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Re: The myth of food production "efficiency" in the "ar" debate
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George Plimpton
Apr 25, 2012, 11:59:10 PM4/25/12
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On 7/26/2007 5:02 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, Dutch<n...@email.com> wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, "Dutch"<n...@home.com> wrote:
>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
>>>>> relevant difference between them.
>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>>
>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>>
>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>>
>
> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
Why not? Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
it. Here's a start:
"Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>> "capacity",
>
> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
Bullshit. You're just too fucking lazy to go find it. I found it, and
I don't pretend to be a specialist.
> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> nonhumans have.
No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
Except that he's not saying it.
> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>
>> but that objection is weak and has not been put forth. In
>> fact capacity is a transparent concept, an acorn possesses the capacity
>> to become an oak tree, a fertile egg possesses the capacity to be a
>> chicken, a baby human and a person in a coma possess the capacity to
>> become a moral agent.
>>
>
> That sounds like by "capacity" you mean "potential ability", which he
> explicitly disavows.
No, he doesn't. Stop lying about what he wrote.
> And "potential ability" won't cover the cases
> where the human is permanently impaired.
He addresses that separately.
> On Jul 26, 6:06 pm, Dutch<n...@email.com> wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Jul 6, 5:41 pm, "Dutch"<n...@home.com> wrote:
>>>>> That's not the meaning of "discrimination" we're talking about here.
>>>>> We're saying that, if you make different moral judgements about two
>>>>> different cases, you're under an obligation to specify a morally
>>>>> relevant difference between them.
>>>> How many times do I have to repeat this? The chief morally relevant
>>>> differences between humans and non-humans, in fact among all organisms, are
>>>> intelligence and sentience.
>>
>>> But this doesn't distinguish *all* humans from *all* nonhumans. How
>>> many times do I have to repeat *that*?
>>
>> You never even have to think it again, it has been dispelled by an
>> alternative way of approaching the whole subject of moral beings.
>> "THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
>> A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT "
>>
>
> Yes, I know you're impressed by that essay. I'm not impressed by that
> part of it, as it stands. I don't find the explanation of the crucial
> notion of "capacity" to be anything approaching adequate.
Why not? Just because it doesn't fit with what you want to believe?
You /could/ learn what it is, but you're too lazy and self-absorbed for
it. Here's a start:
"Thus, asked whether she can multiply two digit numbers, a child
who at present can only multiply one-digit numbers may say that
she cannot do so at present (ability), but that she is sure she
could learn to do so if properly instructed (capability)."
>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>> "capacity",
>
> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
Bullshit. You're just too fucking lazy to go find it. I found it, and
I don't pretend to be a specialist.
> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> nonhumans have.
No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
Except that he's not saying it.
> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>
>> but that objection is weak and has not been put forth. In
>> fact capacity is a transparent concept, an acorn possesses the capacity
>> to become an oak tree, a fertile egg possesses the capacity to be a
>> chicken, a baby human and a person in a coma possess the capacity to
>> become a moral agent.
>>
>
> That sounds like by "capacity" you mean "potential ability", which he
> explicitly disavows.
No, he doesn't. Stop lying about what he wrote.
> And "potential ability" won't cover the cases
> where the human is permanently impaired.
He addresses that separately.
Rupert
Apr 26, 2012, 9:56:02 AM4/26/12
to
> >> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >> "capacity",
>
> > Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>
> Bullshit. You're just too fucking lazy to go find it. I found it, and
> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>
AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
moral agency. What you have said so far doesn't explain what the
meaning of this is. Nor is the explanation to be found anywhere in
Wetlesen's essay.
> > He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> > nonhumans have.
>
> No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>
> > Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>
> Except that he's not saying it.
>
> > He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>
> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>
some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack, and that
it is his burden to identify this property. My remark was correct.
>
>
> >> but that objection is weak and has not been put forth. In
> >> fact capacity is a transparent concept, an acorn possesses the capacity
> >> to become an oak tree, a fertile egg possesses the capacity to be a
> >> chicken, a baby human and a person in a coma possess the capacity to
> >> become a moral agent.
>
> > That sounds like by "capacity" you mean "potential ability", which he
> > explicitly disavows.
>
> No, he doesn't. Stop lying about what he wrote.
>
"However, a subject may have the capabilities of moral agency without
having the operative abilities. In that case the subject is a moral
person without being a moral agent, since moral personhood is grounded
on the actual capability and not on the potential ability." From
Wetlesen's essay, in the section "A rebuttal of the argument from
marginal cases".
Please don't accuse other people of lying when you have no rational
foundation for this accusation.
> > And "potential ability" won't cover the cases
> > where the human is permanently impaired.
>
> He addresses that separately.
capability for moral agency. This is crucial to his attempted rebuttal
of the AMC.
Have you read the essay?
George Plimpton
Apr 26, 2012, 11:53:52 AM4/26/12
to
retard? It illustrates the difference between ability and capability.
You may no longer try to be evasive on that issue.
>
>>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
>>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
>>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
>>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
>>>> "capacity",
>>
>>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>>
>> Bullshit. You're just too fucking lazy to go find it. I found it, and
>> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>>
>
> In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
> AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
> permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
> moral agency.
equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
property possessed by the person. You just don't get it.
You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
>>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
>>> nonhumans have.
>>
>> No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>>
>>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>>
>> Except that he's not saying it.
>>
>>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>>
>> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>>
>
> He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
> some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.
Rupert
Apr 27, 2012, 1:25:01 AM4/27/12
to
abilty and capability, which is probably different to what Wetlesen
had in mind because Wetlesen explicitly denied that capability meant
the same thing as potential ability.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>> The class of beings called "moral persons" satisfies this objection. No
> >>>> non-human possesses the inherent capacity to be a moral agent or to
> >>>> display the other markers for advanced intelligence and sentience. You
> >>>> have tried to hang your hat on a supposed lack of clarity of the word
> >>>> "capacity",
>
> >>> Pretty much no attempt has been made to explain this crucial concept.
>
> >> Bullshit. You're just too fucking lazy to go find it. I found it, and
> >> I don't pretend to be a specialist.
>
> > In order for Wetlesen's argument to be a successful rebuttal of the
> > AMC, he has to argue that there is at least a possibility that a
> > permanently severely retarded human being possesses the capability for
> > moral agency.
>
> No, he doesn't. You show that you *still* don't understand that fully
> equal moral considerability is *NOT* dependent on some individual
> property possessed by the person. You just don't get it.
>
individual property, because he accepts the formal principle of
justice. You ought to read his essay.
> You and the other AMC-addicts just don't get it.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> He's saying there's some property that all humans have and no
> >>> nonhumans have.
>
> >> No, he isn't. He isn't saying what all humans have at all.
>
> >>> Fine, then it's his burden to state what it is.
>
> >> Except that he's not saying it.
>
> >>> He hasn't even begun to embark on this task.
>
> >> Nor will he - he doesn't need to do so.
>
> > He acknowledges that in order to rebut the AMC he needs to identify
> > some property that marginal humans have and nonhumans lack,
>
> Where does he acknowledge that? Show us.
>
> You're *still* stuck on this idea of *individuals*, and that's simply wrong.
to all moral persons. Hence this position is universalistic and
egalitarian. If this way of understanding the relation between moral
persons and moral agents works, there will be no need to distinguish
Agent's Rights and Human Rights the way Warren does. They will be
grounded in the same internal property of moral persons, and there
will be no need for a supplementary justification based on an external
relation such as membership in a human society.
The second consequence which follows from this position is that there
will be a relevant difference between human and non-human beings,
which can justify a differential treatment with regard to the
ascription of moral status. Humans have a property which other animals
lack, notably the capability of being moral agents, and if this
property is accepted to be a necessary condition for the ascription of
moral status, then its absence in other animals will be a sufficient
condition for denying moral status to them."
(It should be noted that later in the essay Wetlesen in fact argues
that all individual biological organisms have moral status, and
speculates that ethical vegetarianism may be obligatory on these
grounds, because of a duty to do the least possible harm.)
Wetlesen most definitely agrees that the moral status of individuals
should be grounded in individual internal or relational properties
that they have. This is clear when you read his essay. You should
understand the argument and the way it differs from the ASN before
rushing to its defence.
George Plimpton
Apr 27, 2012, 2:32:59 AM4/27/12
to
Rupert
Apr 27, 2012, 10:23:06 AM4/27/12
to
moral status and deny it to another then one must identify a morally
relevant property that the first has and the second lacks.
George Plimpton
Apr 27, 2012, 11:34:59 AM4/27/12
to
talking about kinds.
Rupert
Apr 27, 2012, 1:48:52 PM4/27/12
to
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