Moral relativism
Steve Murgaski
Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
"Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such a
judgement be made?
The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty good
sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
But that position is certainly relativistic.
David Johnston
<stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote:
>I really struggle with this concept.
>
>Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
Because it's a recipe for chaos.
Jim Ward
> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
> What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
> "Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such a
> judgement be made?
Some emprical evidence would be nice ... we'd need a good/bad detector ...
Randy Story
"Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote in message
news:c3ndf6$f9...@mercury.cc.uottawa.ca...
Because it is simply self defeating. Anyone who states that all morals
are relative has just made a judgement as to the state of all morality, but
in making this judgement he is asserting that his view is either good or
true or right but how can he judge this when he holds that there is no
absolute standard by which his view can be shown to be either good, or true
or right.
As such moral absolutes are what the founding fathers called self
evident truths or in philosophy is called undeniable truths. This of course
doesnt mean that it cant be morals absolutes cant be denied, its just that
one must assume there own moral absolute to deny all absolutes exist.
It just like those who say logic doesnt apply to reality, yet they must
use logic about reality in there very attempt to deny logic.
Or those who say all truth is relative except of course there statement
of truth that all truth is relative.
So what to do. be convinced that truth and morality are absolute.
David O'Bedlam
So is moral absolutism -- since there's not only one "moral absolutism".
D.
--
"They hung there dependent from the sky like some heavy metal fruit."
...................................................................
(C) 2004 TheDavid^TM | David, P.O. Box 21403, Louisville, KY 40221
Miriam Theotokos
David O'Bedlam wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2004, David Johnston wrote:
>
>>On Mon, 22 Mar 2004 13:54:16 -0500, "Steve Murgaski"
>><stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>I really struggle with this concept.
>>>
>>>Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
>>
>>Because it's a recipe for chaos.
>
>
> So is moral absolutism -- since there's not only one "moral absolutism".
I think you all need to pay more attention to the _Principia_.
David O'Bedlam
[...]
> Anyone who states that all morals
> are relative has just made a judgement as to the state of all morality, but
> in making this judgement he is asserting that his view is either good or
> true or right but how can he judge this when he holds that there is no
> absolute standard by which his view can be shown to be either good, or true
> or right.
But that's true: there is no absolute standard. Though there are lots of
contenders for that title, who've been duking it out for millenia -- to
the tune of millions of maimings, imprisonments and deaths each century.
It's a no-win game. Give it up. The belief in moral absolutes is immoral,
in my book. The best one can do is fit one's relative morals to reason
and the objective situation one is dealing with.
> As such moral absolutes are what the founding fathers called self
> evident truths or in philosophy is called undeniable truths. This of course
> doesnt mean that it cant be morals absolutes cant be denied, its just that
> one must assume there own moral absolute to deny all absolutes exist.
You're not making much sense here. Please try again.
m.
> I really struggle with this concept.
>
> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
> What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
> "Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such a
> judgement be made?
>
god is dead leads to moral relativism in the sense that there is no
longer an objective standard by which to measure anything. So some see
moral relativism as "dangerous" because without "god" or an absolute
authority acting as judge, how do we determine, for instance, that being
a murderer is wrong?
but just because god is dead, and there is no "uber" judge, this doesn't
equate into there no longer being a judge. It should force us to realize
that all along we have been the 'uber" judge.
> The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty good
> sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
>
my Kant stuff is very rusty (and shallow), but for me, it seems that the
CI ignores context and how certain situations inherently call for
actions that might be deemed "wrong" in others.
> At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
> I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
> But that position is certainly relativistic.
>
not really, what is morality but a long training of our bodies?
Jim Ward
> Because it's a recipe for chaos.
On the plus side, relativism encourages toleration.
On the minus side, relativism tends to degenerate into subjectivism,
where each individual sets his own moral code.
Jim Ward
> But that's true: there is no absolute standard. Though there are lots of
> contenders for that title, who've been duking it out for millenia -- to
> the tune of millions of maimings, imprisonments and deaths each century.
> It's a no-win game. Give it up. The belief in moral absolutes is immoral,
> in my book. The best one can do is fit one's relative morals to reason
> and the objective situation one is dealing with.
Fiting one's mn just sidesteps the issue because there is no
absolute reason. I'm sure Pol Pot had perfectly good reasons why doctors
were bourgeoisie and thus should be eliminated.
Jim Ward
> Fiting one's mn just sidesteps the issue because there is no
> absolute reason. I'm sure Pol Pot had perfectly good reasons why doctors
> were bourgeoisie and thus should be eliminated.
(My reason swallowed some characters) The first line should read:
"Fiting one's morals to reason just sidesteps the issue because there is no"
Michael S. Morris
Monday, the 22nd of March, 2004
Steve Murgaski wrote:
I really struggle with this concept.
Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral
relativism" is unacceptable?
Most people do not think this. The American public schools
positively indoctrinate to it, and have been doing so since
the 1930's. Usually, the root error is a category mistake---
the observation of cultures with different "ethical" standards
is taken as proof of the relativity of all normative standards.
I.e., it is a confusion of an "is" for an "ought".
Steve:
What is the basis for supposing that a universally
applicable standard of "Right and wrong" exists?
Well, I'm not sure what you mean by "universally
applicable". If you mean universal human agreement
about it, there is no basis. But, then, there isn't
universal human agreement about the laws of physics
or of mathematics or of aesthetics. So, if ethical laws
are propositions of ethical philosophy which are in some
sense analogous to geometric laws as propositions of
mathematical philosophy, then we certainly are not
going to expect universal human agreement as the
standard of validity. Moreover, ethical laws tend to be
propositions like "You ought to do X, and not Y, in order
to achieve Q." Where Q is something like happiness or
human excellence. So, the observation of the sociological
fact that some people choose to do Y and not X is not
relevant to the claim. One always has to trace the "in order
to" part of the claim.
Steve:
If god is dead, by what authority could such a
judgement be made?
I'm afraid I do not understand the question. I mean,
apply the same question to laws of physics. If god is dead,
by what authority could we judge whether laws of physics
are true or not? The answer is: Human reason applied according
to the rules of the philosophical endeavour. Why you imagine ethics
should be fundamentally any different than math or physics,
I don't know. You can't even begin to do physics, or judge
its validity, without making axiomatic assumptions. Same
for ethics.
Steve:
The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative"
makes pretty good sense to me, but no one seems to take
it seriously now. Why not?
I think people certainly do take it seriously now. So, again,
I don't know what you mean your claim that people don't.
Steve:
At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and
"Wrong" as feelings. I.E., if it feels as though it
would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
But that position is certainly relativistic.
Sure, it's relativistic. It's also anti-rational,
and likely to get you beaten up in certain bars.
Do you also go with your feelings when it comes
to deciding about the truth of mathematical statements
or laws of science? What about aesthetics? I.e.,
do judge art by "your feelings" about it? (Never
having had the experience of being repulsed by something
at a gut level, but being able to approach it an
intellectual level, and coming intellectually to
understand it and admire it and find it beautiful?)
These are all judgments that we make as human beings,
True/False, Beautiful/Ugly, Good/Evil in our
capacities as thinkers, makers, and doers. Do
you think that judgments about True/False and Beautiful/Ugly
are just as relative as judgments about Good/Evil?
And whatever your response to that is, do think it
True?
Mike Morris
David Johnston
<thed...@shell.rawbw.com> wrote:
>On Mon, 22 Mar 2004, Randy Story wrote:
>[...]
>
>> Anyone who states that all morals
>> are relative has just made a judgement as to the state of all morality, but
>> in making this judgement he is asserting that his view is either good or
>> true or right but how can he judge this when he holds that there is no
>> absolute standard by which his view can be shown to be either good, or true
>> or right.
>
>But that's true: there is no absolute standard. Though there are lots of
>contenders for that title, who've been duking it out for millenia -- to
>the tune of millions of maimings, imprisonments and deaths each century.
>
>It's a no-win game. Give it up. The belief in moral absolutes is immoral,
>in my book.
Yup. Nobody should ever believe that torturing people to death
is wrong. Because that's wrong.
Jim Ward
> The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty good
> sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
I think the Categorical Imperative is like the principle of the Conservation
of Energy - if moral laws exist, they should obey the CI, much like
physical laws should obey the CE. But try deducing any physical law, say
gravity, from the CE! The same difficulty applies to the CI. Kant attempted
deductions from CI, but his rules were so unpalatable, they appeared only to
apply in a non-Euclidean moral universe.
David Johnston
>Steve Murgaski wrote:
>
>> I really struggle with this concept.
>>
>> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
>> What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
>> "Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such a
>> judgement be made?
>>
>
>god is dead leads to moral relativism in the sense that there is no
>longer an objective standard by which to measure anything.
God is not an objective standard.
James Whitehead
"David Johnston" <rgorma...@telusplanet.net> wrote in message
news:405f334a....@news.telusplanet.net...
"How do you like your eggs?"
"just keep em in their shells for christs sake!"
Jim Ward
> God is not an objective standard.
I dunno, he keeps revealing books with lots of commandments. Fairly
steadily over the ages, from what I can see. When Nietzsche said "God
is Dead" I don't think he was talking about Larry Gott from Hamburg.
jonah thomas
> "Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote
>>I really struggle with this concept.
>>Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
>>What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
>>"Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such a
>>judgement be made?
>>The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty good
>>sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
>>At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
>>I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
>>But that position is certainly relativistic.
> Because it is simply self defeating. Anyone who states that all morals
> are relative has just made a judgement as to the state of all morality, but
> in making this judgement he is asserting that his view is either good or
> true or right but how can he judge this when he holds that there is no
> absolute standard by which his view can be shown to be either good, or true
> or right.
This is simply wrong. It is not not even wrong.
> As such moral absolutes are what the founding fathers called self
> evident truths or in philosophy is called undeniable truths. This of course
> doesnt mean that it cant be morals absolutes cant be denied, its just that
> one must assume there own moral absolute to deny all absolutes exist.
> It just like those who say logic doesnt apply to reality, yet they must
> use logic about reality in there very attempt to deny logic.
If you apply logic to a set of assumptions and you find a
contradiction, then you have shown those assumptions can't all be true
as they stand. You don't need a moral absolute to do it, provided the
assumptions themselves do contradict each other.
> Or those who say all truth is relative except of course there statement
> of truth that all truth is relative.
The relationship of one morality to the world is a different realm
from the relationship of moralities to logic. They aren't comparable.
> So what to do. be convinced that truth and morality are absolute.
One workable possibility might be to suppose that there is an absolute
truth and an absolute morality, but there is no reason to believe that
either have been discovered yet. Then you could examine each new
candidate by whatever methods you can come up with to see whether you
can rule it out as the correct one. At any given time you might have
a collection of moralities that have been ruled out, and a collection
that have not been ruled out yet. Who knows, someday you might find
the absolute best one.
Another workable possibility might be to suppose that there could
possibly be an absolute truth and an absolute morality, and there is
no reason to believe that either have been discovered yet. And then
proceed as before.
A third workable possibility might be to suppose that the morality you
were taught as a child is the absolute truthful morality and all
others are wrong and should be stamped out. This provides much more
certainty which is often a plus, people who believe they know the
absolute truth are often happier and more placid than other people.
jonah thomas
> "David Johnston" <rgorma...@telusplanet.net> wrote
>> "Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote:
>>>I really struggle with this concept.
>>>Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is
>>>unacceptable?
>>Because it's a recipe for chaos.
> "How do you like your eggs?"
> "just keep em in their shells for christs sake!"
Hardboiled.
jonah thomas
> I really struggle with this concept.
> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
Because people don't want to take personal responsibility for their
actions. Like, when you go into a store the employees justify what
they do with "company policy". They know they're just supposed to
follow orders, and it isn't their problem unless something gets so bad
they think they ought to quit their jobs over it -- which mostly does
not happen.
Similarly, having an absolute morality gives them a set of orders to
follow. They don't have to choose for themselves, they can refer to
the morality and say it isn't their fault.
> At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
> I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
> But that position is certainly relativistic.
You could reason backward from the results you want. But you can't
ever be sure you'll get those results. Say you break some eggs and
then you wind up with no omelette, just a mess of broken eggs on the
floor....
David Johnston
wrote:
>Steve Murgaski wrote:
>
>> I really struggle with this concept.
>
>> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
>
>Because people don't want to take personal responsibility for their
>actions.
With moral relativism, you don't have to take personal responsibility
for your actions, because nothing is actually wrong.
smw
David Johnston wrote:
Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
jonah thomas
> god is dead leads to moral relativism in the sense that there is no
> longer an objective standard by which to measure anything. So some see
> moral relativism as "dangerous" because without "god" or an absolute
> authority acting as judge, how do we determine, for instance, that being
> a murderer is wrong?
Doesn't it depend on circumstance? Some times murder is more wrong
than other times.
Once you decide that murder is wrong, what do you do to murderers?
Kill them? Well, sometimes. It depends on circumstance.
The inuit were pretty variable, but some of them took the position
that a really good hunter had the right to kill people who weren't
very valuable to the community. (Or rather, in specific cases when
people had disputes with good hunters the elders advised them to run
and not fight. And in specific cases where good hunters did kill
people, no one did anything about it.) "Whips make dogs and gifts
make slaves." Good hunters were valuable.
Usually murder came when a wife was dissatisfied with her husband and
chose someone else, who then killed the husband by surprise. Usually
nobody did anything about it.
Occasionally murders happened for other reasons. For example, during
a famine a man didn't hunt but took meat off the board without
contributing anything. Somebody put up a dog liver that he took and
ate and died. The claim was that he didn't hunt, he took food without
contributing, and he was so foolish that he didn't recognise a dog
liver. There was a story about a quarrelsome man who was on a hunting
trip with some others. He called himself a great hunter. He had
killed a great bear. He killed a great moose. One day part of the
shelter fell in and he went out to fix it. He was framed in the hole
and one man said "It is a great belly" and another said "It is indeed
a great belly" and somebody stabbed him.
When the canadians and the danish etc went in to enforce the laws they
took murderers to jail where they promptly got tuberculosis and died.
Sometimes they took accused murderers to jail to await trial where
they promptly got tuberculosis and died.
jonah thomas
> Steve Murgaski wrote:
>> If god is dead, by what authority could such a
>> judgement be made?
> I'm afraid I do not understand the question. I mean,
> apply the same question to laws of physics. If god is dead,
> by what authority could we judge whether laws of physics
> are true or not?
We have no business judging whether laws of physics are 'true' or not.
Laws of physics fit experimental data better or worse. Better is
considered better. This is not truth, this is fitting experimental data.
> The answer is: Human reason applied according
> to the rules of the philosophical endeavour. Why you imagine ethics
> should be fundamentally any different than math or physics,
> I don't know. You can't even begin to do physics, or judge
> its validity, without making axiomatic assumptions. Same
> for ethics.
No, that's completely wrong. You use a math based on axiomatic
assumptions to generate the results to compare to experimental data.
While there are axiomatic assumptions about statistics that can be
used to judge how well theory compares to experiment, the more data
you're willing to collect the less statistics you need to compare the
results. Statistics get used to deal with factors that are
uncontrolled (learn a way to control for them and you don't need those
statistics) and to generate conclusions with less data (do the work to
collect more data and your results get clearer).
Ned Ludd
"smw" <sm...@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:TOK7c.14905$t16.8...@newssvr28.news.prodigy.com...
>
>>>> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is
>>>> unacceptable?
>>>
>>> Because people don't want to take personal responsibility for their
>>> actions.
>>
>> With moral relativism, you don't have to take personal responsibility
>> for your actions, because nothing is actually wrong.
>
> Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
> stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
> relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
> stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
> wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
> lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
> friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
>
Well, cutting to the chase... were it not for moral relativism,
slavery would still be morally and legally acceptable, a man could
still have four wives, and unmarried/adulterous/homosexual lovers
could still be killed by being stoned to death.
Any more questions?
Ned
jonah thomas
> David Johnston wrote:
>> With moral relativism, you don't have to take personal responsibility
>> for your actions, because nothing is actually wrong.
> Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
> stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
> relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
> stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
> wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
> lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
> friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
Sometimes the truth people deserve is "It's none of your business.".
Unfortunately, that doesn't help much with the gestapo or the FBI.
jonah thomas
Are you sure? Even if there's no absolute standard, still it's your
own responsibility to get what you want. And if you have the luxury
to think ahead a little, that turns into your responsibility to turn
the world into the kind of world you can get what you want in. If you
help to create a chaos that you can't live with, it's your own
responsibility when you don't get what you want from it.
michael
smw wrote:
>A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
>lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
>friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
oh no! that way chaos lies!
Pete Watters
Yes. Your extrapolation differs from acceptable mores in parts of
northern Arizona and southern Utah exactly how?
Pete
--
Don't we all test our 9-volt batteries with our tongues? -- Dale Tilson
David J. Loftus
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2004 13:54:16 -0500, "Steve Murgaski"
>
This is a commonly held article of faith, but I don't know how
you might prove it.
As far as I can see, we've been living under such conditions for
quite some time, and though I wouldn't call the results ideal, it's
far from chaotic.
David Loftus
Ned Ludd
"Pete Watters" <ab...@cox.net> wrote in message
news:absfg-697D8D....@news.west.cox.net...
>
>>> Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
>>> stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
>>> relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
>>> stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
>>> wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
>>> lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
>>> friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
>>
>> Well, cutting to the chase... were it not for moral relativism,
>> slavery would still be morally and legally acceptable, a man could
>> still have four wives, and unmarried/adulterous/homosexual lovers
>> could still be killed by being stoned to death.
>> Any more questions?
>
> Yes. Your extrapolation differs from acceptable mores in parts of
> northern Arizona and southern Utah exactly how?
> Pete
>
They hide it. And pretend. The triumph of modernism. Why hasn't
pomo's 'retro' captured slavery/polygamy/intolerance?
Ned
meat n potatoes
> I really struggle with this concept.
>
> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
> judgement be made?
>
> sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
>
> I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
> But that position is certainly relativistic.
moderation is best. moral relativism is okay to an extent. for
example, there is no progress for any culture if it is totally
convinced that its values are the best and that's that. we must
realize that we are trapped within culture and our values are
conditioned.
on the other hand, if pushed too far, moral relativism ends up
defending what the very thing it is arguing against. under moral
relativism, nazism or fundamentalist islam is just as valid as any
other value system since within its own value system, nazism and the
taliban have their own logical understanding of what's right and
wrong.
the best way is to use moral relativism to understand the complexity
of the world. but moral relativism cannot be practiced because
anything can be defended, from polygamy to human sacrifice to
pedophilia.
while all morality is based and rooted in culture, higher morality
only comes thru transcendance from that culture. while total
liberation is not possible, there have been people who broke away from
the dogma of tradition. socrates who questioned everything, buddha who
pared down hinduism into compassion and abandoned all that caste
system b.s., and jesus who said god is love and for everyone.
what we must rely on is the heart and the mind. heart is compassion
and the mind allows us to question received dogmas and values. when
the mind is reconnected with the heart, a process of purification
takes place and that should be the basis for a true society.
so if a korean guy eats dogs, he's obeying his tradition. but if he
connects with his heart he will know that a dog is wonderful animal.
he will realize there is a value beyond his savage culture. and if he
uses his mind to change his value based on this compassion, he will
have arrived at a higher morality. he will walk his dog instead of
woking it.
moral relativism is a great tool for anthropologists who need to
understand other cultures from within. but, it cannot be practiced.
for example, to understand a culture that practices human sacrifice we
must understand their tradition and cosmology. if we just judge them
and call them savages, we wont' unnerstand them. but, if we go beyond
understanding and put moral relativism to practice, then we end up
justifiying human sacrifice. or slavery. i mean why should a liberal
democracy with its values try to enforce its value system on slave
systms? what right did the union have in banning slavery in the
south?
C.J.W.
jonah thomas wrote:
> Randy Story wrote:
> > "Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote
<snip>
> > Because it is simply self defeating. Anyone who states that all morals
> > are relative has just made a judgement as to the state of all morality, but
> > in making this judgement he is asserting that his view is either good or
> > true or right but how can he judge this when he holds that there is no
> > absolute standard by which his view can be shown to be either good, or true
> > or right.
>
> This is simply wrong. It is not not even wrong.
It is simply right, which is why you can't really deny it as if what you are
saying is true. It is a self evident truth evident in the Self. Morality is
based on common sense. The common sense that all is not as it should be. From
there, vast codes of ethics are built up and the issue is whether they are right
or wrong.
<snip>
> If you apply logic to a set of assumptions and you find a
> contradiction, then you have shown those assumptions can't all be true
> as they stand. You don't need a moral absolute to do it, provided the
> assumptions themselves do contradict each other.
If you're saying that you're right about something as if what you're saying is
true and others ought to agree then you are attempting to understand a moral
absolute.
> > Or those who say all truth is relative except of course there statement
> > of truth that all truth is relative.
>
> The relationship of one morality to the world is a different realm
> from the relationship of moralities to logic.
Moral views are based on logic and common sense. It isn't a different realm.
<snip>
> > So what to do. be convinced that truth and morality are absolute.
>
> One workable possibility might be to suppose that there is an absolute
> truth and an absolute morality, but there is no reason to believe that
> either have been discovered yet.
If you have a reason for reason then there is plenty of reason. It's the people
that begin their reasoning without such a reason that tend to be unreasonable.
Common sense indicates that we all have some knowledge that all is not right with
the world and therefore have some knowledge of right and wrong.
> Then you could examine each new
> candidate by whatever methods you can come up with to see whether you
> can rule it out as the correct one. At any given time you might have
> a collection of moralities that have been ruled out, and a collection
> that have not been ruled out yet. Who knows, someday you might find
> the absolute best one.
Morality is understood, not invented. You can only supposedly have a collection
of so-called "moralities" if you assume that morality is invented. This notion
that morality is invented lies at the heart of philosophies of might makes right,
Nazism, etc. The notion that morality is something to be understood lies at the
heart of right makes might, Americanism, etc.
<snip>
> A third workable possibility might be to suppose that the morality you
> were taught as a child is the absolute truthful morality and all
> others are wrong and should be stamped out. This provides much more
> certainty which is often a plus, people who believe they know the
> absolute truth are often happier and more placid than other people.
Well, typically the morality that people were taught as a child is based on their
cultural prejudices which are informed by millenia of human experience. It is
generally not a bad place to start.
--W
smw
C.J.W. wrote:
> It is a self evident truth evident in the Self.
Keep up the good work! I especially like the self/Self distinction.
Pete Watters
Sheesh. You gots to be mo before you can be pomo, Ned.
http://www.sltrib.com/2004/Jan/01242004/utah/utah.asp
C.J.W.
Steve Murgaski wrote:
> I really struggle with this concept.
>
> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
Generally, because they don't want to be bound by any ethical code. If they
can make it up as they go along they think they will be "happy." It generally
doesn't seem to turn out that way though.
> What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
> "Right and wrong" exists?
The Nazis called it the "Jewish influence."
I would say it's a little broader than that, common sense. (Although the
"Jewish influence" is an excellent example of its clear expression.)
> If god is dead, by what authority could such a
> judgement be made?
You don't make such a judgement based on authority or might. You either admit
to it in your heart or you don't. It is not complicated. There are very
smart people who are very evil and immoral and people that are not as smart
who are very moral.
<snip>
> At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
> I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
> But that position is certainly relativistic.
Not if common sense is universal and in some sense it is. It can only be
supressed but not eliminated. You'll come across this fact debating any
relativist, even a Nazi. They have the common sense that they are wrong but
supress it to the point of self-refutation or even a "true" refutation of
sentience, death. See: (The Revenge of Conscience, by J. Budziszewski) I
would argue that common sense is closely bound to language itself and most of
what you'll find among people who have chosen to supress common sense is
simply an abuse of language. You can unwind it and skewer them with it but
most relativists still won't change their "minds" because what really seems to
govern them is pure emotion. The American Founders sought to protect the
expression of common sense through protecting its expression through
religion. But you'll find that those who tend to abuse language, people want
to adhere to political correctness instead of moral correctness, have turned
the American Founder's Constitution on its head so that it supposedly works in
a fascist way to supress religious expression and so supress common sense.
They do this through the abuse of language and so on. Eventually, they come
to the point where the Constitution is supposedly saying that the Constitution
is "unconstitutional" and the Declaration of Independence (which the American
Founders viewed as the ends to which the Constitution was merely a means) is
also "unconstitutional."
--W
C.J.W.
jonah thomas wrote:
> m. wrote:
>
> > god is dead leads to moral relativism in the sense that there is no
> > longer an objective standard by which to measure anything. So some see
> > moral relativism as "dangerous" because without "god" or an absolute
> > authority acting as judge, how do we determine, for instance, that being
> > a murderer is wrong?
>
> Doesn't it depend on circumstance? Some times murder is more wrong
> than other times.
>
> Once you decide that murder is wrong, what do you do to murderers?
> Kill them? Well, sometimes. It depends on circumstance.
You're still applying the standard that murder is wrong to the circumstances.
Your argument leads to judges making up the law rather than just applying it
to the circumstances. Unfortunately your view is increasingly typical and
judges are just inventing more and more law.
> The inuit were pretty variable, but some of them took the position
> that a really good hunter had the right to kill people who weren't
> very valuable to the community.
"Life unworthy of life." a typical view among philosophic naturalists.
It's an uncivilized view.
<snip>
> Usually murder came when a wife was dissatisfied with her husband and
> chose someone else, who then killed the husband by surprise. Usually
> nobody did anything about it.
That doesn't mean they didn't sense it was wrong.
> Occasionally murders happened for other reasons. <snip>
As if that doesn't still happen?
Your argument looks like: "People disagree about what is moral. Therefore,
morality doesn't exist."
Well, I disagree with that. So your argument doesn't exist as if it has
"meaning."
--W
C.J.W.
meat n potatoes wrote:
> "Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote in message news:<c3ndf6$f9...@mercury.cc.uottawa.ca>...
> > I really struggle with this concept.
> >
> <snip>
>
> while all morality is based and rooted in culture, higher morality
> only comes thru transcendance from that culture. while total
> liberation is not possible, there have been people who broke away from
> the dogma of tradition. socrates who questioned everything, buddha who
> pared down hinduism into compassion and abandoned all that caste
> system b.s., and jesus who said god is love and for everyone.<snip>
Actually, I think most of those whom you cite were going back to common sense and appealing to the heart.
That could be an explanation why they were so successful because all they had to do was appeal to a common
sense already there.
In contrast, most of the philosophers who wanted to change common sense, overcome it, demolish it, etc.,
you didn't list. The Marquis de Sade, Nietzsche, the Nazis, Machiavelli, etc.
--W
smw
C.J.W. wrote:
>
> meat n potatoes wrote:
>
>
>>"Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote in message news:<c3ndf6$f9...@mercury.cc.uottawa.ca>...
>>
>>>I really struggle with this concept.
>>>
>>
>><snip>
>>
>>while all morality is based and rooted in culture, higher morality
>>only comes thru transcendance from that culture. while total
>>liberation is not possible, there have been people who broke away from
>>the dogma of tradition. socrates who questioned everything, buddha who
>>pared down hinduism into compassion and abandoned all that caste
>>system b.s., and jesus who said god is love and for everyone.<snip>
>
>
> Actually, I think most of those whom you cite were going back to common sense
Yeah, "turn the other cheek," "love your enemies," all common sense.
Just like "if you want justice, the first thing to do is to take kids
away from their parents and make wives communal property." Whose heart
wouldn't be warmed?
jonah thomas
> jonah thomas wrote:
>>m. wrote:
>>>god is dead leads to moral relativism in the sense that there is no
>>>longer an objective standard by which to measure anything. So some see
>>>moral relativism as "dangerous" because without "god" or an absolute
>>>authority acting as judge, how do we determine, for instance, that being
>>>a murderer is wrong?
>>Doesn't it depend on circumstance? Some times murder is more wrong
>>than other times.
>>Once you decide that murder is wrong, what do you do to murderers?
>>Kill them? Well, sometimes. It depends on circumstance.
> You're still applying the standard that murder is wrong to the circumstances.
> Your argument leads to judges making up the law rather than just applying it
> to the circumstances. Unfortunately your view is increasingly typical and
> judges are just inventing more and more law.
Surely you wouldn't argue that the american legal system has much to
do with morality.
>>The inuit were pretty variable, but some of them took the position
>>that a really good hunter had the right to kill people who weren't
>>very valuable to the community.
> "Life unworthy of life." a typical view among philosophic naturalists.
> It's an uncivilized view.
I'm particularly interested in the inuit because they had to live in
relatively small groups (so they didn't have so much room for special
castes of liars to arise and live off the rest) and they were living
at carrying capacity. In good years the population expanded, in bad
years it contracted. So they didn't have as much room for nonsense.
They needed a simple system that let them survive.
> <snip>
>>Usually murder came when a wife was dissatisfied with her husband and
>>chose someone else, who then killed the husband by surprise. Usually
>>nobody did anything about it.
> That doesn't mean they didn't sense it was wrong.
Many of them sensed that killing animals for meat was wrong, but they
had to do it or starve. At one time they had the custom of thanking
the animal for sacrificing itself for them. The conceit was that he
knew they were waiting to ambush him, and he went into their ambush
willingly. They prayed for his soul and did what courtesies they
could -- a taste of fresh water, a pat on the head, the feel of a
glass marble or something else soothing.
More than we do for the animals we slaughter.
>>Occasionally murders happened for other reasons. <snip>
> As if that doesn't still happen?
It was kind of different. The stories from Point Barrow give lots of
examples of men-who-kill-people. A man who lost an only son might
start killing young men who visited from elsewhere. The local people
wouldn't stop him but might warn a particular young man to give him
the chance to kill the man-who-kills-people instead.
> Your argument looks like: "People disagree about what is moral. Therefore,
> morality doesn't exist."
No, my claim is that morality *does* exist to the extent that people
agree about it. Which is a whole lot. It exists as itself,
independent of reasons they might have to agree or whatever truth
there might be to those reasons etc. It has no ultimate justification
beyond the fact that they agree and are willing to enforce it, and it
needs none.
> Well, I disagree with that. So your argument doesn't exist as if it has
> "meaning."
Shared meanings are shared among whoever shares them. To the extent
that the Whorf hypothesis fits the reality, the existence of a lot of
chinese who don't know any east-indian language and a lot of
east-indians who don't know any chinese language would imply that
there is very little we all share. Whorf himself claimed that the
hopi indians have some senses of time that anglos mostly don't get,
that are represented by special verb tenses in their language. "I am
hoeing my corn (as I always do, as my ancestors always did, as
everybody does, as hopis will always do)." A sort of always-present.
I wouldn't argue that their meaning doesn't exist just because we
don't do it that way. And I similarly wouldn't argue that the only
morality is what we all have in common. No, morality is what people
recite principles to force on each other, and it doesn't matter how
few people are doing it, it's still morality.
jonah thomas
> Morality is
> based on common sense. The common sense that all is not as it should be. From
> there, vast codes of ethics are built up and the issue is whether they are right
> or wrong.
You have left out a step between "I want things to be different" and
"There is an absolute morality".
>>If you apply logic to a set of assumptions and you find a
>>contradiction, then you have shown those assumptions can't all be true
>>as they stand. You don't need a moral absolute to do it, provided the
>>assumptions themselves do contradict each other.
> If you're saying that you're right about something as if what you're saying is
> true and others ought to agree then you are attempting to understand a moral
> absolute.
Well, it depends. Logical inference is a simple thing that people
pick up easily. Telling the difference between a valid logical
inference and an invalid one is also a simple thing that people pick
up easily. What makes it hard is when we leave out a whole lot of
steps. If you're willing to describe a logical proof in very tedious
form, a very simple computer program can check whether it's valid.
The more tediously you're willing to present it, the simpler the
program can be down to a very simple absolute minimum. Having a
logical proof doesn't mean your conclusions are correct, it means only
that your conclusions have been shown to follow logically from your
assumptions which may or may not be correct.
Formal logic appears to have been invented independently at least a
few times, by the chinese, the tibetans, and much later the europeans.
These three systems differ in subtle details but not in anything
that makes a difference. I have not heard of an alternative formal
logic, they all seem to be pretty much equivalent. Logic is a way to
check that your conclusions follow from your assumptions. If you
don't need to check your results you don't need it. It gives no
particular help in generating conclusions, as witness logic generating
programs are much more difficult than logic checking programs.
Logic has no obvious moral component, it is simply a set of rules to
test a chain of inferences from assumptions to conclusions. It isn't
immoral not to use it to check, and applying logic to your assumptions
doesn't make them more moral. If you have moral assumptions that
include a logical contradiction, and if you are willing to accept
logical inferences, then your morality is shit, it is possible to
infer both sides of any question from your assumption.
I say that moral systems that start with contradictory assumptions and
that allow logical inferences are no good, they are all worse than
moral systems that do not start with contradictions or that don't
allow logical inferences. If you disagree I'm willing to listen.
>>> Or those who say all truth is relative except of course there statement
>>>of truth that all truth is relative.
>>The relationship of one morality to the world is a different realm
>>from the relationship of moralities to logic.
> Moral views are based on logic and common sense. It isn't a different realm.
Well, no, they aren't. Moral views are supposed to connect to
reality. The logic that deals with contradictions in moral
assumptions does not connect to reality, it only connects to the moral
assumptions and their logical contradictions. Two different realms.
It's like talking about reality, versus talking about assumptions
about reality. You're making two different kinds of claims, even
though when you try to talk about reality you might only be talking
about your assumptions about reality. It's still a very different claim.
>>One workable possibility might be to suppose that there is an absolute
>>truth and an absolute morality, but there is no reason to believe that
>>either have been discovered yet.
> If you have a reason for reason then there is plenty of reason. It's the people
> that begin their reasoning without such a reason that tend to be unreasonable.
> Common sense indicates that we all have some knowledge that all is not right with
> the world and therefore have some knowledge of right and wrong.
Yes, but there's such a big step from "I want things to be different"
to "I know the absolute correct morality".
>> Then you could examine each new
>>candidate by whatever methods you can come up with to see whether you
>>can rule it out as the correct one. At any given time you might have
>>a collection of moralities that have been ruled out, and a collection
>>that have not been ruled out yet. Who knows, someday you might find
>>the absolute best one.
> Morality is understood, not invented. You can only supposedly have a collection
> of so-called "moralities" if you assume that morality is invented. This notion
> that morality is invented lies at the heart of philosophies of might makes right,
> Nazism, etc. The notion that morality is something to be understood lies at the
> heart of right makes might, Americanism, etc.
What evidence do you have that moralities are found instead of
invented? It sounds like you prefer moralities that claim that
moralities are found rather than invented (and I agree with you about
the examples you gave, I prefer them too). But isn't our preference
irrelevant to their correctness?
>>A third workable possibility might be to suppose that the morality you
>>were taught as a child is the absolute truthful morality and all
>>others are wrong and should be stamped out. This provides much more
>>certainty which is often a plus, people who believe they know the
>>absolute truth are often happier and more placid than other people.
> Well, typically the morality that people were taught as a child is based on their
> cultural prejudices which are informed by millenia of human experience. It is
> generally not a bad place to start.
Yes, it's probably going to be the most comforting choice.
sol
> "Right and wrong" exists?
It seems to me that the only objectors to "moral relativism" are the
monotheistic religions. I think they reject it for two reasons: one, if
morality is relative then it is a man-made concept, not a God-given one and
if it IS a man-made concept, what use is there for God; and two, because
monotheistic religions are intolerant of other world-views so their morality
must be regarded as absolute.
mephisto
Sunny side up, but whites cooked through, yolks still raw. It's an art.
mephisto
>
>
> David O'Bedlam wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 22 Mar 2004, David Johnston wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, 22 Mar 2004 13:54:16 -0500, "Steve Murgaski"
>>> <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> I really struggle with this concept.
>>>>
>>>> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is
>>>> unacceptable?
>>>
>>>
>>> Because it's a recipe for chaos.
>>
>>
>>
>> So is moral absolutism -- since there's not only one "moral absolutism".
>
>
> I think you all need to pay more attention to the _Principia_.
>
I need to see this recipie for chaos.
Steve Hayes
wrote:
>I really struggle with this concept.
>
>Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
>What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
>"Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such a
>judgement be made?
>
>The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty good
>sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
>
>At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
>I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
>But that position is certainly relativistic.
So it is.
So you stick to your morality, and I'll stick to mine.
If someone doesn't think it morally wrong to kill you, never mind, you can
believe that it's morally right to defend yourself from attempts to do so.
Is that libertarian morality?
Can you suggest any good books on the subject, or are you hoping others will
suggest them?
--
Steve Hayes
E-mail: haye...@hotmail.com
Web: http://www.geocities.com/hayesstw/stevesig.htm
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/7734/books.htm
smw
Steve Hayes wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Mar 2004 13:54:16 -0500, "Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org>
> wrote:
>
>
>>I really struggle with this concept.
>>
>>Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
>>What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
>>"Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such a
>>judgement be made?
>>
>>The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty good
>>sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
>>
>>At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
>>I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
>>But that position is certainly relativistic.
>
>
> So it is.
>
> So you stick to your morality, and I'll stick to mine.
>
> If someone doesn't think it morally wrong to kill you, never mind, you can
> believe that it's morally right to defend yourself from attempts to do so.
>
> Is that libertarian morality?
>
> Can you suggest any good books on the subject, or are you hoping others will
> suggest them?
Hell, I'll start: _Leviathan_. A current love.
>
>
>
mephisto
'A Theologico-Political Treatise'
smw
mephisto wrote:
> smw wrote:
>
...
>>
>> Hell, I'll start: _Leviathan_. A current love.
>>
> 'A Theologico-Political Treatise'
eh, you win...
mephisto
"I deny not, but that it is of greatest concernment in the Church and
Commonwealth, to have a vigilant eye how Bookes demeane themselves as
well as men; and thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest
justice on them as malefactors: For Books are not absolutely dead
things, but doe contain a potencie of life in them to be as active as
that soule was whose progeny they are; nay they do preserve as in a
violl the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that
bred them."
Michael S. Morris
Monday, the 22nd of March, 2004
Steve Murgaski wrote:
If god is dead, by what authority could such a
judgement be made?
I said:
I'm afraid I do not understand the question. I mean,
apply the same question to laws of physics. If god is dead,
by what authority could we judge whether laws of physics
are true or not?
jonah thomas:
We have no business judging whether laws of physics are 'true' or not.
Laws of physics fit experimental data better or worse. Better is
considered better. This is not truth, this is fitting experimental data.
Nah, you've been indoctrinated with the standard science-textbook
cardboard propaganda about what science is. "Fitting experimental
data" doesn't get anybody's juices flowing, is the point. Discovering
Truth with a capital T, on the other hand, can get a man laid.
And why experimental should have anything to do with anything is
simply a *metaphysical* assumption that one makes in order to do
physics in the first place. One makes, I think, at least two
fundamental axiomatic assumptions at a metaphysical level in order
to do physics. The first is the "better" is fitting experimental
data assumption, or the material world is the thing investigated
by science assumption. The second assumption is that laws of
nature connect moment to moment in an efficient causal way.
Neither assumption is more than an assumption. You can't prove
with more experiment or more agreement with experiment. Both assumptions
are capable of fruitful negation, too, on occasion.
I said:
The answer is: Human reason applied according
to the rules of the philosophical endeavour. Why you imagine ethics
should be fundamentally any different than math or physics,
I don't know. You can't even begin to do physics, or judge
its validity, without making axiomatic assumptions. Same
for ethics.
jonah thomas:
No, that's completely wrong.
No, it's completely right.
jonah:
You use a math based on axiomatic
assumptions to generate the results to compare to experimental data.
While there are axiomatic assumptions about statistics that can be used
to judge how well theory compares to experiment, the more data you're
willing to collect the less statistics you need to compare the results.
Statistics get used to deal with factors that are uncontrolled (learn a
way to control for them and you don't need those statistics) and to
generate conclusions with less data (do the work to collect more data
and your results get clearer).
You are totally missing the point here. I am *not* talking
about mathematical axioms in science. Those are entirely adjunct
to the process of science itself, which makes *metaphysical*
assumptions about the world, about laws of nature, and about
how one queries the world to find out about those laws.
Mike Morris
Steve Murgaski
"Randy Story" <rsto...@olypen.com> wrote in message
news:105uiij...@corp.supernews.com...
>
> "Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote in message
> news:c3ndf6$f9...@mercury.cc.uottawa.ca...
> >
> > Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is
unacceptable?
> > What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard
of
a
> > judgement be made?
> >
> > The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty
good
> > sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
> >
> > At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
> > I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be
done.
> > But that position is certainly relativistic.
>
>
morals
> are relative has just made a judgement as to the state of all morality,
but
> in making this judgement he is asserting that his view is either good or
> true or right but how can he judge this when he holds that there is no
> absolute standard by which his view can be shown to be either good, or
true
> or right.
To me, it's a matter of burden of proof.
Suppose you and I feel differently about the morality of some particular
act. If I'm a relativist, then our disagreement only means, to me, that our
different perspectives are causing us to see the issue differently. I could
suggest my perspective to you as an alternative that you might want to
adopt, but I couldn't argue that my view is "Right," because "Right and
wrong" aren't concepts that I would understand.
If you, on the other hand, did believe in the existence of some universal
moral code, then I think the burden of proof would be on you to establish
its validity. In order to tell me "You are wrong," you first need to define
"Wrong."
Since "Wrong" wouldn't be a word that I was trying to use, my position
wouldn't require that I define it.
> So what to do. be convinced that truth and morality are absolute.
Thanks. I like that argument. ;)
Steve Murgaski
> stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
> relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
> stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
> wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
> lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
> friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
Thanks. I can see how that should be problematic for Kant.
Maybe Mahatma Gandhi would have said, "I don't choose to answer that," and
taken the consequences, secure in the belief that he could teach his
morality even to Nazis just by setting an example. But you'd have to put
your moral code above everything else in order to do it. Believing that
your code came from God would have to make that a lot easier to do.
Smeebag
They are largely driven by religion and culture.
Morals are hammered into us from a young age by our family and our peers.
A white catholic living in idaho, for example is hardly going to agree with
an Arab living in the
middle east, as to what is moral.
As with most things human, there is no black & white when it comes to morals
and nothing short of the second coming will change that.
"Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote in message
news:c3om08$je...@mercury.cc.uottawa.ca...
Steve Murgaski
"m." <queen...@smiths.net> wrote in message
news:8gI7c.3414$V66...@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
> Steve Murgaski wrote:
>
> > I really struggle with this concept.
> >
> > Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is
unacceptable?
> > What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard
of
> > "Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such
a
> > judgement be made?
> >
>
> longer an objective standard by which to measure anything. So some see
> moral relativism as "dangerous" because without "god" or an absolute
> authority acting as judge, how do we determine, for instance, that being
> a murderer is wrong?
I see it as potentially dangerous as well. (Though I like David's point
that absolutist ideas are also dangerous -- perhaps moreso?)
> but just because god is dead, and there is no "uber" judge, this doesn't
> equate into there no longer being a judge. It should force us to realize
> that all along we have been the 'uber" judge.
Or, that every individual is their own 'uber" judge, since there is no WE.
> > The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty
good
> > sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
> >
>
> my Kant stuff is very rusty (and shallow), but for me, it seems that the
> CI ignores context and how certain situations inherently call for
> actions that might be deemed "wrong" in others.
Seems to be what Silke says too. Guess I'll have to read him myself
someday.
> > At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
> > I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be
done.
> > But that position is certainly relativistic.
> >
>
> not really, what is morality but a long training of our bodies?
Everyone has their own training; particularly, from one culture to another.
Steve Murgaski
>
>
> Steve Hayes wrote to me:
> > If someone doesn't think it morally wrong to kill you, never mind, you
can
> > believe that it's morally right to defend yourself from attempts to do
so.
Or I might try to enlighten them by allowing myself to be killed. I'd have
to think about it. :)
> > Is that libertarian morality?
> >
> > Can you suggest any good books on the subject, or are you hoping others
will
> > suggest them?
I'm not a systematic philosopher. I try to learn about different cultures
by reading books that people in those cultures might read, on the
supposition that they will have evolved ways of thinking about things which
`Work for them.' By comparing those ways of thinking with my own, I might
find things that I'd want to borrow.
So, I read as many translated books as I can find (and find time for).
[Silke]
> Hell, I'll start: _Leviathan_. A current love.
Seriously?
I'm disappointed. That book is nasty, brutish, and long.
David Johnston
wrote:
>
>"smw" <sm...@ameritech.net> wrote in message
>news:TOK7c.14905$t16.8...@newssvr28.news.prodigy.com...
>>
>>>>> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is
>>>>> unacceptable?
>>>>
>>>> Because people don't want to take personal responsibility for their
>>>> actions.
>>>
>>> With moral relativism, you don't have to take personal responsibility
>>> for your actions, because nothing is actually wrong.
>>
>> Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
>> stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
>> relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
>> stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
>> wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
>> lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
>> friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
>>
>
> Well, cutting to the chase... were it not for moral relativism,
>slavery would still be morally and legally acceptable,
No, it wouldn't. The people who strongly objected to it were moral
absolutists, and the economic forces that made it unviable would
still have done their work with or without moral relativism.
David Johnston
>
>
>C.J.W. wrote:
>
>>
>> meat n potatoes wrote:
>>
>>
>>>"Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote in message news:<c3ndf6$f9...@mercury.cc.uottawa.ca>...
>>>
>>>>I really struggle with this concept.
>>>>
>>>
>>><snip>
>>>
>>>while all morality is based and rooted in culture, higher morality
>>>only comes thru transcendance from that culture. while total
>>>liberation is not possible, there have been people who broke away from
>>>the dogma of tradition. socrates who questioned everything, buddha who
>>>pared down hinduism into compassion and abandoned all that caste
>>>system b.s., and jesus who said god is love and for everyone.<snip>
>>
>>
>> Actually, I think most of those whom you cite were going back to common sense
>
>Yeah, "turn the other cheek," "love your enemies," all common sense.
Damn straight. If they didn't turn the other cheek, the Romans were
going to kill their asses.
David Johnston
wrote:
>
>
>Steve Murgaski wrote:
>
>> I really struggle with this concept.
>>
>> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
>
>Generally, because they don't want to be bound by any ethical code. I
Did you confusion "unacceptable" with "acceptable"? Because, y'know,
I'm not quite understanding your response.
David Johnston
wrote:
>
>If someone doesn't think it morally wrong to kill you, never mind, you can
>believe that it's morally right to defend yourself from attempts to do so.
You'd be a hell of a lot safer by convincing him that it's wrong in
the first place.
David Johnston
wrote:
>
>"Pete Watters" <ab...@cox.net> wrote in message
>news:absfg-697D8D....@news.west.cox.net...
>>
>>>> Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
>>>> stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
>>>> relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
>>>> stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
>>>> wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
>>>> lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
>>>> friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
>>>
>>> Well, cutting to the chase... were it not for moral relativism,
>>> slavery would still be morally and legally acceptable, a man could
>>> still have four wives, and unmarried/adulterous/homosexual lovers
>>> could still be killed by being stoned to death.
>>> Any more questions?
>>
>> Yes. Your extrapolation differs from acceptable mores in parts of
>> northern Arizona and southern Utah exactly how?
>> Pete
>>
>
> They hide it.
Hide it? They let 60 Minutes come in and film it!
David Johnston
>
>Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
>stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
>relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
>stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
>wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
>lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
>friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
>
Then again he might argue, for instance, that it's NOT okay
to lie to the Gestapo since that violates the immediately prevailing
morality.
smw
David Johnston wrote:
Hence whoever said that moral relativism puts the responsibility
squarely on your shoulder had it exactly right.
Btw, it's funny that the position you outline above is more likely be
fueled by the law and order position advocated by the self-alleged
anti-relativists.
Ned Ludd
"David Johnston" <rgorma...@telusplanet.net> wrote in message
news:405ff3fe....@news.telusplanet.net...
>
>>> Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
>>> stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
>>> relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
>>> stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
>>> wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
>>> lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
>>> friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
>>
>> Well, cutting to the chase... were it not for moral relativism,
>> slavery would still be morally and legally acceptable,
>
> No, it wouldn't. The people who strongly objected to it were moral
> absolutists, and the economic forces that made it unviable would
> still have done their work with or without moral relativism.
>
Maybe on Mars. But on Earth it took war, and many wars to end
it, because it was - and is - so economically viable.
Ned
jonah thomas
> haye...@hotmail.com (Steve Hayes) wrote:
>>If someone doesn't think it morally wrong to kill you, never mind, you can
>>believe that it's morally right to defend yourself from attempts to do so.
> You'd be a hell of a lot safer by convincing him that it's wrong in
> the first place.
The safest approach -- if you can manage it -- is to kill everybody
else before they get the chance to kill you.
But it isn't workable for people who get real lonely.
jonah thomas
> "Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>"Pete Watters" <ab...@cox.net> wrote in message
>>>Yes. Your extrapolation differs from acceptable mores in parts of
>>>northern Arizona and southern Utah exactly how?
>> They hide it.
> Hide it? They let 60 Minutes come in and film it!
Those are the ones you heard about.
jonah thomas
> "David Johnston" <rgorma...@telusplanet.net> wrote
>>>>Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
>>>>stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
>>>>relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
>>>>stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
>>>>wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
>>>>lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
>>>>friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
>>>Well, cutting to the chase... were it not for moral relativism,
>>>slavery would still be morally and legally acceptable,
>>No, it wouldn't. The people who strongly objected to it were moral
>>absolutists, and the economic forces that made it unviable would
>>still have done their work with or without moral relativism.
> Maybe on Mars. But on Earth it took war, and many wars to end
> it, because it was - and is - so economically viable.
Slavery has big built-in economic defects. Li Ssu had a slogan, "This
plan is so simple even a slave couldn't make it fail!". It's been
recognised for a very long time that it's hard to get work out of
slaves, and they mostly aren't worth the trouble. (But there was a
figure in chinese history who did something right and got a lot of
very efficient loyal slaves. He was regarded as some sort of genius.)
I get the impression that what can make slavery viable is an
inadequate banking system. When there just isn't much money, it helps
to not have to make payrolls. I get the impression this was true in
the american south though I don't remember the titles or authors of a
couple of books that I didn't read that made the claim. The money
went north where it could get a better payoff, so anybody who wanted
to get by in the south had to do it without circulating much money.
Slaves were expensive after they couldn't be imported, but they could
be bought once with profits and then didn't have to be paid. They
grew their own food. If cloth was expensive they could wear their own
homespun. If an owner did his own smithing he mostly had to pay for
their doctor bills, and doctors often accepted produce as payment.
I think it's more that slavery is psychologically viable. A woman who
has slaves can tell them to wash her hair and comb it and so on, and
she knows where she stands. If they do a bad job or if she's just mad
about anything else she can box their ears and there's nothing they
can do about it. If instead she had servants who could quit, her
friends might tend to hire the good ones away from her. If they were
slaves she'd only sell them if she wanted to.
jonah thomas
> Steve Murgaski wrote:
> If god is dead, by what authority could such a
> judgement be made?
> I said:
> I'm afraid I do not understand the question. I mean,
> apply the same question to laws of physics. If god is dead,
> by what authority could we judge whether laws of physics
> are true or not?
> jonah thomas:
> We have no business judging whether laws of physics are 'true' or not.
> Laws of physics fit experimental data better or worse. Better is
> considered better. This is not truth, this is fitting experimental data.
> Nah, you've been indoctrinated with the standard science-textbook
> cardboard propaganda about what science is. "Fitting experimental
> data" doesn't get anybody's juices flowing, is the point. Discovering
> Truth with a capital T, on the other hand, can get a man laid.
Maybe so, but you need emeritus status to get published doing it.
Everybody else is stuck fitting experimental data.
Sometimes it's even worse than that. I remember the lament of a
computational chemist I met in a bar twenty years ago. He said when
he did computations that fit existing experimental data, he got the
criticism that they already knew that. But when he did computations
that predicted new things that hadn't been done yet, he got the
criticism that it wasn't verified.
> And why experimental should have anything to do with anything is
> simply a *metaphysical* assumption that one makes in order to do
> physics in the first place. One makes, I think, at least two
> fundamental axiomatic assumptions at a metaphysical level in order
> to do physics. The first is the "better" is fitting experimental
> data assumption, or the material world is the thing investigated
> by science assumption.
No, we can assume that physics is what we measure by physics
experiments. Arguments about whether the material world is a dream
etc can be left to philosophers.
> The second assumption is that laws of
> nature connect moment to moment in an efficient causal way.
We don't have to assume that experiments are reproducible. We throw
out experiments that aren't reproducible. If you invent a law of
nature that changes second to second, you won't get reproducible
experiments and you'll be stuck doing humanities.
> Neither assumption is more than an assumption. You can't prove
> with more experiment or more agreement with experiment. Both assumptions
> are capable of fruitful negation, too, on occasion.
Irrelevant.
> I said:
> The answer is: Human reason applied according
> to the rules of the philosophical endeavour. Why you imagine ethics
> should be fundamentally any different than math or physics,
> I don't know. You can't even begin to do physics, or judge
> its validity, without making axiomatic assumptions. Same
> for ethics.
> jonah thomas: No, that's completely wrong.
> No, it's completely right.
<shrug>
> jonah:
> You use a math based on axiomatic assumptions to generate the results
> to compare to experimental data. While there are axiomatic assumptions
> about statistics that can be used to judge how well theory compares to
> experiment, the more data you're willing to collect the less statistics
> you need to compare the results. Statistics get used to deal with
> factors that are uncontrolled (learn a way to control for them and you
> don't need those statistics) and to generate conclusions with less data
> (do the work to collect more data and your results get clearer).
> You are totally missing the point here. I am *not* talking
> about mathematical axioms in science. Those are entirely adjunct
> to the process of science itself, which makes *metaphysical*
> assumptions about the world, about laws of nature, and about
> how one queries the world to find out about those laws.
I think you might have a point here. It takes metaphysical
assumptions to decide what meanings to give to science stuff. It
would take metaphysical assumptions to decide that science reveals
Truth, for example. However, I believe those assumptions are not
necessary to the process of science itself. The process can be
carried out regardless. But laws of nature that aren't susceptible to
discovery by scientific method will tend to stay unrevealed by
science. We can't say they aren't there, just we don't know how to
find them. If we were to say that scientific method is guaranteed to
find all the 'real' laws of nature, then we'd be making a metaphysical
assumption.
I suppose you could claim that real scientists are looking for Truth
even though their traditional dogma says that scientific method won't
get there. You could claim that real scientists do science so they
can tell women they have found Truth to get laid. You could claim
that real scientists believe that anything that isn't revealed by
scientific method is wrong. I'm starting to get the idea that making
claims about what goes on in other people's souls is a big part of
what humanities does, and I mostly don't see how to do it using
scientific method, so it looks like 'what physicists really think' is
something that an honest physicist should say isn't his field. He
should leave it to the experts who study that sort of thing.
Michael S. Morris
Tuesday, the 23rd of March, 2004
Silke:
Btw, it's funny that the position you outline above is more likely
be fueled by the law and order position advocated by the self-alleged
anti-relativists.
Actually what would be funny were it not a crying shame is that
one of the e-headlines today is "World Anger at Hamas Killing"
and if you go to the article, it isn't anger at Hamas for its incessant
terror killings of civilian men women and children, it isn't
anger at the Palestinian crowds for reacting to the joyful news
by calling for more murders in revenge for Sheikh Ahmed Yassin,
it isn't applause and cheers for the Israelis for doing the world
a favour in getting rid of another terrorist who should have been
put to death 30 years ago, it isn't anger at the UN Security
Council and at the US and Europe for not having embarked upon
the selfsame anti-terrorist military operations at least 30
years ago, but instead this "world anger" is anger *at Israel*
for conducting just war against an organization whose sole
stated raison d'etre is the murder of Israeli Jews:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3559469.stm>
And no, it is only a moral relativist who rats to the Gestapo
and justifies this in terms of "not telling a lie". It is only a
moral absolutist---one who believes Natural Law as an external given
and not a human autonomy---who has even the *possibility* of choosing
to go against naked and immediate self-interest out of some rational
consideration of the possibility of there being a higher Law of Good
and Evil. It's the moral relativist who has absolutely denied that
possibility from the get-go.
Mike Morris
(msmo...@netdirect.net)
jonah thomas
> Silke:
> Btw, it's funny that the position you outline above is more likely be
> fueled by the law and order position advocated by the self-alleged
> anti-relativists.
> And no, it is only a moral relativist who rats to the Gestapo
> and justifies this in terms of "not telling a lie".
It can be either. The evil psychology experiments of the 1980s showed
that people get swayed by circumstance. Given the chance to do
something necessary but unconventional -- rescue a secretary under a
file cabinet, say, in a part of an office that visitors don't go --
people are far more likely to do it if they're alone than if they're
with a stranger -- they each tend to defer to the other's initiative.
Most people were willing to give painful dangerous nonconsensual
electric shocks when confronted by an authority who said they had no
choice and that he took full responsibility. That worked across
religions and across ethical claims.
There are people who say that you find out who you really are in
crises. There's what you say you would do, but when the crunch comes
what you really do is likely to be different. I say that what you do
in a crisis is likely to be somewhat random. When you have three
weeks to choose what to do and then you do it, that says who you
really are. What you do on the spur of the moment when you're
surprised is not really any indication. Just because you kill
somebody when you're surprised and shocked doesn't really make you a
murderer.
> It is only a
> moral absolutist---one who believes Natural Law as an external given
> and not a human autonomy---who has even the *possibility* of choosing
> to go against naked and immediate self-interest out of some rational
> consideration of the possibility of there being a higher Law of Good
> and Evil. It's the moral relativist who has absolutely denied that
> possibility from the get-go.
Well, no. There's more than one way to be a moral absolutist and more
than one way to be a moral relativist.
Ned Ludd
"jonah thomas" <j2th...@cavtel.net> wrote in message
news:wwX7c.10$kP6....@news.uswest.net...
Well, it may be more than "psychologically viable". Nietzsche
claimed that slavery and many degrees of bondage are the precondition
of every higher culture.
Makes one wonder how slavery continues to work in the developed
nations. (Which I think it does.) Not to mention actual slavery,
which still controls many millions of people on the planet.
Ned
Jim Ward
> I need to see this recipie for chaos.
Recipies are easy, I can't get the hang of sauteing.
jonah thomas
> "jonah thomas" <j2th...@cavtel.net> wrote
>>I think it's more that slavery is psychologically viable. A woman who
>>has slaves can tell them to wash her hair and comb it and so on, and
>>she knows where she stands. If they do a bad job or if she's just mad
>>about anything else she can box their ears and there's nothing they
>>can do about it. If instead she had servants who could quit, her
>>friends might tend to hire the good ones away from her. If they were
>>slaves she'd only sell them if she wanted to.
> Well, it may be more than "psychologically viable". Nietzsche
> claimed that slavery and many degrees of bondage are the precondition
> of every higher culture.
> Makes one wonder how slavery continues to work in the developed
> nations. (Which I think it does.) Not to mention actual slavery,
> which still controls many millions of people on the planet.
Well, what slavery got you and what the modern way gets you is
dependability. The slave couldn't quit, and we make it hard for
modern employees who're supposed to be dependable to quit.
If you have a noncompete agreement that says you won't work in your
field for 2 years after you leave your job for any reason, and you
won't reveal anything you've learned since you took the job, it's hard
to find work without breaking the agreement. You won't be very
employable after 2 years out of the field, either.
And we have a clear distinction between 'special' workers and
'ordinary' workers. A special worker does something kind of unique so
you want very much to keep him. An ordinary worker does his job, if
he doesn't do it well enough you get rid of him and try out somebody
else, if he does it better than you expected you give him a pat on the
head. The difference between getting fired and getting sold down the
river is ... when you get fired you have the chance to take initiative
and find something for yourself, but when you get sold you have to put
up with whatever your former master finds for you. And there's the
difference that you can quit. But "You'll never work in this industry
again" is a powerful threat if you think they can make it stick.
In a lot of circumstances employees aren't allowed to get significant
incentive pay. No piecework. The big exception is sales, where the
employees get to use their initiative to do whatever works. A great
salesman might take home much more in bonuses and commissions than his
base pay. But more often the reward for doing a great job is an
office party. As a team of slaves might get a reward of a keg of
beer, or possibly a keg of whiskey.
There are differences. Slaves traditionally goofed off whenever they
weren't watched. Employees do that some. But it would be more
similar if there was a horde of free people who were on the edge of
starvation who were begging to be enslaved, and masters who found a
slave goofing off would free him on the spot and enslave another
candidate.
Jim Ward
> Morals ARE relative.
> They are largely driven by religion and culture.
> Morals are hammered into us from a young age by our family and our peers.
> A white catholic living in idaho, for example is hardly going to agree with
> an Arab living in the
> middle east, as to what is moral.
Well, they both probably have prohibitions against murder and stealing.
So perhaps there are some absolutes, but not as many as we would like?
Jim Ward
> Hence whoever said that moral relativism puts the responsibility
> squarely on your shoulder had it exactly right.
If it puts the responsibility on the individual's shoulder, what's
the difference between relativism and existentialism?
David O'Bedlam
> <thed...@shell.rawbw.com> wrote:
[...]
> >But that's true: there is no absolute standard. Though there are lots of
> >contenders for that title, who've been duking it out for millenia -- to
> >the tune of millions of maimings, imprisonments and deaths each century.
> >
> >It's a no-win game. Give it up. The belief in moral absolutes is immoral,
> >in my book.
> Yup. Nobody should ever believe that torturing people to death
> is wrong. Because that's wrong.
That's a pretty drastic misrepresentation of my argument, sir or ma'am.
Read it again:
> >But that's true: there is no absolute standard. Though there are lots of
> >contenders for that title, who've been duking it out for millenia -- to
> >the tune of millions of maimings, imprisonments and deaths each century.
It is my contention that there has for thousands of years been a contest
to see which of several "absolute moral standards" is MORE absolute --
which has resulted in lots of people being tortured to death for a long
time. Such as, oh, the Spanish Inquistion, trying to establish that their
"absolute moral standard" gives them more of a right to torture people who
are descended from Jews and Muslims to death than people descended from
Jews and Muslims have to be descended from Jews and Muslims without being
bothered about it. And that they not only have the right, but the *duty*,
accordng to their "absolute moral standard", to do in gobs of Conversos.
Clearly I recognize that many things are wrong. But trying to prove one
is in possession of THE "absolute moral standard" -- "My standard here!
Not that heretic's over there!" -- leads to more and deeper immorality
than the liberal laissez-faire attitude that one's personal morality is
a personal matter, or at least that you don't have to torture anybody
to persuade them of the absolute superiority of your own absolute.
In a war over territory, for example, two sides fight until one side is
clearly in control of the territory, then the fight is over (at least
for a generation or so). But in a war for "the hearts and minds" of the
Other Side, an ideological "moral" struggle, there can be no victory or
even no real truce until you've totally wiped out the competing ideology,
that is until you have converted or killed everybody who does not agree
that your "absolute moral standard" is absolutely the only true one.
So, e.g., because I hold that there is no "absolute moral standard" it
would be, by my own judgment, going way overboard to torture and murder
you for the "heinous sin" of disagreeing with me. As long as your ethics
lead you to think that there are better things to do than torture and
kill, I don't care where you think you get them or what you call them
or whether you think there's a "moral" way to tie your shoes. However
much we may disagree over particulars, I have recognized beforehand
that your "heart and mind" is your own to do with as you see fit. And
that makes *my* life a lot easier too: I have my own heart and mind to
tend to and worry about, after all.
Liberally,
TheDavid
--
"They hung there dependent from the sky like some heavy metal fruit."
...................................................................
(C) 2004 TheDavid^TM | David, P.O. Box 21403, Louisville, KY 40221
David O'Bedlam
> God is not an objective standard.
You're saying then that God not absolute,
but relative to each individual?
Confused,
D.
tejas
"Smeebag" <Brad....@keypoint.com.au> wrote in message
news:c3opa1$1n5q$1...@arachne.labyrinth.net.au...
> Morals ARE relative.
> They are largely driven by religion and culture.
> Morals are hammered into us from a young age by our family and our peers.
> A white catholic living in idaho, for example is hardly going to agree
with
> an Arab living in the
> middle east, as to what is moral.
Is the white catholic in Idaho a Basque sheepherder?
ObBook: CLOSE RANGE by Annie Proulx
Ted
David O'Bedlam
> C.J.W. wrote:
> > It is a self evident truth evident in the Self.
> Keep up the good work! I especially like the self/Self distinction.
Since Associate Professor Silke-Maria Wieneck has decided to ignore
me -- after I showed her I meant it that if she kept insulting me
I would insult her worse and more -- I must ask someone else to tell
me if she thought she was being sarcastic here.
But then, if she answered me herself, she'd only lie -- and insult me.
I figure her getting tenure is an example of the "academic politics"
that I hear so much about. Whose coffee did she have to spike with
ketamine to keep her competitor from finishing what paper first?
Michael S. Morris
Tuesday, the 23rd of March, 2004
Silke:
Btw, it's funny that the position you outline above is more likely
be fueled by the law and order position advocated by the self-alleged
anti-relativists.
I said:
And no, it is only a moral relativist who rats to the Gestapo
and justifies this in terms of "not telling a lie".
jonah:
It can be either.
I agree---I let my rhetoric get command of my
logic. My point is not that any "moral absolutist"
will do the right thing. Many will do the wrong thing.
It's more that only the open possibility of a rational
ethics leads to the possibility of doing the right thing.
The "moral relativist" is being falsely portrayed as
though it's the same thing as someone who thinks
deeply about a moral situation and about what the right
thing to do is. My point is the simple fact that 10 or
15 hard-and-fast commandments don't work to encapsulate
ethics ain't relativism, and the idea that the ethical
substrate may be a deeper more nuanced thing than
Pharisees make of it is belief in a moral absolute
(whether one knows what it is or not), and not belief
that anything anyone thinks should be done is an equally
valid alternative ethics (which *is* relativism).
I said:
It is only a
moral absolutist---one who believes Natural Law as an external given
and not a human autonomy---who has even the *possibility* of choosing
to go against naked and immediate self-interest out of some rational
consideration of the possibility of there being a higher Law of Good
and Evil. It's the moral relativist who has absolutely denied that
possibility from the get-go.
jonah:
Well, no. There's more than one way to be a moral absolutist and more
than one way to be a moral relativist.
Nope, that part I think I said technically correctly. I.e. where
we agree, jonah, is that there are plenty of ways of being
an absolutist, and certainly I think many of them wrong ways.
Where we do not agree is that there is more than one way to be
a moral relativist, and that any moral relativism can lead one
to correct moral judgments about what one ought to do. This is
because what moral relativism is is an absolutist dogmatism
asserting morality's non-existence, and it therefore denies rational
possibility from the start.
In any event, we are certainly not talking about people's *behaviour*
which may well be entirely distinct from what they reason they
ought to do. We are talking about a system of reasoning about
moral questions, and wherein hope lies of reasoning one's way
to a correct moral proposition about what one ought to do in at least
some circumstances. The only hope for doing that is to begin
moral assumptions---in particular with faith in moral
absolutes---and then to reason from there.
Mike Morris
(msmo...@netdirect.net)
David Johnston
>
>
>David Johnston wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 22 Mar 2004 23:39:31 GMT, smw <sm...@ameritech.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
>>>stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
>>>relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
>>>stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
>>>wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
>>>lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
>>>friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Then again he might argue, for instance, that it's NOT okay
>> to lie to the Gestapo since that violates the immediately prevailing
>> morality.
>
>Hence whoever said that moral relativism puts the responsibility
>squarely on your shoulder had it exactly right.
<shrug> So do anything you want. S'all good.
>
> Btw, it's funny that the position you outline above is more likely be
>fueled by the law and order position advocated by the self-alleged
>anti-relativists.
I don't think so.
David O'Bedlam
But then not many people who are amenable to such convincement try to
kill people in the first place. They mostly talk themselves out of it
before you know you might have been on the verge of being killed.
Most people don't worry much about the morals of murder, I think; I'd
say they care more that it's illegal, i.e. that they might get caught.
I myself have a hard time getting past the "it's wrong to kill people"
idea, so I haven't killed anyone yet, not even people I really wanted
to kill when I knew I could most likely get away with it; but if I was
attacked I'd have no problem killing in self-defense, *regardless* of
what might happen to me afterward. A police who was trying to kill me
would be fair game[1] for instance, even though I can't think of any
news article where anyone got off with self-defense for killing a cop,
though I can think of several articles concerning murderously corrupt
police personnel. It seems to be "wiser" to just stand there and let
yourself get shot, hoping the cop misses a vital organ, and that your
family can get you a good lawyer while you're in Intensive Care, but
I hold that that "policy" only encourages cops to shoot people.[2]
But anyway, according to my moral relativism you have as much to live
without me trying to kill you as I do, that is that your right to live
increases relative to your willingness to acknowledge mine. As long as
you show you agree at least enough to not come after me with a deadly
weapon, you'll get to live as long as you would if I'd never existed.
And hey, if your "absolute moral standard" tells you you *must* kill me,
maybe you should listen to somebody else's "voices" instead. *My* voices,
for example, are content when I say Mean Things to people on Usenet.
Luv,
Davey :=)
[1] Note to the "Red Squad": I did not say I have any plans to kill
any police, so you're shit out of luck, so fuck off.)
[2] As a corollary, I hold that when nobody but cops are allowed to
have guns the gun-related crime rate might go down -- because it's
police who get to be in charge of calling something a crime. QED.
jonah thomas
> Silke:
> Btw, it's funny that the position you outline above is more likely
> be fueled by the law and order position advocated by the self-alleged
> anti-relativists.
> I said:
> And no, it is only a moral relativist who rats to the Gestapo
> and justifies this in terms of "not telling a lie".
> jonah:
> It can be either.
> I agree---I let my rhetoric get command of my
> logic. My point is not that any "moral absolutist"
> will do the right thing. Many will do the wrong thing.
> It's more that only the open possibility of a rational
> ethics leads to the possibility of doing the right thing.
Surely a moral relativist can possibly do the right thing -- maybe for
the wrong reason.
> The "moral relativist" is being falsely portrayed as
> though it's the same thing as someone who thinks
> deeply about a moral situation and about what the right
> thing to do is. My point is the simple fact that 10 or
> 15 hard-and-fast commandments don't work to encapsulate
> ethics ain't relativism, and the idea that the ethical
> substrate may be a deeper more nuanced thing than
> Pharisees make of it is belief in a moral absolute
> (whether one knows what it is or not), and not belief
> that anything anyone thinks should be done is an equally
> valid alternative ethics (which *is* relativism).
I think we might be missing each other and both bashing strawmen. I
was considering a moral absolutist to be somebody who's caught by a
moral system. So he doesn't compare moral systems to decide which to
follow, he judges all things *by* the moral system he believes in. He
has no way to judge the validity of alternative ethics except to
compare them to his system and any difference is bad.
And I consider moral relativism to be the idea that you get to judge
moral systems according to your own criteria. Not that every possible
moral system is as good as every other possible system. Some moral
systems tell you nothing, after all, while others occasionally suggest
a course of behavior. "Don't do that. Universal good advice."
"Always tell the truth to your friends. Always lie to your enemies.
There's no way to tell the difference between them." A moral system
that gives you no advice will probably be better or worse than a moral
system that does tell you things to do or not do. Maybe better or
worse, but unlikely to be the same.
If you believe there is a moral absolute but you haven't found it yet
and you get to judge moral systems to decide in your opinion how close
they come, that comes close to my idea of a moral relativist. So
we've probably been talking past each other.
> I said:
> It is only a
> moral absolutist---one who believes Natural Law as an external given
> and not a human autonomy---who has even the *possibility* of choosing
> to go against naked and immediate self-interest out of some rational
> consideration of the possibility of there being a higher Law of Good
> and Evil. It's the moral relativist who has absolutely denied that
> possibility from the get-go.
> jonah:
> Well, no. There's more than one way to be a moral absolutist and more
> than one way to be a moral relativist.
> Nope, that part I think I said technically correctly. I.e. where
> we agree, jonah, is that there are plenty of ways of being
> an absolutist, and certainly I think many of them wrong ways.
Yes, we're agreed on that.
> Where we do not agree is that there is more than one way to be
> a moral relativist, and that any moral relativism can lead one
> to correct moral judgments about what one ought to do. This is
> because what moral relativism is is an absolutist dogmatism
> asserting morality's non-existence, and it therefore denies rational
> possibility from the start.
We are disagreed on definitions here. How could any reasonable person
deny any possibility that there might be an (unknown) moral absolute?
But if you set yourself up to judge moralities -- perhaps by
predicting the results they'll have for societies that follow them,
and deciding for yourself what results are good or bad -- then you
don't believe in one particular absolute morality. If you judge your
morality by results or some other criteria then that's very different
from believing in your moral absolute independent of results.
I don't know anybody who claims that every possible morality is as
good as any other possible morality. Maybe somebody will show up on
this newgroup and claim it, and then I'll know somebody. But I
haven't seen it yet. Everybody has some sort of standard to judge
other people's morality by.
David Johnston
<thed...@shell.rawbw.com> wrote:
>On Tue, 23 Mar 2004, David Johnston wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 23 Mar 2004 04:17:50 GMT, haye...@hotmail.com (Steve Hayes)
>> wrote:
>
>> >If someone doesn't think it morally wrong to kill you, never mind, you
>> >can believe that it's morally right to defend yourself from attempts to
>> >do so.
>
>> You'd be a hell of a lot safer by convincing him that it's wrong in
>> the first place.
>
>But then not many people who are amenable to such convincement try to
>kill people in the first place.
It's a bit late when they already have the gun out. You are much
better off convincing them that murder is wrong before they decide
that they'd be happier with you dead.
smw
Jim Ward wrote:
Not all relativists are existentialists, but all existentialists are
relative relativists.
smw
Michael S. Morris wrote:
>
>
>
> Tuesday, the 23rd of March, 2004
>
> Silke:
>
> Btw, it's funny that the position you outline above is more likely be
> fueled by the law and order position advocated by the self-alleged
> anti-relativists.
>
>
[some lengthy and passionate comment condoning state terrorism in a
country that has perfectly good laws to persecute criminals]
>
> And no, it is only a moral relativist who rats to the Gestapo
> and justifies this in terms of "not telling a lie". It is only a
> moral absolutist---one who believes Natural Law as an external given
> and not a human autonomy---who has even the *possibility* of choosing
> to go against naked and immediate self-interest out of some rational
> consideration of the possibility of there being a higher Law of Good
> and Evil. It's the moral relativist who has absolutely denied that
> possibility from the get-go.
The moral relativist has denied the possibility of a Law of Good and
Evil (intentional caps, I assume), yes. Oddly enough, she still acts
against naked and immediate self-interest all the time, only for
different reasons. The fact that you can't fathom that doesn't speak for
your moral imagination.
smw
Michael S. Morris wrote:
..
> The "moral relativist" is being falsely portrayed as
> though it's the same thing as someone who thinks
> deeply about a moral situation and about what the right
> thing to do is.
Nope -- just as someone who _can_ think as deeply about a moral
situation as a moral absolutist, and, by the logic of the task set out
for him or her, _must_ think more deeply about it. The absolutist,
presumably, can just ask his priest. If he's that kind of absolutist.
>
smw
David Johnston wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Mar 2004 12:15:41 GMT, smw <sm...@ameritech.net> wrote:
...
>
>> Btw, it's funny that the position you outline above is more likely be
>>fueled by the law and order position advocated by the self-alleged
>>anti-relativists.
>
>
> I don't think so.
It's not a matter of what you think. "Positive law must be followed
under all circumstances" is just as absolutist a position as "divine law
must be followed under all circumstances."
michael
existentialism requires adherents to smoke Gauloise/Disc Bleu--
relativism treats all brands pretty much the same...
michael
SMEEBAG
Jim Ward <tomca...@NyOaShPoAoM.com> wrote in message
news:c3pum9$hkh$1...@news1.radix.net...
And thats my point! There can be no real absolutes when you are talking
about
something as varied as human behaviour.
SMEEBAG
Do you seriously think when a guy is at the point of murdering someone, that
he really considers the morality of it?
NO!
The human condition is far too varied to put achievable absolutes on
something as
intangeble as morals. Its like suggesting that everyone HAS to like
chocolate.
Come the day when we are all genetically engineered, with the same
upbringing, education, same culture
and only one religion, then. . . . maybe.
Smee.
smw <sm...@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:_648c.15265$t16.8...@newssvr28.news.prodigy.com...
Jim Ward
> existentialism requires adherents to smoke Gauloise/Disc Bleu--
> relativism treats all brands pretty much the same...
In the existentialist spirit, I got a Juliette Greco album, but I didn't
like it all that much.
Arindam Banerjee
> > Moral relativism doesn't mean nothing is wrong but that moral judgments
> > stand in historical and cultural and personal and circumstantial
> > relations. Thus, it is usually the uncompromisingly non-relativist
> > stances that offend people, such as Kant's argument that lying is always
> > wrong. A moral relativist might argue, for instance, that's it's okay to
> > lie to the Gestapo who've come to ask you whether you know where your
> > friend, the Jewish anti-fascist, is hiding.
Lying to any immoral agency is not immoral. It may even be moral to
do so. The question of morality would come if you gave shelter to a
criminal out of hospitability, and then a moral agency came to you
looking for the criminal. Would you give him up, or not? In the
Indian world-view it would be immoral to give up someone to whom you
have extended hospitality, no matter what. Evidently, this view is
not shared by the West, that bombed Afghans because they would not
give up bin Laden.
> Thanks. I can see how that should be problematic for Kant.
>
> Maybe Mahatma Gandhi would have said, "I don't choose to answer that," and
> taken the consequences, secure in the belief that he could teach his
> morality even to Nazis just by setting an example. But you'd have to put
> your moral code above everything else in order to do it. Believing that
> your code came from God would have to make that a lot easier to do.
Code results from usage, from myths and legends, examples of revered
people, etc. in non-dogmatic people.
Arindam Banerjee
> fundamental axiomatic assumptions at a metaphysical level in order
> to do physics. The first is the "better" is fitting experimental
> data assumption, or the material world is the thing investigated
> by science assumption.
Which is why you have had no clue about the nature of non-material
energy; and why you *had* to impart matter to it via e=mcc!
> The second assumption is that laws of
> nature connect moment to moment in an efficient causal way.
True for non-life objects, and thus a worthy assumption for those
brought up in death-centered cultures. Life forms being naturally
erratic, have little concept of efficiency and being irrational are
prone to randomness without causality.
> Neither assumption is more than an assumption.
At last Morris and I agree on something.
> You can't prove
> with more experiment or more agreement with experiment.
Let us see. Sounds a bit presumptuous to me. Like, the Magdeburg
hemisphere experiment proved the existence of air pressure. It does
exist. Air pressure is a fact and not a theory (conjecture, surmise).
> Both assumptions
> are capable of fruitful negation, too, on occasion.
Because they are flawed to begin with, and have nothing to do with
science and the scientific method.
C.J.W.
jonah thomas wrote:
> C.J.W. wrote:
>
> > Morality is
> > based on common sense. The common sense that all is not as it should be. From
> > there, vast codes of ethics are built up and the issue is whether they are right
> > or wrong.
>
> You have left out a step between "I want things to be different" and
> "There is an absolute morality".
There's also a big step from 2+2=4 to matrix calculus but 2+2=4 is still a part of it.
<sniP>
> Having a
> logical proof doesn't mean your conclusions are correct, it means only
> that your conclusions have been shown to follow logically from your
> assumptions which may or may not be correct.
The assumption that conclusions "ought" to follow logically from your assumptions is a
moral claim based on common sense. So it seems morality doesn't "depend." It is so
pervasive that relativists don't even see it. It is what it is.
<snip>
> Logic has no obvious moral component, it is simply a set of rules to
> test a chain of inferences from assumptions to conclusions.
A "set of rules" based on a sense of "oughtness" that supposedly has no obvious moral
component?
That's a dubious claim.
<sniP>
> If you have moral assumptions that
> include a logical contradiction, and if you are willing to accept
> logical inferences, then your morality is shit, it is possible to
> infer both sides of any question from your assumption.
How about the logical contradiction typical to relativists beginning with
rationalizations instead of a rationale for rationality?
> I say that moral systems that start with contradictory assumptions and
> that allow logical inferences are no good, they are all worse than
> moral systems that do not start with contradictions or that don't
> allow logical inferences. If you disagree I'm willing to listen.
I agree that allowing for logical contradictions is a bad thing, which is why I don't
believe in moral relativism, because it is self refuting.
<snip>
> > Moral views are based on logic and common sense. It isn't a different realm.
>
> Well, no, they aren't. Moral views are supposed to connect to
> reality. The logic that deals with contradictions in moral
> assumptions does not connect to reality, it only connects to the moral
> assumptions and their logical contradictions. Two different realms.
I didn't say logic was the link, common sense and common sentience is the link between
the views and reality. Logic is relativistic but if you trace the logical connections
back.... this is relative to that which is relative to that, etc..... the end is common
sense and self evident truths, a form of Aristotle's unmoved Mover. It isn't a
different realm. If you trace the (il)logic of a relativist back, when their logic
itself is based on relativism all you'll find is nothing, nonsense and self refutation,
not common sense. And so it is very easy to skewer relativists.
<snip>
> > If you have a reason for reason then there is plenty of reason. It's the people
> > that begin their reasoning without such a reason that tend to be unreasonable.
> > Common sense indicates that we all have some knowledge that all is not right with
> > the world and therefore have some knowledge of right and wrong.
>
> Yes, but there's such a big step from "I want things to be different"
> to "I know the absolute correct morality".
There's also a big step from 2+2=4 to matrix calculus but 2+2=4 is still a part of it.
<snip>
> > Morality is understood, not invented. You can only supposedly have a collection
> > of so-called "moralities" if you assume that morality is invented. This notion
> > that morality is invented lies at the heart of philosophies of might makes right,
> > Nazism, etc. The notion that morality is something to be understood lies at the
> > heart of right makes might, Americanism, etc.
>
> What evidence do you have that moralities are found instead of
> invented?
What evidence is there that our common sense of a morality to be found is incorrect?
It seems to me that since everyone agrees that all is not right with the world then it
is up to the relativists to disprove this. Especially given the fact that the
relativist is the one saying that we can simply invent morality, well it's been
invented then.
But as to the evidence..... the typology and teleology of Nature. The common senses
themselves are evidence as well.
> It sounds like you prefer moralities that claim that
> moralities are found rather than invented (and I agree with you about
> the examples you gave, I prefer them too). But isn't our preference
> irrelevant to their correctness?
Yes.
But note that you're falling away from relativism if you agree.
<snip>
> > Well, typically the morality that people were taught as a child is based on their
> > cultural prejudices which are informed by millenia of human experience. It is
> > generally not a bad place to start.
>
> Yes, it's probably going to be the most comforting choice.
It's also typically the closest a correct understanding because as Edmund Burke noted,
with few exceptions, it is usually based on the collective wisdom of the species based
on millennia of experience.
--W
C.J.W.
smw wrote:
> C.J.W. wrote:
>
> >
> > meat n potatoes wrote:
> >
> >
> >>"Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote in message news:<c3ndf6$f9...@mercury.cc.uottawa.ca>...
> >>
> >>>I really struggle with this concept.
> >>>
> >>
> >><snip>
> >>
> >>while all morality is based and rooted in culture, higher morality
> >>only comes thru transcendance from that culture. while total
> >>liberation is not possible, there have been people who broke away from
> >>the dogma of tradition. socrates who questioned everything, buddha who
> >>pared down hinduism into compassion and abandoned all that caste
> >>system b.s., and jesus who said god is love and for everyone.<snip>
> >
> >
> > Actually, I think most of those whom you cite were going back to common sense
>
> Yeah, "turn the other cheek," "love your enemies," all common sense.
Jesus pointed to the reason for the Law/"Jewish influence" but did not do away with it. As I recall, he
offered a succinct summary of the Law: "Love God and love others as you love yourself." He didn't say this
was a new law, only a summary of the old. I.e. the way you love your neighbor cannot be by murdering them,
even if you want to commit suicide.
Most of what the Greek philosophers said is based on common sense. Nietzsche, the Marquis de Sade and
Machiavelli wanted to do away with common sense and the "ethical code worship of the Jews" as I suspect you
do as well because you already tried to deny typology.
<snip>
--W
C.J.W.
David Johnston wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Mar 2004 02:09:59 GMT, "C.J.W." <watt...@bellatlantic.net>
> wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >Steve Murgaski wrote:
> >
> >> I really struggle with this concept.
> >>
> >> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
> >
> >Generally, because they don't want to be bound by any ethical code. I
>
> Did you confusion "unacceptable" with "acceptable"?
Yes.
> Because, y'know,
> I'm not quite understanding your response.
Okay.
--W
C.J.W.
jonah thomas wrote:
> C.J.W. wrote:
> > jonah thomas wrote:
> >>m. wrote:
>
> >>>god is dead leads to moral relativism in the sense that there is no
> >>>longer an objective standard by which to measure anything. So some see
> >>>moral relativism as "dangerous" because without "god" or an absolute
> >>>authority acting as judge, how do we determine, for instance, that being
> >>>a murderer is wrong?
>
> >>Doesn't it depend on circumstance? Some times murder is more wrong
> >>than other times.
>
> >>Once you decide that murder is wrong, what do you do to murderers?
> >>Kill them? Well, sometimes. It depends on circumstance.
>
> > You're still applying the standard that murder is wrong to the circumstances.
> > Your argument leads to judges making up the law rather than just applying it
> > to the circumstances. Unfortunately your view is increasingly typical and
> > judges are just inventing more and more law.
>
> Surely you wouldn't argue that the american legal system has much to
> do with morality.
Because your view of morality as something to be invented is more and more typical
it does have less and less to do with morality and instead deals with an invented
political correctness that replaces adherence to moral and legal correctness.
<snip>
> > "Life unworthy of life." a typical view among philosophic naturalists.
>
> > It's an uncivilized view.
>
> I'm particularly interested in the inuit because they had to live in
> relatively small groups (so they didn't have so much room for special
> castes of liars to arise and live off the rest) and they were living
> at carrying capacity. In good years the population expanded, in bad
> years it contracted. So they didn't have as much room for nonsense.
> They needed a simple system that let them survive.
What "nonsense" is that? Life unworthy of life like the disabled, old, etc.?
<snip>
> > That doesn't mean they didn't sense it was wrong.
>
> Many of them sensed that killing animals for meat was wrong, but they
> had to do it or starve. At one time they had the custom of thanking
> the animal for sacrificing itself for them. The conceit was that he
> knew they were waiting to ambush him, and he went into their ambush
> willingly. They prayed for his soul and did what courtesies they
> could -- a taste of fresh water, a pat on the head, the feel of a
> glass marble or something else soothing.
>
> More than we do for the animals we slaughter.
Jewish Kosher laws actually do deal with animals as if they have some intrinsic
worth. Anyway, among old pantheists as well as New Age vegetarian nudists who want
to go back to Eden sans redemption it does seem to be a common sense that all is
not as it should be in Nature and in man's relationship to it.
> >>Occasionally murders happened for other reasons. <snip>
>
> > As if that doesn't still happen?
>
> It was kind of different. The stories from Point Barrow give lots of
> examples of men-who-kill-people. A man who lost an only son might
> start killing young men who visited from elsewhere. The local people
> wouldn't stop him but might warn a particular young man to give him
> the chance to kill the man-who-kills-people instead.
And why would they warn him?
> > Your argument looks like: "People disagree about what is moral. Therefore,
> > morality doesn't exist."
>
> No, my claim is that morality *does* exist to the extent that people
> agree about it. Which is a whole lot. It exists as itself,
> independent of reasons they might have to agree or whatever truth
> there might be to those reasons etc. It has no ultimate justification
> beyond the fact that they agree and are willing to enforce it, and it
> needs none.
Might makes right, the same old conclusion....
Despite the idiocy of Nietzsche who said the claim based on the "Jewish influence"
is new my claim is probably equally old. It's the claim that morality exists and
to the extent that we can understand typology and design in Nature we can adhere to
transcendent ethics. It's something you either understand or you don't but your
understanding has no bearing on its truth. Do you think that mathematics is
something we "invent" and can change at will? Would you apply the "triumph of the
will" to mathematics in which if a different answer is willed that makes it
true?
> > Well, I disagree with that. So your argument doesn't exist as if it has
> > "meaning."
>
> Shared meanings are shared among whoever shares them.
That meaning is only shared among a small group of "intellectuals," so even
according to your own values it's not clear what its worth is.
I don't share your meaning because it is wrong.
> To the extent
> that the Whorf hypothesis fits the reality, the existence of a lot of
> chinese who don't know any east-indian language and a lot of
> east-indians who don't know any chinese language would imply that
> there is very little we all share. Whorf himself claimed that the
> hopi indians have some senses of time that anglos mostly don't get,
> that are represented by special verb tenses in their language. "I am
> hoeing my corn (as I always do, as my ancestors always did, as
> everybody does, as hopis will always do)." A sort of always-present.
> I wouldn't argue that their meaning doesn't exist just because we
> don't do it that way.
Time exists, you either understand it or you don't. You're either closer to
understanding it correctly or you're farther away. Saying, "This group of people
understands mathematics, time, morality, etc., this way and this group of people
understands it that way." only means just that. Is their understanding correct,
is the question.
> And I similarly wouldn't argue that the only
> morality is what we all have in common. No, morality is what people
> recite principles to force on each other, and it doesn't matter how
> few people are doing it, it's still morality.
Might makes right, the same old conclusion....
Do you really think that Nature has no typology? Systematic thought and
observation applied in pursuit of the truth, i.e. science, gives evidence that it
does.
--W
MG
Steve Murgaski wrote:
> I really struggle with this concept.
>
> Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
The main reason is that people have moral beliefs that they are very
attached to and that they are loathe to give up. Most people are pretty
damned convinced that beliefs such as "genocide is morally bad" and
"torturing babies is morally bad" are true, and, moreover, true
*universally*, across cultures and individuals. The trouble is that
moral relativism implies that there are cases (Nazi Germany, for
example) where indivduals or even whole societies do things that are
acceptible for those inividuals or in those societies, and hence,
morally permissible - even "good" things to do.
> What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
> "Right and wrong" exists?
Hmmm, depends what you are looking for as a "basis" for moral beliefs.
Are you looking for a *self-evident* foundation for moral beliefs? Kant
thought he had one, Utilitarians think they have one.
If god is dead, by what authority could such a
> judgement be made?
In Kant's case, the authority of reason - so he thinks.
>
> The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty good
> sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
Two reasons, I think. The first is that it implies moral truths that
many (most?) people find counter-intuitive (at least unless
significantly augmented). For example: "don't lie". There are many cases
where most people think it permissible to lie, such as when the gestapo
knock on your door asking if there are any Jews there (there are).
Knowing full well that to tell the truth would recent in the near
certain death of those Jews, most people thikn it permissible to lie.
Kant seems to think that it is not permissible at all. (You might try to
get out of this by building a hierarchy of moral laws, with, say, the
right to life being paramount, but then Kant doesn't provide an obvious
way to generate such a hierarchy and resolve such conflicts.)
The second reason (rather closely related to the first, I suppose) is
that it ignores consequences (except to the extent that the consequences
of a moral law must be applicable consistently), and most people think
that the consequences of an action at least count for *something*.
Other reasons include the fact that it is emotionally "cold". It is, for
Kant, simply the application of reason, emotions and suffering, and the
like have little or nothing directly to do with ethics.
But there remain a good many neo-Kantians in the world. Indeed, a
prominent strain of rights theory is Kant inspired, and probably the
most famous defence of liberalism, Rawls "A Theory of Justice" is
neo-Kantian. So it's not true to say that no one takes Kant seriously
anymore.
>
> At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
> I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
> But that position is certainly relativistic.
It isn't *necessarily* the case that if morality was just "feelings"
that morality would be relativistic. The question turns on whether it
makes sense to say that there are morally "good" feelings and morally
"bad" feelings. I would argue that if you have moral *beliefs*: beliefs
such as "genocide is wrong" or "one ought not to engage in torturing
babies", then you are implicitly a moral realist, since to hold those
beliefs to be *true* is (at least on the most natural account of truth -
the correspondence teory) to say that that belief corresponds to some
moral facts.
Lastly, I think it is important to distinguish moral subjectivism (or
moral nihilism, or moral anti-realism) from moral relativism. Moral
relativism ,literally construed, allows that there are (or at least can
be) moral facts. There could even be universal facts (facts true
everywhere and for all people) *if* they are universal across all
indivduals or cultures. However, the anthropological and psychological
evidence strongly suggests that there are no such universal moral facts
across all indivuiduyals, and arguably none across all cultures. The
essence of moral relativism is that the moral facts are all relative to
one's culture or individual moral convictions. Moral subjectivism, by
contrast, deies that there are are objective moral facts (relative or
otherwise) - where "objective" is usually construed as something
external to the subject. These two are often run together, but I can see
no good reason to do that.
Anyway, those are my views.
MG
Steve Hayes
wrote:
>I think you guys are missing the real issue here.
>Do you seriously think when a guy is at the point of murdering someone, that
>he really considers the morality of it?
>
>NO!
But such a person might consider the maorality of it while planning the murder
beforehand, and in reflecting onit afterwards.
I'm sure suicide bombers consider the morality of it.
They probably take a morally absolute view of what they are doing, and so do
those who unconditionally praise or condemn them.
But from a morally relativistic point of view, they are just doing their
thing. It may be right for them, but wrong for me.
--
Steve Hayes
E-mail: haye...@hotmail.com
Web: http://www.geocities.com/hayesstw/stevesig.htm
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/7734/books.htm
MG
Randy Story wrote:
> "Steve Murgaski" <stev...@cyberspace.org> wrote in message
> news:c3ndf6$f9...@mercury.cc.uottawa.ca...
>
>>I really struggle with this concept.
>>
>>Why do most people seem convinced that "Moral relativism" is unacceptable?
>>What is the basis for supposing that a universally applicable standard of
>>"Right and wrong" exists? If god is dead, by what authority could such a
>>judgement be made?
>>
>>The little I've heard of Kant's "Categorical imperative" makes pretty good
>>sense to me, but no one seems to take it seriously now. Why not?
>>
>>At the moment, I can only conceive of "Right" and "Wrong" as feelings.
>>I.E., if it feels as though it would be wrong, then it shouldn't be done.
>>But that position is certainly relativistic.
>
>
>
> Because it is simply self defeating. Anyone who states that all morals
> are relative has just made a judgement as to the state of all morality, but
> in making this judgement he is asserting that his view is either good or
> true or right but how can he judge this when he holds that there is no
> absolute standard by which his view can be shown to be either good, or true
> or right.
I see this sometimes, but I think I might disagree. To judge that all
morals are relative is not, in and of itself, to make a (universal)
*moral* judgement. It could be interpreted as merely descriptive, could
it not? For example, one can be absoultely and universally right in
stating that sychonicity is relative to one's inertial frame of reference.
> As such moral absolutes are what the founding fathers called self
> evident truths or in philosophy is called undeniable truths. This of course
> doesnt mean that it cant be morals absolutes cant be denied, its just that
> one must assume there own moral absolute to deny all absolutes exist.
I just don't see that yet. Why do you think that the claim "all morality
is relative (to whatever)" is itself a *moral* absolutist claim? It's
certainly universal.
> It just like those who say logic doesnt apply to reality, yet they must
> use logic about reality in there very attempt to deny logic.
> Or those who say all truth is relative except of course there statement
> of truth that all truth is relative.
Ah - well that's different, because "truths" are evaluated in terms of
truth/falsehood, and so is the claim that all truths are relative.
MG