On May 22, 1:33 pm, "Sam Taylor" <
cyg...@cncnet.com> wrote:
"Shouldn't Adams Life be redeemed by a second Adam, just like
the first Adam before he sinned. "
No,Adam by sinning dishonored God, so only
God can honor God,and since Adam was a
man, only the God-man in the one Person
of Christ can do it.
The Argument of Cur Deus Homo?
http://www.quodlibet.net/anselm.shtml
Anthropolgy: The Role of Rational Nature
Anselm made quite significant contributions to the medieval church's
understanding of Christian anthropology through such works as De
conordia praescientiae, and Monologian. In Cur Deus Homo?, Anselm
confines his discussion of anthropology to the discussion of the
purpose of man's existence, and the role which man must ultimately
play in the divine plan of God.
Anselm sees divine purpose in the fact that God has bestowed man with
the faculty of reason. This reason or rational nature was "created
just by God, so that it might be blessed in the enjoyment of him" (II.
1). The purpose of the reason is to enable man to distinguish between
the just and unjust, between good and evil. But this rational nature
is not to be seen as a neutral faculty through which either good or
evil may be chosen. Instead, the reason was originally disposed toward
the good, or as Anselm puts it, "the rational nature was created to
love and choose the supreme good above all things," (Ibid.). Anselm
cites the perfection of all of God's designs as proof that reception
of such a faculty points to the fact that man was intended to attain
that which he sought, namely, the supreme good, that is, God. In other
words, God granted rational nature to Adam with the intent that in the
fulness of time, Adam would be blessed with an eternal enjoyment of
God.
According to Anselm, the achievement of this eternal enjoyment was to
play a grander part in God's overall design. "When man was created in
paradise without sin, he was set, as it were, by God between God and
the devil, in order to overcome the devil by not consenting to his
persuasions to sin. This would have vindicated and honored God and
confounded the devil, since man, though the weaker, would have refused
to sin on earth at the instance of that very devil who, though the
stronger, sinned in heaven without persuasion." (II.22)
Man was to be the means through which God demonstrated the devil's
weakness and man's superior ability to obey. But this was not realized
in Eden, due to Adam's fall from grace. Does this then leave the
divine plan of God thwarted? Anselm does not believe so. Since God so
purposed such a destiny for man from the beginning, such a destiny
must still exist. Somehow man must achieve both perfect obedience to
God while demonstrating his superiority of obedience over the devil.
The answer to how this can be achieved will be postponed until
Anselm's Christology is discussed.
Brief mention should be made regarding Anselm's epistemology. Anselm
views the particulars and phenomena as dependent upon universals
grounded in the mind of God. An example of this is seen above in the
fact that Anselm bases upon the fact that men possess rational natures
that God must indeed have a divine purpose from which this possession
is derived (namely, to eternally enjoy God's presence). In addition,
this purpose, being grounded in the perfect will of God, is
unchangeable, enabling Anselm to confidently assert that men must
necessarily achieve this purpose, even if it means that God Himself
must accomplish it for man (through the work of a Man-God). This
epistemology (referred to a "Realism", though differentiated from that
of modern discussions) provides the structural backbone to Anselm's
reasoning.
Hamartiology
Central to Anselm's argument is his understanding of sin. Anselm sees
the duty of every rational creature as subjecting every inclination to
the will of God. Of this Anselm writes, "This is the debt which angels
and men owe to God. No one who pays it sins; everyone who does not pay
it sins. This is the sole and entire honor which we owe to God, and
God requires from us. One who does not render this honor to God takes
away from God what belongs to him, and dishonors God, and to do this
is to sin. Moreover, as long as he does not repay what he has stolen,
he remains at fault." (I.11)
Anselm's belief that all sin stems from a violation of God's inherent
honor forms the backbone of his theory of atonement. Much has been
written on the subject of where Anselm derived his understanding of
sin. Many explain Anselm's unique perspective as a result of medieval
society's shift in its understanding of justice from that of Roman law
to a feudal system. Erickson writes, "...The feudal system was the
most powerful force in the structuring of society. Justice and law had
become more of a personal matter; violations of the law were now
thought of as offenses against the person of the feudal overlord... In
matters of private offense, various forms of satisfaction could be
substituted for punishment. By Anselm's time the concept of
satisfaction had become an integral part of the feudal structure...
Anselm pictures God as a feudal overlord who, to maintain his honor,
insists that there be adequate satisfaction for any encroachment on
it," (797; emphasis mine).
But Anselm's understanding may go much deeper than a mere transference
of theology onto fuedal justice theory. For in his insistence that sin
is a violation of God's honor, Anselm, in effect, grounds the reality
of sin to the character of God. Such a structure automatically
disallows the possibility that "sin" is merely a governmental or
arbitrary standard imposed by God on mankind. Anselm then uses this
understanding of sin's utter reality as the foundation for his entire
soteriology. If sin is indeed a reality in relation to the character
of God, then God will be moved to respond to man's guilt of sin.
Soteriology
Anselm deliberately refutes the predominant atonement theory of his
day, the Ransom theory developed by Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. The
Ransom theory proposed that prior to the atonement, the devil had the
"right of possession" over men due to their falleness. The death of
Christ then served as a ransom for our rescue, with the devil
believing that he had swapped mankind for the crucified second Person
of the Trinity. But Satan was ultimately deceived by assuming that
Christ could be held by death.
In chapter seven of Book One, Anselm refutes the claim of the ransom
theorists that God owed the devil anything. He writes, "I cannot see
what force this argument has. If the devil or man belonged to himself
or to anyone but God, or remained in some power other than God's,
perhaps it would be a sound argument. But the devil and man belong to
God alone, and neither one stands outside God's power; what case,
then, did God have to plead with his own creature, concerning his own
creature, in his own affair, unless it was in order to punish his
servant, who had persuaded his fellow servant to desert their common
master?"
Instead of the ransom theory, Anselm sets forth what has come to be
known as the Satisfaction or Commercial Theory. As stated earlier,
Anselm's soteriology rests upon his understanding of sin, namely, that
sin is a violation of the honor of God. What then is to be done to
vindicate such a violation? Anslem claims that God has two choices:
punishment and satisfaction. Punishment would restore honor to God
through the removal of freedom or ability from the individual, and
through demonstrating God's sovereignty. Satisfaction restores God's
honor through the individual's payment to God, first, in full, and
then above and beyond the debt incurred. The fact that sin is rooted
in a violation of God's character necessitates a response by God in
either of these two methods of vindication. Anselm writes, It does not
belong to [God's] freedom or kindness or will to forgive unpunished
the sinner who does not repay to God what he took away," (I.12).
It should be remembered that the purpose of Anselm's treatise is to
demonstrate the necessity of Christ's death on the cross. Therefore,
the punishment option must be shown to be not possible, since God
ultimately chose the mode of ssatisfaction. Anselm does this by
adopting an argument proposed by Augustine which claims since some of
the angels had fallen from grace, there must then be at least as many
men who are restored, since the original appointed number of
individuals who will occupy the "heavenly city" must not waver. "We
cannot doubt that the rational nature, which either is or is going to
be blessed in the contemplation of God, was foreseen by God as
existing in a particular reasonable and perfect number, so that its
number cannot be greater or smaller... Either [the fallen angels']
number must necessarily be made up, or else the rational nature will
remain incomplete in number, although it was foreseen in a perfect
number; but this cannot be." (I.16) (The reader may again take note of
the fact that (Augustine and) Anselm's argument here employs
[medieval] Realism.)
The only reasonable choice left for God (based on his will to have the
perfect number of rational natures) between punishment and
satisfaction is that of satisfaction. As stated above, satisfaction
consists of both the full payment of the debt and a gift whereby the
debt is exceeded. The debt in this instance which must be repaid in
full is that honor which was taken from God when man failed to obey
God fully and thereby shame the devil by demonstrating that the weaker
creature could persevere in obedience to a greater degree than the
stronger.
But now that man has fallen into disobedience, how may he ever regain
his original state of innocence within which he was called to
persevere. Indeed this in itself is an impossible task!. Regarding a
payment in excess of the debt, who has possession of that which
exceeds the tremendous debt incurred? Since all of creation has now
fallen, that which must be given must exceed all of creation in
greatness. Anselm writes, "If he is to give something of his own to
God, which surpasses everything that is beneath God, it is also
necessary for him to be greater than everything that is not God. But
there is nothing above everything that it not God, save God himself...
Then no one but God can make this satisfaction," (II.6).
Christology
It is clear from Anselm's argument (and any reasonable consideration)
that man has no hope of satisfying the vindication required by the
violation of God's honor. But all is not lost for mankind, for this
leaves open only one possible solution: "If then, that celestial city
[i.e., the perfect number of rational natures] must be completed from
among men, and this cannot happen unless the aforementioned
satisfaction is made, while no one save God can make it and no one
save man ought to make it, it is necessary for a God-Man to make
it." (Ibid.) Anselm concludes that the dire predicament of man
necessitates the work of a God-Man who alone is able to achieve the
task which is being required of man.
In his following description of this necessary God-Man, Anselm
maintains a Chalceonian christology through emphasizing the need of
two natures within one person: "If these two complete natures are said
to be united in some way, but still man is one person and God another,
so that the same person is not both God and man, the two natures
cannot do what needs to be done. For God will not do it, because he
does not owe it, and man will not do it, because he cannot. Therefore,
for the God-Man to do this, the person who is to make the satisfaction
must be both perfect God and perfect man, because none but true God
can make it, and none but true man owes it." (II.7) Anselm then goes
on to describe the fittingness whereby this perfect God should be the
second Person of the Trinity (II.9), and that the perfect man should
be born of a virgin woman (II.8).
This God-Man then proceeds to live a perfect life upon earth despite
the persuasions of the devil, just as Adam was originally intended. To
live thus is the duty of all men, and therefore, in the case of the
God-Man, secures no special grace from God. Rather it is payment of
the first portion of the satisfaction, namely, payment in full of the
debt incurred: "If we say that he will give himself to obey God, so
that in steadfastly maintaining justice he submits himself to his
will, this will not be to give what God does not require of him as an
obligation. For very rational creature owes this obedience to
God." (II.11).
The question is then raised regarding what this God-Man might give in
order to pay the full satisfaction. Anselm begins his answer by
pointing out that since "mortality belongs to the corrupt, not to the
pure nature of man," (Ibid.), it follows that this sinless God-Man
"will not be obliged to die," (II.10). As to whether or not it will
even be possible for the God-Man to die, Anselm writes, "As he will be
God, he will also be almighty. Then if he wills it he will be able to
lay down his life and take it again... If he wills to permit it, it
will be possible for him to be killed, and if he does not will it, it
will not be possible," (II.11).
This freedom to lay down his life and take it up again, based on his
willing it, opens the door to a possible way to fully pay the
satisfaction. Anselm continues, "Nothing that man can suffer for God's
honor, freely and not as an obligation, is more bitter or harder than
death. Nor can a man give himself more fully to God than he does when
he surrenders himself to death for His honor. Then he who wishes to
make satisfaction for man's sin must be able to die if he wills
it," (II.11). The greatest act of honor which a man can do for God is
to lay down his own life in order to protect that honor. Since death
is not an obligation upon sinless men, this act, when performed by the
sinless God-Man, would suffice to exceed in payment the original debt.
This then, being the only feasible method whereby mankind may be
relieved of its debt and restored to its intended purpose, becomes, in
Anselm's argument, proof of its reasonableness, necessity and truth.
In this way Anselm presents the necessity of Christ having to die upon
the cross for the sake of mankind.
How can this act secure the forgiveness of such a great multitude of
sins? The answer lies in the fact that this evil is committed against
the very Person of God. [Boso:] "A sin committed against [the God-
Man's] person is incommensurate with every conceivable sin that does
not touch his person. [Anselm:] We see, then, that no greatness or
multitude of sins apart from God's person can be compared to an injury
done to the bodily life of this Man." (II.14) The fact that such an
experience as the God-Man underwent is unparalleled in its gravity due
to the Person against whom it is being committed results in a likewise
unparalleled merit toward the willing and unobliged participant. It is
through this willing obedience that the act of the God-Man secures
infinite merit in the sight of God.
What then, did the God-Man objectively achieve through a willing
death? The answer is two-fold. Firstly, he demonstrated to all men the
degree to which obedience is owed God. "Do you not understand that by
enduring with gentle patience the injuries and insults and death on
the cross with thieves, all brought on him by his obedience in
maintaining justice, he gave an example to men, to teach them not to
turn away from the justice they owe to God on account of any trials
they can experience?" (II.18) This owed obedience which resulted for
the God-Man in suffering and humiliation is to be a sign to men that
obedience should and must be maintained despite seemingly adverse
consequences.
The fact that this owed obedience resulted in a death which the God-
Man was not obliged to undergo (due to his sinlessness), provides men
with an example of willfull surrender of their own lives which they
know are obliged to suffer death. "This Man freely offered to the
father what he would never have lost by any necessity, and paid for
sinners what he did not owe for himself. Therefore he gave us a more
striking example, to the effect that each man should not hesitate to
surrender to God for himself, when reason demands it, what he is going
to lose very soon." (Ibid.)
Secondly, the fact that the God-Man willingly underwent such grave
injustice in order to pay in full the satisfaction results in the
necessity that God reward the Son. But the Son, being God himself, is
in need of no thing nor lacks anything. "What then, will be given him
as a reward, when he is in need of nothing and there is nothing that
can be given or forgiven him?" (II.19) The hope of man lies in the
fact that the Son is free to give the reward to whomever he pleases
and the Father will be obliged to give it since it is the Son's to do
with as he pleases. Anselm concludes, "To whom would it be more
fitting for him to assign the fruit and recompense of his death than
to those for whose salvation (as truthful reason has taught us) he
made himself man, and to whom (as we have said) by dying he gave an
example of dying for the sake of justice?... Or whom will he more
justly make heirs of the debt which he does not need, and the
abundance of his own fullness, than his kinsmen and brethren, whom he
sees bound by so many great debts, languishing in poverty and deepest
misery, so that what they owe for their sins may be forgiven them, and
what they need, on account of their sins, may be given them?" (II.19)
In Anselm's view, Christ passes on to mankind the infinite merit which
he accomplished in his work on the cross. This merit then restores
mankind in the sight of God, enabling the original purpose of God to
be fulfilled, namely, that man as a rational creature may eternally
enjoy contemplation of God's presence.
Some scholars criticize Anselm on several grounds which we can only
briefly mention here. First, as mentioned above, many see an over-
dependence by Anselm upon medieval justice theory. Secondly, Anselm
makes no mention of any "penalty" for sin. Berkhof writes, "This
theort really has no place for the idea that Christ by suffering
endured the penalty of sin, and that His suffering was strictly
vicarious. The death of Christ is merely a tribute offered voluntarily
to the honor of the Father," (Theology, 386). A third criticism is
aimed at Anselm's lack of discussion regarding in what manner Christ's
infinite merit is passed on to man. "[Anselm's Satisfaction theory]
represents the application of the merits of Christ to the sinner as a
merely external transaction. There is no hint of the mystical union Of
Christ and believers." (Berkhof, History, 174) "There is no hint of
the mystical..., nor of faith as accepting the righteousness of
Christ. Since the whole transaction appears to be rather commercial,
the theory is often called the commercial theory." (Theology, 386)
A final problem which may face contemporary readers of Anselm may well
be the entire epistemology under which the author constructs his
argument. It is true that most readers have not consciously chosen
under which epistemology they will operate. Often an eclecticism is
probably employed. But in reading Cur Deus Homo?, one cannot help but
become aware of a foreignness to a reasoning which claims the
necessity of a certain number of rational natures to occupy heaven,
and for man to necessary possess rational contemplation of God due to
the fact that Edenic Adam was given a chance.
I must admit that I question this epistemology, and yet am the first
to admit that Anselm would surely be appalled at the degree of
relativism which he would find in my own reasoning, as a mere by-
product of my existence within contemporary American culture. To me,
this is the major issue facing Anselm's relevance to today's world.
And yet, the author of this paper is in no way prepared to construct
any conclusion on this matter. Let it merely be said that Anselm
presents a very viable demonstration of the necessity for the gospels'
account of Christ's work, and that contemporary students would do well
to learn from both its content and methodology.
Bibliography
Anselm of Canterbury. Cur Deus Homo? In A Scholastic Miscellany:
Anselm to Ockham.
Fairweather, Eugene R. ed. (Philadelphia: Westminter Press; 1956):
100-183.
Berkhof, Louis. The History of Christian Doctrines. (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House;
1937)
........Systematic Theology. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmens Publ.; 1941)
Erickson, Millard J. Christian Theology. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House; 1985)
Horne, Charles M. The Doctrine of Salvation. (Chicago: Moody Press;
1984)