Proof of logic?
hol...@delphi.com
one know that logic is a valid means of deriving facts?
This may seem a ridiculous question, but when you think about it, it's not.
Every means I can think of for proving that logic is a valid method uses
logic to prove that. (That's what a proof is, innit?) Thus one must
accept the validity of logic before one can prove the validity of logic.
Hence logic must be accepted on faith.
In Barbara Branden's biography of Ayn Rand, she noted that Rand would argue
vehemently over any topic except with those who refused to accept the validity
of reason. This sounds like a cop-out, like someone afraid to argue because
they know they can't win. But then again, as I have shown, it really isn't
possible to argue the validity of logic, since one must already have accepted
logic.
If it's true that logic must be accepted on faith, that it is a premise or
postulate and not something to be proved, what about all the other things
which must be accepted without proof? Mysticism, religion, etc. Objectivists
dismiss these things because they cannot be proved by logic. Yet one must
assume logic. One might as well assume Zen. How is one to know that logic
is better than these other methods?
Then again, if there was a reason logic was better, that would constitute
a logical proof, wouldn't it?
Somehow I get the feeling that this matter is one which would be answered by
"MU".
Charles Hollingsworth
Enright
: Thus one must
: accept the validity of logic before one can prove the validity of logic.
: Hence logic must be accepted on faith.
: One might as well assume Zen. How is one to know that logic
: is better than these other methods?
In all seriousness, run some controlled experiments.
Try them both. Try the unlogical things in a safe environment.
Observe people who try unlogical things on a big scale.
Observe people who try logical things on a big scale.
See who lives and dies. I mean, that's one of Rand's main
points in Atlas Shrugged.
--
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Enright from address: jenr...@home.interaccess.com
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>one know that logic is a valid means of deriving facts?
>
>This may seem a ridiculous question, but when you think about it, it's not.
Oh, I think this is not a ridiculous question at all! Lots of people
have this question and lots of professional philosophers get tangled
up on this point. I have found discussions of it to be very interesting
and helpful!
>Every means I can think of for proving that logic is a valid method uses
>logic to prove that. (That's what a proof is, innit?) Thus one must
>accept the validity of logic before one can prove the validity of logic.
>Hence logic must be accepted on faith.
You are pretty much o.k. up until this last line. Does it really follow?
I don't think so.
Laws of logic are among the widest kind of abstractions, but they are
still abstractions, identifications of the facts of reality. Leonard
Peikoff gives a very nice explanation of the process of coming to know
the law of noncontradiction in "Aristotle's 'Intuitive Induction'",
_The New Scholasticism_, 1985.
Essentially, in Peikoff's presentation, the process goes like this:
I perceive (directly, via observation) that "this man is not both
white and nonwhite" (at the same time and in the same respect, of
course). I see that this pail of water is not both wet and non-wet.
At a later point in time, I abstract from the particulars that I've
observed and note that "No being is both A and non-A." This holds
no matter what being and what attribute is being considered.
>If it's true that logic must be accepted on faith, that it is a premise or
>postulate and not something to be proved, what about all the other things
>which must be accepted without proof? Mysticism, religion, etc. Objectivists
>dismiss these things because they cannot be proved by logic. Yet one must
>assume logic. One might as well assume Zen. How is one to know that logic
>is better than these other methods?
Keep in mind that "validation" is a broader concept that "proof."
As Peikoff put it many years ago, "'Validation' in the broad sense
includes any process of relating mental contents to the facts of
reality. Direct perception, the method of validating axioms, is one
such process. 'Proof' designates another type of validation. Proof
is the process of deriving a conclusion logically from antecedent
knowledge." (Quoted in the AR Lexicon under 'validation'.)
--Jimbo
Jeffrey Allan Miller
> hol...@delphi.com wrote:
> : Thus one must
> : accept the validity of logic before one can prove the validity of logic.
>
> : Hence logic must be accepted on faith.
>
> : One might as well assume Zen. How is one to know that logic
> : is better than these other methods?
>
> In all seriousness, run some controlled experiments.
> Try them both. Try the unlogical things in a safe environment.
And how do you analyze the evidence of the experiment without
the logic you have yet to confirm?
The only answers to this very good question I have ever really
heard was that logic was an axiom confirmed by evidence. No
one has ever explained how they were able to confirm it without
using any logic in the process. I have always contended that
the primacy of logic is an assumption, not an axiom, that we
make based upon internal feelings of happiness.
Jeff Miller
Jeff Dalton
>hol...@delphi.com wrote:
>: Thus one must
>: accept the validity of logic before one can prove the validity of logic.
>
>: Hence logic must be accepted on faith.
>
>: One might as well assume Zen. How is one to know that logic
>: is better than these other methods?
>
>In all seriousness, run some controlled experiments.
>Try them both. Try the unlogical things in a safe environment.
>
>Observe people who try unlogical things on a big scale.
>Observe people who try logical things on a big scale.
>
>See who lives and dies. I mean, that's one of Rand's main
>points in Atlas Shrugged.
Rand's performed these experiments, has she? She's noticed
that all the Zen masters died while Objectivists live, what,
forever?
Jeff Dalton
>Laws of logic are among the widest kind of abstractions, but they are
>still abstractions, identifications of the facts of reality. Leonard
>Peikoff gives a very nice explanation of the process of coming to know
>the law of noncontradiction in "Aristotle's 'Intuitive Induction'",
>_The New Scholasticism_, 1985.
>
>Essentially, in Peikoff's presentation, the process goes like this:
>I perceive (directly, via observation) that "this man is not both
>white and nonwhite" (at the same time and in the same respect, of
>course). I see that this pail of water is not both wet and non-wet.
Really? As a child, say, did you ever find yourself thinking "this
pail of water is not both wet and non-wet"?
>At a later point in time, I abstract from the particulars that I've
>observed and note that "No being is both A and non-A." This holds
>no matter what being and what attribute is being considered.
But that's not all there is to logic.
So I find this account frustratingly incomplete.
Dr. Michael M. Cohen
>In article <Bm+ODfg...@delphi.com>, hol...@delphi.com writes:
>|> Thoughts, anyone?
>|>
>|> Charles Hollingsworth
>
>Sure, the whole law excluded middle issue only applies to propositions
>that can evaluated as TRUE or FALSE. Emotions, which drive most human
>behavior, are thus outside the laws of logic. Since i have a great interest
>in humans the laws of logic are of little use. And if fuzzy logic is used,
>as it must be to solve any useful problems, then the importance of "No
>being
>is both A and non-A." is further reduced.
>
>>Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu> writes:
>>
>>Essentially, in Peikoff's presentation, the process goes like this:
>>I perceive (directly, via observation) that "this man is not both
>>white and nonwhite" (at the same time and in the same respect, of
>>course). I see that this pail of water is not both wet and non-wet.
>>At a later point in time, I abstract from the particulars that I've
>>observed and note that "No being is both A and non-A." This holds
>>no matter what being and what attribute is being considered.
>
>
>Wetness is NOT an attribute of water, it only exists in relation to
>an entity that perceives wetness. Does a fish perceive wetness? If not,
>does wetness exist? How do i measure wetness if i'm wearing gloves?
>Will wetness be different for me if i'm a very hairy person, live in the
>desert, or live in the artic? Abstraction from particulars is a very
>messy business, as anyone who builds realities knows. Given the same
>particulars no two people will consistently abstract the same.
>
>--
>Todd Hoff
To quote Lotfi Zadeh:
"When the only tool you have is a hammer,
everything begins to look like a nail"
This seems to be a central problem of Objectivism.
That is to say, with only binary logic, one
can only see extremes. What fuzzy logic gives us
is not wishy-washy thinking, but rather precision.
Of course, it makes the world a simpler place
if you have binary vision. Easier to call people
good or evil, easier to make "moral" judgments
and philosophical pronouncements. But evil and evading
if evil entails disregarding information.
For more information of Fuzzy logic I've put
a couple of documents on fuzzy.ucsc.edu in pub
for anonymous ftp:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-rw-r--r-- 1 0 1 59032 Apr 24 03:39 fuzzy_logic_faq
-rw-r--r-- 1 0 1 23199 Apr 24 03:39 fuzzy_systems_tutorial
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
If Objectivism has a refutation for fuzzy
logic, I'd be interested to hear about it.
Cheers, MMCohen
--
======================================================================
= Dr. Michael M. Cohen mmc...@dewi.ucsc.edu =
= Program in Experimental Psychology mmc...@fuzzy.ucsc.edu =
= 68 Clark Kerr Hall 408-459-2655 VOICE =
= University of California - Santa Cruz 408-459-2700 MESSAGES =
= Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA 408-459-3519 FAX =
= WWW URL: http://mambo.ucsc.edu/psl/mmc.html =
Dr. Michael M. Cohen
>In article <Bm+ODfg...@delphi.com>, hol...@delphi.com writes:
>|> Thoughts, anyone?
>|>
>|> Charles Hollingsworth
>
>Sure, the whole law excluded middle issue only applies to propositions
>that can evaluated as TRUE or FALSE. Emotions, which drive most human
>behavior, are thus outside the laws of logic.
Don't know that that's so. Perhaps we simply don't
yet understand the logic of emotions...
Otherwise I agree. MMC
Paul Michael Szpunar
Metaphysics (sorry, I don't have it on me to give the passages) was to
point out that any attempt to refute or deny it necessarily involved the
affirmation of the principle. This is how Rand defended her three
primary axioms. I think something similar would apply to logic as a
whole. Any attempt to refute it would necessarily involve the use of
logic. I'm assuming that any attempt to refute logic would involve
argumentation against logic, which would seem to involve logic to have
any hope of being successful.
Tibor Machan has written an excellent essay on this subject called
"Evidence for Necessary Existence", published in _Objectivity_, Vol 1,
No.4.
Sorry if this post was a little too brief and unclear. However, I really
must study for my final exam in my Aristotle class tomorrow :-)
--
***************************************************************************
Paul Szpunar "I'm fearless in my heart.
University of Michigan They will always see that in my eyes.
ah...@umich.edu or: I am the Passion; I am The Warfare.
paul szp...@um.cc.umich.edu I will never stop...Always constant,
accurate and intense." -- Steve Vai
***************************************************************************
hol...@delphi.com
>I perceive (directly, via observation) that "this man is not both
>white and nonwhite" (at the same time and in the same respect, of
>course). I see that this pail of water is not both wet and non-wet.
>At a later point in time, I abstract from the particulars that I've
>observed and note that "No being is both A and non-A." This holds
>no matter what being and what attribute is being considered.
on logic, how do you know that, just because you've observed two things which
cannot be A and non-A, that *nothing* can be A and non-A? You can demonstrate
this with a logical proof, but not just from observation.
Another example of how logic might not be valid is Lewis Carrol's "Two-point
invention": Say you have a proof:
A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
B) The two sides of this triangle are things that are equal to the same.
Z) The two sides of this triangle are equal to each other.
If you've already accepted logic and the rules that come with it as valid,
Z follows from A and B. But what if you haven't? You would need a third
point to show that it does follow:
C) If A and B are true, Z must be true.
But you can't use logic-- because you haven't assumed it as true. No rule
states that if A, B, and C are true, Z must be true. So let's make one:
D) If A, B, and C are true, Z must be true.
So on, ad infinitum.
Thoughts, anyone?
Charles Hollingsworth
Enright
: Rand's performed these experiments, has she?
Not that I know of. No one would bother to perform them unless
they doubted the principles of logic. Most people regard them
as self-evident. But Jimmy Wales' comments on the kinds of
observations that validate logic are very much to the point.
: She's noticed
: that all the Zen masters died while Objectivists live, what,
: forever?
Some Objectivists die young. And I suppose most Zen masters
are already old when they attain mastery. I hope you don't
really think I meant that logic guarantees longevity. Would
that it were so.
What would you regard as an illogical act? I would regard
standing in the path of an oncoming train, in the hope
that it would pass through me without harming me, to be
highly illogical.
Also, I'm not sure it's fair to regard Zen masters as
illogical. A-logical would be more like it.
John Enright
--
-------------------------------------------------------------
from address: jenr...@home.interaccess.com
-------------------------------------------------------------
Todd Hoff
|> Thoughts, anyone?
|>
|> Charles Hollingsworth
Sure, the whole law excluded middle issue only applies to propositions
that can evaluated as TRUE or FALSE. Emotions, which drive most human
behavior, are thus outside the laws of logic. Since i have a great interest
in humans the laws of logic are of little use. And if fuzzy logic is used,
as it must be to solve any useful problems, then the importance of "No
being
is both A and non-A." is further reduced.
>Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@silver.ucs.indiana.edu> writes:
>
>Essentially, in Peikoff's presentation, the process goes like this:
>I perceive (directly, via observation) that "this man is not both
>white and nonwhite" (at the same time and in the same respect, of
>course). I see that this pail of water is not both wet and non-wet.
>At a later point in time, I abstract from the particulars that I've
>observed and note that "No being is both A and non-A." This holds
>no matter what being and what attribute is being considered.
Color is on a scale. Almost no one is white as almost no one is black.
Enright
: Aristotle's defense of the principle of noncontradiction in the
: Metaphysics...
I'm thinking I misunderstood the initial question here.
In my youth, I went through a period where I definitely had my
doubts about the principle of noncontradiction. And one of the things
that finally convinced me it was true, was watching how it worked
in practice.
My mention of doing experiments may have seemed odd, but from my
personal perspective, I do such experiments on a daily basis,
as part of earning my living. When I write logical code, it
works. When I write illogical code (by accident) it doesn't
work. Curiously, this never fails to impress me.
But these are things that impress a person of an empirical
bent, such as myself. I think the initial question here,
however, was designed to elicit replies of the analytical
variety. So that pointers to Aristotle's approach, and
Peikoff's approach, are more relevant.
On the subject of fuzzy logic, I just want to say that it
doesn't really contradict the law of the excluded middle,
but that it takes a different approach to the issue.
Obviously fuzzy logic is compatible with binary logic,
since it is typically implemented on binary logic machines.
Dr. Michael M. Cohen
> ...
>On the subject of fuzzy logic, I just want to say that it
>doesn't really contradict the law of the excluded middle,
>but that it takes a different approach to the issue.
>
I think that it does contradict: If X=0.5, not(X)=X
[ with the definition not(X)=1.0-X ]
>
>Obviously fuzzy logic is compatible with binary logic,
>since it is typically implemented on binary logic machines.
>
Compatible to the degree that one can represent analog quantities digitally.
Jawaid Bazyar
>Here's something which has been bothering me for some time: how does
>one know that logic is a valid means of deriving facts?
>This may seem a ridiculous question, but when you think about it, it's not.
>Every means I can think of for proving that logic is a valid method uses
>logic to prove that. (That's what a proof is, innit?) Thus one must
>accept the validity of logic before one can prove the validity of logic.
>Hence logic must be accepted on faith.
No. The "proof" of logic is all around you, you use the results every
days. You walk in the streets of a city built by reason and logic; you
drive a car that has steadily improved over 100 years by reason and
logic; the computer you're typing on had its foundation in _pure logic_
in the 1930's (the fundamentals of how computers work were laid down
in the 30's by mathematical theoreticians, 10-15 years before the first
modern computers were actually built).
To attempt to claim that the products of humanity are no proof of
the validity of reason, is to attempt to claim that progress is
made by chance, or luck. One might point to the "infinite number of
monkeys" quote and say that that is how humanity achieves; but the facts
of the tremendous, unparalleled progress of the last two centuries
in the United States show that logic and reason do in fact exist, work,
and will continue to do so.
One can come to an incorrect conclusion, either by not thinking
properly, or by having facts which are not, but that does not mean
that logic itself is flawed; rather, it simply shows that logic is
not an instinct, that it is a process of thought, which is not
an easy enterprise.
>Charles Hollingsworth
--
Jawaid Bazyar | Like UNIX? Like your Apple IIGS? Then ask
Procyon, Inc. | me about GNO/ME for the Apple IIgs!
baz...@netcom.com | P.O Box 620334
--Apple II Forever!-- | Littleton, CO 80162-0334 (303) 781-3273
Jawaid Bazyar
>In all seriousness, run some controlled experiments.
>Try them both. Try the unlogical things in a safe environment.
>Observe people who try unlogical things on a big scale.
>Observe people who try logical things on a big scale.
Good point, but the experiment has already been done, and the
results are plain to anyone who cares to open their eyes.
Jawaid Bazyar
>Don't know that that's so. Perhaps we simply don't
>yet understand the logic of emotions...
Some of us do.
Enright
: jenr...@interaccess.com (Enright) writes:
: > ...
: >On the subject of fuzzy logic, I just want to say that it
: >doesn't really contradict the law of the excluded middle,
: >but that it takes a different approach to the issue.
: >
: I think that it does contradict: If X=0.5, not(X)=X
: [ with the definition not(X)=1.0-X ]
If the two systems use different definitions of "Not X",
then they don't really disagree about whether something
can be both white and not white at the same time in the
same respect.
If something is half-white and half-red, a checkered
table-cloth let us say, is it white or not? Aristotelians,
approaching this question, are inclined to say that the
table-cloth is white in one respect, but not in another.
Fuzzy logic approaches the problem differently - by
approaching it numerically, and giving the table-cloth
a 50% membership in the set of "white things".
These are different procedures, and one or the other may
be the more productive in any given case. But do they
necessarily involve substantial disagreement?
If we take the table-cloth square by square, so that each
piece we consider is all white or all black, so that the
fuzzy approach assigns 100% class membership in one color
or the other, then the traditional Aristotelian exclusions
arise as a special case within the fuzzy method. That is,
if a piece of cloth is 100% white, then it is 0% non-white.
Tom Radcliffe
|> In article <2pk2rg$q...@mailhost.interaccess.com> jenr...@interaccess.com (Enright) writes:
|> > ...
|> >On the subject of fuzzy logic, I just want to say that it
|> >doesn't really contradict the law of the excluded middle,
|> >but that it takes a different approach to the issue.
|> >
|>
|> I think that it does contradict: If X=0.5, not(X)=X
|> [ with the definition not(X)=1.0-X ]
|>
Sorry, are you asserting this is a true statement? And not a false one?
Fuzzy logic is a generalization of Boolean logic, and is an extremely
powerful tool for dealing with situations where there is incomplete
or imperfect information. In cases where information is complete and
error-free, it becomes Boolean logic. So where's the contradiction?
|> >
|> >Obviously fuzzy logic is compatible with binary logic,
|> >since it is typically implemented on binary logic machines.
|> >
|>
|> Compatible to the degree that one can represent analog quantities digitally.
|>
That is to say, with almost arbitrarily high accuracy.
Paul Michael Szpunar
: Perhaps the argument requires only _part_ of logic. That is, you
: could use one part of logic to show there was something wrong with
: other parts. Don't suppose that arguing against logic must use
: all the logical principles the argument questions: work it out.
: Moreover, if someone constructs a valid logical argument against
: logic, this shows there's something wrong with logic. Saying "he's
: using logic to argue against logic and is therefore assuming what he's
: arguing against" does not show he is wrong. If there's no mistake in
: the argument itself, the argument shows there's something wrong with
: logic. If anything is shown to be self-refuting in this case, it's
: logic, not the argument against logic.
: If there are logical arguments against logic, and there are no
: errors in the arguments, then logic is in trouble. Note that
: using logic is *not* an error in the argument.
OK, I messed up here. Actually, what I wanted to say is that any attempt
to refute the principle of non-contradiction ends up affirming the
principle. The principle states that things have a distinct nature, and
that they are distinct from other things; there is difference. Attempts
to refute the principle necessarily involve its use. I can't remember
the specific examples Aristotle gives to clarify this point. What he
claims is that *any* action affirms the principle. When one speaks, say,
predicating a property of something, one is predicating some property
rather than another to some subject rather than another. If one refuses
to speak, one still affirms the principle. One can designate difference
by body language and other physical actions just as well as one can with
speech.
Of course, the principle of non-contradiction is not all of logic, but it
is certainly its foundation. One could demonstrate that some part of
logic is erroneous, but to reject logic as a whole, or even very large
chunks of it, would probably eventually result in an attack on the
principle of non-contradiction.
Enright
: Enright wrote:
: >
: >: Rand's performed these experiments, has she?
: >
: >Not that I know of. No one would bother to perform them unless
: >they doubted the principles of logic. Most people regard them
: >as self-evident.
: 1. I was responding to an article that said:
: In all seriousness, run some controlled experiments.
: Try them both. Try the unlogical things in a safe environment.
: Perhaps not so serious after all?
I was serious. I was recommending this approach as a way of verifying
the principles of logic, for someone who seemed to have some doubt
about it. As I've said elsewhere, I have myself been in that position,
and found this approach useful. Most people never get in that position.
: 2. It's hardly self evident that people who try unlogical things die.
: Remember that I was responding to:
: Observe people who try unlogical things on a big scale.
: Observe people who try logical things on a big scale.
: See who lives and dies. I mean, that's one of Rand's main
: points in Atlas Shrugged.
: > But Jimmy Wales' comments on the kinds of
: >observations that validate logic are very much to the point.
: At most for a tiny part of logic.
: >: She's noticed
: >: that all the Zen masters died while Objectivists live, what,
: >: forever?
: >
: >Some Objectivists die young. And I suppose most Zen masters
: >are already old when they attain mastery. I hope you don't
: >really think I meant that logic guarantees longevity. Would
: >that it were so.
: It sure looked to me like we had a claim that people who did
: unlogical things died.
If you look again, I suggested observing the results of large
scale logical action, as opposed to large scale illogical action.
I said to watch who lived and died. A clear trend will emerge,
but it will be a trend and not a guarantee of success or doom.
: >What would you regard as an illogical act? I would regard
: >standing in the path of an oncoming train, in the hope
: >that it would pass through me without harming me, to be
: >highly illogical.
: >
: >Also, I'm not sure it's fair to regard Zen masters as
: >illogical. A-logical would be more like it.
: But wouldn't "unlogical" include a-logical?
What I had in mind here was the fact that Zen, like its
close relative, Taoism, developed in a culture which
had not yet discovered logic. So that as belief systems,
they do not originally have positions on logic as we
understand it. I'm sure that Zen masters, like most
people, are logical some of the time, and less than
logical on other occasions. All that being said,
I'll be glad to grant that certain aspects of Zen
Buddhism are basically illogical. And that many of
its modern Western adherents adopt a staunchly
anti-logical attitude.
But how many will stand in the path of the oncoming train?
Todd Hoff
Radcliffe) writes:
|> |> I think that it does contradict: If X=0.5, not(X)=X
|> |> [ with the definition not(X)=1.0-X ]
|> |>
|>
|> Sorry, are you asserting this is a true statement? And not a false
|> one?
|> Fuzzy logic is a generalization of Boolean logic, and is an extremely
|> powerful tool for dealing with situations where there is incomplete
|> or imperfect information. In cases where information is complete and
|> error-free, it becomes Boolean logic. So where's the contradiction?
|>
Take the classic example: is X tall? How can the response map down to
TRUE or FALSE? What more information do you need? What is imperfect?
Other questions: Is X sexy? Is X smart? Is that curtain red?
Fuzzy logic captures aspects of reality boolean logic fails to capture.
It is not useful only in situations where information is incomplete
or imperfect, it is useful because reality is analog, not digital, and
cannot be fully explained digitally.
--
Todd Hoff
Dr. Michael M. Cohen
>In article <2pka27$a...@darkstar.UCSC.EDU>, mmc...@dewi.ucsc.edu (Dr. Michael M. Cohen) writes:
>|> In article <2pk2rg$q...@mailhost.interaccess.com> jenr...@interaccess.com (Enright) writes:
>|> > ...
>|> >On the subject of fuzzy logic, I just want to say that it
>|> >doesn't really contradict the law of the excluded middle,
>|> >but that it takes a different approach to the issue.
>|> >
>|>
>|> I think that it does contradict: If X=0.5, not(X)=X
>|> [ with the definition not(X)=1.0-X ]
>|>
>
>Sorry, are you asserting this is a true statement? And not a false one?
Yes, if X is 0.5, it is true that not(X) = X
i.e. 0.5 = 0.5
Or as the Oists say A = A
>Fuzzy logic is a generalization of Boolean logic, and is an extremely
>powerful tool for dealing with situations where there is incomplete
>or imperfect information.
A situation which is pretty common....
> In cases where information is complete and
> error-free, it becomes Boolean logic. So where's the contradiction?
>
Only if the information in question is binary in nature.
When, as is often the case, the information is continuous
in nature, then the fuzzy logic rules apply.
MMCohen
Dr. Michael M. Cohen
Sounds similar to the question:
"Are you still beating your wife?"
Is the principle of the argument different?
MMC
Chris Wolf
>If it's true that logic must be accepted on faith, that it is a premise or
>postulate and not something to be proved, what about all the other things
>which must be accepted without proof? Mysticism, religion, etc.
>Objectivists dismiss these things because they cannot be proved by logic.
>Yet one must assume logic. One might as well assume Zen. How is one to
>know that logic is better than these other methods?
It's not true that logic must be accepted on faith. You are falling victim
to the fallacy of the false alternative; the choice is not simply between
'proof' and 'faith.' To 'prove' something means to demonstrate that it
corresponds to reality. This proof is accomplished via reason, logic, and
axioms. It is then natural to ask, "What proof do we have that logic and
axioms are correct?" As you have correctly pointed out, there is no proof
of these things, because they are the precondition of all proof. So how
does one demonstrate the validity of logic and axioms?
Here is where the more fundamental concept of self-evident comes in. The
concept of self-evident preceeds the concept of proof. Self-evident simply
means that the mere perception of something is enough to establish its
existence. Take the fact that you exist. How do you know that you exist?
It is a self-evident fact. You validate this fact simply by being aware of
yourself. Your existence is a self-evident, inescapable fact. Even the
*attempt* to attack this fact requires that you implicitly accept it as
true. The same is true of logic. Logic is a self-evident truth that
follows from the fundamental axioms of existence.
The understanding and acceptance of self-evident truths is absolutely
essential for a rational man. If you reject the concept of self-evident,
then you have nowhere to go but into subjectivism. You will be forced to
take your most fundamental axioms on faith. And you will have no reason to
accept logic over mysticism, religion, zen, etc. You will have totally cut
your mind off from its only anchor to reality. Sad to say, this inability
to accept the self-evident is quite common among modern-day philosophers
and intellectuals. If you have ever wondered how a contemporary philosopher
can make the claim, "I can prove you have no hands," then you have seen
first-hand the inability to accept the self-evident.
The reason we do not accept mysticism or religion as a self-evident truth
is because there is nothing self-evident about them. There is nothing
about opening your eyes and looking around to suggest the existence of
mysticism, or God. There is *everything* to suggest the existence of
reality. If someone says, "I do not accept reality as a self-evident
truth," then that person is not rational, and cannot be dealt with.
To take something on faith is to believe without any evidence. Accepting
the existence of reality, or logic, because they are self-aware, is not an
act of faith. The evidence for the existence of reality and logic is more
than overwhelming. It is total.
This is not to say that the concept of self-evident is easy to understand.
Sometimes it seems that it is one of the hardest concepts to grasp and
accept. Some people never seem to get it. I would strongly urge you to
read Dr. Leonard Peikoff's book *Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand*
for a more complete discussion of the self-evident.
Chris Wolf
cwo...@delphi.com
Enright
Jeff Dalton (je...@aiai.ed.ac.uk) wrote:
: If you want to understand Objectivism, pay attention to Jawaid's
: posts. The Kelley-ites are far too reasonable to give you a true
: picture of Objectivism.
: Take such posts, apply the $-notation (as in "Some of us do
: understand the $logic of $emotion"), and you are well on your way.
Is the proposal self-referential? Should the beginning of this read:
If you want to understand $Objectivism... ?
Where "$Objectivism" refers to Jeff Dalton's usage of the term, which
excludes proponents he regards as too reasonable.
Todd Hoff
writes:
|> jenr...@interaccess.com (Enright) writes:
|>
|> >In all seriousness, run some controlled experiments.
|> >Try them both. Try the unlogical things in a safe environment.
|>
|> >Observe people who try unlogical things on a big scale.
|> >Observe people who try logical things on a big scale.
|>
|> Good point, but the experiment has already been done, and the
|> results are plain to anyone who cares to open their eyes.
|>
Let's see, in my business i work with hords of logical people. Yet
most projects in this industry fail. Is this logical?
A preacher of god's word can say homosexuals must die? Is this logical?
Nixon can say "let's go rob some secrets" even though he was almost
assured
of reelection. Is this logical?
An intelligent middle class person can chose to be homeless. Is this
logical?
Everyday humans say of the other, the other religion, the other nation,
let's kill them. Is this logical?
--
Todd Hoff
Jeff Dalton
>
>: Rand's performed these experiments, has she?
>
>Not that I know of. No one would bother to perform them unless
>they doubted the principles of logic. Most people regard them
>as self-evident.
1. I was responding to an article that said:
In all seriousness, run some controlled experiments.
Try them both. Try the unlogical things in a safe environment.
Perhaps not so serious after all?
2. It's hardly self evident that people who try unlogical things die.
Remember that I was responding to:
Observe people who try unlogical things on a big scale.
Observe people who try logical things on a big scale.
See who lives and dies. I mean, that's one of Rand's main
points in Atlas Shrugged.
> But Jimmy Wales' comments on the kinds of
>observations that validate logic are very much to the point.
At most for a tiny part of logic.
>: She's noticed
>: that all the Zen masters died while Objectivists live, what,
>: forever?
>
>Some Objectivists die young. And I suppose most Zen masters
>are already old when they attain mastery. I hope you don't
>really think I meant that logic guarantees longevity. Would
>that it were so.
It sure looked to me like we had a claim that people who did
unlogical things died.
>What would you regard as an illogical act? I would regard
>standing in the path of an oncoming train, in the hope
>that it would pass through me without harming me, to be
>highly illogical.
>
>Also, I'm not sure it's fair to regard Zen masters as
>illogical. A-logical would be more like it.
But wouldn't "unlogical" include a-logical?
-- jd
Jeff Dalton
>Aristotle's defense of the principle of noncontradiction in the
>Metaphysics (sorry, I don't have it on me to give the passages) was to
>point out that any attempt to refute or deny it necessarily involved the
>affirmation of the principle. This is how Rand defended her three
>primary axioms. I think something similar would apply to logic as a
>whole. Any attempt to refute it would necessarily involve the use of
>logic. I'm assuming that any attempt to refute logic would involve
>argumentation against logic, which would seem to involve logic to have
>any hope of being successful.
Perhaps the argument requires only _part_ of logic. That is, you
could use one part of logic to show there was something wrong with
other parts. Don't suppose that arguing against logic must use
all the logical principles the argument questions: work it out.
Moreover, if someone constructs a valid logical argument against
logic, this shows there's something wrong with logic. Saying "he's
using logic to argue against logic and is therefore assuming what he's
arguing against" does not show he is wrong. If there's no mistake in
the argument itself, the argument shows there's something wrong with
logic. If anything is shown to be self-refuting in this case, it's
logic, not the argument against logic.
In short, this whole approach to defending logic is wrong-headed.
If there are logical arguments against logic, and there are no
errors in the arguments, then logic is in trouble. Note that
using logic is *not* an error in the argument.
-- jd
Jeff Dalton
If you want to understand Objectivism, pay attention to Jawaid's
posts. The Kelley-ites are far too reasonable to give you a true
picture of Objectivism.
Take such posts, apply the $-notation (as in "Some of us do
understand the $logic of $emotion"), and you are well on your way.
For an amusing example where Rand just doesn't get it, see what
she says about "You can't measure love" in the Intro to Objectivist
Epistemology. When people say things like that (you can't measure
Love), what they have in mind is something like assigning specific
numeric values. One of the episodes of the tv series Square
Pegs had a good example. Someone had invented a machine that,
when two people were attached, would measure, on a numeric scale,
how strongly they felt about each other. That's an example of
measureing love in the sense that (some) people say can't be done.
But what does Rand say? Does she defend that sort of measuring?
Of course not. Instead, she takes the approach that I'm starting
to think is standard with Objectivists. She reads "You can't
measure love" as "You can't $meaure love", where $measure is
the Objectivist notion of measuring, and proceeds to defend the
possibility of measuring love in that sense. That this is an
almost complete misunderstanding of the original claim doesn't
seem to occur to her.
Moreover, even her defense of $measuring love is odd. In an earlier
section, she talked about measurement, measurement omission, units,
and so on. Then she turns to "You can't measure love". Now, does
she apply the stuff she's just been saying about measurement?
Noooooo. Instead, she introduces a bunch of new stuff. There
was no suggestion earlier that this sort of extension would be
needed, so one is left with the impression that you can't measure
love even in the Objectivist sense that was just introduced!
That is, you have to elaborate the Objectivist notion further
before love can be handled.
-- jd
Robert J. Kolker
......snip.....
>My mention of doing experiments may have seemed odd, but from my
>personal perspective, I do such experiments on a daily basis,
>as part of earning my living. When I write logical code, it
>works. When I write illogical code (by accident) it doesn't
>work. Curiously, this never fails to impress me.
sense it causes your computer to do something, if that something
is to go into an un-interruptable wait state ( = halt). Badly
written code is code that does not achive your objective. If you set
out to write a square root routine and you in-advertently write
a cube root extractor, in what sense is the code illogical. Not in
the internal sense. The dissonance occurs between what you wrote
(the means) and what you wanted to happend (the end). That is not
the same as asserting A & -A is true.
......snip....
>On the subject of fuzzy logic, I just want to say that it
>doesn't really contradict the law of the excluded middle,
>but that it takes a different approach to the issue.
in fuzzy and in probalistic logics and propositon and its denial
can have equal fuzz value. This denies that one or the other must
be definite. On the other hand neither logic would assert the
conjunction of the two is definite true.
.....rest snipped...
--
Conan the Libertarian
"Taxation is Theft. "
"There are no good governments, only bad ones and worse ones"
"If you can't love the Constitution, then at least hate the Government"
Jawaid Bazyar
>In article <bazyarCo...@netcom.com>, baz...@netcom.com (Jawaid Bazyar)
>writes:
>|> jenr...@interaccess.com (Enright) writes:
>|>
>|> >In all seriousness, run some controlled experiments.
>|> >Try them both. Try the unlogical things in a safe environment.
>|>
>|> >Observe people who try unlogical things on a big scale.
>|> >Observe people who try logical things on a big scale.
>|>
>|> Good point, but the experiment has already been done, and the
>|> results are plain to anyone who cares to open their eyes.
>|>
>Let's see, in my business i work with hords of logical people. Yet
>most projects in this industry fail. Is this logical?
Certainly. You have bad managers, bad executives, bad employees,
or combinations of the three.
>A preacher of god's word can say homosexuals must die? Is this logical?
No.
>Nixon can say "let's go rob some secrets" even though he was almost
>assured
>of reelection. Is this logical?
I don't recall that Nixon ever authorized the Watergate breakins
beforehand.
>An intelligent middle class person can chose to be homeless. Is this
>logical?
Are you asking why anyone would choose to lower their quality
of living? That question has a number of answers. It doesn't make
sense to me, and giving up one's wealth to become a beggar certainly
goes against my grain. If they want to do that it's not my problem.
>Everyday humans say of the other, the other religion, the other nation,
>let's kill them. Is this logical?
No.
I never claimed that everyone acts rationally all the time, and
never claimed that the proof of the validity of logic depended
on every human being completely rational all the time.
Jawaid Bazyar
>If you want to understand Objectivism, pay attention to Jawaid's
>posts. The Kelley-ites are far too reasonable to give you a true
>picture of Objectivism.
I don't yet claim to be an Objectivist. Things that I say are
not to be taken as "Official Tenets of Objectivism", nor "
The Word of Ayn Rand as Given Us By Jawaid". I'm still learning,
and I'll make mistakes. Don't fool yourself into thinking
you're actually attacking Objectivism when you go after _my_
vulnerabilities. When and if I claim to be an Objectivist, then
you can attack Objectivism for the things I say.
I could just as easily attack Objectivism by calling Rush Limbaugh
an Objectivist.
Shall we try again?
>Take such posts, apply the $-notation (as in "Some of us do
>understand the $logic of $emotion"), and you are well on your way.
Since the rest of your post is based on this interesting leap
of "logic" (which seems to denounce values, the dollar, and the
United States all in one fell swoop), I'm not even going to bother.
I mean, really.
Enright
: Let's see, in my business i work with hords of logical people. Yet
: most projects in this industry fail. Is this logical?
: A preacher of god's word can say homosexuals must die? Is this logical?
: Nixon can say "let's go rob some secrets" even though he was almost
: assured of reelection. Is this logical?
Affirming that logic is valid is not the same as affirming that
all people are perfectly logical all the time. Would that they
were.
Nor is it an affirmation that all logical people will be
successful in all of their ventures. Would that it were.
Todd Hoff
(Enright) writes:
|> Todd Hoff (t...@darla.asd.sgi.com) wrote:
|>
|> : Let's see, in my business i work with hords of logical people. Yet
|> : most projects in this industry fail. Is this logical?
|>
|> : A preacher of god's word can say homosexuals must die? Is this
|> logical?
|>
|> : Nixon can say "let's go rob some secrets" even though he was almost
|> : assured of reelection. Is this logical?
|>
|> Affirming that logic is valid is not the same as affirming that
|> all people are perfectly logical all the time. Would that they
|> were.
|>
|> Nor is it an affirmation that all logical people will be
|> successful in all of their ventures. Would that it were.
My reply was specifically to the "look all around" you response
for the a priori validity of logic. The answer to my questions is
that yes, every instance i sighted is perfectly logical within the
context of the person doing the reasoning, it's only from alien
reference frames that logic appears to fail.
--
Todd Hoff
Enright
: Badly
: written code is code that does not achive your objective. If you set
: out to write a square root routine and you in-advertently write
: a cube root extractor, in what sense is the code illogical. Not in
: the internal sense. The dissonance occurs between what you wrote
: (the means) and what you wanted to happend (the end). That is not
: the same as asserting A & -A is true.
Agreed.
The code is not truly illogical. Rather my thinking,
in writing the code, contained some logical error.
No, it's not the same as asserting A & -A...
unless I was so foolish as to keep insisting that
the routine was a square-root extractor in spite
of the fact it was returning cube roots. At least,
asserting that square-roots always = cube roots,
is perilously close to asserting A & -A.
Enright
: My reply was specifically to the "look all around" you response
: for the a priori validity of logic. The answer to my questions is
: that yes, every instance i sighted is perfectly logical within the
: context of the person doing the reasoning, it's only from alien
: reference frames that logic appears to fail.
Thanks. I didn't get it. I still have a question, about, say,
your Nixon example and your preacher example.
I'll agree with you that RMN must have _thought_ that his early
Watergate coverup activities were logical... But I'm not
sure that makes it fair to say his thought processes were
perfectly logical in his own context, and only wrong from
alien reference frames. Are you saying a person can never
detect his own logical errors?
As to wacky preachers, there are some Christians who hold
beliefs that they recognize as non-logical, indeed, as
apparently nonsensical - "mysteries" accepted on faith.
Would you agree that such Christians' beliefs do NOT
appear logical, even from their own frame of reference?
Jeff Dalton
>
>Jeff Dalton (je...@aiai.ed.ac.uk) wrote:
>: If you want to understand Objectivism, pay attention to Jawaid's
>: posts. The Kelley-ites are far too reasonable to give you a true
>: picture of Objectivism.
>
>: Take such posts, apply the $-notation (as in "Some of us do
>: understand the $logic of $emotion"), and you are well on your way.
>
>Is the proposal self-referential? Should the beginning of this read:
>
> If you want to understand $Objectivism... ?
No.
>Where "$Objectivism" refers to Jeff Dalton's usage of the term, which
>excludes proponents he regards as too reasonable.
$X always refers to the Objectivist notion of X.
Of course, Kelley-ites can approach Randroid-ness when pushed.
See, e.g., Chris Wolf's recent post on logic, in which we find
the following:
It's not true that logic must be accepted on faith. You are falling victim
to the fallacy of the false alternative; the choice is not simply between
'proof' and 'faith.' To 'prove' something means to demonstrate that it
corresponds to reality. [...]
This is $proof, not proof.
Here is where the more fundamental concept of self-evident comes in. The
concept of self-evident preceeds the concept of proof. Self-evident simply
means that the mere perception of something is enough to establish its
existence.
This is $self-evidence, and probably $perception and $existence as well.
Take the fact that you exist. How do you know that you exist?
It is a self-evident fact. You validate this fact simply by being aware of
yourself. Your existence is a self-evident, inescapable fact. Even the
*attempt* to attack this fact requires that you implicitly accept it as
true. The same is true of logic. Logic is a self-evident truth that
follows from the fundamental axioms of existence.
Straight orthodox Objectivism. Note too the Peikoff ref at the end
[not in what I quote].
And, of course, it's $logic he's talking about, not logic.
The understanding and acceptance of self-evident truths is absolutely
essential for a rational man. If you reject the concept of self-evident,
then you have nowhere to go but into subjectivism.
What happened to that fallacy of the false alternative? But perhaps
it's not a false alternative if he means $self-evident and $subjectivism.
I've never quite been able to figure out whether Objectivism is
consistent in its own terms.
You will be forced to
take your most fundamental axioms on faith. And you will have no reason to
accept logic over mysticism, religion, zen, etc.
So if logic isn't self-evident, I can have "no reason"? I can't,
just for instance, determine that logic is correct by doing some
intellectual work?
Since this stuff is so obviously false if interpreted according to the
ordinary meanings of words, we're pretty much forced to use special,
Objectivist meanings if we want to see what's true in this kind of
account.
You will have totally cut
your mind off from its only anchor to reality. Sad to say, this inability
to accept the self-evident is quite common among modern-day philosophers
and intellectuals. If you have ever wondered how a contemporary philosopher
can make the claim, "I can prove you have no hands," then you have seen
first-hand the inability to accept the self-evident.
Another standard Objectivist technique: the bizarre example.
Seriously, how many of you have ever heard such a claim from
a contemporary philosopher? I certainly haven't.
Etc.
Jeff Dalton
>
>>If you want to understand Objectivism, pay attention to Jawaid's
>>posts. The Kelley-ites are far too reasonable to give you a true
>>picture of Objectivism.
>
> I don't yet claim to be an Objectivist. Things that I say are
>not to be taken as "Official Tenets of Objectivism", nor "
>The Word of Ayn Rand as Given Us By Jawaid". I'm still learning,
>and I'll make mistakes.
You have the right _style_.
> Don't fool yourself into thinking
>you're actually attacking Objectivism when you go after _my_
>vulnerabilities.
But I didn't really go after you. Indeed, most of my article
was directed against ITOE.
>When and if I claim to be an Objectivist, then
>you can attack Objectivism for the things I say.
Really? All you have to do is *claim* to be an Objectivist?
>>Take such posts, apply the $-notation (as in "Some of us do
>>understand the $logic of $emotion"), and you are well on your way.
>
> Since the rest of your post is based on this interesting leap
>of "logic" (which seems to denounce values, the dollar, and the
>United States all in one fell swoop), I'm not even going to bother.
>I mean, really.
The rest of my post tells the truth about one aspect of the ITOE.
If you think not, address what I said.
Charles Dlhopolsky
>
>Fuzzy logic approaches the problem differently - by
>approaching it numerically, and giving the table-cloth
>a 50% membership in the set of "white things".
>
>John Enright
>
Perhaps the law of the excluded middle extended to Fuzzy logic is
just:
If x is the fuzzy percentage of a thing having property A
and y is the fuzzy percentage of a thing NOT having property A
then it is always the case that x+y = 100%
Which for example means that a thing cannot be both 60% white and 55%
non-white, nor can it be 40% white and 40% non-white.
This generalizes to boolean logic very nicely, in that x and y must
have either the value 100% or 0%. A thing cannot be both white (x =
100%) and not white (y = 100%) because x+y= 200 in that case...
-charlie
Tom Radcliffe
|> In article <CoxLy...@knot.ccs.queensu.ca>, t...@mips2.phy.queensu.ca (Tom
|> Radcliffe) writes:
|>
|> |> |> I think that it does contradict: If X=0.5, not(X)=X
|> |> |> [ with the definition not(X)=1.0-X ]
|> |> |>
|> |>
|> |> Sorry, are you asserting this is a true statement? And not a false
|> |> one?
|> |> Fuzzy logic is a generalization of Boolean logic, and is an extremely
|> |> powerful tool for dealing with situations where there is incomplete
|> |> or imperfect information. In cases where information is complete and
|> |> error-free, it becomes Boolean logic. So where's the contradiction?
|> |>
|>
|> Take the classic example: is X tall? How can the response map down to
|> TRUE or FALSE? What more information do you need? What is imperfect?
|> Other questions: Is X sexy? Is X smart? Is that curtain red?
|>
I need information that would define a binary standard of tallness.
If I define tall as ``greater than 180 cm'' then there is no problem
doing the Boolean thing. It would not be a very good representation
of how we think about these things, but that is just the point: sometimes
you are better off, uh, omitting the measurements.
Dr. Michael M. Cohen
But why throw away information?
Why deal with binaries when finer resolution is available?
I want to stress that fuzzy logic was not made to deal with
cases of "incomplete or imperfect information". I was made to
deal with cases where we have precise, continuous data.
To me, throwing away precision is evasion of reality.
MMCohen
mike...@liberty.com
Well, Charles, I really don't like Peikoff's presentation of this point
(as you have quoted him).
While it's true enough that you cannot understand logic without
empirical observation, logic is a kind of secondary process, something
you do once you're convinced that things are stable.
You use empirical observation to note that, gee whiz, a man has 2
ears and a nose, and by golly the second man I see has that also. Then,
eventually, man as a species differs from other species by its means of
survival, by the use of the rational faculty to create wealth.
While you take due note of differences within men, some being
smart, some retards, some even having just one ear or no
nose...nontheless, it seems pretty clear to you what you mean by a
"healthy" man, i.e., having all intact body parts functioning with no
sign of disease. You may look far and wide among men, but your
definition of healthy man doesn't seem to need any change in describing
all people born a certain way with certain genes.
It's the same thing when studying the sun. Hot during the day, it
recedes at night to one's vision and feel. You can study the gases that
compose it or how far away it is. It changes constantly, but only in
certain limits with certain potentialities. Within those limits, there
is no change.
Within the limits of potential for man, there is no change.
Everything, but everything, is stable in this sense, having its
own internal logic and consistency. Never changing fundamentally. (Yes,
fundamental change is possible, in which case you're talking about a
totally different object...as when ore is heated to liquid state, and
poured into a mold, to make coins).
That is where empirical observation comes in. You look at the
world. The sun. Moon. flowers. dirt. men. homes. Eventually, you become
convinced that reality is stable, that everything has its own specific
identity with characteristics that are stable over time.
After the law of identity hits you hard, as a result of all this
empirical observation (you might also note that every success that you
have in life, from typing on the computer to moving your body off the
bed, is done when you act on the premise that A is A and that it exists
in stable form independently of your awareness... when you try to act
against your own knowledge, you run into problems, quickly!), THEN you
can use logic to get answers to questions.
Logic says that since reality is stable, once you know something
about the reality you're studying at the moment, your later inferences
must not conflict with that certain knowledge. If there is a conflict,
then if your knowledge is certain, your later inference is wrong. Or, if
you're fairly sure about your inference, maybe your initial "knowledge"
was not, in effect, knowledge about the reality under consideration. Of
course, there is always the possiblity that both your earlier
"knowledge" and your later inference are both wrong.
The context of all these remarks about stability are: at a given
time and in a certain respect. A thing cannot both b and not-b at the
same timein the same respect. At different times or in different
respects, things can change, of course.
Hope that my ramblings help clarify this issue a mite.
Best Wishes,
Mike Rael
ac...@kbb.com
Todd Hoff
|> your Nixon example and your preacher example.
|>
|> I'll agree with you that RMN must have _thought_ that his early
|> Watergate coverup activities were logical... But I'm not
|> sure that makes it fair to say his thought processes were
|> perfectly logical in his own context, and only wrong from
|> alien reference frames. Are you saying a person can never
|> detect his own logical errors?
|>
i've never committed a logical error. in retrospect i have been
wrong, but at the time i made the decisions my decisions made
perfect sense, they were all perfectly logical. Now were the
decisions logical in the classical mathematical sense? Probably not.
But i as a human find it quite easy to pursue two contradictory goals
at the same time. I think nixon was in this same place.
Nixon's group of thugs, lead by Liddy, were itching to do some sort of
black bag job, and if you've read Liddy's bio this is not hard to believe.
They proposed several wild and expensive schemes which were
nixed because they were too wild or too expensive. Then the watergate
job was proposed. It was accepted because it was cheap and fairly
straight forward. Now why was it accpeted? It was surely a stupid thing
to do and would benifit Nixon not a whit. One explanation i accept
is that the reason is human nature. The explanation is based on the
pattern of making your first bid high, then a counter bid is made, and
you settle somewhere in the middle. People are very reluctant to refuse
what is considered a fair offer after several rejections have been made.
This is a possible explanation of why the watergate job was approved.
Several elaborate jobs were proposed and rejected. Then when a more
reasonable job was proposed it made it almost impossible not to accept it.
Is this logical? Yes, very, within the framework of human behavior. Is
it logical according to classical logic? Does it matter?
|> As to wacky preachers, there are some Christians who hold
|> beliefs that they recognize as non-logical, indeed, as
|> apparently nonsensical - "mysteries" accepted on faith.
|> Would you agree that such Christians' beliefs do NOT
|> appear logical, even from their own frame of reference?
|>
|> John Enright
Like Pascal they've made the decision that faith is a reasonable
basis for decision making. Faith is as good a source of facts and axioms
as the scientific method.
--
Todd Hoff
Tom Radcliffe
Although good design practice dictates that the sum of the membership
values of all fuzzy sets defined on an axis be less than or equal to
one at all points, there is nothing inheirent in fuzzy logic that
makes this a requirement.
Tom Radcliffe
The information we throw away is in the definition of the sets, not
in the specific values we apply them to. There is no agreed upon
definition of ``tall'' or ``fast'' that have sharp boundaries. We
could presumably impose a sharp-edged definition if we believe that
there is a single correct one. Failing to do so is what I meant
by ``throwing away information.'' Perhaps it was not so aptly put.
The point is there are cases where we have a choice of fuzzy or
Boolean sets, and if we choose to use a fuzzy set (there may be
good reason for this) we are throwing away some information.
Chris Wolf
>heard was that logic was an axiom confirmed by evidence. No
>one has ever explained how they were able to confirm it without
>using any logic in the process. I have always contended that
>the primacy of logic is an assumption, not an axiom, that we
>make based upon internal feelings of happiness.
>
>Jeff Miller
Logic *is* an axiom confirmed by evidence. All axioms are confirmed by
direct perceptual evidence. Of course you can't confirm logic without using
logic in the process. Anytime you confirm logic, your confirmation will
always contain the implicit assumption that logic is true.
*All* arguments or proofs presuppose the validity of logic...including the
argument that logic is true. This is not a negation of the argument; it
merely further demonstrates the validity and axiomatic nature of logic. It
is inescapable. Even an argument purporting to prove that logic is false
would have to implicitly assume that logic is true. Otherwise the argument
would be meaningless. It would be...illogical.
Chris Wolf
cwo...@delphi.com
Chris Wolf
>Moreover, if someone constructs a valid logical argument against
>logic, this shows there's something wrong with logic. Saying "he's
>using logic to argue against logic and is therefore assuming what he's
>arguing against" does not show he is wrong. If there's no mistake in
>the argument itself, the argument shows there's something wrong with
>logic. If anything is shown to be self-refuting in this case, it's
>logic, not the argument against logic.
>
>In short, this whole approach to defending logic is wrong-headed.
>
>If there are logical arguments against logic, and there are no
>errors in the arguments, then logic is in trouble. Note that
>using logic is *not* an error in the argument.
>
>-- jd
But what you have just stated is an impossibility. If there are no errors
in your argument against logic, then logic itself is not valid, and there is
no such thing as a 'logical' argument. Therefore your argument against
logic cannot be valid because it is now illogical. Since any argument
presupposes the existence of logic, it is impossible to produce a 'logical'
argument against logic that would be without error. Thus, no such argument
could ever be correct or valid, because the moment it achieved its goal, it
would cease to be a valid argument.
It seems to me that you are committing the fallacy of the stolen concept.
You are implicitly assuming that a particular concept is true (in this
case, logic) before attacking the validity of the same concept. In this
particular case, you are assuing that logical arguments exist (and therefore
logic is valid), and then claiming to have a logical argument that logic is
not valid. Your position is self-refuting.
Your phrase "logical argument against logic" is a contradiction in terms.
It's like saying that you have a "realistic argument against reality."
Chris Wolf
cwo...@delphi.com
Enright
Distribution:
Todd Hoff (t...@darla.asd.sgi.com) wrote:
: i've never committed a logical error. in retrospect i have been
: wrong, but at the time i made the decisions my decisions made
: perfect sense, they were all perfectly logical. Now were the
: decisions logical in the classical mathematical sense? Probably not.
: But i as a human find it quite easy to pursue two contradictory goals
: at the same time...
Okay. We're almost talking two different languages here, I think.
To me, "pursuing two contradictory goals" is a perfect example of
what _I_ would regard as a logical error.
Your position reminds me a little bit of a claim I like to make in
jest:
"I'm never wrong.
I once _believed_ I was wrong,
but it turned out that belief was mistaken."
However, I do think I understand your way of speaking now, and
I think your account of Liddy and company is very likely true.
Thank you for explaining.
Robert J. Kolker
>In article <bazyarCo...@netcom.com>, baz...@netcom.com (Jawaid Bazyar)
>writes:
....snip enright quote...
>Let's see, in my business i work with hords of logical people. Yet
>most projects in this industry fail. Is this logical?
>A preacher of god's word can say homosexuals must die? Is this logical?
>Nixon can say "let's go rob some secrets" even though he was almost
>assured
>of reelection. Is this logical?
>An intelligent middle class person can chose to be homeless. Is this
>logical?
>Everyday humans say of the other, the other religion, the other nation,
>let's kill them. Is this logical?
You are confusing the concept of logical with the concept of
reasonable. Logic (as opposed to reason) is a formal method
of deriving true statements from true statements. It is a set
of operations on statements such that the truth value of the result
is at least as great as the truth value of the initial statements.
Thus a correct system of logic will never derive a false statement
from a true statement.
Logical inference may be a component of reasonable behaviour but
is is not all of reasonable behaviour. Reaonable people make
inductive hypotheses in which a general statement is derived (but
not proven) from a descrete set of instances. It is both *reasonable*
and necessary to make inducitive hypotheses since our lifespans are
too short and our situtations to pressing to gather *all* possible
information about this or that.
Logic + induction is a subset of reasonable behaviour, but still not
all of it. The part not caputured by logic and reason is the ability
to formulate the premises (about the word) that we need to apply
our inference methodology to.
Chris Wolf
>>It's not true that logic must be accepted on faith. You are falling
>>victim to the fallacy of the false alternative; the choice is not simply
>>between 'proof' and 'faith.' To 'prove' something means to demonstrate
>>that it corresponds to reality. [...]
Jeff Dalton writes:
>This is $proof, not proof.
>This is $self-evidence, and probably $perception and $existence as well.
((Much additional "$arguments" ommitted))
I am unable to comment on the lengthy "$arguments" that make up the bulk of
Dalton's post, since I do not have a Captain Marvel Secret Decoder Ring, and
so am unable to extract the encrypted $message in his $post.
In the future, Mr. Dalton, please do the rest of us a favor, and write your
response in simple, declarative English sentences. Even if I had the key to
your "$argument" code, I would not use it. If you cannot be bothered to
write out your arguments so that normal people can read and understand them,
I am certainly not going to take the time to try and decode them. APO
really isn't the place to play silly code games.
Now let's take a look at the parts of Dalton's post that weren't written in
code.
>So if logic isn't self-evident, I can have "no reason"? I can't,
>just for instance, determine that logic is correct by doing some
>intellectual work?
And just what intellectual work are you going to do that does not depend on
the existence of logic for its validity? What arguments can you make that
do not presuppose the validity of logic? I would very much like to see an
argument that did not at least implicitly presuppose the validity of logic.
We could be talking Nobel Prize here.
>Since this stuff is so obviously false if interpreted according to the
>ordinary meanings of words, we're pretty much forced to use special,
>Objectivist meanings if we want to see what's true in this kind of
>account.
Well if this stuff is so obviously false, let's see some proof to back up
your empty assertion. I am not aware that the words used in Objectivism
have any different meanings than those use in ordinary writings. Unless, of
course, Mr. Dalton is simply playing the corrupt word games or other
varieties of linguistic analysis that so many modern philosophers spend
their lives doing.
>>You will have totally cut your mind off from its only anchor to reality.
>>Sad to say, this inability to accept the self-evident is quite common
>>among modern-day philosophers and intellectuals. If you have ever
>>wondered how a contemporary philosopher can make the claim, "I can prove
>>you have no hands," then you have seen first-hand the inability to accept
>>the self-evident.
>Another standard Objectivist technique: the bizarre example.
>Seriously, how many of you have ever heard such a claim from
>a contemporary philosopher? I certainly haven't.
>
>Etc.
Objectivists frequently use bizarre examples to demonstate the irrationality
of modern philosophy because there is a plethora of such examples. Modern
philosophy is so corrupt that it really takes no effort to find such
examples. If Mr. Dalton has not heard this particular claim from a
contemporary modern philosopher, perhaps he is simply confessing his own
ignorance. The particular contemporary philosopher that I was referring to
was recently written up in the local newspaper. This gentleman is currently
on a speaking tour. Unfortunately, I no longer have the newspaper article,
and the name of the philosopher escapes me. Perhaps someone else knows who
I am referring to, and can supply the name.
Really, Mr. Dalton, a confession of your own ignorance is hardly a
refutation of my bizarre example.
Perhaps you would like to respond again to my original posting; this time
with a serious argument written in plain English.
Chris Wolf
cwo...@delphi.com
Donald Bottstein
correctly determine what characteristics, etc. are relevant to an argument
and eliminate from consideration those that are not. Granted, separating the
essential from the non-essential can be difficult and can be open to argument
(some may hold that it is impossible). I yield to those more qualified to
respond to this point.
I am intrigued by fuzzy logic's potential for dealing with complex systems,
in which essentials/non-essentials may not yet be properly identified or
there may be too many essentials for the traditional approach to be used
effectively. (Come to think of it, the second case may be redundant.)
In the case where essentials cannot be properly identified (i.e. the particulars
are fuzzy), then traditional logic is inappropriate, or ineffective, or
down-right dangerous. On the other hand, where essentials can be identified
properly, fuzzy logic is not necessary. Or more accurately, fuzzy logic breaks
properly, fuzzy logic is not necessary. Or more accurately, fuzzy logic breaks
properly, fuzzy logic is not necessary. Or more accurately, fuzzy logic breaks
properly, fuzzy logic is not necessary. Or more accurately, fuzzy logic breaks
properly, fuzzy logic is not necessary. Or more accurately, fuzzy logic breaks
properly, fuzzy logic is not necessary. Or more accurately, fuzzy logic breaks
Todd Hoff
(Enright) writes:
|> Todd Hoff (t...@darla.asd.sgi.com) wrote:
|> : i've never committed a logical error. in retrospect i have been
|> : wrong, but at the time i made the decisions my decisions made
|> : perfect sense, they were all perfectly logical. Now were the
|> : decisions logical in the classical mathematical sense? Probably not.
|> : But i as a human find it quite easy to pursue two contradictory goals
|> : at the same time...
|>
|> Okay. We're almost talking two different languages here, I think.
|> To me, "pursuing two contradictory goals" is a perfect example of
|> what _I_ would regard as a logical error.
No, i think we're back to my original point! A given form of logic,
of which there are many, is only valid within a given domain. To extend
the
traditional concepts of logic into the human domain is a grave error.
Why? Because it doesn't work. When i mean "doesn't work" i mean it doesn't
help understand/predict/aid human thought/beleifs/actions.
Logic works in Tarsky's world, but in no world i've ever lived in. It's a
world made up of statements that are always either
true or false. If that's your domain then a case can be made for the
law of identity, law of the excluded middle, and the law contradiction.
Keep logic in the world of math where it belongs.
However in the domain of the human mind i believe there is no case to be
made for these laws. Look at the resistence in this group against such a
simple idea as fuzzy logic! You'll have has much chance getting a fundy
to deny jesus is lord as you will to get an oist to even question the
basic assumptions of logic. In all my logic classes this was so so i
guess i am not suprised. Somehow we can accept the transitive relation
only applyies over certain domains but certain rules of logic for some
reason MUST be universal.
Humans can and do persue one or more contractidictory goals at a time.
Humans can and do believe two contradictory facts at the same time.
Humans can and do perform several contradictory roles at the same time.
But instead of trying to devise systems that apply to the human domain
most just find solace in the simplistic logic they were fed at their
mother's breast. A more palatable god. Good work is being done in the
areas
of cognitive science and non-linear dynamic systems. Perhaps a more
useful system of philisophy can be found there.
--
Todd Hoff
Jeff Dalton
> Logic says that since reality is stable, once you know something
>about the reality you're studying at the moment, your later inferences
>must not conflict with that certain knowledge.
N.B. This is not the standard meaning of logic or certain.
> If there is a conflict,
>then if your knowledge is certain, your later inference is wrong. Or, if
>you're fairly sure about your inference, maybe your initial "knowledge"
>was not, in effect, knowledge about the reality under consideration.
Or maybe it wasn't certain after all, but you just thought it was.
Jeff Dalton
>Organization: InterAccess, Chicagoland's Full Service Internet Provider
>Distribution:
>
>Todd Hoff (t...@darla.asd.sgi.com) wrote:
>
>: i've never committed a logical error. in retrospect i have been
>: wrong, but at the time i made the decisions my decisions made
>: perfect sense, they were all perfectly logical. Now were the
>: decisions logical in the classical mathematical sense? Probably not.
>: But i as a human find it quite easy to pursue two contradictory goals
>: at the same time...
>
>Okay. We're almost talking two different languages here, I think.
>
>To me, "pursuing two contradictory goals" is a perfect example of
>what _I_ would regard as a logical error.
Why is that? Suppose you don't know which one will pan out and
you want to win either way?
Enright
: I wrote:
: >To me, "pursuing two contradictory goals" is a perfect example of
J.D. wrote:
: Why is that? Suppose you don't know which one will pan out and
: you want to win either way?
Oh. Excellent point! I _assumed_ the pursuit was in the hope of
achieving both. But let us say I apply to both Harvard and Yale for
a job as a janitor. I can't work at both places at once, but it
is still a good idea to apply to both places.
I _assumed_ the contradictory goals would be something more along the
lines of "socialism & prosperity."
I think... I have made a logical error!
Jeff Dalton
>
>>Moreover, if someone constructs a valid logical argument against
>>logic, this shows there's something wrong with logic. Saying "he's
>>using logic to argue against logic and is therefore assuming what he's
>>arguing against" does not show he is wrong. If there's no mistake in
>>the argument itself, the argument shows there's something wrong with
>>logic. If anything is shown to be self-refuting in this case, it's
>>logic, not the argument against logic.
>>
>>In short, this whole approach to defending logic is wrong-headed.
>>
>>If there are logical arguments against logic, and there are no
>>errors in the arguments, then logic is in trouble. Note that
>>using logic is *not* an error in the argument.
>
How do you know? Maybe logic is inconsistent.
I'm not saying you should suppose Logic _is_ inconsistent, however,
only that _if_ some argument purports to show that it is inconsistent,
_and_ there's no logical error in the argument, then logic is in
trouble. Now, the attacks on such arguments (supposedly made by
Dewey et al) identify no such errors. Instead, they rely on the
same meta-argument that you do. Unfortunately, that meta-argument
doesn't work.
A logical argument against logic does indeed cut the ground out
from under itself. You are right there. But it also wrecks logic,
because logic has no objection to the argument. If you want to
defend logic against such arguments, you must show that the arguments
must contain errors. It doesn't work to show the argument uses
logic. How could it? That it uses logic is precisely what makes
it such a problem for logic.
> If there are no errors
>in your argument against logic, then logic itself is not valid, and there is
>no such thing as a 'logical' argument.
Just so. So there had better be such errors, no?
> Therefore your argument against
>logic cannot be valid because it is now illogical.
It's invalid only if it contains an error. If it contains no error,
then logic says it's valid. And if logic says an argument against
logic is valid, logic is in trouble.
Since any argument
>presupposes the existence of logic, it is impossible to produce a 'logical'
>argument against logic that would be without error. Thus, no such argument
>could ever be correct or valid, because the moment it achieved its goal, it
>would cease to be a valid argument.
What error would it be? So far, all you've said against the argument
is that it presupposes logic. But that's not an error!
Please note that I'm not saying you can't defeat arguments against
logic. All I'm saying is that you can't defeat them _this way_.
BTW, I would appreciate it if you would explain just what you
mean by "logic". Sometimes, it sounds like Objectivists mean
only the principle of noncontradiction. At others, they seem to
mean correct principles of reasoning in general.
>It seems to me that you are committing the fallacy of the stolen concept.
>You are implicitly assuming that a particular concept is true (in this
>case, logic) before attacking the validity of the same concept.
Not that *I* am not attacking logic. I am attacking a particular
defense of logic.
> In this
>particular case, you are assuing that logical arguments exist (and therefore
>logic is valid), and then claiming to have a logical argument that logic is
>not valid. Your position is self-refuting.
If I assume logical arguments exist and then show that logic is
invalid, hence that logical arguments do not exist, what we have
is P -> not-P, where P = "logical arguments exist". That places
P in very serious trouble indeed. Set aside the stolen concepts
idea for a minute and think about it. If a correct (ie, error-free)
logical argument showns that logic is incorrect, how can logic
not be in trouble? This is logic containing the seeds of its
own destruction. Think about it. You said the same yourself.
You wrote:
If there are no errors in your argument against logic, then logic
itself is not valid, and there is no such thing as a 'logical'
argument.
So hadn't there better be some errors? And since when is using
logic or presupposing logic an error?
>Your phrase "logical argument against logic" is a contradiction in terms.
>It's like saying that you have a "realistic argument against reality."
If I had a realist argument (ie, an argument a realist would
accept as true) against realism, realism would be in trouble,
make no mistake about it. Indeed, it would show that this
position -- realism -- was inconsistent or incoherent in its
own terms.
The same can be said of a realist argument against reality.
Reality will come out of it ok, but realism is in trouble,
big trouble, with a capital "T" and the rhymes with "P"
and that stands for "Pool".
-- jd
Jeff Dalton
>Chris Wolf writes:
>
>>>It's not true that logic must be accepted on faith. You are falling
>>>victim to the fallacy of the false alternative; the choice is not simply
>>>between 'proof' and 'faith.' To 'prove' something means to demonstrate
>>>that it corresponds to reality. [...]
>
>
>Jeff Dalton writes:
>
>>This is $proof, not proof.
>>This is $self-evidence, and probably $perception and $existence as well.
>
> ((Much additional "$arguments" ommitted))
They were observations, not arguments. Was that not clear?
>I am unable to comment on the lengthy "$arguments" that make up the bulk of
>Dalton's post, since I do not have a Captain Marvel Secret Decoder Ring, and
>so am unable to extract the encrypted $message in his $post.
>
>In the future, Mr. Dalton, please do the rest of us a favor, and write your
>response in simple, declarative English sentences. Even if I had the key to
>your "$argument" code, I would not use it. If you cannot be bothered to
>write out your arguments so that normal people can read and understand them,
>I am certainly not going to take the time to try and decode them. APO
>really isn't the place to play silly code games.
When I offer an argument, typically it's ignored or misrepresented.
When I merely offer observations, people start to think "this will
be easy" and pretend the observations are arguments. Of course
it's easy to rubbish "arguments" when they're not arguments.
Now, I would have thought that you, who seem to be on the Kelley
side of things, might be interested in how Objectivism might be
explained to non_Objectivists. Well, if so, you may have noticed
that Objectivists often say things that look false to non-Objectivists
who are familiar with non-Objectivist discussions of the same issues.
You may also have noticed that non-Objectivists often complain that
Objectivists use non-standard definitions of a number of key terms.
Of course, a number of things might be said in defense of Objectivism
and against these claims. But the fact remains that this difference
-- or apparent difference -- in vocabulary is a barrier to understanding.
The $-notation started off as a way to for anti-Objectivists to mark
Objectivist terms, and so as an implicit criticism whenever used, but
I have found that it works both ways. The $-notation allows one to
set aside the question of who is right about what the words mean. It
allows one to say "suppose I take Objectivism in its own terms -- does
it make any sense?" Often it does.
I also think it shows where Objectivist may have made some mistakes
in interpreting what other people say. I posted an example a while
back: "You can't measure love". (Of course, that part of my message
was ignored as netters looked for easier targets.) I made the same
point in connection with Peikoff's attack on the analytic/synthetic
distinction.
Anyway, I had hoped that those on the Kelley side might do a better
job of using language non-Objectivists could understand without first
learning lots of Objectivism, but it turns out that this is often
not so. Hence my criticism of your article.
>Now let's take a look at the parts of Dalton's post that weren't written in
>code.
>
>>So if logic isn't self-evident, I can have "no reason"? I can't,
>>just for instance, determine that logic is correct by doing some
>>intellectual work?
>
>And just what intellectual work are you going to do that does not depend on
>the existence of logic for its validity? What arguments can you make that
>do not presuppose the validity of logic? I would very much like to see an
>argument that did not at least implicitly presuppose the validity of logic.
>We could be talking Nobel Prize here.
This depends on what you count as part of "logic". It may be, given
the Objectivist view of what Logic contains, that what you say is
correct, although I would like to see something more in the way
of explanation, rather than mere assertion.
In any case, given the ordinary account of Logic, it is not self-
evident that all of logic is correct. For instance, people have
disagreed about rules of inference, and about whether certain
principles are correct. Some parts of logic may fall under a
"must be presupposed", but others do not.
Now, most of the postings about Logic in a.p.o just assume that
we all agree on what Logic is. But we don't.
Ok, with that out of the way, we can go back to what I said.
Your point seemed to be that if logic isn't self-evident,
then we can have "no reason" to find it valid. I was suggesting
that even if it were not _self-evident_ we might still have
_reasons_ to think it valid. The idea that we either treat it
as a brute fact or else fall into the abyss is wrong. it's
a false alternative.
>>Since this stuff is so obviously false if interpreted according to the
>>ordinary meanings of words, we're pretty much forced to use special,
>>Objectivist meanings if we want to see what's true in this kind of
>>account.
>
>Well if this stuff is so obviously false, let's see some proof to back up
>your empty assertion. I am not aware that the words used in Objectivism
>have any different meanings than those use in ordinary writings.
This is one of the oddest things Objectivists say. So odd, indeed,
that I wonder whether they can be saying it in good faith. Do you
really not know how Objectivism looks to many non-Objectivists?
>>Another standard Objectivist technique: the bizarre example.
>>Seriously, how many of you have ever heard such a claim from
>>a contemporary philosopher? I certainly haven't.
>>
>>Etc.
>
>Objectivists frequently use bizarre examples to demonstate the irrationality
>of modern philosophy because there is a plethora of such examples.
They typically use straw man examples.
> Modern
>philosophy is so corrupt that it really takes no effort to find such
>examples.
Give a proper citation then. Who ever claimed "I can prove you have
no hands"? Come on, what's the problem? If examples are so plentiful,
then surely publsihed examples cannot be so hard to find. Give us
a proper citation so that we can see for ourselves just how irrational
modern philsophy is.
> If Mr. Dalton has not heard this particular claim from a
>contemporary modern philosopher, perhaps he is simply confessing his own
>ignorance.
Then prove it. You can nail me on this one just by saying who and
where.
>The particular contemporary philosopher that I was referring to
>was recently written up in the local newspaper. This gentleman is currently
>on a speaking tour. Unfortunately, I no longer have the newspaper article,
>and the name of the philosopher escapes me. Perhaps someone else knows who
>I am referring to, and can supply the name.
Well, how about another example. If they're so plentiful, there
must be other, equally good, examples out there. I will accept them
from anyone, not just Chris Wolf. On the other hand, I will expect
it to be a philospher there's some reason to care about. There are
plenty of loons out there, so merely finding a philosopher who holds
a bizarre view is not very convincing. Still, it would be better than
nothing.
>Really, Mr. Dalton, a confession of your own ignorance is hardly a
>refutation of my bizarre example.
I'll have to remember this technique.
>Perhaps you would like to respond again to my original posting; this time
>with a serious argument written in plain English.
Perhaps after we deal with the terminology issue. I have tried to
give a serious explanation of my views above, despite an admixture
of flames.
BTW I can find a defense in Rorty of what I say is the Objectivist
approach, if you could stand to have such allies.
-- jd
Enright
: No, i think we're back to my original point! A given form of logic,
: of which there are many, is only valid within a given domain. To extend
: the traditional concepts of logic into the human domain is a grave error.
: Why? Because it doesn't work. When i mean "doesn't work" i mean it doesn't
: help understand/predict/aid human thought/beleifs/actions.
Logic, as first laid out by Aristotle, did start out in the human domain.
It was a tool for avoiding self-contradiction, in speech and thought.
You state that a given form of logic is only valid withing a given domain.
This is a human statement. Does this mean that the contradiction of this
statement may ALSO be true? So that it is ALSO true that any given form
of logic is valid across all domains?
: However in the domain of the human mind i believe there is no case to be
: made for these laws. Look at the resistence in this group against such a
: simple idea as fuzzy logic! You'll have has much chance getting a fundy
: to deny jesus is lord as you will to get an oist to even question the
: basic assumptions of logic.
Resistance to fuzzy logic? Most people here seem to think it's a handy
tool. The resistance is to your interpretation of it. Or, perhaps,
they are both resisting and not resisting, at the same time and in the
same respect?
Robert J. Kolker
the big deal?
Jeff Dalton
>BTW p -> ~p is just a fancy way of asserting ~p, that is p is false. What is
>the big deal?
I'm not sure what you're referring to here, but if it was to my
posting where I wrote:
Sure, but if you start off "(1) logic is valid" and end up, via a
logical argument, with "(n) logic is invalid" that looks an awful lot
like "logic is valid implies that logic is invalid", which would be
a serious problem for logic.
That was my point exactly, for if p -> ~p, then p is false.
Charles Dlhopolsky
I wrote:
>|> Perhaps the law of the excluded middle extended to Fuzzy logic is
>|> just:
>|>
>|> If x is the fuzzy percentage of a thing having property A
>|> and y is the fuzzy percentage of a thing NOT having property A
>|> then it is always the case that x+y = 100%
>|>
>|> -charlie
Tom wrote:
>Although good design practice dictates that the sum of the membership
>values of all fuzzy sets defined on an axis be less than or equal to
>one at all points, there is nothing inheirent in fuzzy logic that
>makes this a requirement.
I'm not all that familiar with fuzzy logic but I don't see how its
logically possible for a thing to have 60% membership in the set of
things that are white and 60% membership in the set of things that
are not white. I could see the values adding up to greater than 100%
if the sets were not orthogonal, but otherwise it seems wrong...
-charlie
Tom Radcliffe
[deleted]
|>
|> I'm not all that familiar with fuzzy logic but I don't see how its
|> logically possible for a thing to have 60% membership in the set of
|> things that are white and 60% membership in the set of things that
|> are not white. I could see the values adding up to greater than 100%
|> if the sets were not orthogonal, but otherwise it seems wrong...
|>
All I'm saying is that it is formally possible to do this with fuzzy
logic, and it is sometimes useful to do so. Suppose you were creating
a fuzzy logic system that had something to do with nationalism. In
a recent poll in Britain 70 percent of the people questioned reported
that they were ``proud or very proud'' to be British, and 65 percent
said they would emigrate if they were able to. Given such contradictory
responses it may be worthwhile to have a single number specifying
``nationalism'' but have the ``nationalist'' set defined on that axis
in such a way that it is possible for someone to be both strongly
nationalist and strongly not-nationalist at the same time. If you like,
it is a way of supressing or hiding the ``in the same respect'' part of
the law of contradiction.
Likewise there may be a range of speeds for a train that are in some
contexts ``fast'' and in others ``not-fast''. If the software sorts
out these contexts in subsequent rules there is no reason not to have
cases where a particular speed has > 50% membership in both sets.
Furthermore, because we rarely reason inside of a single context, I
think fuzzy logic captures something about the way we actually reason
that Boolean logic does not. Our thoughts are parallel, holding many
contingent contexts simultaneously, and fuzzy logic is an appropriate
tool for capturing this capability in machines in a relatively simple
way.
Chris Wolf
>For an amusing example where Rand just doesn't get it, see what
>she says about "You can't measure love" in the Intro to Objectivist
>Epistemology. When people say things like that (you can't measure
>Love), what they have in mind is something like assigning specific
>numeric values. One of the episodes of the tv series Square
>Pegs had a good example. Someone had invented a machine that,
>when two people were attached, would measure, on a numeric scale,
>how strongly they felt about each other. That's an example of
>measureing love in the sense that (some) people say can't be done.
This is utter abusrdity. To claim that a machine (especially one seen on
television) can actually measure love on a numeric scale, is preposterous.
Even lie detectors don't actually determine that the subject is lying. They
simply measure heartbeat, respiration, blood pressure, galvanic skin
response, etc., which a trained operator can sometimes interpet as evidence
that the subject is lying. AT BEST, I would assume that this so-called love
meter is doing something similar (and that's assuming that the whole thing
isn't just a television gag). A machine that could actually measure emotion
would be a tremendous scientific breakthrough, and such a thing has not yet
been achieved.
To cite such a preposterous example as a refutation of Rand's statement
concerning the measuring of love, is almost beyond belief. Maybe some other
enemy of Ayn Rand can cite a quote from Barney The Dinosaur as a refutation
of her epistemology.
Chris Wolf
cwo...@delphi.com
Jeffrey Allan Miller
>
> Logic *is* an axiom confirmed by evidence. All axioms are confirmed by
> direct perceptual evidence. Of course you can't confirm logic without using
> logic in the process. Anytime you confirm logic, your confirmation will
> always contain the implicit assumption that logic is true.
This is what I have argued--that logic is an assumption and
must therefore be considered in light of this. I've demanded
an "almost certainly" instead of a "certainly."
Jeff Dalton
>Jeff Dalton writes:
>
>>For an amusing example where Rand just doesn't get it, see what
>>she says about "You can't measure love" in the Intro to Objectivist
>>Epistemology. When people say things like that (you can't measure
>>Love), what they have in mind is something like assigning specific
>>numeric values. One of the episodes of the tv series Square
>>Pegs had a good example. Someone had invented a machine that,
>>when two people were attached, would measure, on a numeric scale,
>>how strongly they felt about each other. That's an example of
>>measureing love in the sense that (some) people say can't be done.
>
>This is utter abusrdity. To claim that a machine (especially one seen on
>television) can actually measure love on a numeric scale, is preposterous.
But of course.
>To cite such a preposterous example as a refutation of Rand's statement
>concerning the measuring of love, is almost beyond belief. Maybe some other
>enemy of Ayn Rand can cite a quote from Barney The Dinosaur as a refutation
>of her epistemology.
I didn't cite it as a refutation of Rand's claim that love could
be measured. I brought it in to explain how Rand is attacking the
wrong interpretation of "You can't measure love". She misunderstood
it, and in a characteristic way.
Note too that I am not defending "You can't measure love".
However, it looks like both of us might be inclined to think
it might be true for the sense of measuring love that I
indicated by my example.
Now, you might defend Rand against the attack I actually made
by showing that there really was a claim that love couldn't
be measured -- in the Objectivist sense of measure (which can
even be the ultimately right sense, so far as this attack is
concerned) -- and that Rand was answering that claim.
Since it is extremely unlikely that anyone did that (most
people have not encountered the Objectivist account of
measurement, and few would discover it idependently), I
think you will fail.
-- jd
Chris Wolf
>Like Pascal they've made the decision that faith is a reasonable
>basis for decision making. Faith is as good a source of facts and axioms
>as the scientific method.
>
>--
>Todd Hoff
So you are saying that a witch doctor's faith that his diseased patient is
suffering from demonic possession is just as reliable as a medical doctor's
diagnosis of pneumonia?
Chris Wolf
cwo...@delphi.com
Todd Hoff
(Chris Wolf) writes:
|>
|> >Like Pascal they've made the decision that faith is a reasonable
|> >basis for decision making. Faith is as good a source of facts and
|> axioms
|> >as the scientific method.
|>
|> is
|> suffering from demonic possession is just as reliable as a medical
|> doctor's
|> diagnosis of pneumonia?
|>
Now would that be a certified witch doctor?
--
Todd Hoff
Chris Wolf
>How do you know? Maybe logic is inconsistent.
>
>I'm not saying you should suppose Logic _is_ inconsistent, however,
>only that _if_ some argument purports to show that it is inconsistent,
>_and_ there's no logical error in the argument, then logic is in
>trouble. Now, the attacks on such arguments (supposedly made by
>Dewey et al) identify no such errors. Instead, they rely on the
>same meta-argument that you do. Unfortunately, that meta-argument
>doesn't work.
>
>A logical argument against logic does indeed cut the ground out
>from under itself. You are right there. But it also wrecks logic,
>because logic has no objection to the argument. If you want to
>defend logic against such arguments, you must show that the arguments
>must contain errors. It doesn't work to show the argument uses
>logic. How could it? That it uses logic is precisely what makes
>it such a problem for logic.
>logic says it's valid. And if logic says an argument agaist logic is
>valid, logic is in trouble.
>-- jd
If a scientist announced that he had facts to prove that existence does not
exist, it would not be necessary to even look at his arguments. We would
automatically know that he is in error. We would know that any fact
presupposes existence, and therefore the scientist's claim is impossible. If
the scientist was right that existence does not exist, then there are no
facts, no arguments, no scientist, and no listener.
In the same way, all arguments presuppose the correctness of logic. No
logic; no arguments. Therefore it is impossible to have a valid argument
that refutes logic. Any such argument will always contain an error. This
is what makes logic a self-evident truth. I really don't know how to make
this principle any clearer. Any argument you try to offer to the contrary,
is refuted by its mere statement; just like an argument against reality.
Chris Wolf
cwo...@delphi.com
Chris Wolf
>>Jeff Dalton writes:
>They were observations, not arguments. Was that not clear?
>When I merely offer observations, people start to think "this will
>be easy" and pretend the observations are arguments. Of course
>it's easy to rubbish "arguments" when they're not arguments.
Well, observations without arguments to back them up aren't worth much. Of
course people think they've found an easy target. If you make an
observation without an argument to back it up, people will simply think
you're making an empty assertion, without proof, and will take you to task
accordingly.
>Now, I would have thought that you, who seem to be on the Kelley
>side of things, might be interested in how Objectivism might be
>explained to non_Objectivists. Well, if so, you may have noticed
>that Objectivists often say things that look false to non-Objectivists
>who are familiar with non-Objectivist discussions of the same issues.
>You may also have noticed that non-Objectivists often complain that
>Objectivists use non-standard definitions of a number of key terms.
>Of course, a number of things might be said in defense of Objectivism
>and against these claims. But the fact remains that this difference
>-- or apparent difference -- in vocabulary is a barrier to understanding.
>Anyway, I had hoped that those on the Kelley side might do a better
>job of using language non-Objectivists could understand without first
>learning lots of Objectivism, but it turns out that this is often
>not so. Hence my criticism of your article.
Of course Objectivists use non-standard definitions of a number of key
terms. Definitions depend on the axioms you start with. Since Objectivism
starts with self-evident truths (largely rejected by modern philosophy), *of
course* we're going to end up with different definitions. Capitalism won't
be defined as "exploitation of the masses by property owners," selfishness
won't be defined as "sacrificing others to oneself," and logic won't be
defined as "whatever you happen to feel is true."
However I reject the claim that this poses a barrier to understanding.
Anyone entering a philosophical discussion should already be aware of
differences in definition, and should make it their first priority to
determine these differences in order to make a rational discussion possible.
Only individuals so steeped in modern philosophy as to have severely damaged
epistemologies (or drunks) will find such differences in definitions to be
insurrmountable obstacles.
>>Well if this stuff is so obviously false, let's see some proof to back up
>>your empty assertion. I am not aware that the words used in Objectivism
>>have any different meanings than those use in ordinary writings.
>This is one of the oddest things Objectivists say. So odd, indeed,
>that I wonder whether they can be saying it in good faith. Do you
>really not know how Objectivism looks to many non-Objectivists?
Of course we're saying it in good faith. Objectivism is a pretty radical
philosophy. I'm sure that Objectivists and non-Objectivists find each other
*extremely* odd. This is to be expected. I can't speak for other
Objectivists, but I'm always willing to define my terms, name my axioms, and
explain my reasoning to any non-Objectivist.
>>Modern philosophy is so corrupt that it really takes no effort to find
>>such examples.
>Give a proper citation then. Who ever claimed "I can prove you have
>no hands"? Come on, what's the problem? If examples are so plentiful,
>then surely publsihed examples cannot be so hard to find. Give us
>a proper citation so that we can see for ourselves just how irrational
>modern philsophy is.
>If they're so plentiful, there
>must be other, equally good, examples out there. I will accept them
>from anyone, not just Chris Wolf. On the other hand, I will expect
>it to be a philospher there's some reason to care about. There are
>plenty of loons out there, so merely finding a philosopher who holds
>a bizarre view is not very convincing. Still, it would be better than
>nothing.
I think Bertrand Russell is an excellent example of the corruptness of
modern philosophy. His logical quandry over the question of "Is the King of
France bald?" is a perfect example. The fact that there is no King of
France to begin with, and is therefore a meaningless question,
illustrates the corruptness of the man's reasoning.
Actually, the corruptness of modern philosophy is hardly a well-kept secret.
All you have to do is read a textbook on modern philosophy, or attend a
university class on modern philosophy. Have you ever attended a meeting of
the American Philosophical Society? These people publicly announce that
what they are doing has no relationship to modern life (or indeed, any kind
of life), and has zero practical value. This is not my opinion. These
philosophers proudly announce it themselves. If that doesn't qualify as
corrupt, then I don't know what would.
Chris Wolf
cwo...@delphi.com
Robert J. Kolker
>
........snip.....
>Of course we're saying it in good faith. Objectivism is a pretty radical
>philosophy. I'm sure that Objectivists and non-Objectivists find each other
>*extremely* odd. This is to be expected. I can't speak for other
>Objectivists, but I'm always willing to define my terms, name my axioms, and
>explain my reasoning to any non-Objectivist.
>
It would be interesting to see if Objectivists can formalize their
arguments. When I was going through ITOE (2nd ed) I spotted severa
instanceces where Rand shifted meaning in mid argument. (I posted
about 7 serious contradictions in ITOE to this conference about
a year ago). Properly formalized arguments have the advantage
of keeping the meaning of terms in plain sight for the duration
of the argument. Verbal arguments are difficult critters. Granting
good faith to a verbal arguer, natural language constructs bear
multiple layers of semantics (nuances, shadings of meanings, double
entendre, etc. etc.) and it would require the sure footedness of an
ibex, not to slip on this semantic slopes.
The type of arguments that objectivists, and other Aristoteleans
put forth are in the mideaval style of the disputation. Historically
disputations produces some dazzling verbal fencing, but little in the
way of empirically verifiable truth.
That is one of the reasons that Leibnitz wanted to make a logic machine
so that instead of arguing we could calculate. In modern times we have
such a device, it is called a computer. Goedels incompleteness theorem
not withstanding, the *act* of setting up an argument so it can
be mechanically verified is a salutory excercise in exactness and
rigor. It is something that I have yet to see in objectivist circles.
BTW I am not picking on objectivists alone, here. Other schools of
philosophy and psuedo science suffer from the same defect. Other
philosophers beside Rand also are lacking in rigour. For example,
F. Neitzche, who I read for entertainment and a good rush, rather
than for logic and rigor.
Heidegger and Hegel are other examples of incomprehensibility and
let us not forget Kant. Kant is interesting, in that a philosophical
cottage industry has grown up around his philosophy. I visited the
philosophy section of Barnes and Noble Books the other day and I saw
no fewer than 45 treatises, written by professional philosophers
telling us not so much as what Kant said, but what he *meant*.
Am I being cross, or am I being reasonable in preferring that a
philosopher be plain in his reasoning. That does not mean simple,
by any means, for some arguments are subtle and complicated, but
at least the means of expression should be lucid and not get in the
way of the inherent complications of the argument.
....snip....
>I think Bertrand Russell is an excellent example of the corruptness of
>modern philosophy. His logical quandry over the question of "Is the King of
>France bald?" is a perfect example. The fact that there is no King of
>France to begin with, and is therefore a meaningless question,
>illustrates the corruptness of the man's reasoning.
Bertie has his flaws. His politics suffered from pink-eye and his
blindness to Stalin's outrages made him literally incredible in the
political sphere. But the King of France connundrum is not a flaw.
All the current Kings of France are bald. That is a true statement.
(x)( KF(x) -> B(x)). If it were not true, then Ey (KF(y) & ~B(y))
from which we can infer Ey KF(y) which is manifistly untrue.
In Aristotles logic, to assert P(x) meant there had to be some x
for which P is true. This restriction was lifted when Boole mathem-
atized logic. In technical terms, you have to allow empty classes
to make a Boolean Lattice that is complete and complemented. That is
a requirement of mathematical symettry and there is nothing philo-
sophical about it.
Speaking of Bertie, I remember seeing him debate Edward Teller, my
ex-boss, on how to deal with Red Russia. Bertie wanted to lay down
our arms and suck their dicks. Dr. Teller, needless to say, had an-
other view entirely. When the arguments came down to *facts*, Teller
made Hungarian Goulash out of Lord Russle. Teller is a staunch anti-
communist, was in his time a top physicist, and is a great
Jungarian Hew (refer to Jose Jemenez routines, and thank you Bill
Dana).
>Actually, the corruptness of modern philosophy is hardly a well-kept secret.
>All you have to do is read a textbook on modern philosophy, or attend a
>university class on modern philosophy. Have you ever attended a meeting of
>the American Philosophical Society? These people publicly announce that
>what they are doing has no relationship to modern life (or indeed, any kind
>of life), and has zero practical value. This is not my opinion. These
>philosophers proudly announce it themselves. If that doesn't qualify as
>corrupt, then I don't know what would.
I can't dispute you on this point.
Robert J. Kolker
>
>>>Jeff Dalton writes:
>
>>They were observations, not arguments. Was that not clear?
>
>>When I offer an argument, typically it's ignored or misrepresented.
>>When I merely offer observations, people start to think "this will
>>be easy" and pretend the observations are arguments. Of course
>>it's easy to rubbish "arguments" when they're not arguments.
>Well, observations without arguments to back them up aren't worth much. Of
>course people think they've found an easy target. If you make an
>observation without an argument to back it up, people will simply think
>you're making an empty assertion, without proof, and will take you to task
>accordingly.
Whoa! If I observe a bird on my roof, what argument do I need? If
you are nearby you either see a bird on my roof or you don't.
Argumentation is not what is called for. Coroberration is what is
called for.
If scientist had to metaphysically justify every procedure they
use in empirically establishing a result, no science would get done.
I grant that some scientific findings are so "against the grain"
and unexpected, that it may be necessary in those difficult case to
ground to basic metaphysics and epistemological principles, to get
a sanity check on the outcome. But most observation does not require
a fresh metaphysical revalidation.
>
>>Now, I would have thought that you, who seem to be on the Kelley
>>side of things, might be interested in how Objectivism might be
>>explained to non_Objectivists. Well, if so, you may have noticed
>>that Objectivists often say things that look false to non-Objectivists
>>who are familiar with non-Objectivist discussions of the same issues.
>>You may also have noticed that non-Objectivists often complain that
>>Objectivists use non-standard definitions of a number of key terms.
>>Of course, a number of things might be said in defense of Objectivism
>>and against these claims. But the fact remains that this difference
>>-- or apparent difference -- in vocabulary is a barrier to understanding.
I think the variant use of common words is not the problem. The
objectivist or Randian notion of concepts is the sticking point
for non-objectivists. I know that it is so for me ( I am not
an Objectivist). I understand the Randian idea of concept (although
I don't accept it fully), so I am able to follow objectivist
utterances on various metaphysical and epistemological issues.
>>Anyway, I had hoped that those on the Kelley side might do a better
>>job of using language non-Objectivists could understand without first
>>learning lots of Objectivism, but it turns out that this is often
>>not so. Hence my criticism of your article.
See above remark. If you want to converse with Objectivists you
have to understand their mind set as well as their words.
>Of course Objectivists use non-standard definitions of a number of key
>terms. Definitions depend on the axioms you start with. Since Objectivism
>starts with self-evident truths (largely rejected by modern philosophy), *of
>course* we're going to end up with different definitions. Capitalism won't
>be defined as "exploitation of the masses by property owners," selfishness
>won't be defined as "sacrificing others to oneself," and logic won't be
>defined as "whatever you happen to feel is true."
Self evident truth. That is disputable. What you have is a set
of principles that have self referential properties so that denial
of the principle implies acceptance of the principle. That is not
necessarily a guarantee of true in the sense of the correspondence
theory. I would prefer to restrict the semantics of discourse so
the self reference does not occur.
>
>However I reject the claim that this poses a barrier to understanding.
>Anyone entering a philosophical discussion should already be aware of
>differences in definition, and should make it their first priority to
>determine these differences in order to make a rational discussion possible.
>Only individuals so steeped in modern philosophy as to have severely damaged
>epistemologies (or drunks) will find such differences in definitions to be
>insurrmountable obstacles.
To Chris:
Now, now. Where are you manners?
>
>>>Well if this stuff is so obviously false, let's see some proof to back up
>>>your empty assertion. I am not aware that the words used in Objectivism
>>>have any different meanings than those use in ordinary writings.
>
>>This is one of the oddest things Objectivists say. So odd, indeed,
>>that I wonder whether they can be saying it in good faith. Do you
>>really not know how Objectivism looks to many non-Objectivists?
>Of course we're saying it in good faith. Objectivism is a pretty radical
>philosophy. I'm sure that Objectivists and non-Objectivists find each other
>*extremely* odd. This is to be expected. I can't speak for other
>Objectivists, but I'm always willing to define my terms, name my axioms, and
>explain my reasoning to any non-Objectivist.
To Chris:
Sometimes, when or if the spirit moves you, tell me how you infer
determinate mechanical causility from IDENTITY, EXISTENCE and CONS-
CIOUSNESS. Then if the spirit further moves you, tell me how you
reconcile this derivation with laboratory evidence implying quite
the contrary.
>I think Bertrand Russell is an excellent example of the corruptness of
>modern philosophy. His logical quandry over the question of "Is the King of
>France bald?" is a perfect example. The fact that there is no King of
>France to begin with, and is therefore a meaningless question,
>illustrates the corruptness of the man's reasoning.
See my comment to Chris in the prior posting.
....snip the rest....
Dr. Michael M. Cohen
>
>
>If a scientist announced that he had facts to prove that existence does not
>exist, it would not be necessary to even look at his arguments. We would
>automatically know that he is in error. We would know that any fact
>presupposes existence, and therefore the scientist's claim is impossible. If
>the scientist was right that existence does not exist, then there are no
>facts, no arguments, no scientist, and no listener.
>
>In the same way, all arguments presuppose the correctness of logic. No
>logic; no arguments. Therefore it is impossible to have a valid argument
>that refutes logic. Any such argument will always contain an error. This
>is what makes logic a self-evident truth. I really don't know how to make
>this principle any clearer. Any argument you try to offer to the contrary,
>is refuted by its mere statement; just like an argument against reality.
>
>Chris Wolf
>cwo...@delphi.com
>
>
Right. But which logic? That might not be obvious.
MMC
--
======================================================================
= Dr. Michael M. Cohen mmc...@dewi.ucsc.edu =
= Program in Experimental Psychology mmc...@fuzzy.ucsc.edu =
= 68 Clark Kerr Hall 408-459-2655 VOICE =
= University of California - Santa Cruz 408-459-2700 MESSAGES =
= Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA 408-459-3519 FAX =
= WWW URL: http://mambo.ucsc.edu/psl/mmc.html =
R. T. Puckett
& Self evident truth. That is disputable. What you have is a set
& of principles that have self referential properties so that denial
& of the principle implies acceptance of the principle. That is not
& necessarily a guarantee of true in the sense of the correspondence
& theory. I would prefer to restrict the semantics of discourse so
& the self reference does not occur.
&
Forgive me for snatching this paragraph away from its associated
context. I do so in the hopes of finding out more about what you are
saying in this particular aspect of your argument, not to destroy
your meaning. If I have dropped a critical part of your argument,
please bring it back in.
Could you give an example of a principle or set of principles that is
false by the correspondence theory but true due to the fact that
rejecting the principle implies its acceptance? From what I've read,
part of the basis (if not _the_ basis) of Rand's epistemology is that
a principle that you cannot deny without accepting its truth is also
true by the correspondence theory. If you do not have an example,
then please explain your point further. This point is critical to the
Objectivist epistemology and thus to the whole system.
How can one "restrict the semantics of discourse so the self reference
does not occur?" I don't understand -- probably because of my limited
knowledge of philosophy. References to external sources are
appreciated, but if you can briefly explain what you mean here,
you'll convince everyone a lot sooner. Thanks for your thoughtful
contributions.
--
H. J. Puckett hothead paisan