Eureka! I've done it!
Phil Roberts, Jr.
PHIL'S DERIVATION OF A MORAL 'OUGHT' FROM AN EPISTEMIC 'IS'
STEP ONE:
Assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being
objective', not only cognitively, but valuatively as well
(impartiality), and in which no individual, culture, belief,
theory, value, objective, etc. is likely to be rational
in any but a relative sense of the term (incompleteness).
STEP TWO:
Corroborate the epistemic credentials of the above
theory/definition by demonstrating that it can maximize
explanatory coherence better than any of its competitors
(e.g., the means/end theory, rational choice theory,
egoism, utilitarianism, etc.).
For example, the above theory/definition…
a. can explain what morality “is” (p. 2),
b. can unify the sexual and altruistic aspects of morality
...(pp. 2,3),
c. exhibits logical symmetry between the valuative and
...cognitive domains (p. 3),
d. has much in common with a longstanding paradigm for
...rationality (pp. 3,4),
e. can resolve the paradox of rational irrationality
...(pp. 4,5),
f. can ameliorate cognitive vs. practical rationality
...conflict (p. 5),
g. can resolve the “rationality debate” in a straightforward
...manner (p. 5),
h. is immune to the paradox of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (p. 6),
i. is compatible with our common sense understanding of jury
...selection (p. 6),
j. can afford an avenue for the justification of a moral
...‘ought’ (pp. 6,7),
k. etc.
STEP THREE:
Derive an 'ought' from an 'is' via the syllogism:
PREMISE:
Given that one is rational
CONNECTIVE:
then one 'ought' to..
MORAL MAXIM:
'Love one's neighbor as one's self', i.e., one 'ought' to be
valuatively objective (impartial).
Note 1: The 'ought' in STEP THREE is actually predictive rather
than prescriptive. This is because STEP TWO already establishes
that it is rational to 'love one's neighbor as one's self' and
therefore that the prescriptive 'ought' of a widely accepted
moral maxim is "true" by definition and, as such, constitutes
a categorical imperative.
Note 2: The page refs in STEP TWO are to a paper in which I
have presented this derivation in greater detail.
.
Mal
wrote:
I thought "eureka" meant "i have found it" not "i've done it."
Mal
Given the immense complexity of human psychology, I don't
believe you can derive a predictive (causal) ought so easily.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
As the result of my brief dialogue with Mal over at hbo,
I have come to realize that my claim that the prescriptive
'ought' of a moral maxim is analytic and as such constitutes
a categorical imperative was in err. I should like to present
an updated derivation which amounts to the more modest
claim that I have developed an epistemic justification of the
prescriptive 'ought' of a widely accepted moral maxim:
PHIL'S DERIVATION OF A MORAL 'OUGHT' FROM AN EPISTEMIC 'IS'
STEP ONE:
Assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being
objective', not only cognitively, but valuatively as well
(impartiality), and in which no individual, culture, belief,
theory, value, objective, etc. is likely to be rational
in any but a relative sense of the term (incompleteness).
STEP TWO:
Corroborate the epistemic credentials of the above
theory/definition by demonstrating that it can maximize
explanatory coherence better than any of its competitors
(e.g., the means/end theory, rational choice theory,
egoism, utilitarianism, etc.).
For example, the above theory/definition...
a. can explain what morality "is" (p. 2),
b. can unify the sexual and altruistic aspects of morality (pp. 2,3),
c. exhibits logical symmetry between the valuative and cognitive domains
(p. 3),
d. has much in common with a long-standing paradigm for rationality (pp. 3,4),
e. can resolve the paradox of rational irrationality (pp. 4,5),
f. can ameliorate cognitive vs. practical rationality conflict (p. 5),
g. can resolve the "rationality debate" in a straightforward manner (p. 5),
h. is immune to the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma (p. 6),
i. is compatible with our common sense understanding of jury selection (p. 6),
j. can afford an avenue for the justification of a moral `ought' (pp. 6,7),
k. can explain an evolutionary anomaly (p. 1)
l. etc.
STEP THREE:
Given that it is demonstrably "true" that 'being rational' entails
'being valuatively objective/impartial' (presumably established in
STEP TWO), it is demonstrably "true" that, ideally, one 'ought' to
be valuatively objective/impartial on the grounds that the concept
or attribute of rationality is the fount from which all normativity
flows.
Another way of saying this is...
Given that it is demonstrably "true" that 'being rational' entails
'being valuatively objective/impartial' (presumably established in
STEP TWO), it is demonstrably "true" that, ideally, one 'ought' to
'love one's neighbor as one's self' on the grounds that the concept
or attribute of rationality is the fount from which all normativity
flows.
Wolfgang Cernoch
Look at Ernst Mally, who makes the same error how You do! Like Alexus
Meinong, a pupil of Franz Brentano, who works on pure
»Gegenstandtheorie«, Mally starts with the Idea of the
»Allgemeinbegriff des Dreiecks« of John Locke, similar how Husserls
»Logische Untersuchungen II«. In his next step, Mally becomes the
inventor of deontic logic. But he going wrong, because he identified
the problems of constitution and ethics.
Begin to read perhaps
also in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy »Ernst Mally«
or Roberto Poli
http://www.robertopoli.it/Papers.html
Kant make this difference clear between »technisch-praktische
Vernunft« as Collorarium to the pure concepts of experience (reine
Verstandesbegriffe der Erfahrung) and the Idea of pure ethical reason
(Idee der REINEN praktischen Vernunft oder Sittlichkeit). Also between
»bedingter Imperativ« and »kategorischer Imperativ«. The main
difference is, that the first point deals with construction, they
should be possible as physically existence, the second point deals
with constructions, they should be possible as social environment, AND
be volitional (desired) as ethical norm for everybody (like in the
»kategorischer Imperative« Kants)
Greatings and good luck for the next steps in a great question!
Wolfgang Cernoch
Wolfgang Cernoch
wrote:
>
> also in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy »Ernst Mally«
>
>
> Kant make this difference clear between »technisch-praktische
> Vernunft« as Collorarium to the pure concepts of experience (reine
> Verstandesbegriffe der Erfahrung) and the Idea of pure ethical reason
> (Idee der REINEN praktischen Vernunft oder Sittlichkeit). Also between
> »bedingter Imperativ« and »kategorischer Imperativ«. The main
> difference is, that the first point deals with construction, they
> should be possible as physically existence, the second point deals
> with constructions, they should be possible as social environment, AND
> be volitional (desired) as ethical norm for everybody (like in the
> »kategorischer Imperative« Kants)
>
> Greatings and good luck for the next steps in a great question!
>
> Wolfgang Cernoch
P.S.:
The volitional (desired) aspect of the ethic in Kant's »kategorischer
Imperative« deals also with the »moral intuition« of Adam Smith in
difference to the economical interests. Also for Adam Smith is the
second point refered to the social environment, the first to pure
emotion. This difference ist constitutive for human beeing, not for
physical existence.
Kant try to combinate the reasoning about social environment, is only
similar to technical practice, but not identical, and the moral
intitution (feeling or primitive evidence). This go back to the
scholastic discussion between moral feeling and rational argumentation
as the last ground of ethics.