> > "Frank" <
frankdotlogu...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> >news:kk6tke$gaa$2...@dont-email.me...
> >> On 4/11/2013 1:49 PM, Sid9 wrote:
> >>> "jane" <
jane.pla...@gmail.com> wrote in message
typical "CONSERVATIVE", beyond stupid, we are sick of your
stupidity, we are sick of "CONSERVATIVE" lies. bush invaded, and bush
bungled the invasion, because "THE CONSERVATIVE" was sick with greed,
and lusted after another countries wealth, iraqs oil.
At critical moments in the fight for Afghanistan, the Bush
administration diverted scarce intelligence and reconstruction
resources to Iraq, including elite C.I.A. teams and Special Forces
units involved in the search for terrorists. As sophisticated Predator
spy planes rolled off assembly lines in the United States, they were
shipped to Iraq, undercutting the search for Taliban and terrorist
leaders, according to senior military and intelligence officials.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Advertise on NYTimes.com
How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad
By DAVID ROHDE and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: August 12, 2007
Correction Appended
Two years after the Taliban fell to an American-led coalition, a group
of NATO ambassadors landed in Kabul, Afghanistan, to survey what
appeared to be a triumph — a fresh start for a country ripped apart by
years of war with the Soviets and brutal repression by religious
extremists.
Losing the Advantage
Misjudgments in Iraq’s Shadow
Reach of War
With a senior American diplomat, R. Nicholas Burns, leading the way,
they thundered around the country in Black Hawk helicopters, with
little fear for their safety. They strolled quiet streets in Kandahar
and sipped tea with tribal leaders. At a briefing from the United
States Central Command, they were told that the Taliban were now a
“spent force.”
“Some of us were saying, ‘Not so fast,’ ” Mr. Burns, now the under
secretary of state for political affairs, recalled. “While not a
strategic threat, a number of us assumed that the Taliban was too
enmeshed in Afghan society to just disappear.”
But that skepticism had never taken hold in Washington. Since the 2001
war, American intelligence agencies had reported that the Taliban were
so decimated they no longer posed a threat, according to two senior
intelligence officials who reviewed the reports.
The American sense of victory had been so robust that the top C.I.A.
specialists and elite Special Forces units who had helped liberate
Afghanistan had long since moved on to the next war, in Iraq.
Those sweeping miscalculations were part of a pattern of assessments
and decisions that helped send what many in the American military call
“the good war” off course.
Like Osama bin Laden and his deputies, the Taliban had found refuge in
Pakistan and regrouped as the American focus wavered. Taliban fighters
seeped back over the border, driving up the suicide attacks and
roadside bombings by as much as 25 percent this spring, and forcing
NATO and American troops into battles to retake previously liberated
villages in southern Afghanistan.
They have scored some successes recently, and since the 2001 invasion,
there have been improvements in health care, education and the
economy, as well as the quality of life in the cities. But
Afghanistan’s embattled president, Hamid Karzai, said in Washington
last week that security in his country had “definitely deteriorated.”
One former national security official called that “a very diplomatic
understatement.”
President Bush’s critics have long contended that the Iraq war has
diminished America’s effort in Afghanistan, which the administration
has denied, but an examination of how the policy unfolded within the
administration reveals a deep divide over how to proceed in
Afghanistan and a series of decisions that at times seemed to relegate
it to an afterthought as Iraq unraveled.
Statements from the White House, including from the president, in
support of Afghanistan were resolute, but behind them was a halting,
sometimes reluctant commitment to solving Afghanistan’s myriad
problems, according to dozens of interviews in the United States, at
NATO headquarters in Brussels and in Kabul, the Afghan capital.
At critical moments in the fight for Afghanistan, the Bush
administration diverted scarce intelligence and reconstruction
resources to Iraq, including elite C.I.A. teams and Special Forces
units involved in the search for terrorists. As sophisticated Predator
spy planes rolled off assembly lines in the United States, they were
shipped to Iraq, undercutting the search for Taliban and terrorist
leaders, according to senior military and intelligence officials.
As defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld claimed credit for toppling
the Taliban with light, fast forces. But in a move that foreshadowed
America’s trouble in Iraq, he failed to anticipate the need for more
forces after the old government was gone, and blocked an early
proposal from Colin L. Powell, then the secretary of state, and Mr.
Karzai, the administration’s handpicked president, for a large
international force. As the situation deteriorated, Mr. Rumsfeld and
other administration officials reversed course and cajoled European
allies into sending troops.
When it came to reconstruction, big goals were announced, big projects
identified. Yet in the year Mr. Bush promised a “Marshall Plan” for
Afghanistan, the country received less assistance per capita than did
postconflict Bosnia and Kosovo, or even desperately poor Haiti,
according to a RAND Corporation study. Washington has spent an average
of $3.4 billion a year reconstructing Afghanistan, less than half of
what it has spent in Iraq, according to the Congressional Research
Service.
The White House contends that the troop level in Afghanistan was
increased when needed and that it now stands at 23,500. But a senior
American commander said that even as the military force grew last
year, he was surprised to discover that “I could count on the fingers
of one or two hands the number of U.S. government agricultural
experts” in Afghanistan, where 80 percent of the economy is
agricultural. A $300 million project authorized by Congress for small
businesses was never financed.
Underlying many of the decisions, officials say, was a misapprehension
about what Americans would find on the ground in Afghanistan. “The
perception was that Afghans hated foreigners and that the Iraqis would
welcome us,” said James Dobbins, the administration’s former special
envoy for Afghanistan. “The reverse turned out to be the case.”
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice defended the administration’s
policy, saying, “I don’t buy the argument that Afghanistan was starved
of resources.” Yet she said: “I don’t think the U.S. government had
what it needed for reconstructing a country. We did it ad hoc in the
Balkans, and then in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq.”
In interviews, three former American ambassadors to Afghanistan were
more critical of Washington’s record.
“I said from the get-go that we didn’t have enough money and we didn’t
have enough soldiers,” said Robert P. Finn, who was the ambassador in
2002 and 2003. “I’m saying the same thing six years later.”
Zalmay Khalilzad, who was the next ambassador and is now the American
ambassador to the United Nations, said, “I do think that state-
building and nation-building, we came to that reluctantly,” adding
that “I think more could have been done earlier on these issues.”
And Ronald E. Neumann, who replaced Mr. Khalilzad in Kabul, said, “The
idea that we could just hunt terrorists and we didn’t have to do
nation-building, and we could just leave it alone, that was a large
mistake.”
A Big Promise, Unfulfilled
After months of arguing unsuccessfully for a far larger effort in
Afghanistan, Mr. Dobbins received an unexpected call in April 2002.
Mr. Bush, he was told, was planning to proclaim America’s commitment
to rebuild Afghanistan.
“I got a call from the White House speech writers saying they were
writing a speech and did I see any reason not to cite the Marshall
Plan,” Mr. Dobbins recalled, referring to the American rebuilding of
postwar Europe. “I said, ‘No, I saw no objections’, so they put it in
the speech.”
On April 17, Mr. Bush traveled to the Virginia Military Institute,
where Gen. George C. Marshall trained a century ago. “Marshall knew
that our military victory against enemies in World War II had to be
followed by a moral victory that resulted in better lives for
individual human beings,” Mr. Bush said, calling Marshall’s work “a
beacon to light the path that we, too, must follow.”
Mr. Bush had belittled “nation building” while campaigning for
president 18 months earlier. But aware that Afghans had felt abandoned
before, including by his father’s administration after the Soviets
left in 1989, he vowed to avoid the syndrome of “initial success,
followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure.
“We’re not going to repeat that mistake,” he said. “We’re tough, we’re
determined, we’re relentless. We will stay until the mission is done.”
The speech, which received faint notice in the United States, fueled
expectations in Afghanistan and bolstered Mr. Karzai’s stature before
an Afghan grand council meeting in June 2002 at which Mr. Karzai was
formally chosen to lead the government.
Yet privately, some senior officials, including Mr. Rumsfeld, were
concerned that Afghanistan was a morass where the United States could
achieve little, according to administration officials involved in the
debate.
Within hours of the president’s speech, Mr. Rumsfeld announced his own
approach at a Pentagon news conference.
“The last thing you’re going to hear from this podium is someone
thinking they know how Afghanistan ought to organize itself,” he said.
“They’re going to have to figure it out. They’re going to have to grab
ahold of that thing and do something. And we’re there to help.”
But the help was slow in coming. Despite Mr. Bush’s promise in
Virginia, in the months that followed his April speech, no detailed
reconstruction plan emerged from the administration. Some senior
administration officials lay the blame on the National Security
Council, which is charged with making sure the president’s foreign
policy is carried out.
The stagnation reflected tension within the administration over how
large a role the United States should play in stabilizing a country
after toppling its government, former officials say.
After the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, Mr. Powell and Ms.
Rice, then the national security adviser, argued in confidential
sessions that if the United States now lost Afghanistan, America’s
image would be damaged, officials said. In a February 2002 meeting in
the White House Situation Room, Mr. Powell proposed that American
troops join the small international peacekeeping force patrolling
Kabul and help Mr. Karzai extend his influence beyond the capital.
Mr. Powell said in an interview that his model was the 1989 invasion
of Panama, where American troops spread out across the country after
ousting the Noriega government. “The strategy has to be to take charge
of the whole country by military force, police or other means,” he
said.
Richard N. Haass, a former director of policy planning at the State
Department, said informal talks with European officials had led him to
believe that a force of 20,000 to 40,000 peacekeepers could be
recruited, half from Europe, half from the United States.
But Mr. Rumsfeld contended that European countries were unwilling to
contribute more troops, said Douglas J. Feith, then the Pentagon’s
under secretary for policy. He said Mr. Rumsfeld felt that sending
American troops would reduce pressure on Europeans to contribute, and
could provoke Afghans’ historic resistance to invaders and divert
American forces from hunting terrorists. Mr. Rumsfeld declined to
comment.
Some officials said they also feared confusion if European forces
viewed the task as peacekeeping while the American military saw its
job as fighting terrorists. Ms. Rice, despite having argued for fully
backing the new Karzai government, took a middle position, leaving the
issue unresolved. “I felt that we needed more forces, but there was a
real problem, which you continue to see to this day, with the dual
role,” she said.
Ultimately, Mr. Powell’s proposal died. “The president, the vice
president, the secretary of defense, the national security staff, all
of them were skeptical of an ambitious project in Afghanistan,” Mr.
Haass said. “I didn’t see support.”
Mr. Dobbins, the former special envoy, said Mr. Powell “seemed
resigned.”
“I said this wasn’t going to be fully satisfactory,” he recalled. “And
he said, ‘Well, it’s the best we could do.’ ”
In the end, the United States deployed 8,000 troops to Afghanistan in
2002, with orders to hunt Taliban and Qaeda members, and not to engage
in peacekeeping or reconstruction. The 4,000-member international
peacekeeping force did not venture beyond Kabul.
As an alternative, officials hatched a loosely organized plan for
Afghans to secure the country themselves. The United States would
train a 70,000-member army. Japan would disarm some 100,000 militia
fighters. Britain would mount an antinarcotics program. Italy would
carry out changes in the judiciary. And Germany would train a 62,000-
member police force.
But that meant no one was in overall command, officials now say. Many
holes emerged in the American effort.
There were so few State Department or Pentagon civil affairs officials
that 13 teams of C.I.A. operatives, whose main job was to hunt
terrorists and the Taliban, were asked to stay in remote corners of
Afghanistan to coordinate political efforts, said John E. McLaughlin,
who was deputy director and then acting director of the agency. “It
took us quite awhile to get them regrouped in the southeast for
counterterrorism,” he said of the C.I.A. teams.
Sixteen months after the president’s 2002 speech, the United States
Agency for International Development, the government’s main foreign
development arm, had seven full-time staffers and 35 full-time
contract staff members in Afghanistan, most of them Afghans, according
to a government audit. Sixty-one agency positions were vacant.
“It was state-building on the cheap, it was a duct tape approach,”
recalled Said T. Jawad, Mr. Karzai’s chief of staff at the time and
Afghanistan’s current ambassador to Washington. “It was fixing things
that were broken, not a strategic approach.”
A Shift of Resources to Iraq
In October 2002, Robert Grenier, a former director of the C.I.A.’s
counterintelligence center, visited the new Kuwait City headquarters
of Lt. Gen David McKiernan, who was already planning the Iraq
invasion. Meeting in a sheet metal warehouse, Mr. Grenier asked
General McKiernan what his intelligence needs would be in Iraq. The
answer was simple. “They wanted as much as they could get,” Mr.
Grenier said.
Throughout late 2002 and early 2003, Mr. Grenier said in an interview,
“the best experienced, most qualified people who we had been using in
Afghanistan shifted over to Iraq,” including the agency’s most skilled
counterterrorism specialists and Middle East and paramilitary
operatives.
That reduced the United States’ influence over powerful Afghan
warlords who were refusing to turn over to the central government tens
of millions of dollars they had collected as customs payments at
border crossings.
While the C.I.A. replaced officers shifted to Iraq, Mr. Grenier said,
it did so with younger agents, who lacked the knowledge and influence
of the veterans. “I think we could have done a lot more on the Afghan
side if we had more experienced folks,” he said.
A former senior official of the Pentagon’s Central Command, which was
running both wars, said that as the Iraq planning sped up, the
military’s covert Special Mission Units, like Delta Force and Navy
Seals Team Six, shifted to Iraq from Afghanistan.
So did aerial surveillance “platforms” like the Predator, a remotely
piloted spy plane armed with Hellfire missiles that had been effective
at identifying targets in the mountains of Afghanistan. Predators were
not shifted directly from Afghanistan to Iraq, according to the former
official, but as new Predators were produced, they went to Iraq.
“We were economizing in Afghanistan,” said the former official, who
requested anonymity because he was not authorized to comment publicly.
“The marginal return for one more platform in Afghanistan is so much
greater than for one more in Iraq.”
The shift in priorities became apparent to Dov Zakheim, the Pentagon’s
former comptroller, as planning for the Iraq war was in high gear in
the fall of 2002. Mr. Rumsfeld asked him to serve as the Pentagon’s
reconstruction coordinator in Afghanistan. It was an odd role for the
comptroller, whose primary task is managing the Pentagon’s $400
billion a year budget.
“The fact that they went to the comptroller to do something like that
was in part a function of their growing preoccupation with Iraq,” said
Mr. Zakheim, who left the administration in 2004. “They needed
somebody, given that the top tier was covering Iraq.”
In an interview, President Bush’s national security adviser, Stephen
J. Hadley, insisted that there was no diversion of resources from
Afghanistan, and he cited recently declassified statistics to show
that troop levels in Afghanistan rose at crucial moments — like the
2004 Afghan election — even after the Iraq war began.
But the former Central Command official said: “If we were not in Iraq,
we would have double or triple the number of Predators across
Afghanistan, looking for Taliban and peering into the tribal areas.
We’d have the ‘black’ Special Forces you most need to conduct
precision operations. We’d have more C.I.A.”
“We’re simply in a world of limited resources, and those resources are
in Iraq,” the former official added. “Anyone who tells you differently
is blowing smoke.”
A Piecemeal Operation
As White House officials put together plans in the spring of 2003 for
President Bush to land on the deck of the aircraft carrier Abraham
Lincoln and declare the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the
Pentagon decided to make a similar, if less dramatic, announcement for
Afghanistan.
On May 1, hours before Mr. Bush stood beneath a “Mission Accomplished”
banner, Mr. Rumsfeld appeared at a news conference with Mr. Karzai in
Kabul’s threadbare 19th-century presidential palace. “We clearly have
moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and
stabilization and reconstruction activities,” he said. “The bulk of
the country today is permissive, it’s secure.”
The Afghanistan announcement was largely lost in the spectacle of Mr.
Bush’s speech. But the predictions of stability proved no less
detached from events on the ground.
Three weeks later, Afghan government workers who had not been paid for
months held street demonstrations in Kabul. An exasperated Mr. Karzai
publicly threatened to resign and announced that his government had
run out of money because warlords were hoarding the customs revenues.
“There is no money in the government treasury,” Mr. Karzai said.
At the same time, the American-led training of a new Afghan Army was
proving far more difficult than officials in Washington had expected.
The new force, plagued by high desertion rates, had only 2,000
soldiers. The Germans’ effort to train police officers was off to an
even slower start, and the British-led counternarcotics effort was
dwarfed by an explosion in the poppy crop. Already, small groups of
Taliban fighters had slipped back over the border from Pakistan and
killed aid workers, stalling reconstruction in the south.
A senior White House official said in a recent interview that in
retrospect, putting different countries in charge of different
operations was a mistake. “We piecemealed it,” he said. “One of the
problems is when everybody has a piece, everybody’s piece is made
third and fourth priority. Nobody’s piece is first priority. Stuff
didn’t get done.”
A month after his announcement in Kabul, Mr. Rumsfeld’s aides
presented a strategy to the White House aimed at weakening warlords
and engaging in state-building in Afghanistan. In some ways, it was
the approach Mr. Rumsfeld had rejected right after the invasion.
Pentagon officials said that Mr. Rumsfeld’s views began to shift after
a December 2002 briefing by Marin Strmecki, an Afghanistan expert at
the Smith Richardson Foundation, who argued that Afghanistan was not
ungovernable and that it could be turned into a moderate, Muslim force
in the region.
Mr. Strmecki said that the United States needed to help Afghans create
credible national institutions and that Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s
largest ethnic group and historically the Taliban’s base of support,
needed a more prominent role in the government. Mr. Rumsfeld,
according to aides, was impressed by Mr. Strmecki’s emphasis on
training Afghans to run their own government and hired him.
Then another personnel change helped alter Afghanistan policy. Mr.
Khalilzad, an Afghan-American who was a senior National Security
Council official and a special envoy to Iraq exiles, was appointed
ambassador to Afghanistan.
Mr. Khalilzad said he accepted the job after Mr. Bush promised to
greatly expand resources in Afghanistan. “We had gotten the president
to a significant increase,” Mr. Khalilzad recalled.
A leading neo-conservative, Mr. Khalilzad could get Ms. Rice or — if
need be — Mr. Bush on the phone. He had been a counselor to Mr.
Rumsfeld and had worked for Dick Cheney when Mr. Cheney was the first
President Bush’s defense secretary. “Zal could get things done,” said
Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, a former American military commander in
Afghanistan.
When Mr. Khalilzad arrived in Kabul on Thanksgiving 2003, he brought
nearly $2 billion — twice the amount of the previous year — as well as
a new military strategy and private experts to intensifying
rebuilding.
They started a reconstruction plan dubbed “accelerating success” that
involved the kind of nation-building once dismissed by the
administration. General Barno expanded “Provincial Reconstruction
Teams” to build schools, roads and wells and to win the “hearts and
minds” of Afghans. The teams amounted to a much smaller version of the
force that Mr. Powell had proposed 18 months earlier.
By January 2004, Afghanistan had reached a compromise on a new Afghan
Constitution. With American backing, Mr. Karzai weakened several
warlords. In October 2004, Mr. Karzai, who had been appointed
president, was elected. At the same time, NATO countries steadily sent
more troops to Afghanistan, and soon Mr. Rumsfeld, needing for troops
for Iraq, proposed that NATO take over security for all of
Afghanistan.
By spring 2005, Afghanistan seemed to be moving toward the success Mr.
Bush had promised. But then, fearing that Iraq was spinning out of
control, the White House asked Mr. Khalilzad to become ambassador to
Baghdad.
A Lingering Threat
Before departing Afghanistan, Mr. Khalilzad fought a final battle
within the administration. It revealed divisions within the American
government over Pakistan’s role in aiding the Taliban, a delicate
subject as the administration tried to coax Pakistan’s president, Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, to cooperate.
In an interview on Afghan television, Mr. Khalilzad noted that
Pakistani journalists had recently interviewed a senior Taliban
commander in Pakistan. He questioned Pakistan’s claim that it did not
know the whereabouts of senior Taliban commanders — a form of
skepticism discouraged in Washington, where the administration’s line
had always been that General Musharraf was doing everything he could.
“If a TV station can get in touch with them, how can the intelligence
service of a country, which has nuclear bombs, and a lot of security
and military forces, not find them?” Mr. Khalilzad asked.
Pakistani officials publicly denounced Mr. Khalilzad’s comments and
denied that they were harboring Taliban leaders. But Mr. Khalilzad had
also exposed the growing rift between American officials in Kabul and
those in Islamabad.
Mr. Grenier said that when he was the C.I.A. station chief in
Islamabad the issue of fugitive Taliban leaders was repeatedly raised
with senior Pakistani intelligence officials in 2002. “The results
were just not there,” he recalled. “And it was quite clear to me that
it wasn’t just bad luck.”
Pakistani had backed the Taliban throughout the 1990s as a
counterweight to an alliance of northern Afghan commanders backed by
India, Pakistan’s bitter rival. Pakistani officials also distrusted
Mr. Karzai.
Deciding that the Pakistanis would not act on the Taliban, Mr. Grenier
said he had urged them to focus on arresting Qaeda members, who he
said were far more of a threat to the United States.
“From our perspective at the time, the Taliban was a spent force,” he
said, adding, “We were very much focused on Al Qaeda and didn’t want
to distract the Pakistanis from that.”
But Mr. Khalilzad, American military officials and others in the
administration argued that the Taliban were crossing from Pakistan
into Afghanistan and killing American troops and aid workers.
“Colleagues in Washington at various levels did not recognize that
there was the problem of sanctuary and that this was important,” Mr.
Khalilzad said.
But it was not until 2006, after ordering a study on Afghanistan’s
future, that Mr. Bush strenuously pressed General Musharraf on the
Taliban. Later, Mr. Bush told his aides he worried that “old school
ties” between Pakistani intelligence and the Taliban endured, despite
the general’s assurances. The Pakistanis, one senior American
commander said, were “hedging their bets.”
“They’re not sure that we are staying,” he added. “And if we are gone,
the Taliban is their next best option” to remain influential in
Afghanistan.
As 2005 ended, the Taliban leaders remained in hiding in Pakistan,
waiting for an opportunity to cross the border. Soon, they would find
one.
To Afghans, a Fickle Effort
In September 2005, NATO defense ministers gathered in Berlin to
complete plans for NATO troops to take over security in Afghanistan’s
volatile south. It was the most ambitious “out of area” operations in
NATO history, and across Europe, leaders worried about getting support
from their countries. Then, American military officials dropped a
bombshell.
The Pentagon, they said, was considering withdrawing up to 3,000
troops from Afghanistan, roughly 20 percent of total American forces.
NATO’s secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said he had protested
to Mr. Rumsfeld that a partial American withdrawal would discourage
others from sending troops.
In the end, the planned troop reduction was abandoned, but chiefly
because the American ground commander at the time, Lt. Gen. Karl W.
Eikenberry, concluded that the Taliban were returning and that he
needed to shift troops to the east to try to stop them. But the
announcement had sent a signal of a wavering American commitment.
“The Afghan people still doubt our staying power,” General Eikenberry
said. “They have seen the world walk away from them before.”
To sell their new missions at home, British, Dutch and Canadian
officials portrayed deployments to Afghanistan as safe, and better
than sending troops to Iraq. Germany and Italy prevented their forces
from being sent on combat missions in volatile areas. Those regions
were to be left to the Americans, Canadians, British and Dutch.
Three months after announcing the proposed troop withdrawal, the White
House Office of Management and Budget cut aid to Afghanistan by a
third.
Ms. Rice said that much of the money allocated to Afghanistan the
previous year had not been spent. “There was an absorption problem,”
she said.
Mr. Neumann, then the ambassador, said he had argued against the
decision.
Even so, American assistance to Afghanistan dropped by 38 percent,
from $4.3 billion in fiscal 2005 to $3.1 billion in fiscal 2006,
according to a study by the Congressional Research Service.
By February 2006, Mr. Neumann had come to the conclusion that the
Taliban were planning a spring offensive, and he sent a cable to his
superiors.
“I had a feeling that the view was too rosy in Washington,” recalled
Mr. Neumann, who retired from the State Department in June. “I was
concerned.”
Mr. Neumann’s cable proved prophetic. In the spring of 2006, the
Taliban carried out their largest offensive since 2001, attacking
British, Canadian and Dutch troops in southern Afghanistan.
Hundreds of Taliban swarmed into the south, setting up checkpoints,
assassinating officials and burning schools. Suicide bombings
quintupled to 136. Roadside bombings doubled. All told, 191 American
and NATO troops died in 2006, a 20 percent increase over the 2005
toll. For the first time, it became nearly as dangerous,
statistically, to serve as an American in Afghanistan as in Iraq.
Mr. Neumann said that while suicide bombers came from Pakistan, most
Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan were Afghans. Captured
insurgents said they had taken up arms because a local governor
favored a rival tribe, corrupt officials provided no services or their
families needed money.
After cutting assistance in 2006, the United States plans to provide
$9 billion in aid to Afghanistan in 2007, twice the amount of any year
since 2001.
Despite warnings about the Taliban’s resurgence from Mr. Neumann, Mr.
Khalilzad and military officials, Ms. Rice said, “there was no doubt
that people were surprised that the Taliban was able to regroup and
come back in a large, well-organized force.”
Divisions Over Strategy
In July 2006, NATO formally took responsibility for security
throughout Afghanistan. To Americans and Europeans, NATO is the
vaunted alliance that won the cold war. To Afghans it is little more
than a strange, new acronym. And NATO and the Americans are divided
over strategy.
The disagreement is evident on the wall of the office of Gen. Dan K.
McNeill, the commander of the 35,000 NATO forces in Afghanistan, where
he keeps a chart that is a sea of yellow and red blocks. Each block
shows the restrictions that national governments have placed on their
forces under his command. Red blocks represent tasks a country will
not do, like hunting Taliban or Qaeda leaders. Yellow blocks indicate
missions they are willing to consider after asking their capitals for
approval.
In Washington, officials lament that NATO nations are unwilling to
take the kinds of risks and casualties necessary to confront the
Taliban. Across Europe, officials complain the United States never
focused on reconstruction, and they blame American forces for mounting
air attacks on the Taliban that cause large civilian casualties,
turning Afghans against the West.
The debate over how the 2001 victory in Afghanistan turned into the
current struggle is well under way.
“Destroying the Al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan was an extraordinary
strategic accomplishment,” said Robert D. Blackwill, who was in charge
of both Afghanistan and Iraq policy at the National Security Council,
“but where we find ourselves now may have been close to inevitable,
whether the U.S. went into Iraq or not. We were going to face this
long war in Afghanistan as long as we and the Afghan government
couldn’t bring serious economic reconstruction to the countryside, and
eliminate the Taliban’s safe havens in Pakistan.”
But Henry A. Crumpton, a former C.I.A. officer who played a key role
in ousting the Taliban and became the State Department’s
counterterrorism chief, said winning a war like the one in Afghanistan
required American personnel to “get in at a local level and respond to
people’s needs so that enemy forces cannot come in and take
advantage.”
“These are the fundamentals of counterinsurgency, and somehow we
forgot them or never learned them,” he added. He noted that “the
United States has 11 carrier battle groups, but we still don’t have
expeditionary nonmilitary forces of the kind you need to win this sort
of war.”
“We’re living in the past,” he said.
Among some current and former officials, a consensus is emerging that
a more consistent, forceful American effort could have helped to keep
the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s leadership from regrouping.
Gen. James L. Jones, a retired American officer and a former NATO
supreme commander, said Iraq caused the United States to “take its eye
off the ball” in Afghanistan. He warned that the consequences of
failure “are just as serious in Afghanistan as they are in Iraq.”
“Symbolically, it’s more the epicenter of terrorism than Iraq,” he
said. “If we don’t succeed in Afghanistan, you’re sending a very clear
message to the terrorist organizations that the U.S., the U.N. and the
37 countries with troops on the ground can be defeated.”
Carlotta Gall contributed reporting.
Correction: August 14, 2007
A front-page article on Sunday about how
security and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan have faltered referred
incorrectly in some copies to the timing of a trip to Afghanistan by
NATO representatives. The trip occurred two years after the fall of
the Taliban, not one year. A front-page chart with the article gave an
incorrect total in some copies for the amount spent on aid and
reconstruction in Afghanistan by the United States from 2003 to 2007.
It is $19 billion, not $22 billion.