Little Man at Home Educational Program for the Challenged Class. AV-8B Harrier Operations 101
HMFIC-1369
During the 1982 Falklands Conflict a total of 28 Sea Harriers and 14 RAF
Harrier GR3s were eventually deployed to the South Atlantic. Over 1,100
combat air patrol missions and 90 offensive support operations were flown by
Sea Harriers and 125 ground attack and tactical reconnaissance sorties by
Harrier GR3s. These aircraft were a major success, showing themselves to be
flexible, robust, reliable and effective. Sea Harriers, which are intended
largely for air defence, were also employed in the ground attack and
reconnaissance roles: the Harrier GR3s, primarily ground attack aircraft,
were converted within a week to use Sidewinder AIM 9L air-to-air missiles in
the air defence role. There was 95% availability at the beginning of each
day and 99% of all planned missions were flown. Sea Harrier demonstrated
itself to be more than a match for Argentine conventional fixed wing
aircraft with 20 confirmed and 3 probable kills, of which 16 and 1
respectively are attributable to Sidewinder AIM 9L missiles. Six Sea
Harriers were destroyed, of which two were lost to enemy fire-one to
small-arms fire and one to a Roland surface-to-air missile. Three GR3s were
also lost to enemy fire, all to ground gunfire. Most aircraft engaged in
offensive support survived damage, which usually resulted from intense
Argentine anti-aircraft gunfire. The need was demonstrated for certain
improvements to Sea Harrier to provide greater endurance and weapon carrying
capacity and a better radar. As a result, Sea Harriers, starting with those
already deployed in HMS Illustrious, were given greater endurance by the fit
of larger drop tanks, and increased armament by the fit of four rather than
two Sidewinder missiles.
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was highlighted by expeditionary air
operations performed by the AV-8B. The Harrier II was the first Marine Corps
tactical strike platform to arrive in theater, and subsequently operated
from various basing postures. Three squadrons, totaling 60 aircraft, and one
six-aircraft detachment operated ashore from an expeditionary airfield,
while one squadron of 20 aircraft operated from a sea platform. During the
ground war, AV-8Bs were based as close as 35 nautical miles (40.22 miles)
from the Kuwait border, making them the most forward deployed tactical
strike aircraft in theater. The AV-8B flew 3,380 sorties for a total of
4,083 flight hours while maintaining a mission capable rate in excess of
90%. Average turnaround time during the ground war surge rate flight
operations was 23 minutes.
During April and May 1999 the 26th MEU participated in Operations Noble
Anvil and Shining Hope. While supporting Noble Anvil, the unit participated
in the NATO bombing Campaign in Kosovo with AV-8B Harrier Attack Aircraft.
Marines aboard USS Kearsarge acted as the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and
Personnel (TRAP) Force as AV-8B Harriers showed their strength overhead by
participating in the NATO bombing campaign over the former Republic of
Yugosalvia (Operation Allied Force). The Marine Corps provided an outsized
contribution to the air campaign as well. In addition to the expeditionary
Prowlers, VMFA(AW)-332 and -533 F/A-18Ds deployed to Taszar, Hungary.
Complemented by 12 AV-8B Harrier IIs from Nassau and Kearsarge, together
they flew nearly 500 sorties, destroying significant high-value targets.
Marine Corps aircrews, along with supporting ground forces, maintained a
continuous Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel alert throughout the
conflict. During the 1999 campaign in Kosovo, RAF Harrier GR7s were
deployed. At the beginning of 1999, eight Harriers deployed to a base in
Italy, together with two Tristar tankers, to support the Kosovo Verification
Mission. This force was increased to 12 Harriers in late March. In the main,
these aircraft dropped either cluster bombs, gravity bombs or precision
guided weapons. RAF Harriers conducted cluster bomb attack on munitions
storage site in Kosovo on 18 April 1999. No aircraft were lost during the
campaign.
In July 2000 Aviation Systems Command ordered a temporary suspension of
flight operations for a portion of the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier fleet.
The decision to temporarily suspend flight operations was based upon
preliminary engineering findings that pointed to the number three engine
bearing assembly in the F402-RR-408 engine as the likely cause of an engine
fire that resulted in the loss of an AV-8B during a training mission at
Twenty-Nine Palms, CA on 21 June 2000. The pilot of that aircraft ejected
safely. Officials addressed concerns about the number three engine bearing
assemblies when they previously ordered a recurring 15-flight hour oil
sampling/analysis process. Although these precautions successfully
identified problems in at least two engines recently, they were unable to
identify the symptoms of the impending failure that led to the June 21
mishap. Until the cause of this latest engine failure is fully under-stood,
Naval Air Systems Command ordered suspension of flight operations to ensure
the safety of the pilots and aircraft. The F402 Engine Group team to include
Rolls Royce, Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point and the Naval Air Systems
Command Team, completed their review of the engineering findings of the
investigation. At that time, the commander of Naval Air Systems Command
determined the course of action required to return the fleet to flight
status. This action affected 105 AV-8B Harriers, 11 of which are deployed.
AV-8B aircraft with F402-RR-406 engines installed were not affected by this
flight restriction because of a different number three bearing design.
During the late-2000 WestPac deployment on LHA 1 Tarawa the Aviation Combat
Element (ACE) for the 13th MEU(SOC) was Marine Medium Helicopter
Squadron-161 [HMM-161 Reinforced]. This unit included 12 CH-46E Sea Knight
medium lift helicopters, four CH-53E Super Stallion heavy lift helicopters,
four AH-1W Super Cobra gunships, two UH-1N utility helicopters and six AV-8B
Harrier attack jets. The Marine Corps grounded all of its Vertical/Short
Takeoff and Landing jets 12 July 2000 due to problems with the main engine
bearing. This grounding initially included all of HMM-161's Harriers. Four
of the newer-model Harriers were relocated from Marine Corps Air Station
Yuma, AZ, directly to USS Tarawa to replace the grounded ones. Squadrons
often swap aircraft in order to accomplish the mission. In this case, the
mission was to deploy six active Harriers with the 13th MEU(SOC). During the
late-2000 Mediteranean deployment on LHA 2 Saipan, the Aviation Combat
Element (ACE) for the 26th MEU(SOC) was Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
264 (HMM-264 Reinforced). This unit included 12 CH-46E Sea Knight medium
lift helicopters, four CH-53E Super Stallion heavy lift helicopters, four
AH-1W Super Cobra gunships, two UH-1N utility helicopters and six AV-8B
Harrier attack jets.
By July 2001 the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harriers had returned to full
deployment status after undergoing major engine repairs and other systems
enhancements to resolve Harrier engine problems and the slowly improving
mission capable rate of the Harrier fleet. Harrier squadrons deployed a
detachment with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in the Western
Pacific, and deployed with the 26 th MEU on the East Coast and the 15th MEU
on the West Coast. Commanders have implemented necessary training and
qualification courses, to regain pilot proficiency and experience lost
during the Harrier grounding.
All-too-often, pilot proficiency degrades during the six-month deployments.
A common post-cruise complaint is that there is just not enough quality
flying. This is an obvious risk considering that these pilots fly a high
performance, single-engine, single-seat airplane at night aboard ship as
their primary mission.
The surveillance and precision approach radars found on many of the
amphibious ships would be unacceptable by USN Carrier standards. Yet, USMC
Harriers perform very similar missions from these small-deck ships, often in
support of real-world operations, and in a wide range of weather conditions
during both day and night. And, they do this without any self-contained
approach capability. These deficiencies have been known for many years and
although upgrades to these systems have been planned, they are continuously
being delayed or diluted as amphibious ship upgrades fall victim to budget
priorities. As a result, the embarked squadron's flexibility is severely
hampered when rapidly changing weather conditions prevail. The lack of
capability and dependability seen in these systems often causes squadrons to
hold their aircraft on deck just in consideration of the potential for
change in the weather. When aircraft are airborne, they are always at risk
to rapidly changing weather.
AV-8B shipboard operations continue to be of concern, since the community
experiences relatively poor success in its efforts to become truly
integrated as a relevant weapon system for the deployed MEU (SOC). At
program inception, the AV-8B was a credible attack platform with a unique
and very relevant basing capability. Over time, increasing both system
capabilities and the basic performance of the aircraft reinforced these
attributes. The Night Attack and Radar/Night Attack variants were the
results of these efforts. However, despite a substantial level of effort on
the part of the Marine Corps, the aircraft still lacks an appropriate
synergy of attributes that would make it truly relevant in today's
operational environment, which now focuses primarily on support of the
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)).
Although the Radar/Night Attack aircraft have excellent night vision and
navigation suites, they lack a targeting pod and future weapons capabilities
(JDAM/JSOW) which would provide the day/night precision strike, standoff,
lethality, urban engagement and minimum collateral damage effects required
in the most foreseeable scenarios. Although the aircraft possess excellent
navigation and digital communication systems that would enable them to
conduct all-weather Close Air Support (CAS), they lack a compatible protocol
that will permit communication with the USMC's emerging ground digital
terminal. Although the amphibious basing capability and radar of the Harrier
II+ provide the opportunity to provide force protection for our amphibious
shipping and assault support evolutions, the aircraft lacks a beyond-visual
range air-to-air weapon system that can provide the full range of protection
that is required. Last, and certainly not least, the aircraft is uniquely
available to meet the MAGTF's ground attack needs. This is particularly true
with regard to the provision of responsive CAS support and tightly
integrated Armed Reconnaissance. Unfortunately, the AV-8B is susceptible to
IR missile threats and its vulnerability is less than desirable in exactly
those types of employment scenarios.
To sustain its warfighting capabilities, the Harrier requires investment in
four key areas: precision targeting, connectivity, force protection, and
survivability. Investments should be focused on providing maximum platform
relevance to the MEU(SOC) mission. Due to hardware limits with the current
architecture, most of these upgrades hinge on incorporation of computers
with increased processing capability such as the Open Systems Core Avionics
Requirement (OSCAR). OSCAR is a Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technology
program that replaces some of the critical avionics with commercially
available processors using higher order language. Increasing this capability
is a critical requirement if an upgrade path for the aircraft is to be
maintained.
Man at Home
news:jXT8f.1624$8T1.931@trnddc05:
This is a prime example that you can't believe everything you read in
the papers or on the internet. I think I will change my subscription to
the LA Times. Maybe they will be more "Fair and Balanced."
I am glad you did some research for those of us who were there it is
good to know the stories behind the military action.