things-in-themselves "cause" Phenomena?
nem846
Philosophy", although I am sure it appears elsewhere. There is probably
even a special name for it, but I don't know it.
Kant claims that the categories (e.g.causation) are not applied to things in
themselves. But he contradicts himself when he claims that phenomena are
caused by things in themselves.
I don't like this argument, but I can't figure out how to refute it. The
word "cause" seems to take on two very different meanings, and I think Kant
usually says phenomena come forth from noumena or something like that so he
avoids the word cause.
He proves that something must exist outside of us, and that we must be
connected to it somehow,but that doesn't really clear up the contradiction.
The only thing I can think of is to say that noumena don't cause phenomena
in the same sense that one billiard ball causes another to move, but we lack
the mental ability to comprehend this more fundamental cause. This is a
pretty lame argument.
the only other way out seems to be that we don't really know if phenomena
are connected to anything "real." Instead of many the noumenon table
causing my to percieve the phenomenon table there is really just one stuff
that logically must be not me.
now I feel like I am treating Kant like an idealist.
any help is greatly appreciated
Malenor
"nem846" <nem...@mail.utexas.edu> wrote in message
news:mFAK9.189807$8D.49...@twister.austin.rr.com...
Russell's argument is found at
http://www3.justnet.ne.jp/~e00859/07-POP08.HTM
Here is a typical statement from that essay:
"To say that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not account
for this [a priori certainty]. Our nature is as much a fact of the existing
world as anything, and there can be no certainty that it will remain
constant."
But Prof. Russell, human nature, considered transcendentally, is not
phenomenal, therefore it doesn't have to follow your empiricist rules.
Anyway, back to your question. It is a point that I am familiar with.
How can the thing-in-itself *cause* an influence upon my senses
before any faculties have lent their synthesis to the process?
The only alternative would be to claim that the understanding
*causes* causality. But that is not the case. The understanding
only legislates to representations in general, not to the noumenal.
The deduction of the categories only proves one thing: the
lawfulness of phenomena considered as representation.
If there were no action of the thing-in-itself upon the senses,
then, according to Kant, it would be like having representations
with nothing to represent.
nem846
> Russell's argument is found at
> http://www3.justnet.ne.jp/~e00859/07-POP08.HTM
>
> Here is a typical statement from that essay:
> "To say that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not account
> for this [a priori certainty]. Our nature is as much a fact of the
existing
> world as anything, and there can be no certainty that it will remain
> constant."
>
> But Prof. Russell, human nature, considered transcendentally, is not
> phenomenal, therefore it doesn't have to follow your empiricist rules.
>
I have been wondering for a long time why many philosophers could/should
give Kant more credit. I am surprised that this, Russell's main argument
against Kant, seems so naive.
> Anyway, back to your question. It is a point that I am familiar with.
> How can the thing-in-itself *cause* an influence upon my senses
> before any faculties have lent their synthesis to the process?
>
> The only alternative would be to claim that the understanding
> *causes* causality. But that is not the case. The understanding
> only legislates to representations in general, not to the noumenal.
> The deduction of the categories only proves one thing: the
> lawfulness of phenomena considered as representation.
> If there were no action of the thing-in-itself upon the senses,
> then, according to Kant, it would be like having representations
> with nothing to represent.
This then requires that causation exist outside the category, correct?
what about substance, If the thing-in-itself acts upon the senses it would
seem that it would have to have substance.
on the other hand, noumena can't really act on the senses because this would
require their place in time (the moment before the noumena acted, the moment
after).
This all does point to the argument that our representations don't really
represent anything.
All Kant can show is that it doesn't make sense to deny the connection. I
want to prove it because I want everyone to be able to look at the same
object and see the same thing. But the best I can do is assume that
everyone sees the same thing and this makes sense because I can't get inside
anyone's head.
The answer to this contradiction reminds me of his answer to the question do
we have freedom. Have faith. This is still a much better position than
Russell's.
Hans van Duijnhoven
wrote:
As far as I understand Kant it is something like this.
We observe phenomena in the world around us and we interpret them,
we want some order in the chaos of phenomena.
Our tools of interpretation need/are space, time and causation.
But at the same time our tools don't tell us anything about the things
themselves (die Dinge-an-sich).
Now I think the contradiction is: if we can't know anything about the
things themselves, what do they so show us? How can the things appear
as phenomena?
On the other hand we are also "things in ourselves", unable to
discover who we really are, but somehow we have some tools to observe
phenomena. So our selfreflection needs the same "phenomenal tools".
How can we have them?
Kant's philosophy means to me a doubling of reality. On one hand there
is the world of phenomena, and besides that there is an un-detectable,
indeed Platonic world of ideal "things in themselves".
So I agree with your "idealist treatment"
Regards, Hans
(remove the x for e-mail)
Malenor
To put this matter another way (thankfully I have my bagful of answers
at hand): The category of causality does not legislate to particular
causal relationships, such as hold between our senses and objects.
These relationships are empirical, thus contingent. Causality in the
transcendental sense, however, legislates to representations, and only
generally. The "object" of such Critique is not the thing-in-itself, but
faculties and representations. So the whole point about physical
stimulation of the senses is meaningless in the Kantian context.
It is an entirely different way of considering the matter of perception,
and one that only gives contingency.
Malenor
"Hans van Duijnhoven" <hanxs...@mail.tele.dk> wrote in message
news:bbenvuombl7tcf3kj...@4ax.com...
The thing-in-itself is detectable, by your analysis, or else you could
not call it a "chaos."
Here is the key to understanding the error, your statement:
"How can the things appear as phenomena?" In other words, How can
the thing-in-itself appear as phenomena?
That is to start *with* the thing-in-itself, and not with phenomena.
This is to commit Russell's error and to agree with his failure to
make the transcendental distinction. That distinction, in a way, is
based on determining the source of necessary knowledge. For
Russell, this source is external to him, therefore his interpretation
of Kant is the same old externalism with an admixture of psychology.
For Kant, the source is internal, but not psychological. Where does
the word "transcendental" come from? It is the source of all
necessary a priori ideas and concepts brought into view through
a transcendental reflection upon the forms and faculties --
not an analysis of the empirical creation of perceptions through the
physical stimulation of the five senses.
Karl Wagner
[...]
>
> The only thing I can think of is to say that noumena don't cause phenomena
> in the same sense that one billiard ball causes another to move, but we
> lack
> the mental ability to comprehend this more fundamental cause. This is a
> pretty lame argument.
>
> the only other way out seems to be that we don't really know if phenomena
> are connected to anything "real." Instead of many the noumenon table
> causing my to percieve the phenomenon table there is really just one stuff
> that logically must be not me.
> now I feel like I am treating Kant like an idealist.
>
> any help is greatly appreciated
There are phenomena: these are the familiar things which appear to us and
which depend on our notions, our theories, our language, our biological
dispositions etc. The phenomenon is the thing considered under the apsekt
how we know this thing: how it appear to us.
The trancendental philosophy considers our a priori knowledge about these
familiar things which is a priori an thus says only something about the
form of phenomena: the things that we know.
But furthermore you can consider a thing also under the aspect that it is
(absolutely, whatever this means :) ) independent from our preconditions to
know it: this is what Kant names: "thing in itself"; and this is what we
are doing when we say there is something: we /think/ something which we
know dependent of our preconditions to know something, but we /think/, that
it is independent how we learn about it: it exists in itself.
Thus it is not the case that there is a thing which we know and furthermore
a thing in itself which we don't know: there is only one thing and the
thing in itself is only "negative concept".
Kant is no idealist, he is a realist from a classical standpoint (see
refutation of the idealism). Kant is a tranzendental idealist this means
/not/ that the things in time and space are in us but the forms how things
appear to us (in time and space) are forms of our faculty to intuit and
thus "subjective" and ideal.
Regards,
Karl.
Malenor
"Karl Wagner" <karl....@web.de> wrote in message
news:jc9uc-...@3101202561136226583-0001.dialin.t-online.de...
> There are phenomena: these are the familiar things which appear to us and
> which depend on our notions, our theories, our language, our biological
> dispositions etc. The phenomenon is the thing considered under the apsekt
> how we know this thing: how it appear to us.
> The trancendental philosophy considers our a priori knowledge about these
> familiar things which is a priori an thus says only something about the
> form of phenomena: the things that we know.
> But furthermore you can consider a thing also under the aspect that it is
> (absolutely, whatever this means :) ) independent from our preconditions
to
> know it: this is what Kant names: "thing in itself"; and this is what we
> are doing when we say there is something: we /think/ something which we
> know dependent of our preconditions to know something, but we /think/,
that
> it is independent how we learn about it: it exists in itself.
> Thus it is not the case that there is a thing which we know and
furthermore
> a thing in itself which we don't know: there is only one thing and the
> thing in itself is only "negative concept".
> Kant is no idealist, he is a realist from a classical standpoint (see
> refutation of the idealism). Kant is a tranzendental idealist this means
> /not/ that the things in time and space are in us but the forms how things
> appear to us (in time and space) are forms of our faculty to intuit and
> thus "subjective" and ideal.
I'd like to correct a couple little items there if you don't mind, Karl.
Appearance is not phenomena, or, phenomena are not things considered
in the way they appear in terms of the transcendental forms. Phenomena
*are* the things, not even the thing-in-itself, just "the things."
You say that phenomena are familiar to us, or that which lies in the
realm of things familiar to us. But that is not necessarily the case, as
phenomena can also include anything unexplained. E.g., "the ufo
phenomenon." To be a phenomenon is simply to be an object of
understanding, subject to and classifiable under general laws of nature.
You say that Kant was a realist in the classic sense. It would be
more accurate to say that Kant was an empiricist. A realist in the
classic sense makes a positive ontological claim about the reality of
the forms. The opposite of a realist is not an idealist, but a
nominalist. The opposite of an idealist is a materialist. A nominalist
makes a less substantial claim about the forms -- either they are just
sounds we make, or they are just mental concepts on a par
with "table" or "chair" (conceptualism) or a similar claim.
You may have meant that Kant was an empirical realist, which
is true. That term is only the belief that the empirical world is
real. That would go against the commonly-held false claim that for
Kant only the noumenal is real, while the phenomenal is the
illusory (because it is "mere appearance," which it isn't).
nem846
Kant's answer to Hume much more clearly now. Thanks
Malenor
"nem846" <nem...@mail.utexas.edu> wrote in message
news:ac6eadc7.02121...@posting.google.com...
> That explanation very nicely puts Hume's argument in context. I see
> Kant's answer to Hume much more clearly now. Thanks
Gilles Deleuze has been very helpful to me lately in pinning
down these sorts of issues. Russell's argument is yet another
case in which a valid counterargument is being offered;
unfortunately for him, it is completely outside of Kant's
transcendental context. Just another straw dog.
I read a webpage recently in which Kant's theory was
shown to have a "dialectical" nature, in which things in
general are looked at from different perspectives, a
transcendental one in this case. It's not to say there is no
empirical perspective anymore, and it's not to say that
Russell is wrong; only, he's out of context, he has not
attained the Kantian perspective. Russell is both right
and wrong at the same time, in different respects. But if
he wanted to criticize Kant and get it right, or at least
be on the right track, then he needed to develop the
appropriate perspective on these sorts of issues.
Whenever you find a criticism of Kant difficult to fend
off, the first thing to ask yourself is this: does the critiquer
understand the transcendental distinction? Some of them
fail to see it completely, remaining completely ignorant
of any perspectives foreign to their own.
The transcendental perspective itself can be seen from
3 different perspectives, depending on the subject
matter. That is why there are 3 Critiques. Each Critique
places a different legislative Faculty at the apex of its
discussion, and analyzes its effects upon the other two
in terms of its Interests.
Karl Wagner
Hmm, difficult problem :). What means Kant with "phenomenon" precisely:
"...gewisse Gegenstände, als Erscheinungen, Sinnenwesen(Phaenomena)..."
could be interpreted "Obects as appearences are sensible
existences[strange translation:)]=phenomena..." The "mundus phenonenon" are
the "objects of sense" B328 ?
I have to admit that it is hard for me to grasp the difference
between appearance and phenomenon: on one hand it seems quite clear to me:
"Objects as appearances are phenomena"; but eventually this does not make
the point much clearer , since on the other hand Kant claims "appearances"
are "Gegenstände einer möglichen Erfahrung (objects of a possible
experience)"B297 Furthermore appearance is "the object of an empirical
intuition" B33 and the "objects of sense" are "the mundus phenomenon" and
the "Sinneswesen oder Erscheinungen (phaenomena), die die Sinneswelt
ausmachen" (phenomena equal to appearance!) prolegomena §32, but then he
says also: "Also ist in allen Erscheinungen das Beharrliche der Gegenstand
selbst, d.i. die Substanz(phaenomen) [in all appearances the permanent is
the object itself, that is, the substance(phenomenon)]" (phenomenon not
equal appearance)B227
Anyway I do not think that it is correct to say that the phenomenon are
"just the things", they are things under certain conditions: "objects as
appearances", objects of a empirical intuition or sometimes "objects of a
/possible/ experience". I would suggest phenomena are the real things or
more precisely: "realitas phenomeon" "das Reale in der Erscheinung(the real
in the appearance)"B320
> You say that phenomena are familiar to us, or that which lies in the
> realm of things familiar to us. But that is not necessarily the case, as
> phenomena can also include anything unexplained. E.g., "the ufo
> phenomenon." To be a phenomenon is simply to be an object of
> understanding, subject to and classifiable under general laws of nature.
>
Ufos are familiar to us in so far that we would know, what is the case, when
there are Ufos. Some people even think that they have evidence for the
existence of these objects, but I do not think that this is /really/ true,
and I can say why (By the way, do you think that UFOs are "subjekt and
classifiable under certain general laws of nature"? ;-) ).
[...]
>
> You may have meant that Kant was an empirical realist, which
> is true. That term is only the belief that the empirical world is
> real. That would go against the commonly-held false claim that for
> Kant only the noumenal is real, while the phenomenal is the
> illusory (because it is "mere appearance," which it isn't).
This is exactly what I've tried to express,
Regards,
Karl.
mmaterial1
> That explanation very nicely puts Hume's argument in context. I see
> Kant's answer to Hume much more clearly now. Thanks
Kant would say that experience is not possible without causation,
and that experience is proof of causation. Clearly, cause equals
change which equal motion; and without motion, there would be
no change and no time, but because there is experience, there
must be causation. Nothing would come into existence, or if
anything were in existence, there would be no motion without
cause and no experience.
Malenor
Kant obviously failed to clearly distinguish some key concepts, that's why
I don't cite him on this subject. My point was that the term "phenomenon"
is not transcendental, not a priori, therefore it is empirical. Phenomena
are empirical. Appearance, in the sense that Kant takes it, relies on
a transcendental distinction, it is a term singularly apt for Kant's
purposes
and no others. While I can easily understand the terms standing in a
positive
comparison with one another, they are not equivalent. The term "phenomenon"
does nothing to explicate the transcendental distinction.
So what does Kant mean when he states that "appearances are phenonema"?
It means that phenomena are to be considered for purposes of his argument
as the products of an a priori synthesis, and in the most general sense
possible, with no reference to particular phenomena (such as ufo's).
> Anyway I do not think that it is correct to say that the phenomenon are
> "just the things", they are things under certain conditions: "objects as
> appearances", objects of a empirical intuition or sometimes "objects of a
> /possible/ experience". I would suggest phenomena are the real things or
> more precisely: "realitas phenomeon" "das Reale in der Erscheinung(the
real
> in the appearance)"B320
>
I agree, phenomena are the real in appearance, which is to say, the
*empirically* real in appearance. But the term "appearance" is a product
of a critical analysis of the forms, whereas "phenomenon" is a term more
commonly used to express the basic idea of the senses being confronted by
some reality.
The term "phenomenon" is therefore quite mundane and ordinary, so its
role in Critique must be to help illuminate through contrast the
introduction
of a "new" term: the noumenon, a term more properly a product of a
critical analysis of forms and concepts. In order for Kant's argument to
progress, it must be necessary for the term "phenomenon" to fall aside,
like a familiar ladder that carried us up only so far and lost its
effectiveness.
But when seen in a different light (transcendentally), it gives way to
the noumenon, a conceptual bridge to the critique of pure reason itself in
the section on the Dialectic.
> > You say that phenomena are familiar to us, or that which lies in the
> > realm of things familiar to us. But that is not necessarily the case, as
> > phenomena can also include anything unexplained. E.g., "the ufo
> > phenomenon." To be a phenomenon is simply to be an object of
> > understanding, subject to and classifiable under general laws of nature.
> >
>
> Ufos are familiar to us in so far that we would know, what is the case,
when
> there are Ufos. Some people even think that they have evidence for the
> existence of these objects, but I do not think that this is /really/ true,
> and I can say why (By the way, do you think that UFOs are "subjekt and
> classifiable under certain general laws of nature"? ;-) ).
Um, no, not the way they fly around. But such phenomenality is an
assumption we make when setting out to exploring new territories.
If it's not considered a phenomenon, then it's not worth understanding.
Malenor
> Hmm, difficult problem :). What means Kant with "phenomenon" precisely:
> "...gewisse Gegenstände, als Erscheinungen, Sinnenwesen(Phaenomena)..."
> could be interpreted "Obects as appearences are sensible
> existences[strange translation:)]=phenomena..." The "mundus phenonenon"
are
> the "objects of sense" B328 ?
> I have to admit that it is hard for me to grasp the difference
> between appearance and phenomenon: on one hand it seems quite clear to me:
> "Objects as appearances are phenomena"; but eventually this does not make
> the point much clearer , since on the other hand Kant claims "appearances"
> are "Gegenstände einer möglichen Erfahrung (objects of a possible
> experience)"B297 Furthermore appearance is "the object of an empirical
> intuition" B33 and the "objects of sense" are "the mundus phenomenon" and
> the "Sinneswesen oder Erscheinungen (phaenomena), die die Sinneswelt
> ausmachen" (phenomena equal to appearance!) prolegomena §32, but then he
> says also: "Also ist in allen Erscheinungen das Beharrliche der Gegenstand
> selbst, d.i. die Substanz(phaenomen) [in all appearances the permanent is
> the object itself, that is, the substance(phenomenon)]" (phenomenon not
> equal appearance)B227
>
I've looked up some other translations, and found this interesting dilemma.
At a20/b34, Meiklejohn has, "The undetermined object of an empirical
intuition is called phenomenon." Pluhar has the same sentence as, "The
undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance."
Smith's is identical to Pluhar's.
Since you are using your own translating skills, the text is subject to your
interpretation, as with the authors above.
Omar Lughod
phenomena are distinguished from noumena. That would suggest that
there is a category difference between appearance and phenomena. I
suspect that noumena and phenomena refer to the domain in which
appearances and things in themselves lie. That is, appearance, as the
undetermined object of sensibility belongs to the domain of the
phenomenal, while things in themselves, which cannot be known but only
thought, belong to the supersensible domain of the noumenal.
Omar
"Malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<fOUL9.2969$c52.3...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
Malenor
"Omar Lughod" <OLugh...@cs.com> wrote in message
news:eadc6d15.02121...@posting.google.com...
> appearances are distinguished from things in themselves, while
> phenomena are distinguished from noumena. That would suggest that
> there is a category difference between appearance and phenomena. I
> suspect that noumena and phenomena refer to the domain in which
> appearances and things in themselves lie. That is, appearance, as the
> undetermined object of sensibility belongs to the domain of the
> phenomenal, while things in themselves, which cannot be known but only
> thought, belong to the supersensible domain of the noumenal.
>
> Omar
>
Welcome to alt.philosophy.kant, Omar. You certainly keep busy with
these groups, which is good; or perhaps you followed me from the
Kant-l Yahoo group, which is either bad or a compliment or a strange
coincidence, hehe. But I haven't posted there for a long time because
it is not a very speculative group. As you told me, the purpose is to first
understand Kant. I understand him generally, but I can't learn the
details unless I engage in playful speculative reasoning about his
concepts rather than merely memorizing them.
But I am really glad to see you here!
--
**********************************************************
I have always distinguished those terms more severely than most of
the regulars here. For me, "phenomenon" is an empirical judgment
applicable to objects of experience known or knowable conceptually,
while "appearance" has been used transcendentally to emphasize for
purposes of Critique the formality of space and time underlying
phenomena. I have understood "phenomenon" in its common usage, as
simply any object of investigation. So you have "phenomenon" in the
empirical sense, and "phenomenon qua appearance" which is simply the
empirical viewed from the transcendental perspective.
An appearance is, as you noted, undetermined, but only for purposes
of transcendental argument, while phenomena are determined in the
general sense (although particular phenomena, such as UFOs, may
not be). I.e., a phenomenon is something that I *determined* to be a
phenomenon through empirical cognition. An appearance is a
representation that I determined to be (indeterminate) appearance
through a priori reflection, transcendentally, and merely conceptually.
If there is any categorical distinction, then perhaps that is
it.
But I'll ask again, just like I asked in the Kant-l group and
was thoroughly dismissed by one of the regulars there: How can I
determine a representation that has an indeterminate empirical
content unless I utilize another faculty, a faculty other than reason or
understanding, to determine it? How can I determine that a
representation is indeterminate appearance, transcendentally and
merely discursively without the aid of any intuition, without relying
on some other faculty that is not concerned with schematizing
empirical representations, or with regulating to the concepts, but
with merely reflecting on the faculties?
Critique is the apex of all reasoning, legislating to the lower
faculties by spelling out their particular roles. It is not a spontaneous
faculty, it does not automatically produce any representation, but
is the product itself of a purely discursive mental process.
In order to talk about reason per se, for instance, it is necessary to
attain some level of conception higher than reason: the level
of Critique, the faculty of purely discursive, a priori reflection
on the forms of human knowledge.
The obvious response to this analysis, one which was leveled at
me, is to declare that there is no basis for any of this in the CPR
or elsewhere. However, Kant at least gives it a purpose, and a name:
the propaedeutic, or preparation, of pure reason which "investigates
our power of reason with regard to all pure a priori cognition,
and is also called *critique*." (A841/B869)
The only change I have made is to give this power the status of
a faculty. And as I said in the other group, how can it be a
POWER without also having the status of a faculty? It is
certainly not a mere representation. It's just that Kant does not
call it a faculty, and since the CPR is the Bible to some, then
I must be mistaken, right?
So I have some grievances with that group. I reason things out
with all the logic and Kantian knowledge I possess, but it is no use
*simply because Kant didn't say it first!* But that is to make
Architectonic into a religion, and not a science. Kant-l is hardly
anything more than an area of cyberspace where scholars can
worship Kant in peace.
Omar Lughod
You are raising, I believe, the entire issue of "meta-critique". I
actually think that Kant has a great deal to say of the perspective
that gains us access to the transcendental perspective. I believe he
does it reflectively in two ways: 1)through his characterization of
philosophy as a teleology of human reason -- "teleologia rationis
humanae", or "the science of the relation of all cognition to the
final end of our reason". This means that transcendental philosophy
ultimately answers the question -- What must our reason be like,
theoretical, judicial and practical in order to be compatible with the
achievement of the highest good. to answer this question without
arguing in a circle would be to employ some kind of meta-teleological
reflective judgment that reflects on the end of reason, the highest
good (as the "unconditioned condition of every conditioned object), by
positing the conditions (the forms, the designs: the categories, both
theoretical and practical) that will bring that end about. This is
final causation applied to the very faculties that are to generate the
highest good. This approach is suggested by Kant's use of the term
"epigenesis" with respect to the categories. A mere reflection on
what is necessary to produce the highest good would (as it were) allow
the categories to be "acquired" by positing ideals (God, World, and
Man in the Opus Postumum, and God, freedom and the Soul before
that)that provide a "focus imaginarius" for our thinking, a focus that
illuminates the categories by the extention (as it were) that forces
experience past the domain of its possibilities (leading to the
antinomies, and hence to the need for Critique); 2) a reflecton on our
difference from God's putative capacities leads Kant to be aware of
our all too human capacities (that our thinking is dependent on what
is given through sensibility to gain knowledge). Thus Critique
operated meta-critically by reflecting on our difference from a God, a
reflection which leads to the trnascendental ideality of our
knowledge, and with it the justification of the necessity of our
apriori claims -- that they apply only to what appears and not to
things in themselves.
We can bring together both these approaches with a little bit of
nudging: teleological reasoning is analogical fundamentally, and one
is able to identify the transcendental perspective only by reflecting
analogically on our difference from God. To posit the basis of
knowledge and practice in ourselves rather than in GOd is
fundamentally teleolical in the sense that Kant means -- epigenesis --
which posits in our own capacities the forms of God as a mere "virtual
power". that power must be "acquired" by our human sensibility (which
is illuminated only through the transcendental differentiation from
God)in order to be realized, that is, to be made objectively real (as
demonstrated in the deductions).
Is that speculative enough?
Omar
Malenor
No, it has only bridged the gap into fantasy. There is no meta-critique,
that is a Hegelian idea. (Or, for the Brits lurking in the audience, aN
Hegelian idea.) My quote from the CPR should have been sufficient to
explain my point: there is a faculty of Critique, and it is just another
name for the faculty of Pure Reason. To claim there is a meta-critique
would be to claim the existence of a meta-faculty, a faculty higher
than Pure Reason. But there would be no use for such a thing.
Unity is unity, there is no higher perspective than that, only lower
diversity in the empirical.
Hegel thought there must be a meta-Critique because he was
seeking the Absolute viewpoint that stood above our merely
human perspective. He used Critique as a bridge to that
"higher" perspective. More likely, he stole a few of Kant's
ideas such as the antinomies and transformed them back
into the transcendental realist perspective from which he could
play the role of God.
But let's put this sentence into more common terms: "What must our
reason be like, theoretical, judicial and practical in order to be
compatible
with the achievement of the highest good." Isn't this to imply that the
final product of man's intellectual achievements *will* be unity with
the mind of God, or, an understanding on a par with God's? That
is not to say an intellectual intuition, but an ability to know the mind
of God, to see things from God's perspective.
Isn't this what philosophy has often been about, the seeking after
an absolute perspective? But Kant has found that perspective,
there is no more. Our human perspective is absolute in the sense
that we cannot surpass it, but it is sufficient to derive necessity.
Even when and if we find God, we will still be limited to our human
intellectual dimension even though the horizons of our thinking may
no longer be expanded.
And that brings another issue: how does one know when the
absolute limit of conception has been reached? We know there
is something beyond these limits through analogy with experience.
Therefore this knowledge is contingent, based on our expectation
that phenomena will provide us with those clues enabling us to
hypothesize about that which lies beyond our present horizons.
God, Freedom and the Immortal Soul are more than Ideas, they are
Transcendental Realities. They are only ideas from the empirical
perspective. But how do you prove, only by analogy (as you say,
"analogically"), that they are realities of a sort? Because of their
use-value for cognition and the formation of hypotheses, correct?
So it is to say that just because "we don't know it," that doesn't
mean "it" doesn't exist or isn't real.
This idea is "meta-" in the sense that it enables us to expand
our present intellectual horizons, but it is not meta-critique. It is
only more critique, and sufficient to our intellectual needs.
The teleology you referred to would best be called Critical
Teleology. Teleology is nothing more than the study of final
ends, but Critical Teleology is the study of the final ends of
human reason.
An example of meta-critique would be Hegelian dialectics
and its historicism which is only a pretense at a Kantian
teleology. It is not even transcendental, but transcendent
in the ancient sense, a revival of pre-Aristotle metaphysics
which never actually died out -- un-Critical mysticism.
And Aristotle himself did nothing more for metaphysics
than to formalize teleology, in an almost Critique-like manner,
in order to create his own transcendent idea over those of
Heraclites and Parmenides. But to formalize an error is not to
overcome and correct it, only to solidify it by giving it the
respectability granted to Reason in general.
Karl Wagner
[...]
>> I have to admit that it is hard for me to grasp the difference
>> between appearance and phenomenon: on one hand it seems quite clear to
>> me: "Objects as appearances are phenomena"; but eventually this does not
>> make the point much clearer , since on the other hand Kant claims
>> "appearances" are "Gegenstände einer möglichen Erfahrung (objects of a
>> possible experience)"B297 Furthermore appearance is "the object of an
>> empirical intuition" B33 and the "objects of sense" are "the mundus
>> phenomenon" and the "Sinneswesen oder Erscheinungen (phaenomena), die die
>> Sinneswelt ausmachen" (phenomena equal to appearance!) prolegomena §32,
>> but then he says also: "Also ist in allen Erscheinungen das Beharrliche
>> der Gegenstand selbst, d.i. die Substanz(phaenomen) [in all appearances
>> the permanent is the object itself, that is, the substance(phenomenon)]"
>> (phenomenon not equal appearance)B227
>>
>
> Kant obviously failed to clearly distinguish some key concepts, that's why
> I don't cite him on this subject. My point was that the term "phenomenon"
> is not transcendental, not a priori, therefore it is empirical. Phenomena
> are empirical. Appearance, in the sense that Kant takes it, relies on
> a transcendental distinction, it is a term singularly apt for Kant's
> purposes
> and no others. While I can easily understand the terms standing in a
> positive
> comparison with one another, they are not equivalent. The term
> "phenomenon" does nothing to explicate the transcendental distinction.
>
situations. In the Blackwell Dictionary there are some interessting hints
about the development of Kants notion of phenomena. It suggests a
distinction between appearance to signify "that which precedes the logical
use of the understanding" and phenomena the "objects of experiences". It
derives this view from the "Inaugural dissertation". And this is how Kant
uses the terms "phenomena" and expecially "appearance" in many situations
(for example in the tranzendental deduction), in other cases Kant uses the
term appearance as opposite of the thing in itself and here it seems that
Kant uses the term simply as "object of experience", but I think Kant only
wants to point out the possibility of the things to appear, to be
appearance, not that the objects of experiences /are/ appearances which
would be wrong, since appearances are ""the object of an empirical
intuition" B33 which says appearantly more than just beeing an object of
experience.
Regards,
Karl.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Karl Wagner wrote:
>
> I feel more that Kant uses the terms in different ways in different
> situations. In the Blackwell Dictionary there are some interessting hints
> about the development of Kants notion of phenomena. It suggests a
> distinction between appearance to signify "that which precedes the logical
> use of the understanding" and phenomena the "objects of experiences". It
> derives this view from the "Inaugural dissertation". And this is how Kant
> uses the terms "phenomena" and expecially "appearance" in many situations
> (for example in the tranzendental deduction), in other cases Kant uses the
> term appearance as opposite of the thing in itself and here it seems that
> Kant uses the term simply as "object of experience", but I think Kant only
> wants to point out the possibility of the things to appear, to be
> appearance, not that the objects of experiences /are/ appearances which
> would be wrong, since appearances are ""the object of an empirical
> intuition" B33 which says appearantly more than just beeing an object of
> experience.
> Regards,
How would my personal view fit into things here, i.e., my belief that
the world is comprised of NEITHER mind nor matter, but that the two
are manifestations of causal propensities that give rise to BOTH
the appearance of mind and matter? In other words, the same causal
propensities that give rise to thoughts and feelings also give
rise to the perception refered to as a brain, just via different
sense organs. Is this anything at all like Kant's ontology and,
if not, how would his differ?
PR
Malenor
That would be a transcendental statement.
> and phenomena the "objects of experiences".
That is an empirical statement about experience.
> It derives this view from the "Inaugural dissertation". And this is how
Kant
> uses the terms "phenomena" and expecially "appearance" in many situations
> (for example in the tranzendental deduction), in other cases Kant uses the
> term appearance as opposite of the thing in itself and here it seems that
> Kant uses the term simply as "object of experience", but I think Kant only
> wants to point out the possibility of the things to appear, to be
> appearance, not that the objects of experiences /are/ appearances which
> would be wrong, since appearances are ""the object of an empirical
> intuition" B33 which says appearantly more than just beeing an object of
> experience.
That would be A20/B34, actually. This is where Kant defines "appearance"
as "the undetermined object of an empirical intuition." The term "object"
is translated from the word "gegenstand." According to Allison, there are
two senses of the word "object" used in the CPR, the Gegenstand and
the Objekt. Gegenstand is what Allison calls the "weighty" sense of
the word "object." I take that to mean, object of experience and not
object in general (Objekt).
This is confusing because it should be just the opposite. But perhaps
not. I don't know. In the Deduction, Kant uses Objekt and
Gegenstand in sequence and always together, almost as if he
were not concerned with their distinctive meanings but only
synonymously, as if he were merely concerned with breaking up the
monotony of using the same word over and over again. (Objekt...
Gegenstand... Objekt... Gegenstand...). If Kant used them
interchangably, then I don't see why Allison fusses over their
respective intended meanings. He claims that the first part
of the Deduction is concerned with the Objekt, the second
part with the Gegenstand. Likewise, the first part is concerned
with determining the objective validity of the Objekt, the
second part is concerned with determining the objective
reality of the Gegenstand. But I can't decide that for myself,
so I have to take Allison's word for it. Or I can treat
Allison's explanation as useful, but not necessarily true to
Kant's intentions.
As such, it doesn't explain to me Kant's definition of
"appearance" as the "undetermined object (Gegenstand)
of an empirical intuition." If undetermined, then it should
stand as Objekt, not Gegenstand.
So as I said, Kant is being inconsistent with his terms.
There is much textual support for this conclusion. Kant
often uses the terms "concept," "idea," and "principle"
interchangably. He even calls the forms of space and
time "concepts" in the Aesthetic. He calls the concepts
of the understanding "principles." Perhaps there is a
method to this apparent madness.
I agree with you that Kant uses the terms different ways
in different situations. Whether he is being methodological
or has some other plan, or perhaps is just being sloppy,
I don't know. But it seems to me that his every word
is carefully thought-out, so it appears that his usages
change with differing contexts. It is then necessary
to constantly ask oneself, "What is Kant talking about
now?" and, "Why is he expressing the idea in those terms?"
His tendency to digress into alternate thought-trails, only
to return to the original point, makes interpreting even
more difficult.
Jos Horikx
<karl....@web.de> wrote:
>Kant is no idealist, he is a realist from a classical standpoint
Perhaps there could be another way to envisage the philosophical
"things" in general and the Kantian things in particular.
In a historical overview about metaphisics it is all about
"things". (substance, essence etc) But Kant was, as you say, and
I think you are correct in this respect, in his time also in the
middle of the struggle of two other philosophical mainstreams,
those of the realists and the idealists.
The Britannica distinguishes between two types of idealism
" Thus the two basic forms of Idealism are metaphysical
Idealism, which asserts the ideality of reality, and epis-
temological Idealism, which holds that in the knowledge
process the mind can grasp only the psychic or that its
objects are conditioned by their perceptibility. In its
metaphysics, Idealism is thus directly opposed to Materia-
lism , the view that the basic substance of the world is
matter and that it is known primarily through and as
material forms and processes; and in its epistemology, it
is opposed to Realism, which holds that in human knowledge
objects are grasped and seen as they really are—in their
existence outside and independently of the mind. "
And Kant distinguishes also (but not exactly the same way)
between two types of idealism. Kant:
" In the transcendental aesthetic we proved that everything
intuited in space and time, all objects of a possible expe-
rience, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere represen-
tations; and that these, as presented to us- as extended
bodies, or as series of changes- have no self-subsistent
existence apart from human thought. This doctrine I call
Transcendental Idealism.* The realist in the transcendental
sense regards these modifications of our sensibility, these
mere representations, as things subsisting in themselves.
I have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism, to
distinguish it from material idealism, which doubts or
denies the existence of external things. To avoid ambigui-
ty, it seems advisable in many cases to employ this term
instead of that mentioned in the text."
Nowadays realism would not say that things "have no
self-subsistent existence apart from human thought."
First I like to give a small exemple in order to explain things.
A naive way of looking at language is that words have unique
meanings more or less attached to them: The word "home"
could remind one at shelter and warmth, the word "hate" has
something ugly in it and is feels as if it were yellow with
black thorns, etc. etc...
But what do the word "word" (in itself) refer to? You can't say
anything about *that* word, i.e. not without going to another
"level" (and that should be some metaphysical level because we
left the real (perceived) objects of the real world)
Sometimes I like to read Kant in this alternative way. As if he
was just talking about the notion of "thing" when talking about
the "thing-in-itself". That correlates very well with his strong
and repetitive utterance that nothing can be said about the
thing-in-itself, it is very well in line with his knowledge of
classical metaphysics (substances, essences), it explains his
problems with realism and idealism and last but not least its
matches perfectly with the *transcendental* character of his
thinking. (i.e. transcending experience but not human knowledge)
JH
mal...@hotmail.com
wrote:
>On Sun, 15 Dec 2002 13:32:51 +0100, Karl Wagner
><karl....@web.de> wrote:
>
>>Kant is no idealist, he is a realist from a classical standpoint
>
>Perhaps there could be another way to envisage the philosophical
>"things" in general and the Kantian things in particular.
>
>In a historical overview about metaphisics it is all about
>"things". (substance, essence etc) But Kant was, as you say, and
>I think you are correct in this respect, in his time also in the
>middle of the struggle of two other philosophical mainstreams,
>those of the realists and the idealists.
>
I like your opinion on this matter up to a point, and that is your
division of epistemology into realism and idealism. That division
should be named realism vs. nominalism, as per the tradition of Kant's
day. The metaphysical division between idealism and materialism is the
traditional form.
>The Britannica distinguishes between two types of idealism
>
>" Thus the two basic forms of Idealism are metaphysical
> Idealism, which asserts the ideality of reality, and epis-
> temological Idealism, which holds that in the knowledge
> process the mind can grasp only the psychic
"psychic"?
> or that its
> objects are conditioned by their perceptibility. In its
> metaphysics, Idealism is thus directly opposed to Materia-
> lism , the view that the basic substance of the world is
> matter and that it is known primarily through and as
> material forms and processes; and in its epistemology, it
> is opposed to Realism, which holds that in human knowledge
> objects are grasped and seen as they really are—in their
> existence outside and independently of the mind. "
>
The tension between Realism and Idealism is most likely expressed in
politics or aesthetics, not epistemology. For example, m-w.com has
this to say about idealism and realism (under the article for
"idealism"): "literary or artistic theory or practice that affirms
the preeminent value of imagination as compared with faithful copying
of nature -- compare REALISM" [Link to article about Realism:
"fidelity in art and literature to nature or to real life and to
accurate representation without idealization").
Philosophypages.com hit it on the mark with the following synopsis of
"realism": "Belief that universals exist independently of the
particulars that instantiate them. Realists hold that each general
term signifies a real feature or quality, which is numerically the
same in all the things to which that term applies. Thus, opposed to
nominalism."
The realism vs. nominalism debate consists of two opposing schools of
thought offering their respective answer to the problem of universals.
As such, the realists hold that the answer is metaphysical, i.e.,
ontological, while the nominalists hold that the answer is
epistemological (for example, conceptualism), and that such
ontological realities don't exist (or at least, are unimportant for
us).
>And Kant distinguishes also (but not exactly the same way)
>between two types of idealism. Kant:
>
>" In the transcendental aesthetic we proved that everything
> intuited in space and time, all objects of a possible expe-
> rience, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere represen-
> tations; and that these, as presented to us- as extended
> bodies, or as series of changes- have no self-subsistent
> existence apart from human thought. This doctrine I call
> Transcendental Idealism.* The realist in the transcendental
> sense regards these modifications of our sensibility, these
> mere representations, as things subsisting in themselves.
>
> I have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism, to
> distinguish it from material idealism, which doubts or
> denies the existence of external things. To avoid ambigui-
> ty, it seems advisable in many cases to employ this term
> instead of that mentioned in the text."
>
It strikes me as strange that Kant chooses to call it "material
idealism" instead of "empirical idealism." For sure, the latter would
be the interpretation closer to Kant's meaning, and closer to
Berkeley's intended meaning. But that interpretation depends on the
English translation too. It just makes more sense to call it
"empirical idealism" because then it stands more thoroughly opposed to
"transcendental idealism."
Critique divides all philosophy into Transcendental Idealism/Empirical
Realism vs. Transcendental Realism/Empirical Idealism. Kant showed
that one implied the other, e.g., transcendental idealism implies
empirical realism. He stated that the transcendental realist, who
holds that universals are real entities underlying the empirical
world, thus idealizes the empirical. This is because, without the
underlying transcendent realm, the empirical is nothing; whereas for
his theory, without the empirical realm, the transcendental is
nothing. This latter is explicitly shown in his example of subtracting
away all attributes of an object, leaving behind only the space which
it had previously occupied. Without those empirical attributes, you
are left with literal nothingness.
>Nowadays realism would not say that things "have no
>self-subsistent existence apart from human thought."
>
>First I like to give a small exemple in order to explain things.
>A naive way of looking at language is that words have unique
>meanings more or less attached to them: The word "home"
>could remind one at shelter and warmth, the word "hate" has
>something ugly in it and is feels as if it were yellow with
>black thorns, etc. etc...
>
>But what do the word "word" (in itself) refer to? You can't say
>anything about *that* word, i.e. not without going to another
>"level" (and that should be some metaphysical level because we
>left the real (perceived) objects of the real world)
>
Isn't this Wittgensteinian thinking?
>Sometimes I like to read Kant in this alternative way. As if he
>was just talking about the notion of "thing" when talking about
>the "thing-in-itself". That correlates very well with his strong
>and repetitive utterance that nothing can be said about the
>thing-in-itself, it is very well in line with his knowledge of
>classical metaphysics (substances, essences), it explains his
>problems with realism and idealism and last but not least its
>matches perfectly with the *transcendental* character of his
>thinking. (i.e. transcending experience but not human knowledge)
>
That is an ontological interpretation of "thing-in-itself" which is
not supported by the text.
Jos Horikx
>On Thu, 02 Jan 2003 06:00:14 +0100, Jos Horikx <jho...@chello.nl>
>wrote:
>>On Sun, 15 Dec 2002 13:32:51 +0100, Karl Wagner
>><karl....@web.de> wrote:
>>>Kant is no idealist, he is a realist from a classical standpoint
>>Perhaps there could be another way to envisage the philosophical
>>"things" in general and the Kantian things in particular.
>>In a historical overview about metaphisics it is all about
>>"things". (substance, essence etc) But Kant was, as you say, and
>>I think you are correct in this respect, in his time also in the
>>middle of the struggle of two other philosophical mainstreams,
>>those of the realists and the idealists.
>I like your opinion on this matter up to a point, and that is your
>division of epistemology into realism and idealism. That division
>should be named realism vs. nominalism, as per the tradition of Kant's
>day. The metaphysical division between idealism and materialism is the
>traditional form.
Are you sure? Who was the first one to label Idealism as an op-
posite of Materialism, _using_these_very_words_? I have some
idea, and it was not someone in Kant's time or before that.
>>The Britannica distinguishes between two types of idealism
>>" Thus the two basic forms of Idealism are metaphysical
>> Idealism, which asserts the ideality of reality, and epis-
>> temological Idealism, which holds that in the knowledge
>> process the mind can grasp only the psychic
>"psychic"?
It says so.
" Etymology: Geek psychikos of the soul, from psychE soul...
2-lying outside the sphere of physical science or knowledge:
immaterial, moral, or spiritual in origin or force",
according to the dictionary, or does it mean in the States
something else than in Britain?
>> or that its
>> objects are conditioned by their perceptibility. In its
>> metaphysics, Idealism is thus directly opposed to Materia-
>> lism , the view that the basic substance of the world is
>> matter and that it is known primarily through and as
>> material forms and processes; and in its epistemology, it
>> is opposed to Realism, which holds that in human knowledge
>> objects are grasped and seen as they really are—in their
>> existence outside and independently of the mind. "
>The tension between Realism and Idealism is most likely expressed in
>politics or aesthetics, not epistemology. For example, m-w.com has
>this to say about idealism and realism (under the article for
>"idealism"): "literary or artistic theory or practice that affirms
>the preeminent value of imagination as compared with faithful copying
>of nature -- compare REALISM" [Link to article about Realism:
>"fidelity in art and literature to nature or to real life and to
>accurate representation without idealization").
Sure, but that is not the philosophical meaning of the word,
about that subject I trust the Britannica more than M-W.
(besides this, the Larousse, the French encyclopedia says more
or less the same as the British one, about the German Brockhaus
I do not really know by now)
>Philosophypages.com hit it on the mark with the following synopsis of
>"realism": "Belief that universals exist independently of the
>particulars that instantiate them. Realists hold that each general
>term signifies a real feature or quality, which is numerically the
>same in all the things to which that term applies. Thus, opposed to
>nominalism."
But you forget to mention that the meanings of words float
during the centuries. What was than called Platonic realism is
today called Platonic idealism. What matters is with (or
against) what school of philosophy Kant was arguing, and pro-
bably that is the philosophy of Leibniz. In more modern times
"realism" means something as that there is a real world, not
made bij the thinking itself, and that world has an existence
outside and independently of that thinking.
Kant was in the middle of this transition period. (and he was a
natural scientist as well)
" Widerlegung des Idealismus
Der Idealismus (ich verstehe den materialen) ist die
Theorie, welche das Dasein der Gegenstände im Raum außer
uns entweder bloß für zweifelhaft und unerweislich, oder
für falsch und unmöglich erklärt; "
Translation: He calls material (materialen) idealism that kind
of thought (Theorie) that calls the real existence (dasein) of
things (gegenstände) doubtful (zweifelhaft) or even wrong and
impossible (falsch und unmöglich)
The best translation of "materialen" is material, that comes
from the Latin "materia"
What Kant is saying is that he recognizes things (objects)
outside us, that is situated in time and space, and he calls it
"formal", but the other idealists, they don't even admit
full-hartedly that there *are* objects out there. But those
things are *not* the things as such. (in themselves)
>Critique divides all philosophy into Transcendental Idealism/Empirical
>Realism vs. Transcendental Realism/Empirical Idealism. Kant showed
>that one implied the other, e.g., transcendental idealism implies
>empirical realism.
Well, even Kant thus places idealism versus realism? (and no
materialism around here)
>He stated that the transcendental realist, who
>holds that universals are real entities underlying the empirical
>world, thus idealizes the empirical. This is because, without the
>underlying transcendent realm, the empirical is nothing; whereas for
>his theory, without the empirical realm, the transcendental is
>nothing. This latter is explicitly shown in his example of subtracting
>away all attributes of an object, leaving behind only the space which
>it had previously occupied. Without those empirical attributes, you
>are left with literal nothingness.
>>Nowadays realism would not say that things "have no
>>self-subsistent existence apart from human thought."
>>First I like to give a small exemple in order to explain things.
>>A naive way of looking at language is that words have unique
>>meanings more or less attached to them: The word "home"
>>could remind one at shelter and warmth, the word "hate" has
>>something ugly in it and is feels as if it were yellow with
>>black thorns, etc. etc...
>>But what do the word "word" (in itself) refer to? You can't say
>>anything about *that* word, i.e. not without going to another
>>"level" (and that should be some metaphysical level because we
>>left the real (perceived) objects of the real world)
>Isn't this Wittgensteinian thinking?
Possibly, but Wittgenstein was much later than Kant, so, if Kant
had more or less the same thoughts (but immature) he almost
certainly should have used other terms to express the same kinds
of concepts.
>>Sometimes I like to read Kant in this alternative way. As if he
>>was just talking about the notion of "thing" when talking about
>>the "thing-in-itself". That correlates very well with his strong
>>and repetitive utterance that nothing can be said about the
>>thing-in-itself, it is very well in line with his knowledge of
>>classical metaphysics (substances, essences), it explains his
>>problems with realism and idealism and last but not least its
>>matches perfectly with the *transcendental* character of his
>>thinking. (i.e. transcending experience but not human knowledge)
>That is an ontological interpretation of "thing-in-itself" which is
>not supported by the text.
But it makes the text much easier to read, and it was just this
kind of things that Kant was struggling with between the A and
B edition of his Kritik...
JH
Mal...@hotmail.com
wrote:
>On Thu, 02 Jan 2003 06:52:38 GMT, mal...@hotmail.com wrote:
>>On Thu, 02 Jan 2003 06:00:14 +0100, Jos Horikx <jho...@chello.nl>
>>wrote:
>>>On Sun, 15 Dec 2002 13:32:51 +0100, Karl Wagner
>>><karl....@web.de> wrote:
>
>>>>Kant is no idealist, he is a realist from a classical standpoint
>
>>>Perhaps there could be another way to envisage the philosophical
>>>"things" in general and the Kantian things in particular.
>
>>>In a historical overview about metaphisics it is all about
>>>"things". (substance, essence etc) But Kant was, as you say, and
>>>I think you are correct in this respect, in his time also in the
>>>middle of the struggle of two other philosophical mainstreams,
>>>those of the realists and the idealists.
>
>>I like your opinion on this matter up to a point, and that is your
>>division of epistemology into realism and idealism. That division
>>should be named realism vs. nominalism, as per the tradition of Kant's
>>day. The metaphysical division between idealism and materialism is the
>>traditional form.
>
>Are you sure? Who was the first one to label Idealism as an op-
>posite of Materialism, _using_these_very_words_? I have some
>idea, and it was not someone in Kant's time or before that.
>
I don't know who said it first, but it says this at this webpage:
http://www.saint-andre.com/ismbook/M.html
"Materialism (Principle and Tradition in metaphysics) — Materialism is
the idea that the only thing that really exists in the world is matter
in its various states and movements (commonly atoms or other physical
particles). Thus materialism is the opposite of idealism."
And this:
http://www.saint-andre.com/ismbook/I.html#Idealism
"Idealism (Principle and Tradition in metaphysics) — In metaphysics,
idealism is a term used to describe the sort of theory which claims
that something "ideal" or non-physical is the primary reality...The
opposite of idealism is materialism."
The common term between both those definitions that concerns my view
is "tradition." This IS a traditional manner of defining the issue,
and as I showed, it goes back to the problem of universals. Tracing
the etymology of that distinction in those exact terms, I leave up to
you.
However, in the first Critique, Kant does make a distinction between
idealism and materialism, as you yourself showed in that quote about
material idealism.
Here, Kant pits materialism against spiritualism which is a type of
idealism:
" If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend
the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense,
neither it nor the two counter-alternatives - pneumatism on
the one hand, materialism on the other..."
And here:
"Thus, if materialism is disqualified from explaining my existence,
spiritualism is equally incapable of doing so..."
And here:
"Rational psychology exists not as doctrine, furnishing an
addition to our knowledge of the self, but only as discipline.
It sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, and
thus keeps us, on the one hand, from throwing ourselves into
the arms of a soulless materialism, or, on the other hand, from
losing ourselves in a spiritualism which must be quite unfounded so
long as we remain in this present life."
So Kant in effect distinguishes his Idealism from other forms of
idealism by labeling them Spiritualism (or the strange term
Pneumatism). But the main distinction is between materialism and
Idealism, although Kant wants to distance himself intellectually from
the old-fashioned spiritualistic idealism.
From http://www.saint-andre.com/ismbook/I.html#Idealism :
"Obviously, spiritualism is similar to idealism..."
http://www.saint-andre.com/ismbook/S.html#Spiritualism
"Sometimes, spiritualism is also taken to refer to a belief or
practice that places the concerns of a "higher world" or afterlife
above this-worldly concerns such as making money or becoming happy (a
kind of idealism or asceticism opposed to secularism)."
Plato is considered the father of modern secular idealism which
translates spirits into Ideas. Kant translated Ideas further into
transcendental ideas, but brought them back down to earth by declaring
them as nothing without the empirical to substantiate them.
>>>The Britannica distinguishes between two types of idealism
>
>>>" Thus the two basic forms of Idealism are metaphysical
>>> Idealism, which asserts the ideality of reality, and epis-
>>> temological Idealism, which holds that in the knowledge
>>> process the mind can grasp only the psychic
>
>>"psychic"?
>
>It says so.
>
>" Etymology: Geek psychikos of the soul, from psychE soul...
> 2-lying outside the sphere of physical science or knowledge:
> immaterial, moral, or spiritual in origin or force",
>
>according to the dictionary, or does it mean in the States
>something else than in Britain?
>
As long as it "says so," that's all I wanted to know, if it was a typo
or not. I would say that your British Britannica has used a different
style of language compared to the US version, but I haven't checked
it.
>>> or that its
>>> objects are conditioned by their perceptibility. In its
>>> metaphysics, Idealism is thus directly opposed to Materia-
>>> lism , the view that the basic substance of the world is
>>> matter and that it is known primarily through and as
>>> material forms and processes; and in its epistemology, it
>>> is opposed to Realism, which holds that in human knowledge
>>> objects are grasped and seen as they really are—in their
>>> existence outside and independently of the mind. "
>
>>The tension between Realism and Idealism is most likely expressed in
>>politics or aesthetics, not epistemology. For example, m-w.com has
>>this to say about idealism and realism (under the article for
>>"idealism"): "literary or artistic theory or practice that affirms
>>the preeminent value of imagination as compared with faithful copying
>>of nature -- compare REALISM" [Link to article about Realism:
>>"fidelity in art and literature to nature or to real life and to
>>accurate representation without idealization").
>
>Sure, but that is not the philosophical meaning of the word,
>about that subject I trust the Britannica more than M-W.
>(besides this, the Larousse, the French encyclopedia says more
>or less the same as the British one, about the German Brockhaus
>I do not really know by now)
>
Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, so how can you say it is not the
philosophical meaning of the word?
Besides, I did more checking around than just at m-w.com, I just found
that that site worded the distinctions well. It is not however
concerned primarily with philosophy -- but then, neither is
Britannica.com or the Britannica encyclopedia. I don't trust one more
than the other in that regard. The fact that they conflict on this
issue only tells you that they conflict, not which one is correct. If
I can show that there is a conflict, that serves to give me a
rhetorical advantage by throwing your source into question, but that
is all.
Therefore I headed to philosophypages.com, a site devoted to the topic
at issue.
>>Philosophypages.com hit it on the mark with the following synopsis of
>>"realism": "Belief that universals exist independently of the
>>particulars that instantiate them. Realists hold that each general
>>term signifies a real feature or quality, which is numerically the
>>same in all the things to which that term applies. Thus, opposed to
>>nominalism."
>
>But you forget to mention that the meanings of words float
>during the centuries. What was than called Platonic realism is
>today called Platonic idealism. What matters is with (or
>against) what school of philosophy Kant was arguing, and pro-
>bably that is the philosophy of Leibniz. In more modern times
>"realism" means something as that there is a real world, not
>made bij the thinking itself, and that world has an existence
>outside and independently of that thinking.
>
>Kant was in the middle of this transition period. (and he was a
>natural scientist as well)
>
There is a problem with the inconsistency of definitions. However, I
invoked the traditional usage as my authority. The modern meaning of
"realism" that you described above however is really more consistent
with aesthetics. It is almost as if the aesthetic schools of thought
now linguistically dominate metaphysics.
In any conflict of the two, traditional versus modern, I choose the
traditional because it best reflects the basic conflict that created
philosophy in the first place: the problem of universals, realism vs.
nominalism. The problem of universals poses the problem of the ideas
(marks held in common by many entities, such as redness: is the
redness of two red books the same redness for each book?).
I would speculate that if modern language has twisted the traditional
terminology, then it reflects the dominance of one or another school
of thought's answer to the problem of universals, and it seems to
reflect the Nominalistic answer.
But who asked the basic questions of modern philosophy in the first
place? Plato. Who posed the first problems which puzzled philosophers
for centuries afterward? Plato. Plato the Realist. (Zeno and others
posed problems, but they did not get philosophical thinking rolling
the way Plato did through his introduction of a methodology for
answering questions, not merely asking skeptical questions designed to
stump opponents. Zeno and others showed through their skepticism that
a rational methodology was lacking, and Plato offered one.)
That is your translation (thank you), followed by this interpretation:
>What Kant is saying is that he recognizes things (objects)
>outside us, that is situated in time and space, and he calls it
>"formal", but the other idealists, they don't even admit
>full-hartedly that there *are* objects out there. But those
>things are *not* the things as such. (in themselves)
>
A more direct interpretation is that, for Berkeley, *matter* is ideal.
It's opposite, spirit, is the real. There is a difference between the
empirical world and the material world. To say that the world is
material is ontological monism. To state that the world is empirical
is just to say that it is an object of empirical understanding, an
epistemological problem (with, of course, a metaphysical implication).
Bishop Berkeley was an empiricist who began with the assumption that
the empirical world is material -- a metaphysical monist. He attempted
to prove that sensation of the material world can possibly be
explained through supposing the existence of ideas in our minds
created by God. The empirical world, therefore, would be in our heads.
The external world of matter would only be an illusion generated by
those ideas. In order to truly understand the empirical world, we have
to begin by realizing its material ideality.
So I can see where Kant is coming from, and I wouldn't declare him
wrong. It appears that at that point in the Critique Kant was offering
a disproof of material idealism, which is just what he said. But
wouldn't that theory be a form of empirical idealism anyway, if
Berkeley began with the assumption that the empirical world is
material? It just so happens that all our sensations of the empirical
world are material, just as Kant mentioned in the first Critique
("That which corresponds to the real in sensation I term its matter,"
or words to that effect...)
I agree with Berkeley, by the way, to the extent that he does manage
to disprove materialistic monism through reductio, whether or not that
was his intent.
>>Critique divides all philosophy into Transcendental Idealism/Empirical
>>Realism vs. Transcendental Realism/Empirical Idealism. Kant showed
>>that one implied the other, e.g., transcendental idealism implies
>>empirical realism.
>
>Well, even Kant thus places idealism versus realism? (and no
>materialism around here)
>
Yes, but remember what I said previously about Idealism and Realism
being products of Aesthetic thinking? The chapter containing that
particular proof contains the word "Aesthetic." Moreover, there is a
real connection between that title and the debates within the field of
aesthetics which were occurring in Kant's day about the nature of the
beautiful and such. An Aesthetic must start out with the fundamental
assumption that the senses are being stimulated by the object of an
act of aesthetic appreciation. The fact that it was called the
Transcendental Aesthetic was no accident.
The distinction between concepts of concretes and concepts of
abstractions was old in Kant's day.
>>>Sometimes I like to read Kant in this alternative way. As if he
>>>was just talking about the notion of "thing" when talking about
>>>the "thing-in-itself". That correlates very well with his strong
>>>and repetitive utterance that nothing can be said about the
>>>thing-in-itself, it is very well in line with his knowledge of
>>>classical metaphysics (substances, essences), it explains his
>>>problems with realism and idealism and last but not least its
>>>matches perfectly with the *transcendental* character of his
>>>thinking. (i.e. transcending experience but not human knowledge)
>
>>That is an ontological interpretation of "thing-in-itself" which is
>>not supported by the text.
>
>But it makes the text much easier to read, and it was just this
>kind of things that Kant was struggling with between the A and
>B edition of his Kritik...
>
No, the problems posed by the Aesthetic can best be read in terms of
grounding geometry in the transcendental. The thing-in-itself cannot
be an object of geometrical abstraction. If appearance is the
thing-in-itself, then geometry would have only problematic application
to appearance, at best; there would be an unbridgeable gulf between
our ideas and reality throwing all our ideas into the arms of a deadly
skepticism.
But if appearance is just representation qua modification of the
faculty of sensibility, then it is a simple matter to relate other
representations, the geometrical, to appearances. There is no longer
the problem of asking how our ideas manage to correspond to the
thing-in-itself, no necessity of appealing to God to make this
synthesis possible. It is possible because the problems of philosophy,
and abstract thought generally, are leveled down to the playing field
shared by all representations, their generation and grounding a priori
through synthetic method. There is no longer the problem brought up by
Berkeley of how to get from here (the mind) to there (the
thing-in-itself), if the proofs are kept outside the milieu of that
thing-in-itself and kept within the forum of transcendental, a priori
thinking.
Berkeley was correct insofar as he managed to point us in the
direction of a problem, but his answer only led to new questions and
new problems. Berkeley was the Zeno of his day, who posed a certain
set of problems, while Kant was the Plato of his day who offered a
method for resolving such problems.
Jos Horikx
[realism/idealism/materialism]
Well, thank you Malenor.
My problem is more or less not a problem of etymology, but of
history. Everyone has (for himself) the duty to answer the fol-
lowing question when reading philosophy, and that question is:
do I consider mij set of words (notions/conceptions) as given
and do I judge the various philosophers according to that set,
or do I have to try to hunt down what set of notions probably
was "en vogue" at the time of (e.g.) Kant.
In my opinion *both* is needed.
Than the next fact becomes of importance: the view that mate-
rialism and idealism are opposites or contraries is in fact a
*Marxist* notion, brought to us mainly by Lenin (but he had the
idea from Marx and Engels)
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/index.htm
It is from this tradition that, historically spoken, the oppo-
site between materialism and idealism entered, as such, our
dictionaries. (since the end of the 19th century, the book of
the link, a comprehencive reader, dates from 1908 or so)
I live in Europe, so this will be less a shock to us than for
people in other continents but nevertheless do I ask myself:
Is this notion adequate to describe Kants philosophy? And on
this point I say: No, that can not be done.
>However, in the first Critique, Kant does make a distinction between
>idealism and materialism, as you yourself showed in that quote about
>material idealism.
He gives names. Its not a good departing point to say that Kant
introduced the difference between materialism as we know it
versus idealism as we know it, because that contradiction comes
from the Marxists.
>Here, Kant pits materialism against spiritualism which is a type of
>idealism:
Yes and no. Yes, materialism is contrair to spiritualism (on the
field of metaphysics and realism is contrair to idealism in
epistomology. (The French and Germans are better epistemologists
than than the Dutch, English and Americans, epistemology is a
very broad field)
When Kant said: "material idealism" did he think of te first
field (metaphysics) or the last (epistemology)? I choose for the
last...
>" If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend
>the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense,
>neither it nor the two counter-alternatives - pneumatism on
>the one hand, materialism on the other..."
yes, pneumatism is equal to spiritualism, of course.
>And here:
>
>"Thus, if materialism is disqualified from explaining my existence,
>spiritualism is equally incapable of doing so..."
Yes, the same two (as opposites) on the same field.
>And here:
>"Rational psychology exists not as doctrine, furnishing an
>addition to our knowledge of the self, but only as discipline.
>It sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, and
>thus keeps us, on the one hand, from throwing ourselves into
>the arms of a soulless materialism, or, on the other hand, from
>losing ourselves in a spiritualism which must be quite unfounded so
>long as we remain in this present life."
>So Kant in effect distinguishes his Idealism from other forms of
>idealism by labeling them Spiritualism (or the strange term
>Pneumatism). But the main distinction is between materialism and
>Idealism, although Kant wants to distance himself intellectually from
>the old-fashioned spiritualistic idealism.
>From http://www.saint-andre.com/ismbook/I.html#Idealism :
>
>"Obviously, spiritualism is similar to idealism..."
No that would be to simple, Kant was an materialist and a
(transcendental) idealist. Spiritualism (=pneumatism) is not
equivalent to idealism, it is juist part of another dichotomy
idealism is when ideas have some real existence and constitute
the world and realism exists when the objects have real
existence. (But the meanings flow during history)
pneumatism (=spiritualism) is something else, and is situated
against materialism.
...
>>>The tension between Realism and Idealism is most likely expressed in
>>>politics or aesthetics, not epistemology.
Thus no: The tension between materialism and idealism is a
matter of politics. (see Lenin, i consider the man as a poli-
tician first and as a philosopher on the second place)
>>>For example, m-w.com has
>>>this to say about idealism and realism (under the article for
>>>"idealism"): "literary or artistic theory or practice that affirms
>>>the preeminent value of imagination as compared with faithful copying
>>>of nature -- compare REALISM" [Link to article about Realism:
>>>"fidelity in art and literature to nature or to real life and to
>>>accurate representation without idealization").
>>Sure, but that is not the philosophical meaning of the word,
>>about that subject I trust the Britannica more than M-W.
>>(besides this, the Larousse, the French encyclopedia says more
>>or less the same as the British one, about the German Brockhaus
>>I do not really know by now)
>Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, so how can you say it is not the
>philosophical meaning of the word?
But now you refer to Baumgarten (Alexander Gottlieb, not to the
aesthetics (in art etc) from before. Baumgarten is the founder
of modern aesthitics. He also wrote a "Metaphysica" (that was
used by Kant during his colleges/lessons)
...
So far today, I may reply on the rest later,
JH
Jos Horikx
>On Thu, 02 Jan 2003 12:31:42 +0100, Jos Horikx <jho...@chello.nl>
>wrote:
[ cut: that part I already replied, the subject changed more or
less to materialism/idealism/realism/spiritualism ]
>Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, so how can you say it is not the
>philosophical meaning of the word?
>Besides, I did more checking around than just at m-w.com, I just found
>that that site worded the distinctions well. It is not however
>concerned primarily with philosophy -- but then, neither is
>Britannica.com or the Britannica encyclopedia. I don't trust one more
>than the other in that regard. The fact that they conflict on this
>issue only tells you that they conflict, not which one is correct. If
>I can show that there is a conflict, that serves to give me a
>rhetorical advantage by throwing your source into question, but that
>is all.
Okee...
>Therefore I headed to philosophypages.com, a site devoted to the topic
>at issue.
Whether you retrict yourself to one source or to just one
language domain, the problem itself remains.
>>>Philosophypages.com hit it on the mark with the following synopsis of
>>>"realism": "Belief that universals exist independently of the
>>>particulars that instantiate them. Realists hold that each general
>>>term signifies a real feature or quality, which is numerically the
>>>same in all the things to which that term applies. Thus, opposed to
>>>nominalism."
>>But you forget to mention that the meanings of words float
>>during the centuries. What was than called Platonic realism is
>>today called Platonic idealism. What matters is with (or
>>against) what school of philosophy Kant was arguing, and pro-
>>bably that is the philosophy of Leibniz. In more modern times
>>"realism" means something as that there is a real world, not
>>made bij the thinking itself, and that world has an existence
>>outside and independently of that thinking.
>>Kant was in the middle of this transition period. (and he was a
>>natural scientist as well)
>There is a problem with the inconsistency of definitions. However, I
>invoked the traditional usage as my authority. The modern meaning of
>"realism" that you described above however is really more consistent
>with aesthetics. It is almost as if the aesthetic schools of thought
>now linguistically dominate metaphysics.
I'm not aware of what you mean by the "aesthetic schools of
thought", I have my own aesthetics. Do you perhaps mean
postmodernism?
>In any conflict of the two, traditional versus modern, I choose the
>traditional because it best reflects the basic conflict that created
>philosophy in the first place: the problem of universals, realism vs.
>nominalism. The problem of universals poses the problem of the ideas
>(marks held in common by many entities, such as redness: is the
>redness of two red books the same redness for each book?).
But nowadays realism (the scientific models of matter etc) will
say that you have to interprete their constituents in a
nominalist way. What is that, realism or idealism? Todays
materialism is the nominalism/idealism of the past, but is
certainly *not* spiritualism (or pneumatism as you labelled it)
>I would speculate that if modern language has twisted the traditional
>terminology, then it reflects the dominance of one or another school
>of thought's answer to the problem of universals, and it seems to
>reflect the Nominalistic answer.
The twist is in the fact that nowadays philosophy thinks that
materialism and idealism are contraries. This in fact is a
Marxist or Leninist influence on nowadays philosophy. If someone
does not agree with me in this respect, I will ask him/her
gently and polite to provide me with a earlier text where the
contradiction (between materialism and idealism, in those very
words) is discussed
>But who asked the basic questions of modern philosophy in the first
>place? Plato. Who posed the first problems which puzzled philosophers
>for centuries afterward? Plato. Plato the Realist. (Zeno and others
>posed problems, but they did not get philosophical thinking rolling
>the way Plato did through his introduction of a methodology for
>answering questions, not merely asking skeptical questions designed to
>stump opponents. Zeno and others showed through their skepticism that
>a rational methodology was lacking, and Plato offered one.)
I agree that Plato is important. But nowadays many people say
that Plato is an idealist instead of a realist. This is my very
point: the philosophical contradiction is that between realism
versus idealism (and materialism versus spiritualism)
...
>>" Widerlegung des Idealismus
>> Der Idealismus (ich verstehe den materialen) ist die
>> Theorie, welche das Dasein der Gegenstände im Raum außer
>> uns entweder bloß für zweifelhaft und unerweislich, oder
>> für falsch und unmöglich erklärt; "
>>Translation: He calls material (materialen) idealism that kind
>>of thought (Theorie) that calls the real existence (dasein) of
>>things (gegenstände) doubtful (zweifelhaft) or even wrong and
>>impossible (falsch und unmöglich)
>>The best translation of "materialen" is material, that comes
>>from the Latin "materia"
>That is your translation (thank you), followed by this interpretation:
...followed by the rest of the translation
>>What Kant is saying is that he recognizes things (objects)
>>outside us, that is situated in time and space, and he calls it
>>"formal", but the other idealists, they don't even admit
>>full-hartedly that there *are* objects out there. But those
>>things are *not* the things as such. (in themselves)
>A more direct interpretation is that, for Berkeley, *matter* is ideal.
>It's opposite, spirit, is the real.
Yes, this is what I said: spiritualism is the opposite of
materialism.
>There is a difference between the
>empirical world and the material world. To say that the world is
>material is ontological monism. To state that the world is empirical
>is just to say that it is an object of empirical understanding, an
>epistemological problem (with, of course, a metaphysical implication).
>Bishop Berkeley was an empiricist who began with the assumption that
>the empirical world is material -- a metaphysical monist.
He never started with that assumption, maybe only from a
rethorical point of view: he was a clergyman, it was all about
his own position within the the church and his view concerning
a/the supreme (spiritual) being.
>He attempted
>to prove that sensation of the material world can possibly be
>explained through supposing the existence of ideas in our minds
>created by God. The empirical world, therefore, would be in our heads.
>The external world of matter would only be an illusion generated by
>those ideas. In order to truly understand the empirical world, we have
>to begin by realizing its material ideality.
>So I can see where Kant is coming from, and I wouldn't declare him
>wrong. It appears that at that point in the Critique Kant was offering
>a disproof of material idealism, which is just what he said. But
>wouldn't that theory be a form of empirical idealism anyway, if
>Berkeley began with the assumption that the empirical world is
>material? It just so happens that all our sensations of the empirical
>world are material, just as Kant mentioned in the first Critique
I do not critizise Kant, I just say that is was not Kant who
said that idealism was the opposite of materialism (but that it
was Marx/Lenin)
>("That which corresponds to the real in sensation I term its matter,"
>or words to that effect...)
>I agree with Berkeley, by the way, to the extent that he does manage
>to disprove materialistic monism through reductio, whether or not that
>was his intent.
>>>Critique divides all philosophy into Transcendental Idealism/Empirical
>>>Realism vs. Transcendental Realism/Empirical Idealism. Kant showed
>>>that one implied the other, e.g., transcendental idealism implies
>>>empirical realism.
>>Well, even Kant thus places idealism versus realism? (and no
>>materialism around here)
>Yes, but remember what I said previously about Idealism and Realism
>being products of Aesthetic thinking? The chapter containing that
>particular proof contains the word "Aesthetic." Moreover, there is a
>real connection between that title and the debates within the field of
>aesthetics which were occurring in Kant's day about the nature of the
>beautiful and such. An Aesthetic must start out with the fundamental
>assumption that the senses are being stimulated by the object of an
>act of aesthetic appreciation. The fact that it was called the
>Transcendental Aesthetic was no accident.
But my point was that, as I said, even Kant placed idealism
versus realism. My question remains: who placed idealism versus
materialism using those very words? My answer is (until I get
any counterexamples): Marx and Lenin.
...
I agree with this. If I schould say it in my own words: Kant A-
solved some problems between rationalism and empiricism and B:
threw a new light over the problems with realism and idealism.
Kant called himself an idealist but he is fully compatible with
nowadays realism.
>Berkeley was correct insofar as he managed to point us in the
>direction of a problem, but his answer only led to new questions and
>new problems. Berkeley was the Zeno of his day, who posed a certain
>set of problems, while Kant was the Plato of his day who offered a
>method for resolving such problems.
Berkeley was someone with two agenda's. Lenin was right in
seeing that. Lenin was wrong in situating idealism (inclusive
Kant) in an opposition against materialism.
JH
mmaterial1
"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote in message
news:m7ed1v4poud5fnln9...@4ax.com...
> On Thu, 02 Jan 2003 20:45:57 GMT, Mal...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> >On Thu, 02 Jan 2003 12:31:42 +0100, Jos Horikx <jho...@chello.nl>
> >wrote:
>
>
> The twist is in the fact that nowadays philosophy thinks that
> materialism and idealism are contraries. This in fact is a
> Marxist or Leninist influence on nowadays philosophy. If someone
> does not agree with me in this respect, I will ask him/her
> gently and polite to provide me with a earlier text where the
> contradiction (between materialism and idealism, in those very
> words) is discussed
They are. Materialism considers matter to be real, to exist without
human minds. Idealism ( the Berkeley type) denies the existence of
matter. Kant, in my view, is a phenomenal realist which requires
no explanation, but I'll offer one: phenomena exists. I can deem
Kant to be a materialist with his introduction of the-thing-in-itself--
matter, and an empiricist since an empiricist can be a materialist.
Kant's transcendental philosophy is intellectual (mental) which can
be called idealism. Incidentally, Marx turned Hegel's absolute upside
down and made it material. Then there is the dichotomy of matter
and mind; no matter, never mind--he, he.
Jos Horikx
<mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
...
>> The twist is in the fact that nowadays philosophy thinks that
>> materialism and idealism are contraries. This in fact is a
>> Marxist or Leninist influence on nowadays philosophy. If someone
>> does not agree with me in this respect, I will ask him/her
>> gently and polite to provide me with a earlier text where the
>> contradiction (between materialism and idealism, in those very
>> words) is discussed
> They are. Materialism considers matter to be real, to exist without
> human minds. Idealism ( the Berkeley type) denies the existence of
> matter. Kant, in my view, is a phenomenal realist which requires
> no explanation, but I'll offer one: phenomena exists.
Here the trouble (concerning Kant) begins. Many people (myself
included) have different opinions on Kant. The two most known
"schools" of Kantian thought ("school" could be named "college"
in english I'm not really sure) are the so-called "Badense
school" and "Marburger school", called after the German cities
of Baden and Marburg and at least one of them is ended by
National Socialist intervention in the thirties.
I personally would say that phenomena exists in a (transcenden-
tal) idealistic way, what really exists is/are, following Kant,
the "Ding(e) an sich" (thing as such, thing in themself)
> I can deem
> Kant to be a materialist with his introduction of the-thing-in-itself--
> matter, and an empiricist since an empiricist can be a materialist.
> Kant's transcendental philosophy is intellectual (mental) which can
> be called idealism.
Well, in my opinion it doesn't really matter whether I call
Kant a materialist or an (in my opinion, but I feel myself back-
ed by at least two encyclopedia's) spiritualist (= a metaphy-
sical idealist), because Kant wrote his own metaphysics.
> Incidentally, Marx turned Hegel's absolute upside
> down and made it material. Then there is the dichotomy
> of matter and mind; no matter, never mind--he, he.
In my view Marx turned Hegels *dialectics* upside down.
(see Engels on http://makeashorterlink.com/?L2F322AF2 ,
I consider Marx and Engels as being identical on this point)
but I cannot close out the truth of what you say (because I
can't find Marx'own text right now)
I do not follow Hegelian dialectics. I am suspicious and I don't
like it. I like the classical dialectics better. (And that of
Kant of course) Than Marx turns it "upside down". I'm not really
sure what to think of that. It gets too complicated. I think I
could not deal with that stuff completely without using the word
"empirism" somewhere. I see you did the same above.
I agree with you that there is a dichotomy of matter and mind,
but that is exactly what I said: the (metaphysical) opposition
is that between materialism and *spiritualism*
But my point was that I liked to see an text on materialism and
*idealism*, _in_those_very_words_, as _opposites_, originating
from before Marx.
JH
Malenor
wrote:
>On Thu, 02 Jan 2003 20:45:57 GMT, Mal...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
>>On Thu, 02 Jan 2003 12:31:42 +0100, Jos Horikx <jho...@chello.nl>
>>wrote:
>>There is a problem with the inconsistency of definitions. However, I
>>invoked the traditional usage as my authority. The modern meaning of
>>"realism" that you described above however is really more consistent
>>with aesthetics. It is almost as if the aesthetic schools of thought
>>now linguistically dominate metaphysics.
>
>I'm not aware of what you mean by the "aesthetic schools of
>thought", I have my own aesthetics. Do you perhaps mean
>postmodernism?
>
You can include postmodernism.
>>In any conflict of the two, traditional versus modern, I choose the
>>traditional because it best reflects the basic conflict that created
>>philosophy in the first place: the problem of universals, realism vs.
>>nominalism. The problem of universals poses the problem of the ideas
>>(marks held in common by many entities, such as redness: is the
>>redness of two red books the same redness for each book?).
>
>But nowadays realism (the scientific models of matter etc) will
>say that you have to interprete their constituents in a
>nominalist way. What is that, realism or idealism? Todays
>materialism is the nominalism/idealism of the past, but is
>certainly *not* spiritualism (or pneumatism as you labelled it)
>
"Pneumatism" was Kant's term. "If, however, as commonly happens, we
seek to extend the concept of dualism, and take it in the
transcendental sense, neither it nor the two counter-alternatives -
pneumatism on the one hand, materialism on the other - would have any
sort of basis, since we should then have misapplied our concepts..."
I labeled it an "odd term" if I labeled anything at all.
I then equated pneumatism with spiritualism, and spiritualism is a
type of idealism. And there you have your coinciding of the
expressions of materialism and idealism.
But what you won't see in Kant is a coinciding in *those* last terms,
because he wanted to distinguish his idealism from the airy-fairy
pneumatism of the past. I take "pneumatism" to be a pejorative term,
that's why I described it that way.
What you call "realism" above is actually materialism, or better,
positivism. You then state that today's realism is nominalism, but
that is what I already stated. Furthermore, re-labeling the ancient
problem of Universals in a "realist/idealist" fashion is indicative of
nominalism's dominance today. I agree that materialism/positivism is
the idealism of the past, and not spiritualism. Spiritualism is only a
form of idealism, they are not equivalent. Idealism is traditionally
the claim that Universals are ideal, which is nominalism. So
materialism draws on the implications of nominalism, which is
consistent with everything you wrote.
>>I would speculate that if modern language has twisted the traditional
>>terminology, then it reflects the dominance of one or another school
>>of thought's answer to the problem of universals, and it seems to
>>reflect the Nominalistic answer.
>
>The twist is in the fact that nowadays philosophy thinks that
>materialism and idealism are contraries. This in fact is a
>Marxist or Leninist influence on nowadays philosophy. If someone
>does not agree with me in this respect, I will ask him/her
>gently and polite to provide me with a earlier text where the
>contradiction (between materialism and idealism, in those very
>words) is discussed
>
I haven't seen the text to support the idea that those words are
discussed in that way by Marx or Lenin or even Engels. The first
occurrence of a materialism/idealism distinction was in St.
Augustine's works in reference to Plato's "spiritualism," not
idealism. But since Plato is often considered an idealist, what's the
difference?
>>But who asked the basic questions of modern philosophy in the first
>>place? Plato. Who posed the first problems which puzzled philosophers
>>for centuries afterward? Plato. Plato the Realist. (Zeno and others
>>posed problems, but they did not get philosophical thinking rolling
>>the way Plato did through his introduction of a methodology for
>>answering questions, not merely asking skeptical questions designed to
>>stump opponents. Zeno and others showed through their skepticism that
>>a rational methodology was lacking, and Plato offered one.)
>
>I agree that Plato is important. But nowadays many people say
>that Plato is an idealist instead of a realist. This is my very
>point: the philosophical contradiction is that between realism
>versus idealism (and materialism versus spiritualism)
>
Plato has been labeled a realist and an idealist, depending on how you
look at his thought. The term "idealism" is just a reference to
Platonic ideas, not to its ontological status, as his answer to the
problem of universals which is called Realism. In this regard, Kant
called it transcendental realism.
>>>What Kant is saying is that he recognizes things (objects)
>>>outside us, that is situated in time and space, and he calls it
>>>"formal", but the other idealists, they don't even admit
>>>full-hartedly that there *are* objects out there. But those
>>>things are *not* the things as such. (in themselves)
>
>>A more direct interpretation is that, for Berkeley, *matter* is ideal.
>>It's opposite, spirit, is the real.
>
>Yes, this is what I said: spiritualism is the opposite of
>materialism.
>
You said it just a few paragraphs ago, not previously to this
response.
>>There is a difference between the
>>empirical world and the material world. To say that the world is
>>material is ontological monism. To state that the world is empirical
>>is just to say that it is an object of empirical understanding, an
>>epistemological problem (with, of course, a metaphysical implication).
>
>>Bishop Berkeley was an empiricist who began with the assumption that
>>the empirical world is material -- a metaphysical monist.
>
>He never started with that assumption, maybe only from a
>rethorical point of view: he was a clergyman, it was all about
>his own position within the the church and his view concerning
>a/the supreme (spiritual) being.
>
http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/berk.htm
"It is the earlier immaterialist philosophy, in which he employed
strictly empiricist principles in defence of the view that only minds
or spirits exist, for which Berkeley is now remembered."
>>He attempted
>>to prove that sensation of the material world can possibly be
>>explained through supposing the existence of ideas in our minds
>>created by God. The empirical world, therefore, would be in our heads.
>>The external world of matter would only be an illusion generated by
>>those ideas. In order to truly understand the empirical world, we have
>>to begin by realizing its material ideality.
>
>>So I can see where Kant is coming from, and I wouldn't declare him
>>wrong. It appears that at that point in the Critique Kant was offering
>>a disproof of material idealism, which is just what he said. But
>>wouldn't that theory be a form of empirical idealism anyway, if
>>Berkeley began with the assumption that the empirical world is
>>material? It just so happens that all our sensations of the empirical
>>world are material, just as Kant mentioned in the first Critique
>
>I do not critizise Kant, I just say that is was not Kant who
>said that idealism was the opposite of materialism (but that it
>was Marx/Lenin)
>
You only say it, you don't show it.
>>("That which corresponds to the real in sensation I term its matter,"
>>or words to that effect...)
>
>>I agree with Berkeley, by the way, to the extent that he does manage
>>to disprove materialistic monism through reductio, whether or not that
>>was his intent.
>
Actually, it was his intent, a reductio on Lockean empiricism.
>>>>Critique divides all philosophy into Transcendental Idealism/Empirical
>>>>Realism vs. Transcendental Realism/Empirical Idealism. Kant showed
>>>>that one implied the other, e.g., transcendental idealism implies
>>>>empirical realism.
>
>>>Well, even Kant thus places idealism versus realism? (and no
>>>materialism around here)
>
>>Yes, but remember what I said previously about Idealism and Realism
>>being products of Aesthetic thinking? The chapter containing that
>>particular proof contains the word "Aesthetic." Moreover, there is a
>>real connection between that title and the debates within the field of
>>aesthetics which were occurring in Kant's day about the nature of the
>>beautiful and such. An Aesthetic must start out with the fundamental
>>assumption that the senses are being stimulated by the object of an
>>act of aesthetic appreciation. The fact that it was called the
>>Transcendental Aesthetic was no accident.
>
>But my point was that, as I said, even Kant placed idealism
>versus realism. My question remains: who placed idealism versus
>materialism using those very words? My answer is (until I get
>any counterexamples): Marx and Lenin.
>
Until I get an example, you won't get a counterexample.
I don't see Kant as being compatible with anybody at all. As for past
philosophers, Kant takes them all on. As for the future, it seems that
Kant failed to get his message across, and modern thought slithered
backward into a materialistic swamp.
But is this materialism a realism in your terms? No. Matter in the
modern view is an axiomatic idea upon which the universe is to be
constructed. This entire project is ideal, noumenal. It is called
'reality' only because the totality of existence is considered the
ultimate ideal goal. The hypocrisy of this "realism" is that the whole
affair takes place in the realm of ideas when in fact materialism
considers ideas to be illusions generated by matter. So the whole
project is illusory. So much for your modern "Realism."
>>Berkeley was correct insofar as he managed to point us in the
>>direction of a problem, but his answer only led to new questions and
>>new problems. Berkeley was the Zeno of his day, who posed a certain
>>set of problems, while Kant was the Plato of his day who offered a
>>method for resolving such problems.
>
>Berkeley was someone with two agenda's. Lenin was right in
>seeing that. Lenin was wrong in situating idealism (inclusive
>Kant) in an opposition against materialism.
>
I haven't seen any reference by Lenin to Kant or idealism.
mmaterial1
>
> But my point was that I liked to see an text on materialism and
> *idealism*, _in_those_very_words_, as _opposites_, originating
> from before Marx.
The only answer I can provide now without further research is
the idealism of the Bishop of Cloyne; moreover, the only real
idealism is that of the good Bishop and in a lesser sense, the
notion that universals or real which I reject in favor of
nominalism.
>
> JH
Phil Roberts, Jr.
mmaterial1 wrote:
> Materialism considers matter to be real, to exist without
> human minds. Idealism ( the Berkeley type) denies the existence of
> matter. Kant, in my view, is a phenomenal realist which requires
> no explanation, but I'll offer one: phenomena exists. I can deem
> Kant to be a materialist with his introduction of the-thing-in-itself--
> matter, and an empiricist since an empiricist can be a materialist.
> Kant's transcendental philosophy is intellectual (mental) which can
> be called idealism. Incidentally, Marx turned Hegel's absolute upside
> down and made it material. Then there is the dichotomy of matter
> and mind; no matter, never mind--he, he.
>
I love Hume because, like the Bible, you can pretty much find an argument
for any number of positions. For example, most folks would think Hume
offers support for a deterministic view of things, with his little
spiel on "reason is the slave of the passions" and what not. But at the
same time, lets not forget that it is also Hume who has maintained
that 'all forms of reason are nothing but comparing'. If this is
so, then we have reason to suspect that reason itself is ANAlogical in
nature. Perhaps someone more versed in these matters will have my hide
for this, but I regard the ANA as denoting two things, 1. that rationality
can not be reduced to logic and 2. that it appears in nature along a
continuum.
And Hume's notion of comparing also allows for a certain amount of
insight into this free will business. That's because, if reasoning
is simply comparing, then one might readily conclude that reasoning is
not so much a matter of following a rule (order) as a matter of COGNIZING
a rule and, once cognized, the OPTION to follow the rule or not when
and if it is deemed "rational". In other words, following Hume's little
dictum, it seems to me it wouldn't be all that much of a stretch to
conclude that there is an inverse correlation between 'being rational'
and 'being determined' and that both occur along a continuum.
I would also like to remind those who have convinced themselves that
brain physiology is going to swallow up psychology in the not too
distant future that causation is not a physical
attribute, that the only observable physical relationships are
spatial/temporal in nature and that, almost certainly, our belief
in causal relationships is based on the mind's affectations and
effectations. This is evidenced in the fact that
all the earliest causal hypothesese took the form of full blown
self-conscious entities (gods, spirits, etc.) suggesting, to me
at least, that the advent of self-consciousness and the discovery
of causation were one and the same discovery. As such, I would
tend to view brains and minds as both the product of more basic
causal propensities, giving rise to the perception of brain via one
sensory route, and to the perception of thoughts and feelings
via another sensory route, but with an inverse correlation between
'being rational' and 'being determined' by these causal propensities.
PR
Jos Horikx
<mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>> But my point was that I liked to see an text on materialism and
>> *idealism*, _in_those_very_words_, as _opposites_, originating
>> from before Marx.
> The only answer I can provide now without further research is
> the idealism of the Bishop of Cloyne; moreover, the only real
> idealism is that of the good Bishop and in a lesser sense, the
> notion that universals or real which I reject in favor of
> nominalism.
Hmm... the only problems are that:
- the word "idealist"or "idealism" doesn't show up in his
treatise,
- neither does the word "materialism" or materialist,
http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwilkins/Berkeley/HumanKnowledge/1734/HumKno.html
- Berkeley is not talking about epistemology (where the
opposition between idealism and realism is supposed to
reside) but about metaphysics. See the next quote:
"From what has been said, it follows, there is not any other
Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives."
(source: the link given above)
Though Berkeley is an idealist, the opposition he states here is
not the opposition between matter and idea, but between matter
and spirit. (see quote)
His treatise is about what the general stuff is things are made
of. The realism/idealism debate is about whether we know the
world because we can know or perceive its objects (things), or
do we constitute our own world bij using our ideas and senses
("esse percipi est")
JH
Jos Horikx
wrote:
>>I do not critizise Kant, I just say that is was not Kant who
>>said that idealism was the opposite of materialism (but that it
>>was Marx/Lenin)
>You only say it, you don't show it.
How can you mis it?: Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism
http://www.marx2mao.org//Lenin/MEC08.html :
" Ten Questions to a Lecturer
... 2. Does the lecturer acknowledge Engels’ fundamental
division of philosophical systems into idealism and mate-
rialism, Engels regarding those intermediate between
these two, wavering between them, as the line of Hume in
modern philosophy, calling this line “agnosticism” and
declaring Kantianism to be a variety of agnosticism? ",
and, somewhere in the middle of this book:
" The principal feature of Kant’s philosophy is the reconci-
liation of materialism with idealism, a compromise between
the two, the combination within one system of heterogeneous
and contrary philosophical trends. "
JH
mmaterial1
> On Mon, 6 Jan 2003 12:50:05 -0800, "mmaterial1"
> <mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>
>
> >> But my point was that I liked to see an text on materialism and
> >> *idealism*, _in_those_very_words_, as _opposites_, originating
> >> from before Marx.
>
> > The only answer I can provide now without further research is
> > the idealism of the Bishop of Cloyne; moreover, the only real
> > idealism is that of the good Bishop and in a lesser sense, the
> > notion that universals or real which I reject in favor of
> > nominalism.
>
> Hmm... the only problems are that:
>
> - the word "idealist"or "idealism" doesn't show up in his
> treatise,
> - neither does the word "materialism" or materialist,
I distinctly recall the word material or materialism during
my reading of Berkeley. To him that word represnted
atheism which he railed against.
>
> http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwilkins/Berkeley/HumanKnowledge/1734/HumKno.html
> - Berkeley is not talking about epistemology (where the
> opposition between idealism and realism is supposed to
> reside) but about metaphysics. See the next quote:
>
> "From what has been said, it follows, there is not any other
> Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives."
> (source: the link given above)
No matter, never spirit; but idealism proceeds from the spirit.
> Though Berkeley is an idealist, the opposition he states here is
> not the opposition between matter and idea, but between matter
> and spirit. (see quote)
Ok. But I suppose such debates are not enlightening.
>
> His treatise is about what the general stuff is things are made
> of. The realism/idealism debate is about whether we know the
> world because we can know or perceive its objects (things), or
> do we constitute our own world bij using our ideas and senses
> ("esse percipi est")
Yes, not matter but ideas. Earlier philosophers, Kant included,
have to be classified by later generations in accordance with
updated views
>
>
> JH
Jos Horikx
<mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>
>"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote in message
>news:3p7l1v499eh9nej85...@4ax.com...
>> On Mon, 6 Jan 2003 12:50:05 -0800, "mmaterial1"
>> <mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>>>> But my point was that I liked to see an text on materialism and
>>>> *idealism*, _in_those_very_words_, as _opposites_, originating
>>>> from before Marx.
>>> The only answer I can provide now without further research is
>>> the idealism of the Bishop of Cloyne; moreover, the only real
>>> idealism is that of the good Bishop and in a lesser sense, the
>>> notion that universals or real which I reject in favor of
>>> nominalism.
>> Hmm... the only problems are that:
>> - the word "idealist"or "idealism" doesn't show up in his
>> treatise,
>> - neither does the word "materialism" or materialist,
> I distinctly recall the word material or materialism during
> my reading of Berkeley. To him that word represnted
> atheism which he railed against.
>> http://www.maths.tcd.ie/~dwilkins/Berkeley/HumanKnowledge/1734/HumKno.html
It would be easier if you quoted the frases you are referring to
as I did below; Berkeleys most important work is, as an url,
given just above.
>> - Berkeley is not talking about epistemology (where the
>> opposition between idealism and realism is supposed to
>> reside) but about metaphysics. See the next quote:
>> "From what has been said, it follows, there is not any other
>> Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives."
>> (source: the link given above)
> No matter, never spirit; but idealism proceeds from the spirit.
Classical realism also proceeds from the spirit. That is why the
realism/idealism debate is another one as the materialism/spiri-
tualism debate.
>> Though Berkeley is an idealist, the opposition he states here is
>> not the opposition between matter and idea, but between matter
>> and spirit. (see quote)
> Ok. But I suppose such debates are not enlightening.
It is enlightning when you try to interprete other philosophers
(and when tracking or tracing the influence of thinkers of the
past on the thinking of the present, also the daily thinking of
the average people)
>> His treatise is about what the general stuff is things are made
>> of. The realism/idealism debate is about whether we know the
>> world because we can know or perceive its objects (things), or
>> do we constitute our own world bij using our ideas and senses
>> ("esse percipi est")
> Yes, not matter but ideas. Earlier philosophers, Kant included,
> have to be classified by later generations in accordance with
> updated views
But as I said in e0r91v4g3v818k83t...@4ax.com ,
(in the beginning of it) one has to investigate his own concepts
etc. as thoroughly as those of (e.g.) Kant.
JH
mmaterial1
> >>> The only answer I can provide now without further research is
> >>> the idealism of the Bishop of Cloyne; moreover, the only real
> >>> idealism is that of the good Bishop and in a lesser sense, the
> >>> notion that universals or real which I reject in favor of
> >>> nominalism.
>
> >> Hmm... the only problems are that:
>
>
> But as I said in e0r91v4g3v818k83t...@4ax.com ,
> (in the beginning of it) one has to investigate his own concepts
> etc. as thoroughly as those of (e.g.) Kant.
>
I accept your view as wise and should be followed to
enhance one's own views. Still, Berkeley was trying to save
God which appears to be a loosing battle, and it was materialism
which threatened God until Kant made the kill.
mmaterial1
>
> But as I said in e0r91v4g3v818k83t...@4ax.com ,
> (in the beginning of it) one has to investigate his own concepts
> etc. as thoroughly as those of (e.g.) Kant.
>" XLVII. Farther, a little Thought will discover to us, that though we
allow the Existence of Matter or Corporeal Substance, yet it will
unavoidably follow from the Principles which are now generally admitted,
that the particular Bodies of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst
they are not perceived." Percepi est esse.
It becomes just a matter of deeming the above Idealism/materialism.
>
> JH
John Hernlund
> Russell's argument is found at
> http://www3.justnet.ne.jp/~e00859/07-POP08.HTM
>
> Anyway, back to your question. It is a point that I am familiar with.
> How can the thing-in-itself *cause* an influence upon my senses
> before any faculties have lent their synthesis to the process?
>
> The only alternative would be to claim that the understanding
> *causes* causality. But that is not the case. The understanding
> only legislates to representations in general, not to the noumenal.
> The deduction of the categories only proves one thing: the
> lawfulness of phenomena considered as representation.
>
> If there were no action of the thing-in-itself upon the senses,
> then, according to Kant, it would be like having representations
> with nothing to represent.
This is a fun topic...I have enjoyed reading some of your posts on the
issue. I think that Hegel drove this criticism too hard as well. I
always got the impression that Kant was purposely avoiding saying
anything about the noumena, other than simply "noumena happens." Of
course, this does not completely close the issue of noumena, but I think
that attempting to shore it up was quite beside the main points that
Kant was making in his epistemology. However the idea comes right back
in the moral theory, where the will originates from the free rational
being, which is noumena, and which subsequently causes phenomena.
John
Malenor
<hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>Malenor wrote:
>> Russell's argument is found at
>> http://www3.justnet.ne.jp/~e00859/07-POP08.HTM
>>
>> Anyway, back to your question. It is a point that I am familiar with.
>> How can the thing-in-itself *cause* an influence upon my senses
>> before any faculties have lent their synthesis to the process?
>>
>> The only alternative would be to claim that the understanding
>> *causes* causality. But that is not the case. The understanding
>> only legislates to representations in general, not to the noumenal.
>> The deduction of the categories only proves one thing: the
>> lawfulness of phenomena considered as representation.
>>
>> If there were no action of the thing-in-itself upon the senses,
>> then, according to Kant, it would be like having representations
>> with nothing to represent.
>
>This is a fun topic...I have enjoyed reading some of your posts on the
>issue.
Only some of them?
> I think that Hegel drove this criticism too hard as well.
He turned an issue of formal logic into an ontology. Or to put it
another way, he declared that a method is a supernatural absolute.
> I
>always got the impression that Kant was purposely avoiding saying
>anything about the noumena, other than simply "noumena happens." Of
>course, this does not completely close the issue of noumena, but I think
>that attempting to shore it up was quite beside the main points that
>Kant was making in his epistemology. However the idea comes right back
>in the moral theory, where the will originates from the free rational
>being, which is noumena, and which subsequently causes phenomena.
>
The nature of the noumenal was supposed to be a matter of metaphysical
speculation -- a speculation that takes place Critically, in
accordance with certain rules. It has become a scientific construction
based on math as modern physics took the place of metaphysics in its
cosmology. But Kant anticipated modern scientific cosmology when he
showed that the universe had a beginning, only this beginning must be
indeterminate (A518/B546). Stephen Hawking wrote in "A Brief History
of Time" (14): "One may say that time had a beginning in the Big Bang,
in the sense that earlier times simply would not be defined." In other
words, the Big Bang started at an indefinite time, such that, "One can
imagine that God created the universe at literally any time in the
past" except for the fact that the expansion of the universe seems to
indicate that the universe is unwinding like the proverbial watch
spring, and that some Watchmaker must have wound that spring up in the
first place at an arbitrary point in some ancient past time = 0, a
point of time which we assume from the evidence but can never prove
scientifically. The beginning of time itself we could approach by
tracing back the universal expansion, but never attain. Instead, we
would only find events at smaller and smaller fractions of a second,
and never an event at zero.
If you happen to check that Hawking quote, notice what he says on the
previous page, 13. Instead of giving Kant credit for proving the
indeterminacy of a universal beginning point, he only mentions the
Antinomies of pure reason, and gets the antithesis of the First
Conflict wrong. Hawking explains the antithesis, incorrectly, as
saying that if the universe had a beginning in time, then there would
be "an infinite period of time before it."
Hawking then claims that Kant's argument for thesis and antithesis are
basically the same (assuming an infinite time), and that, on the other
hand, "the concept of time has no meaning before the beginning of the
universe" (13). But no, Kant states that "no coming to be of a thing
is possible in an empty time" (A427/B455). The true antithesis says
nothing about an infinite time before the beginning of time, which
would be a plain contradiction in terms.
It seems that Hawking is, as he says, not an Einstein, as he takes the
usual Positivistic approach with Kant: to misinterpret his
metaphysical arguments, and then build a scientific counter-argument
on the ruins.
In fact, all science does is confirm what metaphysics has already
known.
John Hernlund
Malenor wrote:
> On Thu, 09 Jan 2003 14:24:29 -0800, John Hernlund
> <hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>>This is a fun topic...I have enjoyed reading some of your posts on the
>>issue.
>
> Only some of them?
Well, I do work for a living...unfortunately.
> It seems that Hawking is, as he says, not an Einstein, as he takes the
> usual Positivistic approach with Kant: to misinterpret his
> metaphysical arguments, and then build a scientific counter-argument
> on the ruins.
>
> In fact, all science does is confirm what metaphysics has already
> known.
I agree with you on that...I had an interesting line of thought based on
math and science history suggesting that Kant's ideas on space and time
ultimately led to the development of the general theory of
relativity...I'll post it here some time when I have more than a few
minutes; it is fairly technical. Let's see...Kant was 1790s...Einstein
1920s...which would mean philosophy had a 130 year jump start on physics
in incorporating and realizing more general notions and aspects about
the properties of space and time.
As far as Hawking's crap goes, I never read it. From a scientific
viewpoint I think that the arrow of time is provided by entropy, and it
follows from the second (entropy increases in a closed system) and third
law of thermodynamics (entropy is bounded) that there was a beginning of
time. I hope that makes sense to you...if entropy always decreases into
the past (2nd law), but can't decrease indefinitely and must have an
absolute lower bound (3rd law), then there must be a beginning of time.
I am not surprised to hear Hawking misquoting or misunderstanding Kant,
since people have a real knack of really screwing up his ideas when
recited. I have heard the most bizarre crap from people claiming to have
studied Kant. Few people in science (that I know of) take Hawking very
seriously...he is mostly considered a popular science type of guy,
that's all. You may not want to take him too seriously either.
Cheers!
John
Jos Horikx
<mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>I accept your view as wise and should be followed to
>enhance one's own views. Still, Berkeley was trying to save
>God which appears to be a loosing battle, and it was materialism
>which threatened God until Kant made the kill.
Elsewhere I got the reproach or twit (from a postmodern point of
view) that Kant didn't liberate himself thoroughly enough from
religious roots.
(My answer was that he had got a publication ban on religious
affairs but that argument did not sink in at the other side)
JH
Jos Horikx
<mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>> But as I said in e0r91v4g3v818k83t...@4ax.com ,
>> (in the beginning of it) one has to investigate his own concepts
>> etc. as thoroughly as those of (e.g.) Kant.
Berkeley said:
>>" XLVII. Farther, a little Thought will discover to us, that though we
>allow the Existence of Matter or Corporeal Substance, yet it will
>unavoidably follow from the Principles which are now generally admitted,
>that the particular Bodies of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst
>they are not perceived." Percepi est esse.
>It becomes just a matter of deeming the above Idealism/materialism.
Its just because we live in such a one-dimensional world that
one can make more than one fundamental distinction.
Even within the non-materialists (that is: the spiritualists)
the distinction between idealism and realism remains because
someone has to distribute the names and words and notions.
(In His time the church, that is the very reason that Berkeley
fought against the materialists)
Also within the group of materialists this distinction remains,
but here it is easier to see of course.
Berkeley was both: an spiritualist and an (subjective) idealist.
But that do not take away that, for analytical purposes, the use
of two distinctions (a third distinction could be the difference
between rationalism and empiricism) is better than the use of
just one. Even when in daily life the second and/or third dis-
tinction is hardly known by most people. And when one preferes
to use just one distinction, than, as I see it, knowledge of the
history of the different words and notions just gain importance.
(By the way, in my view postmodernism could be seen in some
way as the inheritrix of the thinking of Berkeley, exept that
they generally do not accept a Deity or supreme being)
JH
mmaterial1
"Malenor" <Mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:j8bs1vgtk9nlj8mje...@4ax.com...
> On Thu, 09 Jan 2003 14:24:29 -0800, John Hernlund
> <hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>
> >Malenor wrote:
> >> Russell's argument is found at
> >> http://www3.justnet.ne.jp/~e00859/07-POP08.HTM
> basically the same (assuming an infinite time), and that, on the other
> hand, "the concept of time has no meaning before the beginning of the
> universe" (13)
. But no, Kant states that "no coming to be of a thing
> is possible in an empty time" (A427/B455). The true antithesis says
> nothing about an infinite time before the beginning of time, which
> would be a plain contradiction in terms.
How does Kant know that "no coming to be of a thing
is possible in an empty time"? My contention is that the
creation of the universe began in pre-time and void-space,
the realm of the immaterial by an immaterial force, since
the universe could not create itself. Incidentally, one can
only be convinced of knowing by experience. Now if
you say that 2+2 will always be 4, it will be necessary
to make that analytic by defining a base such as 10.
It is also necessary to define what 1 is, etc. So now
one is confronted with a long process.
> In fact, all science does is confirm what metaphysics has already
> known.
Materialistic science confirms metaphysics!! Incredible.
>
mmaterial1
> On Wed, 8 Jan 2003 15:50:10 -0800, "mmaterial1"
> <mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>
> >I accept your view as wise and should be followed to
> >enhance one's own views. Still, Berkeley was trying to save
> >God which appears to be a loosing battle, and it was materialism
> >which threatened God until Kant made the kill.
>
> Elsewhere I got the reproach or twit (from a postmodern point of
> view) that Kant didn't liberate himself thoroughly enough from
> religious roots.
I thought Kant was religious, but I'm convinced that some views
of Aquinas were not liked since Kant reduced his 5 to 3 and
refuted them, thus receiving credit for the kill.
> (My answer was that he had got a publication ban on religious
> affairs but that argument did not sink in at the other side)
But he did save belief by banning speculation.
>
>
> JH
Jos Horikx
<mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>> Elsewhere I got the reproach or twit (from a postmodern point of
>> view) that Kant didn't liberate himself thoroughly enough from
>> religious roots.
>
> I thought Kant was religious, but I'm convinced that some views
>of Aquinas were not liked since Kant reduced his 5 to 3 and
>refuted them, thus receiving credit for the kill.
Im not really sure. I remember a saying of him: "If God would
speak to us: how can we know that it is Him, who spoke to us?"
I do not really know how to value his other remarks on a supreme
being: maybe they could be interpreted as the vehicle that had
to carry his other thinking to his contemporaries. But I have
never focussed on Kant in this respect. I could be very wrong...
JH
Malenor
<hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>
>
>Malenor wrote:
>> On Thu, 09 Jan 2003 14:24:29 -0800, John Hernlund
>> <hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>>>This is a fun topic...I have enjoyed reading some of your posts on the
>>>issue.
>>
>> Only some of them?
>
>Well, I do work for a living...unfortunately.
>
>> It seems that Hawking is, as he says, not an Einstein, as he takes the
>> usual Positivistic approach with Kant: to misinterpret his
>> metaphysical arguments, and then build a scientific counter-argument
>> on the ruins.
>>
>> In fact, all science does is confirm what metaphysics has already
>> known.
>
>I agree with you on that...I had an interesting line of thought based on
>math and science history suggesting that Kant's ideas on space and time
>ultimately led to the development of the general theory of
>relativity...I'll post it here some time when I have more than a few
>minutes; it is fairly technical. Let's see...Kant was 1790s...Einstein
>1920s...which would mean philosophy had a 130 year jump start on physics
>in incorporating and realizing more general notions and aspects about
>the properties of space and time.
>
That idea has been bantered about on this forum for some time. I'd
still like to see the information, especially since I recently had a
go-around with a physicist who claimed that Kant's influence on
Einstein was minimal at best. If you want to read more on that topic,
the book I mentioned below, Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist,
reveals exactly the nature of the relationship between Einstein's and
Kant's thinking.
It is an interesting subject. Einstein, as usual for scientists,
misinterpreted Kant for the most part, and then -- here's the amazing
part -- developed an epistemology that is equivalent to Kantian
formalism.
What people don't seem to understand about Einstein is that in order
for him to create his new paradigm it was necessary for him to do
original philosophy as a backdrop to it. Einstein makes it clear that
he arrived at his philosophical ideas based upon the Enlightenment
philosophies of Hume and Kant. Einstein approved of Humean skepticism,
but did not believe that Kant had the answer to it. But it is obvious
that Einstein took his cues from Kant, in first demolishing Kant by
misinterpretation, and then building a new epistemology on the ruins
-- an epistemology that is ironically nothing more than the Kantian
formalism he had demolished. But he didn't really demolish it, he only
knocked down a straw man.
The argument I was having with the physicist involved the actual
influence of Kant on Einstein. It is not so much that Einstein took
his ideas directly from Kant -- although some of Einstein's
terminology seems to indicate plagiarism -- but still, if it hadn't
been for Kant there would have been no Einstein because the influence
is definitely present whether Einstein understood Kant or not. The
physics professor, on the other hand, argued that Einstein did not
agree with Kant; how, therefore, could there be any influence? Easy.
The nature of dialectics is to demolish one's opponent and to build a
new and greater system on the ruins. But dialectics needs that
opponent, that is the very basis of dialectics, to put things in
opposition, even if one has to invent the opposition through
misinterpretation as Hawking and Einstein does (and Positivism in
general).
>As far as Hawking's crap goes, I never read it. From a scientific
>viewpoint I think that the arrow of time is provided by entropy, and it
>follows from the second (entropy increases in a closed system) and third
>law of thermodynamics (entropy is bounded) that there was a beginning of
>time. I hope that makes sense to you...if entropy always decreases into
>the past (2nd law), but can't decrease indefinitely and must have an
>absolute lower bound (3rd law), then there must be a beginning of time.
>
Hawking was basing the theory that the universe has a beginning on
history: it was Edwin Hubble who made the first discovery which
pointed in the direction of a Big Bang theory.
>I am not surprised to hear Hawking misquoting or misunderstanding Kant,
>since people have a real knack of really screwing up his ideas when
>recited. I have heard the most bizarre crap from people claiming to have
>studied Kant. Few people in science (that I know of) take Hawking very
>seriously...he is mostly considered a popular science type of guy,
>that's all. You may not want to take him too seriously either.
>
Since Hawking occupies the Lucasian chair, isn't he like the Pope of
science? Or is it just an honorary position? Hawking wrote some
popular science books, popular in more than one way. But he is hardly
limited to that "Martin Gardener" type of writing. His idea that black
holes emanate radiation created quite stir. I would take Hawking
seriously on physics, but not on philosophy.
I watched a show on Stephen Hawking the other day. One of his old
physics professors recounted this story. He had given his students a
very difficult 10-question assignment and a week to finish it.
Hawking, as usual, waited until the last minute to do his homework,
starting to work on the problems on the morning the assignment was
due. Later that day, Hawking's professor asked him if he'd managed to
solve any of the problems, and Hawking said words to the effect that,
"I only managed to answer ten of them..."
Stephen Hawking is a brilliant physicist, there is no doubt about it.
He is no Einstein in terms of changing any paradigms. Einstein also
seemed to have been more of a philosopher than Hawking is. Nobody is
going to write a book called "Stephen Hawking, Philosopher-Scientist,"
as they did for Einstein. Hawking is a great technical scientist who
is capable of new inductions, but not new paradigms.
mmaterial1
> On Fri, 10 Jan 2003 00:22:21 -0800, "mmaterial1"
> <mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>
> >> Elsewhere I got the reproach or twit (from a postmodern point of
> >> view) that Kant didn't liberate himself thoroughly enough from
> >> religious roots.
> >
> > I thought Kant was religious, but I'm convinced that some views
> >of Aquinas were not liked since Kant reduced his 5 to 3 and
> >refuted them, thus receiving credit for the kill.
>
> Im not really sure. I remember a saying of him: "If God would
> speak to us: how can we know that it is Him, who spoke to us?"
I'm convinced that Kant was religious, a Pietist I believe; however,
Malenor can enlighten us.
Malenor
wrote:
>
>"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote in message
>news:vn4t1v85n533j5vpj...@4ax.com...
>> On Fri, 10 Jan 2003 00:22:21 -0800, "mmaterial1"
>> <mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>>
>> >> Elsewhere I got the reproach or twit (from a postmodern point of
>> >> view) that Kant didn't liberate himself thoroughly enough from
>> >> religious roots.
>> >
>> > I thought Kant was religious, but I'm convinced that some views
>> >of Aquinas were not liked since Kant reduced his 5 to 3 and
>> >refuted them, thus receiving credit for the kill.
>>
>> Im not really sure. I remember a saying of him: "If God would
>> speak to us: how can we know that it is Him, who spoke to us?"
>
> I'm convinced that Kant was religious, a Pietist I believe; however,
> Malenor can enlighten us.
Many people can enlighten you on the fact that Kant was a Lutheran
Pietist who only attended church as social needs demanded it. Pietists
did not believe in making public shows of faith, and this is probably
based on a certain criticism by Jesus of those who wept and wailed to
God in the streets, making a public show of their faith. But God knows
what's in your heart, and that's the important thing. It doesn't
matter what other people think.
>>
>> I do not really know how to value his other remarks on a supreme
>> being: maybe they could be interpreted as the vehicle that had
>> to carry his other thinking to his contemporaries. But I have
>> never focussed on Kant in this respect. I could be very wrong...
In the CPR, Kant said that you could use God or Nature interchangably.
What mattered to him was not the label (which was understandably
important to his religious contemporaries) but the idea behind the
label.
mmaterial1
> On Fri, 10 Jan 2003 17:44:23 -0800, "mmaterial1" <mmate...@msn.com>
> wrote:
>
> >
> >"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote in message
> >news:vn4t1v85n533j5vpj...@4ax.com...
> >> On Fri, 10 Jan 2003 00:22:21 -0800, "mmaterial1"
> >> <mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
> >>
> >
> Many people can enlighten you on the fact that Kant was a Lutheran
> Pietist who only attended church as social needs demanded it. Pietists
> did not believe in making public shows of faith, and this is probably
> based on a certain criticism by Jesus of those who wept and wailed to
> God in the streets, making a public show of their faith. But God knows
> what's in your heart, and that's the important thing. It doesn't
> matter what other people think.
Thank God or rather ML for the Reformation.
I bought a copy of Smith's Kant which tells me that the
transcendental is about how the human consciousness is able to
arrive at its a priori synthetic concepts. I just didn't like Kant's
example of 7+5=12, but no where in the subject is the predicate
contained; however, 7+5=12 could be considered 12=12, a mere
tautology or a=a.
Thanks for your response. I like this NG and prefer to be civil.
I have made an ass out of myself more than once, so I shall try
to be more accurate and fairer with Kant, a formidable philosopher.
>
Malenor
wrote:
>
>"Malenor" <Mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:848v1v0na6isvs48a...@4ax.com...
>> On Fri, 10 Jan 2003 17:44:23 -0800, "mmaterial1" <mmate...@msn.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Jos Horikx" <jho...@chello.nl> wrote in message
>> >news:vn4t1v85n533j5vpj...@4ax.com...
>> >> On Fri, 10 Jan 2003 00:22:21 -0800, "mmaterial1"
>> >> <mmate...@msn.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >
>> Many people can enlighten you on the fact that Kant was a Lutheran
>> Pietist who only attended church as social needs demanded it. Pietists
>> did not believe in making public shows of faith, and this is probably
>> based on a certain criticism by Jesus of those who wept and wailed to
>> God in the streets, making a public show of their faith. But God knows
>> what's in your heart, and that's the important thing. It doesn't
>> matter what other people think.
>
>Thank God or rather ML for the Reformation.
>
>I bought a copy of Smith's Kant which tells me that the
>transcendental is about how the human consciousness is able to
>arrive at its a priori synthetic concepts. I just didn't like Kant's
>example of 7+5=12, but no where in the subject is the predicate
>contained; however, 7+5=12 could be considered 12=12, a mere
>tautology or a=a.
I've always explained it like this. 7+5 implies some number as a
result. It doesn't contain within itself the actual result, only the
possibility of some result or other. The proposition "7 + 5 = some
number" is analytical. Arriving at the actual result requires a
procedure.
So what if I gave the proposition as a problem to be solved, assuming
you didn't already know the answer? Then you would see that you not
only had to arrive at the answer through a combination of elements in
the subject of the problem, but you also had to refer to something
empirical to help you arrive at the answer through incrementation of
units. Each unit, whatever you happen to use, whether it is pencils or
pencil marks on paper, is an element of a wider totality that you
consider to be the result: 12. This totality is arrived at by
synthesis of these individual, commensurate units (marks).
The fact that you consider this 12 to be a sum-total connotes the
synthetic application of the category of totality. The fact that you
started with commensurate units connotes another synthetic application
of a category, unity.The fact that you had to put something of
yourself into the process, the categories of unity and totality,
indicates a priori synthesis.
mmaterial1
Which, must of course, be joined by universality and necessity,
characteristics of the a priori.
Malenor
wrote:
Philosophy has often been held up in comparison to mathematics as the
ultimate determiner of this universality and necessity. The problem
had been how philosophy can imitate this accomplishment. So Kant had
to determine what makes mathematics "tick." This is where he arrived
at the concept of an a priori synthesis.
But that was not good enough. Mathematics has only arbitrary
necessity; it's the arbitrariness of math that makes it necessarily
true. Math needs no connection with the emipirical to make it true,
and in fact, such a connection would only lend it contingent
uncertainty. So Kant took the a priori synthesis from math, leaving
its arbitrary axiomatic basis, and applied it to his new theory of
transcendentalism.
As a result we learn that applied math determines truth through
successive synthesis of commensurate units in time by means of a rule
that acts as a schema of this process. The fact that this process is
original with us (original in the sense of "original sin" I suppose,
although without the sinning) in our natures is what lends the process
universal necessity. So it is not possible that 5 objects could
suddenly become 2 objects because this would violate the temporal
chain of succession, of orderly coming to be and passing away in time.
John Hernlund
Sure, I'll post it some time soon.
Yes, saying that Einstein didn't have any influence from Kant because of
his (apparent) disagreement is like saying that Kant had no influence
from Hume for the same reasons...an obvious folly. Interestingly, I have
heard people argue that Hume was misunderstood, and may have had a much
closer view to Kant's on epistemology...however I always thought that
Hume was a very good writer and made his points very clear, leaving
little room for imagination to wander.
My Kant-Einstein connection is quite different from the one you have
mentioned here. It has more to do with the mathematical developments
that allowed Einstein to even think about tweeking with space and time
and eventually arrive at general relativity. A brief overlook:
late 1700s: Kant...you are probably aware of his interpretation of space
and time as intuition rather than a property derived from the senses.
According to a discussion I had many moons ago in a Kant class as an
undergrad, I recall this being a fairly big deal in Kant's time. This is
a time when the fires were being stoked and a fatal blow was eventually
delivered to dogmatic Euclidean geometry.
early 1800s: Lobachevski's demonstration of the arbitrariness of the
Euclidean system of geometry.
mid 1800s: Riemman writes his thesis, similar to Lobachevski's work.
late 1800s: Beltrami shows that the metric properties of space are mere
definitions. Ricci develops a new mathematical formalism called
"tensors" to deal with the general metric properties of space.
early 1900s: Einstein introduces several mappings that preserve the
constancy of the speed of light and the equivalence of gravitational
mass and inertia.
There is more meat to add here, but you can see how the tools that
Einstein needed and used were developed in the period directly after
Kant, who is a main suspect in causing this havoc.
>>As far as Hawking's crap goes, I never read it. From a scientific
>>viewpoint I think that the arrow of time is provided by entropy, and it
>>follows from the second (entropy increases in a closed system) and third
>>law of thermodynamics (entropy is bounded) that there was a beginning of
>>time. I hope that makes sense to you...if entropy always decreases into
>>the past (2nd law), but can't decrease indefinitely and must have an
>>absolute lower bound (3rd law), then there must be a beginning of time.
>
> Hawking was basing the theory that the universe has a beginning on
> history: it was Edwin Hubble who made the first discovery which
> pointed in the direction of a Big Bang theory.
Okay...that is an awfully dull way to get about it.
>>I am not surprised to hear Hawking misquoting or misunderstanding Kant,
>>since people have a real knack of really screwing up his ideas when
>>recited. I have heard the most bizarre crap from people claiming to have
>>studied Kant. Few people in science (that I know of) take Hawking very
>>seriously...he is mostly considered a popular science type of guy,
>>that's all. You may not want to take him too seriously either.
>>
> Since Hawking occupies the Lucasian chair, isn't he like the Pope of
> science? Or is it just an honorary position? Hawking wrote some
> popular science books, popular in more than one way. But he is hardly
> limited to that "Martin Gardener" type of writing. His idea that black
> holes emanate radiation created quite stir. I would take Hawking
> seriously on physics, but not on philosophy.
Lucasian chair? Nobody gives a damn. This kind of thing may have been
important many decades ago, but increasingly the most prestigious
positions in science have become occupied by pseudo-retired
stuffed-shirt types that don't really produce anything useful. As far as
I know, Hawking's only real contribution to science is the black hole
work...which was quite some time ago. It is kind of sad, but a lot of
universities that used to be greatly productive in the sciences have
become quite complacent and lazy. Popular science books seem to flow
from this sort of spring quite readily.
> I watched a show on Stephen Hawking the other day. One of his old
> physics professors recounted this story. He had given his students a
> very difficult 10-question assignment and a week to finish it.
> Hawking, as usual, waited until the last minute to do his homework,
> starting to work on the problems on the morning the assignment was
> due. Later that day, Hawking's professor asked him if he'd managed to
> solve any of the problems, and Hawking said words to the effect that,
> "I only managed to answer ten of them..."
Yes...this is a skill any physicist must have just to get through grad
school...this is no sign of genius by any stretch.
> Stephen Hawking is a brilliant physicist, there is no doubt about it.
He was a brilliant physicist, in the past.
> He is no Einstein in terms of changing any paradigms. Einstein also
> seemed to have been more of a philosopher than Hawking is. Nobody is
> going to write a book called "Stephen Hawking, Philosopher-Scientist,"
> as they did for Einstein. Hawking is a great technical scientist who
> is capable of new inductions, but not new paradigms.
Actually, Hawking's black hole work was deduction rather than induction,
which is why it is not all that impressive, since science grows on
induction.
Cheers!
John
Malenor
<hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
I didn't mention the actual connection between Kant and Einstein, but
it would indeed derive from Kant's exigesis on space and time. The
arbitrariness of the Euclidean system demonstrated by Lobachevski is
deducible from Kant's reduction of perception to appearances and the
phenomenal/noumenal split.
It's not that Kant didn't believe the universe was Euclidean. I don't
see where Kant made any distinction between the perceived universe and
the physical universe. Nor does he claim that only appearances are
Euclidean in structure. But that they are so structured by us, and not
by the physical universe, leaves an opening for the study of that
universe apart from the senses, noumenally.
As Filmer Northrop wrote in his article "Einstein's Conception of
Science," "There is, for Albert Einstein, as for Kant, spatio-temporal
relatedness in scientific knowledge, which is not to be identified
with sensed relatedness." Filmer then goes on to distinguish Kant's
and Einstein's theories, but makes a grave error in doing so: "But
this systematic relatedness is not a universal and necessary
presupposition of any possible empirical experience. It has to be
discovered by a free play of the formal, mathematical, intellectual
imagination" which has to be tested. The error is this: by calling it
a "free play of the imagination," Filmer is actually re-stating a
Kantian principle found in the Critique of Judgment. So are Kant and
Einstein really that different?
In the next paragraph, Filmer then goes on to quote Einstein stating
that his own concept of space and time "cannot be justified...by the
nature of the intellect..." that is, not a priori [ellipses in
original]. I don't think that's entirely correct for Einstein to say,
as this free play of the imagination is in the nature of the intellect
such that it warranted Kant's a priori examination. However, I agree
that the physical space of physics is not the a priori space of Kant.
The main difference, however, is this: the space/time of physics is a
mathematical construction, while the formal space and time of Kant
result from transcendental analysis, or, to use loose terms,
deconstruction of experience into its constituent forms. In other
words, space/time is a noumenal construct, while formal space and time
are the forms of phenomena.
So I decided that physics was the attempt to re-construct the physical
universe through laws described mathematically, thus purely and not
sensibly. Filmer is wrong to claim that non-Euclidean geometry is not
a priori, it is a mathematical a priori that receives its
justification in the transcendental as a possibility for physics at
all.
There are also interesting ties between Kant and Einstein in the realm
of Kant's theory of Pure Reason, the faculty of intellectual unity.
Although not admitted by Kant, this theory gives direct support to
Einstein's search for a Unified Field Theory.
Einstein makes other Kantian statements, such as this one summed up by
Victor Lenzen in "Einstein's Theory of Knowledge": "The certainty of
mathematical axioms, more adequately, the precision with which they
hold, is founded on the function of creating their objects." (This
followed a famous quote from Einstein that "In so far as the
propositions of mathematics refer to reality they are not certain and
in so far as they are certain they do not refer to reality.")
Mathematics must create its object -- but not the object of
perception, as was probably the case with the ancient Greeks, but the
noumenal thing-in-itself.
All these ideas are a direct result of Kantian concepts, whether or
not Einstein derived them directly from him. However, it is the case
that Einstein read the Critique of Pure Reason, at least, when he was
a teenager. The idea of a free play of the imagination, if not a
direct plagiarism, came down from Kant's Critique of Judgment somehow
or other, although I haven't searched for other possible sources such
as Hume.
>>>As far as Hawking's crap goes, I never read it. From a scientific
>>>viewpoint I think that the arrow of time is provided by entropy, and it
>>>follows from the second (entropy increases in a closed system) and third
>>>law of thermodynamics (entropy is bounded) that there was a beginning of
>>>time. I hope that makes sense to you...if entropy always decreases into
>>>the past (2nd law), but can't decrease indefinitely and must have an
>>>absolute lower bound (3rd law), then there must be a beginning of time.
>>
>> Hawking was basing the theory that the universe has a beginning on
>> history: it was Edwin Hubble who made the first discovery which
>> pointed in the direction of a Big Bang theory.
>
>Okay...that is an awfully dull way to get about it.
>
I don't see how you can say that entropy can't decrease indefinitely.
It can do so in tinier and tinier fractions without limit.
>>>I am not surprised to hear Hawking misquoting or misunderstanding Kant,
>>>since people have a real knack of really screwing up his ideas when
>>>recited. I have heard the most bizarre crap from people claiming to have
>>>studied Kant. Few people in science (that I know of) take Hawking very
>>>seriously...he is mostly considered a popular science type of guy,
>>>that's all. You may not want to take him too seriously either.
>>>
>> Since Hawking occupies the Lucasian chair, isn't he like the Pope of
>> science? Or is it just an honorary position? Hawking wrote some
>> popular science books, popular in more than one way. But he is hardly
>> limited to that "Martin Gardener" type of writing. His idea that black
>> holes emanate radiation created quite stir. I would take Hawking
>> seriously on physics, but not on philosophy.
>
>Lucasian chair? Nobody gives a damn. This kind of thing may have been
>important many decades ago, but increasingly the most prestigious
>positions in science have become occupied by pseudo-retired
>stuffed-shirt types that don't really produce anything useful. As far as
>I know, Hawking's only real contribution to science is the black hole
>work...which was quite some time ago. It is kind of sad, but a lot of
>universities that used to be greatly productive in the sciences have
>become quite complacent and lazy. Popular science books seem to flow
>from this sort of spring quite readily.
Hawking produced 3 new theories: the black hole-emanation theory, the
no-boundaries proposal, and a synthesis of qm and general relativity
embodied as a massive black hole the size of a proton.
>> I watched a show on Stephen Hawking the other day. One of his old
>> physics professors recounted this story. He had given his students a
>> very difficult 10-question assignment and a week to finish it.
>> Hawking, as usual, waited until the last minute to do his homework,
>> starting to work on the problems on the morning the assignment was
>> due. Later that day, Hawking's professor asked him if he'd managed to
>> solve any of the problems, and Hawking said words to the effect that,
>> "I only managed to answer ten of them..."
>
>Yes...this is a skill any physicist must have just to get through grad
>school...this is no sign of genius by any stretch.
>
Not creative genius, no. He strove to synthesize qm and general
relativity, and came up with the theory that shortly after the big
bang mini-singularities the size of a proton would be created.
Hawking's "no boundary proposal" theory is consistent with Kant's
theory that the universe has a beginning but an indefinite one -- for
Hawking, time and space are finite, but boundless.
>> Stephen Hawking is a brilliant physicist, there is no doubt about it.
>
>He was a brilliant physicist, in the past.
>
Since Einstein did his major work when he was young, you could have
said the same about him when he was 60.
>> He is no Einstein in terms of changing any paradigms. Einstein also
>> seemed to have been more of a philosopher than Hawking is. Nobody is
>> going to write a book called "Stephen Hawking, Philosopher-Scientist,"
>> as they did for Einstein. Hawking is a great technical scientist who
>> is capable of new inductions, but not new paradigms.
>
>Actually, Hawking's black hole work was deduction rather than induction,
>which is why it is not all that impressive, since science grows on
>induction.
I should have said that he was capable of new syntheses, but not new
paradigms.
When I first heard about the black hole emanation theory, I was
impressed but somewhat skeptical. When I learned that the particles
theoretically emanating were never in the event horizon at all, but on
its very edge, I was curious to know why such a big deal was made out
of this. The theory might give astronomers a new way of finding black
holes, but it doesn't change our idea of what a black hole is.
John Hernlund
> On Tue, 14 Jan 2003 19:40:36 -0800, John Hernlund
> <hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>
>>Malenor wrote:
>>
>>>On Thu, 09 Jan 2003 21:12:28 -0800, John Hernlund
>>><hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
>>
>>My Kant-Einstein connection is quite different from the one you have
>>mentioned here. It has more to do with the mathematical developments
>>that allowed Einstein to even think about tweeking with space and time
>>and eventually arrive at general relativity. A brief overlook:
>
> it would indeed derive from Kant's exigesis on space and time. The
> arbitrariness of the Euclidean system demonstrated by Lobachevski is
> deducible from Kant's reduction of perception to appearances and the
> phenomenal/noumenal split.
Absolutely...I believe we are thinking along the same lines here.
> It's not that Kant didn't believe the universe was Euclidean. I don't
> see where Kant made any distinction between the perceived universe and
> the physical universe. Nor does he claim that only appearances are
> Euclidean in structure. But that they are so structured by us, and not
> by the physical universe, leaves an opening for the study of that
> universe apart from the senses, noumenally.
Right. And from the scientific viewpoint, the key to carrying physics
beyond Euclidean geometry is the realization that a Riemannian or
Lobachevskian geometry contains the Euclidean one as a special case.
I am not sure I completely understand what you are stating here. The
mathematical description of space/time is entirely based upon a priori
concepts, without which any meaningful progress could not take place.
> So I decided that physics was the attempt to re-construct the physical
> universe through laws described mathematically, thus purely and not
> sensibly. Filmer is wrong to claim that non-Euclidean geometry is not
> a priori, it is a mathematical a priori that receives its
> justification in the transcendental as a possibility for physics at
> all.
I believe physics works from notions of space and time and toward the
ideal of a pure descriptionI think I will diverge from your point of
view on this one. The whole notion of the most important objects of
mathematical physics are indeed geometric by nature. The entire
quantitative notion of work (and by association energy, which may be
regarded as the underpinning of all physics) is based upon forces
(naturally a covariant contribution) acting upon particles or continua
resulting in displacements (naturally a contravariant contribution).
Forces, just like displacements, are treated in a manner that is always
consistent with geometric invariance., not the other way around.
> There are also interesting ties between Kant and Einstein in the realm
> of Kant's theory of Pure Reason, the faculty of intellectual unity.
> Although not admitted by Kant, this theory gives direct support to
> Einstein's search for a Unified Field Theory.
>
> Einstein makes other Kantian statements, such as this one summed up by
> Victor Lenzen in "Einstein's Theory of Knowledge": "The certainty of
> mathematical axioms, more adequately, the precision with which they
> hold, is founded on the function of creating their objects." (This
> followed a famous quote from Einstein that "In so far as the
> propositions of mathematics refer to reality they are not certain and
> in so far as they are certain they do not refer to reality.")
> Mathematics must create its object -- but not the object of
> perception, as was probably the case with the ancient Greeks, but the
> noumenal thing-in-itself.
>
> All these ideas are a direct result of Kantian concepts, whether or
> not Einstein derived them directly from him. However, it is the case
> that Einstein read the Critique of Pure Reason, at least, when he was
> a teenager. The idea of a free play of the imagination, if not a
> direct plagiarism, came down from Kant's Critique of Judgment somehow
> or other, although I haven't searched for other possible sources such
> as Hume.
hmmm... This is an interesting topic, since it brings up the interplay
between the sciences in general and mathematics. This is something Kant
never wrote about explicitly.
>>>>As far as Hawking's crap goes, I never read it. From a scientific
>>>>viewpoint I think that the arrow of time is provided by entropy, and it
>>>>follows from the second (entropy increases in a closed system) and third
>>>>law of thermodynamics (entropy is bounded) that there was a beginning of
>>>>time. I hope that makes sense to you...if entropy always decreases into
>>>>the past (2nd law), but can't decrease indefinitely and must have an
>>>>absolute lower bound (3rd law), then there must be a beginning of time.
>>>
>>>Hawking was basing the theory that the universe has a beginning on
>>>history: it was Edwin Hubble who made the first discovery which
>>>pointed in the direction of a Big Bang theory.
>>
>>Okay...that is an awfully dull way to get about it.
>>
>
> I don't see how you can say that entropy can't decrease indefinitely.
> It can do so in tinier and tinier fractions without limit.
Sure, this is always possible, without taking other things into account,
such as the manner in which entropy is propagated and increased (i.e.
the functional form). It wouldn't be unreasonable to say as a rough
approximation, based on propositions of statistical physics, that
entropy is produced at a rate that is proportional to the number of
states available to the system (which is again proportional to the
amount of entropy), i.e. it increases exponentially. An exponential
function indeed has no zero point in finite time. This would be
consistent with your notion. However, this requires (implicitly)
arbitrarily assigning the lowest point of entropy to be zero, which is
not the case at all, and would be inconsistent with this model. The
lowest entropy in this scenario must be finite and positive, since
saying it is zero would be equivalent to saying that there is such a
thing as entropy when NO states are available to the system. When there
are no states available to a system, to ask what its entropy is becomes
impossible, for entropy cannot be defined in this case. Thus your
objection is not a problem for this entropy model from a scientific
viewpoint considering the nature of entropy. Time begins when more than
one state becomes available to the system.
>>>>I am not surprised to hear Hawking misquoting or misunderstanding Kant,
>>>>since people have a real knack of really screwing up his ideas when
>>>>recited. I have heard the most bizarre crap from people claiming to have
>>>>studied Kant. Few people in science (that I know of) take Hawking very
>>>>seriously...he is mostly considered a popular science type of guy,
>>>>that's all. You may not want to take him too seriously either.
>>>>
>>>
>>>Since Hawking occupies the Lucasian chair, isn't he like the Pope of
>>>science? Or is it just an honorary position? Hawking wrote some
>>>popular science books, popular in more than one way. But he is hardly
>>>limited to that "Martin Gardener" type of writing. His idea that black
>>>holes emanate radiation created quite stir. I would take Hawking
>>>seriously on physics, but not on philosophy.
>>
>>Lucasian chair? Nobody gives a damn. This kind of thing may have been
>>important many decades ago, but increasingly the most prestigious
>>positions in science have become occupied by pseudo-retired
>>stuffed-shirt types that don't really produce anything useful. As far as
>>I know, Hawking's only real contribution to science is the black hole
>>work...which was quite some time ago. It is kind of sad, but a lot of
>>universities that used to be greatly productive in the sciences have
>>become quite complacent and lazy. Popular science books seem to flow
>
>>from this sort of spring quite readily.
>
> Hawking produced 3 new theories: the black hole-emanation theory, the
> no-boundaries proposal, and a synthesis of qm and general relativity
> embodied as a massive black hole the size of a proton.
Alright...
>>>I watched a show on Stephen Hawking the other day. One of his old
>>>physics professors recounted this story. He had given his students a
>>>very difficult 10-question assignment and a week to finish it.
>>>Hawking, as usual, waited until the last minute to do his homework,
>>>starting to work on the problems on the morning the assignment was
>>>due. Later that day, Hawking's professor asked him if he'd managed to
>>>solve any of the problems, and Hawking said words to the effect that,
>>>"I only managed to answer ten of them..."
>>
>>Yes...this is a skill any physicist must have just to get through grad
>>school...this is no sign of genius by any stretch.
>>
>
> Not creative genius, no. He strove to synthesize qm and general
> relativity, and came up with the theory that shortly after the big
> bang mini-singularities the size of a proton would be created.
> Hawking's "no boundary proposal" theory is consistent with Kant's
> theory that the universe has a beginning but an indefinite one -- for
> Hawking, time and space are finite, but boundless.
>
>>>Stephen Hawking is a brilliant physicist, there is no doubt about it.
>>
>>He was a brilliant physicist, in the past.
>
> Since Einstein did his major work when he was young, you could have
> said the same about him when he was 60.
When Einstein was 60 he was continuing to make profound contributions to
physics, and was immersed in the grand unified theory problem. Much of
this work has also made a significant impact, although it is even more
difficult to understand than gen rel and so doesn't receive as much
attention.
>>>He is no Einstein in terms of changing any paradigms. Einstein also
>>>seemed to have been more of a philosopher than Hawking is. Nobody is
>>>going to write a book called "Stephen Hawking, Philosopher-Scientist,"
>>>as they did for Einstein. Hawking is a great technical scientist who
>>>is capable of new inductions, but not new paradigms.
>>
>>Actually, Hawking's black hole work was deduction rather than induction,
>>which is why it is not all that impressive, since science grows on
>>induction.
>
> I should have said that he was capable of new syntheses, but not new
> paradigms.
Right...
> When I first heard about the black hole emanation theory, I was
> impressed but somewhat skeptical. When I learned that the particles
> theoretically emanating were never in the event horizon at all, but on
> its very edge, I was curious to know why such a big deal was made out
> of this. The theory might give astronomers a new way of finding black
> holes, but it doesn't change our idea of what a black hole is.
True. Hawking's work, as far as I understand it, is a pure distillation
from conservation laws.
Cheers!
John
Malenor
<hern...@ess.ucla.edu> wrote:
Einstein reversed Sir Francis Bacon's Organon. He didn't completely
dispute it, but he put a Kantian spin on it. Einstein's method is
mathematical a priori deduction (aided by playful, intuitive
thought-experiments). Bacon's proposed method was a priori induction.
>> So I decided that physics was the attempt to re-construct the physical
>> universe through laws described mathematically, thus purely and not
>> sensibly. Filmer is wrong to claim that non-Euclidean geometry is not
>> a priori, it is a mathematical a priori that receives its
>> justification in the transcendental as a possibility for physics at
>> all.
>
> I believe physics works from notions of space and time and toward the
>ideal of a pure description[.] I think I will diverge from your point of
>view on this one. The whole notion of the most important objects of
>mathematical physics are indeed geometric by nature. The entire
>quantitative notion of work (and by association energy, which may be
>regarded as the underpinning of all physics) is based upon forces
>(naturally a covariant contribution) acting upon particles or continua
>resulting in displacements (naturally a contravariant contribution).
>Forces, just like displacements, are treated in a manner that is always
>consistent with geometric invariance., not the other way around.
>
I missed the point of divergence here, even after re-reading a few
time.
>> There are also interesting ties between Kant and Einstein in the realm
>> of Kant's theory of Pure Reason, the faculty of intellectual unity.
>> Although not admitted by Kant, this theory gives direct support to
>> Einstein's search for a Unified Field Theory.
>>
>> Einstein makes other Kantian statements, such as this one summed up by
>> Victor Lenzen in "Einstein's Theory of Knowledge": "The certainty of
>> mathematical axioms, more adequately, the precision with which they
>> hold, is founded on the function of creating their objects." (This
>> followed a famous quote from Einstein that "In so far as the
>> propositions of mathematics refer to reality they are not certain and
>> in so far as they are certain they do not refer to reality.")
>> Mathematics must create its object -- but not the object of
>> perception, as was probably the case with the ancient Greeks, but the
>> noumenal thing-in-itself.
>>
>> All these ideas are a direct result of Kantian concepts, whether or
>> not Einstein derived them directly from him. However, it is the case
>> that Einstein read the Critique of Pure Reason, at least, when he was
>> a teenager. The idea of a free play of the imagination, if not a
>> direct plagiarism, came down from Kant's Critique of Judgment somehow
>> or other, although I haven't searched for other possible sources such
>> as Hume.
>
>hmmm... This is an interesting topic, since it brings up the interplay
>between the sciences in general and mathematics. This is something Kant
>never wrote about explicitly.
>
I'm not sure.
Yes. I don't see any disagreement there. There can be no zero entropy,
only null entropy, which is just the null set and not a set containing
something, {0}.
>>>>Stephen Hawking is a brilliant physicist, there is no doubt about it.
>>>
>>>He was a brilliant physicist, in the past.
>>
>> Since Einstein did his major work when he was young, you could have
>> said the same about him when he was 60.
>
>When Einstein was 60 he was continuing to make profound contributions to
>physics, and was immersed in the grand unified theory problem. Much of
>this work has also made a significant impact, although it is even more
>difficult to understand than gen rel and so doesn't receive as much
>attention.
>
My biographical reading indicates that Einstein accomplished little or
nothing after his primary works. So who do I believe?