
places to go and (real) things to see.
Jim May, Practicing Objectivist
Chris Nielsen
Tony Donadio <tdon...@panix.com> wrote:
>Chris Nielsen (nie...@u.washington.edu) wrote:
>
>: >There is no "space" in a rational epistemology to be taken up by faith.
>: >it as knowledge. If he does not, if he has inconclusive evidence, then he
>: >does not properly treat it as _knowledge_.
>
>: I don't think that this is what Objectivism says.
>
>: I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the context
>: of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
>
>does not mean incomplete or inconclusive; it means contextual.
I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the context
of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
Do you have a bio/home-page some where?
How long have you studied objectivism?
How many of the conferences have you been to?
How many of the tape lecture courses have you heard?
How many lectures / vidio-tape lectures have you seen?
Do you actively attend any local objectivist discussion/study group?
I have only been here for a short while. But my observation is that
you make a lot of assertions without providing much argumentation.
If you are busy, I can understand this. But since the only other
basis I have for accepting what you say is your credentials, I want
to know what they are.
Chris
Chris Nielsen
Tony Donadio <tdon...@panix.com> wrote:
>The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
>transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
>about the allegedly unknowable.
I don't get it. I mean suppose that I admit that we do know somethings
about an object including the fact that there are other things that
we can never know about it. How is this a 'transparent' fallacy?
I think that the problem with saying that there is something un-knowable
has more to do with the laws of identity and causality.
Tony Donadio
lack of knowledge of what he was talking about:
: Ayn Rand's philosophy stems directly from her metaphysics
: which states that there is no supernatural entity, this life is all we've
: got, and when we die we merely become plant food. From this belief one
: can make a weak claim for hedonism, claiming that there is no absolute
: good or evil, thus we should maximize our pleasure. Objectivism is
: merely a twisted form of hedonism which claims that by maximizing my own
: happiness I will essentially help to maximize everyonelse's happiness,
First: Objectivism rejects hedonism *explicitly*.
Second: Objectivism DOES NOT justify *anything* on the grounds that it
will "help to maximize everyone else's happiness." This is a Utilitarian
argument, and Utilitarianism is *another* ideology that Objectivism
rejects *explicitly*.
Third: The Objectivist ethics is based NOT on man's happiness, but *man's
life* as the standard of value. However, since happiness is the state
resulting from the successful, long-range achievement of _values_, action
based on actual values results in happiness. Happiness is not the
standard, but a consequence of successful living.
: therefore hedonism is good.
Objectivism explicitly rejects hedonism.
: This is barbaric, silly, and the mindset of an eight year old.
Objectivism quite agrees.
: I am tired of "discussing" things on this group, because no one listens.
An ironic remark from someone whose "listening" has been so shoddy as to
lead him to self-righteously bash straw men in front of thousands of
people on the net. There is no excuse for the poster publicly berating
Objectivism for holding views that it *EXPLICITLY REJECTS* and is in fact
the exact opposite of, all in obvious ignorance. If he does not know
enough about Objectivism to at least KNOW what the view he is attacking
is, then he should reconsider whether he has any business attacking it.
Tony Donadio
: >There is no "space" in a rational epistemology to be taken up by faith.
: >If someone has conclusive evidence of something, then in reason he accepts
: >it as knowledge. If he does not, if he has inconclusive evidence, then he
: >does not properly treat it as _knowledge_.
: I don't think that this is what Objectivism says.
: I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the context
: of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
No. Contextual certainty requires _conclusive_ evidence. Contextual
does not mean incomplete or inconclusive; it means contextual.
Tony Donadio
: Do you have a bio/home-page some where?
No.
: How long have you studied objectivism?
Thirteen years.
: How many of the conferences have you been to?
Six.
: How many of the tape lecture courses have you heard?
All of them except Modern Philosophy and Principles of Grammar. I own
most of the others, including Fiction Writing and Introduction to Logic,
which I am currently listening to.
: How many lectures / vidio-tape lectures have you seen?
Far too many to try counting them for the poster's benefit.
: Do you actively attend any local objectivist discussion/study group?
By email, yes. I've been a member of OSG for over four years, and I'm
moderately active in the Gotham Objectivist Club.
: I have only been here for a short while. But my observation is that
: you make a lot of assertions without providing much argumentation.
: If you are busy, I can understand this. But since the only other
: basis I have for accepting what you say is your credentials, I want
: to know what they are.
Excuse me, but I do not buy this. If this was not intended as a public
challenge, then it could (and should) have been asked by private email.
Yes, I am busy, which is why my response was terse. If the poster needs a
reference for the observation I offered, I suggest Leonard Peikoff's
_Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, chapter 5, in the subsection
"Certainty as Contextual."
Finally: PLEASE do not accept what I say on the basis of my "credentials,"
because I don't have any. I do not speak for Objectivism.
S. Wyshynski
<cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu> wrote:
>Chris Nielsen (nie...@u.washington.edu) wrote:
>
>: So, gamblers, insurance companines and stock investers are all the
>: most truely religously faithfull people? Their cold calculated
>: risks are the ultimate example of warm accepting faith? (I wish
>: my insurance company had more faith in me.)
>
>No. Insurance companies are not religious. My contention is that they
>have faith that their past evidence will lead to their expected results
>in the future.
No. What you do not understand is that faith is an "anti-concept"; it merges
two unrelated things.
To illustrate: "Democracy" is a popular package-deal anti-concept; it can
mean either "representative government of elected individuals" or it can
mean "tyranny of the majority". When a man of reason objects to a particular
irrational measure, some people like to say "Well, you can't go against the
will of the people; that's democracy", thereby hinting that the speaker is
anti-democracy, by unspoken assumption of the second meaning. Its purpose
is meant to obliterate the difference between tyranny and freedom by
disguising one as the other. It also serves to disarm the unwary, silencing
their proper protest. If the speaker is confident and identifies the
tyrannical definition, the others attempt to retreat under cover of the
innocuous definition, thereby making the speaker look 'extreme'.
In the case of 'faith' the two things being lumped together are: a deep, serene
emotion of confidence, of completeness, with no hint of fear or guilt or doubt;
versus the epistemology of non-reason.
Someone who knew nothing about his convictions could say that John Galt was
a man of 'great faith'; he never swerved from his path, he held to his goal
with great tenacity, certainty and serenity; he had no doubts. Even in
_The Fountainhead_, Rand had Toohey tell Hopton Stoddard to say to Roark,
"In your own way, I know that you are a deeply religious man..."
It is not faith as anti-reason that is being discussed here; it is faith
as that deep, unified emotion that makes men great and their lives fulfilled.
When Ayn Rand described the emotion of 'exaltation', she was describing
the specific emotion at the climax of one's life.
And she did it in the context of reclaiming the concepts of 'sacred',
'worship', 'sanctity' etc. from their monopolization by religion.
This package-deal is now used to trip up some Objectivists by attempting to
merge the exalted /confident state of being with the epistemology of faith
(non-reason). To have faith in something could mean either; it could mean
that one trusts in something despite the evidence (epistemological faith) or
it means that one has great confidence in something (from evidence).
>I am not saying that insurance companies are irrational. I am saying that
>they are not assured of the outcome.
>
>Certain religious people base their beliefs on the evidence presented to
>them. I am saying that they are rational people. Why is this a non-sequiter?
Because the term 'religious' NECESSARILY invokes faith-as-unreason.
Something that often gets missed by people who talk about the 'evidence'
for sundry irrational beliefs is the fact that unexplained phenomenon as
such are not evidence for any particular theory; they are merely evidence
that there is 'more'.
Because of this disdain for 'rules of evidence', the single thing that stands
in the way of an explanation for unexplained things like crop circles or UFO's
is the hordes of UFO freaks and paranormal 'experts'. Because of their
insistence on imposing form (their pet theories) on what is really the unknown
(zero particular evidence) they are incapable of actually discovering
anything.
God is a HUGE example of this -- study history!
>Maybe it is because you are assuming the non-existence of god. There is
>no rational reason to believe this. It is only an assumption. You cannot
>rationally disprove the non-existence of something.
You cannot know the ABSENCE of something until you know the PRESENCE. You
can't know an ISN'T until you have grasped the IS. The statement "there are
no elephants in your room" has no meaning until you grasp what an elephant
IS (and where they ARE SOMEPLACE). The IS always precedes the IS NOT.
For this reason, the onus of evidence is ALWAYS on the POSITIVE first; he
who advocates an IS (there IS a God) must first provide evidence! (as well
as a proper definition). This has never been done.
In general, the proper response to theists is not "there is no God", but
simply "What is God?" and then proceed to dynamite their pathetic attempts
to define God by what he is NOT. And then you walk away saying "concept GOD
has no referent in reality."
In the meantime, since there is no evidence for or against God, we must treat
the assertion "There is a God" as an _arbitrary_ one, i.e. epistemologically
non-existent.
If you define God as having any infinite attributes, you make the situation
harder for yourself; I can prove, by simple mathematics, that infinities of
anything cannot exist, and neither can an infinite God. Even if you
present evidence for his existence, there is NO WAY he can be omni-anything.
>Why? Because all cognition is based on the 5 senses and the mind. When we
>say something is non-existent we are saying that we are not able to
>perceive it. So disproving god on a rational level is a joint hypothesis:
>1) that god does not exist 2)Our perceptions are aware of everything that
>exists. This hypothesis is impossible to prove.
Our perceptions are of that which exists, not necessarily everything; other
than that, see above; in the case of an omni-anything God, it CAN be proven.
>A better analogy would be sailing to a distant land. One path leads to a
>rumored paradise but the waters are rough. The other leads to nothing,
>but the waters are smooth. Which path do you take assuming you are forced
>to make a decision *now*?
The nothing is no more certain than the paradise.
Jim May, Practicing Objectivist
Brad Aaronson
I was speaking yesterday with a friend and he pointed out to me that my
knowledge of this subject is all in Hebrew, and that I've been mistrans-
lating left and right. As a result, I have made statements that I should
not have made and did not mean.
Therefore, and because I want to think through his points, I am withdraw-
ing virtually everything I wrote on this thread. This does not necessar-
ily mean I am repudiating it, but you may take it that way if you wish.
Some last comments, though:
To Tony Donadio:
I appreciate your answer to the example I gave of rejecting the existence of
Abraham Lincoln, as opposed to the entirely subjective response of S. Joel
Katz. I do not withdraw the fact that the Exodus and Sinai (not Siani, btw)
were historical facts. I would hazard a guess that I have a great deal more
information on which to base a conclusion here than you do (including arguments
against), but since I am not prepared at this time to offer you an acceptable
explanation of what precisely happened there, I will leave off with a _nolo
contendre_.
But as far as existence exists meaning that existence has always existed, here
I have to differ both with you and with Ayn Rand (this is the *sole* point that
I think she erred in logic). "Existence exists" is an axiom. This means that
it is a proposition where any attempt to disprove it requires its acceptance.
Fine. I can't say "existence doesn't exist" without existing to say it. But I
can say that existence did not always exist, and came into being at a given
point, without this problem. My statement that existence did not always exist
does not require that I accept that it always existed.
But it's a moot point, since, as my friend pointed out to me, both I and the
Torah do hold that existence has always existed. :-)
I assure you that what I have in mind has nothing to do with the concept
that is labeled "God" in English. As someone once said, "The God you
don't believe in - well, I don't believe in him either."
----------------------
To John Enright:
I have a 20.6 Kb ASCII file containing the text of an article due to be
published in a magazine in New York in another month on the topic of the Exodus
and Egyptian history. I'll e-mail it to you if you like. Or to anyone else
who sends a request to da...@netvision.net.il. Alternatively, I am going to be
visiting my family in Chicago (Highland Park) from about March 9-28. If you
would like to call to discuss it (or anything else), the number there is (708)
432-6425 (if you decide to call, please don't from about an hour before sundown
on Friday until about an hour after sundown on Saturday).
******************************************************************
Brad Aaronson, Objectivist in Training
*****************************
* Reality - What a Concept! *
* -Robin Williams *
******************************************************************
e-mail to da...@netvision.net.il only
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
: In article <3ic125$5...@panix3.panix.com>,
: Tony Donadio <tdon...@panix.com> wrote:
: >The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
: >transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
: >about the allegedly unknowable.
: I don't get it. I mean suppose that I admit that we do know somethings
: about an object including the fact that there are other things that
: we can never know about it. How is this a 'transparent' fallacy?
As I understand it, this is Tony's assertion.
In order to prove the non-existence of something, we must define what it
is. In order to define what something is, we must be able to reason what
it is. In order to reason what it is, it must be able to be sensed. If we
are able to sense it, then it must exist thereby refuting the claim that
it does not exist.
This only works when we are talking about location. The example given to
me by another poster was trying to prove that alien artifiacts were not
in my room. In order for me to prove they do not exist, I would have to
define them, etc...
We cannot prove the unknowable. It is an apparent paradox since the
assumption is that we know nothing about it. On the flip side, we cannot
prove that all things are knowable.
-Jim
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
: In the case of 'faith' the two things being lumped together are: a deep, serene
: emotion of confidence, of completeness, with no hint of fear or guilt or doubt;
: versus the epistemology of non-reason.
If this is your definition of faithful, I know of at least 1 non-faithful
orthodox religious person.
: (non-reason). To have faith in something could mean either; it could mean
: that one trusts in something despite the evidence (epistemological faith) or
: it means that one has great confidence in something (from evidence).
You will not accept that faith can mean acceptance of something based on
limited evidence?
: Because the term 'religious' NECESSARILY invokes faith-as-unreason.
I do not understand this.
: Something that often gets missed by people who talk about the 'evidence'
: for sundry irrational beliefs is the fact that unexplained phenomenon as
: such are not evidence for any particular theory; they are merely evidence
: that there is 'more'.
I am not talking about evidence of the supernatural.
I am talking about evidence in the context of a specific religion. In
other words, if I were to ask God to allow me to flip a coin a 100 times
and have it come up heads and it actually happened, this would be good
enough for me (the Christian God).
However, if I just flipped a coin 100 times and they all came up heads, I
would not accept this as evidence of a God.
: Because of this disdain for 'rules of evidence', the single thing that stands
: in the way of an explanation for unexplained things like crop circles or UFO's
: is the hordes of UFO freaks and paranormal 'experts'. Because of their
: insistence on imposing form (their pet theories) on what is really the unknown
: (zero particular evidence) they are incapable of actually discovering
: anything.
Still don't follow you. Are you suggesting we suspend all thought on a
topic until something is provable? This is not how rational people act.
We do not ignore the possibility of something until enough evidence is
collected. We base theories and explanations on the evidence that we have.
I believe UFO explanation of crop circles were as plausible as anything
else at the time.
I am not saying that all religious people are rational. I am saying that
I know of at least one who bases his religious belief on evidence. The
evidence is similar to all other types of evidence: a cause-effect
relationship that is explained nicely by the existence of a specific
(religion-specific) god and which has no other plausible explanation.
: You cannot know the ABSENCE of something until you know the PRESENCE. You
: can't know an ISN'T until you have grasped the IS. The statement "there are
: no elephants in your room" has no meaning until you grasp what an elephant
: IS (and where they ARE SOMEPLACE). The IS always precedes the IS NOT.
Or in other words, you can't prove non-existence, period. Absence (in a
particular location) and non-existence are quite different. You seem to
be blending the two.
: For this reason, the onus of evidence is ALWAYS on the POSITIVE first; he
: who advocates an IS (there IS a God) must first provide evidence! (as well
: as a proper definition). This has never been done.
My religious friend has. He has presented me evidence not only of the
supernatural but of a specific God. He defines God as onmi-everything and
creator of all things.
: In the meantime, since there is no evidence for or against God, we must treat
: the assertion "There is a God" as an _arbitrary_ one, i.e. epistemologically
: non-existent.
There is no evidence for you. Your implication is that there is no
evidence for anyone. This is irrational as you cannot possibly know the
experiences of everyone else.
: If you define God as having any infinite attributes, you make the situation
: harder for yourself; I can prove, by simple mathematics, that infinities of
: anything cannot exist, and neither can an infinite God. Even if you
: present evidence for his existence, there is NO WAY he can be omni-anything.
You will have proved either that omni-anything cannot exist or that
simple mathematics cannot capture infinity. But I'd be very interested in
this proof that you have.
Again, we face the impossibility of proving a joint-hypo. Unfortunately,
this is even worse than a joint hypothesis to prove. Omnipotence would
also mean the ability to create contradictions.
Omnipotence is a concept beyond our current capacity for reason. Our
reasoning is based on impossibilities. We prove something by rejecting
the impossible until we are left only with the possible. Unfortunately,
possibility of all things is incompatible with the way we reason.
: Our perceptions are of that which exists, not necessarily everything; other
: than that, see above; in the case of an omni-anything God, it CAN be proven.
Sorry. You cannot prove it.
I once had a proof for the non-existence of God when I was younger. It
went something like, God is omnipotent. God cannot flip a coin heads and
tails at the same time. Therefore, God is not omnipotent. :) My younger
sister (11 years old at the time) reminded me that God can do anything...
even mutually exclusive tasks. Omnipotence is beyond our reasonable
capacities.
: >A better analogy would be sailing to a distant land. One path leads to a
: >rumored paradise but the waters are rough. The other leads to nothing,
: >but the waters are smooth. Which path do you take assuming you are forced
: >to make a decision *now*?
: The nothing is no more certain than the paradise.
It doesn't matter. Decisions are not based on pure probabilities. They
are based on personal utilities associated with their probabilities.
In other words, who cares if there is no paradise or not. If you don't
mind the rough waters, why not go the route that is rumored to be paradise?
-Jim
Matt Zwolinski
Tony: I've already explained this to him via email. He's apparently only
interested in clinging to his pre-conceived notions of Objectivism though,
as he never responds to argument.
--
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Matt Zwolinski | "Malo periculosam libertatem
ma...@tsoft.net | quam quietam servitium."
PGP Public Key available via finger |
Stephen Grossman
>Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
>: Faith is belief in the absence of evidence. Reason is belief _only_ on
>: the basis of evidence. I say again: the two are mutually exclusive.
>
>To endorse this view is (at least) to adopt the epistemic principle that
>rational belief goes by way of appropriate (if perhaps inconclusive)
>evidence; more perspicuously:
>
> (*) A person is rational in believing p only if she has adequate
> reasons for thus believing p.
>
>And (again) I ask: What reasons are there for believing (*)?
>
of too much linguistic analysis. There is a world of difference between
evidence (of whatever kind) and a lack of evidence.
********************************************************************************
"The existential atmosphere of [the pre-WW1 West] (which was then being
destroyed by Europe's philosophical trends and political systems) still held a
benevolence that would be incredible to the men of today, i.e., a smiling
confident good will of man to man, and of man to life." [Ayn Rand]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHEN GROSSMAN SGRO...@UMASSD.EDU
********************************************************************************
Stephen Grossman
>He is not 100% convinced of God's existence. He is, however, practices
>the strictest orthodoxy of this religion because the value associated
>with it (his eternal soul) is associated with the slim probability that
>God is alive.
>
and the possibility that God is his asshole?
cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu
: >He is not 100% convinced of God's existence. He is, however, practices
: >the strictest orthodoxy of this religion because the value associated
: >with it (his eternal soul) is associated with the slim probability that
: >God is alive.
: >
: and the possibility that God is his asshole?
Now *this* would be faith as he has no evidence to support the idea that
God is his asshole.
-Jim
James Carnicelli
Phil Oliver
cwo...@delphi.com (Chris Wolf)
PHIL: Every Christian writer/spokesman is indeed carrying on a battle
against reason.
CHRIS: This is the sort of overblown nonsense that gives Objectivism a
bad name. 'Belief in God' does not equal 'attack on reason.'
JVC: Consider a simpler example of the same principle: a man
believes that killing droves of humans is moral whenever a
drought hits an area. Whether he wishes to accept it in his own
mind or not, he embraces murder as moral. Why? For the simple
reason that human sacrifice must be accomplished by murder. He
can pretend there is no connection between the two all he likes,
but they are inseparable.
I see no reason to believe that belief that a deity exists is,
by itself, connected to attacking reason. I do, however, believe
that any religion in which man must have faith in some ideas,
without rational reasons--and often in the face of solid
evidence--are. This includes every religion I know of. Faith
is the antipode of reason.
-James Vincent Carnicelli II
Stevens Institute of Technology
Paul Martin
: [snip]
: you really should have a lobotomy to relieve yourself of the physical
: pressure of too much linguistic analysis. There is a world of difference
: between evidence (of whatever kind) and a lack of evidence.
As there is between talk about evidence and talk about 'evidence'. So
maybe you should explain to the rest of us the difference between use and
mention. Anyway, many thanks for your congenial and conciliatory reply.
pma...@csulb.edu
_______________________________________
Philosophy, California State University
Long Beach, CA 90840 (310) 985-4331
Fax: (310) 985-7135
Dorothy E. Fanyo
In article <>, "J. Gill" (jg...@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu) writes:
>
>
>>
>> Are you an objectivist? Do you believe that, for example, all of
>> >reality is knowable to man? Do you believe that reason is man's only
>> >method of obtaining knowledge? Do you believe that existence has primacy
>> >over consciousness and needs no explanation?
>> >
>> Oops, I just hit a bump! I must believe that all of reality is
>> knowable to man in order to be a bona fide Objectivist?
>
>to believe that all of reality is knowable to man(kind)?
Since we don't have the foggiest notion of the enormity of_what_ is
yet unknown, how is it possible to say with surity that we _can_
know it? Saying such a thing implies that evolution has tailored our
minds so that we can, and how do we know even _that_? Scientists are
_constantly_ being surprised at information which poses questions
never before thought of. How do we _know_ that we can find answers
to everything, or even that we can come to the point of knowing that
all the questions have been asked?
>This was probably a collective statement, but regardless, you have
>dropped the context here. What was said, was, "knowable to man."
>Implying that if an individual seeks knowledge of an aspect of reality,
>it is within his/her grasp.
That's different. Saying he's seeking knowledge of a certain
aspect of reality says that he's already asked the question, What
if he's never dreamed that there's a question of ask?
In the reality of nature's cosmos, we're tiny little things crawling
around on an insignificant little planet orbiting around one little
sun on the edge of one galaxy. Why should the mass inside our
skulls (the functions of which are still largely a mystery to us)
necessarily be capable of knowing everything that is?
Look. I think I know why the assertion "all reality is knowable to
man" is made. It's to counter the assertion of mystics that there
exist supernatural realms which are unknowable to man. But to
negate that assertion of the mystics by declaring its opposite to be
true doesn't prove the validity of the oppossing statement.
I don't see how you can say with any surity that all reality is
knowable until you _know_ all of reality and _know_ that you know
all of it. Until then, it's a supposition.
It's the same sort of thing as Aristotle saying you can't say that
you've lived a happy life until you come to the very end of it --
you can't say that you _can_ know all of reality until you finally
actually _do_ know all of reality, and _know_ that you do, that
there are no more questions to ask or answer.
Unless someone can convince me differently (notice I did not say
"prove", for I don't think that's possible), I'll continue to
categorize "all reality is knowable to man" as article of faith -- or
hope. Such a belief does have a great deal of charm and appeal, and
I'll be glad to listen to any arguments which uphold it. I haven't
heard any so far.
>What superman could have individual knowledge of all things at one
>time? None born yet.
No argument. :-)
John McVey
>
>I have faith based on reason the sun will shine tomorrow.
>
*NO*, you _trust_ that the sun will shine tomorrow. Faith is
unquestioning, trust is not. Questioning destroys faith but strengthens
trust. You trust it will shine tomorrow as you know why it keeps coming up
and see no reasoon why those circustances will change.
Learn to know the difference between faith and trust!!
TDB
--
John J McVey | " When I'm not chasing the Ironman Crown, I'm | _________
chasing the utlimate wave. One day I'll nail it. There won't be |\/ Darwin o\
any spectators out here, so noone will ever know, except the one|/\_________/
person that matters." - Darren Mercer | bb bb
Chris Wolf
>>This is the sort of overblown nonsense that gives Objectivism a bad name.
>>'Belief in God' does not equal 'attack on reason.'
S. Joel Katz writes:
> Does "crusade for God" equal "crusade against reason"? Does
>"belief in god" equal "belief against reason"?
I don't think so.
/**************************************************************************\
| "This does not mean that all errors are honest. People |
|Chris Wolf subscribe to mistaken views, in philosophy as elsewhere,|
|cwo...@delphi.com for any number of bad motives. But it does mean that |
| we cannot judge a person's rationality solely by |
| reference to the content of his ideas." -David Kelley- |
\**************************************************************************/
Betsy Speicher
> I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the context
> of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
Not true. Sometimes an Objectivist is _UN_certain within the context of
his knowledge. Sometimes he just doesn't have enough evidence one way or
another to come to any conclusion or even to an interesting hypothesis.
Under those circumstances, an Objectivist, being epistemologically
self-aware and being honest, would say, "I don't know."
Betsy Speicher
Chris Nielsen
Tony Donadio <tdon...@panix.com> wrote:
>Chris Nielsen wrote:
>: I have only been here for a short while. But my observation is that
>: you make a lot of assertions without providing much argumentation.
>: If you are busy, I can understand this. But since the only other
>: basis I have for accepting what you say is your credentials, I want
>: to know what they are.
>
>Excuse me, but I do not buy this. If this was not intended as a public
>challenge, then it could (and should) have been asked by private email.
This was not intended as any sort of challenge.
Now I know that you are in a position to be knowledgeable
about Objectivism.
>If the poster needs
>a reference for the observation I offered, I suggest Leonard Peikoff's
>_Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, chapter 5, in the subsection
>"Certainty as Contextual."
Thankyou.
>Finally: PLEASE do not accept what I say on the basis of my "credentials,"
>because I don't have any. I do not speak for Objectivism.
I would not *accept* what you say on the basis of your credentials.
However, when a person talks as if he is knowledgable about
something, and yet what he says seems wrong to me, how I respond
to him depends a great deal on wheteher I think he is in a position
to be knowledgeable about what he is talking about.
Chris =)
S. Joel Katz
>In article <3ifff7$1...@panix3.panix.com>,
>Tony Donadio <tdon...@panix.com> wrote:
>>Chris Nielsen (nie...@u.washington.edu) wrote:
>>
>>: >There is no "space" in a rational epistemology to be taken up by faith.
>>: >If someone has conclusive evidence of something, then in reason he accepts
>>: >it as knowledge. If he does not, if he has inconclusive evidence, then he
>>: >does not properly treat it as _knowledge_.
>>
>>: I don't think that this is what Objectivism says.
>>
>>: I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the context
>>: of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
>>
>>No. Contextual certainty requires _conclusive_ evidence. Contextual
>>does not mean incomplete or inconclusive; it means contextual.
>I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the context
>of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
What exactly is he supposed to be certain of? I imagine that if I
were willing to say I was *certain* that X is true, I would also have to
be certain I had conclusive evidence. That evidence may subsequently turn
out to be erroneous, and my conclusion that it was certain may be wrong
-- I am not omnisceint.
--
S. Joel Katz Information on Objectivism, Linux, 8031s, and atheism
Stim...@Panix.COM is available at http://www.panix.com/~stimpson/
S. Joel Katz
>In article <3ic125$5...@panix3.panix.com>,
>Tony Donadio <tdon...@panix.com> wrote:
>>The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
>>transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
>>about the allegedly unknowable.
>I don't get it. I mean suppose that I admit that we do know somethings
>about an object including the fact that there are other things that
>we can never know about it. How is this a 'transparent' fallacy?
Exactly which things are you claiming we can never know about it?
Just 'some' things? What is a thing? When does some alleged entity get
the status of 'thing'?
>I think that the problem with saying that there is something un-knowable
>has more to do with the laws of identity and causality.
Maybe so.
S. Joel Katz
>Chris Wolf writes:
>>>This is the sort of overblown nonsense that gives Objectivism a bad name.
>>>'Belief in God' does not equal 'attack on reason.'
>S. Joel Katz writes:
>> Does "crusade for God" equal "crusade against reason"? Does
>>"belief in god" equal "belief against reason"?
>I don't think so.
Let me clarify what I think you are trying to say and you can
tell me if I'm way off base. A person who belives in god has an erroneous
belief, there is no _reason_ he could come to that belief because it is
incorrect; however, it doesn't follow that he is against reason in any
sense. A misuse of reason does not imply a rejection of reason.
Is that what you are trying to say?
S. Joel Katz
>This was not intended as any sort of challenge.
>Now I know that you are in a position to be knowledgeable
>about Objectivism.
>>If the poster needs
>>a reference for the observation I offered, I suggest Leonard Peikoff's
>>_Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, chapter 5, in the subsection
>>"Certainty as Contextual."
>Thankyou.
>>Finally: PLEASE do not accept what I say on the basis of my "credentials,"
>>because I don't have any. I do not speak for Objectivism.
>I would not *accept* what you say on the basis of your credentials.
>However, when a person talks as if he is knowledgable about
>something, and yet what he says seems wrong to me, how I respond
>to him depends a great deal on wheteher I think he is in a position
>to be knowledgeable about what he is talking about.
I would think you would be far more interested in whether he
_seems_ knowledgeable about what he is talking about -- in whether his
claims make sense and are well-argued.
Matt Zwolinski
S. Wyshynski <vi...@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> wrote:
>In article <3idae5$h...@netnews.upenn.edu>,
> <cha...@futures.wharton.upenn.edu> wrote:
>>Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
>>: The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
>>: transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
>>: about the allegedly unknowable.
>>
>
>Where? You have only given one co-ordinate (out of four).
>
>>True, I DO know something about the future. In order for me to make this
>>statement, I must know that 5:00 tomorrow exists.
>>
>>But this is a long way from the implication that since I know something
>>about the future, I should theoretically be able to know everything about it.
>
>There is no such implication. That the entire universe is knowable to man
>does not mean that man can 'theoretically' know everything (such would be
>a bad theory, as it wouldn't account for the limited size of the human brain
>as well as other factors); it merely implies that it is possible for man to
>know _anything_, NOT _everything_. There is no particular that is out of
>bounds.
>
>>The fact still remains, I do no know what will happen at 5:00.
>>
>>
>>-Jim
>
>Given a place (the other three co-ordinates), it is possible for me to
>make such predictions, depending on the place. It is extremely likely that
>tomorrow at 5:00 PM EST (yeah, what time zone BTW?) there will still be
>people working at the Vivid office.
>
Here's a point to keep in mind when this objection is brought up. An action
taken at 5:00 tomorrow cannot be known because it isn't an existant. It doesn't
yet exist. This does not violate the principle that all of reality is knowable
to man, because it is not yet part of reality.
Paul Martin
: In <3igsat$e...@nntp2.u.washington.edu> nie...@u.washington.edu (Chris
: Nielsen) writes:
: >In article <3ic125$5...@panix3.panix.com>,
: >Tony Donadio <tdon...@panix.com> wrote:
: >>The fallacy of claiming that certain things are unknowable to man is
: >>transparent: the act of asserting this statement is a claim of knowledge
: >>about the allegedly unknowable.
: >I don't get it. I mean suppose that I admit that we do know somethings
: >about an object including the fact that there are other things that
: >we can never know about it. How is this a 'transparent' fallacy?
: Exactly which things are you claiming we can never know about it?
Nothing in particular. Just so, there need be no contradiction (or other
impropriety) in claiming to know that not all truths can be known, i.e.,
that some truths are unknowable. No doubt one can't properly claim to know
of some particular proposition p, both that p is true and that it can't be
known (to be true). But, adapting Shakespeare, there are more ways of
demonstrating
(*) Some truths are unknowable
than, evidently, are dreamt of in your philosophy -- certainly ways other
than _displaying_ (perhaps _per impossibile_) a true but unknowably true
proposition and then generalizing. For of course one might instead argue
that the denial of (*), together with otherwise eminently plausible
principles regarding the nature of knowledge, leads to contradiction. And
_reductio_ proofs for (*) have indeed been offered, most notably by
Frederick Fitch [1], whose argument is more recently revived by W. D.
Hart and Colin McGinn [3] (cf. Hart [2] and Rescher [4]). Whether such
arguments hold up is another matter altogether. What is clear is that one
can't rightly dismiss (*) with little more than a hand wave.
[1] Frederick B. Fitch, "A logical analysis of some value concepts",
_J. Symb. Logic_ 28 (1963), 135-42.
[2] W. D. Hart, "The epistemology of abstract objects", _Proc. Arist.
Soc._, supp. vol. liii (1979), 164-65 n. 3.
[3] W. D. Hart and Colin McGinn, "Knowledge and necessity," _J.
Phil. Logic_ 5 (1976), 205-8.
[4] Nicholas Rescher, _The Limits of Science_ (Univ. of California
Press, 1984), p. 150 n. 8.
_____________________________ ___ ____________________________
pma...@csulb.edu Philosophy \\\ What we can't say we can't
California State University /// say, and we can't whistle it
Long Beach, CA 90840 \\\ either.
(310) 985-4331, -7135 (fax) /// -- Frank Plumpton Ramsey
_____________________________ ___ ____________________________
John Enright
: : I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the
: : context of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive*
: : evidence.
He wrote it _to_ Tony Donadio. But the attributions did get confusing.
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Enright from address: jenr...@home.interaccess.com
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Wolf
It's certainly true that faith and reason are contradictory, but men are
quite capable of holding contradictions as a result of honest error. I
know many people who uphold reason as a prime virtue, but also have faith
in God. They simply haven't yet realized the contradiction. I don't think
these people can be accused of attacking reason, unless you consider an
'attack' to be anything that harms the cause of reason. For me, an 'attack'
must require deliberate intent to destroy. I can't equate 'attack' with
'honest mistake.'
Chris Wolf
>>>Does "crusade for God" equal "crusade against reason"? Does
>>>"belief in god" equal "belief against reason"?
Chris Wolf writes:
>>I don't think so.
S. Joel Katz writes:
> Let me clarify what I think you are trying to say and you can
>tell me if I'm way off base. A person who belives in god has an erroneous
>belief, there is no _reason_ he could come to that belief because it is
>incorrect; however, it doesn't follow that he is against reason in any
>sense. A misuse of reason does not imply a rejection of reason.
> Is that what you are trying to say?
Yes. You have stated my position precisely.
Chris Nielsen
I did not mean to suggest that Objectivists were *always* certain about
everyting.
What I said was:
I thought that an Objectivist *COULD* be "Certain within the context
of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
I am still fairly sure I remember this as being an Objectivist claim.
Chris
Chris Nielsen
>>I thought that an Objectivist could be "Certain within the context
>>of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
>
> What exactly is he supposed to be certain of? I imagine that if I
>were willing to say I was *certain* that X is true, I would also have to
>be certain I had conclusive evidence. That evidence may subsequently turn
>out to be erroneous, and my conclusion that it was certain may be wrong
>-- I am not omnisceint.
Right, so my understanding was that an Objectivist would say that
you *were* certin witin the "context of your knolwedge". But,
then the context of your knowledge changed.
Chris
Tony Donadio
: In article <3ikllf$c...@panix3.panix.com>,
: S. Joel Katz <stim...@panix.com> wrote:
: >
: >>I would not *accept* what you say on the basis of your credentials.
: >>However, when a person talks as if he is knowledgable about
: >>something, and yet what he says seems wrong to me, how I respond
: >>to him depends a great deal on wheteher I think he is in a position
: >>to be knowledgeable about what he is talking about.
: >
: > I would think you would be far more interested in whether he
: >_seems_ knowledgeable about what he is talking about -- in whether his
: >claims make sense and are well-argued.
: When I believe that a person is making arbitrary false claims
: about a subject which he knows nothing about, there is no reason
: for me to respond, respect, or investigate. However, when I
: believe a person is making arbitrary false claims about a subject
: which he is in a position to know something about, I might consider
: responding respectfully and investigating untill I find the
: source of the disagreement.
: Chris =)
All right, let me take a minute to disabuse the poster of his
misconception on this issue.
What was stated, essentially, was that, according to Objectivism, one
could be "contextually certain" of something for which one did not have
conclusive evidence. The error in this formulation is misunderstanding of
either (or both) what "contextual certainty" means, or what "conclusive
evidence" is (I suspect the former).
"Contextual" in this context does not mean "epistemologically incomplete,"
which seems to be how the poster is taking it. It is not a license to
treat inconclusive evidence as "contextually conclusive," in an extremely
impoverished context. For example, I cannot be "contextually certain"
that OJ Simpson is guilty; I know that I do not have all the relevant
evidence necessary to come to such a judgement. Otherwise, I could
consider myself "contextually certain" of every rumor I hear, in a so-
called "context" which consists of that rumor only and nothing else.
For a conclusion to qualify as _certain_, one must be able to identify the
_context_ in which one holds it as _conclusive_ and complete, according to
the standard of proof appropriate to the subject in question. Dr.
Peikoff discusses this in the section in OPAR I cited, beginning on page
176 (paperback version), where he discusses the "evidential continuum" of
possible -- probable -- certain. Summarizing: if one's context consists
of some but not conclusive evidence, then its epistemological status is
not "contextually certain," but simply "possible." If there is a
substantial body of evidence, it is probable; and to quote Dr. Peikoff, "A
conclusion is certain when the evidence in its favor is conclusive... the
total of the available evidence points in a single direction, and the
evidence fulfills the standard of proof" (p 179). A standard of proof
(discussed by Dr. Peikoff earlier) consists of those aspects of the issue
that have been identified previously as all the ones relevant to the kind
of judgement being reached. (The example Dr. Peikoff gives is that of
proof in a murder trial, where the establishment that one and only one
person had motive, means and opportunity constitutes conclusive evidence.)
I hope this is clarifying.
Tony Donadio
: What I said was:
: I thought that an Objectivist *COULD* be "Certain within the context
: of his knowledge" even if he did not have *conclusive* evidence.
: I am still fairly sure I remember this as being an Objectivist claim.
Perhaps Chris could explain where he heard this, because it is nothing
like anything I have ever heard claimed about Objectivist epistemology.
Tony Donadio
But for the original claim to certainty to have been valid, it would have
had to have been made in the context of _conclusive evidence_. Having
conclusive evidence, however, is not a guarantee of infallibility.
Dorothy E. Fanyo
In article <3ien2m$l...@panix3.panix.com>, S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) writes:
>In <5...@teekay.win.net> de...@teekay.win.net (Dorothy E. Fanyo) writes:
>
>>By the way, I'm not trying to argue a point. I always think of
>>"existence" as meaning *everything* -- you and me and
>>consciousness, ladybugs and yellow maples, red apples and red cars,
>>boulders and galactic clusters. If, in philosophy, the meaning of
>>the term is restricted to the world physics, so be it. I simply
>>want to know.
>
> No, you are right. Existence means just that. There are many
>philosophical groups _other_than_Objectivism_ that seek to read
>consciousness out of reality. There are some great discussions of this
>subject in several Objectivist periodicals, for example, _Biology Without
>Consciousness and its Consequences_.
>
> Objectivism asserts primacy of existence by three axioms,
>existence, identity, and consciousness. "Consciousness" refers to a
>special piece of the identity of some existent entities.
>
>
Thanks for your explicit, complete answer. It's just what I was
looking for. Obviously, I had been confused by posts which
seemingly referred to reality in a restricted sense. I must have
been mistaken.
Now, on to another question. Since functions of the human mind are
part of reality (consciousness, imagination, emotions, reasoning, the
senses, language), it seems to me that it's important in
understanding the nature of man to classify as much as science now
knows about how it works. Admittedly that's not much, not in
relation to the unnumbered questions still unanswered!... Still...
For instance, it's becoming increasingly clear that the use
of language is hard-wired. Examples of facts which uphold the idea:
the commonality of sounds used to construct every language (only a
few out of many which humans make, and those few are universally
used -- 5 basic vowel sounds, plus consonants); the commonality of
the repertoire of sounds children all over the word make before
they actually speak; the incredible ease with which children learn
their native language; the huge brain area given over to language;
the change in the location of the larynx during the first few
months of a child's life.
Unargueably, language is necessary for man to live qua man.
Language sounds and biological structures to accomodate them and
form them, basic grammar, the huge area of the brain given to
language -- all these and more are hard wired, not learned. How
then does one classify language?
An instinct is an inborn pattern of activity or tendency of action
common to a given biological species. Does not human language fit
that definition? If not, why not?
Paul Martin
: >Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
: >: Faith is belief in the absence of evidence. Reason is belief _only_ on
: >: the basis of evidence. I say again: the two are mutually exclusive.
: >To endorse this view is (at least) to adopt the epistemic principle that
: >rational belief goes by way of appropriate (if perhaps inconclusive)
: >evidence; more perspicuously:
: > (*) A person is rational in believing p only if she has adequate
: > reasons for thus believing p.
: >And (again) I ask: What reasons are there for believing (*)?
: The major flaw in your reasoning is to equate rational conviction
: with belief. This is the reason you run into the above platform problem.
Two remarks -- questions, really -- on your comments here.
(i) What _reasoning_? Perhaps there's an argument in the offing, but so
far I've done no more than inquire into the evidential credentials of an
epistemic principle, (*), that Tony seemed to be endorsing. (In fact, it's
pretty clear from what he says elsewhere that Tony means to place a much
stronger condition on rational or reasonable belief, requiring not simply
adequate but _conclusive_ evidence).
(ii) (*) is indeed a principle about belief, stating a necessary condition
under which a belief is rational. But how does this _identify_ belief with
rational belief? It does nothing more than state a condition which a
belief must satisfy to count as rational; i.e., it connects (by way of
this necessary condition) rational believings and the having of adequate
reasons for thus believing. Is your point, then, that in order to
circumvent whatever problems they may be having with their (platform)
shoes, Objectivists eschew, or at any rate ought to eschew, even rational
belief -- as if in Objectivism we learn how to say 'I know (/am certain)
that p but I don't believe it' and say something true? Okay, and if the
aspirin doesn't help, try cutting off your head. (Apologies to Fodor.)
: No matter what answer a person has to the question, "What is
: fundamental?" You can always ask, "Why that and not something else?" To
: accept the legitimacy of that question is to accept that nothing can be
: fundamental because an explanation of something must precede acceptance
: of that something.
I suppose one _can_ always ask that question. But it doesn't follow from
its legitimacy that nothing can be fundamental or otherwise properly taken
as basic (see below). Anyway, I wondered what reasons there might be for
thinking that (*) formulates an acceptable epistemic principle; whether it
is (somehow) fundamental is another question entirely.
Obviously, the acceptability of (*) depends upon what it is to have an
adequate reason for a belief. And suppose we say (plausibly enough) that a
person S has an adequate reason for believing p only if S rationally
believes another proposition q such that (i) q appropriately supports p
and (ii) p is believed on basis of q. But of course if having an adequate
reason is in this way to be understood by way of _rational_ belief, then
(unless a coherentist account consistent with Objectivism is available) I
can't be rational in believing anything, being lead by (*) into a regress
or else a circular chain of reasons. _Having an adequate reason_ thus
understood, therefore, I can have no adequate reason for believing (*).
The wider moral here is not anti-reason, but rather that one ought to
distinguish those beliefs which are believed on the basis of other beliefs
from those which aren't, adding the beliefs of either sort can (under
appropriate circumstances) be rational or justified or warranted. (In this
connection, contemporary epistemologists often distinguish between
_mediate_ and _immediate_ justification.) On a natural foundationalist
picture, those rational beliefs which don't derive their justification or
warrant from other beliefs -- properly _basic_ beliefs, let's say -- are
among the foundations; and the justification of any (rational) non-basic
belief is ultimately traced back to one or another foundational or
properly basic belief. It would remain to supply an acceptable account of
the conditions under which a belief can properly be taken as basic (i.e.,
an account of immediate justification).
: So how do humans solve the platform problem? Any Objectivist will
: tell you -- we are directly connected with reality. We have _senses_. So
: long as we can trace all of our concepts back to sensory evidence, we
: never have a platform problem. This _is_ what is meant by reason --
: prediction, demonstration, consistency with observed reality, and all the
: rest.
If we are to understand sensory evidence in terms of _beliefs_ about the
deliverances of sensation, then this changes things not at all and we are
still without a reason for endorsing (*). But perhaps (in the spirit of
immediate justification) you mean to appeal to those deliverances,the
sensory experiences, themselves. Fair enough; among the beliefs which
foundationalists have often counted as properly basic are those which are
grounded in immediate (sensory) experience or otherwise evident to the
senses. But for the problem at hand -- which, I should emphasize again, is
independent of (what I take to be) the "platform" problem -- this move is
likewise of little help; for while it might well be the case that (some
sophistication of)
I have two hands
is indeed evident to the senses, if we know anything at all here we know
that
(*) A person is rational in believing p only if she has adequate reasons
for thus believing p
is _not_ thus evident.
: So, to defend faith, you will either have to attack reason
: wholesale (as you have done -- ironically through an appeal to reason --
: to the circular argument fallacy) or attack the senses.
I've neither defended faith nor attacked reason. What I've done here
(among other things) is argue that a partial account of rational belief,
namely (*), is untenable. But maybe you _should_ talk to Tony; he's seems
inclined to the grotesque bifurcation between having conclusive reasons
and epistemic anarchy. If you want a wholesale attack on the reliability
of the senses, I'll suggest the following lines from Montaigne's _Apology
for Raymond Sebond_ (p. 185 in Screech's translation):
We register the appearances of objects; to judge them we
need an instrument of judgement; to test the veracity of that
instrument we need a practical proof; to test the proof we need an
instrument. We are going round in circles.
But this would bring us to (a special case of) the platform problem.
(BTW, this _is_ an attack on reason for Montaigne, who by this time has
lead us to the view that whatever foundation we have for any of our
beliefs lies in the senses.)
: If you continue to attack reason the way you have, you cut
: yourself off from the tools you need to make your arguments.
I've done no such thing (attack reason). And the second part of what you
say here is equally incorrect. Any moderately resourceful skeptic can
manage just fine by supplying skeptical arguments which proceed from
premises and by patterns of argument which her opponent accepts. Whether
the skeptic has any right to those materials is wholly irrelevant. An
argument, as Feyerabend suggests, isn't (or at any rate needn't be) a
_confession_. But then, I've no interest in offering arguments to
skeptical conclusions.
: If I accept the platform problem, why should that convince me my
: position is wrong if I have rejected the need for _reasons_ for beliefs?
: Anyone can play it aces wild -- thus, if you are right that reasons are
: not necessary for beliefs, you have no tools for communication or
: persuasion.
But this is precisely what I said _doesn't_ follow from an assault on (*),
let alone simply questioning its epistemic pedigree. What is wanted, on a
foundationalist theory, is an account of proper basicality. No doubt the
platform problem -- the ancient pyrrhonian skeptical problem of the
criterion -- is lurking in the nearby bushes. And here we are enjoined to
distinguish the following questions:
(1) What things are known or true or rationally believed or properly basic?
(2) What is the _criterion_ of knowledge (truth, etc.) -- that by virtue
of which we may determine whether something counts as knowledge
(...)?
The skeptic's strategy is to help us see that we don't stand any chance of
answering (1) unless we have an answer to (2); i.e., unless we have a
criterion or method for distinguishing (e.g.) knowledge from its
complement. But she adds (again on our behalf) that can't really answer
(2) in advance of (1); for we can't determine whether our criterion is any
good -- whether it succeeds in its job of separating the epistemic sheep
from the goats -- unless we already know what things are known; i.e.,
unless we have an answer to (1). So, says the skeptic, we can't even
begin.
The problem of the criterion is among the very central problems of
epistemology. And since Montaigne dusted it off in the Renaissance
rediscovery of things ancient, it has been _the_ central problem. Indeed,
according to Roderick Chisholm, one hasn't so much as begun to
philosophize until one faces this problem squarely. Dismissing it out of
hand as futile is the _skeptic's_ gambit, who enjoins us not to worry but
be happy. Of course you may choose to operate above this fray (as some
verificationists in the waning days of logical positivism with their
criterion of meaning) by offering your account of reason as nothing more
that a _stipulation_, a mere convention to which you've pledged
your allegiance. Whatever. But the impotency of reason in that case is
transparent.
My apologies for the length of this post.
_____________________________ ___ _____________________________
pma...@csulb.edu Philosophy /// I am not a marksian, but only
California State University \\\ a symbol-minded logician.
Long Beach, CA 90840 ///
(310) 985-4331, -7135 (fax) \\\ -- Henry Sheffer
_____________________________ ___ _____________________________
Robert J. Kolker
......snip....
>Now, on to another question. Since functions of the human mind are
>part of reality (consciousness, imagination, emotions, reasoning, the
>senses, language), it seems to me that it's important in
>understanding the nature of man to classify as much as science now
>knows about how it works. Admittedly that's not much, not in
>relation to the unnumbered questions still unanswered!... Still...
>For instance, it's becoming increasingly clear that the use
>of language is hard-wired. Examples of facts which uphold the idea:
>the commonality of sounds used to construct every language (only a
>few out of many which humans make, and those few are universally
>used -- 5 basic vowel sounds, plus consonants); the commonality of
>the repertoire of sounds children all over the word make before
>they actually speak; the incredible ease with which children learn
>their native language; the huge brain area given over to language;
>the change in the location of the larynx during the first few
>months of a child's life.
>Unargueably, language is necessary for man to live qua man.
To be sure. Linquistic development and conceptual development
proceed colaterally.
>Language sounds and biological structures to accomodate them and
>form them, basic grammar, the huge area of the brain given to
>language -- all these and more are hard wired, not learned. How
>then does one classify language?
>An instinct is an inborn pattern of activity or tendency of action
>common to a given biological species. Does not human language fit
>that definition? If not, why not?
>
Ants have instinct. Their behavioural patterns are determined
in detail genetically. Ants do not exhibit learning behaviour
or at least not to the extent mammals do.
On the other hand, from the few examples of feral children
we have, children do *not* devlop language skills on their
own, and when such children are brought back into contact
with other humans they never fully develop language or
conceptual skills. If language is truly an instinct then
children will develop some language, even a private one,
in the absence of other human contact.
However, we are built to speak, and we do learn speech
somewhere between 6 months and 2 years (post birth) we
perform a development of superlative complexity. It is an
act of genius, which every normal child on the planet (save
the handful of feral children and defectives) accomplish.
--
"Taxation is Theft, Jury Duty and the Draft are servitude"
"Those who *would* govern us are enemies"
"An armed society is a polite society""
S. Joel Katz
>In article <3ikllf$c...@panix3.panix.com>,
>S. Joel Katz <stim...@panix.com> wrote:
>>
>>>I would not *accept* what you say on the basis of your credentials.
>>>However, when a person talks as if he is knowledgable about
>>>something, and yet what he says seems wrong to me, how I respond
>>>to him depends a great deal on wheteher I think he is in a position
>>>to be knowledgeable about what he is talking about.
>>
>> I would think you would be far more interested in whether he
>>_seems_ knowledgeable about what he is talking about -- in whether his
>>claims make sense and are well-argued.
>When I believe that a person is making arbitrary false claims
>about a subject which he knows nothing about, there is no reason
>for me to respond, respect, or investigate. However, when I
>believe a person is making arbitrary false claims about a subject
>which he is in a position to know something about, I might consider
>responding respectfully and investigating untill I find the
>source of the disagreement.
The position you state is reasonable, however it didn't seem to me
that this was the principle you were applying. I can understand using a
person's 'credibility' to determine whether or not to evaluate their
claim(s). If you have personally evaluated a person's previous claims and
found them irrational or find the person's claims so inconsistent with
what you know and no evidence presented, fine, ignore them. But, using
their credentials to decide a disposition in mid-debate -- to decide
whether to continue or how seriously to take the claims seems like something
entirely.
Once you are in a discussion or once you have decided to
evaluate, it is the merits you must analyze.
S. Joel Katz
Right. But at the time that you were certain in the context of
your present knowledge, you were also certain. You were also incorrect.
Someone can be certain of something that turns out to be wrong. Humans
are not omniscient.
Stephen Kirschner
>And lo, Stephen Kirschner (skirs...@delphi.com) did say:
>>
>>I have faith based on reason the sun will shine tomorrow.
>>
>*NO*, you _trust_ that the sun will shine tomorrow. Faith is
>unquestioning, trust is not. Questioning destroys faith but strengthens
>trust. You trust it will shine tomorrow as you know why it keeps coming up
>and see no reasoon why those circustances will change.
>
>Learn to know the difference between faith and trust!!
"unquestioning?" Do Webster's and Oxford's say "unquestioning?"
When were you elected SUPREME DICTATOR of word usage? []
Stephen Kirschner
>Now "faith" is when you have reason to believe something but don't
>bother to find the reason and believe it anyway.
Joel, your words above expose a colossal ignorance.
You began your assault, in response to my proposition that acting in faith
on some things, without thought, like "the sun will shine tomorrow," could
be "of value", and "perhaps theraputic", with
> So what about things that you don't have reason to believe but
>believe without reason, [ . . . ]
(This is like, "have you stopped beating your wife?")
On what (irrational) basis do you accuse me of such reprehensible belief?
> [. . . ] You could just as well have
>faith the sun won't shine tomorrow. Either way this new "faith" is useless
>in distinguishing truth from falsehood.
>
> So, since your new definition of faith has [no] potency
>in [separating] a truth from a falsehood, it isn't a method of epistemology
>-- that is, it cannot tell us what we should believe.
_MY_ new definition of faith? My use has been fairly plain and reasonably
compatible with Webster's definitions. Have I missed out on something? Is
there a special guide book entitled something like, "Objectivist Speak?"
No? Well then Joel, you are a uniquely irrational individual. Nothing I've
ever written implies faith is a "method of epistemology." I've never heard
of anybody anywhere ever having suggested such a proposition, except now
for you. Joel, as in the example above, you use a lot of bandwidth beating
up straw men I know not from where.
Ayn Rand, in so many words, wrote that worshipping totem poles is
irrational. She stated she was an atheist, wrote that rational thinkers
are likely to adopt an atheist viewpoint, but did not make atheism her
pre-requisite for rational thinking. While I don't give Rand the
absolute, final word, I find her reasoning eloquently rational.
Is your position, "Atheism is a pre-requisite for rational thinking?" []
S. Joel Katz
[agreements deleted]
>Now, on to another question. Since functions of the human mind are
>part of reality (consciousness, imagination, emotions, reasoning, the
>senses, language), it seems to me that it's important in
>understanding the nature of man to classify as much as science now
>knows about how it works. Admittedly that's not much, not in
>relation to the unnumbered questions still unanswered!... Still...
>For instance, it's becoming increasingly clear that the use
>of language is hard-wired. Examples of facts which uphold the idea:
>the commonality of sounds used to construct every language (only a
>few out of many which humans make, and those few are universally
>used -- 5 basic vowel sounds, plus consonants); the commonality of
>the repertoire of sounds children all over the word make before
>they actually speak; the incredible ease with which children learn
>their native language; the huge brain area given over to language;
>the change in the location of the larynx during the first few
>months of a child's life.
>Unargueably, language is necessary for man to live qua man.
>Language sounds and biological structures to accomodate them and
>form them, basic grammar, the huge area of the brain given to
>language -- all these and more are hard wired, not learned. How
>then does one classify language?
>An instinct is an inborn pattern of activity or tendency of action
>common to a given biological species. Does not human language fit
>that definition? If not, why not?
Because language is a volitionally employed faculty like sight.
What does it do to say "man has an instinct to see"? What you mean is
that man has the _ability_ to see if he chooses to do so. To call a
language an 'instinct' is to pretend that a man can't choose not to speak.
Language is necessary for man to survive qua man, but so is
sight, hearing, and so on. Admittedly one person can survive minus many
of these faculties, but on balance, they are part of the raw materials
which nature has equipped man with to facilitate his survival.
But, because man is volitional, employment of all of his
faculties is volitional. He may have 'reflexes' which are actions beyond
volitional control, but what would an 'instinct' be?
The only use I know of for the term 'instinct' with respect to
man is to obliterate the volitional nature of the employment of the
particular capability. Some things man does are not volitional -- touch a
hot object, pull away. Some things man does are volitional -- choose to
speak, speak. Man has certain faculties that equip him to survive, some
act volitionally some don't (reflexes). What is left out that you wish to
call an instinct?
S. Joel Katz
>S. Joel Katz (stim...@panix.com) wrote:
>: In <3id7t2$j...@garuda.csulb.edu> pma...@csulb.edu (Paul Martin) writes:
>: >Tony Donadio (tdon...@panix.com) wrote:
>: >: Faith is belief in the absence of evidence. Reason is belief _only_ on
>: >: the basis of evidence. I say again: the two are mutually exclusive.
>: >To endorse this view is (at least) to adopt the epistemic principle that
>: >rational belief goes by way of appropriate (if perhaps inconclusive)
>: >evidence; more perspicuously:
>: > (*) A person is rational in believing p only if she has adequate
>: > reasons for thus believing p.
>: >And (again) I ask: What reasons are there for believing (*)?
>: The major flaw in your reasoning is to equate rational conviction
>: with belief. This is the reason you run into the above platform problem.
>Two remarks -- questions, really -- on your comments here.
>(i) What _reasoning_? Perhaps there's an argument in the offing, but so
>far I've done no more than inquire into the evidential credentials of an
>epistemic principle, (*), that Tony seemed to be endorsing. (In fact, it's
>pretty clear from what he says elsewhere that Tony means to place a much
>stronger condition on rational or reasonable belief, requiring not simply
>adequate but _conclusive_ evidence).
If I ask you, "How do you know you exist?" (And I'm being
serious, not rhetorical) There is implicit reasoning that grounds my
question. You asked a question whose implicit reasoning is invalid.
>(ii) (*) is indeed a principle about belief, stating a necessary condition
>under which a belief is rational. But how does this _identify_ belief with
>rational belief? It does nothing more than state a condition which a
>belief must satisfy to count as rational; i.e., it connects (by way of
>this necessary condition) rational believings and the having of adequate
>reasons for thus believing. Is your point, then, that in order to
>circumvent whatever problems they may be having with their (platform)
>shoes, Objectivists eschew, or at any rate ought to eschew, even rational
>belief -- as if in Objectivism we learn how to say 'I know (/am certain)
>that p but I don't believe it' and say something true? Okay, and if the
>aspirin doesn't help, try cutting off your head. (Apologies to Fodor.)
Whatever principal you claim defines what is rational and what is
not, autmatically _must_ be itself rational.
>: No matter what answer a person has to the question, "What is
>: fundamental?" You can always ask, "Why that and not something else?" To
>: accept the legitimacy of that question is to accept that nothing can be
>: fundamental because an explanation of something must precede acceptance
>: of that something.
>I suppose one _can_ always ask that question. But it doesn't follow from
>its legitimacy that nothing can be fundamental or otherwise properly taken
>as basic (see below). Anyway, I wondered what reasons there might be for
>thinking that (*) formulates an acceptable epistemic principle; whether it
>is (somehow) fundamental is another question entirely.
See my essays (or anyones) on Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology.
>Obviously, the acceptability of (*) depends upon what it is to have an
>adequate reason for a belief. And suppose we say (plausibly enough) that a
>person S has an adequate reason for believing p only if S rationally
>believes another proposition q such that (i) q appropriately supports p
>and (ii) p is believed on basis of q. But of course if having an adequate
>reason is in this way to be understood by way of _rational_ belief, then
>(unless a coherentist account consistent with Objectivism is available) I
>can't be rational in believing anything, being lead by (*) into a regress
>or else a circular chain of reasons. _Having an adequate reason_ thus
>understood, therefore, I can have no adequate reason for believing (*).
Right. That is why you start with percepts and build concept from
them. There is no place to start _but_ reality.
>The wider moral here is not anti-reason, but rather that one ought to
>distinguish those beliefs which are believed on the basis of other beliefs
>from those which aren't, adding the beliefs of either sort can (under
>appropriate circumstances) be rational or justified or warranted.
This is a direct attack on the conceptual nature of
consciousness. Simply put, men reason by manipulating the concepts the
same way they manipulate percepts. That is the secret of the human intellect.
>(In this
>connection, contemporary epistemologists often distinguish between
>_mediate_ and _immediate_ justification.) On a natural foundationalist
>picture, those rational beliefs which don't derive their justification or
>warrant from other beliefs -- properly _basic_ beliefs, let's say -- are
>among the foundations; and the justification of any (rational) non-basic
>belief is ultimately traced back to one or another foundational or
>properly basic belief. It would remain to supply an acceptable account of
>the conditions under which a belief can properly be taken as basic (i.e.,
>an account of immediate justification).
Simple, if it is perceived it is immediately justified. This is
why objectivism starts with existence, identity, and consciousness. When
anyone reasons, these three things are always immediately perceivable.
>: So how do humans solve the platform problem? Any Objectivist will
>: tell you -- we are directly connected with reality. We have _senses_. So
>: long as we can trace all of our concepts back to sensory evidence, we
>: never have a platform problem. This _is_ what is meant by reason --
>: prediction, demonstration, consistency with observed reality, and all the
>: rest.
>If we are to understand sensory evidence in terms of _beliefs_ about the
>deliverances of sensation, then this changes things not at all and we are
>still without a reason for endorsing (*). But perhaps (in the spirit of
>immediate justification) you mean to appeal to those deliverances,the
>sensory experiences, themselves. Fair enough; among the beliefs which
>foundationalists have often counted as properly basic are those which are
>grounded in immediate (sensory) experience or otherwise evident to the
>senses. But for the problem at hand -- which, I should emphasize again, is
>independent of (what I take to be) the "platform" problem -- this move is
>likewise of little help; for while it might well be the case that (some
>sophistication of)
>I have two hands
>is indeed evident to the senses, if we know anything at all here we know
>that
>(*) A person is rational in believing p only if she has adequate reasons
> for thus believing p
>is _not_ thus evident.
Oh but you are wrong. Again, read up on objectivist epistemology.
>: So, to defend faith, you will either have to attack reason
>: wholesale (as you have done -- ironically through an appeal to reason --
>: to the circular argument fallacy) or attack the senses.
>I've neither defended faith nor attacked reason. What I've done here
>(among other things) is argue that a partial account of rational belief,
>namely (*), is untenable. But maybe you _should_ talk to Tony; he's seems
>inclined to the grotesque bifurcation between having conclusive reasons
>and epistemic anarchy. If you want a wholesale attack on the reliability
>of the senses, I'll suggest the following lines from Montaigne's _Apology
>for Raymond Sebond_ (p. 185 in Screech's translation):
> We register the appearances of objects; to judge them we
> need an instrument of judgement; to test the veracity of that
> instrument we need a practical proof; to test the proof we need an
> instrument. We are going round in circles.
How does he know all this? It is not obvious.
Again, we simply start with perception. We can perceive enough
that by perceptual integration and concept formation, we build up our
entire cognitive net. Do you assualt integration or concept formation?
>The problem of the criterion is among the very central problems of
>epistemology. And since Montaigne dusted it off in the Renaissance
>rediscovery of things ancient, it has been _the_ central problem. Indeed,
>according to Roderick Chisholm, one hasn't so much as begun to
>philosophize until one faces this problem squarely. Dismissing it out of
>hand as futile is the _skeptic's_ gambit, who enjoins us not to worry but
>be happy. Of course you may choose to operate above this fray (as some
>verificationists in the waning days of logical positivism with their
>criterion of meaning) by offering your account of reason as nothing more
>that a _stipulation_, a mere convention to which you've pledged
>your allegiance. Whatever. But the impotency of reason in that case is
>transparent.
I don't see it that way.
>My apologies for the length of this post.
Heck. Mine's longer.
Blake D Mills IV
: interested in clinging to his pre-conceived notions of Objectivism though,
: as he never responds to argument.
I do respond to argument, but I am just fed up with this objectivism crap
so I have weaned myself from displaying its many holes. As far as your
intricately defined word of self-interest goes, I would reply with the
fact that you have a negative responsibility to other human beings to
help them out if they are placed in an unfortunate situation. Ignoring
it is not OK. Which is what you seem to blatently miss time and time
again. Your allowing someonelses suffering is just as bad as you causing
it, which is why self-interest as long as no one gets hurt falls short of
the mark.
-Blake Mills
S. Joel Katz
>Joel Katz wrote,
>
>>Now "faith" is when you have reason to believe something but don't
>>bother to find the reason and believe it anyway.
>
>Joel, your words above expose a colossal ignorance.
Of what, pray tell?
>You began your assault, in response to my proposition that acting in faith
>on some things, without thought, like "the sun will shine tomorrow," could
>be "of value", and "perhaps theraputic", with
>
>> So what about things that you don't have reason to believe but
>>believe without reason, [ . . . ]
>
>(This is like, "have you stopped beating your wife?")
>On what (irrational) basis do you accuse me of such reprehensible belief?
I do not do that at all. You asserted that there might be value
in holding beliefs on faith. I responded by pointing out that either you
intended that comment to include beliefs for which one had rational
grounds or not. You responded that it included such beliefs (in fact, I
think you limited it exclusively to those beliefs). Then I asked why one
needed "faith" to hold those beliefs since one was in possession of
suffient grounds to demonstrate the object of belief.
My point is that the concept "faith" is only useful to justify
beliefs held without rational grounds -- reason serves to defend beliefs
held on rational grounds and it is always sufficient.
Next you claimed that faith could sort of "fill in the gap"
between reason's uncertaintys. I pointed out that when one is uncertain,
one should stay that way. If one takes a leap of faith one may leap the
wrong way. Worse, reason pertains to justification -- holding beliefs
wihout justification _is_ unreasonable.
Your response now seems to indicate that I accused you of acting
unreasonably. If you practice what you preach, I stand by that accusation
(though I never made it).
>> [. . . ] You could just as well have
>>faith the sun won't shine tomorrow. Either way this new "faith" is useless
>>in distinguishing truth from falsehood.
>>
>> So, since your new definition of faith has [no] potency
>>in [separating] a truth from a falsehood, it isn't a method of epistemology
>>-- that is, it cannot tell us what we should believe.
>
>_MY_ new definition of faith? My use has been fairly plain and reasonably
>compatible with Webster's definitions. Have I missed out on something? Is
>there a special guide book entitled something like, "Objectivist Speak?"
Faith is always used (except by philosophers) to mean a belief
that cannot be justified on rational grounds. I can quote many religious
authorities on this if you want. They go so far as to say that they don't
have _faith_ that they exist, they _know_ they exist. They reserve faith
for things that cannot be proven. That is why they make faith a virtue
and not (or less so) reason.
>No? Well then Joel, you are a uniquely irrational individual. Nothing I've
>ever written implies faith is a "method of epistemology." I've never heard
>of anybody anywhere ever having suggested such a proposition, except now
>for you. Joel, as in the example above, you use a lot of bandwidth beating
>up straw men I know not from where.
Man, you are the ignorant one. Immanuel Kant proposed faith and
reason and competing epistemologies. He gave each one its own realm
(reason for physical objects, faith for eternal truths) with faith having
precedence (naturally).
>Ayn Rand, in so many words, wrote that worshipping totem poles is
>irrational. She stated she was an atheist, wrote that rational thinkers
>are likely to adopt an atheist viewpoint, but did not make atheism her
>pre-requisite for rational thinking. While I don't give Rand the
>absolute, final word, I find her reasoning eloquently rational.
This is a bunch of sloppy nonsene. Rand felt unequivocally that
there was no rational alternative to atheism. Clearly it's not a
"pre-requisite".
>Is your position, "Atheism is a pre-requisite for rational thinking?" []
No. My position is that atheism is a _consequence_ of rational
thinking. As, most certainly, was Rand's.
Tony Donadio
: _MY_ new definition of faith? My use has been fairly plain and reasonably
: compatible with Webster's definitions. Have I missed out on something? Is
: there a special guide book entitled something like, "Objectivist Speak?"
:
: No? Well then Joel, you are a uniquely irrational individual. Nothing I've
: ever written implies faith is a "method of epistemology." I've never heard
: of anybody anywhere ever having suggested such a proposition, except now
: for you. Joel, as in the example above, you use a lot of bandwidth beating
: up straw men I know not from where.
WHAT?!?!?!?!!?!?
The claim that faith is not a method of epistemology is patently absurd on
its face. This is a _philosophical_ discussion, and even if it were the
case that the word has colloquial usages that are a little different, that
does not change the fact that in a philosophical context has a specific,
epistemological meaning.
This is a classic "Emperor's New Clothes" gambit, and aside from pointing
this out, I won't waste further bandwidth addressing it.
Tony Donadio
: Because language is a volitionally employed faculty like sight.
: What does it do to say "man has an instinct to see"? What you mean is
: that man has the _ability_ to see if he chooses to do so. To call a
: language an 'instinct' is to pretend that a man can't choose not to speak.
Just a minor quibble: perception is not a volitionally employed faculty.
One can close one's eyes, but this is not the same as "choosing not to
see." There is a profound difference between perception and conception;
the former is non-volitional and automatic, the latter a matter of choice.
One of the major errors of intrinsicist and so-called "realist"
philosophers through the ages has been to make the error of attributing to
conception the same kind of non-volitional nature as perception. The
distinction is an important one.
Tony Donadio
: : Tony: I've already explained this to him via email. He's apparently only
I respond to argument also, but unfortunately I do not see one here. All
I see is a set of arbitrary, ungrounded assertions: "you have a negative
responsibility to other human beings to help them ," "allowing someone
else's suffering is just as bad as you causing it," and so on. Perhaps
the poster would care to offer an _argument_ to justify these assertions,
instead of simply assuming that they are "facts" [!] that we are ignoring.
James Carnicelli
bla...@william.seas.upenn.edu (Blake D Mills IV)
BLAKE: As far as your intricately defined word of self-interest goes, I
would reply with the fact that you have a negative responsibility
to other human beings to help them out if they are placed in an
unfortunate situation. Ignoring it is not OK. ... Your allowing
someone elses suffering is just as bad as you causing it, which
is why self-interest as long as no one gets hurt falls short of
the mark.
JVC: Scenario:
-20 people are dying on a lifeboat with me.
-I have food enough for only myself.
-I save the food for myself.
-I am evil.
You do not believe in a human's right to his own life if you
believe this, and by your statement, you believe this.
Dorothy E. Fanyo
How would one lone ant, or even a half dozen, behave out of his
social context, I wonder. See remarks on termites below.
>
> On the other hand, from the few examples of feral children
> we have, children do *not* devlop language skills on their
> own, and when such children are brought back into contact
> with other humans they never fully develop language or
> conceptual skills. If language is truly an instinct then
> children will develop some language, even a private one,
> in the absence of other human contact.
Groups of children together do develop a language of their own!
I read of this amazing fact in an article in _Discover_ on sign
language: A group of young deaf children were gathered together
from homes where they were the only ones who were deaf. Within a
short time, with no outside help, the children developed a sign
language of their very own! So language is a social construct... if
humans find themselves in a position to communicate, they _do_
communicate, because the means to do so is hard wired!
The feral children might be compared to the actions of termites.
When only a few termites are together, they wander around
aimlessly; but when a critical number congregate, they promptly
start rolling dirt pills and building arches. Fascinating how those
termitic instincts are structured!
When enough termites are together, they build nests. When enough
humans are together, they build language. Instincts.
> However, we are built to speak, and we do learn speech
> somewhere between 6 months and 2 years (post birth) we
> perform a development of superlative complexity. It is an
> act of genius, which every normal child on the planet (save
> the handful of feral children and defectives) accomplish.
>
With a huge head start from their genes. I'd say basic language
is genetically determined, and only a particular language results
from the environment. We're born with language in our heads, all
ready to go, and we learn the words to insert from the people around
us, from education in its broadest sense.
S. Wyshynski
Robert J. Kolker <r...@max.tiac.net> wrote:
>vi...@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (S. Wyshynski) writes:
>
>....snip....
>>This does not follow. That we cannot prove anything about the necessarily
>>non-existent merely means the flip side that we CAN prove ANYTHING
>>about the EXISTENT. (Note that the concept "proof" necessarily implies
> You can't prove that an existing entity posseses an attribute
> which it does not posess.
That is correct, and I thought that such would be implied by stating that the
concept "proof" necessarily presupposes...
>>objectivity, so I am not saying that we can prove any _whim_, like oranges
>>are blue; it means that no FACT cannot be proven, i.e. all facts are provable.)
> I am not following this. Are you saying a FACT because it is
> a fact is self evident and requires no prior fact for its
> establishment as a fact?
By this I meant that all aspects of reality as such can be known, regardless
of whether we actually know them right now. The number of planets orbiting
Sirius is knowable, for instance, even though we are nowhere near having
the means to that knowledge (the means to perceive it) yet.
In one sense, that fact is not provable now, since we aren't yet able to find
out; but in another sense, it can be proven once we do have that info. All
facts, whether known or unknown, are potentially knowable and provable.
>>Proof of the unknowable is impossible; proof of the knowable is redundant.
>
> To say something is knowable is not to posess specific knowlege
> about it. Just knowing that a substance has a specific gravity is
> no substitute for determining what the specific gravity is. To
> establish that a statement is a statement of fact, i.e. is in
> correspondence with that which is, which is to say the statement is
> *true* requires proof and evidence. That is what science is all
> about.
>
> The road to truth is litered with discarded theories and
> disproved assertions.
That is exactly right, and now let me thank you for making my point.
It is true that saying something is knowable is not to say anything specific
about it. It is also true that to say something exists expresses no specific
knowledge about it. Each statement is a redundancy!
Proof is applicable only to specific things and specific
knowledge. Existence, since it IS everything, cannot be treated as
a specific, since specificity is required for the purpose of distinguishing
something from something else. In the case of existence, its very definition
precludes any "something else".
As knowability is also a universal aspect (if it is, it is knowable), it
also is non-specific, and since it is attributable to all things, it cannot
be treated as a specific attribute.
Jim May, Practicing Objectivist