Ockham, Billy, and Custer
Bob Tiernan
Ockham's Razor wrote:
> To be fair, Custer and W function at two different levels.
>
> Custer had no option but to stay the course as he was
> the local tactical commander. About like any Lt. Col.
> in Iraq nowadays.
Custer was certainly not there to let an opportunity be missed. Billy.s
reasoning on this matter is always flawed because he thinks too much in terms
of conventional warfare, which Plains Indian campaigns were decidedly not.
Except for an experimental operation like that carried out by Forsyth which led
to Beecher.s Island, the rule was get into a village, get into a village, get
into a village. Anything short of that wasn.t going to bring a campaign to a
conclusion. Any hesitancy or unforeseen circumstances that prevented a column
from getting to a village would only lead to having to start all over again or
to an inconclusive shooting match miles from the village.
> You are correct, "arrogance, incompetance, and bull-headness"
> go poorly together.
I guess they do. But that doesn't describe what went wrong at Little Big Horn.
If it does, then Billy must condemn every single Indian campaigner, even those
who survived like Crook, Miles and Mackenzie and Carr. All of them completely
understood what Custer was trying to do at LBH, even if they or their adjutants
later tried to elevate them with, .But So-and-so wouldn.t have done X. (Miles
never did that, tho').
As for bull-headedness, I note that neither you nor Billy ever assigns that
trait to the much admired Crook who often sent a part of his column ahead (out
of supporting range of the rest) to strike a village (known to exist or one he
felt was there, a day away of out of sight a few miles away). He was so sure
of it, and was correct at times. Was he bull headed? Maybe he was just doing
what all experienced campaigners would make an attempt at, so important was it
to get to a village even if it was only a portion of the column. Even Sheridan
understood this "chastise" aspect of these campaigns even if he was more
interested in staying back east w/o ever getting into an Indian fight.
It's probably best to end this one with that passage I like so much that was
written by 1st Lieut. Edward Godfrey regarding Plains Indian campaigning and
operations. Godfrey (acting K Company commander at LBH) wasn't friendly with
Custer but was a keen student of frontier warfare and fully understood what
Custer was trying to do in given situations and why. Written in 1892, with
knowledge of huge conventional armies facing each other for much longer periods
in the 1860s and 70s, Godfrey was impatient with those who tried to judge
Indian campaigners using conventional rules, and was aware that few really knew
or understood this. What he says makes Shatzer's opinions worthless.
Wrote Godfrey:
It is a rare occurrence in Indian warfare that gives a commander an opportunity
to reconnoiter the enemy's position in daylight. This is particularly true if
the Indians have a knowledge of the presence of troops in the country. When
following an Indian trail the "signs" indicate the length of time elapsed since
the presence of the Indians. When the "signs" indicate a "hot trail" i.e. near
approach, the commander judges his distance and by a forced march, usually in
the night time, tries to reach the Indian village at night and make his
disposition for a surprise attack at daylight. At all events his attack must
be made with celerity, and generally without other knowledge of the numbers of
the opposing force than that discovered or conjectured while following the
trail. The dispositions for the attack may be said to be "made in the dark",
and successful surprise to depend upon luck. If the advance to the attack be
made in daylight it is next to impossible that a near approach can be made
without discovery. In all our previous experiences, when the immediate
presence of the troops was once known to them, the warriors swarmed to the
attack, and resorted to all kinds of ruses to mislead the troops, to delay the
advance towards their camp or village while the squaws and children secured
what personal effects they could, drove off the pony herd, and by flight put
themselves beyond danger, and then scattering, made successful pursuit next to
impossible. In civilized warfare the hostile forces may confront each other
for hours, days or weeks, and the battle may be conducted with a tolerable
knowledge of the numbers, positions, etc. of each other. A full knowledge of
the immediate presence of the enemy does not imply immediate attack. In Indian
warfare the rule is "touch and go". In fact, the firebrand nature of Indian
warfare is not generally understood. In mediating upon the preliminaries of an
Indian battle, old soldiers who have participated only in the battles of
"civilized" war are apt to draw upon their own experiences for comparison, when
there IS no comparison.
--Brig. General Edward S. Godfrey (1843-1932)
(2nd/1st Lieut under Custer, 1867-1876).
Bob Tiernan
EZ rider
great newspaper article about him. His goal was to nominated for the
presidenicy of the U.S. He failed to listen to his Crow scouts when they
advised him there were following the trail of to big a encampment.
He failed when he sent Major Benteen off
in a totally wrong direction, with no scouts and no one who knew the
area.
He split his forces again by sending Major Reno to attack and telling
him he would back him up if he had any trouble.
And finally when he rode down Medicine tail coulie he thought he was
attacking the north end of the camp when in fact he was in the middle of
it. At that point is where he was probably shot off his horse.
Custer only had 2 wounds on him one in the left breast ( probably a high
lung hit )
and one in the temple. His body was not
mutilate, he was the only one who was not.
Bob Tiernan
> Custer did several things wrong there but had one goal
> in mind. To get a great newspaper article about him.
Nonsense. He always welcomed good press, but he would
have done the same thing had there been no
reporter around. By the way, Custer had one reporter
and Crook had five.
> His goal was to nominated for the presidenicy of the
> U.S.
More junk. Not one shred of evidence exists.
> He failed to listen to his Crow scouts when they
> advised him there were following the trail of to
> big a encampment.
Quite the contrary, it was the Crows who urged him
to attack when he did, stressing speed before the
Sioux encampment could be alerted after the
column was sighted by some herders and hunters.
Sorry, nice try.
> He failed when he sent Major Benteen off in a totally
> wrong direction
No, Benteen was basically going in the same general direction
but slightly to the left in a short scouting mission
to look from high points to the left and then to return
to the main column, which he did in a relatively short time
as Custer expected (since Benteen did not run into any
Indians, which Custer said was possible). Benteen then
slowed down, which didn't help. Stop reading Benteen's
post-battle garbage about this movement to the left.
It doesn't jive with what his subordinate officers
wrote (without agenda) not long afterwards. That
would be Gibson, Godfrey, and Edgerly.
> with no scouts and no one who knew the area.
He didn't need them. He was a mile away or so
to the left, paralleling Custer/Reno, who were in
sight often. The actual route of this scout
to the left was much shorter and closer to the
main trail than the route shown in older
histories based on Benteen's post-battle CYA
accounts.
> He split his forces again by sending Major Reno to
> attack and telling him he would back him up if he
> had any trouble.
Commonly accepted operational practice in the
Plains campaigns.
> And finally when he rode down Medicine tail coulie he
> thought he was attacking the north end of the camp when
> in fact he was in the middle of it.
Can't see why that's an error. He wouldn't have
minded going into it at the middle. Besides,
he knew it wasn't the north end since he
saw from the bluffs earlier.
> At that point is where he was probably shot off his horse.
> Custer only had 2 wounds on him one in the left breast
> ( probably a high lung hit ) and one in the temple.
There's also evidence of a hit in the arm.
> His body was not mutilate, he was the only one who was not.
More garbage. He was mutilated a little (including an
arrow shoved up his penis) but much less than many others.
Bob T
wild bill
Crook did have 5 reporters with him. But
he also lost the fight at the Rosebud. He went back into Wyo and then
went hunting up on Cloud Peak. he left the rest of his troop to fend for
themselves.
June 24-26 1876 Scout for Custer were Mitch Bouyer, who rode into coulee
with Custer . Also Charlie Reynolds, Isaiah Dorman & Girard the
interpreter.
The Sioux were gathered for the annual Teton council. There were 7
divisions of western Sioux tribes there. Along with Cheyenne & others.
It was for there religious Sun Dance Ceremony.
The crow scouts as they were approaching
the area, observed the marks made by the horse drags covered a area 3/4
of a mile wide. Once they observed the camp from the crows nest they
told Custer who had ridden up there that the camp was to big and not to
attack. When he refused
Bloody Knife told him that after the fight we will both go home by
different paths.
When Custer split his force and sent Benteen to the left the area he was
to go into was at least 3 miles south of the
LBH. Benteen had considered those orders as military senseless from the
start.
Once Major Reno was stopped & was
pushed back to the hill top His command was stopped and pinned down till
Benteen arrived. They both thought that Custer was going to return to
help them. As they both stated at the Reno Court Marshal.
As for Custer it is known from the way he
attack the village at the Battle of the Washita Nov 27 1868 and again on
Nov 27 1869 when he fought the Southern Cheyenne the he favored
attacking from as many sides as he could. So since he used that battle
plan twice before to a
successful completion it will / should work at the LBH. WRONG he did
not listen to anyone as to the size or number of fighting force he would
encounter.
As for where he was shot the best guess is at the bottom of Medicine
Tail Coulee.
In a book by written by David Humphreys Miller in aprox 1900 + or - he
was told by
Bobtail Horse, White Cow Bull & Roan Bear that they arrived at the
crossing just a the troopers were coming down the Coulee. Two of these
men had some type
of fire arm and one had a bow.
Both Half Yellow Face & White Swan told Benteen later about Custer being
shot at the Coulee.
You are correct about the arrow in the penis. However other than the two
bullet holes in him and the fact that
Monahseetah used a Awl to puncture the ear drums of Custer so he could
hear better in the next life. There were no other marks on him. There is
some talk that Custer shot himself. This due to a story told by Speckled
Cock & Horned Toad.
After his death his body was put into a
coffin and it was never view again. Not even by his wife upon return to
Ft Lincon.
Several seasoned frontiersmen felt that was the reason he was never
mutuilated.
Refference books:
The Battle of the Little Big Horn
by Mari Sandoz
Wooden Leg A warrior who fought Custer. By Thomas B Marquis
Little Big Horn Remembered
By Herman J Viola
And the book by David H Miller
If you want to contact me direct you both can do so. Bill
Bob Tiernan
Wild Bill wrote:
> Crook did have 5 reporters with him. But he also
> lost the fight at the Rosebud.
Well, no, not really. He didn't lose, but he
didn't win, either.
The warriors made a large scale raid on his column
but they didn't do much damage like a similar-sized
conventional force (Confederates, British, Austrians)
would have done in just a quarter of the time. But
the expenditure of ammunition with an attack on a
village still yet to occur (a requirement for conclusion
of such a campaign), and a few score wounded I think,
not to mention animals (I don't have the figures but
mobility was lessened), put Crook in a tougher situation
than he had been before the shooting started. Once he
reversed his direction it became a strategic set-back,
not by any design of the warriors, but by Crook's
option. The battle was a large scale, inconclusive,
low casualty firefight. No more, no less.
It's worthy of study, by the way, to those who wish
to see Little Big Horn in perspective, and that is
a requirement ignored by too many (particularly
Roger Darling, author of "A Sad and Terrible Blunder",
who studied no other Indian battle and who wrote me
that he didn't need to.
But about this study of the Rosebud fight, note
Crook's own splitting of forces, particularly
his sending of a battalion of cavalry down the
narrow Rosebud valley (and it is quite narrow at
that point as I've been there and it's nothing
like the much wider "valley" one finds farther
north where Custer marched southwards). Mills'
battalion was sent to find a village that
he was sure existed not too far to the north.
Note the importance placed on attacking a
village, and even worth attacking with only
a battalion or just a part of a larger column.
Mills was recalled before he had gone more than
a few miles, but the decision was still
important to note. There's no reason to
believe that had Crook found himself in the
same position Custer was in on the morning of
the 25th (or even evening of the 24th) that
he wouldn't have done something similar.
Mackenzie and Miles as well. And Carr and
Anson Mills.
Yes, one must study all Plains Indian battles
in order to put LBH in perspective, as well as
Custer's performance. The latter was hardly
someone who decided to just make up a totally
new and stupid kind of attack that no one
else would have.
> He went back into Wyo and then went hunting up
> on Cloud Peak. he left the rest of his troop to
> fend for themselves.
Not that I'm aware of. The camp he set up on
Goose Creek was dubbed "Camp Cloud Peak" and
Crook went on a few hunting trips of a few days
each, but he didn't leave his column to fend for
itsellf any more than any scouting party did when
it was absent as well. Crook could and should
have done more to make his presence known (even
if that meant sending half the men forward again
with most of the ammo, leaving the rest behind in
a prepared perimeter). But while he did pretty
much take a large column out of action for too
long when their presence was needed (just like
Reno later took three companies out of action
when Custer was counting on them at least being
a magnet for warriors), he didn't leave it to
fend for itself. He stayed with it until more
supplies and reinforcements arrived.
> The crow scouts as they were approaching the area,
> observed the marks made by the horse drags covered
> an area 3/4 of a mile wide. Once they observed the
> camp from the crows nest they told Custer who had
> ridden up there that the camp was too big and not
> to attack. When he refused Bloody Knife told him
> that after the fight we will both go home by
> different paths.
First of all, everybody saw that the trail was
very wide -- almost a mile wide apparently.
Neither Crow nor Arikara scouts were needed to
identify such a trail and to explain what it was.
And second, it was obvious to seasoned campaigners
like Custer that a large village was ahead. Even a
rookie office knew it. Lt. Luther Hare was aiding
Lt. Varnum in taking Indian scouts far ahead of the
main column. In 1892 Hare wrote a letter to a
fellow officer in which he stated that the "size of
the trail we were following" (among other things)
made it obvious that a huge village was ahead (it
could have turned out, by the way, that it was even
a large string of villages that would have been
vulnerable to cavalry attacks before any good-sized
group of warriors could arrive). Custer also had
received a very accurate estimate of the warrior
numbers from interpreter Fred Girard the evening
before the battle - about 1500 to 2000, which was
pretty much the same thing as the actual count of
approximately 1800 who were present.
The only reason Bouyer was telling Custer not to
attack was because he was thinking of the
Indian vs Indian conflicts in which the longer
line could get around the smaller group. In
other words, number alone were very important
in determining ahead of time how well one side
would do. That was not true at all when it
came to Indian vs. conventional forces.
Bouyer was also known to have said the same
things in other situations when his warnings
turned out to be a waste of everyone's time--in
other words, he was always warning that there
were too many ahead.
Also, it's not true at all that the Crow
scouts (there were six of them altogether) told
or even urged Custer not to attack. Quite the
contrary - he was urged TO attack (I'll deal with
this in a minute).
As for the Arikaras (or Rees), they were more
pessimistic (not at all surprising for a very
superstitious people in unfamiliar territory).
Bloody Knife told Custer that he'd find enough
Indians for a two or three day fight, which isn't
the same thing as saying that there were too many.
But in the end even they weren't exactly the
"We're all going to get killed" pessimists that
many writers claim they were.
For example, Bloody Knife, who also told Custer
before the battle that he, Bloody Knife, was
going to get killed in the coming fight (which
can happen even if you're on the winning side),
contradicted all of this when he was later in
the presence of the village itself. Red Star
related this incident from the scouts' advance
on Reno's left in the valley: "Bloody Knife was
far ahead and he brought back three horses
toward his party, calling out: 'Someone take
these horses back to the hill. One of them
is for me'" Doesn't sound like someone who
had no future plans beyond that day, does it?
Now, as for Custer being urged to attack by his
scouts, which is quite the opposite of what
we're normally led to believe, all you need to
do is look into the exchanges between Custer
and his scouts and interpreters on the morning
of the battle.
Recall that when Custer rode ahead eight miles
to the Crows Nest to look for signs of the
village himself, which he acknowledged when
he was sure. After that, the scouts told
him the bad news about possibly being spotted
by some roving Sioux out looking for loose
ponies or hunting. Such a discovery would
have meant that the village might very well
break up and move rapidly away from the
army column, and Custer was reluctant to
admit that he might have to give up his
plan to wait until dark and move forward
for a dawn attack. He appears to have been
a bit too stubborn regarding this but John
Gray has concluded that Custer was merely
angry at having to eventually admit this.
Well, it seems that the Crow scouts (and
this was their area, and they had apparently
become the important scouts at this point)
were urging Custer to attack right away
before the Sioux could break into smaller
groups and head off in multiple directions.
It could take months to find them together
again, if at all.
A scout named Big Belly, who may have been
Half Yellow Face, argued with Custer. The
scouts liked the idea of waiting until night
and then creeping forward to surprise the
village in the morning, but once they
realized that they were probably spotted they
recommended an immediate attack. Here's
the reported exchange:
Custer: "This camp has not seen our army. None
of their scouts have seen us".
Half Yellow Face: "You say we have not been seen.
These Sioux we have seen at the foot of the hill,
two going one way, and four the other, are good
scouts, they have seen the smoke of our camp"
Custer (angrily): "I say again we have not been seen.
That camp has not seen us, I am going ahead to carry
out what I think. I want to wait until it is dark
and then we will march, we will place our army
around the Sioux camp."
Half Yellow Face: "That plan is bad, it should not be
carried out."
Custer: "I have said what I propose to do, I want to
wait until it is dark and then go ahead with my plan."
Red Star was there during this exchange, and although
he liked Custer's plan he was convinced by the Crow
scouts urging Custer to attack. Red Star said that at
this point in the exchange the Crows told Custer that
he needed to attack as soon as possible and capture
the large pony herd in order to eliminate the mobility
of the Sioux and Cheyenne. Custer, who knew that
they were right but who was, as Gray says, "angry
and upset over the possibility of having been
discovered", had to make a decision. Red Star
says the exchange concluded with Custer saying,
"Yes, it shall be done as you say." The party
then rode back to the command where Custer
learned of even more sightings.
Well, so much for the Custer not listening to
his scouts!
> When Custer split his force and sent Benteen
> to the left the area he was to go into was at
> least 3 miles south of the LBH. Benteen had
> considered those orders as military senseless
> from the start.
No, this is another example of erroneous history
passed on for over a century. Benteen invented
this after the fact. At the time of the battle he
voiced no such opinion. Benteen did three things
regarding this move to the left: He lied about
what the orders told him to; that he knew it
was senseless at the time; and that he covered
far more ground during this than he actually did.
Fortunately for history there were two officers
present who wrote letters or accounts from which
we can understand what this move to the left was
all about. One of them was Benteen's subordinate,
Lieut. Gibson, commanding Company H any time
when Benteeen was commanding a battalion or
part of the line on Reno Hill later on. Gibson
wrote plainly that Benteen was to move out where
they'd be off to the left a few miles and to
send a detail up ahead to look from atop a
ridgeline and then to return to the main
trail. Before going too far Custer sent Sgt
Major Sharrow to Benteen with orders to
proceed an additional ridgeline. Not seeing
anything ahead after following these orders
(Gibson and a few others were the ones who
were up ahead at the farthest point
reached, so the three companies did not
go as far as this detail did), Benteen
followed this final creekline back to the
main trail along Reno Creek.
Benteen got back to the main trail early enough
to have taken part in the offensive part of
the battle, despite what he wrote afterwards.
For example, after he got his men on the main
trail again, and while he was watering his
horses near the morass, civilian Boston Custer
rode by on his way to locate and join his
brothers. Boston was found at the base of
Last Stand Hill, and had clearly caught up
with his brothers before they started their
own part of the battle. If Boston did it,
then that gives you an idea of where Benteen
could have been at that same time had he
wanted to. Custer was also aware that Benteen
was within supporting distance for he must
have received the info regarding Benteen's
presence on the main trail. But that's all
another matter for what I'm addressing here
is the fact that the scout to the left has
been ridiculed for far too long because
Benteen has had pretty much a monopoly on
explaining it. But when you look at the
facts of the mission you'll see that Benteen
accomplished exactly what Custer assumed he'd
be able to do, i.e. reconnoiter to the left
and return to the main trail in as quick a
time as possible so that he'd be available
for what came next. Up to that point he
was doing just fine, but then he blew it
by slowing his pace and acting as if he
really didn't care. Had Major Forsyth,
or Captain Mills, been borrowed and had
commanded this battalion, they would have
appeared on the scene and been able to
used by Custer somewhere, either by joining
him or plunging into the village at Medicine
Tail Coulee ford while Custer moved north
as he actually did.
> Once Major Reno was stopped & was pushed
> back to the hill top His command was stopped
> and pinned down till Benteen arrived.
Not quite. The warriors virtually disappeared
as they had gone north to where the Custer fight
was in its early phases. Normally they would
have been very concerned about the presence of
any group of soldiers within a threatening
distance to a village, and it shows us how
clearly they viewed Reno's threat level by
pretty much leaving him where he was. But
they weren't pinned down until a few hours
later. If you don't believe this, then you'll
have to explain why Reno, after reaching the
top of the hill, took a few men with him (and
at least one officer) and went down to the
retreat ford to locate Lieut Hodgson's body
and to remove papers and personal items from
it and to bury or bring it up the hill.
Anyone who has been there knows how difficult
a hike this is - you just don't go down the
bluffs in five minutes. It takes a while
and is difficult. It must have taken an
hour to complete this little expedition.
And not a single warrior lurking around
fired a shot at them. They weren't around.
> They both thought that Custer was going to
> return to help them. As they both stated
> at the Reno Court Marshal [Court of Inquiry].
Maybe, maybe not. After Terry's column arrived
and Benteen was informed that Custer and
his men were killed several miles to the north,
Benteen refused to accept this and insisted that
Custer must have been with some men somewhere
holed up in a timbered position along the
river or somewhere. This is all interesting
in that it shows us that even after seeing the
size of the village area with their own eyes,
and seeing the large number of warriors
with their own eyes, they still did not think
at that time that a 210-man force could have
been wiped out. Stopped, yes, but wiped out,
no. Later on Benteen started making up stuff
again to make it sound as if he was a keen
Indian fighter, such as when he stated that
he "knew" that Custer was going to get "jumped"
sooner or later, when in fact he thought no
such thing. But anyway, maybe they really
did expect Custer to return. They said
this 2-1/2 years later. It would not have
been something unusual to expect at the time,
either.
> As for Custer it is known from the way he
> attack the village at the Battle of the
> Washita Nov 27 1868 and again on Nov 27 1869
> when he fought the Southern Cheyenne the he
> favored attacking from as many sides as he could.
There was no attack of Nov 1869. You might be
thinking of Custer's surrounding a village in
March of 1869 in order to squash any resistance
before it could start, as this did not result
in an attack but in the Indians throwing in
the towel right away. Custer then negotiated
with them over the release of hostages and
the villagers' self-relocation to reservation
land to the east.
> So since he used that battle plan twice before
> to a successful completion it will / should work
> at the LBH.
It's not that he was always trying to do a repeat
of his own Washita attack, but that this was what
veteran campaigners knew created advantages in
such operations. Custer was hardly the only commander
to attack villages from two or more sides.
> WRONG he did not listen to anyone as to the size
> or number of fighting force he would encounter.
WRONG. He did know that it was a huge village and
that there's be about as many warriors as he
actually did find there. He did not need to attack
on four sides, however, as in the end he was satisfied
enough to attack it from two sides. He took eight
companies to within a mile or so of the river, and
then sent Reno and three companies to open the
attack. That was fine. By taking five companies
along the east side of the river, mostly hidden
by terrain, he knew that Reno's attack would by
then be stirring things up and would act as a magnet
for warriors. He would then be faced with fewer
of them when he neared the village for his own attack.
He was correct about Reno being a magnet, for there
were probably at least 800 warriors milling about
Reno when the latter was still in the timber and
during his retreat to the high ground on the other
side of the river.
Imagine Custer having to deal with 1000 warriors
instead of 1800 to 2000 of them instead.
There would have been a huge difference, even
if it may not have looked like it from in the
center of all this. Fewer warriors would have
mean perhaps more time for freedom of action by
Custer, or if on the defensive another hour or two
to overrun of that was to take place just the same.
What would Benteen have done to add to this when
he showed up? And then another 150 or so men with
the pack train after that, all while fighting was
still taking place at the south end of the village
as well as near the north/center of its east side?
This is the kind of fluid operation Custer knew
could take place, even against a large concentration
of villages and warriors. It was not lost before
it started. It required officers who could think
about the larger action and who had the fortitude to
fight for more than ten minutes.
In withdrawing so soon from the fight, Reno released
about 800 to a thousand warriors to fight elsewhere.
That wasn't what Custer had in mind.
> As for where he was shot the best guess is at the
> bottom of Medicine Tail Coulee. In a book by
> written by David Humphreys Miller in aprox 1900 +
> or
Miller published his book in the late 50s I think,
and had interviewed Indian participants going
back to the 1930s. I have a few letters from
Miller from when I wrote to him in the 1970s.
> - he was told by Bobtail Horse, White Cow Bull &
> Roan Bear that they arrived at the crossing just a
> the troopers were coming down the Coulee. Two of
> these men had some type of fire arm and one had a bow.
None of the above mentioned scouts would have seen
Custer shot even if he had been shot while crossing
at the ford. Bob-tail Bull was in the valley fight
and was killed there. There was a White Cow Bull but
he was a Sioux I think, and never said Custer was
killed early on. I don't know of Red Roan. The Crow
scouts who may have seen Custer shot off his horse
were the Crow scouts Goes Ahead, White-Man-Runs Him,
Hairy Moccasin, White Swan and Half Yellow Face. Curly
may have been with them. Anyway, we don't know what
they really saw. They were far away, even though such
an incident may have been clearly seen from the
distance they were away from the ford. But Custer
was one of eight officers weraing buckskins, and
we don't know which of them may have removed a
jacket due to the heat, if any. But Custer was
found on Last Stand Hill, and both the Sgt Major,
the adjutant Lieut Cooke, Tom Custer as Aide-de-Camp,
and the surgeon Dr. Lord were found near Custer
rather than near the next in line to take command
of the five companies -- Captain Keogh.
> Both Half Yellow Face & White Swan told Benteen
> later about Custer being shot at the Coulee.
I've read a lot of material by and about Reno, but
have never come across any mention of this. These
Crow scouts left the battlefield to head north in
a roundabout way, and were no longer involved in
the campaign so far as I know (they were close to
home at this point, and stayed there). Benteen
probably never saw them again. After camping
near the confluence of the Little Big Horn and
the Big Horn after the battle, the troops moved
east and Benteen eventually ended up at Fort Lincoln
and then soon after was sent to Fort Vancouver,|
Washington for court-martial duty. He was unlikely
to have ever met or communicated with any of the
Crow scouts ever again. Of course, there was
the 1886 trip to the Little Big Horn. Benteen
was there. I'm not sure if he met any of the
Crow scouts there.
> You are correct about the arrow in the penis.
> However other than the two bullet holes in him
> and the fact that Monahseetah used a Awl to
> puncture the ear drums of Custer so he could
> hear better in the next life.
I've always doubted the latter story. Too much
of a coincidence. Custer probably looked
like any other dirty, dead white man at that
point, and didn't even have moderately long hair.
But as for the wounds, the shot in the chest
may have been the initial wound, with the
head shot being inflicted as he lay on the
ground, possibly moving or groaning a little.
He could also have been hit in the head as
he knelt behind a horse barricade, the head
and shoulders being about all that was exposed
at times. He may have also had a bullet wound
in one of his arms.
As for the the arrow in the penis, I knew the
historian who was allowed to review the letter
(by Godfrey) in which this was mentioned, but
neither he nor anyone else was permitted to
quote Godfrey although mentioning the facts
of the latter was permitted.
> There were no other marks on him.
Custer also had one of the typical deep gashes
in his thigh.
> There is some talk that Custer shot himself. This
> due to a story told by Speckled Cock & Horned Toad.
Never heard of their accounts, or of them for
that matter, but Custer's head wound wasn't even
in the temple which is where he would have
pointed had he shot himself.
> After his death his body was put into a coffin and
> it was never view again.
It was put into a coffin about 15 months later,
and by then was loose bones.
> Not even by his wife upon return to Ft Lincon.
That's because Custer was buried at the battlefield
for 15 months and dug up with other officers the
following year.
> Several seasoned frontiersmen felt that was
> the reason he was never mutuilated.
He was mutilated, but only moderately so compared
to others.
> Refference books:
> The Battle of the Little Big Horn
> by Mari Sandoz
Not a bad book, but far surpassed by many others
since then. No footnotes, which doesn't help.
> Wooden Leg A warrior who fought Custer. By
> Thomas B Marquis
Probably the best of the books you've mentioned, or
tied with Miller's book. But also far from the best.
> Little Big Horn Remembered
> By Herman J Viola
Don't know this one, but can't imagine why
it would stand out.
> And the book by David H Miller
It came out in the early 70s as "Custer's Fall",
but may have originally had a different title.
A very good read because of the way Miller
pieced together a narrative from what warriors
and scouts told him. Even if one dismisses
the part about Custer being shot at the ford,
the book is still fine because the incident may
very well have been someone else shot at the
ford and the narrative thus has no reason to
be considered weakened.
Bob T
wild bill
Wild Bill
Bob Tiernan
> Benteen was leading the pack train but still not
> to the hill top where Reno had taken refuge.
Benteen got back to the main trail some miles to
the west of where he originally left to go on
his scout a little off to the left. Custer kept
eight companies together for most of the way down
Reno Creek to the LBH so it's a myth that he
divided the command some 12 miles away and sent
battalions off in different directions from there.
Benteen did not have the pack train. He had
three companies -- his own (H), plus D and K.
The pack train was following the route taken
by Custer and the eight companies, but at a
slower pace. The pack train was commanded by
Lt Mathey and consisted of scores of mules,
about a dozen civilian packers, plus about
six or so men from each of the 12 companies
to help keep the animals moving at a quicker
than usual pace. B Company, commanded by
Capt McDougal, was escort for the pack train.
This pack train group was thus a battalion
sized unit in itself so that when it arrived
it bolstered Reno's force with over a hundred
more men, plus extra ammo and food.
[Reason for defeat]
> 2) The men and horses were exhausted by lack
> of sleep and water. This due to the forced
> march by Custer.
There wasn't much of any forced march at all,
by many standards. The night march wasn't
lengthy at all despite what Benteen said
about it, and it followed a period of many
hours when the troops probably got some sleep.
At the camp at the Busby bend where Custer
arrived in late afternoon of the 24th, the men
probably ate and then slept. They were awakened
about 10 pm or so, and the march only lasted
until about 2 am. Atfer that the men slept some
more, and then in the morning instead of the
usual 5 or 6 am march, the regiment was still
doing very little until about 11:30 am (there
was a brief march of a few miles or so which
would have taken a short time on horseback).
But with all of this extra morning time
not engaged in moving, don't assume the
men weren't catching up on sleep.
That almost all of the horses got to where
the battles took place says a lot about
what they were still able to do that day.
Bob Tiernan
wild bill
Its the same thing as with people, whether a person is a novice, or a
researcher.
I think its how you look at things and what conclusions you want to
draw.
People should question whether Indian oral tradition is reliable. Most
anthropologists say it is not. It varies according to what the narrator
thinks the listener expects or want to hear, and shifts with time as the
narrator ages and turns his recollections into a set piece story. Mr.
Richard Fox, who did the archaeology of the battlefield after the fire
in the 80's largely discounts it.
Also, earlier testimony is more reliable than testimony. What the
survivors said immediately after the battle is far more reliable than
what they say after politics began, and blame and e×oneration and
excuses took over. In other words, what was told to Terry's command
immediately after the battle would be far more truthful than what came
later. I tend to discount any account that was cooked up by various
parties later, in the midst of a national furor. I believe, for example,
that Godfrey moved from nutrality to hostility toward Benteen and Reno
as the controversy deepened.
Conspiracy theories are fun, but simply ignore the chaotic conditions in
battles that make plans go awry. In most of the current writings, I
feel/think that most material is over analyzed. I do not feel that
Benteen was maliciously withholding support from Custer. The reality was
probably simpler and more innocent. He was most likely trying to spare
his gravely exhausted horses. There could be nothing worse than going
into a fight on horses too worn to move. He probably was moving at a
fast trot. A gait that spares horses but still eats up miles. That makes
sense to a actual cavalryman but is too mundane for the armchair
conspiracy theorists. I think one of the silliest results of the Custer
battle is that people accumulate evidence to support theories that the
battle was won or lost as a result of malice. Most likely, the disaster
was the result of chaos, accident or bad communication. Remember, the
man that Custer sent to the supply train to bring packs could barely
speak english.
As for the death of Custer, we both agree he was found on Last Stand
Hill, with several members of his staff around him.
That should be as expected, due to who he was, not just as the
commander.
His body was taken from the LBH on the steamer Far West, along with all
the wounded back to Ft. Lincoln and Libby.
I am unable to locate any information that said he was buried at the
battlefield and then removed later. If you have the source please advise
me.
I have stood at the top of Reno Hill and on my first visit, was able to
walk over halfway to the river. You are correct in stating that this is
rough terrain to the river. However, with the flow of adrenalin and
people shooting at you, your progress may be faster than normal. As you
said, there was a lull in the fight at this time.
However, there were Indians left there to keep them pinned down. After
Benteen and the packtrain arrived, there was an attempt to open a path
to Custer. But they were pushed back from Weir Point back to their
original position.
As for the book, Little Big Horn Remembered by Herman J. Viola, he is
the Curator Emeritus of the Smithsonian
Institution and former director of the Smithsonian's National
Anthropological Archives. He is also the biographer of Senator Ben
Nighthorse Campbell
whose Cheyenne grandfather Blackhorse fought at TLB. He is also the
adopted brother of Joseph Medicine Crow, whose grandfather was White Man
Runs Him.
LBH facts: Custer was killed exactly where and when is a moot point.
He is still dead.
In a way, he got exactly what he wanted,
to go down in history. However, I think he wanted to be alive to enjoy
it.
If Custer had done as he was told and/or
taken the gattling guns and/or the infantry
all this second guessing would not be necessary.
The Indians won the battle, but lost the war.
Discussing the LBH battle is like discussing religion. No one will ever
change another's mind when they feel they are correct in their thoughts.
Another good book, besides the ones we have discussed is;
Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle by Richard Allan Fo×,
University of Oklahoma Press.
"OLD" Wild Bill
Bob Tiernan
This is another nonsense story. The *only*
fragment of evidence we have is itself
open to question because of a translation
and recollection issue. An Indian scout
said years later (through an interpreter)
that Custer told him (and other, I gather)
that if he wins the next battle he'd
become the "Great Father" in Washington.
Or something like that. But who knows
what he was really saying to the scouts,
and who knows what, if anything, was
lost in translation.
Even more serious is the total lack of
any shred of evidence from those in
any potential Democratic Party circle
with knowledge of Custer's plan and
who were part of the effort, awaiting
the victory telegram from Dakota
Territory. Not a single piece of
evidence exists that anyone used
the news of the LBH to tell the
press that America had been deprived
of the next president.
Bob T
David Matthews
"wild bill" <bron...@webtv.net> wrote in message
news:27971-478...@storefull-3352.bay.webtv.net...
An excellent summimg up. The discussions will probably be going on for ever
but most will just be pet theories.
Dave in Toronto
wild bill
this.
The decisions made that day and the results will forever be a topic of
conversation. BUT it is enjoyable to discuss or debate the different
sides.
In my mind all he did was foolish. That being said others like Bob have
there thoughts as well. I feel we BOTH enjoy the discussion and have our
own thoughts and ideas. It would be fun to all get together in a room
with our research & book and talk it over.
My thanks to both of you for all your input.
wild bill
for the Democratic Candidate four years earlier. He was on the train
with the Candidate as he was travelling the country.
At the majority of the stops he got a larger audience that the
candidate. Due to his Civil War record. Several of the reporters who
were them also were impressed with
the reaction of the people. The democratic
convention was to be held in Chicago in 1876. Custer by then was a
national hero
& was sure he could get the nomination.
If he was able to win another battle with the Indians he felt he would
be nominated and could win the election. That is why he had Mr Kellog
the reporter with him.
I think my information was found in one of the two following books. But
which one I am not sure of. "With Custer on The Little Big Horn" by
William O Taylor or
"Soldiers Falling into Camp" by Joseph
Marshall III.
In my opinion, due to the national uproar over the loss of the troops &
Custer, and
due to Libby Custers insistence in the paper & in private. A scape goat
was needed and that of course became Reno.
Later on he was discharged became a drunk and died. However he was later
cleared and buried next to the flag pole
at the battlefield.
Custer I think was buried in his home town and then reburied at
Arlington, I think. However I may be wrong on his grave site.
Bob Tiernan
> Custer was part of the Presidential escort for the Democratic Candidate
> four years earlier. He was on the train with the Candidate as he was
> travelling the country. At the majority of the stops he got a larger
> audience that the candidate.
That was in 1866 when he and Libby were in the party
that travelled with President Andrew Johnson. If
anyone in the party got larger crowds than did Johnson,
it was General Grant. In the end, Custer was very
unimpressed with this atmosphere.
> The democratic convention was to be held in Chicago in 1876. Custer
> by then was a national hero & was sure he could get the nomination.
Pure speculation, and no more a fact than was a potential
General Terry nomination. Just because someone fit the
profile common then (popular Civil War general) makes it
nothing more than a profile.
Grant opted to run.
Sherman never wanted to.
Custer never planned on it.
> If he was able to win another battle with the Indians
> he felt he would be nominated and could win the election.
Pure speculation. Nothing more, nothing less. A claim
made about General Terry would be as accurate.
> That is why he had Mr Kellog the reporter with him.
Custer liked havinbg reporters around if he could.
Crook had FIVE reporters with him - does that mean
he, too, was thinking of running for president were
he to win a battle that summer?
> A scapegpoat was needed and that of course became Reno.
> Later on he was discharged became a drunk and died.
> However he was later cleared and buried next to the flag
> pole at the battlefield.
He was never really "cleared", but a grand-nephew was able
to get the gov't to remove the Dishonorable discharge
from the record -- not because of any reevaluation but
because officials in the 1960s really didn't care
about anything regarding this type of things except
satisfying the request of a relative.
> Custer I think was buried in his home town and then
> reburied at Arlington, I think.
He was buried at the battlefield along with all
of the other 260+ men, and over a year later
was dug up along with all other officers (save
Lt Crittendon) plus Boston Custer and Autie Reed,
and he was reburied at West Point. Other Officers'
remains were buried in places like Ft Leavenworth,
Arlington, Auburn, NY. etc.
Bob T
wild bill
Custer was planning to run for President
I will withdraw from that part of the discussion.
HOWEVER I request your source of information on whether Custer was
buried
at the LBH or removed from the battlefield and taken to Ft Lincoln on
the Far West along with the wounded. Wild Bill
Iyotake
tale in itself, because he was talking out of both sides of his mouth, only
letting those closest to him know that he actually did want to run. He
publicly renounced his ambitions all through 1875 and said nothing about it
at all in 1876.
Custer would never have won the presidency unless the other side
(Republicans in his case) was completely inept. I don't think running for
office ever entered his head seriously.
--
Iyotake
Bob Tiernan
> HOWEVER I request your source of information on
> whether Custer was buried at the LBH or removed
> from the battlefield and taken to Ft Lincoln on
> the Far West along with the wounded.
There are numerous first-hand accounts mentioning
the burial on the field, and even describing the
details. Lieut Godfrey is one, but here are a
few others.
Pvt David Dawsey of D Company wrote the follwing:
"When the red devils got Custer they cut the heart
out of this Regiment. It is not often a soldier
wastes ters over an Officer but I saw maney an old
hand wipe his eyes with his blouse sleeve (we had
no handkerchiefs) The day we bureyed Custer".
This was not a fuzzy mis-recollection from years
later, for Pvt Dawsey was killed a year later at
the Battle of Snake Creek in action against the
Nez Perce -- the above quote was from a letter he
wrote to his mother after the LBH.
First Sgt John Ryan's account is more descriptive:
"We dug a grave about 18 inches deep and put the
General in. We then found another body...We examined
the body thoroughly and we found the letters T.W.C.
and that settled it [i.e. that it was Captain tom
Custer].
"We then laid him beside the General in the same grave
and covered them over with pieces of tents and blankets
and mounded the grave over with dirt. We found an
Indian travois and turned it upside down over the grave
and we spiked it down with wooded pins, and we laid
stones around to keep the wolves from digging them up".
In Sandy Bernard's article, "Custer Burial Revisited--West
Point, October 1877" (from the 1992 Symposium), he
wrotes:
"As described by Ryan, the Custer battlefield burial
should have ensured their easy recovery later. But
that proved unture, when in June 1877, a contingent
of 7th Cavalry troopers, commanded by Captain Michael
V. Sheridan, returned to the battlefield to recover the
bodies of Custer and the other officers".
Bob Tiernan