I was a teenage dragon (aka My life as a dragon)
Digital Dragon
Reality posts *lol*
What with all the debate as to what a dragon is, how one should behave
if you are a dragon. The traits, the metaphors, etc. I'm beginning to
think of a really cheesy movie being made based on AFD situations, and
what the "What is a Dragon" answer is.
Personally the traits I think a dragon would have can be found on my
page. But I realised some time ago that dragons are like humans are
like han are like ma'hen'do'sat (sp?). We all have minds. We all -um,
let me be careful with this one- think. Hopefully for ourselves ;)
We all have some sort of goal,no matter how bizaar or twisted it may
seem to others... especially those of another species who don't have
the same set of priorities or values.
Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
We may see things a little differently, but I also see a stereotype
developing. It used to be that dragons were nothing but vicous killing
machines, and while a lot of ignorant ppl still think that, it is a
sterotype.
Now we have the "dragons-are-holier-than-thou" mentality creeping
out, and this is becoming another stereotype.
And this does not help the cause of dragonkind or kin any. I
personally expect there to be some naughty dragons out there, but for
the most part I hope that most dragons would rather show humans what
we are really capable of: compassion, love, kindness, wisdom,
knowledge, and perhaps even a little magic. Lets face it, there _is_ a
little magic in everyone here, its up to you to decide to use it.
=Digi - mushy stuff over with =)
--
_________________________________________________________________
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/ Alfandria Carestaff, Clan Stormchaser, Team Amiga, Team POV-Amiga \
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Alan Sauer
>But I realised some time ago that dragons are like humans are
>like han are like ma'hen'do'sat (sp?).
This is quite possibly very deep.
I just have one question though.
Han and mahenzerwhosie?
-----
Alan
Digital Dragon
>
> I just have one question though.
>
> Han and mahenzerwhosie?
>
Two of the species from the "Pride of Chanur" series by C.J. Cherryh
=Digi
> -----
> Alan
Dawnfire Tailweaver
>Sorry, but I just couldn't resist this after reading some of the
>Reality posts *lol*
}:8) i need to get away from the seriousness of it myself (i think i just made
some people very angry with me :\)
>What with all the debate as to what a dragon is, how one should behave
>if you are a dragon. The traits, the metaphors, etc. I'm beginning to
>think of a really cheesy movie being made based on AFD situations, and
>what the "What is a Dragon" answer is.
*lol* *is picturing the would-be movie*
>And this does not help the cause of dragonkind or kin any. I
>personally expect there to be some naughty dragons out there
like me *nirglive*
nah, i'm just a trouble maker, gotta learn to control my nerves too :8)
>, but for
>the most part I hope that most dragons would rather show humans what
>we are really capable of: compassion, love, kindness, wisdom,
>knowledge, and perhaps even a little magic. Lets face it, there _is_ a
>little magic in everyone here, its up to you to decide to use it.
yep. well said, digi.
>=Digi - mushy stuff over with =)
s'okay, i think we needed a little mushy stuff to balance out all the
nasty/hateful stuff floating around :\
~Dawnfire Tailweaver
Alan Sauer
>> I just have one question though.
>> Han and mahenzerwhosie?
>Two of the species from the "Pride of Chanur" series by C.J. Cherryh
Aaaah. OK. Wasn't sure if you meant fictional, or actual critters
living under, for the sake of argument, your front steps.
But then, I've been in here off and on since 1995. I take nothing
for granted anymore. :)
-----
Alan
Lhexa
>
> Sorry, but I just couldn't resist this after reading some of the
> Reality posts *lol*
For awhile I actually thought that Afd wouldn't see me argue much.
*grins* Silly me.
> What with all the debate as to what a dragon is, how one should behave
> if you are a dragon. The traits, the metaphors, etc. I'm beginning to
> think of a really cheesy movie being made based on AFD situations, and
> what the "What is a Dragon" answer is.
Hm. That'd be embarrassing...
> Personally the traits I think a dragon would have can be found on my
> page. But I realised some time ago that dragons are like humans are
> like han are like ma'hen'do'sat (sp?). We all have minds. We all -um,
> let me be careful with this one- think. Hopefully for ourselves ;)
> We all have some sort of goal,no matter how bizaar or twisted it may
> seem to others... especially those of another species who don't have
> the same set of priorities or values.
So, it's true that every living, or in this case intelligent, creature
has to share those things. But keep in mind that diversity (whether of
species or of individual) is every bit as beneficial as that.
> Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
> Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
I would, but to meet real dragons (with body) might disabuse me of the
notion. But, thinking that, I can't really consider myself a dragon; I
just have the goal of being one.
> We may see things a little differently, but I also see a stereotype
> developing. It used to be that dragons were nothing but vicous killing
> machines, and while a lot of ignorant ppl still think that, it is a
> sterotype.
> Now we have the "dragons-are-holier-than-thou" mentality creeping
> out, and this is becoming another stereotype.
I do that, sometimes. To place dragons highly makes them that much more
useful to me. But I do try to keep that idea a completely personal one,
that has no effect on how I judge anyone other than myself.
> And this does not help the cause of dragonkind or kin any. I
> personally expect there to be some naughty dragons out there, but for
> the most part I hope that most dragons would rather show humans what
> we are really capable of: compassion, love, kindness, wisdom,
> knowledge, and perhaps even a little magic. Lets face it, there _is_ a
> little magic in everyone here, its up to you to decide to use it.
*grins*
> =Digi - mushy stuff over with =)
Lhexa (you call that mushy? I've seen much worse...)
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
> Digital Dragon wrote:
>> Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
>> Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
Why? Because we are dragons. Because we are interacting in a
dragon forum. *ANY* semi-organized grouping of sapients, *ANY* community,
is based on the notion that somehow the "we" of the group are better than
the "them" who aren't in it. Here, dragons are "we".
This elitism is by no means a draconic trait. At the risk of
sounding anti-human, I might have to suggest that we've picked it up out
of the human society that we run around in in the "real world." Certainly
it's around in enough other people and groups that it's a hard trait to
break free of when trying to find a little distance from humanity.
This, of course, does not make it right.
The big problem with this us-and-them-ism is that it is, at some
level, hypocrisy. I can put forth a number of ideals which are associated
with draconity, ideals which are unquestionably more noble than those of
human society's; *to the extent those ideals are followed* there is some
actual validity in saying "dragons are better than humans". But that's
the key, isn't it? Dragons are not perfect; NOBODY is perfect. Those
ideals are just that, ideals, and we are dragons whether or not we live up
to them.
When I first approached draconity, some decade ago, I took it way
too seriously, the way a paladin takes religion in AD&D -- the littlest
transgression and you wouldn't measure up to the standard. I've seen a
great deal to disabuse me of this notion. I've seen dragons do things as
bad as the humans we say we're above; I've seen dragons do things which
fall straight into the old, evil stereotypes set for us. I've made some
pretty big errors myself, and I've been lucky enough to realize something
fairly simple before my ideals drove me crazy.
That being, there is no definition of "dragon."
Dragon is an identity. As such, it means something different to
each person who chooses to accept it. And any single definition of dragon
*has* to account for this -- otherwise, you get into definitions of who's
"really" a dragon, which are about as productive as arguing (say) about
whether black people were "really" humans, back in the 1800's.
And the span of identities is so broad, you end up with something
basically exactly like that of people who say they're human: many noble,
some selfish, and ten million different goals, with ten billion different
paths to reach them.
I don't subscribe to the "dragons are better than humans" argument
because, in the end, we're all the same.
Of course, dragons are better *to me* *to describe myself* than
humans are ... otherwise I wouldn't bother with draconity. ;) But, on a
species level, there is no "better" or "worse" ... just different.
>> And this does not help the cause of dragonkind or kin any. I
>> personally expect there to be some naughty dragons out there, but for
>> the most part I hope that most dragons would rather show humans what
>> we are really capable of: compassion, love, kindness, wisdom,
>> knowledge, and perhaps even a little magic. Lets face it, there _is_ a
>> little magic in everyone here, its up to you to decide to use it.
At the same time, I also hope that humanity as a species (by which
I mean Earth's population) can also show what they're capable of:
compassion, love, kindness, wisdom, knowledge, and perhaps even a little
magic. There's an awful lot of it out there, but also so much meanness,
intolerance, callousness, ignorance, and blindness.
Humans can work to make that better. Dragons can work to make
that better. We can be part of the larger community, or we can be part of
only our own community, or we can ignore those lines. Whatever you want
to call it, it just means ignoring species designations and being Good
People.
What it boils down to is: Can dragons be positive role models,
and can we -- embodying those traits -- live up to the images? Yes, if we
make it happen.
And there I am in complete agreement with Digi: Let's.
>> =Digi - mushy stuff over with =)
> Lhexa (you call that mushy? I've seen much worse...)
-- Baxil (winding down the stirring martial music)
BAXIL's meme-filled millennial 7-LINE .SIG FILE (04-09-2K) * _/|
The haiku, once seen, | DC2.~D Gm a(v++r) L12m W-- Pfwl B- * _-------C_/
is comprehended, only | F+o R+++! Ac J-~ S+++! Fr+++"kiwi" * |. CD |\
to become mere words. | U++ i-- H+ $- M+++!2xy O- V+++ Cgr * | ___ /_ \
The man-the myth-the meme: http://www.ecis.com/~ddragon/ # * |/---\___-' |
Jia's mate; still timestamping sig; new domain coming soon * / / /
QUESTIONS ABOUT DRACONITY? http://www.ecis.com/~ddragon/faq/ has answers!
Digital Dragon
> Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
> > Digital Dragon wrote:
> >> Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
> >> Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
-----snip-----
> That being, there is no definition of "dragon."
>
> Dragon is an identity.
-----snip-----
> What it boils down to is: Can dragons be positive role models,
> and can we -- embodying those traits -- live up to the images? Yes, if we
> make it happen.
> And there I am in complete agreement with Digi: Let's.
Yay for Bax! :)
You managed to say a lot more now than it would have taken me to say. Of
course us mystical types like to keep folk hanging, being vague and
mysterious =)
=Digi
Zon 14
<digi...@discovernet.net> spake thus:
>Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
>Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
Well, actually I had been giving some thought to this very subject. I
tend to think the average dragon as being more intelligent than the
average human. Now that having been said, there's still overlap
between the two, meaning the most intelligent human is smarter than
the least intelligent dragon.
Why do I believe this? To me it boils down to magic use. As I
understand it, using magic on the level that dragons do requires
knowledge and understanding that most humans either can't understand
or aren't ready to understand. Speaking as a typist here, I have no
idea how Zon could build and have a holodeck for a lair which is also
situated in an alternate dimension. Is it magic or technology? Does
it matter? Either way requires knowledge far beyond my comprehension.
As to whether dragon society is superior to human society, that
question is still open. Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. I would like to
believe so, but I'm still not sure. Many so called "primitive"
societies can still be quite advanced in their spiritual approach to
life.
>We may see things a little differently, but I also see a stereotype
>developing. It used to be that dragons were nothing but vicous killing
>machines, and while a lot of ignorant ppl still think that, it is a
>sterotype.
>Now we have the "dragons-are-holier-than-thou" mentality creeping
>out, and this is becoming another stereotype.
Which is just as bad.
>And this does not help the cause of dragonkind or kin any. I
>personally expect there to be some naughty dragons out there, but for
>the most part I hope that most dragons would rather show humans what
>we are really capable of: compassion, love, kindness, wisdom,
>knowledge, and perhaps even a little magic. Lets face it, there _is_ a
>little magic in everyone here, its up to you to decide to use it.
And it's up to us to decide what to do with it.
>=Digi - mushy stuff over with =)
Awwwwwww.
--
Zon 14 cabal 12 district Omega 3 galaxy Xi 305 dimension
Epsilon Tau Rho 4069
Zon's New Version 2 code: DC2.Dw~/Lg/Mb/"coatl"/"Borg Drone"GmL40m15t41wWT
Sk"scales/metal"C"Platinum",egr,wbk/ag/"platinum"B"all"A(v+++r)
Fr++"Cayenne Pepper!"N"Desert"Mr++Ov+H+$Fv/fR+Ac+J+SU+++I-V+++Q++T
c+++! Hail Eris!
23% dragon pure(77% dragon corrupt!)
"Demons are from Hell. Dragons are from Heck."
Defender of hot peppers everywhere.
Remove the obvious to reply by email.
Alan Sauer
>Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
>> Digital Dragon wrote:
>>> Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
>>> Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
>
> Why? Because we are dragons. Because we are interacting in a
>dragon forum. *ANY* semi-organized grouping of sapients, *ANY* community,
>is based on the notion that somehow the "we" of the group are better than
>the "them" who aren't in it. Here, dragons are "we".
<snippage>
>-- Baxil (winding down the stirring martial music)
Airk jumps around cheering wildly and waving a "Bartlet for President"
sign. Then he looks around.
"Oh. I thought from the stirring moral soliloquy we were on 'West Wing.'
My bad."
-----
AIrk
Zon 14
thus:
>Why do I believe this? To me it boils down to magic use. As I
>understand it, using magic on the level that dragons do requires
>knowledge and understanding that most humans either can't understand
>or aren't ready to understand. Speaking as a typist here, I have no
>idea how Zon could build and have a holodeck for a lair which is also
>situated in an alternate dimension. Is it magic or technology? Does
>it matter? Either way requires knowledge far beyond my comprehension.
Oops. Of course, now I realize not every dragon uses magic. Back to
the drawing board there.
>As to whether dragon society is superior to human society, that
>question is still open. Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. I would like to
>believe so, but I'm still not sure. Many so called "primitive"
>societies can still be quite advanced in their spiritual approach to
>life.
Basically the statement that intelligence does not make one being
superior over another. Every species most likely tends to think of
itself as superior. This of course, does not make it so.
--
Zon 14 cabal 12 district Omega 3 Galaxy Xi 305 dimension
Epsilon Tau Rho 4069 Resident: Alpha Kappa Lambda 9116
23% dragon pure(77% dragon corrupt!)
Zon's New Version 2 code: DC2.Dw~/Lg/Mb/"coatl"/"Borg Drone"GmL40m15t41wWT
Sk"scales/metal"C"Platinum",egr,wbk/ag/"platinum"B"all"A(v+++r)
Fr++"Cayenne Pepper!"N"Desert"Mr++Ov+H+$Fv/fR+Ac+J+SU+++I-V+++Q++T
c+++! Hail Eris!
"Jeez if you love Honkus!"
homepage: http://www.aracnet.com/~winsing/main.html
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
> > Digital Dragon wrote:
> >> Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
> >> Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
Er... was I being chided in an indirect way by being replied to, Baxil?
> Why? Because we are dragons. Because we are interacting in a
> dragon forum. *ANY* semi-organized grouping of sapients, *ANY* community,
> is based on the notion that somehow the "we" of the group are better than
> the "them" who aren't in it. Here, dragons are "we".
...Anyway, when I regard the dragons I know over the internet as
constituting draconity, I do not regard them as more of anything than
the humans I have known. I was violently (at least on my side) disabused
of this notion, fairly recently.
> This elitism is by no means a draconic trait. At the risk of
> sounding anti-human, I might have to suggest that we've picked it up out
> of the human society that we run around in in the "real world." Certainly
> it's around in enough other people and groups that it's a hard trait to
> break free of when trying to find a little distance from humanity.
> This, of course, does not make it right.
Well, what about when the idea of the group is made so lofty that I can
find nobody, especially not myself, who really fits it? Is its
effectiveness as an ideal of personal development at all reduced by its
seeming undemocratic?
> The big problem with this us-and-them-ism is that it is, at some
> level, hypocrisy. I can put forth a number of ideals which are associated
> with draconity, ideals which are unquestionably more noble than those of
> human society's; *to the extent those ideals are followed* there is some
> actual validity in saying "dragons are better than humans". But that's
> the key, isn't it? Dragons are not perfect; NOBODY is perfect. Those
> ideals are just that, ideals, and we are dragons whether or not we live up
> to them.
Here I differ. If the ideals of draconity and the ideals of humanity are
compared, the first can, even in the abstract, be better than the second
if it contains, in its entirety, the latter - and more. *grins* Even if
it does so at the price of making a dragon, spiritually, a human as well
- I like the irony. But there is a reason those ideals are labeled
draconity and humanity rather than the highest in draconity and humanity
- because it is always possible, body irregardless, to be lacking in
them.
> When I first approached draconity, some decade ago, I took it way
> too seriously, the way a paladin takes religion in AD&D -- the littlest
> transgression and you wouldn't measure up to the standard. I've seen a
> great deal to disabuse me of this notion. I've seen dragons do things as
> bad as the humans we say we're above; I've seen dragons do things which
> fall straight into the old, evil stereotypes set for us. I've made some
> pretty big errors myself, and I've been lucky enough to realize something
> fairly simple before my ideals drove me crazy.
>
> That being, there is no definition of "dragon."
>
> Dragon is an identity. As such, it means something different to
> each person who chooses to accept it. And any single definition of dragon
> *has* to account for this -- otherwise, you get into definitions of who's
> "really" a dragon, which are about as productive as arguing (say) about
> whether black people were "really" humans, back in the 1800's.
Luckily so. I'm willing to accept draconity as an expedient, or as an
inherent truth - in fact, the first might even be the preferable one.
> And the span of identities is so broad, you end up with something
> basically exactly like that of people who say they're human: many noble,
> some selfish, and ten million different goals, with ten billion different
> paths to reach them.
> I don't subscribe to the "dragons are better than humans" argument
> because, in the end, we're all the same.
That last statement I must disagree with. Admirable as it is as an
attempt to promote tolerance, there are ways to make the point that do
not sacrifice the immense benefit that lies in difference of every kind.
I'd much rather say that I shan't judge the verity of the statement
"dragons are better than humans" because I am completely unable to do
so. However exacting my draconity might be in regards to myself, I am
forced to use a different one when dealing with others, lest I misjudge
them - to pronounce another a dragon, the only accurate basis I have is
their own belief in the matter.
Anyway, ignorance is a much better excuse in this matter than
homogeneity.
> Of course, dragons are better *to me* *to describe myself* than
> humans are ... otherwise I wouldn't bother with draconity. ;) But, on a
> species level, there is no "better" or "worse" ... just different.
For me it is a goal... unless I'm feeling ebullient, in which case I say
'I'm a dragon!' first and add all the qualifiers later.
> At the same time, I also hope that humanity as a species (by which
> I mean Earth's population) can also show what they're capable of:
> compassion, love, kindness, wisdom, knowledge, and perhaps even a little
> magic. There's an awful lot of it out there, but also so much meanness,
> intolerance, callousness, ignorance, and blindness.
> Humans can work to make that better. Dragons can work to make
> that better. We can be part of the larger community, or we can be part of
> only our own community, or we can ignore those lines. Whatever you want
> to call it, it just means ignoring species designations and being Good
> People.
> What it boils down to is: Can dragons be positive role models,
> and can we -- embodying those traits -- live up to the images? Yes, if we
> make it happen.
> And there I am in complete agreement with Digi: Let's.
Yeah. Though, in some cases, there's a lot of silliness to get past. And
not on the part of the dragons. Wait, I think I could have phrased it
better...
> -- Baxil (winding down the stirring martial music)
Lhexa
Nargus
news:Yiq%4.137569$701.1...@news4.giganews.com...
*Nargus looking up into sky*
OH! That's a wonderfull answer for the question. I very very love your
answer. Everyone on the earth has heart and love their life. Everyone stay
on same level. Because they are on the same World. Human and Dragon are a
part of large community, a part of the great nature...
>
> >> =Digi - mushy stuff over with =)
> > Lhexa (you call that mushy? I've seen much worse...)
>
> -- Baxil (winding down the stirring martial music)
--
*Nargus - Dragon/Human Shifter depending on wanted
*The Knight Dragon
*Shireishue of the East
*Mixer of Everythings
*http://go.to/dragonsempire
Weyrlady
>
> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
> > When I first approached draconity, some decade ago, I took it way
> > too seriously, the way a paladin takes religion in AD&D -- the littlest
> > transgression and you wouldn't measure up to the standard. I've seen a
> > great deal to disabuse me of this notion. I've seen dragons do things as
> > bad as the humans we say we're above; I've seen dragons do things which
> > fall straight into the old, evil stereotypes set for us. I've made some
> > pretty big errors myself, and I've been lucky enough to realize something
> > fairly simple before my ideals drove me crazy.
> >
> > That being, there is no definition of "dragon."
On the contrary, Bax, it says right here in the Oxford English
Dictionary, 2nd edition, "Dragon, (n)...
Sorry, just felt I ought to enter a little levity into the situation.
*ducks and cover*
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blackbriar
>let me be careful with this one- think.
for the record i would just like to point out that i am human
and as such i try to avoid thinking whenever possible. it makes
my brain hurt. ow. :)
blackbriar
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Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>> Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
>> > Digital Dragon wrote:
>
> Er... was I being chided in an indirect way by being replied to, Baxil?
Ack ... no, not at all. I apologize if there was any implication.
I didn't see Digi's original post, and replied to it via yours, and forgot
to snip the extra header.
Thank you for asking instead of assuming.
> ...Anyway, when I regard the dragons I know over the internet as
> constituting draconity, I do not regard them as more of anything than
> the humans I have known. I was violently (at least on my side) disabused
> of this notion, fairly recently.
I'm sorry to hear it. :/
And partly, that's what I'm talking about when I say "we're all
the same" (later in my original post) -- that we're all equally capable of
both kindness and malice. It's a very dangerous mistake to think that
dragons are all good, one which I bet a lot of us (including me) have made
at one point or another.
I still do trust fellow dragons *more* than humans, but that's
because I find it a lot easier to empathize and/or figure out their
motives -- and, at least partially, because I think people who have the
courage to call themselves dragons are going to be more mature and honest
in general (draconity still being a very unpopular stance in the "real
world").
<re: elitism>
>> This, of course, does not make it right.
>
> Well, what about when the idea of the group is made so lofty that I can
> find nobody, especially not myself, who really fits it? Is its
> effectiveness as an ideal of personal development at all reduced by its
> seeming undemocratic?
I'm not quite sure I follow.
There's no "charter" on AFD saying you have to subscribe to some
group ideal; everyone brings their own perceptions into it. If the "group
ideal" -- the general consensus -- is too lofty, don't buy into it.
We've all done a lot of not buying into things just by being here;
a little more won't hurt. ;) And I won't speak for the whole group, but
as far as I can tell, everyone who stays polite and generally on-topic is
welcome here, no matter their ideals.
>> I can put forth a number of ideals which are associated
>> with draconity, ideals which are unquestionably more noble than those of
>> human society's; *to the extent those ideals are followed* there is some
>> actual validity in saying "dragons are better than humans". But that's
>> the key, isn't it? Dragons are not perfect; NOBODY is perfect. Those
>> ideals are just that, ideals, and we are dragons whether or not we live
>> up to them.
>
> Here I differ. If the ideals of draconity and the ideals of humanity are
> compared, the first can, even in the abstract, be better than the second
> if it contains, in its entirety, the latter - and more. *grins*
Assuming, of course, that all of these "ideals" are good. If
dragon and human ideals were exactly the same except dragons had the
additional idea of "hoarding gold is good," does that make them better? I
can find economists who'll argue both sides of the issue.
That's sort of a red herring, though, because I don't think that
"dragon ideals" fully contain the set of "human ideals." Let me throw out
a controversial example: I consider conformity to be a "human ideal" (in
the sense of something that current Western civilization holds dear). Cf:
suburbia, advertising, bureaucracy.
> Even if it does so at the price of making a dragon, spiritually, a human
> as well - I like the irony.
We can't escape it, of course, while we're still typing with
fleshy fingers.
>> Dragon is an identity. As such, it means something different to
>> each person who chooses to accept it. And any single definition of dragon
>> *has* to account for this -- otherwise, you get into definitions of who's
>> "really" a dragon, which are about as productive as arguing (say) about
>> whether black people were "really" humans, back in the 1800's.
>
> Luckily so. I'm willing to accept draconity as an expedient, or as an
> inherent truth - in fact, the first might even be the preferable one.
Accepting draconity as an expedient is all I ever ask of people.
;) It's a good compromise between taking me on faith and considering me
crazy.
>> I don't subscribe to the "dragons are better than humans" argument
>> because, in the end, we're all the same.
>
> That last statement I must disagree with. Admirable as it is as an
> attempt to promote tolerance, there are ways to make the point that do
> not sacrifice the immense benefit that lies in difference of every kind.
I think I was trying to say, in my generally
not-descriptive-enough-despite-being-too-verbose way, that we're all the
same in the end in a very Zen or nihilist sense. In the sense that we're
all grains of sand on the beach of life, where from a distance it all
melts into homogeneity, we're the same.
Maybe a better way of saying that is that we all share the same
potential. There's nothing that a dragon can do that a dedicated human
can't, and vice versa.
Individually, of course, this breaks down. I'm very different
from most "humans" I know. And I will accomplish things in my lifetime
that others, because they haven't been raised the same way, won't have the
time for before they die. (And vice versa.) But in the long run, it
evens out.
On the other hand, I strongly agree with you on the benefits of
diversity -- because nobody can do everything, and it's very good for
society if nothing can't be done by somebody. Or something.
> - to pronounce another a dragon, the only accurate basis I have is
> their own belief in the matter.
"Telling other people about themselves is a job for someone with
motives." -- Me, some years ago.
-- Bax, not sure where this thread is going exactly, but glad it's here.
--
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
>> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>> > That being, there is no definition of "dragon."
>
> Dictionary, 2nd edition, "Dragon, (n) ...
Ack! I'm functionally equivalent to an ellipsis! ;P
> Sorry, just felt I ought to enter a little levity into the situation.
> *ducks and cover*
Never a problem. ;)
-- B.
--
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> Lhexa wrote:
>> Here I differ. If the ideals of draconity and the ideals of humanity are
>> compared, the first can, even in the abstract, be better than the second
>> if it contains, in its entirety, the latter - and more. *grins*
>
> Assuming, of course, that all of these "ideals" are good. If
> dragon and human ideals were exactly the same except dragons had the
> additional idea of "hoarding gold is good," does that make them better? I
> can find economists who'll argue both sides of the issue.
> That's sort of a red herring, though, because I don't think that
> "dragon ideals" fully contain the set of "human ideals." Let me throw out
> a controversial example: I consider conformity to be a "human ideal" (in
> the sense of something that current Western civilization holds dear). Cf:
> suburbia, advertising, bureaucracy.
Let me add something before this gets blown out of proportion:
Lhexa -- I haven't been keeping up on the [ooc] reality thread
until just now. I read something there which just cleared up what you
were saying about dragon and human ideals.
So you're entirely correct to say what you did. I'm just coming
from a different perspective -- which is that *I* do not consider *myself*
to share all of the "ideals" that I consider to be human. Therefore I can
say that I think conformity is a human ideal (and certainly it has its
positive uses, most of which I disagree with). YMMV.
And if anything I wrote here still stings, I apologize, because I
didn't fully understand what you were saying 'til just now.
-- Bax, catching up on the rest of the newsgroup.
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
> > constituting draconity, I do not regard them as more of anything than
> > the humans I have known. I was violently (at least on my side) disabused
> > of this notion, fairly recently.
>
> I'm sorry to hear it. :/
It wasn't the Reality thread, though that was bad enough.
> And partly, that's what I'm talking about when I say "we're all
> the same" (later in my original post) -- that we're all equally capable of
> both kindness and malice. It's a very dangerous mistake to think that
> dragons are all good, one which I bet a lot of us (including me) have made
> at one point or another.
All capable, but not equally so... but that's just pedantry, not worth
following through.
> I still do trust fellow dragons *more* than humans, but that's
> because I find it a lot easier to empathize and/or figure out their
> motives -- and, at least partially, because I think people who have the
> courage to call themselves dragons are going to be more mature and honest
> in general (draconity still being a very unpopular stance in the "real
> world").
With humans, my relationships go from distrusting to affable; with
dragons, from distrusting to devoted friendship. So, I do prefer the
latter, even if it keeps me more off-balance.
> <re: elitism>
> >> This, of course, does not make it right.
> >
> > Well, what about when the idea of the group is made so lofty that I can
> > find nobody, especially not myself, who really fits it? Is its
> > effectiveness as an ideal of personal development at all reduced by its
> > seeming undemocratic?
>
> I'm not quite sure I follow.
> There's no "charter" on AFD saying you have to subscribe to some
> group ideal; everyone brings their own perceptions into it. If the "group
> ideal" -- the general consensus -- is too lofty, don't buy into it.
> We've all done a lot of not buying into things just by being here;
> a little more won't hurt. ;) And I won't speak for the whole group, but
> as far as I can tell, everyone who stays polite and generally on-topic is
> welcome here, no matter their ideals.
I did a splendid job of misstating my meaning there. This is it: if I
were to attempt to define a group of people who fit my idea of draconity
(the one that I apply to myself), I would not be able to think of anyone
who qualifies, not even myself. So, elitism using such a group as that
would be an innocent, if silly, thing, because it would be disassociated
from any actual person.
But, again, such would actually be a worthless standard for judging
others, being empty. However, it is an excellent source of development
for me...
> >
> > Here I differ. If the ideals of draconity and the ideals of humanity are
> > compared, the first can, even in the abstract, be better than the second
> > if it contains, in its entirety, the latter - and more. *grins*
>
> Assuming, of course, that all of these "ideals" are good. If
> dragon and human ideals were exactly the same except dragons had the
> additional idea of "hoarding gold is good," does that make them better? I
> can find economists who'll argue both sides of the issue.
*grins* I forgot a few qualifiers. First, the definition of ideal that I
use (and which I created fairly recently) is something of the mind or
spirit that combines an emotion's value with the applicability and
mutability of thought. Put shortly, an ideal would be a combination of
thought and emotion (or an emotional effect), having the unique
attribute of being something that always acts to further itself (thought
and emotion sometimes do this, but not dependably).
So, an ideal could easily have any value, even neutrality. What I actual
believe is that draconity contains all of the _good_ ideals of humanity;
what value the extra ones have is something is something unresolved by
me.
I sometimes toy around with the idea there might be another ideal that
is the combination of all good human ideals: the ideal of humanity. Then
I would be justified in thinking of an ideal of draconity, with only
positive components.
More often, though, I think that to assert a single such ideal would be
to place artificial limits on both humanity and draconity. Instead, I
say that draconity contains the good ideals of humanity but not the evil
ones because, to become a dragon (in the spiritual sense, of course), my
humanity must already be resolved for the better. Not that it is, yet. I
don't think myself capable of being even barely a dragon if I am not yet
an excellent human - not because draconity is necessarily connected to
humanity in that way, but because circumstances have required me to
start with the latter.
> That's sort of a red herring, though, because I don't think that
> "dragon ideals" fully contain the set of "human ideals." Let me throw out
> a controversial example: I consider conformity to be a "human ideal" (in
> the sense of something that current Western civilization holds dear). Cf:
> suburbia, advertising, bureaucracy.
Conformity is an ideal, by my definition: it involves a host of
emotions, most notably shame and acceptance, but would fail if it lacked
the subtlety of thought. And the way in which it furthers itself is
obvious. However, it is at best a neutral ideal, and probably not even
that... so I wouldn't include it.
> > Even if it does so at the price of making a dragon, spiritually, a human
> > as well - I like the irony.
>
> We can't escape it, of course, while we're still typing with
> fleshy fingers.
*grins* In the spiritual sense...
> >
> > Luckily so. I'm willing to accept draconity as an expedient, or as an
> > inherent truth - in fact, the first might even be the preferable one.
>
> Accepting draconity as an expedient is all I ever ask of people.
> ;) It's a good compromise between taking me on faith and considering me
> crazy.
It's expedient both for myself and for others. Draconity has shown
itself irreplacable to me; even with questions of true self aside,
divesting myself of it would be stupid self-affliction.
> >
> > That last statement I must disagree with. Admirable as it is as an
> > attempt to promote tolerance, there are ways to make the point that do
> > not sacrifice the immense benefit that lies in difference of every kind.
>
> I think I was trying to say, in my generally
> not-descriptive-enough-despite-being-too-verbose way, that we're all the
> same in the end in a very Zen or nihilist sense. In the sense that we're
> all grains of sand on the beach of life, where from a distance it all
> melts into homogeneity, we're the same.
Oh. Well, if I knew exactly what you meant, I might argue... but perhaps
I shall argue with my actions instead.
> Maybe a better way of saying that is that we all share the same
> potential. There's nothing that a dragon can do that a dedicated human
> can't, and vice versa.
That is true, but far from sufficient... there is a great difference
between potential and actuality.
> Individually, of course, this breaks down. I'm very different
> from most "humans" I know. And I will accomplish things in my lifetime
> that others, because they haven't been raised the same way, won't have the
> time for before they die. (And vice versa.) But in the long run, it
> evens out.
*grins*
> On the other hand, I strongly agree with you on the benefits of
> diversity -- because nobody can do everything, and it's very good for
> society if nothing can't be done by somebody. Or something.
And that. I think, perhaps, that difference may actually be something
valuable, even without the fact that reality makes it necessary.
> > - to pronounce another a dragon, the only accurate basis I have is
> > their own belief in the matter.
>
> "Telling other people about themselves is a job for someone with
> motives." -- Me, some years ago.
Motives? I've got motives. Just not those.
> -- Bax, not sure where this thread is going exactly, but glad it's here.
>
> --
> BAXIL's meme-filled millennial 7-LINE .SIG FILE (04-09-2K) * _/|
What's a meme?
Lhexa
Dracana
"Digital Dragon" <digi...@discovernet.net> wrote:
> Sorry, but I just couldn't resist this after reading some of the
> Reality posts *lol*
It's okay, thanks for something lighter in fact. }:=8)
> What with all the debate as to what a dragon is, how one should behave
> if you are a dragon. The traits, the metaphors, etc. I'm beginning to
> think of a really cheesy movie being made based on AFD situations, and
> what the "What is a Dragon" answer is.
Oh, the angsty type movies that would come out of that kind of a
movie.
> Personally the traits I think a dragon would have can be found on my
> page. But I realised some time ago that dragons are like humans are
> like han are like ma'hen'do'sat (sp?). We all have minds. We all -um,
> let me be careful with this one- think. Hopefully for ourselves ;)
> We all have some sort of goal,no matter how bizaar or twisted it may
> seem to others... especially those of another species who don't have
> the same set of priorities or values.
I agree. They wouldn't likely hold exactly the same types of
priorities and beliefs as a dragon civilization from across the universe
or so. Maybe similar but not exactly the same because they didn't
develop under the same situations and conditions.
> Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
> Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
>
> We may see things a little differently, but I also see a stereotype
> developing. It used to be that dragons were nothing but vicous killing
> machines, and while a lot of ignorant ppl still think that, it is a
> sterotype.
> Now we have the "dragons-are-holier-than-thou" mentality creeping
> out, and this is becoming another stereotype.
Unfortunately Digi, with a sentient species like all our species
such a thing is bound to happen. With sentient, independant thought
comes all types. Not just the good, wise, noble or quirky but also the
evil and bigoted. All of us still have things to learn.
I myself believe that we are perhaps wiser not because we are
inherently better than hoomans but we've been around longer. We have
learned more. Hoomanity is a relatively young species yet. It hasn't had
as much time as most of us. I must stress again just because one is
wiser does not mean they are better, stronger or smarter. Just learned
more.
> And this does not help the cause of dragonkind or kin any. I
> personally expect there to be some naughty dragons out there, but for
> the most part I hope that most dragons would rather show humans what
> we are really capable of: compassion, love, kindness, wisdom,
> knowledge, and perhaps even a little magic. Lets face it, there _is_ a
> little magic in everyone here, its up to you to decide to use it.
And be responsible for the power you wield of course. I believe
that there will someday be a day when dragonkind can again reveal itself
in all it's slendors and flaws.
--
Dracana Ashiranen Lia'Drakie
Dra...@dragonsight.zzn.com
ICQ #56471441
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Rankor
of lurkdom recently, I will come out of it to put in my meager 2 cents.
I am a dragon. But in saying that, I do not place under myself
ideals which must strngently be followed. To say that to be dragon is
to be good as opposed to evil is just as misinformed as the converse,
which runs so rampant not only in the minds of many, but in literature.
Neither is correct. I for one know I am capable both of good and evil,
and both brilliance, and stupidity. This simply is due to the fact that
draconity...being a dragon..its not a matter of a code, or standard, it
is simply what we are. Sometimes I feel as if, when I speak of being in
our trueforms again one day, we put draconity and such a pedastal it is
as if we are trying to convince ourselves we somehow "are not worthy"
of what we are. This is not a matter of who is better, it is one of who
we are. Instead of worrying about "living up to" anything, why not jut
revel in this wonderful thing that we know about ourselfs, revel in
draconity and being a dragon. Being a dragon does not make us better,
nor does it make us less. It merely makes us dragons. However, that in
itself, might be the greatest thing there is. And nobody and nothing
can take away being a dragon. From the most brilliant, to the least,
morally astute to most morally corrupt, no combination of the above can
take away ones being a dragon, if dragon they be. In this, I fear that
I am now ranting. I hope I have not offended anybody, and said atleast
most of what I have wanted to say in this. Until then,
WTTW
Rankor
--
DC2.Dw Gm L4m W T Sks Cgy--/gr+ B- A- Fr M++ H $+ R+++! J+ S U+ I Q+
85% Dragon corrupt!!!!
"Woe to him who's good name is more to him than goodness"
Lhexa
>
>
> Let me add something before this gets blown out of proportion:
>
> Lhexa -- I haven't been keeping up on the [ooc] reality thread
> until just now. I read something there which just cleared up what you
> were saying about dragon and human ideals.
Er... how? All I remember doing there is asking a few questions of Q and
noting a couple of minor things to Wren and one other person.
> So you're entirely correct to say what you did. I'm just coming
> from a different perspective -- which is that *I* do not consider *myself*
> to share all of the "ideals" that I consider to be human. Therefore I can
> say that I think conformity is a human ideal (and certainly it has its
> positive uses, most of which I disagree with). YMMV.
Well, I made a mistake by not saying that I meant the better ideals.
Conformity is a human one, since so many experience it. What does YMMV
stand for?
> And if anything I wrote here still stings, I apologize, because I
> didn't fully understand what you were saying 'til just now.
I haven't yet been hurt by anything you've said - in fact, right now it
seems that the only way I can be wounded in connection with my ideas or
my debates is by indifference - I've had best friends and strangers
alike insult my ideas, often because of poor wording, but without
effect.
I also didn't think your speech was an attack - but there was plenty of
room for doubt, since that had been the only reply.
Hmm. Apparently I feel verbose tonight.
> -- Bax, catching up on the rest of the newsgroup.
>
> --
> BAXIL's meme-filled millennial 7-LINE .SIG FILE (04-09-2K) * _/|
Lhexa
Elynne
> Weyrlady thoughtfully scribed:
> >> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
> > Dictionary, 2nd edition, "Dragon, (n) ...
> Ack! I'm functionally equivalent to an ellipsis! ;P
*gigglegigglesnortgiggle* I'll *have* to remember that one... ;) :)
> > Sorry, just felt I ought to enter a little levity into the situation.
> > *ducks and cover*
> Never a problem. ;)
I dunno... I think I might have a problem with covering ducks, but I
suppose it depends on what you're covering them with. A blanket is okay,
but enamel could get - messy. *innocent gryn*
--
DC2.Dc Gf Skh/s Fr+++ Nu A | Jia Maebashi, the Procrastinating Draconid
Cre,bwh,fbk Mr+++!2 Fo U+ | Guerrilla Ontologist & Mate of Baxil
R++ Ac+ S+ I+(opinionated) | "Be impulsive! Spontaneously combust!"
B"aubergine" V++(dreaming) | elynne @ wolfenet . com <- new addy yay!
* * * * * http://velar.ctrl-c.liu.se/vcl/Artists/Erin-Lynn/ * * * * *
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
> >
> > noting a couple of minor things to Wren and one other person.
>
> post, and I'm not going to look through the whole thread just to find it,
> but it was in some side example you were making.
*grins* Well, that might've saved me a speech... nah, I like writing
about stuff like that.
> >
> > Conformity is a human [ideal], since so many experience it. What does
> > YMMV stand for?
>
> Your Mileage May Vary. A handy acronym.
Okay.
> And the reason I inserted it there is because I was trying to say
> that I think conformity is a value that humanity finds *positive*. Which
> is a stance I find disturbing.
Well, it's important that the opinion of humanity does not make an ideal
good or evil or positive, even if it is their domain; such would remove
all meaning from the word. But in this matter, humanity does confuse me
a little: conformity is a powerful force in this society, but not one
that is (except in their worse moments) not universally, or even
usually, credited. That is, humans do value differences, and most know
enough to see flaws in conformity - and yet the gap between knowledge
and action remains wide. Maybe I've spent too much time with the better
part of humanity; the malignant and cruel humanity as represented in
some literature, that seeks to crush the spirit out of its every member,
has stayed clear of me, except in miniscule forms.
It's still something I detest, but whatever evil there is in conformity
is of a pitiful, rather than a contemptable, type - made powerful
because it derives from a sincere desire for happiness and value...
>
> Okee. No sense in jump-starting "OOC Reality" over here as well.
> ;) Frankly, it's good to see serious stuff being discussed; I could just
> do without all the hurt feelings and personal affronts being slung around.
It doesn't look like that'll happen...
> Dream well,
>
> Bax
Lhexa (feeling wordy again...)
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>> until just now. I read something there which just cleared up what you
>> were saying about dragon and human ideals.
>
> noting a couple of minor things to Wren and one other person.
Well ...:
> Well, I made a mistake by not saying that I meant the better ideals.
You did in the OOC Reality thread. ;) I don't even remember the
post, and I'm not going to look through the whole thread just to find it,
but it was in some side example you were making.
>> So you're entirely correct to say what you did. I'm just coming
>> from a different perspective -- which is that *I* do not consider *myself*
>> to share all of the "ideals" that I consider to be human. Therefore I can
>> say that I think conformity is a human ideal (and certainly it has its
>> positive uses, most of which I disagree with). YMMV.
>
> Conformity is a human [ideal], since so many experience it. What does
> YMMV stand for?
Your Mileage May Vary. A handy acronym.
And the reason I inserted it there is because I was trying to say
that I think conformity is a value that humanity finds *positive*. Which
is a stance I find disturbing.
>> And if anything I wrote here still stings, I apologize, because I
>> didn't fully understand what you were saying 'til just now.
> I also didn't think your speech was an attack - but there was plenty of
> room for doubt, since that had been the only reply.
Okee. No sense in jump-starting "OOC Reality" over here as well.
;) Frankly, it's good to see serious stuff being discussed; I could just
do without all the hurt feelings and personal affronts being slung around.
Dream well,
Bax
nugator
wrote:
>In article <Yiq%4.137569$701.1...@news4.giganews.com>,
> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott <ddr...@ecis.ecis.com> wrote:
>> Humans can work to make that better. Dragons can work to make
>> that better. We can be part of the larger community, or we can be
>part of
>> only our own community, or we can ignore those lines. Whatever you
>want
>> to call it, it just means ignoring species designations and being Good
>> People.
>> What it boils down to is: Can dragons be positive role models,
>> and can we -- embodying those traits -- live up to the images? Yes,
>if we
>> make it happen.
>> And there I am in complete agreement with Digi: Let's.
>>
> This I completely agree with, and though I have resided in the realm
>of lurkdom recently, I will come out of it to put in my meager 2 cents.
>
Welcome back, dear.
> I am a dragon. But in saying that, I do not place under myself
>ideals which must strngently be followed. To say that to be dragon is
>to be good as opposed to evil is just as misinformed as the converse,
>which runs so rampant not only in the minds of many, but in literature.
>Neither is correct. I for one know I am capable both of good and evil,
>and both brilliance, and stupidity. This simply is due to the fact that
>draconity...being a dragon..its not a matter of a code, or standard, it
>is simply what we are. Sometimes I feel as if, when I speak of being in
>our trueforms again one day, we put draconity and such a pedastal it is
>as if we are trying to convince ourselves we somehow "are not worthy"
>of what we are. This is not a matter of who is better, it is one of who
>we are.
I agree. I don't call myself a drakka because i think myself better
than humanity. I call myself a drakka because when i see myself in my
head, my face is small and blue and scaly. Because flying in planes
has always felt like a poor substitute for real flying. Because my
toes always look impossibly short and stubby to me, and i can't bring
myself to cut my nails until they start chipping and catching on
things. In short, i say i'm a drakka because that's what i am,
inside.
>Instead of worrying about "living up to" anything, why not jut
>revel in this wonderful thing that we know about ourselfs, revel in
>draconity and being a dragon. Being a dragon does not make us better,
>nor does it make us less. It merely makes us dragons. However, that in
>itself, might be the greatest thing there is.
<nods> Not in the sense that we're draks instead of humans, but
because i'd like to think we've gotten a better grasp on what we are
than those humans who are in fact other creatures inside, but have
been led to think of this as silly escapism and, as such, never really
connect with that part of themselves. That said, though, there are
lots of humans who are in this respect about on par with us, simply
because they're human inside and out.
>And nobody and nothing
>can take away being a dragon. From the most brilliant, to the least,
>morally astute to most morally corrupt, no combination of the above can
>take away ones being a dragon, if dragon they be.
That said, though, there is one person who can cause that draconity to
be almost lost, buried beneath layers of disbelief and rejection.
That person, naturally, is the person who carries that same draconity.
>In this, I fear that
>I am now ranting. I hope I have not offended anybody, and said atleast
>most of what I have wanted to say in this.
If you did, i didn't find it.
>Until then,
> WTTW
> Rankor
Dester'edra
--
Dester'edra Cloudancer of Amoraegrarum Somniare
DC2.DGfL10i18tW-TPfwlSksCbl+,baq+,w \rb,eviBmusicAFr++MFR+++S+
"Blessed are they who can laugh at themselves, for they will
never cease to be amused." --unknown
currently posting at draconum<at>fish<dot>mindspring<dot>com
Get fishing rod to reply; no unsolicited mail, please.
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
Rankor thoughtfully scribed:
> draconity...being a dragon..its not a matter of a code, or standard, it
> is simply what we are. Sometimes I feel as if, when I speak of being in
> our trueforms again one day, we put draconity and such a pedastal it is
> as if we are trying to convince ourselves we somehow "are not worthy"
> of what we are. This is not a matter of who is better, it is one of who
> we are. Instead of worrying about "living up to" anything, why not jut
> revel in this wonderful thing that we know about ourselfs, revel in
> draconity and being a dragon.
I spend two hours trying to struggle to a description of why I
don't think the standard for draconity should be unreachable, and you sum
it up in a single paragraph?
My hat is off to you, sir. :)
Dream well,
Bax
--
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
Whew! Put two long-winded dragons together, what do you get? A
lot of thread snippage ... but this is still a LONG post. Be forewarned.
Lhexa and I thoughtfully debated:
>> And partly, that's what I'm talking about when I say "we're all
>> the same" (later in my original post) -- that we're all equally capable of
>> both kindness and malice.
>
> All capable, but not equally so... but that's just pedantry, not worth
> following through.
Eh ... I dunno. I could put together a decent argument for
"equally capable", but you're right -- it's a very side issue.
>> I still do trust fellow dragons *more* than humans,
>
> With humans, my relationships go from distrusting to affable; with
> dragons, from distrusting to devoted friendship. So, I do prefer the
> latter, even if it keeps me more off-balance.
I wrote down why I tend to trust dragons more (although I snipped
it here for space interests); I'm curious as to the reasons this is true
for you.
<snip, slash, shred, cut, paste>
> What's a meme?
It's funny you should ask this. ;) See just below.
<<re: "better" ideals>>
> *grins* I forgot a few qualifiers. First, the definition of ideal that I
> use (and which I created fairly recently) is something of the mind or
> spirit that combines an emotion's value with the applicability and
> mutability of thought. Put shortly, an ideal would be a combination of
> thought and emotion (or an emotional effect), having the unique
> attribute of being something that always acts to further itself (thought
> and emotion sometimes do this, but not dependably).
Firstly, as to memes: You got very close there with your
"ideals" definition. The big difference is that "meme" doesn't really
have any emotional component.
Meme theory says that ideas are, essentially, viruses; they are
spread by contact between minds, require hosts to survive, and are
"competing" for limited mental space by fighting one another for
dominance. In other words, ideas are *alive* and have to follow the same
survival rules as many simpler living organisms.
Among the appeals of this theory is that the idea of memes --
being an idea -- is itself a meme. I have "passed the virus" to you by
telling you this. It's beautifully self-referential.
As a poster I put up on my cubicle wall for a while said: "Meme
-- it's more than just a four-letter word, it's a way of life."
But bax to ideals ...
So, if I understand you correctly, let's take an example.
"Honor" -- as an ideal -- is defined by being both thought (e.g., stories
of honorable people) and emotion (including pride, compassion, guilt) that
work together so as to promote itself? So if I'm selling somebody a
chocolate bar and they overpay -- then if I do the honorable thing and
give them the correct change, then that automatically (being honorable)
will inspire in them thoughts or emotions which (if they act on them) are
also honorable? Or that the positive feedback this act gives me will
inspire me to be honorable again?
> So, an ideal could easily have any value, even neutrality. What I actual
> believe is that draconity contains all of the _good_ ideals of humanity;
> what value the extra ones have is something is something unresolved by
> me.
This sounds to me very much like what you're saying is that if a
dragon acts in accordance with their ideals they need must be good. That
if a dragon acts based on negative emotion or thought, that they are
somehow failing. Is this what you are trying to say? That your idea of
draconity is very paladin-esque?
Or -- if dragons *do* have negative ideals -- then what difference
does it make that they've so many good ones?
> I sometimes toy around with the idea there might be another ideal that
> is the combination of all good human ideals: the ideal of humanity. Then
> I would be justified in thinking of an ideal of draconity, with only
> positive components.
I've got serious questions here, which I'll address below, since
you touch on the matter much more directly.
> More often, though, I think that to assert a single such ideal would be
> to place artificial limits on both humanity and draconity. Instead, I
> say that draconity contains the good ideals of humanity but not the evil
> ones because, to become a dragon (in the spiritual sense, of course), my
> humanity must already be resolved for the better.
You are saying, if I understand correctly, that for you draconity
is a transcendent state. Now I'm starting to understand what you've been
driving at with some of your earlier statements.
For example, I call myself a dragon. I haven't transcended the
human condition; I still am learning to overcome the negative human
ideals. What you're saying is that *by your definition* that makes me not
a dragon. Which is why you are agreeing to go by *my definition* (that
being whatever it happens to be; you're just willing to accept my word on
it) that I'm a dragon. Less trouble all around. I'm cool with that.
But that brings up another question. One you asked yourself, but
I've already snipped out ;P so I'll just try to remember as well as I can.
Does it diminish the value (as an ideal) of your definition of
draconity if the concept "dragon" is unattainable?
Frankly, *my* answer to that question (YMMV ;)) is "yes."
I used to think like that ... of course, this was a decade ago,
before I found AFD, before I'd found any other dragons at all. I figured
that if I was "good enough," I could someday become a dragon.
I can't go back to that any more. For many various reasons.
Perhaps the most significant is that "being good enough" implies an
outside arbiter of goodness -- it takes the power of self-determination
away from me. I'm too strongly attached to the idea of free will; I can't
deal with the concept of treating draconity as a state of being with an
entrance exam.
Also, how does one deal with a dragon who "relapses" once
transcended? Can draconity be revoked, like a college degree if
someone was found to have cheated on their thesis? If my soul rebelled at
the first idea, this one was even more repugnant -- that draconity could
be *taken away* by this "impartial" arbiter.
This was compounded once I was able to do some research into past
lives. I have been a dragon before. If that was the case (and in every
observation I made, ultimately my only other choice was to treat my own
observations as unreliable, and *that's* a slippery slope that goes
nowhere but madness), then why was I a human now? If "dragon" is a
transcendent state, then I *must* have relapsed. I have to admit, I just
strongly dislike that idea. ;)
The final blow for me was when I started thinking about ideals.
I still hold dragon *ideals* highly. (Honor, courage, strength,
dedication, wisdom, and tolerance being the mantra.) The "perfect" dragon
would embody those exactly. I still aim for those heights, and I do a
decent job (imho). But until I hit that "transcendent" state I'll never
be perfect.
I couldn't reconcile this with the idea of having been a dragon
before -- of having seen other dragons as well, none of whom were perfect
-- and I got to thinking: What's the minimum standard? Obviously not
perfection, because perfection means *being incapable of making a
mistake*, and yet here I was, "fallen." So there must be *some* degree of
discretion allowed.
But perfection is infinite goodness. You cannot define "infinity
minus one", which is to say that you cannot set a number for it. You
can't define "one-half of infinity" (half perfect) or "the square root of
infinity" or even "ln infinity". The closest you can get to infinity
without referencing infinity itself is just a really big number, which --
mathematically speaking -- is still an infinite distance away. 1 is the
same distance from infinity that 1,000,000 is.
From there, walls tumbled.
To make a long story short ... I believe there is no minimum
standard for draconity; people who are, are. People who aren't, aren't.
Period. And I am no more willing to be an "impartial arbiter" of other
peoples' draconity than I would be to have someone stand in judgment over
me. Therefore, like you, I take other people's word on their own
identity.
But draconity does (IMHO, YMMV ;)) lose something if the
standard's too high. The way I look at it is -- if my definition of
dragons tells me that *nobody* I meet is a dragon ... how real are they?
If I will never meet one in my lifetime, why believe in them at all?
Which is to say, what is the positive effect of believing in something
which (by its absence) cannot make a difference in your life?
Note that I'm not saying that the ideals don't make a difference.
However, the ideals that dragons follow are there whether dragons exist or
not. So why believe in the dragon instead of the ideal, if the standards
are so high that no dragons will enter your life?
I believe in the (pure, perfect) ideals that dragons strive to
pursue. I also believe in the (living, imperfect) dragons that pursue
them. For me, seeing beings chase the ideals makes them alive. That goes
bax to memes, I guess. ;)
*glances at clock* ... Uhm. I've spent two hours on this post.
I'm going to move on now.
> Not that it is, yet. I
> don't think myself capable of being even barely a dragon if I am not yet
> an excellent human - not because draconity is necessarily connected to
> humanity in that way, but because circumstances have required me to
> start with the latter.
Curious. So do you think that somewhere out there, on a world of
dragons, it's possible that one is saying, "I'd like to transcend
draconity and be a human, but I have to finish up here first"? ;)
>> Accepting draconity as an expedient is all I ever ask of people.
>> ;) It's a good compromise between taking me on faith and considering me
>> crazy.
>
> It's expedient both for myself and for others. Draconity has shown
> itself irreplacable to me; even with questions of true self aside,
> divesting myself of it would be stupid self-affliction.
This is part of what I was talking about when I got way
long-winded earlier. "Stupid self-affliction," anyway.
One of my core beliefs is that, given a question of faith and two
answers which are functionally equal except that one answer makes me
happier, I will choose that answer. If neither answer can be proved, and
neither has more evidence in its favor, why shoot myself in the leg?
This philosophy has guided me remarkably well.
As applied to dragons ... yes, I agree. To give my draconity up
would essentially be to say that I am crazy. Of course, I have no proof
whatsoever that I'm not crazy ... but what does me more good, believing
that I'm a dragon, or believing that I'm crazy?
And I need to give this credit, as well, for being at the heart of
my earlier rant. I follow draconic ideals; does that make me a dragon, or
a dragon-to-be? So what does me more good, believing that I'm struggling
to realize the potential that is already inherent in my acknowledged
draconity, or believing that I'm Just Not Good Enough yet, with nebulous
prospects for advancement?
<<re: "We're all the same in the end">>
>> Maybe a better way of saying that is that we all share the same
>> potential. There's nothing that a dragon can do that a dedicated human
>> can't, and vice versa.
>
> That is true, but far from sufficient... there is a great difference
> between potential and actuality.
Granted. I'm of the opinion that the difference between dragons
and humans is not a difference of degree, but a difference of
distribution. (I.e., the actual talent is in different areas rather than
different amounts.)
>> "Telling other people about themselves is a job for someone with
>> motives." -- Me, some years ago.
>
> Motives? I've got motives. Just not those.
Motives? We don' need no steenkin' motives ;)
Dream well,
Baxil the long-winded
--
BAXIL's meme-filled millennial 7-LINE .SIG FILE (04-09-2K) * _/|
AMW
> > Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
> > Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
> >
> > We may see things a little differently, but I also see a stereotype
> > developing. It used to be that dragons were nothing but vicous killing
> > machines, and while a lot of ignorant ppl still think that, it is a
> > sterotype.
> > Now we have the "dragons-are-holier-than-thou" mentality creeping
> > out, and this is becoming another stereotype.
I wanted to respond to this particular point, and at the risk of
sounding like a child, "They started it!"
Human legends about dragons, especially thorough the Far East depict
them as wise creature, (with the ability to shape change). In the Middle
East, the first Gods and Goddesses were dragons, from whom the earth and
sky were made. In most cultures, up till the advent of Christianity and
Judaism, dragons were revered as Gods. When the new religion sprang up,
the Gods of the old religion became the devils of the new, in form if
not in spirit. (This is not meant as a slam against any religion, but
just the ways things have gone.)
To humans, dragons have become symbols for ability and wisdom. Humans
have put dragons on pedestals, and asked their aid in guarding their
houses and lands. Their discarded bones were considered medicinal.
Ben
aka Drakon@work
AMW
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
> Firstly, as to memes: You got very close there with your
> "ideals" definition. The big difference is that "meme" doesn't really
> have any emotional component.
> Meme theory says that ideas are, essentially, viruses; they are
> spread by contact between minds, require hosts to survive, and are
> "competing" for limited mental space by fighting one another for
> dominance. In other words, ideas are *alive* and have to follow the same
> survival rules as many simpler living organisms.
To interject. I am not at all certain this is quite true. A meme can
assume new characteristics and pass those one onto its offspring, unlike
biological systems. In other words it appears that the evolution of a
meme is governed more by Lemarkian evolution than Darwin.
> But bax to ideals ...
>
> So, if I understand you correctly, let's take an example.
> "Honor" -- as an ideal -- is defined by being both thought (e.g., stories
> of honorable people) and emotion (including pride, compassion, guilt) that
> work together so as to promote itself? So if I'm selling somebody a
> chocolate bar and they overpay -- then if I do the honorable thing and
> give them the correct change, then that automatically (being honorable)
> will inspire in them thoughts or emotions which (if they act on them) are
> also honorable? Or that the positive feedback this act gives me will
> inspire me to be honorable again?
In general I would say that this is true. Although YMMV, in general if
you act honorable toward others, they will tend to act honorable to you,
as well as others. There is a benefit to the honorable life form for his
actions.
Take an extreme example, war. The best way to win a war is to not fight,
have your opponent surrender, and that is not going to happen if your
opponent thinks or believes you are not honorable. That if they
surrender, they would end up just as dead as if they had fought. But if
your opponent thinks or believes you are honorable, that you would at
least respect the Geneva convention and simply take them off the
battlefield and give them 3 hots and cot for the duration, they are more
apt to wonder if a particular battle, or ideology they are fighting for
is worth their lives. Your honor can weaken his ability to fight, which
makes it easier for you to prevail.
>
> > So, an ideal could easily have any value, even neutrality. What I actual
> > believe is that draconity contains all of the _good_ ideals of humanity;
> > what value the extra ones have is something is something unresolved by
> > me.
>
> This sounds to me very much like what you're saying is that if a
> dragon acts in accordance with their ideals they need must be good. That
> if a dragon acts based on negative emotion or thought, that they are
> somehow failing. Is this what you are trying to say? That your idea of
> draconity is very paladin-esque?
> Or -- if dragons *do* have negative ideals -- then what difference
> does it make that they've so many good ones?
When you use the terms "good" or "bad", you are implying some kind of
standard by which such actions are to be measured against. Once you
identify that standard, then I think most of the problems will sort
themselves out as to which is which.
> But that brings up another question. One you asked yourself, but
> I've already snipped out ;P so I'll just try to remember as well as I can.
> Does it diminish the value (as an ideal) of your definition of
> draconity if the concept "dragon" is unattainable?
> Frankly, *my* answer to that question (YMMV ;)) is "yes."
> I used to think like that ... of course, this was a decade ago,
> before I found AFD, before I'd found any other dragons at all. I figured
> that if I was "good enough," I could someday become a dragon.
> I can't go back to that any more. For many various reasons.
> Perhaps the most significant is that "being good enough" implies an
> outside arbiter of goodness -- it takes the power of self-determination
> away from me. I'm too strongly attached to the idea of free will; I can't
> deal with the concept of treating draconity as a state of being with an
> entrance exam.
Or possibly an internal artiber of "goodness". One point I feel needs
making is that being "good" or "bad" has no meaning unless you have a
choice in the matter. If you are reacting to programming, or blindly
picking actions at random, then good and evil have no meaning.
In life we face many choices. We can pick and choose our actions, based
on whatever criteria we want. However each of those actions have
consequences, (which is kind of the reason for picking one such action
over another). Some have argued that this fact alone hampers free will
out of existence. I have sever doubts about that.
> Also, how does one deal with a dragon who "relapses" once
> transcended? Can draconity be revoked, like a college degree if
> someone was found to have cheated on their thesis? If my soul rebelled at
> the first idea, this one was even more repugnant -- that draconity could
> be *taken away* by this "impartial" arbiter.
> This was compounded once I was able to do some research into past
> lives. I have been a dragon before. If that was the case (and in every
> observation I made, ultimately my only other choice was to treat my own
> observations as unreliable, and *that's* a slippery slope that goes
> nowhere but madness), then why was I a human now? If "dragon" is a
> transcendent state, then I *must* have relapsed. I have to admit, I just
> strongly dislike that idea. ;)
You see being human a "relapse"? I am not quite sure I agree, although I
am not at all sure I can disagree. It may be the only form available for
you, your "soul", at this point in history. And regardless of your
physical form, you are still you, whatever you is.
> The final blow for me was when I started thinking about ideals.
> I still hold dragon *ideals* highly. (Honor, courage, strength,
> dedication, wisdom, and tolerance being the mantra.) The "perfect" dragon
> would embody those exactly. I still aim for those heights, and I do a
> decent job (imho). But until I hit that "transcendent" state I'll never
> be perfect.
Some would argue that these are human ideals as well.
> I couldn't reconcile this with the idea of having been a dragon
> before -- of having seen other dragons as well, none of whom were perfect
> -- and I got to thinking: What's the minimum standard? Obviously not
> perfection, because perfection means *being incapable of making a
> mistake*, and yet here I was, "fallen." So there must be *some* degree of
> discretion allowed.
Some have argued that being incapable of making a mistake leaves the
being subject to a very boring and predictable life. Which is considered
flawed, and hence not perfect. :)
> To make a long story short ... I believe there is no minimum
> standard for draconity; people who are, are. People who aren't, aren't.
> Period. And I am no more willing to be an "impartial arbiter" of other
> peoples' draconity than I would be to have someone stand in judgment over
> me. Therefore, like you, I take other people's word on their own
> identity.
And unless one is a extremely good mind reader, that is the best any of
us can do.
> > It's expedient both for myself and for others. Draconity has shown
> > itself irreplacable to me; even with questions of true self aside,
> > divesting myself of it would be stupid self-affliction.
>
> This is part of what I was talking about when I got way
> long-winded earlier. "Stupid self-affliction," anyway.
> One of my core beliefs is that, given a question of faith and two
> answers which are functionally equal except that one answer makes me
> happier, I will choose that answer. If neither answer can be proved, and
> neither has more evidence in its favor, why shoot myself in the leg?
There is a line of thought that pleasure and pain are evolutionary
'signals' to tell you what is true and false. It is a more "gut level"
thing than reason.
However, one has to be careful with that as well. Many recreational
pharmaceuticals will make you "happy" by damaging your brain as well, so
you have to be careful that you are not falling for another type of
drug.
> This philosophy has guided me remarkably well.
> As applied to dragons ... yes, I agree. To give my draconity up
> would essentially be to say that I am crazy. Of course, I have no proof
> whatsoever that I'm not crazy ... but what does me more good, believing
> that I'm a dragon, or believing that I'm crazy?
Define crazy. The courts have such a definition, that despite allusions
to the contrary, works quite well, while allowing a diversity of
opinions. Are you, because of your draconity, a threat to yourself or
others? If no, then no matter how crazy you may be, you are sane in the
eyes of the courts.
> And I need to give this credit, as well, for being at the heart of
> my earlier rant. I follow draconic ideals; does that make me a dragon, or
> a dragon-to-be? So what does me more good, believing that I'm struggling
> to realize the potential that is already inherent in my acknowledged
> draconity, or believing that I'm Just Not Good Enough yet, with nebulous
> prospects for advancement?
Does the lack of following those ideals make anyone less a dragon?
If the effect is that you try your darnest to be more honorable,
courageous, strong, dedicated, wise, and tolerant, then great. As these
are traits that are not only of value to you, but to humans as well,
this will aid you in living with humans.
Ben
aka Drakon@ Work
Terratek
AMW wrote:
> > In article <8hi0kb$s2k$0...@206.165.166.17>,
> > "Digital Dragon" <digi...@discovernet.net> wrote:
>
> > > Some would say that dragons are more intelligent than humans. Why?
> > > Some would place dragons soceity above human's. Why?
> > >
> > > We may see things a little differently, but I also see a stereotype
> > > developing. It used to be that dragons were nothing but vicous killing
> > > machines, and while a lot of ignorant ppl still think that, it is a
> > > sterotype.
> > > Now we have the "dragons-are-holier-than-thou" mentality creeping
> > > out, and this is becoming another stereotype.
>
> I wanted to respond to this particular point, and at the risk of
> sounding like a child, "They started it!"
>
> Human legends about dragons, especially thorough the Far East depict
> them as wise creature, (with the ability to shape change). In the Middle
> East, the first Gods and Goddesses were dragons, from whom the earth and
> sky were made. In most cultures, up till the advent of Christianity and
> Judaism, dragons were revered as Gods. When the new religion sprang up,
> the Gods of the old religion became the devils of the new, in form if
> not in spirit. (This is not meant as a slam against any religion, but
> just the ways things have gone.)
Actually, the idea that dragons are evil started before Christianity and
Judaism. I suspect that those religions used dragons as symbols of evil
because they were fairly well established as such to begin with. For
instance, Babylon had the dragon Tiamat, who was thought of as an evil diety,
the Norse had Jormungand and Nidhogger, both of whom were evil, and Egypt had
Apep, the evil god of darkness.
--
~*Terratek*~
Member of SONNLOS
Official of Something
Owner of 10 Chocolate Points
Member of the AFD Pouncing Team
Terratek's Dragon Code:
DC2.~G~L~W~T~P~Sk~C~B~A-FrM-H+++!$+F~R+++Ac+J+++S++U!I--#
V+++![???]Q+++![???]Tc+++![???]Df+++!
Standard Form Code:
DC2.DwGmLWTSksCwh|bl,ebl,wbl
"The Fuolornis Fire Dragons were revered throughout the lands of Brequinda in
the Foth of Avalars for their savage beauty, their noble ways, and their
habit of biting people who didn't revere them." -Douglas Adams
Mithent
>> And the reason I inserted it there is because I was trying to say
>> that I think conformity is a value that humanity finds *positive*. Which
>> is a stance I find disturbing.
>
>good or evil or positive, even if it is their domain; such would remove
>all meaning from the word. But in this matter, humanity does confuse me
>a little: conformity is a powerful force in this society, but not one
>that is (except in their worse moments) not universally, or even
>usually, credited. That is, humans do value differences, and most know
>enough to see flaws in conformity - and yet the gap between knowledge
>and action remains wide. Maybe I've spent too much time with the better
>part of humanity; the malignant and cruel humanity as represented in
>some literature, that seeks to crush the spirit out of its every member,
>has stayed clear of me, except in miniscule forms.
This also echoes my feelings - I don't want to hurt others and seek to humble
myself if someone feels inadequate because of me. This even stems to insects,
which I'm not too keen on, as I don't want them plaguing me but also don't want
to kill them. Nor do I find others doing it in the slightest amusing.
--
Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
'In heaven, a horse is made into a dragon. On Earth, a dragon is made into a
horse.' - Japanese saying
DC2.H"on Discworld"/D?"in Alfandra" Gm L- W T+ Phfltw Sks Cma Bfl A- Fr- N?
M--- H++ $ Fo+ R+? Ac+"when possible!" J+ S U? I-# V++ Q? Tc+
Remove the DELTHIS to reply directly. Please leave a message after the tone.
Mithent
>So you're entirely correct to say what you did. I'm just coming
>from a different perspective -- which is that *I* do not consider *myself*
>to share all of the "ideals" that I consider to be human. Therefore I can
>say that I think conformity is a human ideal (and certainly it has its
>positive uses, most of which I disagree with). YMMV.
Although I'm not familiar with the acronym at the end, I agree - in fact,
despite me being very unpoetic, I managed to write a 5-7-5 haiku about
conformity:
Haiku are poems
which must fit to a pattern.
Like society.
I don't tend to wear anything Nike or Adidas etc apart from trainers (not that
I wear trainers often anyway), and don't feel any need to do something I
disagree with to fit in, but these sentiments are in the minority.
As a side note, I've tacked a ? on the end of my Reality tag in the DC, making
it R+? for unknown, R+ being my old tag - more and more I'm thinking myself
more draconic, and the description on your Web site of typical dragons, Baxil,
seems eerily accurate. Part, certainly, is not fitting in - similar to the
nickel example, I don't steal other's unoccupied chairs, but go hunting for an
unused one, being unable to explain why I did that, and I've never been the
same as most others. I'm an avid reader and well-educated. The thoughts and
opinions of many of the dragon community are like mine, and I found AFD through
a long series of remarkable coincidences!
Ben Gibson
> Actually, the idea that dragons are evil started before Christianity and
> Judaism. I suspect that those religions used dragons as symbols of evil
> because they were fairly well established as such to begin with. For
> instance, Babylon had the dragon Tiamat, who was thought of as an evil diety,
> the Norse had Jormungand and Nidhogger, both of whom were evil, and Egypt had
> Apep, the evil god of darkness.
The Babylonians also had Tannan (?) who lived in the temple
of Bel and who was worshiped and fed.
Now the question comes up was Tiamat considered evil before
the rise of the cult of Marduk? Or is this another case of
the old gods becoming the devils of the new?
Ben
aka Drakon@home
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa said:
> >> And the reason I inserted it there is because I was trying to say
> >> that I think conformity is a value that humanity finds *positive*. Which
> >> is a stance I find disturbing.
> >
> >Well, it's important that the opinion of humanity does not make an ideal
> >good or evil or positive, even if it is their domain; such would remove
> >all meaning from the word. But in this matter, humanity does confuse me
> >a little: conformity is a powerful force in this society, but not one
> >that is (except in their worse moments) not universally, or even
> >usually, credited. That is, humans do value differences, and most know
> >enough to see flaws in conformity - and yet the gap between knowledge
> >and action remains wide. Maybe I've spent too much time with the better
> >part of humanity; the malignant and cruel humanity as represented in
> >some literature, that seeks to crush the spirit out of its every member,
> >has stayed clear of me, except in miniscule forms.
>
> This also echoes my feelings - I don't want to hurt others and seek to humble
> myself if someone feels inadequate because of me. This even stems to insects,
> which I'm not too keen on, as I don't want them plaguing me but also don't want
> to kill them. Nor do I find others doing it in the slightest amusing.
Well, I was talking more about my lack of knowledge when it comes to
human evil... but that trait of yours will probably be a good one.
> --
> Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
> 'In heaven, a horse is made into a dragon. On Earth, a dragon is made into a
> horse.' - Japanese saying
So that's why I like them...
Lhexa
Ngarewyrd
Awe:
:Terratek wrote:
Old gods, Marduk was a Corruption and a blemish of Babylonian society.
Half the tales about the place were propaganda so that the hill tribes
would be justified in destroying the place
:Ben
:aka Drakon@home
--
As the sun goes down, Ngarewyrd Shurashae sits and
ponders what has been said.
DC2.D/Mcw Gn L-- W T Sks Cgr/br B- A Nj O/
H-- $ Fv/j R++ Ac+ J+ S+ U- I--# V+ Q Tc+
Official of Anything with 12 chocolate points
I have become what I could be, only one question
remains, What will I be next?
Mithent
Oh, right. I've not experienced it in the way that I've been tempted to be evil
in this way, only with others.
>> --
>> Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
>> 'In heaven, a horse is made into a dragon. On Earth, a dragon is made into
>a
>> horse.' - Japanese saying
>
>So that's why I like them...
Horses, or the Japanese? Probably the horses, on reflection! I did wonder if
anyone would notice that in my sig.
--
Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
'In heaven, a horse is made into a dragon. On Earth, a dragon is made into a
horse.' - Japanese saying
DC2.H"on Discworld"/D?"in Alfandra" Gm L- W T+ Phfltw Sks Cma Bfl A- Fr- N?
Mithent
>Part, certainly, is not fitting in - similar to the
>nickel example, I don't steal other's unoccupied chairs, but go hunting for
>an
>unused one, being unable to explain why I did that
Actually, I ought to mention that I didn't have a chair at the time, or that
incident loses all meaning.
Lhexa
>
> Whew! Put two long-winded dragons together, what do you get? A
> lot of thread snippage ... but this is still a LONG post. Be forewarned.
Make one spend an hour writing a reply only to have it lost and deleted,
now
recklessly trying again... then what do you get?
A bad sitcom?
> Lhexa and I thoughtfully debated:
> >
> > With humans, my relationships go from distrusting to affable; with
> > dragons, from distrusting to devoted friendship. So, I do prefer the
> > latter, even if it keeps me more off-balance.
>
> I wrote down why I tend to trust dragons more (although I snipped
> it here for space interests); I'm curious as to the reasons this is true
> for you.
I've seen many human flaws in dragons, at some point or another. But,
unless it becomes necessary to defend a friend, I simply stay away from
the worse... and so my feeling just stays at distrusting. But, other
dragons are people for whom I can feel a friendship more intense than
any I've known with a human - this has to be because of who they are,
but the only reason I can think of that that would be corollary to
draconity is that,
because of what draconity entails in someone sincere about it, other
elements of spirit come with relative ease. Courage is, thusly, a part
of it.
> <<re: "better" ideals>>
*grins* You go about this in an organized manner?
> Firstly, as to memes: You got very close there with your
> "ideals" definition. The big difference is that "meme" doesn't really
> have any emotional component.
> Meme theory says that ideas are, essentially, viruses; they are
> spread by contact between minds, require hosts to survive, and are
> "competing" for limited mental space by fighting one another for
> dominance. In other words, ideas are *alive* and have to follow the same
> survival rules as many simpler living organisms.
> Among the appeals of this theory is that the idea of memes --
> being an idea -- is itself a meme. I have "passed the virus" to you by
> telling you this. It's beautifully self-referential.
> As a poster I put up on my cubicle wall for a while said: "Meme
> -- it's more than just a four-letter word, it's a way of life."
Well, thanks - though if I knew more about the theory I'd probably
disagree with it even more than I'm about to. The theory seems to regard
the spirit as just a playing ground on which memes, without any loyalty
or relationship to the spirit other than coincidence, wage in war in
such a way that the accuracy or beauty of their thought content is not
nearly as important as the survival of the meme. Even if the former was
corollary to the latter, the former would still just be a tool of the
latter.
> But bax to ideals ...
>
> So, if I understand you correctly, let's take an example.
> "Honor" -- as an ideal -- is defined by being both thought (e.g., stories
> of honorable people) and emotion (including pride, compassion, guilt) that
> work together so as to promote itself? So if I'm selling somebody a
> chocolate bar and they overpay -- then if I do the honorable thing and
> give them the correct change, then that automatically (being honorable)
> will inspire in them thoughts or emotions which (if they act on them) are
> also honorable? Or that the positive feedback this act gives me will
> inspire me to be honorable again?
No. I've again failed to explain what I mean by ideals, but at least
it's with reason, since I've made such a strange definition of the word.
An ideal is a thing of the spirit in the same manner as a thought or an
emotion is, but it is neither thought nor emotion, nor a mere
conjunction of the two - despite having similarities to both (the
aforementioned meaningfulness of emotion and agility of thought).
"Ideal" as the word is usually defined is an element of an ideology, and
my definition can occasionally be used in the same way as that; but
overall, it is far different.
One of the most important things about ideals is that they are (usually)
extremely rare. Thus the tendency of an ideal to further itself can only
be carried forward in the spirit of the person feeling (knowing? or
thinking?) the ideal. An intense spiritual experience likely includes an
ideal, as might a deep depression - and both leave the soul changed in
the manner befitting that ideal.
Now, for some examples... a Jungian archetype, at its most influential,
is a weak but all-purpose ideal. Conformity, mentioned elsewhere, is
another - one whose implications are easily absorbed, since one soul
can, after an instant of soul-wrenching loneliness and rejection, make a
resolution to submerge 'es own personality that lasts a lifetime.
'Existential despair', as it is termed, is an ideal (I think). Good
poetry or art can, if good, create emotion or thought in its viewer -
but great art fosters ideals. Fanaticism is an ideal, and a
comparatively enduring one. Beauty, natural or created, can, in the
right person, create an ideal of any kind (though most likely a good
ideal). Most virtues have ideals that represent them, although those are
probably among the rarest of ideals in actual experience; the day-to-day
performance of those virtues must rely on what is learned while the
ideal lasts.
Another way in which an ideal furthers itself is by teaching the spirit
feeling it how to continue carrying out what that ideal implies even
when it is gone (actually, I believe that only the person provides the
force for learning what the ideal implies - so an ideal doesn't really
teach, but gives an opportunity to learn). I mentioned conformity - it
is ridiculously easy how to learn the way of life from a single instance
of that ideal. From many ideals philosophies can, with sufficient time
and thought, be drawn; and the right ideal, of love or cynicism or
ambition, can change a person's outlook forever.
This means that the "attainment" of an ideal is more difficult than just
following some difficult, but easily encompassable, ideological code. I
certainly do not mean feeling that ideal constantly, because then
draconity or humanity would flicker on and off like a bad lightbulb. The
attainment of an ideal, I think, requires the capacity for that ideal,
the occasional experience of it, and (very importantly) to have gained
enough from the ideal to not require its presence in order to remember
and act on what it represents...
There. Five paragraphs should be enough to explain my definition of an
ideal...
The instance of honor you gave might be habit, or it might draw from
knowledge gained while feeling an ideal, but it is probably not an
actual instance of an ideal. If somebody were actually feeling an ideal
of honor (though I don't reallly know what that might entail), they'd be
much more likely to just stand in the middle of the aisle and stare into
space, pensive and reflective, than carry about such day-to-day
business...
One of the things I like best about this theory is its connection to all
sorts of other subjects, most importantly morality. I might get into
that later, if the thread drifts that way.
> > So, an ideal could easily have any value, even neutrality. What I actual
> > believe is that draconity contains all of the _good_ ideals of humanity;
> > what value the extra ones have is something is something unresolved by
> > me.
>
> This sounds to me very much like what you're saying is that if a
> dragon acts in accordance with their ideals they need must be good. That
> if a dragon acts based on negative emotion or thought, that they are
> somehow failing. Is this what you are trying to say? That your idea of
> draconity is very paladin-esque?
If I were to decide to make the draconity include only positive ideals,
then the standard would still not depend on completely strict observance
of some code (and I would think of humanity in the same manner - I'm not
going to be so unfair as to make draconity, by definition, good and
humanity neutral). The definition of an ideal that I just wrote explains
it a bit better, because, even with positive ideals, there is plenty of
room for evil. And, in any case, I will not make negative ideals
disqualifiers (is that a real word?); only the positive ones would be
measures of draconity... so, then draconity would be as much about
exoticness (to humans) and complexity of spirit as goodness or the
potential thereof.
Not paladinish, though. Paladins are honorable and all, but lack a host
of ideals... like creativity, and maybe even originality and
friendliness... *grins* not to mention some of them are being virtuous
out of guilt or self-doubt.
> Or -- if dragons *do* have negative ideals -- then what difference
> does it make that they've so many good ones?
Then the negative ideals would serve as a transition to the positive -
as I, in my more optimistic moods, judge the negative human ones to do.
And all of the good ones would still be good, irregardless of the
others. Also, I consider it almost certain that, in the process of
seeking an exotic good from the starting point of a normal good, I will
come across some strange and occasionally evil things, so I can't take
an absolutic stand with regards to them...
> > More often, though, I think that to assert a single such ideal would be
> > to place artificial limits on both humanity and draconity. Instead, I
> > say that draconity contains the good ideals of humanity but not the evil
> > ones because, to become a dragon (in the spiritual sense, of course), my
> > humanity must already be resolved for the better.
>
> You are saying, if I understand correctly, that for you draconity
> is a transcendent state. Now I'm starting to understand what you've been
> driving at with some of your earlier statements.
I'm not sure what you mean by transcendant. If it is that humanity would
become irrelevent or of less worth, then my answer is a loud no.
> For example, I call myself a dragon. I haven't transcended the
> human condition; I still am learning to overcome the negative human
> ideals. What you're saying is that *by your definition* that makes me not
> a dragon. Which is why you are agreeing to go by *my definition* (that
> being whatever it happens to be; you're just willing to accept my word on
> it) that I'm a dragon. Less trouble all around. I'm cool with that.
I'm also very hesitant about treating others as myself.
> But that brings up another question. One you asked yourself, but
> I've already snipped out ;P so I'll just try to remember as well as I can.
> Does it diminish the value (as an ideal) of your definition of
> draconity if the concept "dragon" is unattainable?
Actually, I asked if the injustice of elitism would remain if it was
based on an empty group. However, neither the ideals nor the concept of
draconity are unattainable. I think it a real possibility that I will
attain it within this lifetime...
> Frankly, *my* answer to that question (YMMV ;)) is "yes."
> I used to think like that ... of course, this was a decade ago,
> before I found AFD, before I'd found any other dragons at all. I figured
> that if I was "good enough," I could someday become a dragon.
> I can't go back to that any more. For many various reasons.
> Perhaps the most significant is that "being good enough" implies an
> outside arbiter of goodness -- it takes the power of self-determination
> away from me. I'm too strongly attached to the idea of free will; I can't
> deal with the concept of treating draconity as a state of being with an
> entrance exam.
The decision lies with nobody but myself. Furthermore, I don't expect
attainment of physical draconity to be connected in any particular way
with spiritual draconity - bodies (though not that one) are too easily
come by. If some way was available right now for me to get the draconic
body I envision, I would take it - but I would not abandon the spiritual
conception, nor think it yet attained. I also don't expect the universe
to
reward one person's attainment of personal goals with a fresh new body,
nor for it to mirror my own conceptions in this matter.
> Also, how does one deal with a dragon who "relapses" once
> transcended? Can draconity be revoked, like a college degree if
> someone was found to have cheated on their thesis? If my soul rebelled at
> the first idea, this one was even more repugnant -- that draconity could
> be *taken away* by this "impartial" arbiter.
The same goes for losing draconity: I am the best, and likely only,
judge of whether or not it would be necessary... despite the fact that,
if that was to happen, I likely would be too arrogant to do that to
myself.
I do believe that there are fair minimum and maximum limits to
draconity... to remove either would, in some way, eliminate the value of
draconity. But I do not assume that they are anything rigid, or that I
know with any real accuracy where they might lie, despite all my
musings. Nor, again, do I expect these limits to be a product of
anything but fair and thorough thought, as opposed to commandments writ
across the sky. The only way that the universe ever judges morality is
in consequences - cliched as it might sound, good creates more good,
while evil more often stagnates... and in consequences there is plenty
of room for error.
*grins* Please note that the fact that my reply contains philosophical
elements from both sides of the issue is intentional, not a cop-out...
free will does not require a relativistic or nihilistic morality, nor do
ethics require a lack of free will.
> But draconity does (IMHO, YMMV ;)) lose something if the
> standard's too high. The way I look at it is -- if my definition of
> dragons tells me that *nobody* I meet is a dragon ... how real are they?
> If I will never meet one in my lifetime, why believe in them at all?
> Which is to say, what is the positive effect of believing in something
> which (by its absence) cannot make a difference in your life?
Because, quite frankly (and arrogantly), I intend to be something that
has never before existed on this world, even as difficult as that is.
Does a person need to see a published version of 'es own book before 'e
can write it? The draconity that I apply to myself is of incredible
benefit as a goal, even when it is so far-off.
However, that is not the issue with regard to the statement 'Dragon
exist'. The importance of those words lies not in the evaluation of its
accuracy, which inevitably degenerates into pedantics of some kind, but
in their emotional impact. The belief in dragons produces quite a
thrill, a unique one - unicorns and gryphons don't produce the
same effect, though theirs are as good. I assume this is what you mean
by the 'positive effect of believing in something'. Because I can find a
definition of dragons that makes the statement 'Dragons exist' neither
inaccurate nor devoid of what it makes it special, I will use that
definition freely and willfully.
If that seemed like an evasion, tell me, and why... I'll try to do
something about it.
I see no dishonor in having two differing definitions of draconity, to
be used in differing situations. To do otherwise would either be to
assume that other people are identical to me, or that my draconity means
the same thing to me as my (not their) draconity means to other people,
neither of which is acceptable to me.
> Note that I'm not saying that the ideals don't make a difference.
> However, the ideals that dragons follow are there whether dragons exist or
> not. So why believe in the dragon instead of the ideal, if the standards
> are so high that no dragons will enter your life?
I've got these two definitions of draconity, see? Apparently one will
not work where the other does. And I'm not afraid to use them!
> I believe in the (pure, perfect) ideals that dragons strive to
> pursue. I also believe in the (living, imperfect) dragons that pursue
> them. For me, seeing beings chase the ideals makes them alive. That goes
> bax to memes, I guess. ;)
The ideals are no more perfect than emotion. In fact, because the only
serious definitions of infinity (in any philosophical sense) that I have
yet seen would, if true, be devaluations of reality, I stay completely
away from
perfection and infinity in my philosophy, except for a timid statement
that they exist. That includes, of course, thinking _any_ of my ideas
are perfect.
> > Not that it is, yet. I
> > don't think myself capable of being even barely a dragon if I am not yet
> > an excellent human - not because draconity is necessarily connected to
> > humanity in that way, but because circumstances have required me to
> > start with the latter.
>
> Curious. So do you think that somewhere out there, on a world of
> dragons, it's possible that one is saying, "I'd like to transcend
> draconity and be a human, but I have to finish up here first"? ;)
That would be neat, although to be true my statement that draconity
contains humanity would have to be false.
> >
> > It's expedient both for myself and for others. Draconity has shown
> > itself irreplacable to me; even with questions of true self aside,
> > divesting myself of it would be stupid self-affliction.
>
> This is part of what I was talking about when I got way
> long-winded earlier. "Stupid self-affliction," anyway.
> One of my core beliefs is that, given a question of faith and two
> answers which are functionally equal except that one answer makes me
> happier, I will choose that answer. If neither answer can be proved, and
> neither has more evidence in its favor, why shoot myself in the leg?
I take it as axiomatic that nothing is true which ultimately cheapens
reality - however, although that's good enough for judging my own ideas,
it's virtually worthless in argument.
> This philosophy has guided me remarkably well.
> As applied to dragons ... yes, I agree. To give my draconity up
> would essentially be to say that I am crazy. Of course, I have no proof
> whatsoever that I'm not crazy ... but what does me more good, believing
> that I'm a dragon, or believing that I'm crazy?
> And I need to give this credit, as well, for being at the heart of
> my earlier rant. I follow draconic ideals; does that make me a dragon, or
> a dragon-to-be? So what does me more good, believing that I'm struggling
> to realize the potential that is already inherent in my acknowledged
> draconity, or believing that I'm Just Not Good Enough yet, with nebulous
> prospects for advancement?
The former is not incompatible with my concepts, but I'll be damned
before I let this concept turn into something neurotic...
A desire to change oneself does not only come after self-hate.
(Insanity, ambition, and/or strangeness helps too.)
> >
> > That is true, but far from sufficient... there is a great difference
> > between potential and actuality.
>
> Granted. I'm of the opinion that the difference between dragons
> and humans is not a difference of degree, but a difference of
> distribution. (I.e., the actual talent is in different areas rather than
> different amounts.)
The way I use it, some qualities (presumably) common among dragons would
be so rare among humans as to be less than dormant - that is, the
capacity does not exist in most, and the potential exists, but requires
considerably more than favorable circumstances to become actual... that
is, personal motivation is also needed.
I also felt that I needed to say something about the connection between
physical and spiritual draconity, and how erratically they seem to
overlap - but I didn't find the opening, so I'll hope one shows up
later. Please don't think, though, that my concepts of spiritual
draconity have nothing to do with the beautiful wings and scales and
limbs...
> >> "Telling other people about themselves is a job for someone with
> >> motives." -- Me, some years ago.
> >
> > Motives? I've got motives. Just not those.
>
> Motives? We don' need no steenkin' motives ;)
I have the motive to make a witty comeback. I just... can't...
> Dream well,
>
> Baxil the long-winded
Lhexa (ofttimes a confusing writer)
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa said:
> >
> >Well, I was talking more about my lack of knowledge when it comes to
> >human evil... but that trait of yours will probably be a good one.
>
> Oh, right. I've not experienced it in the way that I've been tempted to be evil
> in this way, only with others.
Sorry, the sentence confused me a little - do you mean that you have
seen much human evil, but that is has not rubbed off on you?
> >> --
> >> Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
> >> 'In heaven, a horse is made into a dragon. On Earth, a dragon is made into
> >a
> >> horse.' - Japanese saying
> >
> >So that's why I like them...
>
> Horses, or the Japanese? Probably the horses, on reflection! I did wonder if
> anyone would notice that in my sig.
The horses. Theirs are some of my favorite non-human bodies, after those
of dragons.
> --
> Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
Lhexa
Lhexa
>
> Conformity is a powerful force in this society, but not one
> that is (except in their worse moments) not universally, or even
> usually, credited.
Oops, I didn't mean to make that a double negative... stuff like that
happens when I answer these posts so haphazardly.
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
Terratek thoughtfully scribed:
> Actually, the idea that dragons are evil started before Christianity and
> Judaism. I suspect that those religions used dragons as symbols of evil
> because they were fairly well established as such to begin with. For
> instance, Babylon had the dragon Tiamat, who was thought of as an evil
> diety, the Norse had Jormungand and Nidhogger, both of whom were evil,
> and Egypt had Apep, the evil god of darkness.
Firstly, let me correct a common mistake: Tiamat *wasn't a
dragon.* At least, when you see those Babylonian pictures of Marduk
fighting a dragon, he's not fighting Tiamat. Nobody's really sure what
Tiamat's form was, but that wasn't it. That was one of the 11 monsters
she created to avenge her brother Apsu's death. The dragon-thing is
identified as a mush'hushshu (i.e. snake-dragon), which in fact was a
fairly common image identified with at least a large handful of Babylonian
deities.
Secondly, the mush'hushshu wasn't evil. It was also used, aside
from accompanying lots of gods, as a protective symbol.
Tiamat wasn't particularly evil, either, just mad at Ea for
killing her brother. It's just that since her body was used after death
to "pave" the earth and heavens for human life, she's picked up a
reputation as "The Big Primordial Chaos Monster Defeated By A Courageous
Hero To Pave The Earth And Heavens For Human Life."
Egypt: I didn't remember Apep offhand, so a Web search gave me
the basics. Drakon's post raised the question of how many of these dragon
gods were evil from the start, and how many became demonized through
conquest. I find it interesting that
http://www.ixpres.com/netjert/apep.htm mentions:
"In some myths, Apep was an earlier and discarded sun-god himself.
This helps to explain the snake's strength and his resentment of the daily
journey of the sun."
I haven't done much research on Norse mythology, but I suspect a
quick search would also turn up some interesting twists. The idea of
"dragons being a symbol of evil to begin with" is a modern concept, and
dangerously flawed at that.
Dream well,
Baxil
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott said:
>> blah blah blah, snip, ... YMMV.
>
> Although I'm not familiar with the acronym at the end, I agree -
Your Mileage May Vary. A variant of "IMHO."
> in fact, despite me being very unpoetic, I managed to write a 5-7-5
> haiku about conformity:
>
> Haiku are poems
> which must fit to a pattern.
> Like society.
*applauds* Bravo! It made my quotebook.
> As a side note, I've tacked a ? on the end of my Reality tag in the DC,
> making it R+? for unknown, R+ being my old tag - more and more I'm
> thinking myself more draconic, and the description on your Web site of
> typical dragons, Baxil, seems eerily accurate.
I'd like to caution that the listed description (for those coming
into the discussion late, Mithent's referring to my Draconity FAQ; the
URL's in my signature) is of traits which dragons tend to share, not
traits which ONLY dragons tend to share. It's just that, based on
personal observation, the type of person who discovers their own draconity
is far more likely to come from that sort of background than from others
-- such people are much more inclined to introspection and philosophy.
At the same time, I believe that if the you've been "thinking
yourself more draconic" lately, there's a reason for that. You're making
some sort of internal connection, to something, and it's important to
listen to your feelings to figure out the nature of that link. Keep at
it. :)
It's not my place to tell you, Mithent, whether you're a dragon or
not; that's a decision you have to make. I do encourage you to give the
idea some extended thought and come to a decision you're comfortable with.
Or just let the jury sit out until more evidence comes in.
> The thoughts and opinions of many of the dragon community are like mine,
> and I found AFD through a long series of remarkable coincidences!
I've always liked the idea of karma -- that our actions and
beliefs take us to places where we need to be, to learn lessons that we
need to learn. ;) Ten years from now, you can look bax on joining AFD,
and say, "You know, that all made perfect sense."
Dream well,
Bax
Terratek
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
> Terratek thoughtfully scribed:
> > Actually, the idea that dragons are evil started before Christianity and
> > Judaism. I suspect that those religions used dragons as symbols of evil
> > because they were fairly well established as such to begin with. For
> > instance, Babylon had the dragon Tiamat, who was thought of as an evil
> > diety, the Norse had Jormungand and Nidhogger, both of whom were evil,
> > and Egypt had Apep, the evil god of darkness.
>
> Firstly, let me correct a common mistake: Tiamat *wasn't a
> dragon.* At least, when you see those Babylonian pictures of Marduk
> fighting a dragon, he's not fighting Tiamat. Nobody's really sure what
> Tiamat's form was, but that wasn't it. That was one of the 11 monsters
> she created to avenge her brother Apsu's death. The dragon-thing is
> identified as a mush'hushshu (i.e. snake-dragon), which in fact was a
> fairly common image identified with at least a large handful of Babylonian
> deities.
> Secondly, the mush'hushshu wasn't evil. It was also used, aside
> from accompanying lots of gods, as a protective symbol.
> Tiamat wasn't particularly evil, either, just mad at Ea for
> killing her brother. It's just that since her body was used after death
> to "pave" the earth and heavens for human life, she's picked up a
> reputation as "The Big Primordial Chaos Monster Defeated By A Courageous
> Hero To Pave The Earth And Heavens For Human Life."
Oops. I wasn't aware of this.
> Egypt: I didn't remember Apep offhand, so a Web search gave me
> the basics. Drakon's post raised the question of how many of these dragon
> gods were evil from the start, and how many became demonized through
> conquest. I find it interesting that
> http://www.ixpres.com/netjert/apep.htm mentions:
> "In some myths, Apep was an earlier and discarded sun-god himself.
> This helps to explain the snake's strength and his resentment of the daily
> journey of the sun."
Indeed. Still, in later years Apep was viewed as being evil, even though
this wasn't the original idea.
> I haven't done much research on Norse mythology, but I suspect a
> quick search would also turn up some interesting twists. The idea of
> "dragons being a symbol of evil to begin with" is a modern concept, and
> dangerously flawed at that.
Jormungand is the Midgard (Sp?) Serpent, a son of Loki who kills and is
killed by Thor at the battle of Ragnarok. Nidhogger is a dragon who lives in
the land of death. It feeds on the bodies of the dead and gnaws on the roots
of the World Tree, Yggdrasil (Sp?). I suspect that Nidhogger is the model
that the Western dragons are based on. As for the idea of dragons being evil
being a modern one, this seems to be the case, at least as a whole. I'm
inclined to think that the idea began early on, but didn't gain popularity
until recent times. Salamanders, which many consider dragons, were once even
used by Christian churches as a symbol of St. John.
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> Poking his snout in where it probably does not belong:
Not at all! I appreciate your contributions. :)
> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>> Meme theory says that ideas are, essentially, viruses; they are
>> spread by contact between minds, require hosts to survive, and are
>> "competing" for limited mental space by fighting one another for
>> dominance. In other words, ideas are *alive* and have to follow the
>> same survival rules as many simpler living organisms.
>
> To interject. I am not at all certain this is quite true. A meme can
> assume new characteristics and pass those one onto its offspring, unlike
> biological systems. In other words it appears that the evolution of a
> meme is governed more by Lemarkian evolution than Darwin.
I'm not sure there's as big a difference as it sounds. Like an
idea, a virus that one passes on to a friend via coughing isn't the exact
same virus you got when you caught it. It's already gone through many,
many life cycles, with the weak or unlucky being picked off by the body's
internal defenses, and the strong propagating more effectively. So it is
with ideas: An idea may go through several "life cycles" inside your head
before you pass it on. Thinking about ideas is the body's self-defense
mechanism; what survives is the "next-generation idea" which has been
influenced by your own challenges to the concept.
Whether you want to call this "next-generation idea" an actually
new concept (an offspring of the original) or an adaptation (a mutation of
the original) is the big difference between my analogy and yours.
(As an aside: I see the biggest difference between memes and
viruses as being that many memes, unlike viruses, are symbiotic. Ideas
can improve lives, whereas there are no known viruses which improve your
vision or sharpen manual dexterity. Of course, I fully expect technology
to create symbiotic "positive" virii, perhaps within our lifetimes.)
>> This sounds to me very much like what you're saying is that if a
>> dragon acts in accordance with their ideals they need must be good. That
>> if a dragon acts based on negative emotion or thought, that they are
>> somehow failing. Is this what you are trying to say? That your idea of
>> draconity is very paladin-esque?
>> Or -- if dragons *do* have negative ideals -- then what difference
>> does it make that they've so many good ones?
>
> When you use the terms "good" or "bad", you are implying some kind of
> standard by which such actions are to be measured against. Once you
> identify that standard, then I think most of the problems will sort
> themselves out as to which is which.
A good point. Lhexa and I have been dancing around both "good" as
an undefined objective concept, and "good" on the individual level as the
subjective idea of noble ideals to hold.
At this point, I'm not sure how to retroactively define the
objective good, so I'll just take the rest of that topic with a grain of
salt. ;)
>> Does it diminish the value (as an ideal) of your definition of
>> draconity if the concept "dragon" is unattainable?
Keep in mind that the rest of this post (and the original) was in
the context of this question.
>> I used to think like that ... of course, this was a decade ago,
>> before I found AFD, before I'd found any other dragons at all. I figured
>> that if I was "good enough," I could someday become a dragon.
>> I can't go back to that any more. For many various reasons.
>> Perhaps the most significant is that "being good enough" implies an
>> outside arbiter of goodness
>
> Or possibly an internal artiber of "goodness". One point I feel needs
> making is that being "good" or "bad" has no meaning unless you have a
> choice in the matter. If you are reacting to programming, or blindly
> picking actions at random, then good and evil have no meaning.
Ah, but if "goodness" is a self-determined choice, then is it not
possible that I -- imperfect as I am -- might still be "good enough" to
legitimately be a dragon already, if I've met my own standards? That was
where I was leading with that point.
Again, this was all in the context of the earlier question; I was
chiseling away at the idea of "there is a minimum standard beyond which I
must pass before I can be a dragon" by assuming it and reaching a
contradiction.
> In life we face many choices. We can pick and choose our actions, based
> on whatever criteria we want. However each of those actions have
> consequences, (which is kind of the reason for picking one such action
> over another). Some have argued that this fact alone hampers free will
> out of existence. I have sever doubts about that.
Me too. I'm not even sure how I'd make that argument. If people
always acted in their own best self-interest, perhaps I could see that,
but ...
>> Also, how does one deal with a dragon who "relapses" once
>> transcended? Can draconity be revoked, like a college degree if
>> someone was found to have cheated on their thesis?
<snip>
>> ... then why was I a human now? If "dragon" is a
>> transcendent state, then I *must* have relapsed. I have to admit, I
>> just strongly dislike that idea. ;)
>
> You see being human a "relapse"? I am not quite sure I agree, although I
> am not at all sure I can disagree.
DISCLAIMER: "*If 'dragon' is a transcendent state,* then I must
have relapsed." I don't personally believe that 'dragon' is a
transcendent state. I have been a dragon before, so in my position,
someone who believed that would call this lifetime a "relapse." I don't.
A "relapse" is a falling back into a prior state. This to me
indicates that if a dragon can "relapse" into humanity, then one who
*started out* being a dragon *could not* become one, which I've seen
evidence against.
To weasel around that, one can make a judgment call that dragons
are held to be a "higher" state of being than humans, regardless of
initial state, and so any move from "dragon" to "human" is a "relapse"; I
will not take that stance, and so refuse to use the term.
> It may be the only form available for
> you, your "soul", at this point in history. And regardless of your
> physical form, you are still you, whatever you is.
I believe that it was a choice I made. Again, I'm big on free
will; I *could* have been a dragon again, but it would have been too
painful (long story). I wanted to live on a world where humans and
dragons didn't interact. Picked a doozy, didn't I? ;)
>> -- and I got to thinking: What's the minimum standard? Obviously not
>> perfection, because perfection means *being incapable of making a
>> mistake*,
>
> Some have argued that being incapable of making a mistake leaves the
> being subject to a very boring and predictable life. Which is considered
> flawed, and hence not perfect. :)
Conclusion: There ain't no such beast as perfection.
However, this presupposes that boredom and predictability is a
negative state. Perhaps the "perfect" being, since it would necessarily
have to leave that life, would necessarily have to consider that life
ideal in order to be perfect in the first place?
>> One of my core beliefs is that, given a question of faith and two
>> answers which are functionally equal except that one answer makes me
>> happier, I will choose that answer. If neither answer can be proved, and
>> neither has more evidence in its favor, why shoot myself in the leg?
>
> There is a line of thought that pleasure and pain are evolutionary
> 'signals' to tell you what is true and false. It is a more "gut level"
> thing than reason.
Heh! Although I doubt this will ever be proven, so the people who
accept it will do so on a 'gut level,' and the people who don't will cite
its lack of logical footing ... ;)
> However, one has to be careful with that as well. Many recreational
> pharmaceuticals will make you "happy" by damaging your brain as well, so
> you have to be careful that you are not falling for another type of
> drug.
Indeed. However, drugs aren't all pleasure. You're trading off
that short-term "high" for a lot of long-term pain. There's the financial
hit (spending $ on drugs that could have gone to buy more effective means
of pleasure); the social hit (alienating friends and family; doing
something illegal); the physical hit (withdrawal symptoms, side effects,
hangovers).
My parents at one point used the "draconity as another type of
drug" line of reasoning on me, and I responded, in effect: Show me where
it's hurting my life. I countered every argument they threw at me, and
that's one of the biggest reasons they accept it as well as they do. After
all, if "a drug" has no discernible negative effects, why avoid it? What
parent freaks out if they hear their child is regularly eating Tums
tablets? ;) Gotta be careful of all that calcium; you never know what
healthy bones will do to a kid ...
>> This philosophy has guided me remarkably well.
>> As applied to dragons ... yes, I agree. To give my draconity up
>> would essentially be to say that I am crazy. Of course, I have no proof
>> whatsoever that I'm not crazy ... but what does me more good, believing
>> that I'm a dragon, or believing that I'm crazy?
>
> Define crazy. The courts have such a definition, that despite allusions
> to the contrary, works quite well, while allowing a diversity of
> opinions. Are you, because of your draconity, a threat to yourself or
> others? If no, then no matter how crazy you may be, you are sane in the
> eyes of the courts.
This is a question I answered early on. (Hooray for
introspection!) No, draconity has not -- either in myself or in anyone
I've seen -- caused said individual to become a threat.
And I'm not at all insulted you asked ... it's one of the first
things any responsible individual should ask themselves when getting
involved with ANY worldview. F'rinstance, despite all of the bad things
that I see in the news every day, I will not take the stance of hating
humanity. Among other reasons, this is because were I to act on that
stance, I would be killing as many of them as I could get away with, and
that just isn't right.
>> And I need to give this credit, as well, for being at the heart of
>> my earlier rant. I follow draconic ideals; does that make me a dragon, or
>> a dragon-to-be? So what does me more good, believing that I'm struggling
>> to realize the potential that is already inherent in my acknowledged
>> draconity, or believing that I'm Just Not Good Enough yet, with nebulous
>> prospects for advancement?
>
> Does the lack of following those ideals make anyone less a dragon?
>
> If the effect is that you try your darnest to be more honorable,
> courageous, strong, dedicated, wise, and tolerant, then great.
The effect of following those ideals imperfectly was exactly that
... for me ... for a while. But it eventually caught up to me ("it" being
the fact that I wasn't ever going to be perfect within this lifetime, and
so my prospects for becoming a dragon were slim to none). The resulting
disillusionment would have knocked me into a state where I didn't have any
particular reason to follow any of those ideals; rather than lose that
nobility, I questioned my assumptions ... which meant, ultimately, I rid
myself of the idea that "draconity is a transcendent state."
Does this mean that my current stance is necessarily any more
valid than the idea of draconity as transcendence? Not at all, and in
fact, I'm sure a counter-argument could be assembled that I've merely
"taken a step backwards" and pretended to be something which I haven't
"got the right" to become yet.
But neither is THAT stance any more valid than the one which I've
taken. And, again, my guiding principle is that -- since neither idea
will change my ideals, only my happiness -- I'll go with the one that
makes my world brighter.
And I'll let the results speak for themselves.
Dream well,
-- Baxil
Mithent
>Mithent thoughtfully scribed:
>> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott said:
>>> blah blah blah, snip, ... YMMV.
>>
>> Although I'm not familiar with the acronym at the end, I agree -
>
> Your Mileage May Vary. A variant of "IMHO."
Thanks!
>> in fact, despite me being very unpoetic, I managed to write a 5-7-5
>> haiku about conformity:
>>
>> Haiku are poems
>> which must fit to a pattern.
>> Like society.
>
> *applauds* Bravo! It made my quotebook.
I'm honoured! I'm not at all well known for poems, but that one struck me
somehow...
>> As a side note, I've tacked a ? on the end of my Reality tag in the DC,
>> making it R+? for unknown, R+ being my old tag - more and more I'm
>> thinking myself more draconic, and the description on your Web site of
>> typical dragons, Baxil, seems eerily accurate.
>
> I'd like to caution that the listed description (for those coming
>into the discussion late, Mithent's referring to my Draconity FAQ; the
>URL's in my signature) is of traits which dragons tend to share, not
>traits which ONLY dragons tend to share. It's just that, based on
>personal observation, the type of person who discovers their own draconity
>is far more likely to come from that sort of background than from others
>-- such people are much more inclined to introspection and philosophy.
That is true, and the introspection and philosophy do apply to me - but it was
uncanny that that description fitted me so well too. I do understand that those
are not traits to be solely attributed to draconity.
>At the same time, I believe that if the you've been "thinking
>yourself more draconic" lately, there's a reason for that. You're making
>some sort of internal connection, to something, and it's important to
>listen to your feelings to figure out the nature of that link. Keep at
>it. :)
>
> It's not my place to tell you, Mithent, whether you're a dragon or
>not; that's a decision you have to make. I do encourage you to give the
>idea some extended thought and come to a decision you're comfortable with.
>Or just let the jury sit out until more evidence comes in.
I have been thinking, and so far have come to the conclusion that I do not have
some of the tendencies of most others (ie, the chair incident that I
mentioned). I've not come to a final conclusion yet.
>> The thoughts and opinions of many of the dragon community are like mine,
>> and I found AFD through a long series of remarkable coincidences!
>
> I've always liked the idea of karma -- that our actions and
>beliefs take us to places where we need to be, to learn lessons that we
>need to learn. ;) Ten years from now, you can look bax on joining AFD,
>and say, "You know, that all made perfect sense."
There could be something in that :) I can trace how I heard of AFD back to
about 1997, or maybe earlier, despite having only found the newsgroup itself in
about February 2000! Even unlikely things like the free Web provider Geocities
get involved...
> Dream well,
>
>Bax
Thanks,
--
Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
'In heaven, a horse is made into a dragon. Among men, a dragon is made into a
horse.' - Japanese saying
DC2.H"on Discworld"/D?"in Alfandra" Gm L- W T+ Phfltw Sks Cma Bfl A- Fr- N?
Wyrm
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott <ddr...@ecis.ecis.com> put their foot in it by writing:
>Terratek thoughtfully scribed:
>> Actually, the idea that dragons are evil started before Christianity and
>> Judaism. I suspect that those religions used dragons as symbols of evil
>quick search would also turn up some interesting twists. The idea of
>"dragons being a symbol of evil to begin with" is a modern concept, and
>dangerously flawed at that.
Correct. Dragons being marked as 'evil' is predominantly a Christian thing.
Eastern dragons are not evil at all for example. The Egyptians had no real
concept of 'evil', and neither did many other early civillisations. Tiamat was
also a personification of chaos, not evil.
It is thought that dragons came about from early snake worship.
Wyrm.
--
Wyrm: http://www.wyrm.demon.co.uk/
DC2.DGmA+++!L700fW--T-PhlltBflF~+++!R+++!Ac++J+++
NfSFr+++!U+++!I++H++$M/O/V+++!Q---Tc+++Cre'Sks
Dragon's, coming, out of the sea.
Shimmering silver head of wisdom looking at me.
Peter Gabriel - Genesis.
Mithent
>Mithent wrote:
>>
>> Lhexa said:
>> >
>> >Well, I was talking more about my lack of knowledge when it comes to
>> >human evil... but that trait of yours will probably be a good one.
>>
>> Oh, right. I've not experienced it in the way that I've been tempted to be
>evil
>> in this way, only with others.
>
>Sorry, the sentence confused me a little - do you mean that you have
>seen much human evil, but that is has not rubbed off on you?
I'm not implying that I'm being tortured - I'm not experiencing human evil
every moment of my life, if that's what you thought I meant. But I do mean that
it hasn't really rubbed off on me.
>Lhexa
Lhexa
>
> I'm not implying that I'm being tortured - I'm not experiencing human evil
> every moment of my life, if that's what you thought I meant. But I do mean that
> it hasn't really rubbed off on me.
Alright, and thanks.
> Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
Lhexa
Ben Gibson
>
> AMW thoughtfully scribed:
> > To interject. I am not at all certain this is quite true. A meme can
> > assume new characteristics and pass those one onto its offspring, unlike
> > biological systems. In other words it appears that the evolution of a
> > meme is governed more by Lemarkian evolution than Darwin.
>
> I'm not sure there's as big a difference as it sounds. Like an
> idea, a virus that one passes on to a friend via coughing isn't the exact
> same virus you got when you caught it. It's already gone through many,
> many life cycles, with the weak or unlucky being picked off by the body's
> internal defenses, and the strong propagating more effectively. So it is
> with ideas: An idea may go through several "life cycles" inside your head
> before you pass it on. Thinking about ideas is the body's self-defense
> mechanism; what survives is the "next-generation idea" which has been
> influenced by your own challenges to the concept.
> Whether you want to call this "next-generation idea" an actually
> new concept (an offspring of the original) or an adaptation (a mutation of
> the original) is the big difference between my analogy and yours.
> (As an aside: I see the biggest difference between memes and
> viruses as being that many memes, unlike viruses, are symbiotic. Ideas
> can improve lives, whereas there are no known viruses which improve your
> vision or sharpen manual dexterity. Of course, I fully expect technology
> to create symbiotic "positive" virii, perhaps within our lifetimes.)
Grin are you familiar with Retroviruses? If I understand
them correctly, these little buggers can re-write your DNA.
You may be able to literally re-design your form. :)
The difference between the two evolutionary models is that
Darwin cannot pass along anything that it didn't start with,
(with the exception of mutation that arise). Lemarkian
Evolution allows a thing to transfer any traits it picks up
along the way. You change your idea, you can pass that
along. If you "cut off the tail" it will give birth to
others with the tail removed. Ideas are more flexible than
genomes, at least at this stage of the game.
> > When you use the terms "good" or "bad", you are implying some kind of
> > standard by which such actions are to be measured against. Once you
> > identify that standard, then I think most of the problems will sort
> > themselves out as to which is which.
>
> A good point. Lhexa and I have been dancing around both "good" as
> an undefined objective concept, and "good" on the individual level as the
> subjective idea of noble ideals to hold.
> At this point, I'm not sure how to retroactively define the
> objective good, so I'll just take the rest of that topic with a grain of
> salt. ;)
Grin, I have a few ideas in that area.
I work at an atom smasher. (I am just a tech, not like on of
the physicist guys). I work primarily on various types of
power supplies, equipment that takes AC electrical power and
converts it into pulsed or continuous DC, to power RF
"transmitters" of a type, or just power magnets.
Sometimes these supplies need to be repaired. They go "bad",
they no longer fulfill the function we got them for in the
first place. They stop working. Now when they are no longer
doing what we want or need them to do, we say they are
"bad". And so it is with good and bad with actions of
people.
One standard that has been advanced is a person's life. Any
action that results in damage to a person's life would be
bad, while anything that is beneficial to that life is
obviously "good". One can only make moral or ethical
judgments of an action.
One should not apply moral or ethical properties to things
which have no decision making capabilities.
>
> >> Does it diminish the value (as an ideal) of your definition of
> >> draconity if the concept "dragon" is unattainable?
>
> Keep in mind that the rest of this post (and the original) was in
> the context of this question.
>
> >> I used to think like that ... of course, this was a decade ago,
> >> before I found AFD, before I'd found any other dragons at all. I figured
> >> that if I was "good enough," I could someday become a dragon.
> >> I can't go back to that any more. For many various reasons.
> >> Perhaps the most significant is that "being good enough" implies an
> >> outside arbiter of goodness
> >
> > Or possibly an internal artiber of "goodness". One point I feel needs
> > making is that being "good" or "bad" has no meaning unless you have a
> > choice in the matter. If you are reacting to programming, or blindly
> > picking actions at random, then good and evil have no meaning.
>
> Ah, but if "goodness" is a self-determined choice, then is it not
> possible that I -- imperfect as I am -- might still be "good enough" to
> legitimately be a dragon already, if I've met my own standards? That was
> where I was leading with that point.
>
> Again, this was all in the context of the earlier question; I was
> chiseling away at the idea of "there is a minimum standard beyond which I
> must pass before I can be a dragon" by assuming it and reaching a
> contradiction.
Okay can you grow wings out of your back? Not at this early
date, at least not yet. Do you have scales etc.? I do not
think so. So the only attributes that you can hold in common
with dragons are mental or spiritual ones. And again we are
in territory where we have almost no observational data. So
you have to develop a spiritual model of a dragon and try to
fit that. But all that is going to do is be your model of a
dragon, and may or may not have anything to do with dragons
in general.
>
> > In life we face many choices. We can pick and choose our actions, based
> > on whatever criteria we want. However each of those actions have
> > consequences, (which is kind of the reason for picking one such action
> > over another). Some have argued that this fact alone hampers free will
> > out of existence. I have sever doubts about that.
>
> Me too. I'm not even sure how I'd make that argument. If people
> always acted in their own best self-interest, perhaps I could see that,
> but ...
People almost always act in what they think is their own
best interest. But due to lack of information, or lack of
proper focus, sometimes what we think is good for us, isn't.
Too often, people choose the short term instead of the long
term, take care of today, and forget that today's solutions
to problems may cause even worse problems later on. People
fail to find all available options.
> > It may be the only form available for
> > you, your "soul", at this point in history. And regardless of your
> > physical form, you are still you, whatever you is.
>
> I believe that it was a choice I made. Again, I'm big on free
> will; I *could* have been a dragon again, but it would have been too
> painful (long story). I wanted to live on a world where humans and
> dragons didn't interact. Picked a doozy, didn't I? ;)
There are worse ones I am sure :)
> >> -- and I got to thinking: What's the minimum standard? Obviously not
> >> perfection, because perfection means *being incapable of making a
> >> mistake*,
> >
> > Some have argued that being incapable of making a mistake leaves the
> > being subject to a very boring and predictable life. Which is considered
> > flawed, and hence not perfect. :)
>
> Conclusion: There ain't no such beast as perfection.
Grin. That is one possible answer. Another is that you are
already perfect. :)
>
> However, this presupposes that boredom and predictability is a
> negative state. Perhaps the "perfect" being, since it would necessarily
> have to leave that life, would necessarily have to consider that life
> ideal in order to be perfect in the first place?
It seems like a safe bet that boredom and total
predictability is a negative state. After all so much work
goes into entertainment, and making new things, if boredom
were a positive thing, then we would not be working so hard
to avoid it:)
> > There is a line of thought that pleasure and pain are evolutionary
> > 'signals' to tell you what is true and false. It is a more "gut level"
> > thing than reason.
>
> Heh! Although I doubt this will ever be proven, so the people who
> accept it will do so on a 'gut level,' and the people who don't will cite
> its lack of logical footing ... ;)
But there is a logical footing to the above idea. An
evolutionary one at least. A species that feel pleasure when
engaged in detrimental activities, will do detrimental
things. And sooner or later, those detrimental things will
get the critter killed, leaving only the critters that feel
pain and therefore avoid detrimental activities.
>
> > However, one has to be careful with that as well. Many recreational
> > pharmaceuticals will make you "happy" by damaging your brain as well, so
> > you have to be careful that you are not falling for another type of
> > drug.
>
> Indeed. However, drugs aren't all pleasure. You're trading off
> that short-term "high" for a lot of long-term pain. There's the financial
> hit (spending $ on drugs that could have gone to buy more effective means
> of pleasure); the social hit (alienating friends and family; doing
> something illegal); the physical hit (withdrawal symptoms, side effects,
> hangovers).
Grin, exactly. Short term pleasure for long term pain.
>
> My parents at one point used the "draconity as another type of
> drug" line of reasoning on me, and I responded, in effect: Show me where
> it's hurting my life. I countered every argument they threw at me, and
> that's one of the biggest reasons they accept it as well as they do. After
> all, if "a drug" has no discernible negative effects, why avoid it? What
> parent freaks out if they hear their child is regularly eating Tums
> tablets? ;) Gotta be careful of all that calcium; you never know what
> healthy bones will do to a kid ...
Grin.
>
> >> This philosophy has guided me remarkably well.
> >> As applied to dragons ... yes, I agree. To give my draconity up
> >> would essentially be to say that I am crazy. Of course, I have no proof
> >> whatsoever that I'm not crazy ... but what does me more good, believing
> >> that I'm a dragon, or believing that I'm crazy?
> >
> > Define crazy. The courts have such a definition, that despite allusions
> > to the contrary, works quite well, while allowing a diversity of
> > opinions. Are you, because of your draconity, a threat to yourself or
> > others? If no, then no matter how crazy you may be, you are sane in the
> > eyes of the courts.
>
> This is a question I answered early on. (Hooray for
> introspection!) No, draconity has not -- either in myself or in anyone
> I've seen -- caused said individual to become a threat.
> And I'm not at all insulted you asked ... it's one of the first
> things any responsible individual should ask themselves when getting
> involved with ANY worldview. F'rinstance, despite all of the bad things
> that I see in the news every day, I will not take the stance of hating
> humanity. Among other reasons, this is because were I to act on that
> stance, I would be killing as many of them as I could get away with, and
> that just isn't right.
I do not hate humanity, but I find it rather confusing, and,
well, "odd". You see such promise and such destruction, such
brilliance and such stupidity, all mixed up in the same
package. In packs they can be quite dangerous.
Besides going on a killing spree would be bad. It gives them
just cause to hunt you down and kill you, so killing sprees
would not be acting in your own best interest.
And if the results are not positive, not helpful, not
"good", what will you do? :)
Ben
drakon@home
Ben Gibson
>
> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott continued:
> > Firstly, as to memes: You got very close there with your
> > "ideals" definition. The big difference is that "meme" doesn't really
> > have any emotional component.
> > Meme theory says that ideas are, essentially, viruses; they are
> > spread by contact between minds, require hosts to survive, and are
> > "competing" for limited mental space by fighting one another for
> > dominance. In other words, ideas are *alive* and have to follow the same
> > survival rules as many simpler living organisms.
> > Among the appeals of this theory is that the idea of memes --
> > being an idea -- is itself a meme. I have "passed the virus" to you by
> > telling you this. It's beautifully self-referential.
> > As a poster I put up on my cubicle wall for a while said: "Meme
> > -- it's more than just a four-letter word, it's a way of life."
>
> Well, thanks - though if I knew more about the theory I'd probably
> disagree with it even more than I'm about to. The theory seems to regard
> the spirit as just a playing ground on which memes, without any loyalty
> or relationship to the spirit other than coincidence, wage in war in
> such a way that the accuracy or beauty of their thought content is not
> nearly as important as the survival of the meme. Even if the former was
> corollary to the latter, the former would still just be a tool of the
> latter.
No, the model of spirit or whatever that we have, that is
the meme. Just as our concept of "rock" is a meme, and not
the rock itself. The contents of the mind, or spirit.
Now if an idea is accurate, consistent with reality, or
"true", it chances for survival are better than if it is
false. Having a false model is about as useless as having a
bad map of a territory.
I am not at all sure I would agree, but I should probably
think on it longer. To me, an ideal is simply an idea.
Perhaps a very powerful one, or enticing one, but nothing
more than a mental construct. And as such, limited in its
reality to the mind, or soul. While it can motivate a
particular set of actions, it is still the choice of the
possessor as to how that ideal is expressed or even if it is
expressed or translated into actions.
>
> The instance of honor you gave might be habit, or it might draw from
> knowledge gained while feeling an ideal, but it is probably not an
> actual instance of an ideal. If somebody were actually feeling an ideal
> of honor (though I don't reallly know what that might entail), they'd be
> much more likely to just stand in the middle of the aisle and stare into
> space, pensive and reflective, than carry about such day-to-day
> business...
I disagree with this strongly. Staring pensively while bad
things happen around you is hardly honorable. And unless
that ideal is translated into action, then it becomes
doubtful to what degree such ideal is held.
>
> One of the things I like best about this theory is its connection to all
> sorts of other subjects, most importantly morality. I might get into
> that later, if the thread drifts that way.
>
> > > So, an ideal could easily have any value, even neutrality. What I actual
> > > believe is that draconity contains all of the _good_ ideals of humanity;
> > > what value the extra ones have is something is something unresolved by
> > > me.
> >
> > This sounds to me very much like what you're saying is that if a
> > dragon acts in accordance with their ideals they need must be good. That
> > if a dragon acts based on negative emotion or thought, that they are
> > somehow failing. Is this what you are trying to say? That your idea of
> > draconity is very paladin-esque?
>
> If I were to decide to make the draconity include only positive ideals,
> then the standard would still not depend on completely strict observance
> of some code (and I would think of humanity in the same manner - I'm not
> going to be so unfair as to make draconity, by definition, good and
> humanity neutral). The definition of an ideal that I just wrote explains
> it a bit better, because, even with positive ideals, there is plenty of
> room for evil. And, in any case, I will not make negative ideals
> disqualifiers (is that a real word?); only the positive ones would be
> measures of draconity... so, then draconity would be as much about
> exoticness (to humans) and complexity of spirit as goodness or the
> potential thereof.
I will argue this with you if you so desire, the idea(l)
that positive ideals lead to evil actions. From their fruits
they are known.
>
> Not paladinish, though. Paladins are honorable and all, but lack a host
> of ideals... like creativity, and maybe even originality and
> friendliness... *grins* not to mention some of them are being virtuous
> out of guilt or self-doubt.
Is this altogether a bad thing?
> > Frankly, *my* answer to that question (YMMV ;)) is "yes."
> > I used to think like that ... of course, this was a decade ago,
> > before I found AFD, before I'd found any other dragons at all. I figured
> > that if I was "good enough," I could someday become a dragon.
> > I can't go back to that any more. For many various reasons.
> > Perhaps the most significant is that "being good enough" implies an
> > outside arbiter of goodness -- it takes the power of self-determination
> > away from me. I'm too strongly attached to the idea of free will; I can't
> > deal with the concept of treating draconity as a state of being with an
> > entrance exam.
>
> The decision lies with nobody but myself. Furthermore, I don't expect
> attainment of physical draconity to be connected in any particular way
> with spiritual draconity - bodies (though not that one) are too easily
> come by. If some way was available right now for me to get the draconic
> body I envision, I would take it - but I would not abandon the spiritual
> conception, nor think it yet attained. I also don't expect the universe
> to
> reward one person's attainment of personal goals with a fresh new body,
> nor for it to mirror my own conceptions in this matter.
Ditto. But then this bring up the whole question of what it
means to be a dragon, and how do you tell if you are one or
not. People is people, some have wings and scaly hides. And
some are not cursed with ladies tying themselves up outside
their homes for the local knights to rescue.
What it boils down to is, if you think you are one, you
might be, or have been, physical form aside. But if you do
not think you are, aren't you just as likely to have been
one, or be one in spirit? It appears to be true as well. So
thinking or believing you are has no bearing on the
question. We cannot base our answer on our present physical
forms, and we note that what we think about the matter has
no bearing as well.
> > To make a long story short ... I believe there is no minimum
> > standard for draconity; people who are, are. People who aren't, aren't.
> > Period. And I am no more willing to be an "impartial arbiter" of other
> > peoples' draconity than I would be to have someone stand in judgment over
> > me. Therefore, like you, I take other people's word on their own
> > identity.
>
> I do believe that there are fair minimum and maximum limits to
> draconity... to remove either would, in some way, eliminate the value of
> draconity. But I do not assume that they are anything rigid, or that I
> know with any real accuracy where they might lie, despite all my
> musings. Nor, again, do I expect these limits to be a product of
> anything but fair and thorough thought, as opposed to commandments writ
> across the sky. The only way that the universe ever judges morality is
> in consequences - cliched as it might sound, good creates more good,
> while evil more often stagnates... and in consequences there is plenty
> of room for error.
Whenever you say something is of value, you have to ask
yourself of value to whom and for what? What is the value of
your daconity to you? Or myself for that matter. We each are
going to have to put a different price on it, decide how
much value it has. And whether the price we are willing to
pay buys us what we want.
>
> *grins* Please note that the fact that my reply contains philosophical
> elements from both sides of the issue is intentional, not a cop-out...
> free will does not require a relativistic or nihilistic morality, nor do
> ethics require a lack of free will.
Grin, philosophy is like that.
> Because, quite frankly (and arrogantly), I intend to be something that
> has never before existed on this world, even as difficult as that is.
> Does a person need to see a published version of 'es own book before 'e
> can write it? The draconity that I apply to myself is of incredible
> benefit as a goal, even when it is so far-off.
It can be argued that you already are something unique that
has never before existed. Regardless of your physical form
or spiritual content.
>
> However, that is not the issue with regard to the statement 'Dragon
> exist'. The importance of those words lies not in the evaluation of its
> accuracy, which inevitably degenerates into pedantics of some kind, but
> in their emotional impact. The belief in dragons produces quite a
> thrill, a unique one - unicorns and gryphons don't produce the
> same effect, though theirs are as good. I assume this is what you mean
> by the 'positive effect of believing in something'. Because I can find a
> definition of dragons that makes the statement 'Dragons exist' neither
> inaccurate nor devoid of what it makes it special, I will use that
> definition freely and willfully.
The only confusion you will hit is when others are not using
your personal definitions.
> The ideals are no more perfect than emotion. In fact, because the only
> serious definitions of infinity (in any philosophical sense) that I have
> yet seen would, if true, be devaluations of reality, I stay completely
> away from
> perfection and infinity in my philosophy, except for a timid statement
> that they exist. That includes, of course, thinking _any_ of my ideas
> are perfect.
I have my doubts about infinities. Seems like a sloppy way
to make a universe. Perfection I have discussed elsewhere.
> I take it as axiomatic that nothing is true which ultimately cheapens
> reality - however, although that's good enough for judging my own ideas,
> it's virtually worthless in argument.
Not sure what "cheapens reality" means. Could you expand on
it.
> A desire to change oneself does not only come after self-hate.
> (Insanity, ambition, and/or strangeness helps too.)
Boredom, changes in the environment. The central tenet of
life is adapt or die.
(It should be noted that it is not clear as to whether one
should adapt to one's environment or adapt the environment
to one :) )
Ben
aka Drakon@Home
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> >
> > Well, thanks - though if I knew more about the theory I'd probably
> > disagree with it even more than I'm about to. The theory seems to regard
> > the spirit as just a playing ground on which memes, without any loyalty
> > or relationship to the spirit other than coincidence, wage in war in
> > such a way that the accuracy or beauty of their thought content is not
> > nearly as important as the survival of the meme. Even if the former was
> > corollary to the latter, the former would still just be a tool of the
> > latter.
>
> No, the model of spirit or whatever that we have, that is
> the meme. Just as our concept of "rock" is a meme, and not
> the rock itself. The contents of the mind, or spirit.
I do not believe that the content of the thought is what it represents,
but simply whatever its form and meaning might be. Any connection the
survival has with accuracy is secondary; to put it another way, any
accuracy, beauty, or usefulness of a thought would have no meaning
outside of the survival of the meme. See my paragraph just below the
next one to see what I mean.
Now, take some weird and very difficult scientific theorem. Were the
physical evidence not yet found, a simpler, if incorrect, explanation
would be favored by almost every mind over the complex and unverified
theorem; then, once evidence _is_ found, it would become favored.
However, the idea of the theorem is the same before and after the
evidence is introduced, so according to meme theory (as much as I know
of it) the successfulness of the meme would remain constant both before
and after. For instance, there is the idea that the world is round; this
theory has existed since antiquity, and yet (with a few brief
exceptions) was not commonly accepted until the Renaissance. The
difference that caused the exception was a change in the available
evidence, not in the actual idea (thus the meme) of the world's
roundness.
> Now if an idea is accurate, consistent with reality, or
> "true", it chances for survival are better than if it is
> false. Having a false model is about as useless as having a
> bad map of a territory.
There are instances in which the accuracy of a meme would be detrimental
to its survival. WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
No, not an idea, unless by idea you use a way-too-big definition like
anything that can be used to further knowledge. What is your version of
idea?
However, another part of my theory of ideals is that any one of them
implies something that is and will always be true or useful, although
needing frequent revision of scope (that is, making sure not to take an
implication and assume everything similar is true). I don't mean to say
that this learning is easy, either; the amount that can be gained from
an ideal depends on the spirit perusing it, but, again, there is no
ideal from which nothing can be gained. Negative ideals can easily
exist, since this type of knowledge would not necessarily be of or put
to good use.
> > The instance of honor you gave might be habit, or it might draw from
> > knowledge gained while feeling an ideal, but it is probably not an
> > actual instance of an ideal. If somebody were actually feeling an ideal
> > of honor (though I don't reallly know what that might entail), they'd be
> > much more likely to just stand in the middle of the aisle and stare into
> > space, pensive and reflective, than carry about such day-to-day
> > business...
>
> I disagree with this strongly. Staring pensively while bad
> things happen around you is hardly honorable. And unless
> that ideal is translated into action, then it becomes
> doubtful to what degree such ideal is held.
I don't actually know what would happen; I was trying to point out the
_extreme_ unlikeliness of an ideal becoming felt during routine
activities. And there is no guarantee that, having an ideal, a person
would automatically know how to act on it. Note, also, that the example
given of 'bad things happening around you' was an overpaid chocolate
bar, not a battle of good versus evil. Such a small thing as that might
just not be noticed in the intensity of the ideal.
> > If I were to decide to make the draconity include only positive ideals,
> > then the standard would still not depend on completely strict observance
> > of some code (and I would think of humanity in the same manner - I'm not
> > going to be so unfair as to make draconity, by definition, good and
> > humanity neutral). The definition of an ideal that I just wrote explains
> > it a bit better, because, even with positive ideals, there is plenty of
> > room for evil. And, in any case, I will not make negative ideals
> > disqualifiers (is that a real word?); only the positive ones would be
> > measures of draconity... so, then draconity would be as much about
> > exoticness (to humans) and complexity of spirit as goodness or the
> > potential thereof.
>
> I will argue this with you if you so desire, the idea(l)
> that positive ideals lead to evil actions. From their fruits
> they are known.
I did not say that a good ideal leads to an evil one, although the
sentence was so short that I can see how easily that slipped in. I meant
that positive ideals left plenty of _opportunity_ for evil to slip in,
since by ideals I do _not_ mean an ideology or code of morality. For
instance, the ideals could be misapplied or taken with too much
zealousy.
> >
> > Not paladinish, though. Paladins are honorable and all, but lack a host
> > of ideals... like creativity, and maybe even originality and
> > friendliness... *grins* not to mention some of them are being virtuous
> > out of guilt or self-doubt.
>
> Is this altogether a bad thing?
Altogether, no. But there are far better alternatives.
And existing for others is still just half of the matter; existence for
oneself is also, all in all, a good thing; neither is always good.
> >
> > The decision lies with nobody but myself. Furthermore, I don't expect
> > attainment of physical draconity to be connected in any particular way
> > with spiritual draconity - bodies (though not that one) are too easily
> > come by. If some way was available right now for me to get the draconic
> > body I envision, I would take it - but I would not abandon the spiritual
> > conception, nor think it yet attained. I also don't expect the universe
> > to
> > reward one person's attainment of personal goals with a fresh new body,
> > nor for it to mirror my own conceptions in this matter.
>
> Ditto. But then this bring up the whole question of what it
> means to be a dragon, and how do you tell if you are one or
> not. People is people, some have wings and scaly hides. And
> some are not cursed with ladies tying themselves up outside
> their homes for the local knights to rescue.
>
> What it boils down to is, if you think you are one, you
> might be, or have been, physical form aside. But if you do
> not think you are, aren't you just as likely to have been
> one, or be one in spirit? It appears to be true as well. So
> thinking or believing you are has no bearing on the
> question. We cannot base our answer on our present physical
> forms, and we note that what we think about the matter has
> no bearing as well.
Hrm? You just said that draconity is basically unknowable, that
draconity exists but is no way observable (since those observations
could be used to figure out the truth of such draconity). This would
mean that draconity also has no effect on a person's happiness or
personality, since those phenomena, too, could be traced by a
sufficiently intelligent person to draconity. Thus, draconity would be
something that sits off by the side and neither does nor affects
anything. What good or how accurate could such a thing possibly be?
That which has no effect of any kind upon anything else, does not exist.
I truly would not want to make draconity that...
Unless you don't mean that. In which case, curse my twisting eyes.
Still, if you think draconity can cause some kind of effect and yet be
unobservable, then tell me - what are these effects that cannot be
known?
> >
> > I do believe that there are fair minimum and maximum limits to
> > draconity... to remove either would, in some way, eliminate the value of
> > draconity. But I do not assume that they are anything rigid, or that I
> > know with any real accuracy where they might lie, despite all my
> > musings. Nor, again, do I expect these limits to be a product of
> > anything but fair and thorough thought, as opposed to commandments writ
> > across the sky. The only way that the universe ever judges morality is
> > in consequences - cliched as it might sound, good creates more good,
> > while evil more often stagnates... and in consequences there is plenty
> > of room for error.
>
> Whenever you say something is of value, you have to ask
> yourself of value to whom and for what? What is the value of
> your daconity to you? Or myself for that matter. We each are
> going to have to put a different price on it, decide how
> much value it has. And whether the price we are willing to
> pay buys us what we want.
Those are all components of the aforementioned value. Whenever I take
value into account I shall heed them, as well.
> > Because, quite frankly (and arrogantly), I intend to be something that
> > has never before existed on this world, even as difficult as that is.
> > Does a person need to see a published version of 'es own book before 'e
> > can write it? The draconity that I apply to myself is of incredible
> > benefit as a goal, even when it is so far-off.
>
> It can be argued that you already are something unique that
> has never before existed. Regardless of your physical form
> or spiritual content.
I know that uniqueness is a matter of degree, and one that is somewhat
measurable. Thus, I intend to make myself unique to a very great
extent...
> >
> > However, that is not the issue with regard to the statement 'Dragon
> > exist'. The importance of those words lies not in the evaluation of its
> > accuracy, which inevitably degenerates into pedantics of some kind, but
> > in their emotional impact. The belief in dragons produces quite a
> > thrill, a unique one - unicorns and gryphons don't produce the
> > same effect, though theirs are as good. I assume this is what you mean
> > by the 'positive effect of believing in something'. Because I can find a
> > definition of dragons that makes the statement 'Dragons exist' neither
> > inaccurate nor devoid of what it makes it special, I will use that
> > definition freely and willfully.
>
> The only confusion you will hit is when others are not using
> your personal definitions.
Erm... how does that relate to the paragraph I wrote?
> > I take it as axiomatic that nothing is true which ultimately cheapens
> > reality - however, although that's good enough for judging my own ideas,
> > it's virtually worthless in argument.
>
> Not sure what "cheapens reality" means. Could you expand on
> it.
It indicates a model of reality in which some element of significance
has been removed. Since I also take it as axiomatic that there are an
infinite numbers of such elements, the only philosophy to avoid such
cheapening would be one that adds something to the effect of 'And
there's more.'
However, introducing this into argument leads to a bunch of tautological
junk, since the worldviews I argue against could always say that nothing
is left out because their philosophy has already been established as
complete.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@Home
Thanks for jumping in! I'm starting to enjoy this once more.
Lhexa
Alan Sauer
>Weyrlady thoughtfully scribed:
>>> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>>> > That being, there is no definition of "dragon."
>> On the contrary, Bax, it says right here in the Oxford English
>> Dictionary, 2nd edition, "Dragon, (n) ...
> Ack! I'm functionally equivalent to an ellipsis! ;P
Well, keep working, eventually you'll make it to semicolon. :)
>> Sorry, just felt I ought to enter a little levity into the situation.
>> *ducks and cover*
> Never a problem. ;)
Yeah, usually people are injecting so much levity I can't help
thinking the discussions must have some _nasty_ track marks.
"Welcome to Discussions Anonymous. We have a new
member tonight."
"Er . . . hi . . . my name is 'I was a teenage dragon (aka My life
as a dragon)' and I'm a levity addict."
-----
Alan
Lhexa
>
> Ben Gibson wrote:
> >
> > No, the model of spirit or whatever that we have, that is
> > the meme. Just as our concept of "rock" is a meme, and not
> > the rock itself. The contents of the mind, or spirit.
> >
> > "true", it chances for survival are better than if it is
> > false. Having a false model is about as useless as having a
> > bad map of a territory.
>
> There are instances in which the accuracy of a meme would be detrimental
> to its survival. WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
I forgot to finish this part. Here:
There're times in which the accuracy of a meme would be detrimental to
its survival. For instance, a person in a situation that is
near-hopeless would hardly be benefited by believing that; with a belief
of utmost accuracy, such a person would be rather likely to commit
suicide... when a bit of inaccurate optimism could offset that suicide.
Many situations like this exist, although most are of a relatively minor
sort - confidence in others' kindness and goodness, disbelief in their
less sterling qualities... each of these increases the likelihood of the
meme's survival, while likely sacrificing some (usually small) amount of
accuracy. Thus, a meme's survival, in that theory, is superior to its
accuracy...
There're also lots of times when a meme's pragmatic value (that is, the
usefulness of the meme and the happiness it brings) works against its
survival.
The behavior most beneficial to a meme would be one that helps it
survive and that helps its propagation, and for the latter no
personality trait could be better than openness... and yet, in some
situations, openness would just invite flaming and emotionally damaging
cruelty from others. The meme couldn't care less about this, since its
seeds are being spread, to germinate or not. As for usefulness, some
people, as a result of adverse situations, grow up with such distorted
worldviews that they are forever unable to work well with others; yet
these worldviews, perhaps masochistic, perhaps nihilistic, perpetuate
themselves in clever, subtle and insidious ways - that is, these corrupt
worldviews are _incredibly_ strong memes in the right personality. And,
for propagation, all that is needed is for that person to have
children... thus, a meme's survival would be superior to the happiness
or effectiveness of its host...
Furthermore, there are some ideas that, in their age, are so dangerous
and radical that to speak them would invite torture or death from that
society, no matter how correct they might be... and yet, complete
silence would work against the survival of the meme; instead, it works
to make that person eloquent about their views to the detriment of 'es
health. For instance, there are Socrates' trial and execution, or
Copernicus' torture, and a few instances of Christian martyrs. In each
case, since those ideas are supposedly to be regarded as memes, it is
clear that the meme had led that person to their death or torture in
order to let itself be propagated. A meme's survival is even superior to
the survival of its host... imagine a virus. That is what a meme could
be.
So, the meme theory is one in which its accuracy, usefulness, and host
are of secondary importance to its own survival! You can see why I don't
support it...
By the way, Bax, I didn't present a longer counterargument to you
because I didn't know whether you'd feel like debating it. If you do,
here's the place to argue it.
> > Ben
And so the dark side of the meme is revealed...
Lhexa
Lhexa
>
> (As an aside: I see the biggest difference between memes and
> viruses as being that many memes, unlike viruses, are symbiotic. Ideas
> can improve lives, whereas there are no known viruses which improve your
> vision or sharpen manual dexterity. Of course, I fully expect technology
> to create symbiotic "positive" virii, perhaps within our lifetimes.)
There are some situations in which a meme would kill, or at least
torture, its host in order to further itself; see my reply to Ben for a
couple of examples (if you'll reply, do so there, so this'll be
simpler). Although I said there that it could be like a virus, a
bacterium would be a better parallel; some are parasitic, and others
symbiotic (mostly in the digestive system).
> -- Baxil
Lhexa
Lhexa
>
Somebody else - AMW? - wrote:
> >
> > When you use the terms "good" or "bad", you are implying some kind of
> > standard by which such actions are to be measured against. Once you
> > identify that standard, then I think most of the problems will sort
> > themselves out as to which is which.
>
> A good point. Lhexa and I have been dancing around both "good" as
> an undefined objective concept, and "good" on the individual level as the
> subjective idea of noble ideals to hold.
> At this point, I'm not sure how to retroactively define the
> objective good, so I'll just take the rest of that topic with a grain of
> salt. ;)
It couldn't happen. I will disagree in some way with any and every
morality except my own; my ethics are actually that unique (or at least
the philosophical side is). In fact, some disagreement about morality
has already occurred betwixt me and you. So, I think it far better to
only deal with those aspects of goodness and morality that are relevant
to the current discussion.
And, if you might ask, no, I can't explain my morality in a few pages.
Nor is it something that summarizes well. *evil grin* Maybe it's better
that way...
> -- Baxil
Beware rapidly inflating egos in this direction: |
|
v
Lhexa
AMW
Lhexa wrote:
>
> Ben Gibson wrote:
> > No, the model of spirit or whatever that we have, that is
> > the meme. Just as our concept of "rock" is a meme, and not
> > the rock itself. The contents of the mind, or spirit.
>
> I do not believe that the content of the thought is what it represents,
> but simply whatever its form and meaning might be. Any connection the
> survival has with accuracy is secondary; to put it another way, any
> accuracy, beauty, or usefulness of a thought would have no meaning
> outside of the survival of the meme. See my paragraph just below the
> next one to see what I mean.
I have to disagree. The connection between survival and accuracy is very
important for the existence of the meme. Granted it has no meaning
outside of
survival, but to say that survival is secondary, I have to disagree.
>
> Now, take some weird and very difficult scientific theorem. Were the
> physical evidence not yet found, a simpler, if incorrect, explanation
> would be favored by almost every mind over the complex and unverified
> theorem; then, once evidence _is_ found, it would become favored.
> However, the idea of the theorem is the same before and after the
> evidence is introduced, so according to meme theory (as much as I know
> of it) the successfulness of the meme would remain constant both before
> and after. For instance, there is the idea that the world is round; this
> theory has existed since antiquity, and yet (with a few brief
> exceptions) was not commonly accepted until the Renaissance. The
> difference that caused the exception was a change in the available
> evidence, not in the actual idea (thus the meme) of the world's
> roundness.
First off a language note. A theorem is a logically proven statement. A
'scientific theorem' is a logically proven statement that is related to
the external or objectively observable world. Now since all logical
proofs are based on axioms or postulates, and as those statements are
not themselves logically proven, another means of verification of axioms
is required.
The round earth is a very good example of this. Aristotle noted that
during a lunar eclipse, the earth casts a round shadow on the moon,
regardless of what time the eclipse occurs. The only shape that will
consistently produce a circular shadow is a sphere, therefore the earth
is round.
The evidence of this was always available, whether it was recognized or
not is another issue. It is a true idea because it fits the evidence far
better than its competitors. The problem with this particular meme is
that there was a political/religious system in place that held as one of
its axioms, its own infallibility. The act of questioning this authority
was punishable by that authority. It was only when the second meme, the
infallibility of this authority, started to die out, due to its conflict
with observation, that the earlier meme was allowed ascendancy.
>
> > Now if an idea is accurate, consistent with reality, or
> > "true", it chances for survival are better than if it is
> > false. Having a false model is about as useless as having a
> > bad map of a territory.
>
> There are instances in which the accuracy of a meme would be detrimental
> to its survival. WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
Such as? I cannot think of one off the top of my head. Memes require
minds, and if the mind does not survive then memes cannot exist. False
models threaten the survival of the mind that holds them.
Suppose you "believed" you could fly. You step off a cliff. You fall
down, possibly killing yourself. Or you think that this plant is safe,
and decide to eat it. Or you decide that this other plant is not, and
end up starving.
> > I am not at all sure I would agree, but I should probably
> > think on it longer. To me, an ideal is simply an idea.
> > Perhaps a very powerful one, or enticing one, but nothing
> > more than a mental construct. And as such, limited in its
> > reality to the mind, or soul. While it can motivate a
> > particular set of actions, it is still the choice of the
> > possessor as to how that ideal is expressed or even if it is
> > expressed or translated into actions.
>
> No, not an idea, unless by idea you use a way-too-big definition like
> anything that can be used to further knowledge. What is your version of
> idea?
Hmm... I can give examples, as well as examples of things which are not
ideas. I can tell you where ideas reside, (in the mind). An airplane
before it is built is an idea, as well as landing on the moon. Any human
invention started off as an idea and is based on ideas of how the
universe works. Mental models, of how things do work or how things can
work.
Philosophy and science are two ideas, with many different schools and
classifications. This covers alot of ground I know. A map of say,
Wyoming, is a physical representation of an idea, just as a book on
General Relativity.
>
> However, another part of my theory of ideals is that any one of them
> implies something that is and will always be true or useful, although
> needing frequent revision of scope (that is, making sure not to take an
> implication and assume everything similar is true). I don't mean to say
> that this learning is easy, either; the amount that can be gained from
> an ideal depends on the spirit perusing it, but, again, there is no
> ideal from which nothing can be gained. Negative ideals can easily
> exist, since this type of knowledge would not necessarily be of or put
> to good use.
Except possibly as an avoidance technique. The idea(l)s behind
anti-Semitism, I think we can all agree are negative, to put it rather
mildly. However, it is something that we should remember humans are
capable of, to avoid the kinds of excesses of the past.
>
> > > The instance of honor you gave might be habit, or it might draw from
> > > knowledge gained while feeling an ideal, but it is probably not an
> > > actual instance of an ideal. If somebody were actually feeling an ideal
> > > of honor (though I don't reallly know what that might entail), they'd be
> > > much more likely to just stand in the middle of the aisle and stare into
> > > space, pensive and reflective, than carry about such day-to-day
> > > business...
> >
> > I disagree with this strongly. Staring pensively while bad
> > things happen around you is hardly honorable. And unless
> > that ideal is translated into action, then it becomes
> > doubtful to what degree such ideal is held.
>
> I don't actually know what would happen; I was trying to point out the
> _extreme_ unlikeliness of an ideal becoming felt during routine
> activities. And there is no guarantee that, having an ideal, a person
> would automatically know how to act on it. Note, also, that the example
> given of 'bad things happening around you' was an overpaid chocolate
> bar, not a battle of good versus evil. Such a small thing as that might
> just not be noticed in the intensity of the ideal.
For the want of a nail, etc. In business, honor is of paramount
importance in
the survival of the business. Do you regularly deal with clerks who are
going to overcharge you? Or do you look for another business to deal
with? The business dies, then the mind that was being supported by that
business either has to 1) find a new business starting all over again,
except this time after having gotten a reputation for being
dishonorable. 2) Learn from its mistakes and prove to its potential
customers that it has learned. or 3) starve.
If such small things fail to get noticed by the intensity of the ideal
of honor, then it is not because the concept is too "bright" but too
dim. It is because the light of honor is too weak in that mind to spot
these small yet important matters.
> > I will argue this with you if you so desire, the idea(l)
> > that positive ideals lead to evil actions. From their fruits
> > they are known.
>
> I did not say that a good ideal leads to an evil one, although the
> sentence was so short that I can see how easily that slipped in. I meant
> that positive ideals left plenty of _opportunity_ for evil to slip in,
> since by ideals I do _not_ mean an ideology or code of morality. For
> instance, the ideals could be misapplied or taken with too much
> zealousy.
Ah, kind of like blindly accepting a scientific theory without
understanding exactly where that theory came from, or how science works.
Because of its *imcompleteness*, it can be misapplied.
Meme exists as webs, there are extremely few that exist alone. Pull one
strand out and you can unravel the whole.
>
> > >
> > > Not paladinish, though. Paladins are honorable and all, but lack a host
> > > of ideals... like creativity, and maybe even originality and
> > > friendliness... *grins* not to mention some of them are being virtuous
> > > out of guilt or self-doubt.
> >
> > Is this altogether a bad thing?
>
> Altogether, no. But there are far better alternatives.
>
> And existing for others is still just half of the matter; existence for
> oneself is also, all in all, a good thing; neither is always good.
I would argue that. I think that "living for others" has a very bad
historical record. As well as poor logic.
If you are selfish, you can still do good things for other people. You
have a reason for doing so, in that it makes them more willing to help
you out when you need it. You respect others rights, because that gives
them cause to respect yours. it is indicative that it is in their best
interest to support and respect your rights.
But "selfish" is a bad term these days. Living for oneself is considered
bad, and in order to validate that view, a straw man is constructed. A
selfish person who rides roughshod over everyone he meets, who just
doesn't give a damn about anyone else. And what is ignored in this straw
man is the fact that such a person is NOT acting in his own best
interests, but to his detriment. No matter where you go, there are
always going to be more of them than their are of you. There is a power
in numbers, that can be used against you. So you must develop strategies
to prevent them from "pulling the trigger." One must give them reason or
at least pause in order to prevent one's own destruction.
Living for others, well trace the idea from Kant, up through Marx and
Lenin, as well as through Nietchzie and Hitler. To convince others of
the correctness of this idea, they hold up these abhorrent scarecrows.
And while the idea is false, it is in what they believe to be their best
interest to get others to agree with it. They have to work less, and can
feed off the efforts of others. In short, it has been my experience that
the advocates of altruism are themselves acting selfishly. (At least
trying to.)
> > Ditto. But then this bring up the whole question of what it
> > means to be a dragon, and how do you tell if you are one or
> > not. People is people, some have wings and scaly hides. And
> > some are not cursed with ladies tying themselves up outside
> > their homes for the local knights to rescue.
> >
> > What it boils down to is, if you think you are one, you
> > might be, or have been, physical form aside. But if you do
> > not think you are, aren't you just as likely to have been
> > one, or be one in spirit? It appears to be true as well. So
> > thinking or believing you are has no bearing on the
> > question. We cannot base our answer on our present physical
> > forms, and we note that what we think about the matter has
> > no bearing as well.
>
> Hrm? You just said that draconity is basically unknowable, that
> draconity exists but is no way observable (since those observations
> could be used to figure out the truth of such draconity). This would
> mean that draconity also has no effect on a person's happiness or
> personality, since those phenomena, too, could be traced by a
> sufficiently intelligent person to draconity. Thus, draconity would be
> something that sits off by the side and neither does nor affects
> anything. What good or how accurate could such a thing possibly be?
Clarification. Independently observable, Objectively observable. You
have no way of verifying the contents of another's mind. People can lie.
To themselves as
well as to others. Science has to sit on the sidelines, because it
cannot crack the mind of another. It cannot look in, and independently
verify what is going on in there.
Now you seem to be arguing that since it is not observable, then it has
no effect on a person's happiness. And therefore satisfies the
qualifications of "nothing". The problem is that I was not quite clear,
as I meant objectively observable. And happiness falls into that
category as well. Are you happy? How do I know that other than you
telling me? You tell me you are a dragon, in spirit. I have no way of
confirming or refuting the validity of that claim.
What got me to thinking along this line, is one of the other posters who
do not believe in dragons. Who think that such people are basically
lying to themselves. (Nope, not going to start a flame. Lets keep this
cerebral) What if this person were a dragon and they were the one's
lying to themselves? Would we have any way of verifying or refuting this
hypothesis? Unfortunately no. It is as untestable as the reverse.
> That which has no effect of any kind upon anything else, does not exist.
> I truly would not want to make draconity that...
Okay what effects does *my* draconity have on you? And for a moment
assume it has none, does that make it any less real? :)
>
> Unless you don't mean that. In which case, curse my twisting eyes.
> Still, if you think draconity can cause some kind of effect and yet be
> unobservable, then tell me - what are these effects that cannot be
> known?
Grin, what I am saying is that it is nigh impossible to determine
another person's draconity. While some of the ideals we ascribe to
dragons may be held by most, even ourselves, it may not be held by other
dragons at all. That those same ideals are also very highly regarded by
most humans as well. If we limit our definition of who is and is not a
real dragon according to who follows (or tries to follow) those ideals,
we make them indistinguishable from humans. That if we define down a
dragon to that point, then it becomes meaningless.
So, what does it mean to be a dragon? Especially since we are forced to
exclude physical form? And how do we differentiate that from being
human?
> I know that uniqueness is a matter of degree, and one that is somewhat
> measurable. Thus, I intend to make myself unique to a very great
> extent...
Grin, and again, it can be argued that you already have.
>
> > >
> > > However, that is not the issue with regard to the statement 'Dragon
> > > exist'. The importance of those words lies not in the evaluation of its
> > > accuracy, which inevitably degenerates into pedantics of some kind, but
> > > in their emotional impact. The belief in dragons produces quite a
> > > thrill, a unique one - unicorns and gryphons don't produce the
> > > same effect, though theirs are as good. I assume this is what you mean
> > > by the 'positive effect of believing in something'. Because I can find a
> > > definition of dragons that makes the statement 'Dragons exist' neither
> > > inaccurate nor devoid of what it makes it special, I will use that
> > > definition freely and willfully.
> >
> > The only confusion you will hit is when others are not using
> > your personal definitions.
>
> Erm... how does that relate to the paragraph I wrote?
To most people, a dragon is a hexapedal flying reptile who breathes fire
and has a perchance for maiden sacrifice. You define it differently from
that. If you say 'Dragons exist' well as most people are using a
different definition of what a dragon is than you are, they will start
to put away sharp objects. To them, your statement is at best
inconsistent with their own experiences, and at worse, a sign of
insanity.
If you mean that a dragon is someone who identifies himself as a dragon,
then you exclude the closeted dragons. If you mean that a dragon is
someone who holds these idea(l)s very highly, then you make it
indistinguishable from people, and possibly exclude any number of 'bad'
dragons.
>
> > > I take it as axiomatic that nothing is true which ultimately cheapens
> > > reality - however, although that's good enough for judging my own ideas,
> > > it's virtually worthless in argument.
> >
> > Not sure what "cheapens reality" means. Could you expand on
> > it.
>
> It indicates a model of reality in which some element of significance
> has been removed. Since I also take it as axiomatic that there are an
> infinite numbers of such elements, the only philosophy to avoid such
> cheapening would be one that adds something to the effect of 'And
> there's more.'
Okay how do you determine what is 'significant' and what isn't? Or is it
all significant? you appear to be making a value judgment that I am not
sure applies. Reality is reality, and there is a clear value to reality,
mostly due to the temporary nature of life. I do not see how you can
Cheapen that value since is has such an impact on whether as a
biological entity, you live or die.
Infinities give me headaches, and I severely doubt their reality.
>
> However, introducing this into argument leads to a bunch of tautological
> junk, since the worldviews I argue against could always say that nothing
> is left out because their philosophy has already been established as
> complete.
Ah dogmatism. It is rather convenient at that. :)
> Thanks for jumping in! I'm starting to enjoy this once more.
Grin. you are more than welcome. Thanks for letting me.
Ben
aka Drakon@Work
Mithent
>To most people, a dragon is a hexapedal flying reptile who breathes fire
>and has a perchance for maiden sacrifice. You define it differently from
>that. If you say 'Dragons exist' well as most people are using a
>different definition of what a dragon is than you are, they will start
>to put away sharp objects. To them, your statement is at best
>inconsistent with their own experiences, and at worse, a sign of
>insanity.
... which demonstrates a lack of thought on the listener's part. While we
cannot prove that dragons in the physical form exist short of actually finding
one and putting it under their nose, no-one can disprove the existance of
anything either. We can say that actual physical dragons (beyond Komodo
dragons, etc) have not been seen on Earth, there is no reason whatsoever that
they could not exist elsewhere.
One argument is 'they're a figment of your imagination'. Imagine a table. By
the argument above, that table now cannot exist, even if it happens to be in
front of you at the moment, since you imagined it.
>If you mean that a dragon is someone who identifies himself as a dragon,
>then you exclude the closeted dragons. If you mean that a dragon is
>someone who holds these idea(l)s very highly, then you make it
>indistinguishable from people, and possibly exclude any number of 'bad'
>dragons.
Draconity is nightmarishly difficult to define - the closest you can get is
that someone has a connection to dragons. You can't say even that they -feel- a
connection, since they might not do at the present time, nor never. Are there
dragons out there who have not and never will discover draconity?
Still, one thing which I thought interesting is that it is possible that there
is a race of aliens (dragons, whatever) and some of them come to the conclusion
that they are humans! It's precisely the same thing in reverse, and maybe
they're having problems defining humanity. Maybe they have stories regarding
these mythical humans, and the equivalent to an alt.fan.humans newsgroup...
--
Mithent Farsight, Choklitism Official of Insert Something Here
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> > I do not believe that the content of the thought is what it represents,
> > but simply whatever its form and meaning might be. Any connection the
> > survival has with accuracy is secondary; to put it another way, any
> > accuracy, beauty, or usefulness of a thought would have no meaning
> > outside of the survival of the meme. See my paragraph just below the
> > next one to see what I mean.
>
> I have to disagree. The connection between survival and accuracy is very
> important for the existence of the meme. Granted it has no meaning
> outside of
> survival, but to say that survival is secondary, I have to disagree.
Too bad I left that particular paragraph out. See below for an
explanation (and maybe it'll actually be there, this time!)
> >
> > Now, take some weird and very difficult scientific theorem. Were the
> > physical evidence not yet found, a simpler, if incorrect, explanation
> > would be favored by almost every mind over the complex and unverified
> > theorem; then, once evidence _is_ found, it would become favored.
> > However, the idea of the theorem is the same before and after the
> > evidence is introduced, so according to meme theory (as much as I know
> > of it) the successfulness of the meme would remain constant both before
> > and after. For instance, there is the idea that the world is round; this
> > theory has existed since antiquity, and yet (with a few brief
> > exceptions) was not commonly accepted until the Renaissance. The
> > difference that caused the exception was a change in the available
> > evidence, not in the actual idea (thus the meme) of the world's
> > roundness.
>
> First off a language note. A theorem is a logically proven statement. A
> 'scientific theorem' is a logically proven statement that is related to
> the external or objectively observable world. Now since all logical
> proofs are based on axioms or postulates, and as those statements are
> not themselves logically proven, another means of verification of axioms
> is required.
I see what you mean; I'll use theory instead, now.
> The round earth is a very good example of this. Aristotle noted that
> during a lunar eclipse, the earth casts a round shadow on the moon,
> regardless of what time the eclipse occurs. The only shape that will
> consistently produce a circular shadow is a sphere, therefore the earth
> is round.
>
> The evidence of this was always available, whether it was recognized or
> not is another issue. It is a true idea because it fits the evidence far
> better than its competitors. The problem with this particular meme is
> that there was a political/religious system in place that held as one of
> its axioms, its own infallibility. The act of questioning this authority
> was punishable by that authority. It was only when the second meme, the
> infallibility of this authority, started to die out, due to its conflict
> with observation, that the earlier meme was allowed ascendancy.
But the ideas (the memes) on both sides do not change. How does brute
physical evidence wind its way torwards affecting the survival of memes?
> >
> > > Now if an idea is accurate, consistent with reality, or
> > > "true", it chances for survival are better than if it is
> > > false. Having a false model is about as useless as having a
> > > bad map of a territory.
> >
> > There are instances in which the accuracy of a meme would be detrimental
> > to its survival. WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
>
> Such as? I cannot think of one off the top of my head. Memes require
> minds, and if the mind does not survive then memes cannot exist. False
> models threaten the survival of the mind that holds them.
Sorry about this, I forgot to write the paragraph; then I noticed my
mistake, and wrote it out in a new post (in a reply to my own message);
please find it if you can, and if you can't I'll repost it. I use those
'WWW's as place marks.
My examples were of a type wherein a person deludes 'emself as to the
goodness of other people or the prospects of their situation, but I
don't want to write them out again... find that post.
> >
> > No, not an idea, unless by idea you use a way-too-big definition like
> > anything that can be used to further knowledge. What is your version of
> > idea?
>
> Hmm... I can give examples, as well as examples of things which are not
> ideas. I can tell you where ideas reside, (in the mind). An airplane
> before it is built is an idea, as well as landing on the moon. Any human
> invention started off as an idea and is based on ideas of how the
> universe works. Mental models, of how things do work or how things can
> work.
>
> Philosophy and science are two ideas, with many different schools and
> classifications. This covers alot of ground I know. A map of say,
> Wyoming, is a physical representation of an idea, just as a book on
> General Relativity.
That doesn't help yet, since the things you mentioned have no particular
connection or relation to emotion, while that similarity is very
important to my theory of ideals. Nor do I have any idea of the scope of
your definition; for that reason, I'm still unable to decide whether an
ideal would be an idea...
> >
> > However, another part of my theory of ideals is that any one of them
> > implies something that is and will always be true or useful, although
> > needing frequent revision of scope (that is, making sure not to take an
> > implication and assume everything similar is true). I don't mean to say
> > that this learning is easy, either; the amount that can be gained from
> > an ideal depends on the spirit perusing it, but, again, there is no
> > ideal from which nothing can be gained. Negative ideals can easily
> > exist, since this type of knowledge would not necessarily be of or put
> > to good use.
>
> Except possibly as an avoidance technique. The idea(l)s behind
> anti-Semitism, I think we can all agree are negative, to put it rather
> mildly. However, it is something that we should remember humans are
> capable of, to avoid the kinds of excesses of the past.
A person feeling some ideal of anti-Semitism (I don't know that there is
one) would learn avoidance? How's that? Or are you speaking of that
person's victims?
> >
> > I don't actually know what would happen; I was trying to point out the
> > _extreme_ unlikeliness of an ideal becoming felt during routine
> > activities. And there is no guarantee that, having an ideal, a person
> > would automatically know how to act on it. Note, also, that the example
> > given of 'bad things happening around you' was an overpaid chocolate
> > bar, not a battle of good versus evil. Such a small thing as that might
> > just not be noticed in the intensity of the ideal.
>
> For the want of a nail, etc. In business, honor is of paramount
> importance in
> the survival of the business. Do you regularly deal with clerks who are
> going to overcharge you? Or do you look for another business to deal
> with? The business dies, then the mind that was being supported by that
> business either has to 1) find a new business starting all over again,
> except this time after having gotten a reputation for being
> dishonorable. 2) Learn from its mistakes and prove to its potential
> customers that it has learned. or 3) starve.
Again, feeling an ideal does not mean that the person knows or can act
on it well. The ideal might actually require stifling before it can be
acted upon in a minor way.
Remember that by 'ideal' I don't mean a component of an ideology. For
such a thing to work against itself would make it a fallacy, as you and
Bax pointed out in a few ways. What I speak of is a construct/thing of
the mind, having some connection to objective truth, but not a
completely reliable one.
> If such small things fail to get noticed by the intensity of the ideal
> of honor, then it is not because the concept is too "bright" but too
> dim. It is because the light of honor is too weak in that mind to spot
> these small yet important matters.
Again, the ideal of honor wouldn't necessarily _be_ honor or honorable,
just one way in which to learn it. Heck, it is even true that a system
of honor is not honorable, if it is not held to!
> > I did not say that a good ideal leads to an evil one, although the
> > sentence was so short that I can see how easily that slipped in. I meant
> > that positive ideals left plenty of _opportunity_ for evil to slip in,
> > since by ideals I do _not_ mean an ideology or code of morality. For
> > instance, the ideals could be misapplied or taken with too much
> > zealousy.
>
> Ah, kind of like blindly accepting a scientific theory without
> understanding exactly where that theory came from, or how science works.
> Because of its *imcompleteness*, it can be misapplied.
Or taking something that is true in one respect and thinking it true in
every way, such as believing science constitutes a complete morality or
that religious creed is literal truth.
And the ideals are always incomplete; there're always more theories to
make and ideals to know...
> Meme exists as webs, there are extremely few that exist alone. Pull one
> strand out and you can unravel the whole.
> >
> > > >
> > > > Not paladinish, though. Paladins are honorable and all, but lack a host
> > > > of ideals... like creativity, and maybe even originality and
> > > > friendliness... *grins* not to mention some of them are being virtuous
> > > > out of guilt or self-doubt.
> > >
> > > Is this altogether a bad thing?
> >
> > Altogether, no. But there are far better alternatives.
> >
> > And existing for others is still just half of the matter; existence for
> > oneself is also, all in all, a good thing; neither is always good.
>
> I would argue that. I think that "living for others" has a very bad
> historical record. As well as poor logic.
*grins* Didn't you defend paladinism in your last post?
> If you are selfish, you can still do good things for other people. You
> have a reason for doing so, in that it makes them more willing to help
> you out when you need it. You respect others rights, because that gives
> them cause to respect yours. it is indicative that it is in their best
> interest to support and respect your rights.
Or it can make them think that you can be pushed around. It is my
experience that for every good action that can teach others just by
observation and example, there is some mindset practically designed to
work against and ridicule it, against which that action is nearly
helpless on its own.
> But "selfish" is a bad term these days. Living for oneself is considered
> bad, and in order to validate that view, a straw man is constructed. A
> selfish person who rides roughshod over everyone he meets, who just
> doesn't give a damn about anyone else. And what is ignored in this straw
> man is the fact that such a person is NOT acting in his own best
> interests, but to his detriment. No matter where you go, there are
> always going to be more of them than their are of you. There is a power
> in numbers, that can be used against you. So you must develop strategies
> to prevent them from "pulling the trigger." One must give them reason or
> at least pause in order to prevent one's own destruction.
>
> Living for others, well trace the idea from Kant, up through Marx and
> Lenin, as well as through Nietchzie and Hitler. To convince others of
> the correctness of this idea, they hold up these abhorrent scarecrows.
> And while the idea is false, it is in what they believe to be their best
> interest to get others to agree with it. They have to work less, and can
> feed off the efforts of others. In short, it has been my experience that
> the advocates of altruism are themselves acting selfishly. (At least
> trying to.)
You've given a good defense of working for oneself, and I can't see
anything wrong with it. However, the argument you gave against working
for others is vague and incomplete, resorting more to arguments ad
hominem (calling its advocates selfish by assuming, without support,
that they only want others to be selfless, not themselves) and to the
converse of appeals to authority, that is, attempting to show an idea
false because a variety of hated people believe it (Neitzsche, by the
way, is a philosopher extremely far away from selflessness, and Kant's
ethics were basically indifferent to that question). If you're going to
argue against that idea (which I don't object to, if it's done well),
please do so in a way that doesn't resort to these fallacies...
> > > What it boils down to is, if you think you are one, you
> > > might be, or have been, physical form aside. But if you do
> > > not think you are, aren't you just as likely to have been
> > > one, or be one in spirit? It appears to be true as well. So
> > > thinking or believing you are has no bearing on the
> > > question. We cannot base our answer on our present physical
> > > forms, and we note that what we think about the matter has
> > > no bearing as well.
> >
> > Hrm? You just said that draconity is basically unknowable, that
> > draconity exists but is no way observable (since those observations
> > could be used to figure out the truth of such draconity). This would
> > mean that draconity also has no effect on a person's happiness or
> > personality, since those phenomena, too, could be traced by a
> > sufficiently intelligent person to draconity. Thus, draconity would be
> > something that sits off by the side and neither does nor affects
> > anything. What good or how accurate could such a thing possibly be?
>
> Clarification. Independently observable, Objectively observable. You
> have no way of verifying the contents of another's mind. People can lie.
> To themselves as
> well as to others. Science has to sit on the sidelines, because it
> cannot crack the mind of another. It cannot look in, and independently
> verify what is going on in there.
By verifying you mean absolutely certain evidence, right? Observation of
draconity does not need such certainty to have some accuracy, and
absolute axiomatic accuracy is not the only type that exists.
> Now you seem to be arguing that since it is not observable, then it has
> no effect on a person's happiness. And therefore satisfies the
> qualifications of "nothing". The problem is that I was not quite clear,
> as I meant objectively observable. And happiness falls into that
> category as well. Are you happy? How do I know that other than you
> telling me? You tell me you are a dragon, in spirit. I have no way of
> confirming or refuting the validity of that claim.
Yes, you do, though not, now, through very reliable means. You could
start with the assumption that a person has a reason for saying 'e is a
dragon, and if you find that there is no evidence of emotional
self-delusion or neurosis, it can be assumed with significant accuracy
that draconity means to that person's spirit what they think it means. I
know very well that this is not absolutely certain, and I also know that
the degree of accuracy is not and cannot be judged with complete
precision. This does not mean that the accuracy is nonexistent.
> What got me to thinking along this line, is one of the other posters who
> do not believe in dragons. Who think that such people are basically
> lying to themselves. (Nope, not going to start a flame. Lets keep this
> cerebral) What if this person were a dragon and they were the one's
> lying to themselves? Would we have any way of verifying or refuting this
> hypothesis? Unfortunately no. It is as untestable as the reverse.
There would be a reason for such a person to repress their own
draconity, or be ignorant of it. If no such reason can be found at all,
then it is far more likely that not that they are not a dragon.
> > That which has no effect of any kind upon anything else, does not exist.
> > I truly would not want to make draconity that...
>
> Okay what effects does *my* draconity have on you? And for a moment
> assume it has none, does that make it any less real? :)
In your original statement the effects were not limited to someone else;
you said, "We cannot base our answer on our present physical forms, and
we note that what we think about the matter has no bearing as well."
This seemed to include self-perception as well as perception of others.
> > Unless you don't mean that. In which case, curse my twisting eyes.
> > Still, if you think draconity can cause some kind of effect and yet be
> > unobservable, then tell me - what are these effects that cannot be
> > known?
>
> Grin, what I am saying is that it is nigh impossible to determine
> another person's draconity.
I do agree with that; but I draw the line at saying such a thing is
absolutely impossible to determine.
> While some of the ideals we ascribe to
> dragons may be held by most, even ourselves, it may not be held by other
> dragons at all. That those same ideals are also very highly regarded by
> most humans as well. If we limit our definition of who is and is not a
> real dragon according to who follows (or tries to follow) those ideals,
> we make them indistinguishable from humans. That if we define down a
> dragon to that point, then it becomes meaningless.
There is no reason to assume that, because some draconic ideals are
probably also human, all draconic ideals are identical to human ones!
Neither does the occasional similarity between the two mean that
draconity and humanity are indistinguishable from each other.
> So, what does it mean to be a dragon? Especially since we are forced to
> exclude physical form? And how do we differentiate that from being
> human?
There is still something to figure out, but please don't assume I
consider myself to have done so!
> > I know that uniqueness is a matter of degree, and one that is somewhat
> > measurable. Thus, I intend to make myself unique to a very great
> > extent...
>
> Grin, and again, it can be argued that you already have.
I will also be unique according to more standards than just the pedantic
one.
> > >
> > > The only confusion you will hit is when others are not using
> > > your personal definitions.
> >
> > Erm... how does that relate to the paragraph I wrote?
>
> To most people, a dragon is a hexapedal flying reptile who breathes fire
> and has a perchance for maiden sacrifice. You define it differently from
> that. If you say 'Dragons exist' well as most people are using a
> different definition of what a dragon is than you are, they will start
> to put away sharp objects. To them, your statement is at best
> inconsistent with their own experiences, and at worse, a sign of
> insanity.
*grins* Well, _their_ confusion doesn't concern me greatly, since it
could be corrected with a simple conversation.
> If you mean that a dragon is someone who identifies himself as a dragon,
> then you exclude the closeted dragons. If you mean that a dragon is
> someone who holds these idea(l)s very highly, then you make it
> indistinguishable from people, and possibly exclude any number of 'bad'
> dragons.
With the first definition, I make self-belief a qualifier of draconity;
I _do not_ make the lack of such self-belief a disqualifier. As for the
second, it can hardly be assumed that humans have figured out all there
is to know about morality! Ideals can be created which the majority of
humanity couldn't even comprehend.
> > > > I take it as axiomatic that nothing is true which ultimately cheapens
> > > > reality - however, although that's good enough for judging my own ideas,
> > > > it's virtually worthless in argument.
> > >
> > > Not sure what "cheapens reality" means. Could you expand on
> > > it.
> >
> > It indicates a model of reality in which some element of significance
> > has been removed. Since I also take it as axiomatic that there are an
> > infinite numbers of such elements, the only philosophy to avoid such
> > cheapening would be one that adds something to the effect of 'And
> > there's more.'
>
> Okay how do you determine what is 'significant' and what isn't? Or is it
> all significant? you appear to be making a value judgment that I am not
> sure applies. Reality is reality, and there is a clear value to reality,
> mostly due to the temporary nature of life. I do not see how you can
> Cheapen that value since is has such an impact on whether as a
> biological entity, you live or die.
I am able to judge, to a limited extent, the accuracy of my statements;
however, anybody willing to could drive that supposition into such
loathesome pedantics that both debaters would become sick of it, without
resolving in even a minor way either the truth or the falseness of it
(your question about significance might lead that way). That's why I
said I am unwilling to introduce it into arguments except as an aside.
However, the cheapening (why'd you capitalise it?) is more a result of
detrimental effects caused by a limited viewpoint than an actual change
in reality.
> Infinities give me headaches, and I severely doubt their reality.
> >
> > However, introducing this into argument leads to a bunch of tautological
> > junk, since the worldviews I argue against could always say that nothing
> > is left out because their philosophy has already been established as
> > complete.
>
> Ah dogmatism. It is rather convenient at that. :)
>
> > Thanks for jumping in! I'm starting to enjoy this once more.
>
> Grin. you are more than welcome. Thanks for letting me.
Okay. Please don't get angry that I insulted the method of your 'living
for another' counterargument, although I believe my complaints to be
correct.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@Work
Lhexa
Wyrm
chris...@aol.comDELTHIS (Mithent) put their foot in it by writing:
>AMW said:
>>To most people, a dragon is a hexapedal flying reptile who breathes fire
>>and has a perchance for maiden sacrifice. You define it differently from
>.... which demonstrates a lack of thought on the listener's part. While we
>cannot prove that dragons in the physical form exist short of actually finding
Well, it actually shows Western myopia.
To the East, a Dragon is a quaduped - and there are far more people of the
east than of the west.
Hence it's most probably the case that to most people, a dragon is a quadruped
that doesn't breath fire or have anything to do with maiden sacrifice!
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
I'd just like to apologize for my recent silence. Due to the fact
that I'm starting a new job on Monday, I may have to cut down on newsgroup
activity for a while, including this thread.
I'll try to keep up, and throw in my two cents' worth when I can.
And thanks for all the fun discussions :)
-- Bax
AMW
>
> AMW wrote:
> >
> > Lhexa wrote:
> > The evidence of this was always available, whether it was recognized or
> > not is another issue. It is a true idea because it fits the evidence far
> > better than its competitors. The problem with this particular meme is
> > that there was a political/religious system in place that held as one of
> > its axioms, its own infallibility. The act of questioning this authority
> > was punishable by that authority. It was only when the second meme, the
> > infallibility of this authority, started to die out, due to its conflict
> > with observation, that the earlier meme was allowed ascendancy.
>
> But the ideas (the memes) on both sides do not change. How does brute
> physical evidence wind its way torwards affecting the survival of memes?
Brute physical evidence is indicative that the theory is correct, an
accurate representation of reality. Memes require minds in order to
exist. If the theory is a false model of reality, it jeopardizes the
survivability of that mind. The degree of jeopardy is determine by how
relevant that particular meme is to the mind's survival.
Bacon once wrote that for Nature to be commanded, she must be obeyed.
Scotty is quoted as reminding Kirk that he "canna change the laws of
physics." In order to obey Nature, you have to know what it is saying,
how it works, have a true model of reality. Without that, it inhibits
the mind's ability to affect physical change, either in itself or its
environment. It cannot say, predict the weather if it has no idea how
weather works, how the laws of Nature come about to form storm systems
and rain clouds, or droughts. And thereby makes that mind susceptible to
damaging changes in its environment.
False memes get weeded out by in essence killing the minds that hold
them, who act upon those memes, who treat those memes as true when they
are false. (or vice versa).
Now in our modern world, society goes to great extremes in protecting us
from ourselves. We are constantly bombarded with warning and propaganda
attempting to prevent us from doing dumb things and getting ourselves
killed. We make things like seat belt and helmet laws, to protect us
from ourselves and the memes we hold. We are inhibited from say, driving
a motorcycle without a helmet, because of the threat of force. We are
not allowed to act on many of our memes, allegedly for our own safety.
So the meme survives, simply because it is allowed to exist in a dormant
state. Only through the threat of force against the mind are such
dormant memes allowed to exist. Remove the threat and you will see a
rising death toll as bad memes lead people into stupid actions and get
themselves (or others) killed.
> That doesn't help yet, since the things you mentioned have no particular
> connection or relation to emotion, while that similarity is very
> important to my theory of ideals. Nor do I have any idea of the scope of
> your definition; for that reason, I'm still unable to decide whether an
> ideal would be an idea...
Right they don't. I don't see a connection between emotion and ideas,
other than the obvious labeling of emotions. An idea is the product of
thought, of rationality, logic and observation, of integrating concepts.
Emotions are more sub, or unconscious. As a matter of fact, rationality
can get in the way of emotions, just as emotions can get in the way of
thought.
> > Except possibly as an avoidance technique. The idea(l)s behind
> > anti-Semitism, I think we can all agree are negative, to put it rather
> > mildly. However, it is something that we should remember humans are
> > capable of, to avoid the kinds of excesses of the past.
>
> A person feeling some ideal of anti-Semitism (I don't know that there is
> one) would learn avoidance? How's that? Or are you speaking of that
> person's victims?
You do not know if there is an ideal of anti-Semitism? Or you do not
think that anti-Semitism is "ideal"? I think that somewhere a value
judgment is being made, that as part of your definition, you see ideals
as "good" in and of themselves, as intrinsically of value regardless of
the validity of such an ideal. Is this close?
> > For the want of a nail, etc. In business, honor is of paramount
> > importance in
> > the survival of the business. Do you regularly deal with clerks who are
> > going to overcharge you? Or do you look for another business to deal
> > with? The business dies, then the mind that was being supported by that
> > business either has to 1) find a new business starting all over again,
> > except this time after having gotten a reputation for being
> > dishonorable. 2) Learn from its mistakes and prove to its potential
> > customers that it has learned. or 3) starve.
>
> Again, feeling an ideal does not mean that the person knows or can act
> on it well. The ideal might actually require stifling before it can be
> acted upon in a minor way.
>
> Remember that by 'ideal' I don't mean a component of an ideology. For
> such a thing to work against itself would make it a fallacy, as you and
> Bax pointed out in a few ways. What I speak of is a construct/thing of
> the mind, having some connection to objective truth, but not a
> completely reliable one.
But you also use the word "feel" above. There are basically three mode
of cognition, three ways in which we "know" something. One can think
something is true, one can believe, or one can feel.
Feeling something is true is probably the weakest one of these. One is
in essence saying "I don't know how I know this, but it is true." It
would involve intuition or some other subconscious integration of data.
One also feels sensory data, or emotions, and so a feeling of an idea is
being equated to direct sensory data.
When a person believes something, they can at least point to a book or
some such and say, "I believe this is true." They appeal to some
authority of some sort, a church or perhaps some kind of mystical
experience. Regardless of which, it is more conscious than feelings.
Thinking uses logic and observation. A particular set of rules and
procedures in an attempt to derive a particular idea. It specifically
identifies the web of ideas that a particular one is part of, of how it
is a part of that web. Only in this last method is one able to get the
hood up and tinker around underneath, to examine how and where an idea
comes from.
The result of that is that thinking has become a very powerful survival
strategy. Because of this ability to examine the source of an idea, and
examine its roots, it is the basis of the scientific method. And the
product of that method has led to such developments such as medicine,
and computers.
But getting back to "feeling an ideal". In essences you are saying that
you know of an ideal yet have no idea (or at least unsure of) where it
came from, what brought it into existence, how it works, etc. And that
makes it difficult to examine as well as work out how to apply that
particular ideal to practical situations. Close?
>
> > If such small things fail to get noticed by the intensity of the ideal
> > of honor, then it is not because the concept is too "bright" but too
> > dim. It is because the light of honor is too weak in that mind to spot
> > these small yet important matters.
>
> Again, the ideal of honor wouldn't necessarily _be_ honor or honorable,
> just one way in which to learn it. Heck, it is even true that a system
> of honor is not honorable, if it is not held to!
Not sure what you are saying here. I think you lost me. How can a system
of honor be not honorable by not being practiced?
First off, the system is not honorable, that is anthropomorphizing.
People are honorable, not systems, or even ideas. Actions conducted by
people, of their own free choice are honorable or not, but even then it
is a reflection on the person, and not the ideal or meme being held by
that person.
> > Ah, kind of like blindly accepting a scientific theory without
> > understanding exactly where that theory came from, or how science works.
> > Because of its *imcompleteness*, it can be misapplied.
>
> Or taking something that is true in one respect and thinking it true in
> every way, such as believing science constitutes a complete morality or
> that religious creed is literal truth.
Yes!!! (Although we can discuss scientific morality at a later point.
Game theory is something I want to look into one of these days, I think
it holds some vital clues on the question.)
> And the ideals are always incomplete; there're always more theories to
> make and ideals to know...
I am not sure about the idea of infinite knowledge. That it is required
to accurately model the universe or that it even exists.
> > > > > Not paladinish, though. Paladins are honorable and all, but lack a host
> > > > > of ideals... like creativity, and maybe even originality and
> > > > > friendliness... *grins* not to mention some of them are being virtuous
> > > > > out of guilt or self-doubt.
> > > >
> > > > Is this altogether a bad thing?
> > >
> > > Altogether, no. But there are far better alternatives.
> > >
> > > And existing for others is still just half of the matter; existence for
> > > oneself is also, all in all, a good thing; neither is always good.
> >
> > I would argue that. I think that "living for others" has a very bad
> > historical record. As well as poor logic.
>
> *grins* Didn't you defend paladinism in your last post?
You see a conflict? :):) Would it surprise you to learn that this
selfish bastard you are arguing with was a member of the USNavy, ready
to defend this country with his very life if needed? :)
> > If you are selfish, you can still do good things for other people. You
> > have a reason for doing so, in that it makes them more willing to help
> > you out when you need it. You respect others rights, because that gives
> > them cause to respect yours. it is indicative that it is in their best
> > interest to support and respect your rights.
>
> Or it can make them think that you can be pushed around. It is my
> experience that for every good action that can teach others just by
> observation and example, there is some mindset practically designed to
> work against and ridicule it, against which that action is nearly
> helpless on its own.
True. Bad guys don't have to play by any rules. But again, there is
something about evil that gets forgotten. It is self destructive. The
problem with self destructive ideas is that they kill the host, as well
as make it harder to gain ground, by serving as bad examples to other
minds.
For the above example, you see that helping others is self destructive.
Obviously this is not good for you, so what do you do? Do you continue
to act for their benefit? Or do you change your tactics, be more
selective whom you help. (as just one example)
Ah no. It has been my experience that in every case where someone has
called me selfish, it was because I was not working toward their desires
or goals instead of my own. It is not an ad hominum, but an observation,
a report of my experience. From the politician on TV that claims that
advocates of tax breaks are being selfish, because they want to keep
more of their money instead of handing it to the poor, and blithely
ignore the fact that this will gain him votes among the poor so he can
stay in office. To the relative who admonishes me for not loaning him
money to start his own business.
But you illustrate a point here. You think that because I called these
people 'selfish', I was merely insulting them. That I was using the
negative connotative meaning rather than its denotative one. The idea of
selfishness has been so demonized in our society, (by whom? and for what
purpose?) that simply identifying selfishness is considered an insult,
instead of identifying a logically inconsistent attitude.
Re Kant and Neitzche: Kant attempted to give a philosophical basis for
altruism. But he could not find a logical reason why a person should
behave in such a manner. Kant was a Lutheran (I think) and his religious
training is the source of his moral theory. But he did not have any
reason to back it up. He ended up attacking reason. But he is hardly
indifferent to the question. He stands firmly for altruistic morality.
Now, according to Kant, reason cannot be relied upon to obtain true
statements about the world. Observation is limited, and will always be
incomplete, and logic, being solely a product of the mind, says nothing
about the world outside the mind. There is no reason to be altruistic,
it is just something that people should do. Neitzche, as you point out
is far removed from that position. What he does is use Kant's argument
to invert the moral question. Instead of me living for everyone else,
everyone should live for me, for the exact same non reasons that Kant
gives. Since morality has no reason, then having others live for you is
just as "rational" as living for others.
> > > Hrm? You just said that draconity is basically unknowable, that
> > > draconity exists but is no way observable (since those observations
> > > could be used to figure out the truth of such draconity). This would
> > > mean that draconity also has no effect on a person's happiness or
> > > personality, since those phenomena, too, could be traced by a
> > > sufficiently intelligent person to draconity. Thus, draconity would be
> > > something that sits off by the side and neither does nor affects
> > > anything. What good or how accurate could such a thing possibly be?
> >
> > Clarification. Independently observable, Objectively observable. You
> > have no way of verifying the contents of another's mind. People can lie.
> > To themselves as
> > well as to others. Science has to sit on the sidelines, because it
> > cannot crack the mind of another. It cannot look in, and independently
> > verify what is going on in there.
>
> By verifying you mean absolutely certain evidence, right? Observation of
> draconity does not need such certainty to have some accuracy, and
> absolute axiomatic accuracy is not the only type that exists.
Grin, true. But again how do you tell the draconity of a person other
than yourself. And no, I do not mean absolutely certain evidence. Any
evidence about the contents of another's mind is going to be inadequate
at this stage of the game. As long as there is the potential for lying,
you have a problem with the data.
But this is based on the person being rational. People are not so much
rational animals, despite what Aristotle thought. They are critters who
have the ability to reason, if they so choose. They can just as blindly
accept whatever they want to believe, as demonstrated by most of
history.
>
> > Now you seem to be arguing that since it is not observable, then it has
> > no effect on a person's happiness. And therefore satisfies the
> > qualifications of "nothing". The problem is that I was not quite clear,
> > as I meant objectively observable. And happiness falls into that
> > category as well. Are you happy? How do I know that other than you
> > telling me? You tell me you are a dragon, in spirit. I have no way of
> > confirming or refuting the validity of that claim.
>
> Yes, you do, though not, now, through very reliable means. You could
> start with the assumption that a person has a reason for saying 'e is a
> dragon, and if you find that there is no evidence of emotional
> self-delusion or neurosis, it can be assumed with significant accuracy
> that draconity means to that person's spirit what they think it means. I
> know very well that this is not absolutely certain, and I also know that
> the degree of accuracy is not and cannot be judged with complete
> precision. This does not mean that the accuracy is nonexistent.
Exactly. You have no idea just how accurate the statement is or not. The
accuracy is based on an assumption about the person, devoid of
corroborating evidence. You are assuming the statement is accurate and
have no way of confirming or refuting that assumption. There are those
who will argue that the mere statement that one is a dragon is evidence
that the person is self delusional and/or neurotic.
Now is it important to you? What effect does another person's draconity
have on you? Your recognition of your draconity makes you happy, (I am
assuming). We have a case brought up of the recognition is making
another miserable. But as long as your happiness or their unhappiness
stays inside the skull, it does not matter to others. It has no effect
on others directly. It does have an effect on the individual, and this
is key.
>
> > What got me to thinking along this line, is one of the other posters who
> > do not believe in dragons. Who think that such people are basically
> > lying to themselves. (Nope, not going to start a flame. Lets keep this
> > cerebral) What if this person were a dragon and they were the one's
> > lying to themselves? Would we have any way of verifying or refuting this
> > hypothesis? Unfortunately no. It is as untestable as the reverse.
>
> There would be a reason for such a person to repress their own
> draconity, or be ignorant of it. If no such reason can be found at all,
> then it is far more likely that not that they are not a dragon.
Grin. In order to fit into this world, in order to not have people look
at you funny, or giving you an "I love me" jacket, and locking you up.
There is reason enough to suppress it.
>
> > > That which has no effect of any kind upon anything else, does not exist.
> > > I truly would not want to make draconity that...
> >
> > Okay what effects does *my* draconity have on you? And for a moment
> > assume it has none, does that make it any less real? :)
>
> In your original statement the effects were not limited to someone else;
> you said, "We cannot base our answer on our present physical forms, and
> we note that what we think about the matter has no bearing as well."
> This seemed to include self-perception as well as perception of others.
Yep. But it does not answer the question. Is draconity real? We'll
discuss how one knows this answer after we get the answer. :)
>
> > > Unless you don't mean that. In which case, curse my twisting eyes.
> > > Still, if you think draconity can cause some kind of effect and yet be
> > > unobservable, then tell me - what are these effects that cannot be
> > > known?
> >
> > Grin, what I am saying is that it is nigh impossible to determine
> > another person's draconity.
>
> I do agree with that; but I draw the line at saying such a thing is
> absolutely impossible to determine.
At present it is. Will it always be so, I do not have a clue. My crystal
ball is in the shop.
> > While some of the ideals we ascribe to
> > dragons may be held by most, even ourselves, it may not be held by other
> > dragons at all. That those same ideals are also very highly regarded by
> > most humans as well. If we limit our definition of who is and is not a
> > real dragon according to who follows (or tries to follow) those ideals,
> > we make them indistinguishable from humans. That if we define down a
> > dragon to that point, then it becomes meaningless.
>
> There is no reason to assume that, because some draconic ideals are
> probably also human, all draconic ideals are identical to human ones!
> Neither does the occasional similarity between the two mean that
> draconity and humanity are indistinguishable from each other.
Can you name one draconic ideal that is not held by some humans? If you
limit to just ideals, you have a problem in definition. If the
similarity is only occasional, then you may have something. But there
has to be a difference, or else you have not differentiated between
humans and dragons.
> > So, what does it mean to be a dragon? Especially since we are forced to
> > exclude physical form? And how do we differentiate that from being
> > human?
>
> There is still something to figure out, but please don't assume I
> consider myself to have done so!
Drat! I was hoping that you had, at least a better idea than I did. Oh
well, if you want I can continue working on Satan's legal team if it
will help.
> > > > The only confusion you will hit is when others are not using
> > > > your personal definitions.
> > >
> > > Erm... how does that relate to the paragraph I wrote?
> >
> > To most people, a dragon is a hexapedal flying reptile who breathes fire
> > and has a perchance for maiden sacrifice. You define it differently from
> > that. If you say 'Dragons exist' well as most people are using a
> > different definition of what a dragon is than you are, they will start
> > to put away sharp objects. To them, your statement is at best
> > inconsistent with their own experiences, and at worse, a sign of
> > insanity.
>
> *grins* Well, _their_ confusion doesn't concern me greatly, since it
> could be corrected with a simple conversation.
As long as they give you time for one. :)
>
> > If you mean that a dragon is someone who identifies himself as a dragon,
> > then you exclude the closeted dragons. If you mean that a dragon is
> > someone who holds these idea(l)s very highly, then you make it
> > indistinguishable from people, and possibly exclude any number of 'bad'
> > dragons.
>
> With the first definition, I make self-belief a qualifier of draconity;
> I _do not_ make the lack of such self-belief a disqualifier. As for the
> second, it can hardly be assumed that humans have figured out all there
> is to know about morality! Ideals can be created which the majority of
> humanity couldn't even comprehend.
Like QM as an example. :) Okay what do you do with someone who says he
is a dragon, yet holds none of the draconic ideals in common with you?
Do you take his word for it, provisionally, or say he is lying?
Or are you stuck with, "Those that say they are, are. Those that say
they are not, may not be, but it is impossible to determine."?
Old fingers, that is why it got capitalized as far as I can remember.
And I dropped the caps a couple sentences before it and had not used up
my cap quota.
I understand that you are able to judge the accuracy of your own
statements, I am curious as to how you do it. I am not sure I understand
the method you are using, so I am trying to clarify. I do not see how
reality can be cheapened, or exactly what you mean by that. I am getting
a parsing error.
> Okay. Please don't get angry that I insulted the method of your 'living
> for another' counterargument, although I believe my complaints to be
> correct.
What is there to be insulted by? I obviously did not make my self as
clear as I should have. I should be insulted that you point out my own
failings?? Or perhaps I should be angry because you disagree with me,
you think I am mistaken. My, my this would be a dull argument if we
agreed with each other. :):):)
I don't get angry, at least not in discussions of this type. neither of
us has used foul language, (or even fowl language). I do know that I can
be somewhat overbearing at times, and there may be a certain passion to
my writings, but please do not think I am ever angry. This has been one
of the most enjoyable exchanges I have had on the internet.
Ben
aka Drakon@Work
Lhexa
AMW wrote:
Now _that's_ an argument, with all this supporting evidence (your
observations) included. Earlier it was just a statement of "People who
call others selfish are themselves selfish" without a supporting
argument or evidence; that is why I thought it a fallacy ad hominem.
However, you do err in limiting the scope of selflessness to instances
of people calling others selfish. It may be that the people who are
comparatively selfless are hesitant about insulting others in that way.
Selflessness and selfishness (please ignore the connotations of the
words) are defined by actions; words may be related, but are definitely
of minor importance.
Again, I do know that many, perhaps even most, instances of a person
seeming to act selfless are in truth the opposite. However, I have seen
and heard of enough instances in which selfishness is extremely unlikely
to come to believe that the statistics of altruism have no bearing on
its truth or falseness as an ideology. Do you (as it would be
interesting to see) have an argument against altruism that is not
statistical (i.e., calling most people not altruistic).
> But you illustrate a point here. You think that because I called these
> people 'selfish', I was merely insulting them. That I was using the
> negative connotative meaning rather than its denotative one. The idea of
> selfishness has been so demonized in our society, (by whom? and for what
> purpose?) that simply identifying selfishness is considered an insult,
> instead of identifying a logically inconsistent attitude.
Furthermore, your list of personages included people to whom public
opinion is, at best, neutral. The list could just as easily have
included saints or philanthropists in tracing the idea; the only way I
could find of resolving the discrepancy was to conclude that you were
attacking the idea by connecting it to infamy (I still don't see how
Hitler has any significant bearing on the idea of altruism). Now it's
going better, though.
> Re Kant and Neitzche: Kant attempted to give a philosophical basis for
> altruism. But he could not find a logical reason why a person should
> behave in such a manner. Kant was a Lutheran (I think) and his religious
> training is the source of his moral theory. But he did not have any
> reason to back it up. He ended up attacking reason. But he is hardly
> indifferent to the question. He stands firmly for altruistic morality.
Sorry, 'twas a mistake on my part. I've only read his 'Foundations to
the Metaphysics of Morals', and not the 'Critique of Practical Reason'.
The first made no mention of altruism while building up its system.
> Now, according to Kant, reason cannot be relied upon to obtain true
> statements about the world.
Not quite true. He claimed that reason is able to make objective
observations of the physical world and judgments of the moral, but that
it was completely unable to come to conclusions about its methods of
doing so.
> Observation is limited, and will always be
> incomplete, and logic, being solely a product of the mind, says nothing
> about the world outside the mind. There is no reason to be altruistic,
> it is just something that people should do. Neitzche, as you point out
> is far removed from that position. What he does is use Kant's argument
> to invert the moral question. Instead of me living for everyone else,
> everyone should live for me, for the exact same non reasons that Kant
> gives. Since morality has no reason, then having others live for you is
> just as "rational" as living for others.
Well, he still didn't have any effect on the idea other than a negative
one. His place in the 'progression of the idea' is doubtful.
> > > > Hrm? You just said that draconity is basically unknowable, that
> > > > draconity exists but is no way observable (since those observations
> > > > could be used to figure out the truth of such draconity). This would
> > > > mean that draconity also has no effect on a person's happiness or
> > > > personality, since those phenomena, too, could be traced by a
> > > > sufficiently intelligent person to draconity. Thus, draconity would be
> > > > something that sits off by the side and neither does nor affects
> > > > anything. What good or how accurate could such a thing possibly be?
> > >
> > > Clarification. Independently observable, Objectively observable. You
> > > have no way of verifying the contents of another's mind. People can lie.
> > > To themselves as
> > > well as to others. Science has to sit on the sidelines, because it
> > > cannot crack the mind of another. It cannot look in, and independently
> > > verify what is going on in there.
> >
> > By verifying you mean absolutely certain evidence, right? Observation of
> > draconity does not need such certainty to have some accuracy, and
> > absolute axiomatic accuracy is not the only type that exists.
>
> Grin, true. But again how do you tell the draconity of a person other
> than yourself. And no, I do not mean absolutely certain evidence. Any
> evidence about the contents of another's mind is going to be inadequate
> at this stage of the game. As long as there is the potential for lying,
> you have a problem with the data.
As, I suspect, it will ever be. Thus, although I do not hesitate to
create provisional definitions of draconity, I try to keep in mind their
extreme tenuousness.
Furthermore, if a person lies, there must be a reason for that lie (even
an innocuous one, like fitting in). A lack of such a reason after
intense search makes lying the less likely alternative, though not
impossible.
It should be noted that if all these tests I've mentioned produce
basically neutral results, as they most often, though not always, do, I
must rely instead on a pragmatic definition of draconity, by treating
others in this manner as they do themselves.
> >
> > Yes, you do, though not, now, through very reliable means. You could
> > start with the assumption that a person has a reason for saying 'e is a
> > dragon, and if you find that there is no evidence of emotional
> > self-delusion or neurosis, it can be assumed with significant accuracy
> > that draconity means to that person's spirit what they think it means. I
> > know very well that this is not absolutely certain, and I also know that
> > the degree of accuracy is not and cannot be judged with complete
> > precision. This does not mean that the accuracy is nonexistent.
>
> Exactly. You have no idea just how accurate the statement is or not. The
> accuracy is based on an assumption about the person, devoid of
> corroborating evidence. You are assuming the statement is accurate and
> have no way of confirming or refuting that assumption. There are those
> who will argue that the mere statement that one is a dragon is evidence
> that the person is self delusional and/or neurotic.
Why did you earlier disavow infinities and yet now require a perfectly
accurate or dependable firmament before _any_ accuracy is possible?
Accuracy exists, and solipsic examination of its foundations does not
eliminate that fact, only prove that there is more to be learned.
I much prefer your attempts to disprove the accuracy by presenting
counterarguments (such as the possibilities of lies and delusionment)
over refuting accuracy by showing that it is not known how accurate the
accuracy is. A proposition of the form "You do not know how it is true,
therefore it is not true" is not valid, although you don't resort to
that.
As for the mere belief of draconity being neurotic, without any
associated emotional problems... that is outside of the definition of
neurosis. Psychology is able to deal with emotional self-delusion and
the beliefs based on that, but not on self-delusions that actually have
mainly rational (that is, caused by thought) basis.
> > There would be a reason for such a person to repress their own
> > draconity, or be ignorant of it. If no such reason can be found at all,
> > then it is far more likely that not that they are not a dragon.
>
> Grin. In order to fit into this world, in order to not have people look
> at you funny, or giving you an "I love me" jacket, and locking you up.
> There is reason enough to suppress it.
There are people completely free of such worries. I may assume of them
that they are not repressing draconity.
> > In your original statement the effects were not limited to someone else;
> > you said, "We cannot base our answer on our present physical forms, and
> > we note that what we think about the matter has no bearing as well."
> > This seemed to include self-perception as well as perception of others.
>
> Yep. But it does not answer the question. Is draconity real? We'll
> discuss how one knows this answer after we get the answer. :)
Then, what is _required_ for it to be real? Probably not bodies...
> > > > Unless you don't mean that. In which case, curse my twisting eyes.
> > > > Still, if you think draconity can cause some kind of effect and yet be
> > > > unobservable, then tell me - what are these effects that cannot be
> > > > known?
> > >
> > > Grin, what I am saying is that it is nigh impossible to determine
> > > another person's draconity.
> >
> > I do agree with that; but I draw the line at saying such a thing is
> > absolutely impossible to determine.
>
> At present it is. Will it always be so, I do not have a clue. My crystal
> ball is in the shop.
By absolutely impossible I mean forever impossible, maybe even logically
impossible, not just practically impossible, which I still agree with.
*grins* I will continue to defend the possibility of it being possible
to know draconity...
> > There is no reason to assume that, because some draconic ideals are
> > probably also human, all draconic ideals are identical to human ones!
> > Neither does the occasional similarity between the two mean that
> > draconity and humanity are indistinguishable from each other.
>
> Can you name one draconic ideal that is not held by some humans? If you
> limit to just ideals, you have a problem in definition. If the
> similarity is only occasional, then you may have something. But there
> has to be a difference, or else you have not differentiated between
> humans and dragons.
Remember that "some" humans holding an ideal does not make it human.
"Some" could be two schizophrenics. Also note that a draconic ideal
would not be universal among dragons, either. That said, I think a
yearning to wander is a draconic ideal, one that is far from common
among humans; and those times in which humans _do_ like it (as among
nomads) are results of necessity. Dragons, I presume, would enjoy
wandering even if they didn't have to, whereas humans, when presented
the option of spending their lives in one place or wandering, with no
overwhelming necessity for either, almost always choose the former.
I don't think I could name another draconic ideal with such precision,
though, unless it's one of those that's also human. Exoticness of a
non-human type does remain difficult for me.
> > There is still something to figure out, but please don't assume I
> > consider myself to have done so!
>
> Drat! I was hoping that you had, at least a better idea than I did. Oh
> well, if you want I can continue working on Satan's legal team if it
> will help.
I don't even have humanity figured out, although I presume to know them
to a far higher degree than dragons.
> > *grins* Well, _their_ confusion doesn't concern me greatly, since it
> > could be corrected with a simple conversation.
>
> As long as they give you time for one. :)
If they don't, that's another reason not to be worried about their
confusion.
> >
> > > If you mean that a dragon is someone who identifies himself as a dragon,
> > > then you exclude the closeted dragons. If you mean that a dragon is
> > > someone who holds these idea(l)s very highly, then you make it
> > > indistinguishable from people, and possibly exclude any number of 'bad'
> > > dragons.
> >
> > With the first definition, I make self-belief a qualifier of draconity;
> > I _do not_ make the lack of such self-belief a disqualifier. As for the
> > second, it can hardly be assumed that humans have figured out all there
> > is to know about morality! Ideals can be created which the majority of
> > humanity couldn't even comprehend.
>
> Like QM as an example. :) Okay what do you do with someone who says he
> is a dragon, yet holds none of the draconic ideals in common with you?
> Do you take his word for it, provisionally, or say he is lying?
You mean, someone who is morally neutral? Then I would accept the
draconity out of a desire to avoid conflict and out of a healthy measure
of uncertainty.
> Or are you stuck with, "Those that say they are, are. Those that say
> they are not, may not be, but it is impossible to determine."?
Those that say there are, are more likely to be, and I will assume they
are. Those that say they aren't, I won't bother with the question.
> >
> > I am able to judge, to a limited extent, the accuracy of my statements;
> > however, anybody willing to could drive that supposition into such
> > loathesome pedantics that both debaters would become sick of it, without
> > resolving in even a minor way either the truth or the falseness of it
> > (your question about significance might lead that way). That's why I
> > said I am unwilling to introduce it into arguments except as an aside.
> > However, the cheapening (why'd you capitalise it?) is more a result of
> > detrimental effects caused by a limited viewpoint than an actual change
> > in reality.
>
> Old fingers, that is why it got capitalized as far as I can remember.
> And I dropped the caps a couple sentences before it and had not used up
> my cap quota.
>
> I understand that you are able to judge the accuracy of your own
> statements, I am curious as to how you do it. I am not sure I understand
> the method you are using, so I am trying to clarify. I do not see how
> reality can be cheapened, or exactly what you mean by that. I am getting
> a parsing error.
I will continue to try to explain, until I am no longer able to do so;
already I have given a few tests that can be used with hesitation. Feel
free to continue questioning me about it (though I need specific
questions... I don't summarize well), provided you don't use that
'solipsic fallacy' I mentioned earlier. *grins* That thing annoys me.
By the way, while thinking about what to use to assume accuracy when the
underpinnings of that accuracy are hazy, I came up with a simple, nifty
little method, though one open to abuse; I'll present it next time,
after I've given it more thought.
> > Okay. Please don't get angry that I insulted the method of your 'living
> > for another' counterargument, although I believe my complaints to be
> > correct.
>
> What is there to be insulted by? I obviously did not make my self as
> clear as I should have. I should be insulted that you point out my own
> failings?? Or perhaps I should be angry because you disagree with me,
> you think I am mistaken. My, my this would be a dull argument if we
> agreed with each other. :):):)
*grins* Actually, a longer speech would probably have cleared up that
mistake.
> I don't get angry, at least not in discussions of this type. neither of
> us has used foul language, (or even fowl language). I do know that I can
> be somewhat overbearing at times, and there may be a certain passion to
> my writings, but please do not think I am ever angry. This has been one
> of the most enjoyable exchanges I have had on the internet.
Neither do I, but I have made people angry in the past.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@Work
Congratulations, Ben! Several times while writing this post I reached
the limit of how many characters Netscape can handle, and had to delete
more quotations. I had to fragment it...
Lhexa
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
>
> Bacon once wrote that for Nature to be commanded, she must be obeyed.
> Scotty is quoted as reminding Kirk that he "canna change the laws of
> physics." In order to obey Nature, you have to know what it is saying,
> how it works, have a true model of reality. Without that, it inhibits
> the mind's ability to affect physical change, either in itself or its
> environment. It cannot say, predict the weather if it has no idea how
> weather works, how the laws of Nature come about to form storm systems
> and rain clouds, or droughts. And thereby makes that mind susceptible to
> damaging changes in its environment.
>
> False memes get weeded out by in essence killing the minds that hold
> them, who act upon those memes, who treat those memes as true when they
> are false. (or vice versa).
Hold on, we've gotten sidetracked; I'll try to beat it into a shape
relevant to both of our parts. My words were about a meme's survival in
a mind, not the mind's survival. If all minds were alike, then memes
would evolve the same in all minds; but, since my observation that
different evidence favors different memes refutes that (although I
didn't quite get to stating it), alterations in a mind must affect
memes, and, very importantly, both the mind and the meme itself would
judge whether or not a meme 'survives', since observation of evidence is
a type of judgment that is not contained in the meme. To what extent
does the mind judge a meme's survival, as opposed to a meme's
composition determing the survival? Since these two are interconnected,
is there, in fact, any real way to determine where the meme ends and
where the mind begins?
> Now in our modern world, society goes to great extremes in protecting us
> from ourselves. We are constantly bombarded with warning and propaganda
> attempting to prevent us from doing dumb things and getting ourselves
> killed. We make things like seat belt and helmet laws, to protect us
> from ourselves and the memes we hold. We are inhibited from say, driving
> a motorcycle without a helmet, because of the threat of force. We are
> not allowed to act on many of our memes, allegedly for our own safety.
> So the meme survives, simply because it is allowed to exist in a dormant
> state. Only through the threat of force against the mind are such
> dormant memes allowed to exist. Remove the threat and you will see a
> rising death toll as bad memes lead people into stupid actions and get
> themselves (or others) killed.
Again, my examples were not a result of a person being killed by foolish
actions but of a person killing 'emself by suicide, with emotional
causes. Were you able to read that other post?
> > That doesn't help yet, since the things you mentioned have no particular
> > connection or relation to emotion, while that similarity is very
> > important to my theory of ideals. Nor do I have any idea of the scope of
> > your definition; for that reason, I'm still unable to decide whether an
> > ideal would be an idea...
>
> Right they don't. I don't see a connection between emotion and ideas,
> other than the obvious labeling of emotions. An idea is the product of
> thought, of rationality, logic and observation, of integrating concepts.
> Emotions are more sub, or unconscious. As a matter of fact, rationality
> can get in the way of emotions, just as emotions can get in the way of
> thought.
More on this in a moment.
> >
> > A person feeling some ideal of anti-Semitism (I don't know that there is
> > one) would learn avoidance? How's that? Or are you speaking of that
> > person's victims?
>
> You do not know if there is an ideal of anti-Semitism? Or you do not
> think that anti-Semitism is "ideal"? I think that somewhere a value
> judgment is being made, that as part of your definition, you see ideals
> as "good" in and of themselves, as intrinsically of value regardless of
> the validity of such an ideal. Is this close?
No, I meant that I doubted that anti-Semitism had its own private ideal,
being of such limited scope, and having only insignificant differences
with other hate groups. I do not doubt that hate groups _in general_ are
powered in great part by ideals.
So, what would such an ideal(s) have to do with avoidance?
In that case, I am attempting to posit ideals as a fourth mode of
thought. Before I explain how that is, let me argue a few necessities of
your system... First, the introduction of a higher mode of thought does
not make a lower one useless. Feeling something, put crudely, is
necessary to act on a thought, and believing is necessary so that
something may be assumed. I know that few, if any, results of rational
judgment come through with complete certainty; it is only a matter of
which result is considered more likely or rational. Then, the mode of
believing must come into play to assume, even temporarily, that the
result is true and useful; then, it must be felt true so that it may be
acted upon and given the burden of risks.
You could make these suppositions untrue by giving the third mode of
thought (call it reason, though the connotations are different) an
extremely wide scope, so that it includes within itself the capability
of acting upon, assuming, and originating thoughts - in short, doing
whatever there is that can be done to them). In that case, 'twould
include ideals anyway. Furthermore, it would brush dangerously close to
the type of definition of infinity that you earlier eschewed. I see no
problem in defining an infinity that has neither lower nor upper bounds,
nor in defining something finite that has both. However, defining
something that has a lower bound but no upper bound is very dangerous,
for it leads to fallacies of all sorts - for instance, assuming that
what is true of the lower part of this infinity is true of everything
higher. This is not to say that such definitions are inherently false...
they just lend themselves well to fallacious reasoning. I worry that you
have done this to your definition of reason, by giving it a lower bound
(right next to belief), but assuming that there is no limit to what it
can achieve, then assuming that what is true of the familiar portions of
this reason (emotionlessness) will always be true. This may not be the
case with you, of course.
My concept of ideals assumes that there is an upper limit, even if I
have not yet found it; presumably, that limit will come when what makes
an ideal distinct (its blending of thought and emotion into something
new, its forcefulness, its applicability) is no longer so important.
However, since I've set out to describe 'idealling something' (I don't
like making verbs - before here I've been intentionally alternating
between knowing, feeling, and thinking ideals) as a fourth mode of
thought, I think it would be an originator of thoughts and ideas. The
other three modes would then be put into use: reason would judge the
accuracy, scope and usefulness of that idea, belief would make it into
an assumption, then feeling would act on it. Note that I do not assume
that ideals would be the only sources of new ideas; those could come
from biology, or from applying old methods to new data. This is probably
true of the other modes: for instance, habit can carry forth an action
as easily as feeling.
I also define an object of the spirit according to its primary function;
I've just used the mode theory to show it not incompatible with your
ideas. And, sorry, I have not yet come up with a necessary reason for
emotional meaningfulness to be connected with the accuracy of an ideal;
the best I can come up with is that such spirit provides the _effort_
that goes into producing the ideal, while thought reaps the benefit of
it.
> But getting back to "feeling an ideal". In essences you are saying that
> you know of an ideal yet have no idea (or at least unsure of) where it
> came from, what brought it into existence, how it works, etc. And that
> makes it difficult to examine as well as work out how to apply that
> particular ideal to practical situations. Close?
That is not so. Parts of the aforementioned learning from an ideal would
come from observing its causes, its structure, its implications, its
impact, and even its demise; it would not happen through easy intuition.
> >
> > Again, the ideal of honor wouldn't necessarily _be_ honor or honorable,
> > just one way in which to learn it. Heck, it is even true that a system
> > of honor is not honorable, if it is not held to!
>
> Not sure what you are saying here. I think you lost me. How can a system
> of honor be not honorable by not being practiced?
>
> First off, the system is not honorable, that is anthropomorphizing.
> People are honorable, not systems, or even ideas. Actions conducted by
> people, of their own free choice are honorable or not, but even then it
> is a reflection on the person, and not the ideal or meme being held by
> that person.
The system of honor is, in a way, honorable: just observe the fact that,
if you have an honorable person with a system of honor, and you could
somehow take away the system, the honor of the person would vanish.
However, it is equally correct that a system of honor with nobody to
practice it is not honorable. Thus, both a system and a person can be
honorable - but only when there is both (or some alternative to a system
that has a like effect - I know that honor need not be systematic). A
system of honor not held to would have the same effect as no system, and
so that kind of separation would remove the honor both from the person
and from the system.
>
> Yes!!! (Although we can discuss scientific morality at a later point.
> Game theory is something I want to look into one of these days, I think
> it holds some vital clues on the question.)
What is game theory, if you know?
> > And the ideals are always incomplete; there're always more theories to
> > make and ideals to know...
>
> I am not sure about the idea of infinite knowledge. That it is required
> to accurately model the universe or that it even exists.
I hold change, progress, and originality to be good things in and of
themselves as well as for the effects they bring. If it were possible to
reach a point where these are no longer needed, they would not be good
except as related to others, contradicting that first sentence. Thus, I
apply my cheapening axiom mentioned earlier to this, judging a worldview
in which knowledge, beauty, or anything of that sort has a definite
limit to be a cheapened version of the real universe. If it should turn
out that this type of infinity is a logical contradiction (and so not
true), however, then that worldview would _not_ be a cheapening of
reality. I just haven't seen any evidence as of yet that these types of
infinities lead to logical contradictions, unless the said infinity is
somehow said to be 'limited', for instance, homogeneous - in which case
there could be a contradiction. I don't hold to that type.
> > >
> > > I would argue that. I think that "living for others" has a very bad
> > > historical record. As well as poor logic.
> >
> > *grins* Didn't you defend paladinism in your last post?
>
> You see a conflict? :):) Would it surprise you to learn that this
> selfish bastard you are arguing with was a member of the USNavy, ready
> to defend this country with his very life if needed? :)
No, though it is interesting. I've already seen that your 'selfishness'
is amended in an Ayn Randish way (saying that what is in the actual
self-interest of one person does not truly harm another), and thus not
so likely to be a rationalization of actual cruelty.
> > Or it can make them think that you can be pushed around. It is my
> > experience that for every good action that can teach others just by
> > observation and example, there is some mindset practically designed to
> > work against and ridicule it, against which that action is nearly
> > helpless on its own.
>
> True. Bad guys don't have to play by any rules. But again, there is
> something about evil that gets forgotten. It is self destructive. The
> problem with self destructive ideas is that they kill the host, as well
> as make it harder to gain ground, by serving as bad examples to other
> minds.
I said that... *grins* However, to leave evil at that would not explain
its prominence. It must also be taken into account that evil tends to
seem a better option in the short run; thus, a person ignoring or
unaware of the long run might ignore the ethical implications and take
that option.
I also do not put out of mind the possibility of an evil that is able to
evolve _against_ itself (that is, its own nature is the environment that
it must adapt to), constantly introducing new facets that limit its own
self-destructive tendencies.
> For the above example, you see that helping others is self destructive.
> Obviously this is not good for you, so what do you do? Do you continue
> to act for their benefit? Or do you change your tactics, be more
> selective whom you help. (as just one example)
That would depend on how far-sighted you are...
My message has gotten too big, and I have to split it into two parts.
This is the end of the first.
Lhexa
AMW
Okay first off, if the mind dies, then the meme dies with it, unless it
is communicated (infects?) other minds prior to the death of its host.
Second, I think that the mind judges the meme's survival. One can change
one's mind. Now where the meme's content comes in, is how accurate or
true a meme is, as compared to reality. A mind will tend to judge false
memes as false, and discard them. Some minds will even go around and
inform other minds as to the falseness of a meme, like we are doing
here. A mind holding a false meme will tend to get itself killed off,
thereby a Darwinian (actually Lemarkian) mechanism comes into play.
As you your final question. Good one! Let me think on it a bit longer. I
see the mind as analogous to a stage, on which various ideas, emotions,
memories, sense data strut and fret there hour. The difference between
General Relativity and Newtonian Mechanics is the underlying 'stage' in
GR is dynamic, whereas in Newton, it is static and of only one
particular topology. In GR, objects alter this stage, as well are
altered by it. (Space tells matter how to move. Matter tells space how
to curve.)
but there is more to the mind than just a playing field. It is also the
player, the guy/gal inside that judges and decides, that translate this
idea into an action, and discards that idea, based on available
evidence, or perhaps some kind of conflict with another meme, or
whatever method of judging the player chooses.
So do meme's alter this playing field? Hmmm.......
> Again, my examples were not a result of a person being killed by foolish
> actions but of a person killing 'emself by suicide, with emotional
> causes. Were you able to read that other post?
I have not been able to hunt it up just yet.
> > You do not know if there is an ideal of anti-Semitism? Or you do not
> > think that anti-Semitism is "ideal"? I think that somewhere a value
> > judgment is being made, that as part of your definition, you see ideals
> > as "good" in and of themselves, as intrinsically of value regardless of
> > the validity of such an ideal. Is this close?
>
> No, I meant that I doubted that anti-Semitism had its own private ideal,
> being of such limited scope, and having only insignificant differences
> with other hate groups. I do not doubt that hate groups _in general_ are
> powered in great part by ideals.
To take one classic example, and since we are discussing anti-Semitism
as an example, there were several ideals behind the anti-Semite
attitude. First, remember that the Jews were considered outsiders to the
Germans, despite the fact they lived, worked and grew up in the
communities. They were a different people, had different customs and
religious beliefs. They were also successful in business, partly because
they were impartial outsiders, or at the very least viewed as such.
Add to this mix the idea of German superiority, with Neitzche's supermen
who were beyond good and evil, and a bit of Darwinian evolution, and you
have the beginnings of a hate group. (Also add Hitler's own belief that
his grandfather may have been a local Jew who would not marry his
grandmother.) Group identity is something of a problem in this area.
Hopefully I will get to this later, as it has a bearing on dragons.
>
> So, what would such an ideal(s) have to do with avoidance?
Bad idea(l)s should be avoided. They are dangerous. anti-Semitism is
such a bad idea, well basically, it is a false model of people. History
has shown just what kind of excesses this type of thinking can lead to,
and how detrimental it is to life as well as civilization. So such memes
should be remembered, and kept in cages, lest they spring up again and
we have to repeat the horrors of the second world war.
> In that case, I am attempting to posit ideals as a fourth mode of
> thought. Before I explain how that is, let me argue a few necessities of
> your system... First, the introduction of a higher mode of thought does
> not make a lower one useless. Feeling something, put crudely, is
> necessary to act on a thought, and believing is necessary so that
> something may be assumed. I know that few, if any, results of rational
> judgment come through with complete certainty; it is only a matter of
> which result is considered more likely or rational. Then, the mode of
> believing must come into play to assume, even temporarily, that the
> result is true and useful; then, it must be felt true so that it may be
> acted upon and given the burden of risks.
Very good points. I was not attempting to denigrate one mode from
another, and apologize if it came off that way. Who was it that said
"Nothing is ever accomplished without passion."? And what is passion but
an emotion, a feeling?
As far as beliefs, I understand that certain things have to be accepted
"on faith" as it were. But I think that such beliefs should be held at
arms length, identified as such, and constantly tested, until further
evidence lets them fall elsewhere. Either confirmed by direct
experience, or refuted by the same. Godel points out that some elements
will always be untestable, and I hope he is wrong there. :)
>
> You could make these suppositions untrue by giving the third mode of
> thought (call it reason, though the connotations are different) an
> extremely wide scope, so that it includes within itself the capability
> of acting upon, assuming, and originating thoughts - in short, doing
> whatever there is that can be done to them). In that case, 'twould
> include ideals anyway. Furthermore, it would brush dangerously close to
> the type of definition of infinity that you earlier eschewed. I see no
> problem in defining an infinity that has neither lower nor upper bounds,
> nor in defining something finite that has both. However, defining
> something that has a lower bound but no upper bound is very dangerous,
> for it leads to fallacies of all sorts - for instance, assuming that
> what is true of the lower part of this infinity is true of everything
> higher. This is not to say that such definitions are inherently false...
> they just lend themselves well to fallacious reasoning. I worry that you
> have done this to your definition of reason, by giving it a lower bound
> (right next to belief), but assuming that there is no limit to what it
> can achieve, then assuming that what is true of the familiar portions of
> this reason (emotionlessness) will always be true. This may not be the
> case with you, of course.
Is there an upper bound on logical proofs, at least ones that are
worthwhile? Good question. Hmmm...
But the mind can rationally act upon an idea. The mind can decide that
in order to get a particular point across, logic is not going to work,
so one has to appeal to the audience's emotions, or feign anger, or
other such tactics. (Indeed it could be argued that to do otherwise
would be ineffective in some situations. And hence illogical.:) )
The key component of reason is that it cannot contradict itself and
still call itself reason. That alone should be able to rule out most
fallacious reasonings. There are other traps to avoid as well, and I
think almost all of them have been mapped out. There are various
websites on fallacious reasoning and bad debating tactics one can look
at, such as...
http://www.best.com/~dlindsay/skeptic/arguments.html#consequent
as one example.
Now while I consider myself a fan of reason, the list I provided was not
meant to imply any value judgment. It is more of a map, of the different
methods used by people, only.
> My concept of ideals assumes that there is an upper limit, even if I
> have not yet found it; presumably, that limit will come when what makes
> an ideal distinct (its blending of thought and emotion into something
> new, its forcefulness, its applicability) is no longer so important.
> However, since I've set out to describe 'idealling something' (I don't
> like making verbs - before here I've been intentionally alternating
> between knowing, feeling, and thinking ideals) as a fourth mode of
> thought, I think it would be an originator of thoughts and ideas. The
> other three modes would then be put into use: reason would judge the
> accuracy, scope and usefulness of that idea, belief would make it into
> an assumption, then feeling would act on it. Note that I do not assume
> that ideals would be the only sources of new ideas; those could come
> from biology, or from applying old methods to new data. This is probably
> true of the other modes: for instance, habit can carry forth an action
> as easily as feeling.
Hold the phone a second. First off, reason has a known problem, and that
is in its first principles or axioms. They must be validated by some
other means such as observation. Perhaps we should put observation in
the list as well, but I am so used to thinking of the scientific method,
which includes both logic and observation, that I may have glossed over
that part.
[Now you can argue that the acceptance of the an observation boils down
to a belief. A belief that one's sensory apparatus is giving an accurate
representation of the world outside the skull. And you would be right.
But if you look at the counterarguement, that your senses are not giving
you such data, then you are left in a very bad state, philosophically
speaking. In short, there are reasons to believe the first is true. :)]
But reason does not judge. That is left up to the 'player'. I think I
need to digress here just a bit.
Benian (or Drakonian) Metaphysics:
The world consists of 4 parts, and is analogous to a game.
You have the pieces
You have the board, where the game is played, (both space and time)
You have the rules by which the game is played.
And you have the players. That is us. We are the ones that make the
decisions as to which memes to keep and which to toss aside. The player,
the thing that wills, that judges and decides which action is to be
attempted.
Reason does not judge, you do, based on either what reason tells you or
what some other mode tells you. OR even a combination of what the
various tools you have available tell you. Reason will say that if A is
true, B follows, then C etc.
And we are using two different meanings for believing something. When I
say, "I believe A", then I am saying that I have no evidence or logical
proof for A, but I "trust" some authority or some other observer is
telling me the truth. I am also implicitly saying that such trust is
provisional, until I have further evidence of my own to support or
refute A.
You appear to be saying that you have a higher confidence in your
beliefs than say your feelings or possibly reasoning ability. That
"thinking" A is true means you are not as certain of A as "believing" A.
For me the reverse is true. I have more faith in my reasonings than I do
my beliefs. (I have less faith in my faith?)
> I also define an object of the spirit according to its primary function;
> I've just used the mode theory to show it not incompatible with your
> ideas. And, sorry, I have not yet come up with a necessary reason for
> emotional meaningfulness to be connected with the accuracy of an ideal;
> the best I can come up with is that such spirit provides the _effort_
> that goes into producing the ideal, while thought reaps the benefit of
> it.
Again, reason is a tool, thinking is a tool that the "soul" to use a
term, in order to judge the validity of a proposition or to construct
the same.
>
> > But getting back to "feeling an ideal". In essences you are saying that
> > you know of an ideal yet have no idea (or at least unsure of) where it
> > came from, what brought it into existence, how it works, etc. And that
> > makes it difficult to examine as well as work out how to apply that
> > particular ideal to practical situations. Close?
>
> That is not so. Parts of the aforementioned learning from an ideal would
> come from observing its causes, its structure, its implications, its
> impact, and even its demise; it would not happen through easy intuition.
In other words you would reason the ideal. You would think it rather
than feel it?
> > > Again, the ideal of honor wouldn't necessarily _be_ honor or honorable,
> > > just one way in which to learn it. Heck, it is even true that a system
> > > of honor is not honorable, if it is not held to!
> >
> > Not sure what you are saying here. I think you lost me. How can a system
> > of honor be not honorable by not being practiced?
> >
> > First off, the system is not honorable, that is anthropomorphizing.
> > People are honorable, not systems, or even ideas. Actions conducted by
> > people, of their own free choice are honorable or not, but even then it
> > is a reflection on the person, and not the ideal or meme being held by
> > that person.
>
> The system of honor is, in a way, honorable: just observe the fact that,
> if you have an honorable person with a system of honor, and you could
> somehow take away the system, the honor of the person would vanish.
> However, it is equally correct that a system of honor with nobody to
> practice it is not honorable. Thus, both a system and a person can be
> honorable - but only when there is both (or some alternative to a system
> that has a like effect - I know that honor need not be systematic). A
> system of honor not held to would have the same effect as no system, and
> so that kind of separation would remove the honor both from the person
> and from the system.
I think I see what you are saying, but again I disagree. I do not think
that honor is something that can be held by objects, just people, based
on their actions. I think you are applying a property to a class of
objects that is not applicable. But let me think on it some more.
> > Yes!!! (Although we can discuss scientific morality at a later point.
> > Game theory is something I want to look into one of these days, I think
> > it holds some vital clues on the question.)
>
> What is game theory, if you know?
The study of interactive decision making. It explores what choices are
available and attempts to scientifically model those choices and effects
of those choices, on a system, which includes a "player" or decision
maker, as well as possibly other decision makers. It looks pretty cool,
however, there are only so many hours, dammit. It is a big thing in
economics. As morality and ethics are rules by which people make
decisions, it appears to be exactly what the doctor ordered.
> > > And the ideals are always incomplete; there're always more theories to
> > > make and ideals to know...
> >
> > I am not sure about the idea of infinite knowledge. That it is required
> > to accurately model the universe or that it even exists.
>
> I hold change, progress, and originality to be good things in and of
> themselves as well as for the effects they bring. If it were possible to
> reach a point where these are no longer needed, they would not be good
> except as related to others, contradicting that first sentence. Thus, I
> apply my cheapening axiom mentioned earlier to this, judging a worldview
> in which knowledge, beauty, or anything of that sort has a definite
> limit to be a cheapened version of the real universe. If it should turn
> out that this type of infinity is a logical contradiction (and so not
> true), however, then that worldview would _not_ be a cheapening of
> reality. I just haven't seen any evidence as of yet that these types of
> infinities lead to logical contradictions, unless the said infinity is
> somehow said to be 'limited', for instance, homogeneous - in which case
> there could be a contradiction. I don't hold to that type.
Okay first off, I hold nothing to be good or bad in and of itself. Those
are value judgments and get rid of the valuer, which is me (for my
values. You for your values) and such judgments are irrelevant.
Change for the sake of change is not necessarily a good thing. Suppose
you live in a democracy. Then if change is good, changing to a
repressive dictatorship would be good. I disagree. The same arguments
can be said for originality as well. Progress implies a goal of some
kind, and a good goal at that. (One that helps the valuer live a longer
or better life.)
Change does not necessarily mean infinite either. In geometry there are
shapes that are bounded, yet can be viewed as infinite. The circle is
one such shape. :)
> > > > I would argue that. I think that "living for others" has a very bad
> > > > historical record. As well as poor logic.
> > >
> > > *grins* Didn't you defend paladinism in your last post?
> >
> > You see a conflict? :):) Would it surprise you to learn that this
> > selfish bastard you are arguing with was a member of the USNavy, ready
> > to defend this country with his very life if needed? :)
>
> No, though it is interesting. I've already seen that your 'selfishness'
> is amended in an Ayn Randish way (saying that what is in the actual
> self-interest of one person does not truly harm another), and thus not
> so likely to be a rationalization of actual cruelty.
Darn it. You peeked :)
Alot of my thinking on this is derived from Rand, which I had only
discovered about 2(?) years ago. As well as the works of David Kelly. I
hesitate to introduce her as she is considered a "bad girl" in
philosophical circles. She voiced a strong dislike for Kant's work, and
communism. She had a rather bombastic style of writing which rubs many
people the wrong way. She was a witness for the prosecution during the
McCarthy hearings, which earned her a black list entry to many
academics. Many of her followers have taken on the trappings of a cult
of personality, which I find amusing since it is one of the things she
argued against.
But all that aside, I find her logic largely exceptional. While her
atheism I find troubling, (and unnecessary), I find a largely agree with
what she has to say. However, I disagree with her at points, so the best
I can call myself is a
"Heretical Objectivist"
> > True. Bad guys don't have to play by any rules. But again, there is
> > something about evil that gets forgotten. It is self destructive. The
> > problem with self destructive ideas is that they kill the host, as well
> > as make it harder to gain ground, by serving as bad examples to other
> > minds.
>
> I said that... *grins* However, to leave evil at that would not explain
> its prominence. It must also be taken into account that evil tends to
> seem a better option in the short run; thus, a person ignoring or
> unaware of the long run might ignore the ethical implications and take
> that option.
Yes.
> I also do not put out of mind the possibility of an evil that is able to
> evolve _against_ itself (that is, its own nature is the environment that
> it must adapt to), constantly introducing new facets that limit its own
> self-destructive tendencies.
Hmm.... this sounds interesting. If evil is working for its betterment,
then wouldn't it become good? I am reminded of a saying that "out of
chaos comes order." Out of evil comes good???
> > For the above example, you see that helping others is self destructive.
> > Obviously this is not good for you, so what do you do? Do you continue
> > to act for their benefit? Or do you change your tactics, be more
> > selective whom you help. (as just one example)
>
> That would depend on how far-sighted you are...
Which is better, to be far sighted or to be short sighted? :)
>
> My message has gotten too big, and I have to split it into two parts.
> This is the end of the first.
Put two long winded dragons together, and see what happens :)
Ben
aka Drakon@work
AMW
Lhexa wrote:
>
> This is the beginning of the second part.
>
> AMW wrote:
> >
> > Lhexa wrote:
> > Ah no. It has been my experience that in every case where someone has
> > called me selfish, it was because I was not working toward their desires
> > or goals instead of my own. It is not an ad hominum, but an observation,
> > a report of my experience. From the politician on TV that claims that
> > advocates of tax breaks are being selfish, because they want to keep
> > more of their money instead of handing it to the poor, and blithely
> > ignore the fact that this will gain him votes among the poor so he can
> > stay in office. To the relative who admonishes me for not loaning him
> > money to start his own business.
>
> Now _that's_ an argument, with all this supporting evidence (your
> observations) included. Earlier it was just a statement of "People who
> call others selfish are themselves selfish" without a supporting
> argument or evidence; that is why I thought it a fallacy ad hominem.
My apologies. This is getting long as it is. :)
>
> However, you do err in limiting the scope of selflessness to instances
> of people calling others selfish. It may be that the people who are
> comparatively selfless are hesitant about insulting others in that way.
> Selflessness and selfishness (please ignore the connotations of the
> words) are defined by actions; words may be related, but are definitely
> of minor importance.
>
> Again, I do know that many, perhaps even most, instances of a person
> seeming to act selfless are in truth the opposite. However, I have seen
> and heard of enough instances in which selfishness is extremely unlikely
> to come to believe that the statistics of altruism have no bearing on
> its truth or falseness as an ideology. Do you (as it would be
> interesting to see) have an argument against altruism that is not
> statistical (i.e., calling most people not altruistic).
Okay. First off is a totally selfless act even possible? Do you feel
good when you help someone out? That in and of itself, even if there is
no material gain, a benefit. And if you gain by acting "selflessly",
then you have committed a selfish act.
Second of all, one can look to the historical example of communism. Here
you have altruism translated into a political ideology. (At least in
theory if not in practice.) People were expected to work, not for their
own benefit, but for the benefit of everyone in the state. What happened
is that people found out rather quickly that having ability was a
liability, rather than an asset. "From each according to his ability,"
became dangerous. Because those with more ability were expected to work
harder, and produce more, and that the benefits paid out for that work
did not depend in any way on the output. A guy making 20 widgets an hour
made just as much as the guy making 1. Possibly less if the second guy
had more need, more dependents, etc. You work harder for less than the
unproductive person. You give the ones with ability the reason to "slack
off" and mimic the behavior of the unproductive.
Now you can argue that people were acting selfishly. That an "ideal" man
would not sweat the difference in pay. But if you work the one with
ability harder, you wear them out faster. And then you are left with the
needs of the unproductive, and no producers to provide for those needs.
You cannot reward effort, because then it would become a benefit, a
selfish action. So you have no means of giving incentive to the
producers as any such incentive would make their actions selfish. One
could threaten them, but then they can play stupid, and you lose them
that way.
It is basically a Darwinian argument. The individual with more needs,
well, needs more. The person who needs less does not have to expend as
much effort to provide for those needs as one who has more of a load.
They use less resources as well. So in competition, the one with the
greater need has to face off against the many with lesser needs, who
have more time to do other things, such as make babies with lesser
needs, figure out better hunting strategies, etc. You get a population
shift, and the individuals with greater needs dies out. To an altruist,
everyone else is a need he has to provide for. And if that means at the
expense of his own life, well, there ya go. Can you get more selfless
than that? The selfish person has just himself, and therefore the
evolutionary advantage.
> Furthermore, your list of personages included people to whom public
> opinion is, at best, neutral. The list could just as easily have
> included saints or philanthropists in tracing the idea; the only way I
> could find of resolving the discrepancy was to conclude that you were
> attacking the idea by connecting it to infamy (I still don't see how
> Hitler has any significant bearing on the idea of altruism). Now it's
> going better, though.
I got a bit too abbreviated. Sorry. Do you understand the connection
now?
> > Re Kant and Neitzche: Kant attempted to give a philosophical basis for
> > altruism. But he could not find a logical reason why a person should
> > behave in such a manner. Kant was a Lutheran (I think) and his religious
> > training is the source of his moral theory. But he did not have any
> > reason to back it up. He ended up attacking reason. But he is hardly
> > indifferent to the question. He stands firmly for altruistic morality.
>
> Sorry, 'twas a mistake on my part. I've only read his 'Foundations to
> the Metaphysics of Morals', and not the 'Critique of Practical Reason'.
> The first made no mention of altruism while building up its system.
>
> > Now, according to Kant, reason cannot be relied upon to obtain true
> > statements about the world.
>
> Not quite true. He claimed that reason is able to make objective
> observations of the physical world and judgments of the moral, but that
> it was completely unable to come to conclusions about its methods of
> doing so.
And this makes no sense as reason is itself a methodology.
> > Observation is limited, and will always be
> > incomplete, and logic, being solely a product of the mind, says nothing
> > about the world outside the mind. There is no reason to be altruistic,
> > it is just something that people should do. Neitzche, as you point out
> > is far removed from that position. What he does is use Kant's argument
> > to invert the moral question. Instead of me living for everyone else,
> > everyone should live for me, for the exact same non reasons that Kant
> > gives. Since morality has no reason, then having others live for you is
> > just as "rational" as living for others.
>
> Well, he still didn't have any effect on the idea other than a negative
> one. His place in the 'progression of the idea' is doubtful.
I disagree. I can see a clear link between the ideas of Kant and those
of Neitzche, which of course had a major influence on Hitler et.al. If
Kant hadn't left morality swinging in the wind, then I doubt the rest
would have followed.
> > Grin, true. But again how do you tell the draconity of a person other
> > than yourself. And no, I do not mean absolutely certain evidence. Any
> > evidence about the contents of another's mind is going to be inadequate
> > at this stage of the game. As long as there is the potential for lying,
> > you have a problem with the data.
>
> As, I suspect, it will ever be. Thus, although I do not hesitate to
> create provisional definitions of draconity, I try to keep in mind their
> extreme tenuousness.
>
> Furthermore, if a person lies, there must be a reason for that lie (even
> an innocuous one, like fitting in). A lack of such a reason after
> intense search makes lying the less likely alternative, though not
> impossible.
>
> It should be noted that if all these tests I've mentioned produce
> basically neutral results, as they most often, though not always, do, I
> must rely instead on a pragmatic definition of draconity, by treating
> others in this manner as they do themselves.
And I think that is the best that can be done, and go from there.
As to whether it will always be so, I have my doubts. I had heard a few
years back that IBM was working on a mental interface for a computer. In
essence, hook the computer up to something like an EEG and get rid of
the mouse, or keyboard. There had been some limited success. So who
knows. We live in interesting times.
> > Exactly. You have no idea just how accurate the statement is or not. The
> > accuracy is based on an assumption about the person, devoid of
> > corroborating evidence. You are assuming the statement is accurate and
> > have no way of confirming or refuting that assumption. There are those
> > who will argue that the mere statement that one is a dragon is evidence
> > that the person is self delusional and/or neurotic.
>
> Why did you earlier disavow infinities and yet now require a perfectly
> accurate or dependable firmament before _any_ accuracy is possible?
> Accuracy exists, and solipsic examination of its foundations does not
> eliminate that fact, only prove that there is more to be learned.
It is not a question of infinite accuracy. It is a question of having
zero knowledge of that accuracy. These are two separate issues. Whether
you know something to be accurate or true is a different question of
whether it is accurate or true.
>
> I much prefer your attempts to disprove the accuracy by presenting
> counterarguments (such as the possibilities of lies and delusionment)
> over refuting accuracy by showing that it is not known how accurate the
> accuracy is. A proposition of the form "You do not know how it is true,
> therefore it is not true" is not valid, although you don't resort to
> that.
And that is not what I am trying to say at all. You don't know how true
it is, or even if. Period. I would agree that the second does not follow
from the first.
> As for the mere belief of draconity being neurotic, without any
> associated emotional problems... that is outside of the definition of
> neurosis. Psychology is able to deal with emotional self-delusion and
> the beliefs based on that, but not on self-delusions that actually have
> mainly rational (that is, caused by thought) basis.
Again, there is a view, exhibited in another thread that a belief in
draconity is itself taken as prima facia evidence of a neurosis. You and
I can probably agree that this is not so, that it is not such evidence,
but that is not how it is *percieved* by many people. (A belief in
magick was taken as such evidence as well, and may still be part of the
AMA handbook.)
We are talking about two separate issues here. One is what is true. Is
draconity true? The ontological question. The other is how do we know it
is true? The epistemal question. It is important not to confuse the two.
And again I agree with you in that just because you do not know A to be
true does not necessarily mean that A is false.
There is also a third issue, what is "decided" to be true. What is
perceived or judged to be true as well. And again, it has very little
bearing on the ontological nature of the question.
> > > There would be a reason for such a person to repress their own
> > > draconity, or be ignorant of it. If no such reason can be found at all,
> > > then it is far more likely that not that they are not a dragon.
> >
> > Grin. In order to fit into this world, in order to not have people look
> > at you funny, or giving you an "I love me" jacket, and locking you up.
> > There is reason enough to suppress it.
>
> There are people completely free of such worries. I may assume of them
> that they are not repressing draconity.
I am not so sure myself. Each and everyone of us live amongst other
people to some extent. Of course if I ever met such a person, I have
just destroyed the test case, as now we know of each other.
> > Yep. But it does not answer the question. Is draconity real? We'll
> > discuss how one knows this answer after we get the answer. :)
>
> Then, what is _required_ for it to be real? Probably not bodies...
That is the question!!!! I really do not know. I can guess, and flail
about. I can see problems with identifying it as a set of ideals that
dragons have in common. To say you are a dragon is to state you have
properties and characteristic in common with other members of that
group. I really would like to know just what they are.
As a guess, and only a guess, I would consider memories to be a definite
factor in determining a person's draconity. I might be willing to expand
this to dreams, since I am not sure how to answer the butterfly dream.
But then again, without some kind of physical evidence, I am not sure if
those memories are real, or illusions created by my own wishful
thinking. (Or worse: I have had memories of things prior to their
occurrence.)
> > > > Grin, what I am saying is that it is nigh impossible to determine
> > > > another person's draconity.
> > >
> > > I do agree with that; but I draw the line at saying such a thing is
> > > absolutely impossible to determine.
> >
> > At present it is. Will it always be so, I do not have a clue. My crystal
> > ball is in the shop.
>
> By absolutely impossible I mean forever impossible, maybe even logically
> impossible, not just practically impossible, which I still agree with.
> *grins* I will continue to defend the possibility of it being possible
> to know draconity...
Good, prove me wrong. I dare ya. :)
BTW yours or someone else's?
> > Can you name one draconic ideal that is not held by some humans? If you
> > limit to just ideals, you have a problem in definition. If the
> > similarity is only occasional, then you may have something. But there
> > has to be a difference, or else you have not differentiated between
> > humans and dragons.
>
> Remember that "some" humans holding an ideal does not make it human.
> "Some" could be two schizophrenics. Also note that a draconic ideal
> would not be universal among dragons, either. That said, I think a
> yearning to wander is a draconic ideal, one that is far from common
> among humans; and those times in which humans _do_ like it (as among
> nomads) are results of necessity. Dragons, I presume, would enjoy
> wandering even if they didn't have to, whereas humans, when presented
> the option of spending their lives in one place or wandering, with no
> overwhelming necessity for either, almost always choose the former.
Grin, then dragons are rarely if ever sedentary? Or is it the desire to
wander that makes it, not necessarily acting on that desire?
> I don't think I could name another draconic ideal with such precision,
> though, unless it's one of those that's also human. Exoticness of a
> non-human type does remain difficult for me.
>
Is the dragon form exotic to you, or think/believe/feel more like it
"should be" your form? I can see a bit of envy at the form, it has many
advantages, despite the metabolic load wings would place on the system.
> I don't even have humanity figured out, although I presume to know them
> to a far higher degree than dragons.
I find humans to be in general very confusing. As to whether that is a
draconic trait or not, I leave that to the jury. There are apparently
more of them than me, so it should be easier to know them.
> > > *grins* Well, _their_ confusion doesn't concern me greatly, since it
> > > could be corrected with a simple conversation.
> >
> > As long as they give you time for one. :)
>
> If they don't, that's another reason not to be worried about their
> confusion.
Well there is more than one way to cut a conversation short. And that
does worry me. :)
> > Like QM as an example. :) Okay what do you do with someone who says he
> > is a dragon, yet holds none of the draconic ideals in common with you?
> > Do you take his word for it, provisionally, or say he is lying?
>
> You mean, someone who is morally neutral? Then I would accept the
> draconity out of a desire to avoid conflict and out of a healthy measure
> of uncertainty.
Now what practical effect would this have on your choice of actions?
Would this acceptance put you at risk in any way?
> > Or are you stuck with, "Those that say they are, are. Those that say
> > they are not, may not be, but it is impossible to determine."?
>
> Those that say there are, are more likely to be, and I will assume they
> are. Those that say they aren't, I won't bother with the question.
And I think that is the best that can be done at this stage of the game.
> > I understand that you are able to judge the accuracy of your own
> > statements, I am curious as to how you do it. I am not sure I understand
> > the method you are using, so I am trying to clarify. I do not see how
> > reality can be cheapened, or exactly what you mean by that. I am getting
> > a parsing error.
>
> I will continue to try to explain, until I am no longer able to do so;
> already I have given a few tests that can be used with hesitation. Feel
> free to continue questioning me about it (though I need specific
> questions... I don't summarize well), provided you don't use that
> 'solipsic fallacy' I mentioned earlier. *grins* That thing annoys me.
>
> By the way, while thinking about what to use to assume accuracy when the
> underpinnings of that accuracy are hazy, I came up with a simple, nifty
> little method, though one open to abuse; I'll present it next time,
> after I've given it more thought.
Good I would love to take a bite at it. :):)
> > What is there to be insulted by? I obviously did not make my self as
> > clear as I should have. I should be insulted that you point out my own
> > failings?? Or perhaps I should be angry because you disagree with me,
> > you think I am mistaken. My, my this would be a dull argument if we
> > agreed with each other. :):):)
>
> *grins* Actually, a longer speech would probably have cleared up that
> mistake.
Yeah, sorry about that. I am doing this in between trouble calls, when
things are quiet. Sometimes I get rushed. I also type slow. These last
two have taken me about 4 and half hours already. (With a trouble call
in there somewhere.)
> > I don't get angry, at least not in discussions of this type. neither of
> > us has used foul language, (or even fowl language). I do know that I can
> > be somewhat overbearing at times, and there may be a certain passion to
> > my writings, but please do not think I am ever angry. This has been one
> > of the most enjoyable exchanges I have had on the internet.
>
> Neither do I, but I have made people angry in the past.
Me too, without even intending it. Hmm.... another draconic trait? :)
> Congratulations, Ben! Several times while writing this post I reached
> the limit of how many characters Netscape can handle, and had to delete
> more quotations. I had to fragment it...
I can be long winded. You should hear me in person sometimes. :):)
Ben
aka Drakon@work
bogar theresa
> a little more won't hurt. ;) And I won't speak for the whole group, but
> as far as I can tell, everyone who stays polite and generally on-topic is
> welcome here, no matter their ideals.
on topic? what newsgroup are you thinking of, love? ;)
> That's sort of a red herring, though, because I don't think that
> "dragon ideals" fully contain the set of "human ideals." Let me throw out
> a controversial example: I consider conformity to be a "human ideal" (in
> the sense of something that current Western civilization holds dear). Cf:
> suburbia, advertising, bureaucracy.
*nodS* i tihnk there are some species that have a little bit of inherent
ideals and emotional states and don't have others. obviously there's room
for individualism, but, for example, i have never met an elf that
really understands jealousy... however, we do understand all kinds of
other very nasty things that occasionally remind me we are not all
sweetness and light with a swift kick in the pants.
> Accepting draconity as an expedient is all I ever ask of people.
> ;) It's a good compromise between taking me on faith and considering me
> crazy.
*nods* i get away with "well.. it's sort of an archetype that I can
identify with" with most of my family..
magically-bent friends get "well, can you believe in reincarnation? can
you believe in other worlds? put them together. maybe peopel exist who are
from other worlds where things other than human exist..."
> -- Bax, not sure where this thread is going exactly, but glad it's here.
i don't think threads around here are ver predictable, don't worry ;)
--shimmer
Lhexa
The distinguishing feature of meme theory (as Baxil explained it) was
that the meme worked with a mind as might some microorganism with its
host - a symbiote, perhaps, but one which propagated, and adapted, under
its own power, rather than being so affected by the mind. Since you've
said that the mind has such a significant role in the manipulation of
these memes, what remains to distinguish meme theory as a unique theory
of thought?
> > Again, my examples were not a result of a person being killed by foolish
> > actions but of a person killing 'emself by suicide, with emotional
> > causes. Were you able to read that other post?
>
> I have not been able to hunt it up just yet.
I'll repost it as another reply to your post.
> > > You do not know if there is an ideal of anti-Semitism? Or you do not
> > > think that anti-Semitism is "ideal"? I think that somewhere a value
> > > judgment is being made, that as part of your definition, you see ideals
> > > as "good" in and of themselves, as intrinsically of value regardless of
> > > the validity of such an ideal. Is this close?
> >
> > No, I meant that I doubted that anti-Semitism had its own private ideal,
> > being of such limited scope, and having only insignificant differences
> > with other hate groups. I do not doubt that hate groups _in general_ are
> > powered in great part by ideals.
>
> To take one classic example, and since we are discussing anti-Semitism
> as an example, there were several ideals behind the anti-Semite
> attitude. First, remember that the Jews were considered outsiders to the
> Germans, despite the fact they lived, worked and grew up in the
> communities. They were a different people, had different customs and
> religious beliefs. They were also successful in business, partly because
> they were impartial outsiders, or at the very least viewed as such.
So, the decision to join a hate-group is a cold-blooded decision based
on injust principles, more often than an emotional one?
> Add to this mix the idea of German superiority, with Neitzche's supermen
> who were beyond good and evil, and a bit of Darwinian evolution, and you
> have the beginnings of a hate group. (Also add Hitler's own belief that
> his grandfather may have been a local Jew who would not marry his
> grandmother.) Group identity is something of a problem in this area.
> Hopefully I will get to this later, as it has a bearing on dragons.
I do wonder how much dragons - both the human and the theoretical types
- would unthinkingly yield to group standards. Such sometimes seems
inevitable among a race, and I haven't seen an absence of it among all
those I know.
> > So, what would such an ideal(s) have to do with avoidance?
>
> Bad idea(l)s should be avoided. They are dangerous. anti-Semitism is
> such a bad idea, well basically, it is a false model of people. History
> has shown just what kind of excesses this type of thinking can lead to,
> and how detrimental it is to life as well as civilization. So such memes
> should be remembered, and kept in cages, lest they spring up again and
> we have to repeat the horrors of the second world war.
How could they be kept caged?
> > In that case, I am attempting to posit ideals as a fourth mode of
> > thought. Before I explain how that is, let me argue a few necessities of
> > your system... First, the introduction of a higher mode of thought does
> > not make a lower one useless. Feeling something, put crudely, is
> > necessary to act on a thought, and believing is necessary so that
> > something may be assumed. I know that few, if any, results of rational
> > judgment come through with complete certainty; it is only a matter of
> > which result is considered more likely or rational. Then, the mode of
> > believing must come into play to assume, even temporarily, that the
> > result is true and useful; then, it must be felt true so that it may be
> > acted upon and given the burden of risks.
>
> Very good points. I was not attempting to denigrate one mode from
> another, and apologize if it came off that way. Who was it that said
> "Nothing is ever accomplished without passion."? And what is passion but
> an emotion, a feeling?
>
> As far as beliefs, I understand that certain things have to be accepted
> "on faith" as it were. But I think that such beliefs should be held at
> arms length, identified as such, and constantly tested, until further
> evidence lets them fall elsewhere. Either confirmed by direct
> experience, or refuted by the same. Godel points out that some elements
> will always be untestable, and I hope he is wrong there. :)
My definition of belief differs from yours. I merely take it to mean an
assumption that an idea with less than complete and absolute proof - as
most are - is true, rather than limiting the definition to assumptions
with _little_ proof. Belief can be a result of reason, then.
> > You could make these suppositions untrue by giving the third mode of
> > thought (call it reason, though the connotations are different) an
> > extremely wide scope, so that it includes within itself the capability
> > of acting upon, assuming, and originating thoughts - in short, doing
> > whatever there is that can be done to them). In that case, 'twould
> > include ideals anyway. Furthermore, it would brush dangerously close to
> > the type of definition of infinity that you earlier eschewed. I see no
> > problem in defining an infinity that has neither lower nor upper bounds,
> > nor in defining something finite that has both. However, defining
> > something that has a lower bound but no upper bound is very dangerous,
> > for it leads to fallacies of all sorts - for instance, assuming that
> > what is true of the lower part of this infinity is true of everything
> > higher. This is not to say that such definitions are inherently false...
> > they just lend themselves well to fallacious reasoning. I worry that you
> > have done this to your definition of reason, by giving it a lower bound
> > (right next to belief), but assuming that there is no limit to what it
> > can achieve, then assuming that what is true of the familiar portions of
> > this reason (emotionlessness) will always be true. This may not be the
> > case with you, of course.
>
> Is there an upper bound on logical proofs, at least ones that are
> worthwhile? Good question. Hmmm...
Keep in mind that logical proofs do nothing for the generation of
further arguments, nor are their premises provable by the proof itself
(that would make it a tautology). The premises can be supported by
further arguments, but that process can be taken only so far - thus,
logical proof proves itself in this way incomplete. I doubt it will ever
be irrelevant, though - that is not what I mean by an upper limit.
> But the mind can rationally act upon an idea. The mind can decide that
> in order to get a particular point across, logic is not going to work,
> so one has to appeal to the audience's emotions, or feign anger, or
> other such tactics. (Indeed it could be argued that to do otherwise
> would be ineffective in some situations. And hence illogical.:) )
>
> The key component of reason is that it cannot contradict itself and
> still call itself reason. That alone should be able to rule out most
> fallacious reasonings. There are other traps to avoid as well, and I
> think almost all of them have been mapped out. There are various
> websites on fallacious reasoning and bad debating tactics one can look
> at, such as...
> http://www.best.com/~dlindsay/skeptic/arguments.html#consequent
> as one example.
>
> Now while I consider myself a fan of reason, the list I provided was not
> meant to imply any value judgment. It is more of a map, of the different
> methods used by people, only.
No value judgment - but do you regard it as perfectly complete?
Hmm. Are you still using the definition of belief that excludes reason?
Observation wouldn't be belief, if so, because there is considerable
reason and argument on the side of valid observation, and none (unless
you credit a solipsic type of fallacy) on the other.
> But reason does not judge. That is left up to the 'player'. I think I
> need to digress here just a bit.
>
> Benian (or Drakonian) Metaphysics:
> The world consists of 4 parts, and is analogous to a game.
> You have the pieces
> You have the board, where the game is played, (both space and time)
> You have the rules by which the game is played.
> And you have the players. That is us. We are the ones that make the
> decisions as to which memes to keep and which to toss aside. The player,
> the thing that wills, that judges and decides which action is to be
> attempted.
Of what use is this metaphysics?
> Reason does not judge, you do, based on either what reason tells you or
> what some other mode tells you. OR even a combination of what the
> various tools you have available tell you. Reason will say that if A is
> true, B follows, then C etc.
And for what reason do you separate reason from a player, then? Do you
regard it as too mechanistic?
> And we are using two different meanings for believing something. When I
> say, "I believe A", then I am saying that I have no evidence or logical
> proof for A, but I "trust" some authority or some other observer is
> telling me the truth. I am also implicitly saying that such trust is
> provisional, until I have further evidence of my own to support or
> refute A.
Yeah, that's so. The definition of belief that I use - as the assumption
of truth, irregardless of accuracy - still works, though. Maybe
'assumption' would be a word that works just as well, but it too carries
the negative connotations of 'belief'.
> You appear to be saying that you have a higher confidence in your
> beliefs than say your feelings or possibly reasoning ability. That
> "thinking" A is true means you are not as certain of A as "believing" A.
> For me the reverse is true. I have more faith in my reasonings than I do
> my beliefs. (I have less faith in my faith?)
Nope. As far as belief goes, I regard it (using my definition) as a tool
that puts into place what reason has evaluated.
> > I also define an object of the spirit according to its primary function;
> > I've just used the mode theory to show it not incompatible with your
> > ideas. And, sorry, I have not yet come up with a necessary reason for
> > emotional meaningfulness to be connected with the accuracy of an ideal;
> > the best I can come up with is that such spirit provides the _effort_
> > that goes into producing the ideal, while thought reaps the benefit of
> > it.
>
> Again, reason is a tool, thinking is a tool that the "soul" to use a
> term, in order to judge the validity of a proposition or to construct
> the same.
Why wouldn't reason be a part of the soul?
> >
> > That is not so. Parts of the aforementioned learning from an ideal would
> > come from observing its causes, its structure, its implications, its
> > impact, and even its demise; it would not happen through easy intuition.
>
> In other words you would reason the ideal. You would think it rather
> than feel it?
Both, although only the thinking part would be relevant to the accuracy
of its implications.
> >
> > The system of honor is, in a way, honorable: just observe the fact that,
> > if you have an honorable person with a system of honor, and you could
> > somehow take away the system, the honor of the person would vanish.
> > However, it is equally correct that a system of honor with nobody to
> > practice it is not honorable. Thus, both a system and a person can be
> > honorable - but only when there is both (or some alternative to a system
> > that has a like effect - I know that honor need not be systematic). A
> > system of honor not held to would have the same effect as no system, and
> > so that kind of separation would remove the honor both from the person
> > and from the system.
>
> I think I see what you are saying, but again I disagree. I do not think
> that honor is something that can be held by objects, just people, based
> on their actions. I think you are applying a property to a class of
> objects that is not applicable. But let me think on it some more.
I speak of this system of honor at the point in which it becomes part of
a person - to call it an object, then, would be moot.
> > > Yes!!! (Although we can discuss scientific morality at a later point.
> > > Game theory is something I want to look into one of these days, I think
> > > it holds some vital clues on the question.)
> >
> > What is game theory, if you know?
>
> The study of interactive decision making. It explores what choices are
> available and attempts to scientifically model those choices and effects
> of those choices, on a system, which includes a "player" or decision
> maker, as well as possibly other decision makers. It looks pretty cool,
> however, there are only so many hours, dammit. It is a big thing in
> economics. As morality and ethics are rules by which people make
> decisions, it appears to be exactly what the doctor ordered.
Hm. I would still need a demonstration of its efficacity, then... such a
system, in a real application, would be bewilderingly complicated.
> > > > And the ideals are always incomplete; there're always more theories to
> > > > make and ideals to know...
> > >
> > > I am not sure about the idea of infinite knowledge. That it is required
> > > to accurately model the universe or that it even exists.
> >
> > I hold change, progress, and originality to be good things in and of
> > themselves as well as for the effects they bring. If it were possible to
> > reach a point where these are no longer needed, they would not be good
> > except as related to others, contradicting that first sentence. Thus, I
> > apply my cheapening axiom mentioned earlier to this, judging a worldview
> > in which knowledge, beauty, or anything of that sort has a definite
> > limit to be a cheapened version of the real universe. If it should turn
> > out that this type of infinity is a logical contradiction (and so not
> > true), however, then that worldview would _not_ be a cheapening of
> > reality. I just haven't seen any evidence as of yet that these types of
> > infinities lead to logical contradictions, unless the said infinity is
> > somehow said to be 'limited', for instance, homogeneous - in which case
> > there could be a contradiction. I don't hold to that type.
>
> Okay first off, I hold nothing to be good or bad in and of itself. Those
> are value judgments and get rid of the valuer, which is me (for my
> values. You for your values) and such judgments are irrelevant.
They do not get rid of the valuer, if the two are both regarded as real
and sources of value. To have either without the other would, though in
different ways, succeed only by denigrating reality. Assuming that
anything of value exists without some person actually doing the valuing
would make these things ultimately pointless, perhaps even mechanistic,
and assuming a person creates value, but that this value is held apart
from the object valued, can only be done by removing what is vital in
this person (the soul, perhaps) further and further away from any object
it might value. Judging something good or evil as a result of what it
_is_ would imply a combination - it is good because of what it is and
because it is judged so, with both elements intermingling. Thus, seeking
to have only the latter be true would require separating the judgment
from the actual composition of the object - making it both arbitrary
and, eventually, indifferent and powerless to the outside world -
because all parts of that soul that would deal with the world would have
to be purged because they treat objects according to what they are.
That wasn't a very coherent paragraph. Anyway, the most important point
is that it is vital that an object be both good in and of itself and as
it relates to something else, namely a person...
> Change for the sake of change is not necessarily a good thing. Suppose
> you live in a democracy. Then if change is good, changing to a
> repressive dictatorship would be good. I disagree. The same arguments
> can be said for originality as well. Progress implies a goal of some
> kind, and a good goal at that. (One that helps the valuer live a longer
> or better life.)
I did not mean it would always be good, especially in a limited scope of
time. Change has the overall tendency to be good, because it is not
arbitrary - or at least, the adaptation to change is not. I think it
true that, given a sufficient span of time, change will always turn out
to be of overall benefit - that is, there is no such thing as an
eternally degrading situation, when degrading is used in a moral sense.
> Change does not necessarily mean infinite either. In geometry there are
> shapes that are bounded, yet can be viewed as infinite. The circle is
> one such shape. :)
'Twould be homogenous, then. Remember that one thing I said was
necessary to change being good is that there is no homogeneity -
likewise, no eternally repeating patterns...
> > No, though it is interesting. I've already seen that your 'selfishness'
> > is amended in an Ayn Randish way (saying that what is in the actual
> > self-interest of one person does not truly harm another), and thus not
> > so likely to be a rationalization of actual cruelty.
>
> Darn it. You peeked :)
*evil grin* You forgot to mention Hegel!
> Alot of my thinking on this is derived from Rand, which I had only
> discovered about 2(?) years ago. As well as the works of David Kelly. I
> hesitate to introduce her as she is considered a "bad girl" in
> philosophical circles. She voiced a strong dislike for Kant's work, and
> communism. She had a rather bombastic style of writing which rubs many
> people the wrong way. She was a witness for the prosecution during the
> McCarthy hearings, which earned her a black list entry to many
> academics. Many of her followers have taken on the trappings of a cult
> of personality, which I find amusing since it is one of the things she
> argued against.
Some questions: who's David Kelly? How did Rand act as a witness against
alleged communists in the hearing? And, by cult of personality, do you
mean that the group reverenced her, rather than her ideas?
I do not like her tendency, in books, to stereotype her opposition (ie,
those who support altruism) as incompetent, selfish, double-talking
bureaucrats who have no regard for reason. That is, like you mentioned
earlier, erecting a straw man that has limited relevance to reality.
Other than that, I liked her books very much, especially The
Fountainhead.
> But all that aside, I find her logic largely exceptional. While her
> atheism I find troubling, (and unnecessary), I find a largely agree with
> what she has to say. However, I disagree with her at points, so the best
> I can call myself is a
> "Heretical Objectivist"
I have only read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, so I know little
of her philosophy apart from the moral side. I haven't a clue what there
is to her logic, since I haven't been able to find her nonfiction works.
> > I also do not put out of mind the possibility of an evil that is able to
> > evolve _against_ itself (that is, its own nature is the environment that
> > it must adapt to), constantly introducing new facets that limit its own
> > self-destructive tendencies.
>
> Hmm.... this sounds interesting. If evil is working for its betterment,
> then wouldn't it become good? I am reminded of a saying that "out of
> chaos comes order." Out of evil comes good???
Possibly, maybe even ultimately. But keep in mind that the only
betterment that it would seek, at least at first, would be its own
survival - it could as easily spiral into more and more complex forms of
evil, rather than improving, although this would ever require further
evolution.
> > > For the above example, you see that helping others is self destructive.
> > > Obviously this is not good for you, so what do you do? Do you continue
> > > to act for their benefit? Or do you change your tactics, be more
> > > selective whom you help. (as just one example)
> >
> > That would depend on how far-sighted you are...
>
> Which is better, to be far sighted or to be short sighted? :)
Far-sighted. *grins* Unless, for some reason, you want a comfortable
life...
> >
> > My message has gotten too big, and I have to split it into two parts.
> > This is the end of the first.
>
> Put two long winded dragons together, and see what happens :)
Bax said that a moment ago... three long-winded dragons now, I suppose.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
Lhexa
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>
> I'd just like to apologize for my recent silence. Due to the fact
> that I'm starting a new job on Monday, I may have to cut down on newsgroup
> activity for a while, including this thread.
>
> I'll try to keep up, and throw in my two cents' worth when I can.
>
> And thanks for all the fun discussions :)
If the branching messages are too much, you could take your
conversations with me an' Ben to e-mail. I would prefer than immensely
to you dropping out altogether, since I was having so much fun with it.
> -- Bax
Lhexa
AMW
Lhexa wrote:
>
> AMW wrote:
> >
> > Lhexa wrote:
> The distinguishing feature of meme theory (as Baxil explained it) was
> that the meme worked with a mind as might some microorganism with its
> host - a symbiote, perhaps, but one which propagated, and adapted, under
> its own power, rather than being so affected by the mind. Since you've
> said that the mind has such a significant role in the manipulation of
> these memes, what remains to distinguish meme theory as a unique theory
> of thought?
Actually, as I understand it, the microorganism analogy is quite valid.
But it is more of a virus than a sentient. It does not have any power in
and of itself to adapt, or change. It still relies on a communicating
sentient to pass it along, and that sentient is quite free to alter it,
change it, add to it, subtract, screw it up totally, or even keep its
mouth shut and ignore it.
[In short, memes are pieces not players]
A meme is not a sentient. It cannot change on its own. It has no will
let alone the means to enact its will. But using the germ analogy, one
can see how a meme can transmit and "infect" a population, and what the
effects of its adoption. (Hmm... that last word struck me as very
appropriate)
> > To take one classic example, and since we are discussing anti-Semitism
> > as an example, there were several ideals behind the anti-Semite
> > attitude. First, remember that the Jews were considered outsiders to the
> > Germans, despite the fact they lived, worked and grew up in the
> > communities. They were a different people, had different customs and
> > religious beliefs. They were also successful in business, partly because
> > they were impartial outsiders, or at the very least viewed as such.
>
> So, the decision to join a hate-group is a cold-blooded decision based
> on injust principles, more often than an emotional one?
Sigh, I wish! Then the choice would be obvious, to leave such groups
alone. But man is not a rational creature, but a rationalizing one, and
has developed a set of "logical" reasons for the belief. The above
example is based on a false model of man, namely that of "Group
Identity" that a person is not an individual, but a member of a group,
and all such members are the same. Greed, jealousy, and a general
xenophobia, all play a part. The "rational" basis behind those came
later, as a justification for treating such people as members of a group
instead of as individuals.
>
> > Add to this mix the idea of German superiority, with Neitzche's supermen
> > who were beyond good and evil, and a bit of Darwinian evolution, and you
> > have the beginnings of a hate group. (Also add Hitler's own belief that
> > his grandfather may have been a local Jew who would not marry his
> > grandmother.) Group identity is something of a problem in this area.
> > Hopefully I will get to this later, as it has a bearing on dragons.
>
> I do wonder how much dragons - both the human and the theoretical types
> - would unthinkingly yield to group standards. Such sometimes seems
> inevitable among a race, and I haven't seen an absence of it among all
> those I know.
Well, I would hope that dragons are better than that. I have almost
given up hope that humans will get better.
>
> > > So, what would such an ideal(s) have to do with avoidance?
> >
> > Bad idea(l)s should be avoided. They are dangerous. anti-Semitism is
> > such a bad idea, well basically, it is a false model of people. History
> > has shown just what kind of excesses this type of thinking can lead to,
> > and how detrimental it is to life as well as civilization. So such memes
> > should be remembered, and kept in cages, lest they spring up again and
> > we have to repeat the horrors of the second world war.
>
> How could they be kept caged?
Buchenwald and Aushwits are such caged ideal, as is every monument to
every war ever fought. They should be left as reminders, of just how
horrible they can be. But they need to be surrounded by counter
arguments, and anything else that can keep them from being recognized as
anything other than what they are.
> > As far as beliefs, I understand that certain things have to be accepted
> > "on faith" as it were. But I think that such beliefs should be held at
> > arms length, identified as such, and constantly tested, until further
> > evidence lets them fall elsewhere. Either confirmed by direct
> > experience, or refuted by the same. Godel points out that some elements
> > will always be untestable, and I hope he is wrong there. :)
>
> My definition of belief differs from yours. I merely take it to mean an
> assumption that an idea with less than complete and absolute proof - as
> most are - is true, rather than limiting the definition to assumptions
> with _little_ proof. Belief can be a result of reason, then.
So you see more of a continuum between reason and belief, rather than a
one or the other kind of thing.?
> > Is there an upper bound on logical proofs, at least ones that are
> > worthwhile? Good question. Hmmm...
>
> Keep in mind that logical proofs do nothing for the generation of
> further arguments, nor are their premises provable by the proof itself
> (that would make it a tautology). The premises can be supported by
> further arguments, but that process can be taken only so far - thus,
> logical proof proves itself in this way incomplete. I doubt it will ever
> be irrelevant, though - that is not what I mean by an upper limit.
I think I disagree. And will trot out Special Relativity as an example.
SR is based on two postulates, that 1) the laws of physics are the same
in all inertial reference frames, and 2) the speed of light in a vacuum
is the same in all inertial reference frames. The first is a conclusion
of the work done by Galileo, the second a product of Maxwell. So those
two works ended up generating a further set of arguments that we now
call the Special Theory of Relativity. That in turn, with the addition
of the equivalence principle, generate General Relativity.
But at the basis of all this are other postulates. And you are correct
that you cannot logically prove a postulate so you must find some other
means of validating them. And that is where observation comes in.
> > Now while I consider myself a fan of reason, the list I provided was not
> > meant to imply any value judgment. It is more of a map, of the different
> > methods used by people, only.
>
> No value judgment - but do you regard it as perfectly complete?
For the time being. Until and unless further evidence presents itself.
As for perfect, well its the best I have been able to come up with so
far. :)
> > [Now you can argue that the acceptance of the an observation boils down
> > to a belief. A belief that one's sensory apparatus is giving an accurate
> > representation of the world outside the skull. And you would be right.
> > But if you look at the counterarguement, that your senses are not giving
> > you such data, then you are left in a very bad state, philosophically
> > speaking. In short, there are reasons to believe the first is true. :)]
>
> Hmm. Are you still using the definition of belief that excludes reason?
> Observation wouldn't be belief, if so, because there is considerable
> reason and argument on the side of valid observation, and none (unless
> you credit a solipsic type of fallacy) on the other.
Yes I am, and probably always will use such a definition. But I am not
saying that observation itself is a belief, but where it fits into the
set of cognitive modes, that is a belief. It is the acceptance of
observation, the assumption that if you see something, it is there and
not a figment of your (or the Matrix's) imagination.
Think a moment, how do you know that you are seeing this, that the world
is as it appears to be and not some "shadow on the wall"? You see a
cliff, how do you know it is really there and not some kind of illusion?
You can step off the cliff, and suffer the pain of broken bones and
whatnot, but that really doesn't get you anywhere. You are using sensory
data to validate the senses. But if the cliff were an illusion, then
your pain would be an illusion as well.
Objective observation attempts to get around this limitation by in
essence asking someone else what they see. "Is that my leg bone poking
through my skin?". But again, my means of knowing what this outside
observer sees is filtered through his sensory net, then outputted via
his mouth and eventually via my sense net to get to my mind. Since I can
imagine breaking my leg, I can also imagine them telling me I broke my
leg, as well as imagine that they are imagining I broke my leg. So it
really doesn't solve the problem.
This is not mere sophistry, this is the central question of western
philosophy. This has been the issue that the Idealists and Realists have
argued about since the time of Aristotle and Plato. And one ends up
simply deciding which side one takes.
> > But reason does not judge. That is left up to the 'player'. I think I
> > need to digress here just a bit.
> >
> > Benian (or Drakonian) Metaphysics:
> > The world consists of 4 parts, and is analogous to a game.
> > You have the pieces
> > You have the board, where the game is played, (both space and time)
> > You have the rules by which the game is played.
> > And you have the players. That is us. We are the ones that make the
> > decisions as to which memes to keep and which to toss aside. The player,
> > the thing that wills, that judges and decides which action is to be
> > attempted.
>
> Of what use is this metaphysics?
What use is any metaphysics? :) It is a model of how the universe works,
perhaps incomplete, and in need of work, but it is a start. As a model,
if I can properly identify which elements are which, I should be able to
explain observational phenomena, and predict the behavior of the thing
being modeled. To hopefully run simulations of the world in which I live
in and thereby better pick the action I want to take in order to get the
results I want.
>
> > Reason does not judge, you do, based on either what reason tells you or
> > what some other mode tells you. OR even a combination of what the
> > various tools you have available tell you. Reason will say that if A is
> > true, B follows, then C etc.
>
> And for what reason do you separate reason from a player, then? Do you
> regard it as too mechanistic?
That is a big part of it. Also the will or Player can choose to listen
to reason or emotion, or some outside source, such as a book or speaker.
It can act on anything it likes.
>
> > And we are using two different meanings for believing something. When I
> > say, "I believe A", then I am saying that I have no evidence or logical
> > proof for A, but I "trust" some authority or some other observer is
> > telling me the truth. I am also implicitly saying that such trust is
> > provisional, until I have further evidence of my own to support or
> > refute A.
>
> Yeah, that's so. The definition of belief that I use - as the assumption
> of truth, irregardless of accuracy - still works, though. Maybe
> 'assumption' would be a word that works just as well, but it too carries
> the negative connotations of 'belief'.
Hmm... I think that would be a better word. At least an assumption is
more obvious as an assumption than a belief is.
> > Again, reason is a tool, thinking is a tool that the "soul" to use a
> > term, in order to judge the validity of a proposition or to construct
> > the same.
>
> Why wouldn't reason be a part of the soul?
We are going to have to discuss what each of us means by this term.
Eventually, we are going to end up providing competing dictionaries so
we can translate our meanings of each others words. :)
I use soul as the will or "player". The player has several tools
available to him, different modes of cognition, with reason being one of
them. Memes, sensory data and ideas being pieces in this mental
landscape, that these tools manipulate.
> > > > Yes!!! (Although we can discuss scientific morality at a later point.
> > > > Game theory is something I want to look into one of these days, I think
> > > > it holds some vital clues on the question.)
> > >
> > > What is game theory, if you know?
> >
> > The study of interactive decision making. It explores what choices are
> > available and attempts to scientifically model those choices and effects
> > of those choices, on a system, which includes a "player" or decision
> > maker, as well as possibly other decision makers. It looks pretty cool,
> > however, there are only so many hours, dammit. It is a big thing in
> > economics. As morality and ethics are rules by which people make
> > decisions, it appears to be exactly what the doctor ordered.
>
> Hm. I would still need a demonstration of its efficacity, then... such a
> system, in a real application, would be bewilderingly complicated.
Grin it is. Let me see if I can dig out a couple URLs
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html
http://www.columbia.edu/~de11/gamethry.html
http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/eco/game/game.html (take a look
especially at "The Prisoners' Dilemma")
And it is to me at this very early stage. It is one of those things I
would love to know more about, but haven't the time today.
Actually I think I caught alot of that, I just disagree. A thing is just
a thing. A rock is just a rock. There is no such thing as a 'good' rock
or a 'bad'
rock. It is not an intrinsic property of rocks. For a rock to be good,
it has to be good to someone. It can also be detrimental and hence 'bad'
to someone else. [Example. I am trying to kill you. You have a rock to
defend yourself with. To you the rock is good. To me, it is bad. I could
get hurt by it]. Either way, get rid of the valuers, and it is just a
rock. And good or bad have no meaning.
>
> > Change for the sake of change is not necessarily a good thing. Suppose
> > you live in a democracy. Then if change is good, changing to a
> > repressive dictatorship would be good. I disagree. The same arguments
> > can be said for originality as well. Progress implies a goal of some
> > kind, and a good goal at that. (One that helps the valuer live a longer
> > or better life.)
>
> I did not mean it would always be good, especially in a limited scope of
> time. Change has the overall tendency to be good, because it is not
> arbitrary - or at least, the adaptation to change is not. I think it
> true that, given a sufficient span of time, change will always turn out
> to be of overall benefit - that is, there is no such thing as an
> eternally degrading situation, when degrading is used in a moral sense.
And if it is, if you are wrong and things do continue to degrade, in
either sense, what happens to the valuers? :)
> > > No, though it is interesting. I've already seen that your 'selfishness'
> > > is amended in an Ayn Randish way (saying that what is in the actual
> > > self-interest of one person does not truly harm another), and thus not
> > > so likely to be a rationalization of actual cruelty.
> >
> > Darn it. You peeked :)
>
> *evil grin* You forgot to mention Hegel!
I try not to mention specific philosophers, for a number of reasons.
First, I have read alot, and sometimes I get confused as to who says
what. Second, there is the problem of guilt by association that has to
be dealt with. I am sure you have met people who have said, "Oh, you
read Rand? Well she was wrong, so I don't have to listen to what you
say." or something along those lines.
And third, what I espouse, regardless of the source, is what I think is
true. (And we can argue about whether it is true or not :) ) I have
adopted these ideas, or memes wherever they came from. These are my
thoughts, even if they were thought by someone else before me.
>
> > Alot of my thinking on this is derived from Rand, which I had only
> > discovered about 2(?) years ago. As well as the works of David Kelly. I
> > hesitate to introduce her as she is considered a "bad girl" in
> > philosophical circles. She voiced a strong dislike for Kant's work, and
> > communism. She had a rather bombastic style of writing which rubs many
> > people the wrong way. She was a witness for the prosecution during the
> > McCarthy hearings, which earned her a black list entry to many
> > academics. Many of her followers have taken on the trappings of a cult
> > of personality, which I find amusing since it is one of the things she
> > argued against.
>
> Some questions: who's David Kelly? How did Rand act as a witness against
> alleged communists in the hearing? And, by cult of personality, do you
> mean that the group reverenced her, rather than her ideas?
David Kelley (pardon the typo) is the author of several books, "The
Evidence of the Senses", "The Art of Reason" and one of the founders of
the institute for Objectivist Studies (IOS). This is a rival
organization to the Ayn Rand Institute run by Leonard Peokoff, who was
designated Ayn's intellectual heir after her death. The schism is (IMHO)
between those who want to go through and fix any bugs in Rand's system
and those who think her words are the equivalent of Holy Writ. Peokoff's
group, in my opinion, is doing the latter, which answers your last
question.
In 1947, Rand appeared before the House Un-American Activities
Committee. It should be noted that Rand was a staunch anti-Communist,
immigrating from St. Petersburg in 1926 after the Revolution, and saw
first hand what communism was like. A film had been made in 1943 called
"Song of Russia" which Rand testified a propaganda piece for the
communists, and that it was a total lie about conditions in the Soviet
Union. A full transcript of her testimony can be seen at:
http://www.objectivism.addr.com/texts/huac.html
> I do not like her tendency, in books, to stereotype her opposition (ie,
> those who support altruism) as incompetent, selfish, double-talking
> bureaucrats who have no regard for reason. That is, like you mentioned
> earlier, erecting a straw man that has limited relevance to reality.
> Other than that, I liked her books very much, especially The
> Fountainhead.
Grin I cannot say I like it much either, however, I keep getting
presented with people who fit the stereotype all too well.
> I have only read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, so I know little
> of her philosophy apart from the moral side. I haven't a clue what there
> is to her logic, since I haven't been able to find her nonfiction works.
See if you can find "An Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" by
Rand. It is a good overview of the epistemal side. "Objectivism: the
Philosophy of Ayn Rand" by Leonard Peikoff, is a good first text on her
system. You can also check out the Ayn Rand Institute at:
http://www.aynrand.org/
>
> > > I also do not put out of mind the possibility of an evil that is able to
> > > evolve _against_ itself (that is, its own nature is the environment that
> > > it must adapt to), constantly introducing new facets that limit its own
> > > self-destructive tendencies.
> >
> > Hmm.... this sounds interesting. If evil is working for its betterment,
> > then wouldn't it become good? I am reminded of a saying that "out of
> > chaos comes order." Out of evil comes good???
>
> Possibly, maybe even ultimately. But keep in mind that the only
> betterment that it would seek, at least at first, would be its own
> survival - it could as easily spiral into more and more complex forms of
> evil, rather than improving, although this would ever require further
> evolution.
but the whole point is that evil is destructive. The more evil, the more
destructive, until it becomes self destructive. Thereby killing off the
evil person, along with its memes. :)
>
> > > > For the above example, you see that helping others is self destructive.
> > > > Obviously this is not good for you, so what do you do? Do you continue
> > > > to act for their benefit? Or do you change your tactics, be more
> > > > selective whom you help. (as just one example)
> > >
> > > That would depend on how far-sighted you are...
> >
> > Which is better, to be far sighted or to be short sighted? :)
>
> Far-sighted. *grins* Unless, for some reason, you want a comfortable
> life...
Ah, I am not sure I could live a comfortable short sighted life. I would
always worry about the long term. :)
Ben
aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> > However, you do err in limiting the scope of selflessness to instances
> > of people calling others selfish. It may be that the people who are
> > comparatively selfless are hesitant about insulting others in that way.
> > Selflessness and selfishness (please ignore the connotations of the
> > words) are defined by actions; words may be related, but are definitely
> > of minor importance.
> >
> > Again, I do know that many, perhaps even most, instances of a person
> > seeming to act selfless are in truth the opposite. However, I have seen
> > and heard of enough instances in which selfishness is extremely unlikely
> > to come to believe that the statistics of altruism have no bearing on
> > its truth or falseness as an ideology. Do you (as it would be
> > interesting to see) have an argument against altruism that is not
> > statistical (i.e., calling most people not altruistic).
>
> Okay. First off is a totally selfless act even possible? Do you feel
> good when you help someone out? That in and of itself, even if there is
> no material gain, a benefit. And if you gain by acting "selflessly",
> then you have committed a selfish act.
_Totally_ selfless is not necessary for selflessness, nor is total
selfishness for the converse. It can always be argued that there is a
possibility of a selfish motive in a seemingly altruistic action,
although that type of argument utilizes a logical fallacy - the appeal
to ignorance. However, it is also true that it can always be argued that
there is a possibility of a selfless motive in a seemingly selfless act.
That is why I will put no support to an argument requiring a person to
be completely unified in mind and spirit, whether in selfishness or the
converse; a combination of the two is the more frequent occurence.
> Second of all, one can look to the historical example of communism. Here
> you have altruism translated into a political ideology. (At least in
> theory if not in practice.) People were expected to work, not for their
> own benefit, but for the benefit of everyone in the state. What happened
> is that people found out rather quickly that having ability was a
> liability, rather than an asset. "From each according to his ability,"
> became dangerous. Because those with more ability were expected to work
> harder, and produce more, and that the benefits paid out for that work
> did not depend in any way on the output. A guy making 20 widgets an hour
> made just as much as the guy making 1. Possibly less if the second guy
> had more need, more dependents, etc. You work harder for less than the
> unproductive person. You give the ones with ability the reason to "slack
> off" and mimic the behavior of the unproductive.
Such a government would be an instance of taking altruism and using it
to exclude everything else good - most notably justice. It also corrupts
the idea by requiring altruism to be directed towards an abstract state
rather than to individuals, an idea which, in its philosophical
implications, actually removes all value from the concept of altruism...
> Now you can argue that people were acting selfishly. That an "ideal" man
> would not sweat the difference in pay. But if you work the one with
> ability harder, you wear them out faster. And then you are left with the
> needs of the unproductive, and no producers to provide for those needs.
> You cannot reward effort, because then it would become a benefit, a
> selfish action. So you have no means of giving incentive to the
> producers as any such incentive would make their actions selfish. One
> could threaten them, but then they can play stupid, and you lose them
> that way.
>
> It is basically a Darwinian argument. The individual with more needs,
> well, needs more. The person who needs less does not have to expend as
> much effort to provide for those needs as one who has more of a load.
> They use less resources as well. So in competition, the one with the
> greater need has to face off against the many with lesser needs, who
> have more time to do other things, such as make babies with lesser
> needs, figure out better hunting strategies, etc. You get a population
> shift, and the individuals with greater needs dies out. To an altruist,
> everyone else is a need he has to provide for. And if that means at the
> expense of his own life, well, there ya go. Can you get more selfless
> than that? The selfish person has just himself, and therefore the
> evolutionary advantage.
Those people must still accomodate each other. It reduces to a situation
in which the most efficient method of selfishness is also the most
efficient method of selflessness; that is, the way to act that provides
the most benefit for oneself also helps others out the most, and
vice-versa. That is why I regard neither (selfishness nor selflessness)
as having anything significant to do with the basics of morality.
> > Furthermore, your list of personages included people to whom public
> > opinion is, at best, neutral. The list could just as easily have
> > included saints or philanthropists in tracing the idea; the only way I
> > could find of resolving the discrepancy was to conclude that you were
> > attacking the idea by connecting it to infamy (I still don't see how
> > Hitler has any significant bearing on the idea of altruism). Now it's
> > going better, though.
>
> I got a bit too abbreviated. Sorry. Do you understand the connection
> now?
Neitzsche, sure. But what about Hitler? He was influenced by Neitzsche,
but did not make any change to those philosophical concepts. Or were you
just making a list of people who were affected by the idea?
> > > Now, according to Kant, reason cannot be relied upon to obtain true
> > > statements about the world.
> >
> > Not quite true. He claimed that reason is able to make objective
> > observations of the physical world and judgments of the moral, but that
> > it was completely unable to come to conclusions about its methods of
> > doing so.
>
> And this makes no sense as reason is itself a methodology.
I know. However, I see no reason to believe that this flaw is a result
of some character flaw in Kant, nor a vendetta of his against reason; in
fact, he brought many improvements to the philosophy of reason (the
impossibility of 'pure reason' not being one of them). It is just the
limit to his skill as a philosopher.
> >
> > Well, he still didn't have any effect on the idea other than a negative
> > one. His place in the 'progression of the idea' is doubtful.
>
> I disagree. I can see a clear link between the ideas of Kant and those
> of Neitzche, which of course had a major influence on Hitler et.al. If
> Kant hadn't left morality swinging in the wind, then I doubt the rest
> would have followed.
Kant didn't leave morality undefined; he gave it a complete metaphysics
and structure, albeit one too rigid. And it is rather insulting to
Neitzsche to believe that, had the right philosophy been around, he
would have become a meek servant to it! Kant was not responsible for
Neitzsche.
> > Why did you earlier disavow infinities and yet now require a perfectly
> > accurate or dependable firmament before _any_ accuracy is possible?
> > Accuracy exists, and solipsic examination of its foundations does not
> > eliminate that fact, only prove that there is more to be learned.
>
> It is not a question of infinite accuracy. It is a question of having
> zero knowledge of that accuracy. These are two separate issues. Whether
> you know something to be accurate or true is a different question of
> whether it is accurate or true.
And if you know something to be accurate, but not to what degree?
> > As for the mere belief of draconity being neurotic, without any
> > associated emotional problems... that is outside of the definition of
> > neurosis. Psychology is able to deal with emotional self-delusion and
> > the beliefs based on that, but not on self-delusions that actually have
> > mainly rational (that is, caused by thought) basis.
>
> Again, there is a view, exhibited in another thread that a belief in
> draconity is itself taken as prima facia evidence of a neurosis. You and
> I can probably agree that this is not so, that it is not such evidence,
> but that is not how it is *percieved* by many people. (A belief in
> magick was taken as such evidence as well, and may still be part of the
> AMA handbook.)
Well, my point was that such a belief would be in opposition to
professional psychology, unless the draconity also involved emotional
problems. Popular psychology is not relevant here, since it is an
incredibly inaccurate corruption of professional psychology (which has
its flaws, but is way above the popular version), no matter how accurate
its supporters think it to be. The belief that a strange and mostly
unsubstantiated idea is neurotic would make the entire followings of
most religions neurotic, despite the obvious problems with such a
definition.
On a side note, I have listened to the experiences of several dragons
who have revealed the fact to psychologists or counselors... and never
was draconity judged to be a problem needing fixing (parents are a whole
other matter, of course). I've already given the reason why I think this
to be so.
> We are talking about two separate issues here. One is what is true. Is
> draconity true? The ontological question. The other is how do we know it
> is true? The epistemal question. It is important not to confuse the two.
> And again I agree with you in that just because you do not know A to be
> true does not necessarily mean that A is false.
>
> There is also a third issue, what is "decided" to be true. What is
> perceived or judged to be true as well. And again, it has very little
> bearing on the ontological nature of the question.
Because a satisfactory and complete definition of draconity has not yet
been found, the matter is different. A definition of draconity must be
_created_ that is both accurate and relevant to what is basic in
draconity: the body. If I were to believe I am already in a draconic
body, that would destroy the accuracy of the definition, and to believe
that draconity constitutes an arbitrary set of ideal would remove its
relevance to dragons (as exemplified by the question "But would actual
dragons be that way?") The fact that the definition is being created and
chosen is important, provided it is kept in mind that the accuracy of
that definition is not likewise chosen, because it is probably not
something that will come into thought on its own. Both the ontological
and the epistemological questions, as you put them, must depend on the
created definition, and may then be used to find further definitions,
and I have given a fair accounting of those with my definition (although
the connection between it and the draconic _body_ remains a
poetic/intuitive one).
I think you are in error by seeking to determine the validity or
epistemology of draconity before first seeking to know what draconity
is, if that is actually what you are doing. The first two can only come
after the third, and are then used in judgment of it. Even if there is
no possible conjunction of relevance and accuracy for draconity (that
is, draconity is impossible), that can only be found by a complete lack
of results in the seeking. Again, I have sought, and found results,
although yet incomplete ones.
Either that, or you are assuming that reality is composed of words,
making draconity a matter that doesn't need definition, just
observation. I think the flaws of that theory are obvious enough.
> > There are people completely free of such worries. I may assume of them
> > that they are not repressing draconity.
>
> I am not so sure myself. Each and everyone of us live amongst other
> people to some extent. Of course if I ever met such a person, I have
> just destroyed the test case, as now we know of each other.
Living among them does not been domination by them, of course. Are the
people around you so weak?
> > > Yep. But it does not answer the question. Is draconity real? We'll
> > > discuss how one knows this answer after we get the answer. :)
> >
> > Then, what is _required_ for it to be real? Probably not bodies...
>
> That is the question!!!! I really do not know. I can guess, and flail
> about. I can see problems with identifying it as a set of ideals that
> dragons have in common. To say you are a dragon is to state you have
> properties and characteristic in common with other members of that
> group. I really would like to know just what they are.
Then go ahead and create provisional definitions, and subject them to
every test you can imagine. Do the same with my definition, as hazy as
it is, if you remember it. The success of this venture will depend more
on your creativity than on anything else; your ability to create a
concept will eventually make one that you then discover to be true.
> As a guess, and only a guess, I would consider memories to be a definite
> factor in determining a person's draconity. I might be willing to expand
> this to dreams, since I am not sure how to answer the butterfly dream.
> But then again, without some kind of physical evidence, I am not sure if
> those memories are real, or illusions created by my own wishful
> thinking. (Or worse: I have had memories of things prior to their
> occurrence.)
Memories are one, but not the only. The conditions I gave - that a
definition of draconity must be both true and relevant to the body of a
dragon - allows for several valid forms of draconity. Mine, in a
complete lack of past-life-regression-type memories, needs be spiritual
rather than situational.
Butterfly dreams?
> > > > > Grin, what I am saying is that it is nigh impossible to determine
> > > > > another person's draconity.
> > > >
> > > > I do agree with that; but I draw the line at saying such a thing is
> > > > absolutely impossible to determine.
> > >
> > > At present it is. Will it always be so, I do not have a clue. My crystal
> > > ball is in the shop.
> >
> > By absolutely impossible I mean forever impossible, maybe even logically
> > impossible, not just practically impossible, which I still agree with.
> > *grins* I will continue to defend the possibility of it being possible
> > to know draconity...
>
> Good, prove me wrong. I dare ya. :)
Draconity is definable. Therefore, it is knowable - just find the right
definition.
> BTW yours or someone else's?
Whichever.
> > > Can you name one draconic ideal that is not held by some humans? If you
> > > limit to just ideals, you have a problem in definition. If the
> > > similarity is only occasional, then you may have something. But there
> > > has to be a difference, or else you have not differentiated between
> > > humans and dragons.
> >
> > Remember that "some" humans holding an ideal does not make it human.
> > "Some" could be two schizophrenics. Also note that a draconic ideal
> > would not be universal among dragons, either. That said, I think a
> > yearning to wander is a draconic ideal, one that is far from common
> > among humans; and those times in which humans _do_ like it (as among
> > nomads) are results of necessity. Dragons, I presume, would enjoy
> > wandering even if they didn't have to, whereas humans, when presented
> > the option of spending their lives in one place or wandering, with no
> > overwhelming necessity for either, almost always choose the former.
>
> Grin, then dragons are rarely if ever sedentary? Or is it the desire to
> wander that makes it, not necessarily acting on that desire?
Both the desire and the act. And, of course, it need not be a constant
state of wandering.
> > I don't think I could name another draconic ideal with such precision,
> > though, unless it's one of those that's also human. Exoticness of a
> > non-human type does remain difficult for me.
> >
> Is the dragon form exotic to you, or think/believe/feel more like it
> "should be" your form? I can see a bit of envy at the form, it has many
> advantages, despite the metabolic load wings would place on the system.
Both, ironically. I have a desire, which is, by all intents, purposes,
and measures, authentic, but of whose object I know less than little.
> > I don't even have humanity figured out, although I presume to know them
> > to a far higher degree than dragons.
>
> I find humans to be in general very confusing. As to whether that is a
> draconic trait or not, I leave that to the jury. There are apparently
> more of them than me, so it should be easier to know them.
Confusing in the manner of them always contracting each other in thought
and in action, or in the manner of there being something more to them
than yet seen, but which eludes grasping?
> > > > *grins* Well, _their_ confusion doesn't concern me greatly, since it
> > > > could be corrected with a simple conversation.
> > >
> > > As long as they give you time for one. :)
> >
> > If they don't, that's another reason not to be worried about their
> > confusion.
>
> Well there is more than one way to cut a conversation short. And that
> does worry me. :)
Maybe martial arts would prove effective, then.
> > > Like QM as an example. :) Okay what do you do with someone who says he
> > > is a dragon, yet holds none of the draconic ideals in common with you?
> > > Do you take his word for it, provisionally, or say he is lying?
> >
> > You mean, someone who is morally neutral? Then I would accept the
> > draconity out of a desire to avoid conflict and out of a healthy measure
> > of uncertainty.
>
> Now what practical effect would this have on your choice of actions?
> Would this acceptance put you at risk in any way?
Not as of yet, although I do not disregard the possibility. And it does
affect my actions, since if I thought otherwise, being how I am, I would
argue it very loudly.
> > > I understand that you are able to judge the accuracy of your own
> > > statements, I am curious as to how you do it. I am not sure I understand
> > > the method you are using, so I am trying to clarify. I do not see how
> > > reality can be cheapened, or exactly what you mean by that. I am getting
> > > a parsing error.
> >
> > I will continue to try to explain, until I am no longer able to do so;
> > already I have given a few tests that can be used with hesitation. Feel
> > free to continue questioning me about it (though I need specific
> > questions... I don't summarize well), provided you don't use that
> > 'solipsic fallacy' I mentioned earlier. *grins* That thing annoys me.
> >
> > By the way, while thinking about what to use to assume accuracy when the
> > underpinnings of that accuracy are hazy, I came up with a simple, nifty
> > little method, though one open to abuse; I'll present it next time,
> > after I've given it more thought.
>
> Good I would love to take a bite at it. :):)
Rationality goes beyond logic and brute observation - it needs also be
able to make decisions on less-than-absolute matters. Yet it is still
possible for there to be assumptions that are more rational than others,
and known as such; that is to say, there are guidelines for the use of
assumptions and definitions; these are not arbitrary (for instance, I
mentioned the danger of making a definition with a lower bound but no
upper).
Anyway, if an idea is false then it is, somehow, disprovable. So, it may
be correctly _assumed_ (not proven) that, if after much effort in the
matter, no strong disproof may be generated against an idea, then it is
true. Before you mention it, I can see how this can be misused, which is
why I was hesitant to explain it - a person could ignore or refuse to
imagine disproofs, thinking that consolidates the accuracy of an idea.
Likewise, a disproof is to be considered true if it, itself, cannot be
countered. I use this mostly in matters of ontology or knowledge - for
instance, the assumption that observation is valid is considerably more
reasonable than the opposite or the agnostic decision, because the
arguments in support of the former either go completely unrefuted, or
their refutations are rebutted. Anti-realism, as the opposite of the
belief that observation is valid, has not been able to counterargue its
refutations.
Feel free to argue with the presumption, although do it well. Your
recent assertion that observation is not rational (in the most recent
message; I'll reply to it tomorrow night) startled me; do you believe,
then, that reason has only to do with absolute proof? It that is the
case, then reason must always be powerless against solipsism; that is
why I expand reason to include evaluations of assumption as well as of
logic.
> > > What is there to be insulted by? I obviously did not make my self as
> > > clear as I should have. I should be insulted that you point out my own
> > > failings?? Or perhaps I should be angry because you disagree with me,
> > > you think I am mistaken. My, my this would be a dull argument if we
> > > agreed with each other. :):):)
> >
> > *grins* Actually, a longer speech would probably have cleared up that
> > mistake.
>
> Yeah, sorry about that. I am doing this in between trouble calls, when
> things are quiet. Sometimes I get rushed. I also type slow. These last
> two have taken me about 4 and half hours already. (With a trouble call
> in there somewhere.)
Hm. It's a shame I didn't get done with this before the weekend, then...
> > > I don't get angry, at least not in discussions of this type. neither of
> > > us has used foul language, (or even fowl language). I do know that I can
> > > be somewhat overbearing at times, and there may be a certain passion to
> > > my writings, but please do not think I am ever angry. This has been one
> > > of the most enjoyable exchanges I have had on the internet.
> >
> > Neither do I, but I have made people angry in the past.
>
> Me too, without even intending it. Hmm.... another draconic trait? :)
*grins* Possibly. But I do try to cultivate diplomacy, if not
successfully.
> > Congratulations, Ben! Several times while writing this post I reached
> > the limit of how many characters Netscape can handle, and had to delete
> > more quotations. I had to fragment it...
>
> I can be long winded. You should hear me in person sometimes. :):)
I don't think anything is potentially more long-winded than writing. If
you've read Hegel, you'd see what I mean...
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
AMW
Lhexa wrote:
>
> AMW wrote:
> >
> > Lhexa wrote:
> > Okay. First off is a totally selfless act even possible? Do you feel
> > good when you help someone out? That in and of itself, even if there is
> > no material gain, a benefit. And if you gain by acting "selflessly",
> > then you have committed a selfish act.
>
> _Totally_ selfless is not necessary for selflessness, nor is total
> selfishness for the converse. It can always be argued that there is a
> possibility of a selfish motive in a seemingly altruistic action,
> although that type of argument utilizes a logical fallacy - the appeal
> to ignorance. However, it is also true that it can always be argued that
> there is a possibility of a selfless motive in a seemingly selfless act.
> That is why I will put no support to an argument requiring a person to
> be completely unified in mind and spirit, whether in selfishness or the
> converse; a combination of the two is the more frequent occurence.
If you can identify a benifit to the performer of the action, you are no
longer arguing by ignorance. You don't even have to look at the motive,
just look at the results of the action, in most cases.
> > Second of all, one can look to the historical example of communism. Here
> > you have altruism translated into a political ideology. (At least in
> > theory if not in practice.) People were expected to work, not for their
> > own benefit, but for the benefit of everyone in the state. What happened
> > is that people found out rather quickly that having ability was a
> > liability, rather than an asset. "From each according to his ability,"
> > became dangerous. Because those with more ability were expected to work
> > harder, and produce more, and that the benefits paid out for that work
> > did not depend in any way on the output. A guy making 20 widgets an hour
> > made just as much as the guy making 1. Possibly less if the second guy
> > had more need, more dependents, etc. You work harder for less than the
> > unproductive person. You give the ones with ability the reason to "slack
> > off" and mimic the behavior of the unproductive.
>
> Such a government would be an instance of taking altruism and using it
> to exclude everything else good - most notably justice. It also corrupts
> the idea by requiring altruism to be directed towards an abstract state
> rather than to individuals, an idea which, in its philosophical
> implications, actually removes all value from the concept of altruism...
It arbitrarily assigns an intrinsic value to such altruistic actions.
And that is the problem in that an altruistic action is declared "good"
while a selfish action is declared "bad", without any regard to as to
you is the valuer or why. Since altruism is the ethical ideal that such
a government strives for, and political systems draw their legal basis
on what is ethically good, then you give the government the power to
enforce ethical rules by any means necessary. If people are not acting
altruisticly, or unethically, then the government can step in and use
force to make them behave in such a manner.
The same thing is done in every country. Murder is considered unethical.
I doubt you will get much disagreement on that point. So we empower the
governments to punish and if possible prevent people from murdering
other people. In their view, selfishness is unethical, therefore
punishable by law.
It also makes a big thing out of 'group identity' which we discussed
earlier. The state is simply the collection of people, the ones who
benifit from the altruistic actions of the individual.
> > It is basically a Darwinian argument. The individual with more needs,
> > well, needs more. The person who needs less does not have to expend as
> > much effort to provide for those needs as one who has more of a load.
> > They use less resources as well. So in competition, the one with the
> > greater need has to face off against the many with lesser needs, who
> > have more time to do other things, such as make babies with lesser
> > needs, figure out better hunting strategies, etc. You get a population
> > shift, and the individuals with greater needs dies out. To an altruist,
> > everyone else is a need he has to provide for. And if that means at the
> > expense of his own life, well, there ya go. Can you get more selfless
> > than that? The selfish person has just himself, and therefore the
> > evolutionary advantage.
>
> Those people must still accomodate each other. It reduces to a situation
> in which the most efficient method of selfishness is also the most
> efficient method of selflessness; that is, the way to act that provides
> the most benefit for oneself also helps others out the most, and
> vice-versa. That is why I regard neither (selfishness nor selflessness)
> as having anything significant to do with the basics of morality.
It has everything to do with morality. Why have morals to begin with?
What is the purpose of moral rules in the first place? Or, if that is
too abstract a question, what is the purpose of the technical
applications of morality and ethics, namely politics and economics?
Actions have consequences. That is the whole point of picking one action
over another, for the result of this action and avoiding the result of
that one. Those consequences are either to your benefit or detriment.
(Or alternately to the benefit or detriment of the group) They either
help you to live a longer better life or at the other extreme, they kill
you. You can either act in your own best interest, or not.
And so moral and ethics are established in order to help you pick
actions that will help you (or the group) live longer, better etc. Those
same moral and ethical principles are codified into laws and rights, and
governments are established in order to preserve those laws and rights.
And given the legal power to usurp the rights of those who pose a clear
and present danger to the lives of the population in general.
Now it has been argued that eventually it comes down to a choice as to
which is more important, you or the group. One can act solely for the
group's benefit, even at the risk to your own life, health or whatever.
Or you can act for your own benefit. You can act selfishly, or
selflessly. Altruism is one theory of morality that demands you act for
the benefit of others, even if it is to your detriment. That acting for
one's own benifit is not morally or ethically good. (That in fact, if
one does benifit from an action, it destroys the moral quality of the
action.)
[Note: when you decide which is more important, you are making a value
judgement. ]
> Neitzsche, sure. But what about Hitler? He was influenced by Neitzsche,
> but did not make any change to those philosophical concepts. Or were you
> just making a list of people who were affected by the idea?
Hitler did not make any changes to Neitzsche, correct, but he was
influenced by Neitzsche's work, as Neitzsche was influenced by Kant. I
find it rather ironic that both communism and nazism find their roots in
Kant's work.
> I know. However, I see no reason to believe that this flaw is a result
> of some character flaw in Kant, nor a vendetta of his against reason; in
> fact, he brought many improvements to the philosophy of reason (the
> impossibility of 'pure reason' not being one of them). It is just the
> limit to his skill as a philosopher.
Character flaw? I must say this is a bit of a shock at first. However, I
can see where you get the idea from my words. I have severe doubts that
anything that resulted from his works was intentional. Clancey's Law
states "Never attribute to malice what can be better explained by
ignorance." And I think Kant is a prime example of this. From what I
have read, he was a devote Lutheran, and a bit of a book worm, and I
dare say that one could have hooked a generator to his corpse during the
second world war and powered half of Europe.
> > I disagree. I can see a clear link between the ideas of Kant and those
> > of Neitzche, which of course had a major influence on Hitler et.al. If
> > Kant hadn't left morality swinging in the wind, then I doubt the rest
> > would have followed.
>
> Kant didn't leave morality undefined; he gave it a complete metaphysics
> and structure, albeit one too rigid. And it is rather insulting to
> Neitzsche to believe that, had the right philosophy been around, he
> would have become a meek servant to it! Kant was not responsible for
> Neitzsche.
Careful. While Neitzsche is responsible for his actions and the
consequences thereof, the same goes for Kant. And again, I can see a
clear causative connection between the two. To argue that Kant is not
responsible for the consequences of his actions is treading on dangerous
ground.
And note I did not say he left morality undefined. He left it with no
rational basis. This in an increasingly atheistic world. Thanks to the
advances of science, (especailly Darwinian evolution) there were many
who had declared God dead. The same God who was the source of morality
and ethics prior to the 19th century (as well as our own American
"inaleinable rights" of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness.)
Without a rational basis for morality and with God declared dead, there
was no longer any justification for morality.
And this is the whole point. Eventually the needs of the group come in
conflict with the needs of the individual. Ultimately altruism
eventually forces the individual to act against himself, to act to his
detriment because of the needs of the many. To act in such a manner is
dangerous to the individual holding that meme, and acting on that meme.
Kant could not find any rational justification for the church's
teachings, so he turned his attention on rationality, to see if there
were any bugs in there. IMHO, when he disected reason, he ignord where
he sliced, he forgot about the interconnection between observation and
logic, and how they support and aid each other in giving us information
about the world we live in.
And this ignorance led to altruistic morality with no rational basis and
reason itself rendered all but useless. From those roots, you get the
Hitlers and Stalins of the world, by way of Neitzsche and Marx. If Kant
had not missed this, would we have Neitzsche's ubermen fighting Marx's
proletariat?
> > Again, there is a view, exhibited in another thread that a belief in
> > draconity is itself taken as prima facia evidence of a neurosis. You and
> > I can probably agree that this is not so, that it is not such evidence,
> > but that is not how it is *percieved* by many people. (A belief in
> > magick was taken as such evidence as well, and may still be part of the
> > AMA handbook.)
>
> Well, my point was that such a belief would be in opposition to
> professional psychology, unless the draconity also involved emotional
> problems. Popular psychology is not relevant here, since it is an
> incredibly inaccurate corruption of professional psychology (which has
> its flaws, but is way above the popular version), no matter how accurate
> its supporters think it to be. The belief that a strange and mostly
> unsubstantiated idea is neurotic would make the entire followings of
> most religions neurotic, despite the obvious problems with such a
> definition.
I disagree, Pop psy is very relavant here as most of us do not spend our
time surrounded by professional psychologists. We live among family and
freinds and co-workers whose only knowledge of psychology is at the
popular level, and it is their attitude and perceptions that we have to
deal with.
> On a side note, I have listened to the experiences of several dragons
> who have revealed the fact to psychologists or counselors... and never
> was draconity judged to be a problem needing fixing (parents are a whole
> other matter, of course). I've already given the reason why I think this
> to be so.
This is a relief
Before one builds a birdhouse, one has to assemble one's tools. One has
to know what a birdhouse is as well of course. Before deciding if one is
a dragon or not, one has to know what that means as well as how one is
to determine the accuracy of that statement.
>
> Either that, or you are assuming that reality is composed of words,
> making draconity a matter that doesn't need definition, just
> observation. I think the flaws of that theory are obvious enough.
I don't think I am doing that at all. Words are mental constructs used
as labels of external (or internal) entities.
> > I am not so sure myself. Each and everyone of us live amongst other
> > people to some extent. Of course if I ever met such a person, I have
> > just destroyed the test case, as now we know of each other.
>
> Living among them does not been domination by them, of course. Are the
> people around you so weak?
Yes.
> > That is the question!!!! I really do not know. I can guess, and flail
> > about. I can see problems with identifying it as a set of ideals that
> > dragons have in common. To say you are a dragon is to state you have
> > properties and characteristic in common with other members of that
> > group. I really would like to know just what they are.
>
> Then go ahead and create provisional definitions, and subject them to
> every test you can imagine. Do the same with my definition, as hazy as
> it is, if you remember it. The success of this venture will depend more
> on your creativity than on anything else; your ability to create a
> concept will eventually make one that you then discover to be true.
Okay, will do. And I respectfully request that you repost your
definition in the thread. Please.
> > As a guess, and only a guess, I would consider memories to be a definite
> > factor in determining a person's draconity. I might be willing to expand
> > this to dreams, since I am not sure how to answer the butterfly dream.
> > But then again, without some kind of physical evidence, I am not sure if
> > those memories are real, or illusions created by my own wishful
> > thinking. (Or worse: I have had memories of things prior to their
> > occurrence.)
>
> Memories are one, but not the only. The conditions I gave - that a
> definition of draconity must be both true and relevant to the body of a
> dragon - allows for several valid forms of draconity. Mine, in a
> complete lack of past-life-regression-type memories, needs be spiritual
> rather than situational.
Hmm...I am not sure I see a connection between the spirit and the body.
When I think of dragons, being a decendent of Welsh and Scots, I think
of hexapedal critters, with four limbs and two wings. Now with the
recent debate on whether dinosaurs were closer related to birds than
lizzards, it occurs to me that dragons could be as well, avians instead
of reptiles. But that is me, and understand that others may think of
different sort of dragons.
> Butterfly dreams?
"I, Chuang Chou, once dreamt that I was a butterfly. I flitted about,
from flower to flower, on a lazy summer day, drifting merrily around and
about. I did as I pleased--and was ever so happy! I knew nothing about
any Chuang Chou--and didn't care a bit! Then, I awakened, a Chuang Chou
with all his human trappings! Now, here is the real question: Did I,
Chuang Chou, dream that I was a butterfly? Or am I a butterfly, dreaming
that I am Chuang Chou?"
> > > By absolutely impossible I mean forever impossible, maybe even logically
> > > impossible, not just practically impossible, which I still agree with.
> > > *grins* I will continue to defend the possibility of it being possible
> > > to know draconity...
> >
> > Good, prove me wrong. I dare ya. :)
>
> Draconity is definable. Therefore, it is knowable - just find the right
> definition.
Hmm... By George, I think you may have done it.
>
> > BTW yours or someone else's?
>
> Whichever.
Well this is key. You may be able to know you are a dragon. But can you
tell who else is as well?
> > Is the dragon form exotic to you, or think/believe/feel more like it
> > "should be" your form? I can see a bit of envy at the form, it has many
> > advantages, despite the metabolic load wings would place on the system.
>
> Both, ironically. I have a desire, which is, by all intents, purposes,
> and measures, authentic, but of whose object I know less than little.
I think I may be the same way. (However I have been thinking about the
dynamics of the form a bit :) )
> > I find humans to be in general very confusing. As to whether that is a
> > draconic trait or not, I leave that to the jury. There are apparently
> > more of them than me, so it should be easier to know them.
>
> Confusing in the manner of them always contracting each other in thought
> and in action, or in the manner of there being something more to them
> than yet seen, but which eludes grasping?
Confusing in their thoughts and actions, and well... I really do not
want to turn this into human bashing. Suffice to say that I simply do
not get them, after spending 4 decades on this planet (that I can
recall)
> > Well there is more than one way to cut a conversation short. And that
> > does worry me. :)
>
> Maybe martial arts would prove effective, then.
Good point.
> > > You mean, someone who is morally neutral? Then I would accept the
> > > draconity out of a desire to avoid conflict and out of a healthy measure
> > > of uncertainty.
> >
> > Now what practical effect would this have on your choice of actions?
> > Would this acceptance put you at risk in any way?
>
> Not as of yet, although I do not disregard the possibility. And it does
> affect my actions, since if I thought otherwise, being how I am, I would
> argue it very loudly.
Key Point.
> > Good I would love to take a bite at it. :):)
>
> Rationality goes beyond logic and brute observation - it needs also be
> able to make decisions on less-than-absolute matters. Yet it is still
> possible for there to be assumptions that are more rational than others,
> and known as such; that is to say, there are guidelines for the use of
> assumptions and definitions; these are not arbitrary (for instance, I
> mentioned the danger of making a definition with a lower bound but no
> upper).
Disagree. Logic and observation does not make decision, but provides
data for decision making. Minor nit.
> Anyway, if an idea is false then it is, somehow, disprovable. So, it may
> be correctly _assumed_ (not proven) that, if after much effort in the
> matter, no strong disproof may be generated against an idea, then it is
> true. Before you mention it, I can see how this can be misused, which is
> why I was hesitant to explain it - a person could ignore or refuse to
> imagine disproofs, thinking that consolidates the accuracy of an idea.
> Likewise, a disproof is to be considered true if it, itself, cannot be
> countered. I use this mostly in matters of ontology or knowledge - for
> instance, the assumption that observation is valid is considerably more
> reasonable than the opposite or the agnostic decision, because the
> arguments in support of the former either go completely unrefuted, or
> their refutations are rebutted. Anti-realism, as the opposite of the
> belief that observation is valid, has not been able to counterargue its
> refutations.
Or in other words, while a true idea may not be knowable as such, a
false idea can be knowable to be false. Have you read Popper?
As to anti-realism: It is a position that leaves you unable to know
anything about the world you live in. And the whole question is largely
irrelavant anyway. Regardless of whether your sense are valid or not, it
is what you are presented with and that includes the pains involved in
acting as if they are not valid. You want to avoid the pain, you are
forced to act as if your senses are valid, whether they are or not.
Now what do you do with assumptions that are (at present) unfalsifiable?
> Feel free to argue with the presumption, although do it well. Your
> recent assertion that observation is not rational (in the most recent
> message; I'll reply to it tomorrow night) startled me; do you believe,
> then, that reason has only to do with absolute proof? It that is the
> case, then reason must always be powerless against solipsism; that is
> why I expand reason to include evaluations of assumption as well as of
> logic.
I was attempting to make a point, that I finally got to in the paragraph
above. Well several. One is that all logical proofs are based on
assumptions, and these need some other form of verification besides
logic. 2) that even the most basic idea, i.e. that our senses are valid
is itself an assumption, one that (at present) is not falsifiable. And
finally, that many of these questions I try to wrestle with don't
matter. Solipsism is itself a dead end. It removes any and all ability
to know anything. Sure you can construct logical proofs from now until
the end of time, and it will have absolutely no relavance to the world
you live. But you end up having to act as if your senses are valid or
else suffer the consequences of that choice. There are no agnostics in
foxholes, and with sense data being thrown at you on a continuing basis,
such agnostism is not even practical.
> > Me too, without even intending it. Hmm.... another draconic trait? :)
>
> *grins* Possibly. But I do try to cultivate diplomacy, if not
> successfully.
I have been told I have the diplomatic skills of a Klingon. By my wife.
:)
> I don't think anything is potentially more long-winded than writing. If
> you've read Hegel, you'd see what I mean...
Never made it all the way through. However at one time, many years ago,
I used to be a preacher. (I am much better now :) )
Ben
aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> > The distinguishing feature of meme theory (as Baxil explained it) was
> > that the meme worked with a mind as might some microorganism with its
> > host - a symbiote, perhaps, but one which propagated, and adapted, under
> > its own power, rather than being so affected by the mind. Since you've
> > said that the mind has such a significant role in the manipulation of
> > these memes, what remains to distinguish meme theory as a unique theory
> > of thought?
>
> Actually, as I understand it, the microorganism analogy is quite valid.
> But it is more of a virus than a sentient. It does not have any power in
> and of itself to adapt, or change. It still relies on a communicating
> sentient to pass it along, and that sentient is quite free to alter it,
> change it, add to it, subtract, screw it up totally, or even keep its
> mouth shut and ignore it.
>
> [In short, memes are pieces not players]
>
> A meme is not a sentient. It cannot change on its own. It has no will
> let alone the means to enact its will. But using the germ analogy, one
> can see how a meme can transmit and "infect" a population, and what the
> effects of its adoption. (Hmm... that last word struck me as very
> appropriate)
If its analogy to a germ of some kind were correct, the meme would have
to perpetuate itself under its own power, not just be perpetuated by the
mind. How does a meme do this?
> >
> > So, the decision to join a hate-group is a cold-blooded decision based
> > on injust principles, more often than an emotional one?
>
> Sigh, I wish! Then the choice would be obvious, to leave such groups
> alone. But man is not a rational creature, but a rationalizing one, and
> has developed a set of "logical" reasons for the belief. The above
> example is based on a false model of man, namely that of "Group
> Identity" that a person is not an individual, but a member of a group,
> and all such members are the same. Greed, jealousy, and a general
> xenophobia, all play a part. The "rational" basis behind those came
> later, as a justification for treating such people as members of a group
> instead of as individuals.
I meant... by the time a person gets around to joining a hate group, is
much emotional turmoil still going on, or have their perceptions been
corrupted at some earlier time, leaving a shell that needs no emotion to
work on injust principles, but nearly incapable of reasoning otherwise?
> >
> > I do wonder how much dragons - both the human and the theoretical types
> > - would unthinkingly yield to group standards. Such sometimes seems
> > inevitable among a race, and I haven't seen an absence of it among all
> > those I know.
>
> Well, I would hope that dragons are better than that. I have almost
> given up hope that humans will get better.
To what extent do you yourself think yourself free of such things, if
indeed you feel capable of that kind of self-judgment?
> > > Bad idea(l)s should be avoided. They are dangerous. anti-Semitism is
> > > such a bad idea, well basically, it is a false model of people. History
> > > has shown just what kind of excesses this type of thinking can lead to,
> > > and how detrimental it is to life as well as civilization. So such memes
> > > should be remembered, and kept in cages, lest they spring up again and
> > > we have to repeat the horrors of the second world war.
> >
> > How could they be kept caged?
>
> Buchenwald and Aushwits are such caged ideal, as is every monument to
> every war ever fought. They should be left as reminders, of just how
> horrible they can be. But they need to be surrounded by counter
> arguments, and anything else that can keep them from being recognized as
> anything other than what they are.
Oh... but the influence of the memory of past horrors, like those of
World War II, fade over time... if memory is placed as the only
safeguard, wouldn't that just make the atrocities cycle and repeat over
enough time it takes for the public to think it firmly in the past?
> > My definition of belief differs from yours. I merely take it to mean an
> > assumption that an idea with less than complete and absolute proof - as
> > most are - is true, rather than limiting the definition to assumptions
> > with _little_ proof. Belief can be a result of reason, then.
>
> So you see more of a continuum between reason and belief, rather than a
> one or the other kind of thing.?
Yep.
> > > Is there an upper bound on logical proofs, at least ones that are
> > > worthwhile? Good question. Hmmm...
> >
> > Keep in mind that logical proofs do nothing for the generation of
> > further arguments, nor are their premises provable by the proof itself
> > (that would make it a tautology). The premises can be supported by
> > further arguments, but that process can be taken only so far - thus,
> > logical proof proves itself in this way incomplete. I doubt it will ever
> > be irrelevant, though - that is not what I mean by an upper limit.
>
> I think I disagree. And will trot out Special Relativity as an example.
> SR is based on two postulates, that 1) the laws of physics are the same
> in all inertial reference frames, and 2) the speed of light in a vacuum
> is the same in all inertial reference frames. The first is a conclusion
> of the work done by Galileo, the second a product of Maxwell. So those
> two works ended up generating a further set of arguments that we now
> call the Special Theory of Relativity. That in turn, with the addition
> of the equivalence principle, generate General Relativity.
Oh, that's true. Arguments can be drawn from arguments by certain
methods, by implication. But what about when the most implications have
been drawn from a single argument as can be drawn? How do you originate
new philosophy, or develop new methods to evaluate observation
(calculus, for instance, was a new method when Newton began to use it).
> But at the basis of all this are other postulates. And you are correct
> that you cannot logically prove a postulate so you must find some other
> means of validating them. And that is where observation comes in.
And, I presume, imagination; that is, creating arguments and _then_
evaluating their merit. Philosophy is something that requires
significant imagination to create; if it could be gained from
observation alone, there would not be so few philosophers. That is not
to say that philosophy can ignore observation, of course.
> > No value judgment - but do you regard it as perfectly complete?
>
> For the time being. Until and unless further evidence presents itself.
> As for perfect, well its the best I have been able to come up with so
> far. :)
Let me rephrase that - do you think that reason can do for the mind
whatsoever the mind requires... that it is a kind of universal tool?
Well, the only way to completely divest observation from reality would
be to make it causeless... because if there is a cause to the things
observed, a rational cause, then that can potentially be traced by the
mind doing the observation. Even a mind living in a dream can eventually
realize that it is a dream, unless the fact of its being a dream is
inherently unprovable... which would mean that the fact of its being a
dream is separated from the rest of reality, unable to make any
difference in it. That is enough for me to say that it is always
possible to realize the existence of a dream - although the possibility
might be microscopic. Anyway, if observation is divested from reality,
that makes it a tight wad of self-contradictions... uncreated,
irrelevant, and arbitrary. The existence of even a single such thing
would make reason universally worthless. Thus, observation can only be
banished along with reason, which is an argument against such
nihilism... an argument to which, currently, I know no counter. Thus I
will assume that observation is connected to something real, even if not
in the most obvious way.
> > > But reason does not judge. That is left up to the 'player'. I think I
> > > need to digress here just a bit.
> > >
> > > Benian (or Drakonian) Metaphysics:
> > > The world consists of 4 parts, and is analogous to a game.
> > > You have the pieces
> > > You have the board, where the game is played, (both space and time)
> > > You have the rules by which the game is played.
> > > And you have the players. That is us. We are the ones that make the
> > > decisions as to which memes to keep and which to toss aside. The player,
> > > the thing that wills, that judges and decides which action is to be
> > > attempted.
> >
> > Of what use is this metaphysics?
>
> What use is any metaphysics? :) It is a model of how the universe works,
> perhaps incomplete, and in need of work, but it is a start. As a model,
> if I can properly identify which elements are which, I should be able to
> explain observational phenomena, and predict the behavior of the thing
> being modeled. To hopefully run simulations of the world in which I live
> in and thereby better pick the action I want to take in order to get the
> results I want.
You can classify... but what effect does this metaphysics have on your
actions? Is it actually refined enough to make predictions, without
relying for the major part on less metaphysical precepts (like
experience)?
> > > Reason does not judge, you do, based on either what reason tells you or
> > > what some other mode tells you. OR even a combination of what the
> > > various tools you have available tell you. Reason will say that if A is
> > > true, B follows, then C etc.
> >
> > And for what reason do you separate reason from a player, then? Do you
> > regard it as too mechanistic?
>
> That is a big part of it. Also the will or Player can choose to listen
> to reason or emotion, or some outside source, such as a book or speaker.
> It can act on anything it likes.
For a person refusing to use reason, the situation would be the same if
reason was a part of the person, if those other things, emotion, faith,
and all that, are also there. A person _can_ work against 'emself, or
against their own nature, and not necessarily to detriment.
As for reason being too mechanistic... this may be so if reason was some
unified object in the mind, like emotions and certain thoughts seem to
be; but, instead, I conceive of reason as certain elements of the
behavior of thought, namely that self-reflective quality that allows
thought to examine itself; it is also the exercising of that ability.
These thoughts (which I assert to be part of a person), themselves, are
not mechanistic if the person is not mechanistic, which is true. And
since the thoughts are free (to an extent) from determinism, so, too, is
reason.
> >
> > Yeah, that's so. The definition of belief that I use - as the assumption
> > of truth, irregardless of accuracy - still works, though. Maybe
> > 'assumption' would be a word that works just as well, but it too carries
> > the negative connotations of 'belief'.
>
> Hmm... I think that would be a better word. At least an assumption is
> more obvious as an assumption than a belief is.
Then, I will use it hence to contain the meaning of the second 'mode of
thought' as I interpreted it, so that we can keep using both concepts
without confusion...
> > > Again, reason is a tool, thinking is a tool that the "soul" to use a
> > > term, in order to judge the validity of a proposition or to construct
> > > the same.
> >
> > Why wouldn't reason be a part of the soul?
>
> We are going to have to discuss what each of us means by this term.
> Eventually, we are going to end up providing competing dictionaries so
> we can translate our meanings of each others words. :)
The soul, the person? For now, consider it to be the part(s) that has
free will.
> I use soul as the will or "player". The player has several tools
> available to him, different modes of cognition, with reason being one of
> them. Memes, sensory data and ideas being pieces in this mental
> landscape, that these tools manipulate.
I regard many of these tools as partaking of free will, being thus part
of the person. The person/soul, of course, is much more than just a
conjunction of these tools.
> >
> > Hm. I would still need a demonstration of its efficacity, then... such a
> > system, in a real application, would be bewilderingly complicated.
>
> Grin it is. Let me see if I can dig out a couple URLs
> http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html
> http://www.columbia.edu/~de11/gamethry.html
> http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/eco/game/game.html (take a look
> especially at "The Prisoners' Dilemma")
I'm well acquainted with the Prisoners' Dilemma, although I'm not sure
which philosopher originated it... either Locke or Hobbes, I think. I'm
halfway through Hobbes' "Leviathan" right now, so that'll help.
*grins* The others I will look into when I'm not feeling so lazy.
Tomorrow is likely.
> And it is to me at this very early stage. It is one of those things I
> would love to know more about, but haven't the time today.
>
> >
Okay, but counter this counterargument: A person judges, but if this
judgment depends on any part of the object being judged, then the result
of the judgment must, in part (and in a very strange manner of
speaking), be a property of the object. The only alternative to this is
to make this judgment arbitrary... rendering it useless. This does not
mean that an object cannot be judged differently by different people,
but that each judgment would be correlated with some property of the
object, even if that property is a chance conjunction of other
qualities.
Keep in mind that I require both in my philosophy (value from the judger
and value in the judged, or something better phrased). In fact, it seems
to me that the existence of one without the other would be a logical
contradiction.
> >
> > I did not mean it would always be good, especially in a limited scope of
> > time. Change has the overall tendency to be good, because it is not
> > arbitrary - or at least, the adaptation to change is not. I think it
> > true that, given a sufficient span of time, change will always turn out
> > to be of overall benefit - that is, there is no such thing as an
> > eternally degrading situation, when degrading is used in a moral sense.
>
> And if it is, if you are wrong and things do continue to degrade, in
> either sense, what happens to the valuers? :)
Then change Could still be a good thing, but on a thoroughly conditional
basis.
> > > > No, though it is interesting. I've already seen that your 'selfishness'
> > > > is amended in an Ayn Randish way (saying that what is in the actual
> > > > self-interest of one person does not truly harm another), and thus not
> > > > so likely to be a rationalization of actual cruelty.
> > >
> > > Darn it. You peeked :)
> >
> > *evil grin* You forgot to mention Hegel!
>
> I try not to mention specific philosophers, for a number of reasons.
> First, I have read alot, and sometimes I get confused as to who says
> what. Second, there is the problem of guilt by association that has to
> be dealt with. I am sure you have met people who have said, "Oh, you
> read Rand? Well she was wrong, so I don't have to listen to what you
> say." or something along those lines.
>
> And third, what I espouse, regardless of the source, is what I think is
> true. (And we can argue about whether it is true or not :) ) I have
> adopted these ideas, or memes wherever they came from. These are my
> thoughts, even if they were thought by someone else before me.
I said that because I think, with sufficient knowledge of Hegel, you
would have found him a worthier a target for criticism than Kant. Hegel
was, in fact, at least as influential philosophically as Kant. I just
said it because mention of Hegel is absent in every instance of Randian
I've seen (there aren't many - her fiction and a few objectivists), so
that I've come to believe she made no mention of him in her nonfiction.
> > Some questions: who's David Kelly? How did Rand act as a witness against
> > alleged communists in the hearing? And, by cult of personality, do you
> > mean that the group reverenced her, rather than her ideas?
>
> David Kelley (pardon the typo) is the author of several books, "The
> Evidence of the Senses", "The Art of Reason" and one of the founders of
> the institute for Objectivist Studies (IOS). This is a rival
> organization to the Ayn Rand Institute run by Leonard Peokoff, who was
> designated Ayn's intellectual heir after her death. The schism is (IMHO)
> between those who want to go through and fix any bugs in Rand's system
> and those who think her words are the equivalent of Holy Writ. Peokoff's
> group, in my opinion, is doing the latter, which answers your last
> question.
_Designated_ her heir? I don't like the sound of that. Who was it that
thought philosophy something designatable?
Anyway, if I ever find Rand's nonfiction books, I'll probably follow it
up with Kelley. Is he harder to find than she?
> In 1947, Rand appeared before the House Un-American Activities
> Committee. It should be noted that Rand was a staunch anti-Communist,
> immigrating from St. Petersburg in 1926 after the Revolution, and saw
> first hand what communism was like. A film had been made in 1943 called
> "Song of Russia" which Rand testified a propaganda piece for the
> communists, and that it was a total lie about conditions in the Soviet
> Union. A full transcript of her testimony can be seen at:
> http://www.objectivism.addr.com/texts/huac.html
That I actually read. And, even in the context, it is not enough to make
a condemnation of character.
> > I do not like her tendency, in books, to stereotype her opposition (ie,
> > those who support altruism) as incompetent, selfish, double-talking
> > bureaucrats who have no regard for reason. That is, like you mentioned
> > earlier, erecting a straw man that has limited relevance to reality.
> > Other than that, I liked her books very much, especially The
> > Fountainhead.
>
> Grin I cannot say I like it much either, however, I keep getting
> presented with people who fit the stereotype all too well.
Oh... where are they most common?
A strange question, I know. I was kind of at a loss as to how to
continue this part of the conversation.
> > I have only read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, so I know little
> > of her philosophy apart from the moral side. I haven't a clue what there
> > is to her logic, since I haven't been able to find her nonfiction works.
>
> See if you can find "An Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" by
> Rand. It is a good overview of the epistemal side. "Objectivism: the
> Philosophy of Ayn Rand" by Leonard Peikoff, is a good first text on her
> system. You can also check out the Ayn Rand Institute at:
> http://www.aynrand.org/
I went and looked at the summary that webpage gave. It was, with the
exception of the aesthetics, stuff that I inferred from the books.
Thanks, though.
> > Possibly, maybe even ultimately. But keep in mind that the only
> > betterment that it would seek, at least at first, would be its own
> > survival - it could as easily spiral into more and more complex forms of
> > evil, rather than improving, although this would ever require further
> > evolution.
>
> but the whole point is that evil is destructive. The more evil, the more
> destructive, until it becomes self destructive. Thereby killing off the
> evil person, along with its memes. :)
And if it was a type of evil other than killing or material destruction?
> > > > That would depend on how far-sighted you are...
> > >
> > > Which is better, to be far sighted or to be short sighted? :)
> >
> > Far-sighted. *grins* Unless, for some reason, you want a comfortable
> > life...
>
> Ah, I am not sure I could live a comfortable short sighted life. I would
> always worry about the long term. :)
Hm. Ironically, I think that I am far-sighted (to what extent that I am)
by choice, not by nature... I don't have many compliments for the way
biology and environment had left me.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
AMW
Lhexa wrote:
>
> AMW wrote:
> > [In short, memes are pieces not players]
> >
> > A meme is not a sentient. It cannot change on its own. It has no will
> > let alone the means to enact its will. But using the germ analogy, one
> > can see how a meme can transmit and "infect" a population, and what the
> > effects of its adoption. (Hmm... that last word struck me as very
> > appropriate)
>
> If its analogy to a germ of some kind were correct, the meme would have
> to perpetuate itself under its own power, not just be perpetuated by the
> mind. How does a meme do this?
Grin it doesn't. It is more like a virus that has no motive power of its
own, but is swept along by whatever medium it finds itself in. There is
a difference between a virus and a meme in that the "cell" that a meme
finds itself in can choose to ignore it if it desires. That is why it is
only an analogy.
> > Sigh, I wish! Then the choice would be obvious, to leave such groups
> > alone. But man is not a rational creature, but a rationalizing one, and
> > has developed a set of "logical" reasons for the belief. The above
> > example is based on a false model of man, namely that of "Group
> > Identity" that a person is not an individual, but a member of a group,
> > and all such members are the same. Greed, jealousy, and a general
> > xenophobia, all play a part. The "rational" basis behind those came
> > later, as a justification for treating such people as members of a group
> > instead of as individuals.
>
> I meant... by the time a person gets around to joining a hate group, is
> much emotional turmoil still going on, or have their perceptions been
> corrupted at some earlier time, leaving a shell that needs no emotion to
> work on injust principles, but nearly incapable of reasoning otherwise?
Good question. I admit to spending little enough time with hate groups,
so it is difficult to give an answer. The rationalizations are out
there. And it has been noted that Klansman, to use one example, are
usually of extremely limited education.
> > > I do wonder how much dragons - both the human and the theoretical types
> > > - would unthinkingly yield to group standards. Such sometimes seems
> > > inevitable among a race, and I haven't seen an absence of it among all
> > > those I know.
> >
> > Well, I would hope that dragons are better than that. I have almost
> > given up hope that humans will get better.
>
> To what extent do you yourself think yourself free of such things, if
> indeed you feel capable of that kind of self-judgment?
Are you asking if I think of myself as perfected in any respect? :):) I
have to admit to a fondness to bagpipe music, and as to whether the fact
my ancestors are Scottish influences that or not is questionable. Or
more exactly, the fact I know I am of Scottish decent. To use one
example.
I do find myself wearing masks around most people, trying to fit in and
just not be hassled. More than I feel comfortable with. But it seems
prudent considering there are more of them than there are of me.
> > > How could they be kept caged?
> >
> > Buchenwald and Aushwits are such caged ideal, as is every monument to
> > every war ever fought. They should be left as reminders, of just how
> > horrible they can be. But they need to be surrounded by counter
> > arguments, and anything else that can keep them from being recognized as
> > anything other than what they are.
>
> Oh... but the influence of the memory of past horrors, like those of
> World War II, fade over time... if memory is placed as the only
> safeguard, wouldn't that just make the atrocities cycle and repeat over
> enough time it takes for the public to think it firmly in the past?
Yep. And history has shown time and time again a marked inability of
humans to learn from their own history. But I will be damned if I can
think of a better means.
> > So you see more of a continuum between reason and belief, rather than a
> > one or the other kind of thing.?
>
> Yep.
I think I now see where we are at odds, and it is a minor semantic
point. Belief to you, is the acceptance of a proposition, regardless of
the means by which that acceptance is obtained or decided. You believe
A, and you may have reasons for that belief that range from a
mathematically complete proof, to blind 'faith' in some authority, such
as a third party or your own gut.
English is an odd language. Someday we will have to talk about the
different meanings of "my"
> > > Keep in mind that logical proofs do nothing for the generation of
> > > further arguments, nor are their premises provable by the proof itself
> > > (that would make it a tautology). The premises can be supported by
> > > further arguments, but that process can be taken only so far - thus,
> > > logical proof proves itself in this way incomplete. I doubt it will ever
> > > be irrelevant, though - that is not what I mean by an upper limit.
> >
> > I think I disagree. And will trot out Special Relativity as an example.
> > SR is based on two postulates, that 1) the laws of physics are the same
> > in all inertial reference frames, and 2) the speed of light in a vacuum
> > is the same in all inertial reference frames. The first is a conclusion
> > of the work done by Galileo, the second a product of Maxwell. So those
> > two works ended up generating a further set of arguments that we now
> > call the Special Theory of Relativity. That in turn, with the addition
> > of the equivalence principle, generate General Relativity.
>
> Oh, that's true. Arguments can be drawn from arguments by certain
> methods, by implication. But what about when the most implications have
> been drawn from a single argument as can be drawn? How do you originate
> new philosophy, or develop new methods to evaluate observation
> (calculus, for instance, was a new method when Newton began to use it).
And calculus still uses the same kind of mathematics that have existed
since before Euclid. It is built on the pre-existing math of the time,
is more of an extenuation than a whole new direction.
Generating new philosophies I do not see as all that big a deal. I am
more concern with generating the correct set of philosophical theories,
ones that match observation. I guess one could toss out observation and
then one would have limitless opportunities to generate new
philosophies.
> > But at the basis of all this are other postulates. And you are correct
> > that you cannot logically prove a postulate so you must find some other
> > means of validating them. And that is where observation comes in.
>
> And, I presume, imagination; that is, creating arguments and _then_
> evaluating their merit. Philosophy is something that requires
> significant imagination to create; if it could be gained from
> observation alone, there would not be so few philosophers. That is not
> to say that philosophy can ignore observation, of course.
Good point. But the problem with imagination is that unless it is bound
by observation, one can imagine darn near anything. And the resulting
philosophies will have as little to do with the real world.
> > > No value judgment - but do you regard it as perfectly complete?
> >
> > For the time being. Until and unless further evidence presents itself.
> > As for perfect, well its the best I have been able to come up with so
> > far. :)
>
> Let me rephrase that - do you think that reason can do for the mind
> whatsoever the mind requires... that it is a kind of universal tool?
Hmm... good question. I would have to say yes at this point. It can
provide an accurate model of how the world works, new inventions. The
whole progress of science is attributable to its rational approach, its
methodology, which leads to such technical items such as this computer.
But I suspect you are going to disagree with me. :)
> > This is not mere sophistry, this is the central question of western
> > philosophy. This has been the issue that the Idealists and Realists have
> > argued about since the time of Aristotle and Plato. And one ends up
> > simply deciding which side one takes.
>
> Well, the only way to completely divest observation from reality would
> be to make it causeless... because if there is a cause to the things
> observed, a rational cause, then that can potentially be traced by the
> mind doing the observation. Even a mind living in a dream can eventually
> realize that it is a dream, unless the fact of its being a dream is
> inherently unprovable... which would mean that the fact of its being a
> dream is separated from the rest of reality, unable to make any
> difference in it. That is enough for me to say that it is always
> possible to realize the existence of a dream - although the possibility
> might be microscopic. Anyway, if observation is divested from reality,
> that makes it a tight wad of self-contradictions... uncreated,
> irrelevant, and arbitrary. The existence of even a single such thing
> would make reason universally worthless. Thus, observation can only be
> banished along with reason, which is an argument against such
> nihilism... an argument to which, currently, I know no counter. Thus I
> will assume that observation is connected to something real, even if not
> in the most obvious way.
Well the opposing theories do not deny causality, they simply state that
the cause is different from what it is generally thought or appears to
be. As an example, you see a rock. Photons bouncing off the rock and
then ending up in your eye. And your sensory network provides an image
of this rock to your mind. One theory is that the image of the rock is
being generated by some other force, possibly sentient, or possibly just
some mechanistic computer. Another theory is that you are creating the
image of a rock, just as you create the images that play out in your
dreams.
> > > Of what use is this metaphysics?
> >
> > What use is any metaphysics? :) It is a model of how the universe works,
> > perhaps incomplete, and in need of work, but it is a start. As a model,
> > if I can properly identify which elements are which, I should be able to
> > explain observational phenomena, and predict the behavior of the thing
> > being modeled. To hopefully run simulations of the world in which I live
> > in and thereby better pick the action I want to take in order to get the
> > results I want.
>
> You can classify... but what effect does this metaphysics have on your
> actions? Is it actually refined enough to make predictions, without
> relying for the major part on less metaphysical precepts (like
> experience)?
At present? It could use more work. I don't think the rules are
changeable, but the pieces and the board are. We can take a rock and say
melt it down and extract iron from it to make an engine. GR tells us how
to alter space-time by using the presence of mass/energy. And there is
even a theoretical model of exceeding the speed of light without
violating the rules. The way of doing that is completely in accordance
with the rules. By knowing what is changeable and what is not, one can
learn how to better play the game.
Experience of sensory data is in accordance with this model, the game
model can be used to explain at least the mechanics. You have pieces,
such as rocks and photons. You have ways they interact, as well as ways
they do not. These interaction are in accordance with rules, the ones we
know about are called the laws of optics.
> > > And for what reason do you separate reason from a player, then? Do you
> > > regard it as too mechanistic?
> >
> > That is a big part of it. Also the will or Player can choose to listen
> > to reason or emotion, or some outside source, such as a book or speaker.
> > It can act on anything it likes.
>
> For a person refusing to use reason, the situation would be the same if
> reason was a part of the person, if those other things, emotion, faith,
> and all that, are also there. A person _can_ work against 'emself, or
> against their own nature, and not necessarily to detriment.
I am not so sure about that. I don't think a tiger can try to act like a
rabbit to his benefit.
> As for reason being too mechanistic... this may be so if reason was some
> unified object in the mind, like emotions and certain thoughts seem to
> be; but, instead, I conceive of reason as certain elements of the
> behavior of thought, namely that self-reflective quality that allows
> thought to examine itself; it is also the exercising of that ability.
> These thoughts (which I assert to be part of a person), themselves, are
> not mechanistic if the person is not mechanistic, which is true. And
> since the thoughts are free (to an extent) from determinism, so, too, is
> reason.
Again we are in a semantics quandary. I think of reason as a particular
mode of cognition, namely logic and observation. I think I see what you
are saying, and think we are in some agreement, except on terminology.
We may also have different models of the mind. I don't see thoughts as
anything other than the pieces in an internal game. You still need
players to push them around, and rules by which they interact. What
happens when this idea meets up with this one.
> > > > Again, reason is a tool, thinking is a tool that the "soul" to use a
> > > > term, in order to judge the validity of a proposition or to construct
> > > > the same.
> > >
> > > Why wouldn't reason be a part of the soul?
> >
> > We are going to have to discuss what each of us means by this term.
> > Eventually, we are going to end up providing competing dictionaries so
> > we can translate our meanings of each others words. :)
>
> The soul, the person? For now, consider it to be the part(s) that has
> free will.
Granted. And to me, this is the part of myself I most identify with, the
player, the one that decides and picks. Are you using a more inclusive
definition to include the whole contents of the mind, the whole game?
Hmm...not sure I can argue with that.
> > I use soul as the will or "player". The player has several tools
> > available to him, different modes of cognition, with reason being one of
> > them. Memes, sensory data and ideas being pieces in this mental
> > landscape, that these tools manipulate.
>
> I regard many of these tools as partaking of free will, being thus part
> of the person. The person/soul, of course, is much more than just a
> conjunction of these tools.
Agreed
> > > Hm. I would still need a demonstration of its efficacity, then... such a
> > > system, in a real application, would be bewilderingly complicated.
> >
> > Grin it is. Let me see if I can dig out a couple URLs
> > http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html
> > http://www.columbia.edu/~de11/gamethry.html
> > http://william-king.www.drexel.edu/top/eco/game/game.html (take a look
> > especially at "The Prisoners' Dilemma")
>
> I'm well acquainted with the Prisoners' Dilemma, although I'm not sure
> which philosopher originated it... either Locke or Hobbes, I think. I'm
> halfway through Hobbes' "Leviathan" right now, so that'll help.
>
> *grins* The others I will look into when I'm not feeling so lazy.
> Tomorrow is likely.
Well the cool thing about game theory is it gives a mathematical method
of comparing the different strategies. This is a whole new set of tools
to use on problems of moral and ethical theory. A logical set of tools
to apply to those very questions.
> > Actually I think I caught alot of that, I just disagree. A thing is just
> > a thing. A rock is just a rock. There is no such thing as a 'good' rock
> > or a 'bad'
> > rock. It is not an intrinsic property of rocks. For a rock to be good,
> > it has to be good to someone. It can also be detrimental and hence 'bad'
> > to someone else. [Example. I am trying to kill you. You have a rock to
> > defend yourself with. To you the rock is good. To me, it is bad. I could
> > get hurt by it]. Either way, get rid of the valuers, and it is just a
> > rock. And good or bad have no meaning.
>
> Okay, but counter this counterargument: A person judges, but if this
> judgment depends on any part of the object being judged, then the result
> of the judgment must, in part (and in a very strange manner of
> speaking), be a property of the object. The only alternative to this is
> to make this judgment arbitrary... rendering it useless. This does not
> mean that an object cannot be judged differently by different people,
> but that each judgment would be correlated with some property of the
> object, even if that property is a chance conjunction of other
> qualities.
There is a difference between the recognition of a property of an
object, and judging that object, especially making moral judgment on an
object. How do you judge the moral quality of, again, say a rock? (I
always come back to rocks, maybe I am a rock philosopher?)
Take this rock. If you need the rock to defend yourself, then it is a
good thing to have around. If it in the hands of someone trying to kill
you, that situation is not good. Yet it is the same rock, therefore the
moral quality of the rock does not depend on the rock itself. And it is
hardly arbitrary, as the difference is in the situation, in the rock's
effect on you the valuer and your life. It is the relationship that the
rock has to your existence that is being judged and not the object
itself.
When ever you say something is good, whether you are referring to
morality or even physical objects such as rocks, you are stating that
they meet some set of criteria or specification. I work with power
supplies and sometimes these good power supplies go bad. this does not
mean they are running around on a killing spree, but they no longer meet
the manufacturers specifications. That set of specifications is set up
by a person, by deciding what that person needed in order to do what
that person wanted to do. That person sets up a goal, and from that goal
determines what is needed in order to accomplish it. But if there is no
goal, then it is completely irrelevant as to whether the object meets
the specification or not. Again, remove the valuer and the value no
longer exists.
When talking about morality, the other definition of 'good', this is a
set of rules that apply to the consciously chosen actions of a person.
Rocks are not conscious, and have no ability to choose anything, let
alone their own actions. Therefore the whole question about the moral
quality of a rock seems rather bizarre.
> Keep in mind that I require both in my philosophy (value from the judger
> and value in the judged, or something better phrased). In fact, it seems
> to me that the existence of one without the other would be a logical
> contradiction.
You missed the relationship between the two. That is key, and not the
physical objects, not the pieces themselves.
> > And if it is, if you are wrong and things do continue to degrade, in
> > either sense, what happens to the valuers? :)
>
> Then change Could still be a good thing, but on a thoroughly conditional
> basis.
Not if change results in the death of the valuer. Then that change is
bad.
There is a whole line of philosophy that divides the world up into good
and evil. In this model, spirit was considered (judged) good, while
matter was considered evil. It applied intrinsic moral properties to
objects. Now we have humans, which are not pure spirit but live in
physical (evil) bodies, sort of like an amphibian.
> I said that because I think, with sufficient knowledge of Hegel, you
> would have found him a worthier a target for criticism than Kant. Hegel
> was, in fact, at least as influential philosophically as Kant. I just
> said it because mention of Hegel is absent in every instance of Randian
> I've seen (there aren't many - her fiction and a few objectivists), so
> that I've come to believe she made no mention of him in her nonfiction.
She does, as does Kelley. But she singles out Kant as the most
influential and most damaging of the 19th century, as the root of all of
it. She has little good to say of most of the crop of the last couple
centuries, except for Descartes and Locke, I cannot think of any she had
anything nice to say.
I think I have all of her non-fiction works, and read them before I even
touched her fiction.
> > > Some questions: who's David Kelly? How did Rand act as a witness against
> > > alleged communists in the hearing? And, by cult of personality, do you
> > > mean that the group reverenced her, rather than her ideas?
> >
> > David Kelley (pardon the typo) is the author of several books, "The
> > Evidence of the Senses", "The Art of Reason" and one of the founders of
> > the institute for Objectivist Studies (IOS). This is a rival
> > organization to the Ayn Rand Institute run by Leonard Peokoff, who was
> > designated Ayn's intellectual heir after her death. The schism is (IMHO)
> > between those who want to go through and fix any bugs in Rand's system
> > and those who think her words are the equivalent of Holy Writ. Peokoff's
> > group, in my opinion, is doing the latter, which answers your last
> > question.
>
> _Designated_ her heir? I don't like the sound of that. Who was it that
> thought philosophy something designatable?
There was a split between Rand and Nathaniel Branden, and I think she
wanted to prevent her philosophy from being diluted or altered. She was
very certain that she was right, did not think there were any bugs in
her system.
I can't say I care much for it either. But Peikoff's book is a good
primer on Objectivist thought.
>
> Anyway, if I ever find Rand's nonfiction books, I'll probably follow it
> up with Kelley. Is he harder to find than she?
Unfortunately yes. He has 3 books out that I know of, all available via
Amazon, or the IOS
> > In 1947, Rand appeared before the House Un-American Activities
> > Committee. It should be noted that Rand was a staunch anti-Communist,
> > immigrating from St. Petersburg in 1926 after the Revolution, and saw
> > first hand what communism was like. A film had been made in 1943 called
> > "Song of Russia" which Rand testified a propaganda piece for the
> > communists, and that it was a total lie about conditions in the Soviet
> > Union. A full transcript of her testimony can be seen at:
> > http://www.objectivism.addr.com/texts/huac.html
>
> That I actually read. And, even in the context, it is not enough to make
> a condemnation of character.
She was a friendly to the McCarthy hearings. She was at political,
ideological and philosophic odds with a great many intellectuals who
characterized the hearings as some kind of witch hunt. And participation
in such an endeavor, despite the context, was considered prima fascia
evidence of bad character.
She was (and still is) the opposition to that whole line of thought. A
line which denigrates the mind and its abilities, that think man is
better off as a mindless cog in the machine of state. How do you fight
someone like that? You demonize her. You hope people will not look at
the transcripts or her later statements about how the hearings were
misguided.
> > > I do not like her tendency, in books, to stereotype her opposition (ie,
> > > those who support altruism) as incompetent, selfish, double-talking
> > > bureaucrats who have no regard for reason. That is, like you mentioned
> > > earlier, erecting a straw man that has limited relevance to reality.
> > > Other than that, I liked her books very much, especially The
> > > Fountainhead.
> >
> > Grin I cannot say I like it much either, however, I keep getting
> > presented with people who fit the stereotype all too well.
>
> Oh... where are they most common?
I have found more of them since I moved to California.
There is another group who should be factored in, the so-called
"Limousine Liberals". Those who are rich, and feel, I guess, guilty for
being successful, for acting in a selfish manner and finding out just
how profitable it is. For acting contrary to the morality of altruism
and feel somehow wrong for doing so.
> > but the whole point is that evil is destructive. The more evil, the more
> > destructive, until it becomes self destructive. Thereby killing off the
> > evil person, along with its memes. :)
>
> And if it was a type of evil other than killing or material destruction?
Such as? I can guess several possible answers, but to provide one would
spoil things. :)
> Hm. Ironically, I think that I am far-sighted (to what extent that I am)
> by choice, not by nature... I don't have many compliments for the way
> biology and environment had left me.
The choice makes all the difference. The fact you can choose is what
makes you really you, and not some machine.
Ben
aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> > AMW wrote:
>
> >
> > If its analogy to a germ of some kind were correct, the meme would have
> > to perpetuate itself under its own power, not just be perpetuated by the
> > mind. How does a meme do this?
>
> Grin it doesn't. It is more like a virus that has no motive power of its
> own, but is swept along by whatever medium it finds itself in. There is
> a difference between a virus and a meme in that the "cell" that a meme
> finds itself in can choose to ignore it if it desires. That is why it is
> only an analogy.
Okay, then I'll restate an earlier question... it might have been
answered, but I don't recall. Since that's true, what is there to
distinguish meme theory?
> >
> > I meant... by the time a person gets around to joining a hate group, is
> > much emotional turmoil still going on, or have their perceptions been
> > corrupted at some earlier time, leaving a shell that needs no emotion to
> > work on injust principles, but nearly incapable of reasoning otherwise?
>
> Good question. I admit to spending little enough time with hate groups,
> so it is difficult to give an answer. The rationalizations are out
> there. And it has been noted that Klansman, to use one example, are
> usually of extremely limited education.
>
> > >
> > > Well, I would hope that dragons are better than that. I have almost
> > > given up hope that humans will get better.
> >
> > To what extent do you yourself think yourself free of such things, if
> > indeed you feel capable of that kind of self-judgment?
>
> Are you asking if I think of myself as perfected in any respect? :):) I
> have to admit to a fondness to bagpipe music, and as to whether the fact
> my ancestors are Scottish influences that or not is questionable. Or
> more exactly, the fact I know I am of Scottish decent. To use one
> example.
>
> I do find myself wearing masks around most people, trying to fit in and
> just not be hassled. More than I feel comfortable with. But it seems
> prudent considering there are more of them than there are of me.
How do you know how they'd treat you without masks, if you have only
dealt with them through the masks? If you loathe that action of
yourself, it might cause a harsh judgment of those who make it
necessary.
> > > > How could they be kept caged?
> > >
> > > Buchenwald and Aushwits are such caged ideal, as is every monument to
> > > every war ever fought. They should be left as reminders, of just how
> > > horrible they can be. But they need to be surrounded by counter
> > > arguments, and anything else that can keep them from being recognized as
> > > anything other than what they are.
> >
> > Oh... but the influence of the memory of past horrors, like those of
> > World War II, fade over time... if memory is placed as the only
> > safeguard, wouldn't that just make the atrocities cycle and repeat over
> > enough time it takes for the public to think it firmly in the past?
>
> Yep. And history has shown time and time again a marked inability of
> humans to learn from their own history. But I will be damned if I can
> think of a better means.
Hm. I think sufficient old age would do it.
> > > So you see more of a continuum between reason and belief, rather than a
> > > one or the other kind of thing.?
> >
> > Yep.
>
> I think I now see where we are at odds, and it is a minor semantic
> point. Belief to you, is the acceptance of a proposition, regardless of
> the means by which that acceptance is obtained or decided. You believe
> A, and you may have reasons for that belief that range from a
> mathematically complete proof, to blind 'faith' in some authority, such
> as a third party or your own gut.
>
> English is an odd language. Someday we will have to talk about the
> different meanings of "my"
*grins*
> > > I think I disagree. And will trot out Special Relativity as an example.
> > > SR is based on two postulates, that 1) the laws of physics are the same
> > > in all inertial reference frames, and 2) the speed of light in a vacuum
> > > is the same in all inertial reference frames. The first is a conclusion
> > > of the work done by Galileo, the second a product of Maxwell. So those
> > > two works ended up generating a further set of arguments that we now
> > > call the Special Theory of Relativity. That in turn, with the addition
> > > of the equivalence principle, generate General Relativity.
> >
> > Oh, that's true. Arguments can be drawn from arguments by certain
> > methods, by implication. But what about when the most implications have
> > been drawn from a single argument as can be drawn? How do you originate
> > new philosophy, or develop new methods to evaluate observation
> > (calculus, for instance, was a new method when Newton began to use it).
>
> And calculus still uses the same kind of mathematics that have existed
> since before Euclid. It is built on the pre-existing math of the time,
> is more of an extenuation than a whole new direction.
It is related to the old mathematics, but not capable of being derived
from them by any methods known at that time.
> Generating new philosophies I do not see as all that big a deal. I am
> more concern with generating the correct set of philosophical theories,
> ones that match observation. I guess one could toss out observation and
> then one would have limitless opportunities to generate new
> philosophies.
I worry about becoming habituated to an adequate philosophy that, by its
very existence, prevents me from seeking one better.
> > > But at the basis of all this are other postulates. And you are correct
> > > that you cannot logically prove a postulate so you must find some other
> > > means of validating them. And that is where observation comes in.
> >
> > And, I presume, imagination; that is, creating arguments and _then_
> > evaluating their merit. Philosophy is something that requires
> > significant imagination to create; if it could be gained from
> > observation alone, there would not be so few philosophers. That is not
> > to say that philosophy can ignore observation, of course.
>
> Good point. But the problem with imagination is that unless it is bound
> by observation, one can imagine darn near anything. And the resulting
> philosophies will have as little to do with the real world.
So? There are ways to discard such results.
> > > > No value judgment - but do you regard it as perfectly complete?
> > >
> > > For the time being. Until and unless further evidence presents itself.
> > > As for perfect, well its the best I have been able to come up with so
> > > far. :)
> >
> > Let me rephrase that - do you think that reason can do for the mind
> > whatsoever the mind requires... that it is a kind of universal tool?
>
> Hmm... good question. I would have to say yes at this point. It can
> provide an accurate model of how the world works, new inventions. The
> whole progress of science is attributable to its rational approach, its
> methodology, which leads to such technical items such as this computer.
> But I suspect you are going to disagree with me. :)
How does it do the work of imagination, then? Or do I recall falsely
that you said reason included only logic and observation...
My argument was that if something is not as it seems, the truth can
eventually be found beyond the seeming. Thus, if we live in a dream,
then it must be somehow possibility to discover that.
> > > > Of what use is this metaphysics?
> > >
> > > What use is any metaphysics? :) It is a model of how the universe works,
> > > perhaps incomplete, and in need of work, but it is a start. As a model,
> > > if I can properly identify which elements are which, I should be able to
> > > explain observational phenomena, and predict the behavior of the thing
> > > being modeled. To hopefully run simulations of the world in which I live
> > > in and thereby better pick the action I want to take in order to get the
> > > results I want.
> >
> > You can classify... but what effect does this metaphysics have on your
> > actions? Is it actually refined enough to make predictions, without
> > relying for the major part on less metaphysical precepts (like
> > experience)?
>
> At present? It could use more work. I don't think the rules are
> changeable, but the pieces and the board are. We can take a rock and say
> melt it down and extract iron from it to make an engine. GR tells us how
> to alter space-time by using the presence of mass/energy. And there is
> even a theoretical model of exceeding the speed of light without
> violating the rules. The way of doing that is completely in accordance
> with the rules. By knowing what is changeable and what is not, one can
> learn how to better play the game.
Science and technology tell you these things, not your metaphysics. What
does it do that science, alone, cannot?
> > > That is a big part of it. Also the will or Player can choose to listen
> > > to reason or emotion, or some outside source, such as a book or speaker.
> > > It can act on anything it likes.
> >
> > For a person refusing to use reason, the situation would be the same if
> > reason was a part of the person, if those other things, emotion, faith,
> > and all that, are also there. A person _can_ work against 'emself, or
> > against their own nature, and not necessarily to detriment.
>
> I am not so sure about that. I don't think a tiger can try to act like a
> rabbit to his benefit.
But a tigerish human could. Acts of will such as that are not to be
expected of most animals...
> > As for reason being too mechanistic... this may be so if reason was some
> > unified object in the mind, like emotions and certain thoughts seem to
> > be; but, instead, I conceive of reason as certain elements of the
> > behavior of thought, namely that self-reflective quality that allows
> > thought to examine itself; it is also the exercising of that ability.
> > These thoughts (which I assert to be part of a person), themselves, are
> > not mechanistic if the person is not mechanistic, which is true. And
> > since the thoughts are free (to an extent) from determinism, so, too, is
> > reason.
>
> Again we are in a semantics quandary. I think of reason as a particular
> mode of cognition, namely logic and observation. I think I see what you
> are saying, and think we are in some agreement, except on terminology.
>
> We may also have different models of the mind. I don't see thoughts as
> anything other than the pieces in an internal game. You still need
> players to push them around, and rules by which they interact. What
> happens when this idea meets up with this one.
Was that a question? Well, I simply expanded the definition of the
player to include some of the things you considered pieces. The
decisions of the player must have a basis, right? If you separate any
possible basis for decision from the player, then the player would
become an arbitrary middle-man, one whose existence is in no wise
ensured...
> > > We are going to have to discuss what each of us means by this term.
> > > Eventually, we are going to end up providing competing dictionaries so
> > > we can translate our meanings of each others words. :)
> >
> > The soul, the person? For now, consider it to be the part(s) that has
> > free will.
>
> Granted. And to me, this is the part of myself I most identify with, the
> player, the one that decides and picks. Are you using a more inclusive
> definition to include the whole contents of the mind, the whole game?
> Hmm...not sure I can argue with that.
Pretty much. I include those traits through which, if improved, the
person, too, truly improves... this excludes external things, such as
monetary status, because that can be improved but have no effect on a
person.
> > > Actually I think I caught alot of that, I just disagree. A thing is just
> > > a thing. A rock is just a rock. There is no such thing as a 'good' rock
> > > or a 'bad'
> > > rock. It is not an intrinsic property of rocks. For a rock to be good,
> > > it has to be good to someone. It can also be detrimental and hence 'bad'
> > > to someone else. [Example. I am trying to kill you. You have a rock to
> > > defend yourself with. To you the rock is good. To me, it is bad. I could
> > > get hurt by it]. Either way, get rid of the valuers, and it is just a
> > > rock. And good or bad have no meaning.
> >
> > Okay, but counter this counterargument: A person judges, but if this
> > judgment depends on any part of the object being judged, then the result
> > of the judgment must, in part (and in a very strange manner of
> > speaking), be a property of the object. The only alternative to this is
> > to make this judgment arbitrary... rendering it useless. This does not
> > mean that an object cannot be judged differently by different people,
> > but that each judgment would be correlated with some property of the
> > object, even if that property is a chance conjunction of other
> > qualities.
>
> There is a difference between the recognition of a property of an
> object, and judging that object, especially making moral judgment on an
> object. How do you judge the moral quality of, again, say a rock? (I
> always come back to rocks, maybe I am a rock philosopher?)
It's the example that works best. In supporting myself, I'd prefer to
use beauty or ethics.
> Take this rock. If you need the rock to defend yourself, then it is a
> good thing to have around. If it in the hands of someone trying to kill
> you, that situation is not good. Yet it is the same rock, therefore the
> moral quality of the rock does not depend on the rock itself. And it is
> hardly arbitrary, as the difference is in the situation, in the rock's
> effect on you the valuer and your life. It is the relationship that the
> rock has to your existence that is being judged and not the object
> itself.
And that relationship has something to do with the rock, right?
> When ever you say something is good, whether you are referring to
> morality or even physical objects such as rocks, you are stating that
> they meet some set of criteria or specification. I work with power
> supplies and sometimes these good power supplies go bad. this does not
> mean they are running around on a killing spree, but they no longer meet
> the manufacturers specifications. That set of specifications is set up
> by a person, by deciding what that person needed in order to do what
> that person wanted to do. That person sets up a goal, and from that goal
> determines what is needed in order to accomplish it. But if there is no
> goal, then it is completely irrelevant as to whether the object meets
> the specification or not. Again, remove the valuer and the value no
> longer exists.
Why do you imply that I believe that a valuer is unnecessary? I said
otherwise, earlier - I said that it was also necessary.
> When talking about morality, the other definition of 'good', this is a
> set of rules that apply to the consciously chosen actions of a person.
> Rocks are not conscious, and have no ability to choose anything, let
> alone their own actions. Therefore the whole question about the moral
> quality of a rock seems rather bizarre.
If the decision is based on what the object _is_, then the value must
also come, in part, from the object. To state it differently, in marked
comparison with yours, remove anything that can have value and the
valuer no longer exists.
> > Keep in mind that I require both in my philosophy (value from the judger
> > and value in the judged, or something better phrased). In fact, it seems
> > to me that the existence of one without the other would be a logical
> > contradiction.
>
> You missed the relationship between the two. That is key, and not the
> physical objects, not the pieces themselves.
*grins* Likewise. By the way, when did I say the objects had to be
physical? This started out about a system of honor...
> > > And if it is, if you are wrong and things do continue to degrade, in
> > > either sense, what happens to the valuers? :)
> >
> > Then change Could still be a good thing, but on a thoroughly conditional
> > basis.
>
> Not if change results in the death of the valuer. Then that change is
> bad.
That's why I said 'could' and 'conditional'. That is, its value depends
only on circumstance.
> There is a whole line of philosophy that divides the world up into good
> and evil. In this model, spirit was considered (judged) good, while
> matter was considered evil. It applied intrinsic moral properties to
> objects. Now we have humans, which are not pure spirit but live in
> physical (evil) bodies, sort of like an amphibian.
Okay, what do you mean by object?
> > I said that because I think, with sufficient knowledge of Hegel, you
> > would have found him a worthier a target for criticism than Kant. Hegel
> > was, in fact, at least as influential philosophically as Kant. I just
> > said it because mention of Hegel is absent in every instance of Randian
> > I've seen (there aren't many - her fiction and a few objectivists), so
> > that I've come to believe she made no mention of him in her nonfiction.
>
> She does, as does Kelley. But she singles out Kant as the most
> influential and most damaging of the 19th century, as the root of all of
> it. She has little good to say of most of the crop of the last couple
> centuries, except for Descartes and Locke, I cannot think of any she had
> anything nice to say.
>
> I think I have all of her non-fiction works, and read them before I even
> touched her fiction.
I think it likely that she didn't read Hegel, then, if she passed by
without insulting him...
> > > > Some questions: who's David Kelly? How did Rand act as a witness against
> > > > alleged communists in the hearing? And, by cult of personality, do you
> > > > mean that the group reverenced her, rather than her ideas?
> > >
> > > David Kelley (pardon the typo) is the author of several books, "The
> > > Evidence of the Senses", "The Art of Reason" and one of the founders of
> > > the institute for Objectivist Studies (IOS). This is a rival
> > > organization to the Ayn Rand Institute run by Leonard Peokoff, who was
> > > designated Ayn's intellectual heir after her death. The schism is (IMHO)
> > > between those who want to go through and fix any bugs in Rand's system
> > > and those who think her words are the equivalent of Holy Writ. Peokoff's
> > > group, in my opinion, is doing the latter, which answers your last
> > > question.
> >
> > _Designated_ her heir? I don't like the sound of that. Who was it that
> > thought philosophy something designatable?
>
> There was a split between Rand and Nathaniel Branden, and I think she
> wanted to prevent her philosophy from being diluted or altered. She was
> very certain that she was right, did not think there were any bugs in
> her system.
It seems like, if she did that, then her ideal human couldn't be a
philosopher... she wanted lackeys over an original thinker...
> > > In 1947, Rand appeared before the House Un-American Activities
> > > Committee. It should be noted that Rand was a staunch anti-Communist,
> > > immigrating from St. Petersburg in 1926 after the Revolution, and saw
> > > first hand what communism was like. A film had been made in 1943 called
> > > "Song of Russia" which Rand testified a propaganda piece for the
> > > communists, and that it was a total lie about conditions in the Soviet
> > > Union. A full transcript of her testimony can be seen at:
> > > http://www.objectivism.addr.com/texts/huac.html
> >
> > That I actually read. And, even in the context, it is not enough to make
> > a condemnation of character.
>
> She was a friendly to the McCarthy hearings. She was at political,
> ideological and philosophic odds with a great many intellectuals who
> characterized the hearings as some kind of witch hunt. And participation
> in such an endeavor, despite the context, was considered prima fascia
> evidence of bad character.
The hearings do seem to have been a witch hunt. But her part in it
wasn't so.
> She was (and still is) the opposition to that whole line of thought. A
> line which denigrates the mind and its abilities, that think man is
> better off as a mindless cog in the machine of state. How do you fight
> someone like that? You demonize her. You hope people will not look at
> the transcripts or her later statements about how the hearings were
> misguided.
>
> > > > I do not like her tendency, in books, to stereotype her opposition (ie,
> > > > those who support altruism) as incompetent, selfish, double-talking
> > > > bureaucrats who have no regard for reason. That is, like you mentioned
> > > > earlier, erecting a straw man that has limited relevance to reality.
> > > > Other than that, I liked her books very much, especially The
> > > > Fountainhead.
> > >
> > > Grin I cannot say I like it much either, however, I keep getting
> > > presented with people who fit the stereotype all too well.
> >
> > Oh... where are they most common?
>
> I have found more of them since I moved to California.
>
> There is another group who should be factored in, the so-called
> "Limousine Liberals". Those who are rich, and feel, I guess, guilty for
> being successful, for acting in a selfish manner and finding out just
> how profitable it is. For acting contrary to the morality of altruism
> and feel somehow wrong for doing so.
Oh. How many of these do you know, and how many do you just see? That
is... such shallowness might be only a surface detail, in both the
"LL's" and the others.
> >
> > And if it was a type of evil other than killing or material destruction?
>
> Such as? I can guess several possible answers, but to provide one would
> spoil things. :)
Forced conformity.
> > Hm. Ironically, I think that I am far-sighted (to what extent that I am)
> > by choice, not by nature... I don't have many compliments for the way
> > biology and environment had left me.
>
> The choice makes all the difference. The fact you can choose is what
> makes you really you, and not some machine.
Choices of free will can be made either to make a decision for the
external world, or to change oneself. The first is rare enough, but the
second staggeringly so.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> > AMW wrote:
> > >
> >
> > selfishness for the converse. It can always be argued that there is a
> > possibility of a selfish motive in a seemingly altruistic action,
> > although that type of argument utilizes a logical fallacy - the appeal
> > to ignorance. However, it is also true that it can always be argued that
> > there is a possibility of a selfless motive in a seemingly selfless act.
> > That is why I will put no support to an argument requiring a person to
> > be completely unified in mind and spirit, whether in selfishness or the
> > converse; a combination of the two is the more frequent occurence.
>
> If you can identify a benifit to the performer of the action, you are no
> longer arguing by ignorance. You don't even have to look at the motive,
> just look at the results of the action, in most cases.
I meant that your argument seemed to be based on: "For all we know, any
act could be done for selfish reasons." Arguing from that is following
the fallacy of ignorance. If you have a different argument (*grins* ie,
if you can peer into peoples' heads and actually find out) then feel
free to state it...
> It arbitrarily assigns an intrinsic value to such altruistic actions.
> And that is the problem in that an altruistic action is declared "good"
> while a selfish action is declared "bad", without any regard to as to
> you is the valuer or why. Since altruism is the ethical ideal that such
> a government strives for, and political systems draw their legal basis
> on what is ethically good, then you give the government the power to
> enforce ethical rules by any means necessary. If people are not acting
> altruisticly, or unethically, then the government can step in and use
> force to make them behave in such a manner.
*grins* I hope you don't think I'm arguing _for_ them!
> The same thing is done in every country. Murder is considered unethical.
> I doubt you will get much disagreement on that point. So we empower the
> governments to punish and if possible prevent people from murdering
> other people. In their view, selfishness is unethical, therefore
> punishable by law.
>
> It also makes a big thing out of 'group identity' which we discussed
> earlier. The state is simply the collection of people, the ones who
> benifit from the altruistic actions of the individual.
>
> >
> > Those people must still accomodate each other. It reduces to a situation
> > in which the most efficient method of selfishness is also the most
> > efficient method of selflessness; that is, the way to act that provides
> > the most benefit for oneself also helps others out the most, and
> > vice-versa. That is why I regard neither (selfishness nor selflessness)
> > as having anything significant to do with the basics of morality.
>
> It has everything to do with morality. Why have morals to begin with?
> What is the purpose of moral rules in the first place? Or, if that is
> too abstract a question, what is the purpose of the technical
> applications of morality and ethics, namely politics and economics?
To guide actions! Assigning the fact of the object of an action being
oneself or another need not be intrinsic to morality.
> Actions have consequences. That is the whole point of picking one action
> over another, for the result of this action and avoiding the result of
> that one. Those consequences are either to your benefit or detriment.
> (Or alternately to the benefit or detriment of the group) They either
> help you to live a longer better life or at the other extreme, they kill
> you. You can either act in your own best interest, or not.
>
> And so moral and ethics are established in order to help you pick
> actions that will help you (or the group) live longer, better etc. Those
> same moral and ethical principles are codified into laws and rights, and
> governments are established in order to preserve those laws and rights.
> And given the legal power to usurp the rights of those who pose a clear
> and present danger to the lives of the population in general.
>
> Now it has been argued that eventually it comes down to a choice as to
> which is more important, you or the group. One can act solely for the
> group's benefit, even at the risk to your own life, health or whatever.
> Or you can act for your own benefit. You can act selfishly, or
> selflessly. Altruism is one theory of morality that demands you act for
> the benefit of others, even if it is to your detriment. That acting for
> one's own benifit is not morally or ethically good. (That in fact, if
> one does benifit from an action, it destroys the moral quality of the
> action.)
>
> [Note: when you decide which is more important, you are making a value
> judgement. ]
That is a matter in which I would use a different branch of morality to
deal with the problem, unless it just happens to be as clear-cut as you
see in fiction. For instance, I might decide to make it a matter of
honor instead of selfish/lessness.
> > Neitzsche, sure. But what about Hitler? He was influenced by Neitzsche,
> > but did not make any change to those philosophical concepts. Or were you
> > just making a list of people who were affected by the idea?
>
> Hitler did not make any changes to Neitzsche, correct, but he was
> influenced by Neitzsche's work, as Neitzsche was influenced by Kant. I
> find it rather ironic that both communism and nazism find their roots in
> Kant's work.
Again, Hegel has _far_ more connection to communism than Kant, and the
same might go far nazism (but it wasn't really an attempt to make a
seemingly true ideology, like communism was - it was less
philosophical). Marx called his philosophy "Dialectical Materialism";
the 'dialectic method' had been created by Hegel (Marx's concept of
conflicting classes was a mirror image of Hegel's idea of conflicting
ideas). Kant created an ethics in which the individual owes loyalty to a
set abstracted ideas; Hegel, however, asserted that the state was
sovereign (it was based on a poorly explained idea that a person in
submission was superior to a person who dominates). Kant was optimistic
about the governments of his time, but gave them no philosophical
importance.
> > I know. However, I see no reason to believe that this flaw is a result
> > of some character flaw in Kant, nor a vendetta of his against reason; in
> > fact, he brought many improvements to the philosophy of reason (the
> > impossibility of 'pure reason' not being one of them). It is just the
> > limit to his skill as a philosopher.
>
> Character flaw? I must say this is a bit of a shock at first. However, I
> can see where you get the idea from my words. I have severe doubts that
> anything that resulted from his works was intentional. Clancey's Law
> states "Never attribute to malice what can be better explained by
> ignorance." And I think Kant is a prime example of this. From what I
> have read, he was a devote Lutheran, and a bit of a book worm, and I
> dare say that one could have hooked a generator to his corpse during the
> second world war and powered half of Europe.
It is too much to say that one man caused every philosophical evil in
the last century and a half... which of Kant's books have you read?
> > Kant didn't leave morality undefined; he gave it a complete metaphysics
> > and structure, albeit one too rigid. And it is rather insulting to
> > Neitzsche to believe that, had the right philosophy been around, he
> > would have become a meek servant to it! Kant was not responsible for
> > Neitzsche.
>
> Careful. While Neitzsche is responsible for his actions and the
> consequences thereof, the same goes for Kant. And again, I can see a
> clear causative connection between the two. To argue that Kant is not
> responsible for the consequences of his actions is treading on dangerous
> ground.
No, I said that Kant was not responsible for Neitzsche. That is, by word
and action it is clear that Neitzsche didn't give a damn about Kant -
that is, Kant was not an influence on him.
> And note I did not say he left morality undefined. He left it with no
> rational basis. This in an increasingly atheistic world. Thanks to the
> advances of science, (especailly Darwinian evolution) there were many
> who had declared God dead. The same God who was the source of morality
> and ethics prior to the 19th century (as well as our own American
> "inaleinable rights" of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness.)
> Without a rational basis for morality and with God declared dead, there
> was no longer any justification for morality.
Why do you say that he left it without a rational basis? He left reason
itself without giving a rational basis, but he did lay out one for his
morality. Have you read his "Metaphysics of Morals"?
> And this is the whole point. Eventually the needs of the group come in
> conflict with the needs of the individual. Ultimately altruism
> eventually forces the individual to act against himself, to act to his
> detriment because of the needs of the many. To act in such a manner is
> dangerous to the individual holding that meme, and acting on that meme.
> Kant could not find any rational justification for the church's
> teachings, so he turned his attention on rationality, to see if there
> were any bugs in there. IMHO, when he disected reason, he ignord where
> he sliced, he forgot about the interconnection between observation and
> logic, and how they support and aid each other in giving us information
> about the world we live in.
How did he do that?
> And this ignorance led to altruistic morality with no rational basis and
> reason itself rendered all but useless. From those roots, you get the
> Hitlers and Stalins of the world, by way of Neitzsche and Marx. If Kant
> had not missed this, would we have Neitzsche's ubermen fighting Marx's
> proletariat?
Yes. I do not think that any action of Kant's would have magically
removed the bigotry from these people. They believed in their ideas
because they were hateful; but they did not actually become hateful by
believing those ideas.
> > Well, my point was that such a belief would be in opposition to
> > professional psychology, unless the draconity also involved emotional
> > problems. Popular psychology is not relevant here, since it is an
> > incredibly inaccurate corruption of professional psychology (which has
> > its flaws, but is way above the popular version), no matter how accurate
> > its supporters think it to be. The belief that a strange and mostly
> > unsubstantiated idea is neurotic would make the entire followings of
> > most religions neurotic, despite the obvious problems with such a
> > definition.
>
> I disagree, Pop psy is very relavant here as most of us do not spend our
> time surrounded by professional psychologists. We live among family and
> freinds and co-workers whose only knowledge of psychology is at the
> popular level, and it is their attitude and perceptions that we have to
> deal with.
If their opinion has no bearing on the truth, what importance have they?
Must you accomodate yourself to them?
Hm. Did you just agree with me?
> > Either that, or you are assuming that reality is composed of words,
> > making draconity a matter that doesn't need definition, just
> > observation. I think the flaws of that theory are obvious enough.
>
> I don't think I am doing that at all. Words are mental constructs used
> as labels of external (or internal) entities.
Alright.
> > > I am not so sure myself. Each and everyone of us live amongst other
> > > people to some extent. Of course if I ever met such a person, I have
> > > just destroyed the test case, as now we know of each other.
> >
> > Living among them does not been domination by them, of course. Are the
> > people around you so weak?
>
> Yes.
How do you know?
> >
> > Then go ahead and create provisional definitions, and subject them to
> > every test you can imagine. Do the same with my definition, as hazy as
> > it is, if you remember it. The success of this venture will depend more
> > on your creativity than on anything else; your ability to create a
> > concept will eventually make one that you then discover to be true.
>
> Okay, will do. And I respectfully request that you repost your
> definition in the thread. Please.
I will do that in my reply to your e-mail, because I've run out of time
tonight.
> >
> > Memories are one, but not the only. The conditions I gave - that a
> > definition of draconity must be both true and relevant to the body of a
> > dragon - allows for several valid forms of draconity. Mine, in a
> > complete lack of past-life-regression-type memories, needs be spiritual
> > rather than situational.
>
> Hmm...I am not sure I see a connection between the spirit and the body.
> When I think of dragons, being a decendent of Welsh and Scots, I think
> of hexapedal critters, with four limbs and two wings. Now with the
> recent debate on whether dinosaurs were closer related to birds than
> lizzards, it occurs to me that dragons could be as well, avians instead
> of reptiles. But that is me, and understand that others may think of
> different sort of dragons.
Well, I need to consolidate a spiritual side just so that the fact will
make a difference in my life, among other reasons. There would be a
problem with draconity being nothing but an unachievable desire that
causes emotional pain...
> > Butterfly dreams?
>
> "I, Chuang Chou, once dreamt that I was a butterfly. I flitted about,
> from flower to flower, on a lazy summer day, drifting merrily around and
> about. I did as I pleased--and was ever so happy! I knew nothing about
> any Chuang Chou--and didn't care a bit! Then, I awakened, a Chuang Chou
> with all his human trappings! Now, here is the real question: Did I,
> Chuang Chou, dream that I was a butterfly? Or am I a butterfly, dreaming
> that I am Chuang Chou?"
*grins* It helps that the butterfly doesn't have a mind. If 'twere a
butterfly dreaming of Chou, either he could eventually discover it a
dream, or the entire concept of dreaming would be meaningless,
especially to him.
> > >
> > > Good, prove me wrong. I dare ya. :)
> >
> > Draconity is definable. Therefore, it is knowable - just find the right
> > definition.
>
> Hmm... By George, I think you may have done it.
Was that sarcastic or serious?
> > > BTW yours or someone else's?
> >
> > Whichever.
>
> Well this is key. You may be able to know you are a dragon. But can you
> tell who else is as well?
I think, once the definition becomes much more sophisticated.
> > > Is the dragon form exotic to you, or think/believe/feel more like it
> > > "should be" your form? I can see a bit of envy at the form, it has many
> > > advantages, despite the metabolic load wings would place on the system.
> >
> > Both, ironically. I have a desire, which is, by all intents, purposes,
> > and measures, authentic, but of whose object I know less than little.
>
> I think I may be the same way. (However I have been thinking about the
> dynamics of the form a bit :) )
Definitely! Although, as I do that, the form begins to differ from the
conventional one... for instance, I don't especially want to breathe
fire... that does not speak to my desire.
> > > I find humans to be in general very confusing. As to whether that is a
> > > draconic trait or not, I leave that to the jury. There are apparently
> > > more of them than me, so it should be easier to know them.
> >
> > Confusing in the manner of them always contracting each other in thought
> > and in action, or in the manner of there being something more to them
> > than yet seen, but which eludes grasping?
>
> Confusing in their thoughts and actions, and well... I really do not
> want to turn this into human bashing. Suffice to say that I simply do
> not get them, after spending 4 decades on this planet (that I can
> recall)
Well, you could always become a cynic. That would spare you confusion.
> > > Good I would love to take a bite at it. :):)
> >
> > Rationality goes beyond logic and brute observation - it needs also be
> > able to make decisions on less-than-absolute matters. Yet it is still
> > possible for there to be assumptions that are more rational than others,
> > and known as such; that is to say, there are guidelines for the use of
> > assumptions and definitions; these are not arbitrary (for instance, I
> > mentioned the danger of making a definition with a lower bound but no
> > upper).
>
> Disagree. Logic and observation does not make decision, but provides
> data for decision making. Minor nit.
I agree; I was using a figure a speech ('reason decides' replaces
'reason provides the basis for decision'). I still believe that reason
is a part of a person, though.
> > Anyway, if an idea is false then it is, somehow, disprovable. So, it may
> > be correctly _assumed_ (not proven) that, if after much effort in the
> > matter, no strong disproof may be generated against an idea, then it is
> > true. Before you mention it, I can see how this can be misused, which is
> > why I was hesitant to explain it - a person could ignore or refuse to
> > imagine disproofs, thinking that consolidates the accuracy of an idea.
> > Likewise, a disproof is to be considered true if it, itself, cannot be
> > countered. I use this mostly in matters of ontology or knowledge - for
> > instance, the assumption that observation is valid is considerably more
> > reasonable than the opposite or the agnostic decision, because the
> > arguments in support of the former either go completely unrefuted, or
> > their refutations are rebutted. Anti-realism, as the opposite of the
> > belief that observation is valid, has not been able to counterargue its
> > refutations.
>
> Or in other words, while a true idea may not be knowable as such, a
> false idea can be knowable to be false. Have you read Popper?
Nope.
> As to anti-realism: It is a position that leaves you unable to know
> anything about the world you live in. And the whole question is largely
> irrelavant anyway. Regardless of whether your sense are valid or not, it
> is what you are presented with and that includes the pains involved in
> acting as if they are not valid. You want to avoid the pain, you are
> forced to act as if your senses are valid, whether they are or not.
>
> Now what do you do with assumptions that are (at present) unfalsifiable?
Such as?
> > Feel free to argue with the presumption, although do it well. Your
> > recent assertion that observation is not rational (in the most recent
> > message; I'll reply to it tomorrow night) startled me; do you believe,
> > then, that reason has only to do with absolute proof? It that is the
> > case, then reason must always be powerless against solipsism; that is
> > why I expand reason to include evaluations of assumption as well as of
> > logic.
>
> I was attempting to make a point, that I finally got to in the paragraph
> above. Well several. One is that all logical proofs are based on
> assumptions, and these need some other form of verification besides
> logic. 2) that even the most basic idea, i.e. that our senses are valid
> is itself an assumption, one that (at present) is not falsifiable. And
> finally, that many of these questions I try to wrestle with don't
> matter. Solipsism is itself a dead end. It removes any and all ability
> to know anything. Sure you can construct logical proofs from now until
> the end of time, and it will have absolutely no relavance to the world
> you live. But you end up having to act as if your senses are valid or
> else suffer the consequences of that choice. There are no agnostics in
> foxholes, and with sense data being thrown at you on a continuing basis,
> such agnostism is not even practical.
My topic was also that the assumptions, themselves, need not be
basically irrational. Some logicists resort to that when this speaking
of premises; it's quite funny to hear them saying that mathematical
axioms must be taken on faith...
> > > Me too, without even intending it. Hmm.... another draconic trait? :)
> >
> > *grins* Possibly. But I do try to cultivate diplomacy, if not
> > successfully.
>
> I have been told I have the diplomatic skills of a Klingon. By my wife.
> :)
Ooh.
> > I don't think anything is potentially more long-winded than writing. If
> > you've read Hegel, you'd see what I mean...
>
> Never made it all the way through. However at one time, many years ago,
> I used to be a preacher. (I am much better now :) )
Hegel is the most unclear writer I've ever read... so unclear that,
after his death, his followers split into two groups that had opposite
philosophies, each claiming that Hegel's books supported their views!
A preacher? And now... did I hear you were working at a particle
accelerator, or was that somebody else?
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
AMW
>
> AMW wrote:
> >
> > Lhexa wrote:
> > >
> > > AMW wrote:
> Okay, then I'll restate an earlier question... it might have been
> answered, but I don't recall. Since that's true, what is there to
> distinguish meme theory?
I am not real familiar with competing theories, so it is difficult to
say just how it differs. Treating memes as something akin to viruses
does have advantages, and appears to be born out observation. Treating
an idea as a sentient in and of itself does not seem to work.
> > Are you asking if I think of myself as perfected in any respect? :):) I
> > have to admit to a fondness to bagpipe music, and as to whether the fact
> > my ancestors are Scottish influences that or not is questionable. Or
> > more exactly, the fact I know I am of Scottish decent. To use one
> > example.
> >
> > I do find myself wearing masks around most people, trying to fit in and
> > just not be hassled. More than I feel comfortable with. But it seems
> > prudent considering there are more of them than there are of me.
>
> How do you know how they'd treat you without masks, if you have only
> dealt with them through the masks? If you loathe that action of
> yourself, it might cause a harsh judgment of those who make it
> necessary.
Note the "most" above. I have attempted to deal with people without
using masks, and have been repeated been disappointed. And the
reciprocity is there as you note. However, there is little I can do to
"enforce" any judgment I have of others. Or desire even if I had the
ability.
> > Yep. And history has shown time and time again a marked inability of
> > humans to learn from their own history. But I will be damned if I can
> > think of a better means.
>
> Hm. I think sufficient old age would do it.
I would hope so. But I find as I am getting older, remembering the hard
times is more difficult. I find myself think back fondly on the
'wonderful' times I had in the Navy. :)
We have a minimum age for congressmen because we hope that with age
comes wisdom. We let the young fight the wars that the old men decree.
> > And calculus still uses the same kind of mathematics that have existed
> > since before Euclid. It is built on the pre-existing math of the time,
> > is more of an extenuation than a whole new direction.
>
> It is related to the old mathematics, but not capable of being derived
> from them by any methods known at that time.
This I have to disagree with. The taking of say the derivative of a line
function is completely in accordance with known math at the time. One
could argue that after the invention of Cartesian coordinates, it was
all but inevitable.
> > Generating new philosophies I do not see as all that big a deal. I am
> > more concern with generating the correct set of philosophical theories,
> > ones that match observation. I guess one could toss out observation and
> > then one would have limitless opportunities to generate new
> > philosophies.
>
> I worry about becoming habituated to an adequate philosophy that, by its
> very existence, prevents me from seeking one better.
In other words, the blind acceptance of a philosophical school of
thought, in practical fact elevating it to a religion? Not a bad thing
to sweat.
> > > And, I presume, imagination; that is, creating arguments and _then_
> > > evaluating their merit. Philosophy is something that requires
> > > significant imagination to create; if it could be gained from
> > > observation alone, there would not be so few philosophers. That is not
> > > to say that philosophy can ignore observation, of course.
> >
> > Good point. But the problem with imagination is that unless it is bound
> > by observation, one can imagine darn near anything. And the resulting
> > philosophies will have as little to do with the real world.
>
> So? There are ways to discard such results.
Once observation is tossed aside?
> > > Let me rephrase that - do you think that reason can do for the mind
> > > whatsoever the mind requires... that it is a kind of universal tool?
> >
> > Hmm... good question. I would have to say yes at this point. It can
> > provide an accurate model of how the world works, new inventions. The
> > whole progress of science is attributable to its rational approach, its
> > methodology, which leads to such technical items such as this computer.
> > But I suspect you are going to disagree with me. :)
>
> How does it do the work of imagination, then? Or do I recall falsely
> that you said reason included only logic and observation...
You remember correctly.
First shot at it? The player takes pieces of observational data and
assembles them in new ways. For example, we have observations of horses,
and more of people. Juxtapose the two sets together, try to match them
up, and you have the Centaur.
Its only a first guess. You try it. :)
> > Well the opposing theories do not deny causality, they simply state that
> > the cause is different from what it is generally thought or appears to
> > be. As an example, you see a rock. Photons bouncing off the rock and
> > then ending up in your eye. And your sensory network provides an image
> > of this rock to your mind. One theory is that the image of the rock is
> > being generated by some other force, possibly sentient, or possibly just
> > some mechanistic computer. Another theory is that you are creating the
> > image of a rock, just as you create the images that play out in your
> > dreams.
>
> My argument was that if something is not as it seems, the truth can
> eventually be found beyond the seeming. Thus, if we live in a dream,
> then it must be somehow possibility to discover that.
And if we are limited to our dream observations, we have no means to
determine that it is all a dream. And whether it is a dream or not is
largely irrelevant. We have to act "as if" it is real or else suffer the
consequences of that disbelief.
> > At present? It could use more work. I don't think the rules are
> > changeable, but the pieces and the board are. We can take a rock and say
> > melt it down and extract iron from it to make an engine. GR tells us how
> > to alter space-time by using the presence of mass/energy. And there is
> > even a theoretical model of exceeding the speed of light without
> > violating the rules. The way of doing that is completely in accordance
> > with the rules. By knowing what is changeable and what is not, one can
> > learn how to better play the game.
>
> Science and technology tell you these things, not your metaphysics. What
> does it do that science, alone, cannot?
Science is really nothing more than a specific epistemological method.
One that has proven itself effective at determining how the universe
works, and by using that information, of creating technologies that give
us a better life than the ones lived by our ancestors.
The fact that 'science' (in point of fact, a specific theoretical model
of how the universe works which itself was formed by means of the above
method.) give us information about one of the parts of the game (the
board), I think is rather encouraging.
There is a problem in metaphysics in that the above epistemology is
quite effective. It should be noted that cosmology was once part of
metaphysics instead of a sub branch of astronomy that it is today. So
the boundaries of what are the first principles keeps getting moved.
This is a specific metaphysical model by which the universe, both the
external as well as internal 'game' can be understood. A "metamodel", if
you will. Hopefully, it can get rid of some of the mess involved with
the many disparate models we have of say QM, the mind, et.al. Time will
tell.
> > > For a person refusing to use reason, the situation would be the same if
> > > reason was a part of the person, if those other things, emotion, faith,
> > > and all that, are also there. A person _can_ work against 'emself, or
> > > against their own nature, and not necessarily to detriment.
> >
> > I am not so sure about that. I don't think a tiger can try to act like a
> > rabbit to his benefit.
>
> But a tigerish human could. Acts of will such as that are not to be
> expected of most animals...
Why not? :)
> > Again we are in a semantics quandary. I think of reason as a particular
> > mode of cognition, namely logic and observation. I think I see what you
> > are saying, and think we are in some agreement, except on terminology.
> >
> > We may also have different models of the mind. I don't see thoughts as
> > anything other than the pieces in an internal game. You still need
> > players to push them around, and rules by which they interact. What
> > happens when this idea meets up with this one.
>
> Was that a question? Well, I simply expanded the definition of the
> player to include some of the things you considered pieces. The
> decisions of the player must have a basis, right? If you separate any
> possible basis for decision from the player, then the player would
> become an arbitrary middle-man, one whose existence is in no wise
> ensured...
Ah so in other words, to be conscious means to be conscious of some
thing. Consciousness requires a context? Hmmm.... most interesting.
> > > The soul, the person? For now, consider it to be the part(s) that has
> > > free will.
> >
> > Granted. And to me, this is the part of myself I most identify with, the
> > player, the one that decides and picks. Are you using a more inclusive
> > definition to include the whole contents of the mind, the whole game?
> > Hmm...not sure I can argue with that.
>
> Pretty much. I include those traits through which, if improved, the
> person, too, truly improves... this excludes external things, such as
> monetary status, because that can be improved but have no effect on a
> person.
I see your point. I am concerned with what happens to free will at the
point of "improvement", will that get dispensed with when a person acts
completely and totally rational?
> > There is a difference between the recognition of a property of an
> > object, and judging that object, especially making moral judgment on an
> > object. How do you judge the moral quality of, again, say a rock? (I
> > always come back to rocks, maybe I am a rock philosopher?)
>
> It's the example that works best. In supporting myself, I'd prefer to
> use beauty or ethics.
Grin, good choice. As beauty is in the eye of the beholder, as well as
ethical considerations....
>
> > Take this rock. If you need the rock to defend yourself, then it is a
> > good thing to have around. If it in the hands of someone trying to kill
> > you, that situation is not good. Yet it is the same rock, therefore the
> > moral quality of the rock does not depend on the rock itself. And it is
> > hardly arbitrary, as the difference is in the situation, in the rock's
> > effect on you the valuer and your life. It is the relationship that the
> > rock has to your existence that is being judged and not the object
> > itself.
>
> And that relationship has something to do with the rock, right?
Does it? Or does it have to do with the situation the rock is in
*relative* to you the valuer?
>
> > When ever you say something is good, whether you are referring to
> > morality or even physical objects such as rocks, you are stating that
> > they meet some set of criteria or specification. I work with power
> > supplies and sometimes these good power supplies go bad. this does not
> > mean they are running around on a killing spree, but they no longer meet
> > the manufacturers specifications. That set of specifications is set up
> > by a person, by deciding what that person needed in order to do what
> > that person wanted to do. That person sets up a goal, and from that goal
> > determines what is needed in order to accomplish it. But if there is no
> > goal, then it is completely irrelevant as to whether the object meets
> > the specification or not. Again, remove the valuer and the value no
> > longer exists.
>
> Why do you imply that I believe that a valuer is unnecessary? I said
> otherwise, earlier - I said that it was also necessary.
I am trying to make a point, and going the long way to get there.
(Scenic route) The value is not part of the rock. The value is not
really part of the valuer, since the same rock can be valued differently
to the same valuer. The value is in the relationship, between you the
valuer and the rock.
> > When talking about morality, the other definition of 'good', this is a
> > set of rules that apply to the consciously chosen actions of a person.
> > Rocks are not conscious, and have no ability to choose anything, let
> > alone their own actions. Therefore the whole question about the moral
> > quality of a rock seems rather bizarre.
>
> If the decision is based on what the object _is_, then the value must
> also come, in part, from the object. To state it differently, in marked
> comparison with yours, remove anything that can have value and the
> valuer no longer exists.
In the above example, is the value placed on the rock dependent on what
the rock is? Or is it dependent on what effects the property of that
rock can generate in relation to your life?
>
> > > Keep in mind that I require both in my philosophy (value from the judger
> > > and value in the judged, or something better phrased). In fact, it seems
> > > to me that the existence of one without the other would be a logical
> > > contradiction.
> >
> > You missed the relationship between the two. That is key, and not the
> > physical objects, not the pieces themselves.
>
> *grins* Likewise. By the way, when did I say the objects had to be
> physical? This started out about a system of honor...
LOL you are right! But remember, memes are pieces too. :)
>
> > > > And if it is, if you are wrong and things do continue to degrade, in
> > > > either sense, what happens to the valuers? :)
> > >
> > > Then change Could still be a good thing, but on a thoroughly conditional
> > > basis.
> >
> > Not if change results in the death of the valuer. Then that change is
> > bad.
>
> That's why I said 'could' and 'conditional'. That is, its value depends
> only on circumstance.
Exactly. More precisely, the value of an object is dependent on the
relationship between the valuer and that object. On the context that
both find themselves in.
> > There is a whole line of philosophy that divides the world up into good
> > and evil. In this model, spirit was considered (judged) good, while
> > matter was considered evil. It applied intrinsic moral properties to
> > objects. Now we have humans, which are not pure spirit but live in
> > physical (evil) bodies, sort of like an amphibian.
>
> Okay, what do you mean by object?
Entities, things. Individual items, whether rocks or memes.
> > She does, as does Kelley. But she singles out Kant as the most
> > influential and most damaging of the 19th century, as the root of all of
> > it. She has little good to say of most of the crop of the last couple
> > centuries, except for Descartes and Locke, I cannot think of any she had
> > anything nice to say.
> >
> > I think I have all of her non-fiction works, and read them before I even
> > touched her fiction.
>
> I think it likely that she didn't read Hegel, then, if she passed by
> without insulting him...
I didn't say she says nothing about him. She does save most of her
arguments for Kant.
> > > _Designated_ her heir? I don't like the sound of that. Who was it that
> > > thought philosophy something designatable?
> >
> > There was a split between Rand and Nathaniel Branden, and I think she
> > wanted to prevent her philosophy from being diluted or altered. She was
> > very certain that she was right, did not think there were any bugs in
> > her system.
>
> It seems like, if she did that, then her ideal human couldn't be a
> philosopher... she wanted lackeys over an original thinker...
It is a bit more complicated than I have explained in the brief passage
here. Its a bit weird, a cult of personality surrounding a person who
all but demonized such a concept.
> > She was a friendly to the McCarthy hearings. She was at political,
> > ideological and philosophic odds with a great many intellectuals who
> > characterized the hearings as some kind of witch hunt. And participation
> > in such an endeavor, despite the context, was considered prima fascia
> > evidence of bad character.
>
> The hearings do seem to have been a witch hunt. But her part in it
> wasn't so.
And that has nothing to do with it. Whether they were or not is
irrelevant. To her would be peers, both in Hollywood and philosophy, the
hearing stirred up a great deal of anger and resentment. Many objected
because they felt that government was stepping out the bounds, of
attempting censorship of unpopular political views. The fact that those
views were the antithesis of free speech themselves was never commented
on. The fact that Rand opposed those views with every fiber of her being
is quite obvious.
So here it is 50 years later, and all I knew about Rand before reading
anything about her was that she was a 'bad girl' in philosophy. I was
very reticent to read anything by her because of that perception. Now I
have ot question just how accurate that perception is, who is it that
tells me these things, and what their motivation is.
> > I have found more of them since I moved to California.
> >
> > There is another group who should be factored in, the so-called
> > "Limousine Liberals". Those who are rich, and feel, I guess, guilty for
> > being successful, for acting in a selfish manner and finding out just
> > how profitable it is. For acting contrary to the morality of altruism
> > and feel somehow wrong for doing so.
>
> Oh. How many of these do you know, and how many do you just see? That
> is... such shallowness might be only a surface detail, in both the
> "LL's" and the others.
This is not shallowness, this is the problem with altruism in general.
That it is a system of morality that cannot be depended on to maintain a
person's life. That in order to be successful, one must act in
opposition to such ideals. You have to look out for yourself. But doing
so is "wrong" despite the fact it works.
So you feel guilty. First for not acting as you say everyone should, and
second because acting "bad" works, it pays. How does one deal with that
kind of guilt?
> > > And if it was a type of evil other than killing or material destruction?
> >
> > Such as? I can guess several possible answers, but to provide one would
> > spoil things. :)
>
> Forced conformity.
In other words, being forced to pretend you are something you are not?
You exist as something and not as something else. You have certain ways
you can interact with your environment and certain ways you cannot. You
cannot jump from the Sears Tower and hope to survive the fall. Yet birds
do it all the time. Pretending you are a bird does not make you one, and
just makes it more likely that you will be put you in situations where
you are forced to jump off a building.
You are a person, with free will, that is central to your identity as
well as your means of survival. You are unique in that no one else is
like you. By conforming, whether by coercion or otherwise, by pretending
you are like everyone else, you are pretending to be something you are
not. And again sooner or later, the universe catches up with such
pretensions.
The act of coercion itself is an attempt at jumpering out the single
greatest characteristic, as well as the chief survival trait of a
person. Conformity, is demanding others pretend they are not what they
are, and puts their survival at risk that way. Either way, Forced
conformity is itself a kind of murder, of making a person into something
else. Making someone into a something.
>
> > > Hm. Ironically, I think that I am far-sighted (to what extent that I am)
> > > by choice, not by nature... I don't have many compliments for the way
> > > biology and environment had left me.
> >
> > The choice makes all the difference. The fact you can choose is what
> > makes you really you, and not some machine.
>
> Choices of free will can be made either to make a decision for the
> external world, or to change oneself. The first is rare enough, but the
> second staggeringly so.
True
Ben
aka Drakon@work
AMW
>
> AMW wrote:
> >
> > Lhexa wrote:
> > >
> > > AMW wrote:
> I meant that your argument seemed to be based on: "For all we know, any
> act could be done for selfish reasons." Arguing from that is following
> the fallacy of ignorance. If you have a different argument (*grins* ie,
> if you can peer into peoples' heads and actually find out) then feel
> free to state it...
Not at all. :) The whole point of taking a particular action over
another is what the results of that act are. The purpose of the actions
are either to benefit oneself, the actor. Or to benefit someone other
than the actor. If there is a benefit to the actor, then that action is
selfish. If the benefit is solely for others, then that act is
altruistic. You can look at the consequences objectively, independent of
any particular observer, and see just who benefits. What the person
intends is another issue.
>
> > It arbitrarily assigns an intrinsic value to such altruistic actions.
> > And that is the problem in that an altruistic action is declared "good"
> > while a selfish action is declared "bad", without any regard to as to
> > you is the valuer or why. Since altruism is the ethical ideal that such
> > a government strives for, and political systems draw their legal basis
> > on what is ethically good, then you give the government the power to
> > enforce ethical rules by any means necessary. If people are not acting
> > altruisticly, or unethically, then the government can step in and use
> > force to make them behave in such a manner.
>
> *grins* I hope you don't think I'm arguing _for_ them!
:) If you believe that altruism is a correct moral theory, why not? It
seems like a perfectly logical extension of the theory. Politics is
where morality and ethics meets the road, where all the ivory tower
pontificating is made manifest and put to the test as well.
>
> > The same thing is done in every country. Murder is considered unethical.
> > I doubt you will get much disagreement on that point. So we empower the
> > governments to punish and if possible prevent people from murdering
> > other people. In their view, selfishness is unethical, therefore
> > punishable by law.
> >
> > It also makes a big thing out of 'group identity' which we discussed
> > earlier. The state is simply the collection of people, the ones who
> > benifit from the altruistic actions of the individual.
> > It has everything to do with morality. Why have morals to begin with?
> > What is the purpose of moral rules in the first place? Or, if that is
> > too abstract a question, what is the purpose of the technical
> > applications of morality and ethics, namely politics and economics?
>
> To guide actions! Assigning the fact of the object of an action being
> oneself or another need not be intrinsic to morality.
Why do actions need a guide? Because those actions have consequences.
That is the whole point of taking this action instead of that one.
Because you want this outcome and avoid that consequence. And the
consequences can either be the continuation of your life, or the
continuation of some other life at the expense of yours. Sooner or later
it ends up being one or the other.
Remove the benefactor from the question and you have also gotten rid of
valuer. And without a valuer, then morality is of no value. Guiding
actions makes no sense since it ignores the central question of why take
any action in the first place.
Why would you do that? What is the point in behaving honorably?
> Again, Hegel has _far_ more connection to communism than Kant, and the
> same might go far nazism (but it wasn't really an attempt to make a
> seemingly true ideology, like communism was - it was less
> philosophical). Marx called his philosophy "Dialectical Materialism";
> the 'dialectic method' had been created by Hegel (Marx's concept of
> conflicting classes was a mirror image of Hegel's idea of conflicting
> ideas). Kant created an ethics in which the individual owes loyalty to a
> set abstracted ideas; Hegel, however, asserted that the state was
> sovereign (it was based on a poorly explained idea that a person in
> submission was superior to a person who dominates). Kant was optimistic
> about the governments of his time, but gave them no philosophical
> importance.
Grin, is not the group or state an "abstracted idea"? And also remember
that since reason is no guide according to Kant, the picking of one
arbitrary abstraction over another was just as "rational".
> > Character flaw? I must say this is a bit of a shock at first. However, I
> > can see where you get the idea from my words. I have severe doubts that
> > anything that resulted from his works was intentional. Clancey's Law
> > states "Never attribute to malice what can be better explained by
> > ignorance." And I think Kant is a prime example of this. From what I
> > have read, he was a devote Lutheran, and a bit of a book worm, and I
> > dare say that one could have hooked a generator to his corpse during the
> > second world war and powered half of Europe.
>
> It is too much to say that one man caused every philosophical evil in
> the last century and a half... which of Kant's books have you read?
Critic of Pure Reason is one. The arguments I have presented here are
better in both Rand and Kelley's work. And better footnoted.
And I don't think it is. (And also I think it is one thing that Rand
worried about which was why she hand picked a successor.) Kant's
arguments had effects far more reaching than I doubt he dreamed of.
>
> > > Kant didn't leave morality undefined; he gave it a complete metaphysics
> > > and structure, albeit one too rigid. And it is rather insulting to
> > > Neitzsche to believe that, had the right philosophy been around, he
> > > would have become a meek servant to it! Kant was not responsible for
> > > Neitzsche.
> >
> > Careful. While Neitzsche is responsible for his actions and the
> > consequences thereof, the same goes for Kant. And again, I can see a
> > clear causative connection between the two. To argue that Kant is not
> > responsible for the consequences of his actions is treading on dangerous
> > ground.
>
> No, I said that Kant was not responsible for Neitzsche. That is, by word
> and action it is clear that Neitzsche didn't give a damn about Kant -
> that is, Kant was not an influence on him.
I disagree. It is apparent to me that their is a line of thinking that
can be traced between the two. That again Neitzsche was building on what
Kant left behind.
>
> > And note I did not say he left morality undefined. He left it with no
> > rational basis. This in an increasingly atheistic world. Thanks to the
> > advances of science, (especailly Darwinian evolution) there were many
> > who had declared God dead. The same God who was the source of morality
> > and ethics prior to the 19th century (as well as our own American
> > "inaleinable rights" of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness.)
> > Without a rational basis for morality and with God declared dead, there
> > was no longer any justification for morality.
>
> Why do you say that he left it without a rational basis? He left reason
> itself without giving a rational basis, but he did lay out one for his
> morality. Have you read his "Metaphysics of Morals"?
Not in a long while. But what I remember is basically behave in this
manner simply because you are supposed to.
> > And this is the whole point. Eventually the needs of the group come in
> > conflict with the needs of the individual. Ultimately altruism
> > eventually forces the individual to act against himself, to act to his
> > detriment because of the needs of the many. To act in such a manner is
> > dangerous to the individual holding that meme, and acting on that meme.
> > Kant could not find any rational justification for the church's
> > teachings, so he turned his attention on rationality, to see if there
> > were any bugs in there. IMHO, when he disected reason, he ignord where
> > he sliced, he forgot about the interconnection between observation and
> > logic, and how they support and aid each other in giving us information
> > about the world we live in.
>
> How did he do that?
How did he ignore this interconnection?
> > And this ignorance led to altruistic morality with no rational basis and
> > reason itself rendered all but useless. From those roots, you get the
> > Hitlers and Stalins of the world, by way of Neitzsche and Marx. If Kant
> > had not missed this, would we have Neitzsche's ubermen fighting Marx's
> > proletariat?
>
> Yes. I do not think that any action of Kant's would have magically
> removed the bigotry from these people. They believed in their ideas
> because they were hateful; but they did not actually become hateful by
> believing those ideas.
Would you say their hatred was rational, i.e. the product of impartial
observation and logical deduction or induction? I wouldn't think so. As
long as reason is perceived to have the power to figure out which
emotions are justified, and which are just "superstition", to the limits
that it can, such hatreds can be dealt with. They can be argued against,
before they become a danger.
But what do you say to someone who tells you that reason is worthless,
that it cannot tell you anything about the world you live in, let alone
tell which idea is true and which one is false? That synthetic truths
require an infinite amount of data to determine whether they are true or
not, and analytical truths have no basis in the real world. Therefore
the whole concept of truth is likewise meaningless.
In other words, you are right. Hate filled people will choose to believe
hate filled philosophies. But there is a problem here in that thanks to
Kant, one cannot even reason with such people.
> > I disagree, Pop psy is very relavant here as most of us do not spend our
> > time surrounded by professional psychologists. We live among family and
> > freinds and co-workers whose only knowledge of psychology is at the
> > popular level, and it is their attitude and perceptions that we have to
> > deal with.
>
> If their opinion has no bearing on the truth, what importance have they?
> Must you accomodate yourself to them?
If they shun you, or make you an outcast in some manner, then yes it has
a bearing. Would you like it if everyone tiptoed around you because they
thought you were nuts?
You must at least appear to accommodate them. It really depends on how
much respect or feelings you have for the other person. Or how much
damage that person can do to you and your life.
:)
>
> > > Either that, or you are assuming that reality is composed of words,
> > > making draconity a matter that doesn't need definition, just
> > > observation. I think the flaws of that theory are obvious enough.
> >
> > I don't think I am doing that at all. Words are mental constructs used
> > as labels of external (or internal) entities.
>
> Alright.
>
> > > > I am not so sure myself. Each and everyone of us live amongst other
> > > > people to some extent. Of course if I ever met such a person, I have
> > > > just destroyed the test case, as now we know of each other.
> > >
> > > Living among them does not been domination by them, of course. Are the
> > > people around you so weak?
> >
> > Yes.
>
> How do you know?
How does one know anything? Observation.
> > > Memories are one, but not the only. The conditions I gave - that a
> > > definition of draconity must be both true and relevant to the body of a
> > > dragon - allows for several valid forms of draconity. Mine, in a
> > > complete lack of past-life-regression-type memories, needs be spiritual
> > > rather than situational.
> >
> > Hmm...I am not sure I see a connection between the spirit and the body.
> > When I think of dragons, being a decendent of Welsh and Scots, I think
> > of hexapedal critters, with four limbs and two wings. Now with the
> > recent debate on whether dinosaurs were closer related to birds than
> > lizzards, it occurs to me that dragons could be as well, avians instead
> > of reptiles. But that is me, and understand that others may think of
> > different sort of dragons.
>
> Well, I need to consolidate a spiritual side just so that the fact will
> make a difference in my life, among other reasons. There would be a
> problem with draconity being nothing but an unachievable desire that
> causes emotional pain...
Agreed. The point I was attempting to make, is that I think draconity is
independent of any particular physical form. Dragons come in a very wide
variety, from serpent to lung to guivre(?) etc.
>
> > > Butterfly dreams?
> >
> > "I, Chuang Chou, once dreamt that I was a butterfly. I flitted about,
> > from flower to flower, on a lazy summer day, drifting merrily around and
> > about. I did as I pleased--and was ever so happy! I knew nothing about
> > any Chuang Chou--and didn't care a bit! Then, I awakened, a Chuang Chou
> > with all his human trappings! Now, here is the real question: Did I,
> > Chuang Chou, dream that I was a butterfly? Or am I a butterfly, dreaming
> > that I am Chuang Chou?"
>
> *grins* It helps that the butterfly doesn't have a mind. If 'twere a
> butterfly dreaming of Chou, either he could eventually discover it a
> dream, or the entire concept of dreaming would be meaningless,
> especially to him.
How would a thinking butterfly figure it out? Or better yet, how do you
know that you are what you see in the mirror? The fact is that all you
get is impressions of the outside world. You don't have rocks in your
head, just images of rocks. The source of those images you assume are
real physical rocks with real physical photons bouncing off them. But
you can dream of a rock, and somehow have all the same sensation that
you would have while awake. So again, if all you have are the sense
impression, how do you tell the difference?
> > > > Good, prove me wrong. I dare ya. :)
> > >
> > > Draconity is definable. Therefore, it is knowable - just find the right
> > > definition.
> >
> > Hmm... By George, I think you may have done it.
>
> Was that sarcastic or serious?
I am dead serious. I think you did it. If a term is definable, then it
is knowable. Once the characteristics and properties of an entity is
identified, how it is like and different from other entities, then it is
possible to know what the entity is that is being labeled.
> > > > BTW yours or someone else's?
> > >
> > > Whichever.
> >
> > Well this is key. You may be able to know you are a dragon. But can you
> > tell who else is as well?
>
> I think, once the definition becomes much more sophisticated.
Well we'll see here.
> > > > Is the dragon form exotic to you, or think/believe/feel more like it
> > > > "should be" your form? I can see a bit of envy at the form, it has many
> > > > advantages, despite the metabolic load wings would place on the system.
> > >
> > > Both, ironically. I have a desire, which is, by all intents, purposes,
> > > and measures, authentic, but of whose object I know less than little.
> >
> > I think I may be the same way. (However I have been thinking about the
> > dynamics of the form a bit :) )
>
> Definitely! Although, as I do that, the form begins to differ from the
> conventional one... for instance, I don't especially want to breathe
> fire... that does not speak to my desire.
I can see how it would come in handy from time to time. I am always
misplacing my lighter. :)
> > Confusing in their thoughts and actions, and well... I really do not
> > want to turn this into human bashing. Suffice to say that I simply do
> > not get them, after spending 4 decades on this planet (that I can
> > recall)
>
> Well, you could always become a cynic. That would spare you confusion.
That would be inaccurate. It is not so much a condemnation of them, as
simply an inability on my part to figure out just what the heck they are
up to, why they do the things they do, etc. I just don't understand
them.
> > > > Good I would love to take a bite at it. :):)
> > >
> > > Rationality goes beyond logic and brute observation - it needs also be
> > > able to make decisions on less-than-absolute matters. Yet it is still
> > > possible for there to be assumptions that are more rational than others,
> > > and known as such; that is to say, there are guidelines for the use of
> > > assumptions and definitions; these are not arbitrary (for instance, I
> > > mentioned the danger of making a definition with a lower bound but no
> > > upper).
> >
> > Disagree. Logic and observation does not make decision, but provides
> > data for decision making. Minor nit.
>
> I agree; I was using a figure a speech ('reason decides' replaces
> 'reason provides the basis for decision'). I still believe that reason
> is a part of a person, though.
You see the whole internal game as the person, as the mind rather than
just the individual "player". Okay, will keep that in mind.
>
> > > Anyway, if an idea is false then it is, somehow, disprovable. So, it may
> > > be correctly _assumed_ (not proven) that, if after much effort in the
> > > matter, no strong disproof may be generated against an idea, then it is
> > > true. Before you mention it, I can see how this can be misused, which is
> > > why I was hesitant to explain it - a person could ignore or refuse to
> > > imagine disproofs, thinking that consolidates the accuracy of an idea.
> > > Likewise, a disproof is to be considered true if it, itself, cannot be
> > > countered. I use this mostly in matters of ontology or knowledge - for
> > > instance, the assumption that observation is valid is considerably more
> > > reasonable than the opposite or the agnostic decision, because the
> > > arguments in support of the former either go completely unrefuted, or
> > > their refutations are rebutted. Anti-realism, as the opposite of the
> > > belief that observation is valid, has not been able to counterargue its
> > > refutations.
> >
> > Or in other words, while a true idea may not be knowable as such, a
> > false idea can be knowable to be false. Have you read Popper?
>
> Nope.
This sounds like something he said. He was big on falsifiablity.
>
> > As to anti-realism: It is a position that leaves you unable to know
> > anything about the world you live in. And the whole question is largely
> > irrelavant anyway. Regardless of whether your sense are valid or not, it
> > is what you are presented with and that includes the pains involved in
> > acting as if they are not valid. You want to avoid the pain, you are
> > forced to act as if your senses are valid, whether they are or not.
> >
> > Now what do you do with assumptions that are (at present) unfalsifiable?
>
> Such as?
Everette's Many Worlds in QM. Or draconic souls.
>
> > > Feel free to argue with the presumption, although do it well. Your
> > > recent assertion that observation is not rational (in the most recent
> > > message; I'll reply to it tomorrow night) startled me; do you believe,
> > > then, that reason has only to do with absolute proof? It that is the
> > > case, then reason must always be powerless against solipsism; that is
> > > why I expand reason to include evaluations of assumption as well as of
> > > logic.
> >
> > I was attempting to make a point, that I finally got to in the paragraph
> > above. Well several. One is that all logical proofs are based on
> > assumptions, and these need some other form of verification besides
> > logic. 2) that even the most basic idea, i.e. that our senses are valid
> > is itself an assumption, one that (at present) is not falsifiable. And
> > finally, that many of these questions I try to wrestle with don't
> > matter. Solipsism is itself a dead end. It removes any and all ability
> > to know anything. Sure you can construct logical proofs from now until
> > the end of time, and it will have absolutely no relavance to the world
> > you live. But you end up having to act as if your senses are valid or
> > else suffer the consequences of that choice. There are no agnostics in
> > foxholes, and with sense data being thrown at you on a continuing basis,
> > such agnostism is not even practical.
>
> My topic was also that the assumptions, themselves, need not be
> basically irrational. Some logicists resort to that when this speaking
> of premises; it's quite funny to hear them saying that mathematical
> axioms must be taken on faith...
Grin, that it is. Which brings me to an interesting side point.
For centuries Euclidean geometry was considered "true". Many of the
scientific theories of the past, from Newton onward was based on an idea
that space and time were Euclidean, in that geometric objects must obey
the rules of logical which were based on Euclid's fifth postulate. (The
parallel postulate, essentially any two parallel will never meet.) But
compared with the other four, this last postulate is rather ugly, and
does not appear to belong. And in his last years, it is reported that
Euclid's attempted to prove his fifth postulate in terms of the other 4,
to no avail. Mathematicians for centuries attempted the same feat, with
the same results.
Then early in the 19th century, some wise guy decided to reverse the
postulate and hopefully get an illogical result. And he got some weird
ones, like the internal angles of a triangle could be more than 180
degrees. But he could not get a logical contradiction, just some absurd
looking results.
It was then noted that these results actually had relevance to the world
we lived in. That when mapped onto a globe or sphere, triangles do have
interior angles other than 180 degrees. Parallel lines do meet, at the
poles. Non-Euclidean geometry was born. All because some wise guys
refuse to take Euclid's on faith. :)
> > > I don't think anything is potentially more long-winded than writing. If
> > > you've read Hegel, you'd see what I mean...
> >
> > Never made it all the way through. However at one time, many years ago,
> > I used to be a preacher. (I am much better now :) )
>
> Hegel is the most unclear writer I've ever read... so unclear that,
> after his death, his followers split into two groups that had opposite
> philosophies, each claiming that Hegel's books supported their views!
And yet he was very influential??? Hmm... something else about humans I
do not understand.
>
> A preacher? And now... did I hear you were working at a particle
> accelerator, or was that somebody else?
I work at a particle accelerator at present. In the past I have also
worked on nuclear power plants in the Navy, (literally in the middle of
the ocean). Like I said, I am much better now :):)
Ben
aka Drakon@work
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> Lhexa wrote:
>> > > >
>> > > > Good, prove me wrong. I dare ya. :)
>> > >
>> > > Draconity is definable. Therefore, it is knowable - just find the
>> > > right definition.
>> >
>> > Hmm... By George, I think you may have done it.
>>
>> Was that sarcastic or serious?
>
> I am dead serious. I think you did it. If a term is definable, then it
> is knowable. Once the characteristics and properties of an entity is
> identified, how it is like and different from other entities, then it is
> possible to know what the entity is that is being labeled.
I must confess to taking a particularly mathematical stance on
draconity, in that sense:
(1) What's important is whether we can know draconity or not.
(2) If it's definable, then we can know it.
(3) Hmm. Either I could actually provide a definition here, or I can
show that a definition does exist. Either way, the problem's solved.
Which one takes the least amount of work?
... so I'm happy just having a personal definition of draconity
without worrying whether it is "the" definition or not. ;) As long as
there is *a* definition which works, then which one it is, is irrelevant.
*gryn*
-- Baxil, still following this thread, even though he hasn't had much time
to post lately.
AMW
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>
> AMW thoughtfully scribed:
> > Lhexa wrote:
> >> > > >
> >> > > > Good, prove me wrong. I dare ya. :)
> >> > >
> >> > > Draconity is definable. Therefore, it is knowable - just find the
> >> > > right definition.
> >> >
> >> > Hmm... By George, I think you may have done it.
> >>
> >> Was that sarcastic or serious?
> >
> > I am dead serious. I think you did it. If a term is definable, then it
> > is knowable. Once the characteristics and properties of an entity is
> > identified, how it is like and different from other entities, then it is
> > possible to know what the entity is that is being labeled.
>
> I must confess to taking a particularly mathematical stance on
> draconity, in that sense:
>
> (1) What's important is whether we can know draconity or not.
> (2) If it's definable, then we can know it.
> (3) Hmm. Either I could actually provide a definition here, or I can
> show that a definition does exist. Either way, the problem's solved.
> Which one takes the least amount of work?
Providing a definition solves both at once. Obtaining an accurate
definition will entail a population of self identified dragons, as well
as a control group of humans. Note differences between the two groups as
well as similarities. (Obvious the definition is dependent on the
differences between the two groups that are common within each group)
> ... so I'm happy just having a personal definition of draconity
> without worrying whether it is "the" definition or not. ;) As long as
> there is *a* definition which works, then which one it is, is irrelevant.
Well some of us are still looking.
Ben
aka Drakon@work
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> Baxil (That's me!) wrote:
>> I must confess to taking a particularly mathematical stance on
>> draconity, in that sense:
>>
>> (1) What's important is whether we can know draconity or not.
>> (2) If it's definable, then we can know it.
>> (3) Hmm. Either I could actually provide a definition here, or I can
>> show that a definition does exist. Either way, the problem's solved.
>> Which one takes the least amount of work?
>
> Providing a definition solves both at once. Obtaining an accurate
> definition will entail a population of self identified dragons, as well
> as a control group of humans.
"Self-identified dragons"? So a necessary aspect of your
definition of draconity is that the beings identify themselves as dragons?
That doesn't necessarily have to be the case! ;)
Most definitions of draconity that I've heard: (A) allow for the
possibility of people being dragons but not realizing it yet; (B) try in
some vague way to impose a (very) minimum standard of rigorousness, so
that people "just going through a dragon phase" will eventually deselect
themselves; (C) at least disclaimer that in the face of compelling
evidence to the contrary, one's draconity can be re-thought.
Or are you saying "self-identified" taking these qualifying
factors into account? In which case the qualifiers become part of the
definition!
This, I think, is where the discussion started in the first place,
and it's one of the more persistent reasons that a
more-than-merely-personal standard for draconity remains elusive.
>> ... so I'm happy just having a personal definition of draconity
>> without worrying whether it is "the" definition or not. ;) As long as
>> there is *a* definition which works, then which one it is, is irrelevant.
>
> Well some of us are still looking.
By all means, go for it! I'm just as curious as you are, but in
the end, far lazier. ;) Which is one of the prime benefits of being a
mathematician.
Also see my other thread on "What is a dragon?"
Dream well,
Baxil
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> > I meant that your argument seemed to be based on: "For all we know, any
> > act could be done for selfish reasons." Arguing from that is following
> > the fallacy of ignorance. If you have a different argument (*grins* ie,
> > if you can peer into peoples' heads and actually find out) then feel
> > free to state it...
>
> Not at all. :) The whole point of taking a particular action over
> another is what the results of that act are. The purpose of the actions
> are either to benefit oneself, the actor. Or to benefit someone other
> than the actor. If there is a benefit to the actor, then that action is
> selfish. If the benefit is solely for others, then that act is
> altruistic. You can look at the consequences objectively, independent of
> any particular observer, and see just who benefits. What the person
> intends is another issue.
You're using lopsided definitions. Does not the objectivist definition
of selfishness depend on the most powerful motives of the doer, and
isn't that a much more useful definition? Defining selfishness and
selflessness according to results removes the doer's place in the
definitions, because then either can be something that _happens_ to a
person, from unexpected consequences.
> > > It arbitrarily assigns an intrinsic value to such altruistic actions.
> > > And that is the problem in that an altruistic action is declared "good"
> > > while a selfish action is declared "bad", without any regard to as to
> > > you is the valuer or why. Since altruism is the ethical ideal that such
> > > a government strives for, and political systems draw their legal basis
> > > on what is ethically good, then you give the government the power to
> > > enforce ethical rules by any means necessary. If people are not acting
> > > altruisticly, or unethically, then the government can step in and use
> > > force to make them behave in such a manner.
> >
> > *grins* I hope you don't think I'm arguing _for_ them!
>
> :) If you believe that altruism is a correct moral theory, why not? It
> seems like a perfectly logical extension of the theory. Politics is
> where morality and ethics meets the road, where all the ivory tower
> pontificating is made manifest and put to the test as well.
It might if said altruism only included helping out other people to be
happy. But what if you are also trying to help them be honorable, free,
or, most ironically, self-sufficient? A democracy works far better with
those, and others.
> > To guide actions! Assigning the fact of the object of an action being
> > oneself or another need not be intrinsic to morality.
>
> Why do actions need a guide? Because those actions have consequences.
> That is the whole point of taking this action instead of that one.
> Because you want this outcome and avoid that consequence. And the
> consequences can either be the continuation of your life, or the
> continuation of some other life at the expense of yours. Sooner or later
> it ends up being one or the other.
Statistically, yes. But the universe is not a constant state of self vs.
others; those situations are exceptions to daily life. Why should they
be so defining of morality, then?
> Remove the benefactor from the question and you have also gotten rid of
> valuer. And without a valuer, then morality is of no value. Guiding
> actions makes no sense since it ignores the central question of why take
> any action in the first place.
It was just a provisional definition. 'Twould be more correct to say
that ethics includes anything to do with actions...
It's honor. Do you say that honor is nothing but its results? Or that it
should be treated as such?
> > Again, Hegel has _far_ more connection to communism than Kant, and the
> > same might go far nazism (but it wasn't really an attempt to make a
> > seemingly true ideology, like communism was - it was less
> > philosophical). Marx called his philosophy "Dialectical Materialism";
> > the 'dialectic method' had been created by Hegel (Marx's concept of
> > conflicting classes was a mirror image of Hegel's idea of conflicting
> > ideas). Kant created an ethics in which the individual owes loyalty to a
> > set abstracted ideas; Hegel, however, asserted that the state was
> > sovereign (it was based on a poorly explained idea that a person in
> > submission was superior to a person who dominates). Kant was optimistic
> > about the governments of his time, but gave them no philosophical
> > importance.
>
> Grin, is not the group or state an "abstracted idea"? And also remember
> that since reason is no guide according to Kant, the picking of one
> arbitrary abstraction over another was just as "rational".
*grins* You know what I meant. Anyway, Kant only said that reason cannot
be applied to itself - not that it cannot be applied to other things.
> > It is too much to say that one man caused every philosophical evil in
> > the last century and a half... which of Kant's books have you read?
>
> Critic of Pure Reason is one. The arguments I have presented here are
> better in both Rand and Kelley's work. And better footnoted.
Good... *grins* except, of course, for referring me to books I can't
find!
> And I don't think it is. (And also I think it is one thing that Rand
> worried about which was why she hand picked a successor.) Kant's
> arguments had effects far more reaching than I doubt he dreamed of.
Well, I don't think the arguments you've presented in that matter strong
enough. D'you have any more?
> > No, I said that Kant was not responsible for Neitzsche. That is, by word
> > and action it is clear that Neitzsche didn't give a damn about Kant -
> > that is, Kant was not an influence on him.
>
> I disagree. It is apparent to me that their is a line of thinking that
> can be traced between the two. That again Neitzsche was building on what
> Kant left behind.
Apparent! Obviously not, if every non-objectivist historian/philosopher
I've read overlooks it. Neitzsche was influence by philosophy that went
before, undoubtedly, but their theories are too different... not even
relating to each other as a thesis to an antithesis, just different.
> > > And note I did not say he left morality undefined. He left it with no
> > > rational basis. This in an increasingly atheistic world. Thanks to the
> > > advances of science, (especailly Darwinian evolution) there were many
> > > who had declared God dead. The same God who was the source of morality
> > > and ethics prior to the 19th century (as well as our own American
> > > "inaleinable rights" of life liberty and the pursuit of happiness.)
> > > Without a rational basis for morality and with God declared dead, there
> > > was no longer any justification for morality.
> >
> > Why do you say that he left it without a rational basis? He left reason
> > itself without giving a rational basis, but he did lay out one for his
> > morality. Have you read his "Metaphysics of Morals"?
>
> Not in a long while. But what I remember is basically behave in this
> manner simply because you are supposed to.
Pretty much, although he also said that those manners were obvious to
reason... I guess he was getting desperate.
> > > And this is the whole point. Eventually the needs of the group come in
> > > conflict with the needs of the individual. Ultimately altruism
> > > eventually forces the individual to act against himself, to act to his
> > > detriment because of the needs of the many. To act in such a manner is
> > > dangerous to the individual holding that meme, and acting on that meme.
> > > Kant could not find any rational justification for the church's
> > > teachings, so he turned his attention on rationality, to see if there
> > > were any bugs in there. IMHO, when he disected reason, he ignord where
> > > he sliced, he forgot about the interconnection between observation and
> > > logic, and how they support and aid each other in giving us information
> > > about the world we live in.
> >
> > How did he do that?
>
> How did he ignore this interconnection?
That's what I asked. His theory of categories seems to be a melding of
logic and observation, in fact... the logic being the mechanism of the
category, and the observation being the sense-data fed into it.
> > > And this ignorance led to altruistic morality with no rational basis and
> > > reason itself rendered all but useless. From those roots, you get the
> > > Hitlers and Stalins of the world, by way of Neitzsche and Marx. If Kant
> > > had not missed this, would we have Neitzsche's ubermen fighting Marx's
> > > proletariat?
> >
> > Yes. I do not think that any action of Kant's would have magically
> > removed the bigotry from these people. They believed in their ideas
> > because they were hateful; but they did not actually become hateful by
> > believing those ideas.
>
> Would you say their hatred was rational, i.e. the product of impartial
> observation and logical deduction or induction? I wouldn't think so. As
> long as reason is perceived to have the power to figure out which
> emotions are justified, and which are just "superstition", to the limits
> that it can, such hatreds can be dealt with. They can be argued against,
> before they become a danger.
Sure. But who has that power on their own, when they have already gone
through situations that lead them into the hatred? It is a situation in
which the people who have the defense only got it because they didn't
need it.
> But what do you say to someone who tells you that reason is worthless,
> that it cannot tell you anything about the world you live in, let alone
> tell which idea is true and which one is false? That synthetic truths
> require an infinite amount of data to determine whether they are true or
> not, and analytical truths have no basis in the real world. Therefore
> the whole concept of truth is likewise meaningless.
Quit talking to them. Hope desperately that the world does the same.
> In other words, you are right. Hate filled people will choose to believe
> hate filled philosophies. But there is a problem here in that thanks to
> Kant, one cannot even reason with such people.
*grins* Kant has disabled you?
> > > I disagree, Pop psy is very relavant here as most of us do not spend our
> > > time surrounded by professional psychologists. We live among family and
> > > freinds and co-workers whose only knowledge of psychology is at the
> > > popular level, and it is their attitude and perceptions that we have to
> > > deal with.
> >
> > If their opinion has no bearing on the truth, what importance have they?
> > Must you accomodate yourself to them?
>
> If they shun you, or make you an outcast in some manner, then yes it has
> a bearing. Would you like it if everyone tiptoed around you because they
> thought you were nuts?
No. But I have reason to doubt that they would... and even then, I have
some choice of who I go around.
> You must at least appear to accommodate them. It really depends on how
> much respect or feelings you have for the other person. Or how much
> damage that person can do to you and your life.
It may also be a situation in which said accommodation is more harmful
to all parties than the alternative. When it causes some sorrow in the
person doing it, or perpetuates some undesirable trait in the person who
is being accommodated to.
> > > Before one builds a birdhouse, one has to assemble one's tools. One has
> > > to know what a birdhouse is as well of course. Before deciding if one is
> > > a dragon or not, one has to know what that means as well as how one is
> > > to determine the accuracy of that statement.
> >
> > Hm. Did you just agree with me?
>
> :)
A grin!
> > > > > I am not so sure myself. Each and everyone of us live amongst other
> > > > > people to some extent. Of course if I ever met such a person, I have
> > > > > just destroyed the test case, as now we know of each other.
> > > >
> > > > Living among them does not been domination by them, of course. Are the
> > > > people around you so weak?
> > >
> > > Yes.
> >
> > How do you know?
>
> How does one know anything? Observation.
How do you know they are doing it out of cowardice - ie, weakness?
> > Well, I need to consolidate a spiritual side just so that the fact will
> > make a difference in my life, among other reasons. There would be a
> > problem with draconity being nothing but an unachievable desire that
> > causes emotional pain...
>
> Agreed. The point I was attempting to make, is that I think draconity is
> independent of any particular physical form. Dragons come in a very wide
> variety, from serpent to lung to guivre(?) etc.
Not independent. How can it be called draconic when it is separated from
the only thing that is definitely draconic - the body?
> > > "I, Chuang Chou, once dreamt that I was a butterfly. I flitted about,
> > > from flower to flower, on a lazy summer day, drifting merrily around and
> > > about. I did as I pleased--and was ever so happy! I knew nothing about
> > > any Chuang Chou--and didn't care a bit! Then, I awakened, a Chuang Chou
> > > with all his human trappings! Now, here is the real question: Did I,
> > > Chuang Chou, dream that I was a butterfly? Or am I a butterfly, dreaming
> > > that I am Chuang Chou?"
> >
> > *grins* It helps that the butterfly doesn't have a mind. If 'twere a
> > butterfly dreaming of Chou, either he could eventually discover it a
> > dream, or the entire concept of dreaming would be meaningless,
> > especially to him.
>
> How would a thinking butterfly figure it out? Or better yet, how do you
> know that you are what you see in the mirror? The fact is that all you
> get is impressions of the outside world. You don't have rocks in your
> head, just images of rocks. The source of those images you assume are
> real physical rocks with real physical photons bouncing off them. But
> you can dream of a rock, and somehow have all the same sensation that
> you would have while awake. So again, if all you have are the sense
> impression, how do you tell the difference?
I don't know how. I only say that, if the difference has any meaning,
then it is somehow observable.
> > > > > Good, prove me wrong. I dare ya. :)
> > > >
> > > > Draconity is definable. Therefore, it is knowable - just find the right
> > > > definition.
> > >
> > > Hmm... By George, I think you may have done it.
> >
> > Was that sarcastic or serious?
>
> I am dead serious. I think you did it. If a term is definable, then it
> is knowable. Once the characteristics and properties of an entity is
> identified, how it is like and different from other entities, then it is
> possible to know what the entity is that is being labeled.
Oh, thanks. I'm not used to that kind of success...
> > > > Both, ironically. I have a desire, which is, by all intents, purposes,
> > > > and measures, authentic, but of whose object I know less than little.
> > >
> > > I think I may be the same way. (However I have been thinking about the
> > > dynamics of the form a bit :) )
> >
> > Definitely! Although, as I do that, the form begins to differ from the
> > conventional one... for instance, I don't especially want to breathe
> > fire... that does not speak to my desire.
>
> I can see how it would come in handy from time to time. I am always
> misplacing my lighter. :)
Handy - but how can you have a sense of taste or smell when superhot
fire is coursing through the mouth and nose? Sensory cells are delicate
things...
> > > Confusing in their thoughts and actions, and well... I really do not
> > > want to turn this into human bashing. Suffice to say that I simply do
> > > not get them, after spending 4 decades on this planet (that I can
> > > recall)
> >
> > Well, you could always become a cynic. That would spare you confusion.
>
> That would be inaccurate. It is not so much a condemnation of them, as
> simply an inability on my part to figure out just what the heck they are
> up to, why they do the things they do, etc. I just don't understand
> them.
You wouldn't care about the accuracy, though. Thus the efficacity.
> > > Or in other words, while a true idea may not be knowable as such, a
> > > false idea can be knowable to be false. Have you read Popper?
> >
> > Nope.
>
> This sounds like something he said. He was big on falsifiablity.
*grins* Maybe someday I'll make a coherent analysis of assumability...
> > > As to anti-realism: It is a position that leaves you unable to know
> > > anything about the world you live in. And the whole question is largely
> > > irrelavant anyway. Regardless of whether your sense are valid or not, it
> > > is what you are presented with and that includes the pains involved in
> > > acting as if they are not valid. You want to avoid the pain, you are
> > > forced to act as if your senses are valid, whether they are or not.
> > >
> > > Now what do you do with assumptions that are (at present) unfalsifiable?
> >
> > Such as?
>
> Everette's Many Worlds in QM. Or draconic souls.
Present positive or pragmatic arguments. By the way, the former is
probably falsifiable - if you're willing to use philosophy against it...
Congratulations to them. But... you must provide an alternative to the
original to disprove it in that way; you cannot just look at a premise
and say 'That is not so!'
> > Hegel is the most unclear writer I've ever read... so unclear that,
> > after his death, his followers split into two groups that had opposite
> > philosophies, each claiming that Hegel's books supported their views!
>
> And yet he was very influential??? Hmm... something else about humans I
> do not understand.
Well, some parts were clear. For instance, he was clearly an Idealist.
But to hear Hegel speaking of subjectivity is worse than reading through
an Assembly textbook.
> > A preacher? And now... did I hear you were working at a particle
> > accelerator, or was that somebody else?
>
> I work at a particle accelerator at present. In the past I have also
> worked on nuclear power plants in the Navy, (literally in the middle of
> the ocean). Like I said, I am much better now :):)
On a submarine? I can't think of any other mid-ocean nuclear stuff...
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> > > Are you asking if I think of myself as perfected in any respect? :):) I
> > > have to admit to a fondness to bagpipe music, and as to whether the fact
> > > my ancestors are Scottish influences that or not is questionable. Or
> > > more exactly, the fact I know I am of Scottish decent. To use one
> > > example.
> > >
> > > I do find myself wearing masks around most people, trying to fit in and
> > > just not be hassled. More than I feel comfortable with. But it seems
> > > prudent considering there are more of them than there are of me.
> >
> > How do you know how they'd treat you without masks, if you have only
> > dealt with them through the masks? If you loathe that action of
> > yourself, it might cause a harsh judgment of those who make it
> > necessary.
>
> Note the "most" above. I have attempted to deal with people without
> using masks, and have been repeated been disappointed. And the
> reciprocity is there as you note. However, there is little I can do to
> "enforce" any judgment I have of others. Or desire even if I had the
> ability.
The greatest 'mask' I use with others is silence... if I was ever asked
"Do you consider yourself a dragon?" I would answer affirmatively -
despite the asker. And I do accommodate others in terms of feelings...
but I still do not believe that I seek to give anybody a false image of
who I am. And the results have not been all negative.
> > > Yep. And history has shown time and time again a marked inability of
> > > humans to learn from their own history. But I will be damned if I can
> > > think of a better means.
> >
> > Hm. I think sufficient old age would do it.
>
> I would hope so. But I find as I am getting older, remembering the hard
> times is more difficult. I find myself think back fondly on the
> 'wonderful' times I had in the Navy. :)
*grins*
> We have a minimum age for congressmen because we hope that with age
> comes wisdom. We let the young fight the wars that the old men decree.
Is that hypocrisy?
> > > And calculus still uses the same kind of mathematics that have existed
> > > since before Euclid. It is built on the pre-existing math of the time,
> > > is more of an extenuation than a whole new direction.
> >
> > It is related to the old mathematics, but not capable of being derived
> > from them by any methods known at that time.
>
> This I have to disagree with. The taking of say the derivative of a line
> function is completely in accordance with known math at the time. One
> could argue that after the invention of Cartesian coordinates, it was
> all but inevitable.
I did not say it was out of accordance, or an unlikely development, but
that, merely having pre-calculus mathematics does not make you know
calculus... nor could they have invented it without a good deal of
imagination.
> > I worry about becoming habituated to an adequate philosophy that, by its
> > very existence, prevents me from seeking one better.
>
> In other words, the blind acceptance of a philosophical school of
> thought, in practical fact elevating it to a religion? Not a bad thing
> to sweat.
Even my own.
> > > Good point. But the problem with imagination is that unless it is bound
> > > by observation, one can imagine darn near anything. And the resulting
> > > philosophies will have as little to do with the real world.
> >
> > So? There are ways to discard such results.
>
> Once observation is tossed aside?
No, I meant that the false philosophies could be discarded.
> > > Hmm... good question. I would have to say yes at this point. It can
> > > provide an accurate model of how the world works, new inventions. The
> > > whole progress of science is attributable to its rational approach, its
> > > methodology, which leads to such technical items such as this computer.
> > > But I suspect you are going to disagree with me. :)
> >
> > How does it do the work of imagination, then? Or do I recall falsely
> > that you said reason included only logic and observation...
>
> You remember correctly.
>
> First shot at it? The player takes pieces of observational data and
> assembles them in new ways. For example, we have observations of horses,
> and more of people. Juxtapose the two sets together, try to match them
> up, and you have the Centaur.
But, from whence come those new ways? What evidence was there at a human
torso could be stuck on a horse's body? What made them do it? Not logic,
unless you've also made that a huge definition...
> Its only a first guess. You try it. :)
Resorting to a random generator - or some faxsimile - and analyzing the
results.
> > My argument was that if something is not as it seems, the truth can
> > eventually be found beyond the seeming. Thus, if we live in a dream,
> > then it must be somehow possibility to discover that.
>
> And if we are limited to our dream observations, we have no means to
> determine that it is all a dream. And whether it is a dream or not is
> largely irrelevant. We have to act "as if" it is real or else suffer the
> consequences of that disbelief.
You think that the fact of the dream might not be mirrored in the dream?
Every one I have ever dreamt had some dreamlike qualities, even if I was
too sleepy to notice it at the time. How can it be a dream if the dream
never wakes nor stirs?
> > > At present? It could use more work. I don't think the rules are
> > > changeable, but the pieces and the board are. We can take a rock and say
> > > melt it down and extract iron from it to make an engine. GR tells us how
> > > to alter space-time by using the presence of mass/energy. And there is
> > > even a theoretical model of exceeding the speed of light without
> > > violating the rules. The way of doing that is completely in accordance
> > > with the rules. By knowing what is changeable and what is not, one can
> > > learn how to better play the game.
> >
> > Science and technology tell you these things, not your metaphysics. What
> > does it do that science, alone, cannot?
>
> Science is really nothing more than a specific epistemological method.
> One that has proven itself effective at determining how the universe
> works, and by using that information, of creating technologies that give
> us a better life than the ones lived by our ancestors.
Okay, the results of science then.
> The fact that 'science' (in point of fact, a specific theoretical model
> of how the universe works which itself was formed by means of the above
> method.) give us information about one of the parts of the game (the
> board), I think is rather encouraging.
>
> There is a problem in metaphysics in that the above epistemology is
> quite effective. It should be noted that cosmology was once part of
> metaphysics instead of a sub branch of astronomy that it is today. So
> the boundaries of what are the first principles keeps getting moved.
> This is a specific metaphysical model by which the universe, both the
> external as well as internal 'game' can be understood. A "metamodel", if
> you will. Hopefully, it can get rid of some of the mess involved with
> the many disparate models we have of say QM, the mind, et.al. Time will
> tell.
Hmm... well, would there be a difference between how you treat reason
now, if you were to believe it a part of the player?
> > > > For a person refusing to use reason, the situation would be the same if
> > > > reason was a part of the person, if those other things, emotion, faith,
> > > > and all that, are also there. A person _can_ work against 'emself, or
> > > > against their own nature, and not necessarily to detriment.
> > >
> > > I am not so sure about that. I don't think a tiger can try to act like a
> > > rabbit to his benefit.
> >
> > But a tigerish human could. Acts of will such as that are not to be
> > expected of most animals...
>
> Why not? :)
They're a bit more stupid, and less complex. *grins* Unless that's all a
charade.
> > Was that a question? Well, I simply expanded the definition of the
> > player to include some of the things you considered pieces. The
> > decisions of the player must have a basis, right? If you separate any
> > possible basis for decision from the player, then the player would
> > become an arbitrary middle-man, one whose existence is in no wise
> > ensured...
>
> Ah so in other words, to be conscious means to be conscious of some
> thing. Consciousness requires a context? Hmmm.... most interesting.
Yes, though that's changing the context. My points were: A valuer
requires something valued, and something valued requires a reason to be
valued.
> > > Granted. And to me, this is the part of myself I most identify with, the
> > > player, the one that decides and picks. Are you using a more inclusive
> > > definition to include the whole contents of the mind, the whole game?
> > > Hmm...not sure I can argue with that.
> >
> > Pretty much. I include those traits through which, if improved, the
> > person, too, truly improves... this excludes external things, such as
> > monetary status, because that can be improved but have no effect on a
> > person.
>
> I see your point. I am concerned with what happens to free will at the
> point of "improvement", will that get dispensed with when a person acts
> completely and totally rational?
I don't think so... but that's what I don't like about your logic plus
observation definition of reason. Hegel had a similar theory (I think -
I can't really be sure)... in essence, free will was a stage, a flaw, a
wild emotion. And I can see no way to get around this, if reason is the
only true guide (your definition of reason, of course). This may have
been the point I was trying to get to with the talk about imagination -
how can there be novelty in a method of logic? It goes against its very
being.
You could evade it as Kant did, in one of the most idiotic theories I've
seen - he said that history was predetermined, but that every soul is
free. That is a contradiction, but he ignored it. So you could say that
logic can include free will. Or you can say that a 'soul' sits off to
the side, separated from logic and observation, but exuding a magical
quality called 'free will'.
You might have wondered about the profusion of infinities of the
non-moral sort in my philosophy, and this is why: I cannot envisage a
finite metaphysics in which both free will and reason exist and are
true. In any limited system, there is a single best way to act... and if
that exists, free will is doomed.
> > > When ever you say something is good, whether you are referring to
> > > morality or even physical objects such as rocks, you are stating that
> > > they meet some set of criteria or specification. I work with power
> > > supplies and sometimes these good power supplies go bad. this does not
> > > mean they are running around on a killing spree, but they no longer meet
> > > the manufacturers specifications. That set of specifications is set up
> > > by a person, by deciding what that person needed in order to do what
> > > that person wanted to do. That person sets up a goal, and from that goal
> > > determines what is needed in order to accomplish it. But if there is no
> > > goal, then it is completely irrelevant as to whether the object meets
> > > the specification or not. Again, remove the valuer and the value no
> > > longer exists.
> >
> > Why do you imply that I believe that a valuer is unnecessary? I said
> > otherwise, earlier - I said that it was also necessary.
>
> I am trying to make a point, and going the long way to get there.
> (Scenic route) The value is not part of the rock. The value is not
> really part of the valuer, since the same rock can be valued differently
> to the same valuer. The value is in the relationship, between you the
> valuer and the rock.
That's a pretty one. But I see problems with it: most notably, you
cannot treat the relationship as an object. You can work for an object,
or for yourself, or both, but you cannot work for the relationship
except by working for both. Thus I will continue to say that the value
is in both the valuer and the valued.
> > > When talking about morality, the other definition of 'good', this is a
> > > set of rules that apply to the consciously chosen actions of a person.
> > > Rocks are not conscious, and have no ability to choose anything, let
> > > alone their own actions. Therefore the whole question about the moral
> > > quality of a rock seems rather bizarre.
> >
> > If the decision is based on what the object _is_, then the value must
> > also come, in part, from the object. To state it differently, in marked
> > comparison with yours, remove anything that can have value and the
> > valuer no longer exists.
>
> In the above example, is the value placed on the rock dependent on what
> the rock is? Or is it dependent on what effects the property of that
> rock can generate in relation to your life?
Both, since the latter depends on the former.
> > > You missed the relationship between the two. That is key, and not the
> > > physical objects, not the pieces themselves.
> >
> > *grins* Likewise. By the way, when did I say the objects had to be
> > physical? This started out about a system of honor...
>
> LOL you are right! But remember, memes are pieces too. :)
And what is the player, apart from all pieces? And if you answer with
'that which judges', then whence comes that judgment? If something
originates with a piece, and ends in a piece, then why stick a player in
the middle?
> > > Not if change results in the death of the valuer. Then that change is
> > > bad.
> >
> > That's why I said 'could' and 'conditional'. That is, its value depends
> > only on circumstance.
>
> Exactly. More precisely, the value of an object is dependent on the
> relationship between the valuer and that object. On the context that
> both find themselves in.
And the relationship is dependant on the two. See above for why I prefer
the more complex result.
> > > She does, as does Kelley. But she singles out Kant as the most
> > > influential and most damaging of the 19th century, as the root of all of
> > > it. She has little good to say of most of the crop of the last couple
> > > centuries, except for Descartes and Locke, I cannot think of any she had
> > > anything nice to say.
> > >
> > > I think I have all of her non-fiction works, and read them before I even
> > > touched her fiction.
> >
> > I think it likely that she didn't read Hegel, then, if she passed by
> > without insulting him...
>
> I didn't say she says nothing about him. She does save most of her
> arguments for Kant.
What's she say?
> > > There was a split between Rand and Nathaniel Branden, and I think she
> > > wanted to prevent her philosophy from being diluted or altered. She was
> > > very certain that she was right, did not think there were any bugs in
> > > her system.
> >
> > It seems like, if she did that, then her ideal human couldn't be a
> > philosopher... she wanted lackeys over an original thinker...
>
> It is a bit more complicated than I have explained in the brief passage
> here. Its a bit weird, a cult of personality surrounding a person who
> all but demonized such a concept.
Ah. She was trying to combat that fact?
> And that has nothing to do with it. Whether they were or not is
> irrelevant. To her would be peers, both in Hollywood and philosophy, the
> hearing stirred up a great deal of anger and resentment. Many objected
> because they felt that government was stepping out the bounds, of
> attempting censorship of unpopular political views. The fact that those
> views were the antithesis of free speech themselves was never commented
> on. The fact that Rand opposed those views with every fiber of her being
> is quite obvious.
>
> So here it is 50 years later, and all I knew about Rand before reading
> anything about her was that she was a 'bad girl' in philosophy. I was
> very reticent to read anything by her because of that perception. Now I
> have ot question just how accurate that perception is, who is it that
> tells me these things, and what their motivation is.
I didn't hear anything about her before I read her.
> > Oh. How many of these do you know, and how many do you just see? That
> > is... such shallowness might be only a surface detail, in both the
> > "LL's" and the others.
>
> This is not shallowness, this is the problem with altruism in general.
> That it is a system of morality that cannot be depended on to maintain a
> person's life.
This I agree with... but the same goes for selfishness.
> That in order to be successful, one must act in opposition to such ideals. You > have to look out for yourself. But doing so is "wrong" despite the fact it > > works.
>
> So you feel guilty. First for not acting as you say everyone should, and
> second because acting "bad" works, it pays. How does one deal with that
> kind of guilt?
Figure it out. If the person realizes that the only reason they feel
guilty is public opinion...
> > > > And if it was a type of evil other than killing or material destruction?
> > >
> > > Such as? I can guess several possible answers, but to provide one would
> > > spoil things. :)
> >
> > Forced conformity.
>
> In other words, being forced to pretend you are something you are not?
> You exist as something and not as something else. You have certain ways
> you can interact with your environment and certain ways you cannot. You
> cannot jump from the Sears Tower and hope to survive the fall. Yet birds
> do it all the time. Pretending you are a bird does not make you one, and
> just makes it more likely that you will be put you in situations where
> you are forced to jump off a building.
>
> You are a person, with free will, that is central to your identity as
> well as your means of survival. You are unique in that no one else is
> like you. By conforming, whether by coercion or otherwise, by pretending
> you are like everyone else, you are pretending to be something you are
> not. And again sooner or later, the universe catches up with such
> pretensions.
The universe catches up to incomformists more quickly, if the situation
is right. There are situations in which noncomformity would invite death
- from a purely artificial situation, granted, but a nevertheless real
one.
> The act of coercion itself is an attempt at jumpering out the single
> greatest characteristic, as well as the chief survival trait of a
> person. Conformity, is demanding others pretend they are not what they
> are, and puts their survival at risk that way. Either way, Forced
> conformity is itself a kind of murder, of making a person into something
> else. Making someone into a something.
Aye. But have you seen their contentment?
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> I don't think so... but that's what I don't like about your logic plus
> observation definition of reason. Hegel had a similar theory (I think -
> I can't really be sure)... in essence, free will was a stage, a flaw, a
> wild emotion. And I can see no way to get around this, if reason is the
> only true guide (your definition of reason, of course). This may have
> been the point I was trying to get to with the talk about imagination -
> how can there be novelty in a method of logic? It goes against its very
> being.
>
> You could evade it as Kant did, in one of the most idiotic theories I've
> seen - he said that history was predetermined, but that every soul is
> free. That is a contradiction, but he ignored it. So you could say that
> logic can include free will. Or you can say that a 'soul' sits off to
> the side, separated from logic and observation, but exuding a magical
> quality called 'free will'.
Picture a universe in which John Wilkes Booth caught a cold on
that fateful day in 1870-whatever. He gave his gun to his brother, James,
who wandered on down to Ford's.
Now, when James shot Lincoln and jumped to the stage, he didn't
break his leg; he was a professional courier, and walked up hundreds of
staircases every day, toughening the crucial muscles. Therefore, he
escaped much more quickly, was never caught, and ultimately died in
obscurity, never revealing himself as Lincoln's assassin.
What I understand of Kant's theory -- heavily modified by science
fiction, mind you -- is that history is immutable *on the macroscopic
level*. Does it matter whether John or James killed Lincoln? In subtle
ways, yes. To Reconstruction, segregation, and the 1960s civil rights
movement? No. The important thing about history is the idea. Ideas are
not names; ideas are independent of names. Lincoln (or whoever ruled in
his place) was "fated" to die, at the hands of a disgruntled Southern
gentleman, Booth (or whoever stepped up in his place). Basically, Kant
says that there are certain slots, "roles" if you will, that must be
filled -- and that there are more actors than roles, thus no individual
actor is predetermined, but can "walk off the stage" so long as *someone*,
anyone, runs on in their place.
I do not personally believe this theory (since the implication is
that the future, like history, is equally fixed, and I prefer to believe
in free will as an absolute, if only because it provides more hope);
however, I find it self-consistent.
-- Baxil, still following this thread, yay me. ;)
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
> > I don't think so... but that's what I don't like about your logic plus
> > observation definition of reason. Hegel had a similar theory (I think -
> > I can't really be sure)... in essence, free will was a stage, a flaw, a
> > wild emotion. And I can see no way to get around this, if reason is the
> > only true guide (your definition of reason, of course). This may have
> > been the point I was trying to get to with the talk about imagination -
> > how can there be novelty in a method of logic? It goes against its very
> > being.
> >
> > You could evade it as Kant did, in one of the most idiotic theories I've
> > seen - he said that history was predetermined, but that every soul is
> > free. That is a contradiction, but he ignored it. So you could say that
> > logic can include free will. Or you can say that a 'soul' sits off to
> > the side, separated from logic and observation, but exuding a magical
> > quality called 'free will'.
>
> that fateful day in 1870-whatever. He gave his gun to his brother, James,
> who wandered on down to Ford's.
> Now, when James shot Lincoln and jumped to the stage, he didn't
> break his leg; he was a professional courier, and walked up hundreds of
> staircases every day, toughening the crucial muscles. Therefore, he
> escaped much more quickly, was never caught, and ultimately died in
> obscurity, never revealing himself as Lincoln's assassin.
>
> What I understand of Kant's theory -- heavily modified by science
> fiction, mind you -- is that history is immutable *on the macroscopic
> level*. Does it matter whether John or James killed Lincoln? In subtle
> ways, yes. To Reconstruction, segregation, and the 1960s civil rights
> movement? No. The important thing about history is the idea. Ideas are
> not names; ideas are independent of names. Lincoln (or whoever ruled in
> his place) was "fated" to die, at the hands of a disgruntled Southern
> gentleman, Booth (or whoever stepped up in his place). Basically, Kant
> says that there are certain slots, "roles" if you will, that must be
> filled -- and that there are more actors than roles, thus no individual
> actor is predetermined, but can "walk off the stage" so long as *someone*,
> anyone, runs on in their place.
I don't recall Kant making any attempt to reconcile predetermination and
free will. However, I believe mine is the correct interpretation because
Kant argues from a mechanistic standpoint - ie, on its lowest level
nature is rigidly determined, therefore a human body, being composed of
such components, is also determined, therefore the actions of a body is
determined, therefore history is predetermined. That argument clashed
pretty clearly with free will, because the same argument would be
applicable to both a macroscopic and a microscopic viewpoint.
> I do not personally believe this theory (since the implication is
> that the future, like history, is equally fixed, and I prefer to believe
> in free will as an absolute, if only because it provides more hope);
> however, I find it self-consistent.
Your reconciliation might work - although I wouldn't use it either - but
I'm pretty sure Kant didn't make it.
> -- Baxil, still following this thread, yay me. ;)
*grins* You going to reply to that other part?
Lhexa
AMW
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>
> AMW thoughtfully scribed:
> > Baxil (That's me!) wrote:
> >> I must confess to taking a particularly mathematical stance on
> >> draconity, in that sense:
> >>
> >> (1) What's important is whether we can know draconity or not.
> >> (2) If it's definable, then we can know it.
> >> (3) Hmm. Either I could actually provide a definition here, or I can
> >> show that a definition does exist. Either way, the problem's solved.
> >> Which one takes the least amount of work?
> >
> > Providing a definition solves both at once. Obtaining an accurate
> > definition will entail a population of self identified dragons, as well
> > as a control group of humans.
>
> "Self-identified dragons"? So a necessary aspect of your
> definition of draconity is that the beings identify themselves as dragons?
> That doesn't necessarily have to be the case! ;)
Nope not at all. What we are trying to do is define dragon. To start you
need a population of dragons and see how they are similar to each other
as well as different from other entities. But you need that population
first. So we start off with a group who self identify as dragons on the
*provisional* *assumption* that the majority of them are in fact dragons
and not lying to themselves or others.
> Most definitions of draconity that I've heard: (A) allow for the
> possibility of people being dragons but not realizing it yet; (B) try in
> some vague way to impose a (very) minimum standard of rigorousness, so
> that people "just going through a dragon phase" will eventually deselect
> themselves; (C) at least disclaimer that in the face of compelling
> evidence to the contrary, one's draconity can be re-thought.
> Or are you saying "self-identified" taking these qualifying
> factors into account? In which case the qualifiers become part of the
> definition!
Not at all what I am saying, and I agree with what you wrote. I am not
starting off with any preconceived notion of what or who a dragon is. I
am looking at this solely from an epistemal standard, and not worrying
about the ontology at this stage.
> This, I think, is where the discussion started in the first place,
> and it's one of the more persistent reasons that a
> more-than-merely-personal standard for draconity remains elusive.
>
> >> ... so I'm happy just having a personal definition of draconity
> >> without worrying whether it is "the" definition or not. ;) As long as
> >> there is *a* definition which works, then which one it is, is irrelevant.
> >
> > Well some of us are still looking.
>
> By all means, go for it! I'm just as curious as you are, but in
> the end, far lazier. ;) Which is one of the prime benefits of being a
> mathematician.
Okay how does being a mathematician relate to laziness??? From my
studies of tensor math, that is hard work.
Ben
aka Drakon@work
Akilah
>
>
<snip>
>> By all means, go for it! I'm just as curious as you
>> are, but in
>> the end, far lazier. ;) Which is one of the prime benefits of
>> being a
>> mathematician.
>
>Okay how does being a mathematician relate to laziness??? From
>my studies of tensor math, that is hard work.
*grin* All mathematicians are lazy--that's why they chose mental
instead of physical labor! But physicists are lazier, which is
why every good physicist has a pet mathematician to give his or
her problems to once they become simply math. :)
Akilah Rhiamonryu--wanna see mine?
Defender of Chaotic Physics
<The previous text was a joke. Please do not take it
seriously--but I really do have a pet mathematician!>
>Ben
>aka Drakon@work
>
>
Insanity takes its toll.
Please have your fare ready.
DC2.~DwGfB~J+Fr++V+++Q+++Tc+++![phys]Cbl-*ag,bwh,egr-,wpu-*ag,ppu-Sks
11.45 degrees off parallel
-----------------------------------------------------------
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AMW
> AMW wrote:
> > Lhexa wrote:
> > another is what the results of that act are. The purpose of the actions
> > are either to benefit oneself, the actor. Or to benefit someone other
> > than the actor. If there is a benefit to the actor, then that action is
> > selfish. If the benefit is solely for others, then that act is
> > altruistic. You can look at the consequences objectively, independent of
> > any particular observer, and see just who benefits. What the person
> > intends is another issue.
>
> You're using lopsided definitions. Does not the objectivist definition
> of selfishness depend on the most powerful motives of the doer, and
> isn't that a much more useful definition? Defining selfishness and
> selflessness according to results removes the doer's place in the
> definitions, because then either can be something that _happens_ to a
> person, from unexpected consequences.
First off, I will defend my own views and not Rand's. I will let her and
her followers defend her views. Where they coincide, great, but where
they differ, oh well.
The consequences of an action are key to determining the morality of an
action. Having good motives is not enough if the results are disastrous.
Motivation is secondary, a close second, but less important than the
consequences. Nor does it remove the actor's place in the definition of
selfishness in the slightest. The effect of an action on the actor is
central to the whole question of whether the action is selfish or not.
Earlier I had given you a reason to act semi-altruistically from a
selfish perspective. Treating other people the way you want to be
treated is in your best interest, it aids in your survival, makes your
life easier and better. Remove the life of the valuer and the value of
an action or thing becomes meaningless. So preserving that life also
preserves the values that life holds dear. Preserving the valued item at
the expense of the valuer's life destroys the value that that life has
placed on the item.
To the question of unexpected consequences. That is most important, and
something that gets short shrift in alot of moral theory. To many,
having good intentions, while paving the road to hell, is sufficient. So
what if the effects of an action destroys the actor, and along with that
the actor's values. As long as one meant well, it does not matter that
the actions end up turning the environment hostile to one's life. You
see how this kind of thinking is not so good? You can't ignore the
consequences, unexpected or not.
> > > > then the government can step in and use
> > > > force to make them behave in such a manner.
> > >
> > > *grins* I hope you don't think I'm arguing _for_ them!
> >
> > :) If you believe that altruism is a correct moral theory, why not? It
> > seems like a perfectly logical extension of the theory. Politics is
> > where morality and ethics meets the road, where all the ivory tower
> > pontificating is made manifest and put to the test as well.
>
> It might if said altruism only included helping out other people to be
> happy. But what if you are also trying to help them be honorable, free,
> or, most ironically, self-sufficient? A democracy works far better with
> those, and others.
I think we are talking two different things here. A democracy is a means
by which the laws are made. It is a political system, (and hardly an
altruistic one at that :) ). And we can get off on a tangent here if you
like about effective and ineffective political systems. The point above
is talking about the ends of whatever political system is in power, its
laws and institutions for enforcing those laws. A democracy has the same
power to make and enforce detrimental (or beneficial) laws as any other
form of government.
> > > To guide actions! Assigning the fact of the object of an action being
> > > oneself or another need not be intrinsic to morality.
> >
> > Why do actions need a guide? Because those actions have consequences.
> > That is the whole point of taking this action instead of that one.
> > Because you want this outcome and avoid that consequence. And the
> > consequences can either be the continuation of your life, or the
> > continuation of some other life at the expense of yours. Sooner or later
> > it ends up being one or the other.
>
> Statistically, yes. But the universe is not a constant state of self vs.
> others; those situations are exceptions to daily life. Why should they
> be so defining of morality, then?
How many times can you die? Disregard reincarnation for a bit here (and
properly so, because even if reincarnation is true, you have to start
all over from scratch, and most likely not even remember this life at
all). That is a fact of life, only one death to a customer. Life is a
very tenuous thing, it is not permanent, (at least not yet) and you can
either help that along, hasten that point of no return, or try to
maintain this life for as long as achievable.
Also, remember it is you who picks your values. But if you were dead,
your values would be meaningless. So in order to preserve the value of
things, you have to preserve your life as well.
> It was just a provisional definition. 'Twould be more correct to say
> that ethics includes anything to do with actions...
Okay my definitions. Morality has to do with actions that affect only
yourself, while ethics deal with actions that deal with other people. If
you were on a desert island, ethics would be of no concern, as there is
no one around to impact your life, nor be impacted by your actions. But
morality would still be important. Both deal with how one chooses one's
actions.
> > Why would you do that? What is the point in behaving honorably?
>
> It's honor. Do you say that honor is nothing but its results? Or that it
> should be treated as such?
You have a logic loop there. One behaves honorably because it is
honorable to behave so?
What I am saying is that behaving honorably has consequences. Just saw
"The Patriot" this last weekend, and it is a fit example of what I am
talking about. In war, to use an extreme example, the best way to win is
for your opponent to surrender before the first shot is fired. That is
simply not going to happen if your opponent thinks you are dishonorable,
that they will be killed, their homes burned and their crops destroyed.
They know that surrender means death or worse, so they might as well go
down fighting.
But if they know that they will get 3 hots and a cot, and sit out the
war in relative safety, then it makes it easier for them to quit, to
question whether the war is worth fighting for.
On the other hand, there is a story in Sun Tzu about a duke who would
not attack his enemy until after they had crossed a river and has time
to prepare themselves for battle. This duke was killed and lost the
battle as well. All because he thought it dishonorable to attack his
opponent before they were ready. He's dead, and so is the value he
placed on his honor.
> > Grin, is not the group or state an "abstracted idea"? And also remember
> > that since reason is no guide according to Kant, the picking of one
> > arbitrary abstraction over another was just as "rational".
>
> *grins* You know what I meant. Anyway, Kant only said that reason cannot
> be applied to itself - not that it cannot be applied to other things.
Well Kant was wrong there. If you cannot apply reason to itself, if you
cannot see how reason gives the right answers, then that makes any
argument based on reason like a building in the sand.
> Good... *grins* except, of course, for referring me to books I can't
> find!
Damn and blast. Well sorry about that. Kelley is tough to find in
stores. Rand seems to be almost everywhere.
> Well, I don't think the arguments you've presented in that matter strong
> enough. D'you have any more?
Let me get back to you there. My library is at home and would have to
bone up.
> > I disagree. It is apparent to me that their is a line of thinking that
> > can be traced between the two. That again Neitzsche was building on what
> > Kant left behind.
>
> Apparent! Obviously not, if every non-objectivist historian/philosopher
> I've read overlooks it. Neitzsche was influence by philosophy that went
> before, undoubtedly, but their theories are too different... not even
> relating to each other as a thesis to an antithesis, just different.
Um... not even as thesis and anti-thesis? Kant advocated altruism, while
Neitzche advocated a form of selfishness at the expense of others.
> > Not in a long while. But what I remember is basically behave in this
> > manner simply because you are supposed to.
>
> Pretty much, although he also said that those manners were obvious to
> reason... I guess he was getting desperate.
Well I hopefully explained just what that reason is. To paraphrase David
Foley's character from "Blast from the Past" "Manners are how we show
another person that we respect them." And that makes our life better,
more enjoyable, easier, etc.
> > How did he ignore this interconnection?
>
> That's what I asked. His theory of categories seems to be a melding of
> logic and observation, in fact... the logic being the mechanism of the
> category, and the observation being the sense-data fed into it.
Then how did he come up with the problem of the dichotomy of 'truth'.
the disconnect between synthetic and analytical truth and not see the
way they complement each other? How did he miss that? That would have
fixed one of the biggest holes in his system right then and there.
> > Would you say their hatred was rational, i.e. the product of impartial
> > observation and logical deduction or induction? I wouldn't think so. As
> > long as reason is perceived to have the power to figure out which
> > emotions are justified, and which are just "superstition", to the limits
> > that it can, such hatreds can be dealt with. They can be argued against,
> > before they become a danger.
>
> Sure. But who has that power on their own, when they have already gone
> through situations that lead them into the hatred? It is a situation in
> which the people who have the defense only got it because they didn't
> need it.
You do. I don't think I have met a person who does not have that ability
in one form or another. But, like the whole of a person's rational
faculty, you have a choice whether to use it or not. And you do need to
use it, in order to prevent the detrimental effects of hatred from
impacting you.
>
> > But what do you say to someone who tells you that reason is worthless,
> > that it cannot tell you anything about the world you live in, let alone
> > tell which idea is true and which one is false? That synthetic truths
> > require an infinite amount of data to determine whether they are true or
> > not, and analytical truths have no basis in the real world. Therefore
> > the whole concept of truth is likewise meaningless.
>
> Quit talking to them. Hope desperately that the world does the same.
And if the world doesn't, and it threatens your life? If you are forced
to decide between leaving your country forever, or ending up stuffed in
an oven, because of the bad ideas and philosophy of the majority of your
countrymen?
> > In other words, you are right. Hate filled people will choose to believe
> > hate filled philosophies. But there is a problem here in that thanks to
> > Kant, one cannot even reason with such people.
>
> *grins* Kant has disabled you?
Who said I was disabled? :) My preferred choice of tactics simply do not
work on such people. I have to find another means.
> > > > I disagree, Pop psy is very relavant here as most of us do not spend our
> > > > time surrounded by professional psychologists. We live among family and
> > > > freinds and co-workers whose only knowledge of psychology is at the
> > > > popular level, and it is their attitude and perceptions that we have to
> > > > deal with.
> > >
> > > If their opinion has no bearing on the truth, what importance have they?
> > > Must you accomodate yourself to them?
> >
> > If they shun you, or make you an outcast in some manner, then yes it has
> > a bearing. Would you like it if everyone tiptoed around you because they
> > thought you were nuts?
>
> No. But I have reason to doubt that they would... and even then, I have
> some choice of who I go around.
To date. But again, that ability is largely mitigated by the fact that
other people are not trying to commit you. That they do not have the
power as of now, to do so. Will it always remain so?
> > You must at least appear to accommodate them. It really depends on how
> > much respect or feelings you have for the other person. Or how much
> > damage that person can do to you and your life.
>
> It may also be a situation in which said accommodation is more harmful
> to all parties than the alternative. When it causes some sorrow in the
> person doing it, or perpetuates some undesirable trait in the person who
> is being accommodated to.
Good point. Obviously honesty is preferred. But if you are in a
situation where honesty will only get you killed or worse, or do more
harm than good, well, what do you then? You have to look at the context
of each individual situation.
> > > Well, I need to consolidate a spiritual side just so that the fact will
> > > make a difference in my life, among other reasons. There would be a
> > > problem with draconity being nothing but an unachievable desire that
> > > causes emotional pain...
> >
> > Agreed. The point I was attempting to make, is that I think draconity is
> > independent of any particular physical form. Dragons come in a very wide
> > variety, from serpent to lung to guivre(?) etc.
>
> Not independent. How can it be called draconic when it is separated from
> the only thing that is definitely draconic - the body?
But if it requires a particular (set of) form(s) then anyone who claims
to be a dragon, and not possess that form is wrong.
> > How would a thinking butterfly figure it out? Or better yet, how do you
> > know that you are what you see in the mirror? The fact is that all you
> > get is impressions of the outside world. You don't have rocks in your
> > head, just images of rocks. The source of those images you assume are
> > real physical rocks with real physical photons bouncing off them. But
> > you can dream of a rock, and somehow have all the same sensation that
> > you would have while awake. So again, if all you have are the sense
> > impression, how do you tell the difference?
>
> I don't know how. I only say that, if the difference has any meaning,
> then it is somehow observable.
And if the difference is unobservable?
> > I am dead serious. I think you did it. If a term is definable, then it
> > is knowable. Once the characteristics and properties of an entity is
> > identified, how it is like and different from other entities, then it is
> > possible to know what the entity is that is being labeled.
>
> Oh, thanks. I'm not used to that kind of success...
Really? I find that hard to believe. The above argument of yours simply
blew me away. It was brilliant. I can see how you might have thought I
was being sarcastic, and apologize for not making myself more clear. But
I was dead serious. I think you are better at this than you think.
> > I can see how it would come in handy from time to time. I am always
> > misplacing my lighter. :)
>
> Handy - but how can you have a sense of taste or smell when superhot
> fire is coursing through the mouth and nose? Sensory cells are delicate
> things...
Cooling system would be one method, Using blood as a coolant for the
nose and mouth, just the sensory cells. Possibly some kind of
retractable cover...
> *grins* Maybe someday I'll make a coherent analysis of assumability...
Okay you may want to look up Bayseian statistics. I hope I have spelled
that right. It is an alternate theory of probability that I have not had
time to look at just now, but one of the many things I want to learn. As
well as Popper.
> > > > Now what do you do with assumptions that are (at present) unfalsifiable?
> > >
> > > Such as?
> >
> > Everette's Many Worlds in QM. Or draconic souls.
>
> Present positive or pragmatic arguments. By the way, the former is
> probably falsifiable - if you're willing to use philosophy against it...
You can use anything in your intellectual arsenal. I know of any
limitations on the game. Well except to be consistent with logic and
observation. And logic basically boils down to not contradicting
yourself.
> Congratulations to them. But... you must provide an alternative to the
> original to disprove it in that way; you cannot just look at a premise
> and say 'That is not so!'
A proposition is either true or false. Euclid's fifth is either true or
false. That is a tautology. It was accepted, largely as an article of
"faith" that it was true, if somewhat bothersome. So they flipped it and
found out that its *opposite* is also true.
Take an assumption or axiom. The axiom is accepted as true for the
purposed of the proof. The axiom is either a true statement about the
universe we live in or not. So you reverse the axiom and follow out the
logic of resulting from that. Now what do you do if *both* results end
up forming completely non-contradictory logical structures, *and* both
structures are observed in nature?
> > > A preacher? And now... did I hear you were working at a particle
> > > accelerator, or was that somebody else?
> >
> > I work at a particle accelerator at present. In the past I have also
> > worked on nuclear power plants in the Navy, (literally in the middle of
> > the ocean). Like I said, I am much better now :):)
>
> On a submarine? I can't think of any other mid-ocean nuclear stuff...
Exactly. Both a Boomer, (Fleet ballistic missile sub) and a fast attack.
Ben
aka Drakon@work
AMW
Lhexa wrote:
>
> AMW wrote:
> >
> > Lhexa wrote:
> The greatest 'mask' I use with others is silence... if I was ever asked
> "Do you consider yourself a dragon?" I would answer affirmatively -
> despite the asker. And I do accommodate others in terms of feelings...
> but I still do not believe that I seek to give anybody a false image of
> who I am. And the results have not been all negative.
I handle on a case by case basis. Does the asker have a "need to know"
and what are the consequences of telling that asker the truth? Will it
detrimentally affect my relationship with that person? Make it more
difficult to work/live with them, etc.
Perhaps you have more faith in humans than I do. A different set of
experiences.
> > We have a minimum age for congressmen because we hope that with age
> > comes wisdom. We let the young fight the wars that the old men decree.
>
> Is that hypocrisy?
Well I think the intention was good, but it can lead to hypocrisy. I do
think that since the men who have to fight the wars are not the same as
the guys who are negotiating the treaties, there is not as much concern
for whether a treaty will prevent a war or cause one. You are always
more careful with your own money than you are will someone else's.
> I did not say it was out of accordance, or an unlikely development, but
> that, merely having pre-calculus mathematics does not make you know
> calculus... nor could they have invented it without a good deal of
> imagination.
Okay, I think I understand you know.
> > In other words, the blind acceptance of a philosophical school of
> > thought, in practical fact elevating it to a religion? Not a bad thing
> > to sweat.
>
> Even my own.
Especially your own.
>
> > > > Good point. But the problem with imagination is that unless it is bound
> > > > by observation, one can imagine darn near anything. And the resulting
> > > > philosophies will have as little to do with the real world.
> > >
> > > So? There are ways to discard such results.
> >
> > Once observation is tossed aside?
>
> No, I meant that the false philosophies could be discarded.
Okay how do you determine a false philosophy? you have to identify it as
such before throwing it away. You don't want to toss out something
actually worthwhile.
> > > How does it do the work of imagination, then? Or do I recall falsely
> > > that you said reason included only logic and observation...
> >
> > You remember correctly.
> >
> > First shot at it? The player takes pieces of observational data and
> > assembles them in new ways. For example, we have observations of horses,
> > and more of people. Juxtapose the two sets together, try to match them
> > up, and you have the Centaur.
>
> But, from whence come those new ways? What evidence was there at a human
> torso could be stuck on a horse's body? What made them do it? Not logic,
> unless you've also made that a huge definition...
Never forget the power of bad observation. Suppose from a distance you
saw a man on a horse from the back. Did not see the horse's head, just
its body. Or maybe its silhouette. You have just seen a centaur.
I have a hypothesis that many song parodies are created this way.
Mishearing the lyrics.
> > Its only a first guess. You try it. :)
>
> Resorting to a random generator - or some faxsimile - and analyzing the
> results.
Would that be imagination? The random generation, plus selection
criteria?
> You think that the fact of the dream might not be mirrored in the dream?
> Every one I have ever dreamt had some dreamlike qualities, even if I was
> too sleepy to notice it at the time. How can it be a dream if the dream
> never wakes nor stirs?
I have had many dreams where I had no idea that it was a dream. Had to
make sure the wife and kids were okay and such, that 'reality' was back
to normal afterwards. (Sometimes it comes as a disappointment, sometimes
as a relief) Because the dreams were so real.
And might not death be the point where you wake from this dream? :)
> > > Science and technology tell you these things, not your metaphysics. What
> > > does it do that science, alone, cannot?
> >
> > Science is really nothing more than a specific epistemological method.
> > One that has proven itself effective at determining how the universe
> > works, and by using that information, of creating technologies that give
> > us a better life than the ones lived by our ancestors.
>
> Okay, the results of science then.
>
> > The fact that 'science' (in point of fact, a specific theoretical model
> > of how the universe works which itself was formed by means of the above
> > method.) give us information about one of the parts of the game (the
> > board), I think is rather encouraging.
> >
> > There is a problem in metaphysics in that the above epistemology is
> > quite effective. It should be noted that cosmology was once part of
> > metaphysics instead of a sub branch of astronomy that it is today. So
> > the boundaries of what are the first principles keeps getting moved.
> > This is a specific metaphysical model by which the universe, both the
> > external as well as internal 'game' can be understood. A "metamodel", if
> > you will. Hopefully, it can get rid of some of the mess involved with
> > the many disparate models we have of say QM, the mind, et.al. Time will
> > tell.
>
> Hmm... well, would there be a difference between how you treat reason
> now, if you were to believe it a part of the player?
Or a Piece of the Player? :) Recursions upon recursions....
I don't see how it is a "part of the player". I have seen too much
irrational behavior to expect it to be.
> > > But a tigerish human could. Acts of will such as that are not to be
> > > expected of most animals...
> >
> > Why not? :)
>
> They're a bit more stupid, and less complex. *grins* Unless that's all a
> charade.
Grin. And that fact right there is not a good thing. Stupid people are
at a severe disadvantage, both in our society and in the raw world
outside of it. humans have gotten where they are not by being the
strongest, nor swiftest, nor most procreative, but by the power of our
brains. That is what makes humans a successful species.
>
> > > Was that a question? Well, I simply expanded the definition of the
> > > player to include some of the things you considered pieces. The
> > > decisions of the player must have a basis, right? If you separate any
> > > possible basis for decision from the player, then the player would
> > > become an arbitrary middle-man, one whose existence is in no wise
> > > ensured...
> >
> > Ah so in other words, to be conscious means to be conscious of some
> > thing. Consciousness requires a context? Hmmm.... most interesting.
>
> Yes, though that's changing the context. My points were: A valuer
> requires something valued, and something valued requires a reason to be
> valued.
Such as say, the life of the valuer? What effect does the presence of
the valued item have on the valuer's life, its existence? And does not
that value change with regard to context, as demonstrated by the rock
example earlier?
> > I see your point. I am concerned with what happens to free will at the
> > point of "improvement", will that get dispensed with when a person acts
> > completely and totally rational?
>
> I don't think so... but that's what I don't like about your logic plus
> observation definition of reason. Hegel had a similar theory (I think -
> I can't really be sure)... in essence, free will was a stage, a flaw, a
> wild emotion. And I can see no way to get around this, if reason is the
> only true guide (your definition of reason, of course). This may have
> been the point I was trying to get to with the talk about imagination -
> how can there be novelty in a method of logic? It goes against its very
> being.
I think I see what you are driving at. If one obeyed reason exclusively,
then it can be used to your detriment. Suppose someone wanted to kill
you and knew you always behaved rationally. It makes their job easier
and alot more likely to succeed. But to behave rationally in that
situation, would be detrimental to you and your values. What do you do?
Chess is like this sometimes. While it is mostly a very rational game,
there is an effective means of playing irrationally that is sometimes
more effective. Because of its unpredictable nature.
> You could evade it as Kant did, in one of the most idiotic theories I've
> seen - he said that history was predetermined, but that every soul is
> free. That is a contradiction, but he ignored it. So you could say that
> logic can include free will. Or you can say that a 'soul' sits off to
> the side, separated from logic and observation, but exuding a magical
> quality called 'free will'.
That is the central defining characteristic of the 'player', free will.
It can choose to listen to reason, or emotion, or imagination or memory
or faith or whatever else it chooses to listen to. It can freely choose
which sensory data to collide to form new concepts, or which to ignore.
Or even which to give more meaning to, to concentrate on or focus on.
> You might have wondered about the profusion of infinities of the
> non-moral sort in my philosophy, and this is why: I cannot envisage a
> finite metaphysics in which both free will and reason exist and are
> true. In any limited system, there is a single best way to act... and if
> that exists, free will is doomed.
Even if their was an infinite system, there still may be only one "best
way" to act in a particular situation.
I note that the universe is a logical place. (Or at least it appears so,
and whether that appearance is an accurate reflection of what is real or
not is irrelevant. I still have to deal with the sensory data that comes
in, and I either behave as if it were logical, or not. And each choice
has an effect on that sensory data) I see no evidence of an infinity,
either in morality or in the product of scientific methodology. Nor any
need for such. While what is moral or rational may limit what a person
"should" do, the person still has a choice of what he *will* do or does
do. It is the very fact that we have free will in the first place that
morality is needed, that we have a near infinite variety of options that
those options require some form of guide so we don't end up killing
ourselves off. (Or making ourselves miserable, etc.)
If there is an infinity at all, it comes into play because you have free
will, it is created by that fact. Free will does not depend on infinity,
rather, infinity is created by free will.
> > I am trying to make a point, and going the long way to get there.
> > (Scenic route) The value is not part of the rock. The value is not
> > really part of the valuer, since the same rock can be valued differently
> > to the same valuer. The value is in the relationship, between you the
> > valuer and the rock.
>
> That's a pretty one. But I see problems with it: most notably, you
> cannot treat the relationship as an object. You can work for an object,
> or for yourself, or both, but you cannot work for the relationship
> except by working for both. Thus I will continue to say that the value
> is in both the valuer and the valued.
Grin why can't I treat the relationship like an object? Does the rock
have an effect on you? And isn't that effect dependent on something
besides the rock?
> > In the above example, is the value placed on the rock dependent on what
> > the rock is? Or is it dependent on what effects the property of that
> > rock can generate in relation to your life?
>
> Both, since the latter depends on the former.
And since the latter depends on the former, if you had to pick one, you
pick the latter, since that gets you the former.
> And what is the player, apart from all pieces? And if you answer with
> 'that which judges', then whence comes that judgment? If something
> originates with a piece, and ends in a piece, then why stick a player in
> the middle?
Without the player, all you have is rules, board and pieces. you have a
machine and not a game. That is the difference between the two. The
ability to choose, the agent of free will is what makes you a person and
not a machine.
> > Exactly. More precisely, the value of an object is dependent on the
> > relationship between the valuer and that object. On the context that
> > both find themselves in.
>
> And the relationship is dependant on the two. See above for why I prefer
> the more complex result.
Hmm... I think we are going around in circles here. Let me think on
this.
> > It is a bit more complicated than I have explained in the brief passage
> > here. Its a bit weird, a cult of personality surrounding a person who
> > all but demonized such a concept.
>
> Ah. She was trying to combat that fact?
She wrote at length on the dangers of a cult of personality. Of just how
detrimental it is.
> > So here it is 50 years later, and all I knew about Rand before reading
> > anything about her was that she was a 'bad girl' in philosophy. I was
> > very reticent to read anything by her because of that perception. Now I
> > have ot question just how accurate that perception is, who is it that
> > tells me these things, and what their motivation is.
>
> I didn't hear anything about her before I read her.
Well like I said, that is what I heard about her before I read her.
>
> > > Oh. How many of these do you know, and how many do you just see? That
> > > is... such shallowness might be only a surface detail, in both the
> > > "LL's" and the others.
> >
> > This is not shallowness, this is the problem with altruism in general.
> > That it is a system of morality that cannot be depended on to maintain a
> > person's life.
>
> This I agree with... but the same goes for selfishness.
I disagree. :) Acting in one's own self interest is essential to
maintaining one's own life. That is exactly how you do maintain it, by
acting in your own best interest.
> Figure it out. If the person realizes that the only reason they feel
> guilty is public opinion...
Its a big if, especially when you have religion, and philosophers such
as Kant telling you otherwise. There are more of them than there are of
you.
> > In other words, being forced to pretend you are something you are not?
> > You exist as something and not as something else. You have certain ways
> > you can interact with your environment and certain ways you cannot. You
> > cannot jump from the Sears Tower and hope to survive the fall. Yet birds
> > do it all the time. Pretending you are a bird does not make you one, and
> > just makes it more likely that you will be put you in situations where
> > you are forced to jump off a building.
> >
> > You are a person, with free will, that is central to your identity as
> > well as your means of survival. You are unique in that no one else is
> > like you. By conforming, whether by coercion or otherwise, by pretending
> > you are like everyone else, you are pretending to be something you are
> > not. And again sooner or later, the universe catches up with such
> > pretensions.
>
> The universe catches up to incomformists more quickly, if the situation
> is right. There are situations in which noncomformity would invite death
> - from a purely artificial situation, granted, but a nevertheless real
> one.
Grin, so you are saying that if you were in a population that was
different than you, who would act in a xenophobic manner to your
detriment if they figured out you were different, it would be better to
"pretend"?
> > The act of coercion itself is an attempt at jumpering out the single
> > greatest characteristic, as well as the chief survival trait of a
> > person. Conformity, is demanding others pretend they are not what they
> > are, and puts their survival at risk that way. Either way, Forced
> > conformity is itself a kind of murder, of making a person into something
> > else. Making someone into a something.
>
> Aye. But have you seen their contentment?
The smile of a corpse?
Ben
aka Drakon@work
AMW
> What I understand of Kant's theory -- heavily modified by science
> fiction, mind you -- is that history is immutable *on the macroscopic
> level*. Does it matter whether John or James killed Lincoln? In subtle
> ways, yes. To Reconstruction, segregation, and the 1960s civil rights
> movement? No. The important thing about history is the idea. Ideas are
> not names; ideas are independent of names. Lincoln (or whoever ruled in
> his place) was "fated" to die, at the hands of a disgruntled Southern
> gentleman, Booth (or whoever stepped up in his place). Basically, Kant
> says that there are certain slots, "roles" if you will, that must be
> filled -- and that there are more actors than roles, thus no individual
> actor is predetermined, but can "walk off the stage" so long as *someone*,
> anyone, runs on in their place.
>
> I do not personally believe this theory (since the implication is
> that the future, like history, is equally fixed, and I prefer to believe
> in free will as an absolute, if only because it provides more hope);
> however, I find it self-consistent.
By what mechanism is the free choices made by people "modified" to
conform to this historical imperative?
Actually the Lincoln assignation is an interesting side topic to this
discussion. There are several things that had to go wrong for it to
occur in the first place, such as the guard to the President's box
stepping away for a second, as just one example. And there is evidence
that Lincoln had a premonition about his death, just before the
incident.
Ben
aka Drakon@work
AMW
> I don't recall Kant making any attempt to reconcile predetermination and
> free will. However, I believe mine is the correct interpretation because
> Kant argues from a mechanistic standpoint - ie, on its lowest level
> nature is rigidly determined, therefore a human body, being composed of
> such components, is also determined, therefore the actions of a body is
> determined, therefore history is predetermined. That argument clashed
> pretty clearly with free will, because the same argument would be
> applicable to both a macroscopic and a microscopic viewpoint.
But the actions of the body are not predetermined, they are chosen by
you. (for your body at least) You can type any bloody thing you want in
response, even nonsense. While their may be a mechanistic means by which
your brain signals your fingers to hit the keys..etc., it is still your
choice as to whether to hit the keys or not.
Sorry I ain't buying it either.
Ben
aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
>
> Actually the Lincoln assignation is an interesting side topic to this
> discussion. There are several things that had to go wrong for it to
> occur in the first place, such as the guard to the President's box
> stepping away for a second, as just one example. And there is evidence
> that Lincoln had a premonition about his death, just before the
> incident.
Lincoln's wife, I think, had a dream during his first term in which she
saw him lying on a bed, very pale, with two heads. She interpreted it to
mean that he would have two terms, and die in the second... but it
doesn't seem very clear to me.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
Lhexa
I don't. However, you presented an affirmation of free will, not an
argument for it; that wouldn't impress any determinist, in my opinion.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> Nope not at all. What we are trying to do is define dragon. To start you
> need a population of dragons and see how they are similar to each other
> as well as different from other entities. But you need that population
> first. So we start off with a group who self identify as dragons on the
> *provisional* *assumption* that the majority of them are in fact dragons
> and not lying to themselves or others.
Hmm. Granted. Now I'm curious, though, how one backtracks to
"clear out" that assumption once data has been gathered. If you've
answered that elsewhere in the thread, don't worry about repeating; I'll
just see it when I catch up.
>> By all means, go for it! I'm just as curious as you are, but in
>> the end, far lazier. ;) Which is one of the prime benefits of being a
>> mathematician.
>
> Okay how does being a mathematician relate to laziness??? From my
> studies of tensor math, that is hard work.
Mathematics isn't about not getting the job done (which isn't
laziness, it's procrastination) ... it's about finding an efficient way to
do the work. (Simple example. If you have ten piles of ten stones and
need to count the stones, the "obvious way" is just to count all 100 by
hand; the "mathematical way" is to count one pile, realize they're all the
same, and multiply.)
This is very much related to the programmer's idea of laziness,
which is modularity -- quality programmers write EVERYTHING in such a way
that it can be reused for future projects. The irony of this is that it's
more work on the project level, but it pays off in spades the next time
you have to do the task. And given the sheer amount of repetition in most
programming or engineering tasks today, developing quality algorithms is a
huge time-saver, hence a mark of laziness (wanting to spend as little time
as possible on work ;)).
-- B.
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> AMW <am...@slac.stanford.edu> wrote:
>>
>>Okay how does being a mathematician relate to laziness??? From
>>my studies of tensor math, that is hard work.
>
> instead of physical labor! But physicists are lazier,
Lazier!? I doubt it.
In fact, it is possible to prove that mathematicians are lazier
than physicists. However, since this post shows that proof exists, I feel
no need to complete my argument.
-- Baxil, mathematician. (duh ;))
--
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
> The consequences of an action are key to determining the morality of an
> action. Having good motives is not enough if the results are disastrous.
> To the question of unexpected consequences. That is most important, and
> something that gets short shrift in alot of moral theory. To many,
> having good intentions, while paving the road to hell, is sufficient. So
> what if the effects of an action destroys the actor, and along with that
> the actor's values.
> As long as one meant well, it does not matter that
> the actions end up turning the environment hostile to one's life. You
> see how this kind of thinking is not so good? You can't ignore the
> consequences, unexpected or not.
First situation. What if my mother is dying, and I walk down to
the store solely for the purpose of buying medicine for her, and (as an
unexpected consequence) get mugged and die?
Second situation. What if my mother is dying, and I refuse to
walk to the store for medicine for her (presumably worried about being
mugged), and because of this some mugger with no target to waylay breaks
into my home and kills me?
I reject the notion that one "cannot ignore unexpected
consequences", especially in life-or-death situations. This is exactly
because they are unexpected. One (to be morally good) must make choices
based on the best information available to them at the time; we cannot be
moral in hindsight without corrupting the original situation.
Yes, acting "with good intentions" is different from "acting with
the best possible knowledge of the situation," but (as the situation above
hopefully illustrates) *bad things can happen no matter what our choices
are.*
I would argue, and I feel it's a very rational position, that it
is more "moral" to die while walking down to the store than to live by
refusing to get the medicine. This is because either situation #1 or
situation #2 above are equally probable "unexpected" events, assuming no
foreknowledge (which is the human condition). Therefore one takes the
same personal risk whether performing the action or not -- and to not save
another's life when the price involves no additional risk to your own is a
morally evil act.
On the other hand, *if* the coin flips the wrong way, and you end
up in situation #1, then trying to buy the medicine gets you killed. Yes,
you're dead, and that counts for something morally; but how do you propose
to evaluate that action by your standards EXCEPT in hindsight? (Or are
you arguing that morality has no bearing on ongoing events?)
By the way, I'm really enjoying this thread. It feels like that
group of people sitting on the back porch at a party, talking into the wee
hours of the night, all of whom will remember far more of the event than
their peers for whom it was a blur of lights, noise, and beer. (Yeah! :))
Baxil
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> > AMW wrote:
> > > Lhexa wrote:
> > > Not at all. :) The whole point of taking a particular action over
> > > another is what the results of that act are. The purpose of the actions
> > > are either to benefit oneself, the actor. Or to benefit someone other
> > > than the actor. If there is a benefit to the actor, then that action is
> > > selfish. If the benefit is solely for others, then that act is
> > > altruistic. You can look at the consequences objectively, independent of
> > > any particular observer, and see just who benefits. What the person
> > > intends is another issue.
> >
> > You're using lopsided definitions. Does not the objectivist definition
> > of selfishness depend on the most powerful motives of the doer, and
> > isn't that a much more useful definition? Defining selfishness and
> > selflessness according to results removes the doer's place in the
> > definitions, because then either can be something that _happens_ to a
> > person, from unexpected consequences.
>
> First off, I will defend my own views and not Rand's. I will let her and
> her followers defend her views. Where they coincide, great, but where
> they differ, oh well.
Oh, that's fine. You're a Heretical Objectivist, but I'm not yet sure in
what ways heretic and in what ways Objectivist.
> The consequences of an action are key to determining the morality of an
> action. Having good motives is not enough if the results are disastrous.
> Motivation is secondary, a close second, but less important than the
> consequences. Nor does it remove the actor's place in the definition of
> selfishness in the slightest. The effect of an action on the actor is
> central to the whole question of whether the action is selfish or not.
>
> Earlier I had given you a reason to act semi-altruistically from a
> selfish perspective. Treating other people the way you want to be
> treated is in your best interest, it aids in your survival, makes your
> life easier and better. Remove the life of the valuer and the value of
> an action or thing becomes meaningless. So preserving that life also
> preserves the values that life holds dear. Preserving the valued item at
> the expense of the valuer's life destroys the value that that life has
> placed on the item.
>
> To the question of unexpected consequences. That is most important, and
> something that gets short shrift in alot of moral theory. To many,
> having good intentions, while paving the road to hell, is sufficient. So
> what if the effects of an action destroys the actor, and along with that
> the actor's values. As long as one meant well, it does not matter that
> the actions end up turning the environment hostile to one's life. You
> see how this kind of thinking is not so good? You can't ignore the
> consequences, unexpected or not.
And you cannot ignore the motives either. If the consequences are the
only things of import, then a person who drops a pebble on the sidewalk
which somebody else then trips over (and dies from concussion) is just
as much a murderer as one who takes a gun and shoots someone at
random... and a person who wins the lottery is as deserving of that much
money as one who worked hard for it.
Both motives and consequences are important... (notice how often I say
'both' in those matters which have engendered philosophical wars)...
> > > > > then the government can step in and use
> > > > > force to make them behave in such a manner.
> > > >
> > > > *grins* I hope you don't think I'm arguing _for_ them!
> > >
> > > :) If you believe that altruism is a correct moral theory, why not? It
> > > seems like a perfectly logical extension of the theory. Politics is
> > > where morality and ethics meets the road, where all the ivory tower
> > > pontificating is made manifest and put to the test as well.
> >
> > It might if said altruism only included helping out other people to be
> > happy. But what if you are also trying to help them be honorable, free,
> > or, most ironically, self-sufficient? A democracy works far better with
> > those, and others.
>
> I think we are talking two different things here. A democracy is a means
> by which the laws are made. It is a political system, (and hardly an
> altruistic one at that :) ). And we can get off on a tangent here if you
> like about effective and ineffective political systems. The point above
> is talking about the ends of whatever political system is in power, its
> laws and institutions for enforcing those laws. A democracy has the same
> power to make and enforce detrimental (or beneficial) laws as any other
> form of government.
Yes, but history has shown that democracies tend to treat their subjects
better, even through such a convoluted method. Thus, anyone who
altruistically wants a people to have the greatest freedom and success
will work for a democratic and capitalistic system (and a person working
for selfish reasons would probably do the same). Only a cruel, deluded,
or corrupted person would inflict upon a people a communism such as
those seen in the past century!
> > > > To guide actions! Assigning the fact of the object of an action being
> > > > oneself or another need not be intrinsic to morality.
> > >
> > > Why do actions need a guide? Because those actions have consequences.
> > > That is the whole point of taking this action instead of that one.
> > > Because you want this outcome and avoid that consequence. And the
> > > consequences can either be the continuation of your life, or the
> > > continuation of some other life at the expense of yours. Sooner or later
> > > it ends up being one or the other.
> >
> > Statistically, yes. But the universe is not a constant state of self vs.
> > others; those situations are exceptions to daily life. Why should they
> > be so defining of morality, then?
>
> How many times can you die? Disregard reincarnation for a bit here (and
> properly so, because even if reincarnation is true, you have to start
> all over from scratch, and most likely not even remember this life at
> all). That is a fact of life, only one death to a customer. Life is a
> very tenuous thing, it is not permanent, (at least not yet) and you can
> either help that along, hasten that point of no return, or try to
> maintain this life for as long as achievable.
And most lives do not contain such a situation, in which it is either
the certain death of one or the certain death of another.
> Also, remember it is you who picks your values. But if you were dead,
> your values would be meaningless. So in order to preserve the value of
> things, you have to preserve your life as well.
I thought you meant that the conflict with others involved other things
than life, like individuality or willfulness. Such a situation involving
life is rare indeed.
> > It was just a provisional definition. 'Twould be more correct to say
> > that ethics includes anything to do with actions...
>
> Okay my definitions. Morality has to do with actions that affect only
> yourself, while ethics deal with actions that deal with other people. If
> you were on a desert island, ethics would be of no concern, as there is
> no one around to impact your life, nor be impacted by your actions. But
> morality would still be important. Both deal with how one chooses one's
> actions.
I'll remember them, though I might get 'em mixed up. I say that ethics
is the philosophical study of actions, worth, and all that, while a
morality or a _code_ of ethics is the one which a particular person
uses.
> > > Why would you do that? What is the point in behaving honorably?
> >
> > It's honor. Do you say that honor is nothing but its results? Or that it
> > should be treated as such?
>
> You have a logic loop there. One behaves honorably because it is
> honorable to behave so?
One should behave honorably because, whatever the nature of the good
that comes from it, the greatest amount of this worth is gained by
behaving _as if_ it is worth doing in and of itself.
This good exists, certainly, and the above statement is true for any
type of value, whether for oneself or for itself or for another. And
many qualities other than honor can be placed in the same category...
art, for instance.
> What I am saying is that behaving honorably has consequences. Just saw
> "The Patriot" this last weekend, and it is a fit example of what I am
> talking about. In war, to use an extreme example, the best way to win is
> for your opponent to surrender before the first shot is fired. That is
> simply not going to happen if your opponent thinks you are dishonorable,
> that they will be killed, their homes burned and their crops destroyed.
> They know that surrender means death or worse, so they might as well go
> down fighting.
Of course. I also believe that a good of any kind will draw in further
good - behaving honorably brings respect, and maybe even peace; behaving
friendly brings cooperation; behaving wisely can bring success of any
kind, if it is desired. I do not believe that this connection between
things of worth means that any is only valuable as it affects another.
> On the other hand, there is a story in Sun Tzu about a duke who would
> not attack his enemy until after they had crossed a river and has time
> to prepare themselves for battle. This duke was killed and lost the
> battle as well. All because he thought it dishonorable to attack his
> opponent before they were ready. He's dead, and so is the value he
> placed on his honor.
That is proof that a single virtue cannot be absolutely dependable. The
man lacked cunning, maybe even wisdom.
> > > Grin, is not the group or state an "abstracted idea"? And also remember
> > > that since reason is no guide according to Kant, the picking of one
> > > arbitrary abstraction over another was just as "rational".
> >
> > *grins* You know what I meant. Anyway, Kant only said that reason cannot
> > be applied to itself - not that it cannot be applied to other things.
>
> Well Kant was wrong there. If you cannot apply reason to itself, if you
> cannot see how reason gives the right answers, then that makes any
> argument based on reason like a building in the sand.
I agree.
> > Good... *grins* except, of course, for referring me to books I can't
> > find!
>
> Damn and blast. Well sorry about that. Kelley is tough to find in
> stores. Rand seems to be almost everywhere.
Actually, I saw her books in Salt Lake City once. But I passed them up
in favor of Schopenhauer. Otherwise, they are... lost to me.
Do you think a used bookstore would put them in some section other than
philosophy?
> > Well, I don't think the arguments you've presented in that matter strong
> > enough. D'you have any more?
>
> Let me get back to you there. My library is at home and would have to
> bone up.
In the matter of Kant's infernal bungling; you're still bringing new
stuff on selfishness and related matters.
> > > I disagree. It is apparent to me that their is a line of thinking that
> > > can be traced between the two. That again Neitzsche was building on what
> > > Kant left behind.
> >
> > Apparent! Obviously not, if every non-objectivist historian/philosopher
> > I've read overlooks it. Neitzsche was influence by philosophy that went
> > before, undoubtedly, but their theories are too different... not even
> > relating to each other as a thesis to an antithesis, just different.
>
> Um... not even as thesis and anti-thesis? Kant advocated altruism, while
> Neitzche advocated a form of selfishness at the expense of others.
Yet he did not advocate moral nihilism. His words that a person could
develop beyond good and evil means, I think, that the 'good and evil' he
refers to is not any type of morality, but the false one that infused
humanity, containing submission and conformity.
> > > Not in a long while. But what I remember is basically behave in this
> > > manner simply because you are supposed to.
> >
> > Pretty much, although he also said that those manners were obvious to
> > reason... I guess he was getting desperate.
>
> Well I hopefully explained just what that reason is. To paraphrase David
> Foley's character from "Blast from the Past" "Manners are how we show
> another person that we respect them." And that makes our life better,
> more enjoyable, easier, etc.
Quite a change of subject! From 'in this matter' to etiquette stuff.
However, although your definition of reason is a well-developed one
(perhaps more so than mine), I don't think it complete or exact.
> > > How did he ignore this interconnection?
> >
> > That's what I asked. His theory of categories seems to be a melding of
> > logic and observation, in fact... the logic being the mechanism of the
> > category, and the observation being the sense-data fed into it.
>
> Then how did he come up with the problem of the dichotomy of 'truth'.
> the disconnect between synthetic and analytical truth and not see the
> way they complement each other? How did he miss that? That would have
> fixed one of the biggest holes in his system right then and there.
I haven't a clue. Maybe he wanted to deny that people who have had
different experiences would naturally have differing philosophies, and
preferred to believe that reason brought the same results in everybody.
> > > Would you say their hatred was rational, i.e. the product of impartial
> > > observation and logical deduction or induction? I wouldn't think so. As
> > > long as reason is perceived to have the power to figure out which
> > > emotions are justified, and which are just "superstition", to the limits
> > > that it can, such hatreds can be dealt with. They can be argued against,
> > > before they become a danger.
> >
> > Sure. But who has that power on their own, when they have already gone
> > through situations that lead them into the hatred? It is a situation in
> > which the people who have the defense only got it because they didn't
> > need it.
>
> You do. I don't think I have met a person who does not have that ability
> in one form or another. But, like the whole of a person's rational
> faculty, you have a choice whether to use it or not. And you do need to
> use it, in order to prevent the detrimental effects of hatred from
> impacting you.
Some do. In others, that 'form of power' is so submerged and weak that,
for practical purposes, there may be said to be none. It is another
situation in which the exceptions - those who break free of the hatred -
are not to be confused with the whole.
They can, but they don't. Stupid semantic bits...
> > > But what do you say to someone who tells you that reason is worthless,
> > > that it cannot tell you anything about the world you live in, let alone
> > > tell which idea is true and which one is false? That synthetic truths
> > > require an infinite amount of data to determine whether they are true or
> > > not, and analytical truths have no basis in the real world. Therefore
> > > the whole concept of truth is likewise meaningless.
> >
> > Quit talking to them. Hope desperately that the world does the same.
>
> And if the world doesn't, and it threatens your life? If you are forced
> to decide between leaving your country forever, or ending up stuffed in
> an oven, because of the bad ideas and philosophy of the majority of your
> countrymen?
I leave the country. But if it is no longer a single person - but a
legion of irrational nihilists who want my life, I would take actions
that a single person wouldn't merit.
> > > In other words, you are right. Hate filled people will choose to believe
> > > hate filled philosophies. But there is a problem here in that thanks to
> > > Kant, one cannot even reason with such people.
> >
> > *grins* Kant has disabled you?
>
> Who said I was disabled? :) My preferred choice of tactics simply do not
> work on such people. I have to find another means.
I do not think that hatred has changed in any significant way in the two
hundred or so years between Kant and me. Thus, any change Kant has
caused would be in the defender, instead.
Or maybe in those who control the grunts. That's a different matter.
> > > If they shun you, or make you an outcast in some manner, then yes it has
> > > a bearing. Would you like it if everyone tiptoed around you because they
> > > thought you were nuts?
> >
> > No. But I have reason to doubt that they would... and even then, I have
> > some choice of who I go around.
>
> To date. But again, that ability is largely mitigated by the fact that
> other people are not trying to commit you. That they do not have the
> power as of now, to do so. Will it always remain so?
If the situation became overwhelming, I would use deception. But right
now, I just don't see the need.
> > > You must at least appear to accommodate them. It really depends on how
> > > much respect or feelings you have for the other person. Or how much
> > > damage that person can do to you and your life.
> >
> > It may also be a situation in which said accommodation is more harmful
> > to all parties than the alternative. When it causes some sorrow in the
> > person doing it, or perpetuates some undesirable trait in the person who
> > is being accommodated to.
>
> Good point. Obviously honesty is preferred. But if you are in a
> situation where honesty will only get you killed or worse, or do more
> harm than good, well, what do you then? You have to look at the context
> of each individual situation.
Certainly. So, accommodation would sometimes be necessary - but not, I
think, as often as you say.
> > > Agreed. The point I was attempting to make, is that I think draconity is
> > > independent of any particular physical form. Dragons come in a very wide
> > > variety, from serpent to lung to guivre(?) etc.
> >
> > Not independent. How can it be called draconic when it is separated from
> > the only thing that is definitely draconic - the body?
>
> But if it requires a particular (set of) form(s) then anyone who claims
> to be a dragon, and not possess that form is wrong.
No! Something draconic must be related to the draconic body, not
possessed of one.
Still, I'm perfectly willing to call the other varieties dragons, even
if they don't move me in the same way.
> > > How would a thinking butterfly figure it out? Or better yet, how do you
> > > know that you are what you see in the mirror? The fact is that all you
> > > get is impressions of the outside world. You don't have rocks in your
> > > head, just images of rocks. The source of those images you assume are
> > > real physical rocks with real physical photons bouncing off them. But
> > > you can dream of a rock, and somehow have all the same sensation that
> > > you would have while awake. So again, if all you have are the sense
> > > impression, how do you tell the difference?
> >
> > I don't know how. I only say that, if the difference has any meaning,
> > then it is somehow observable.
>
> And if the difference is unobservable?
Absolutely so? Then something exists in the universe that is without
logic... I go by the axiom, There is no difference that does not cause a
difference.
> > > I am dead serious. I think you did it. If a term is definable, then it
> > > is knowable. Once the characteristics and properties of an entity is
> > > identified, how it is like and different from other entities, then it is
> > > possible to know what the entity is that is being labeled.
> >
> > Oh, thanks. I'm not used to that kind of success...
>
> Really? I find that hard to believe. The above argument of yours simply
> blew me away. It was brilliant. I can see how you might have thought I
> was being sarcastic, and apologize for not making myself more clear. But
> I was dead serious. I think you are better at this than you think.
At philosophy, maybe, but not at convincing people.
But that might be my screening process... I try hard to only argue with
those who can readily argue back; and if someone starts the argument
themselves, I will break it off myself if I think the arguer not up to
it. You proved yourself capable of honorable argument, else I wouldn't
still be talking.
> > > I can see how it would come in handy from time to time. I am always
> > > misplacing my lighter. :)
> >
> > Handy - but how can you have a sense of taste or smell when superhot
> > fire is coursing through the mouth and nose? Sensory cells are delicate
> > things...
>
> Cooling system would be one method, Using blood as a coolant for the
> nose and mouth, just the sensory cells. Possibly some kind of
> retractable cover...
A retractable cover, maybe, but no cooling system would be quick enough
to counteract sustained blasts of fire. There's also the matter of
metabolism - that would be demanding enough to fly such a large creature
without producing fire to be tossed about.
> > *grins* Maybe someday I'll make a coherent analysis of assumability...
>
> Okay you may want to look up Bayseian statistics. I hope I have spelled
> that right. It is an alternate theory of probability that I have not had
> time to look at just now, but one of the many things I want to learn. As
> well as Popper.
Statistics? That's not what I mean by assumability, because it has
little relevance to philosophy (can you take of poll of which worlds
have free will and which don't, then decide the more common one is
truth?). I meant the instances in which logic does not suffice in
disproof.
> > > > Such as?
> > >
> > > Everette's Many Worlds in QM. Or draconic souls.
> >
> > Present positive or pragmatic arguments. By the way, the former is
> > probably falsifiable - if you're willing to use philosophy against it...
>
> You can use anything in your intellectual arsenal. I know of any
> limitations on the game. Well except to be consistent with logic and
> observation. And logic basically boils down to not contradicting
> yourself.
Certain metaphysics oppose draconic souls, and others the branching
worlds theory. It doesn't make argument easy, however, because they have
usually assumed the opposing metaphysics to be false.
> > Congratulations to them. But... you must provide an alternative to the
> > original to disprove it in that way; you cannot just look at a premise
> > and say 'That is not so!'
>
> A proposition is either true or false. Euclid's fifth is either true or
> false. That is a tautology. It was accepted, largely as an article of
> "faith" that it was true, if somewhat bothersome. So they flipped it and
> found out that its *opposite* is also true.
>
> Take an assumption or axiom. The axiom is accepted as true for the
> purposed of the proof. The axiom is either a true statement about the
> universe we live in or not. So you reverse the axiom and follow out the
> logic of resulting from that. Now what do you do if *both* results end
> up forming completely non-contradictory logical structures, *and* both
> structures are observed in nature?
Limit the scope of both; they both become 'partially' true (ie, in some
situations). But Euclidian geometry could not have been so limited had
not the alternative - the version based on differing fifth axioms - been
created.
> > > > A preacher? And now... did I hear you were working at a particle
> > > > accelerator, or was that somebody else?
> > >
> > > I work at a particle accelerator at present. In the past I have also
> > > worked on nuclear power plants in the Navy, (literally in the middle of
> > > the ocean). Like I said, I am much better now :):)
> >
> > On a submarine? I can't think of any other mid-ocean nuclear stuff...
>
> Exactly. Both a Boomer, (Fleet ballistic missile sub) and a fast attack.
*grins*
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
Raudrin
>
> > > I see your point. I am concerned with what happens to free will at the
> > > point of "improvement", will that get dispensed with when a person acts
> > > completely and totally rational?
> >
> > I don't think so... but that's what I don't like about your logic plus
> > observation definition of reason. Hegel had a similar theory (I think -
> > I can't really be sure)... in essence, free will was a stage, a flaw, a
> > wild emotion. And I can see no way to get around this, if reason is the
> > only true guide (your definition of reason, of course). This may have
> > been the point I was trying to get to with the talk about imagination -
> > how can there be novelty in a method of logic? It goes against its very
> > being.
>
> I think I see what you are driving at. If one obeyed reason exclusively,
> then it can be used to your detriment. Suppose someone wanted to kill
> you and knew you always behaved rationally. It makes their job easier
> and alot more likely to succeed. But to behave rationally in that
> situation, would be detrimental to you and your values. What do you do?
>
> Chess is like this sometimes. While it is mostly a very rational game,
> there is an effective means of playing irrationally that is sometimes
> more effective. Because of its unpredictable nature.
>
well. In one problem given to a class of mine once (pick as many vertices
of a certain-dimensional hypercube with each vertex being a certain
distance from any other vertex), I chose my vertices randomly and ended
up with more than 25% more vertices listed than any other person in the
class. (which presumably for the most part chose theirs using some logical
or rational method) Also, it has been proven (though I haven't read the
proofs or studied any further in this subject) that in large computer
networks, using random wiring is more efficient than any other known
wiring scheme. So there does seem to be a basis for irrational and
random behavior in nature.
--
, , -=- Raudrin Talarlesa -=- Jared Lemke -=-
/|\_/|\_ -=- peg...@avalon.net -=- ICQ:24761065 -=-
|,-'/_|\\`_ -=- Webpage coming when I get some time -=-
,'_._,_\/ K_\`. -=- Do what you will but harm none. -=-
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jml ' ,-~ Fr+ M H+ $ F+ R++ Ac+ J+ S+ I# V Tc+++
Lhexa
>
> Lhexa wrote:
> >
> > The greatest 'mask' I use with others is silence... if I was ever asked
> > "Do you consider yourself a dragon?" I would answer affirmatively -
> > despite the asker. And I do accommodate others in terms of feelings...
> > but I still do not believe that I seek to give anybody a false image of
> > who I am. And the results have not been all negative.
>
> I handle on a case by case basis. Does the asker have a "need to know"
> and what are the consequences of telling that asker the truth? Will it
> detrimentally affect my relationship with that person? Make it more
> difficult to work/live with them, etc.
>
> Perhaps you have more faith in humans than I do. A different set of
> experiences.
It seems so. Or... a nearly insane confidence in my own abilities to
handle such things.
> > > We have a minimum age for congressmen because we hope that with age
> > > comes wisdom. We let the young fight the wars that the old men decree.
> >
> > Is that hypocrisy?
>
> Well I think the intention was good, but it can lead to hypocrisy. I do
> think that since the men who have to fight the wars are not the same as
> the guys who are negotiating the treaties, there is not as much concern
> for whether a treaty will prevent a war or cause one. You are always
> more careful with your own money than you are will someone else's.
Yes, but a democracy makes the concerns of most people closer to the
leaders; if they are displeased, the leader loses his position. An
autocratic leader does not have to worry so much about their
well-being...
> > > In other words, the blind acceptance of a philosophical school of
> > > thought, in practical fact elevating it to a religion? Not a bad thing
> > > to sweat.
> >
> > Even my own.
>
> Especially your own.
Yes... but a moment ago you said that you did not see a purpose in
frequent revision of philosophy. I think that a lack of some doubt about
the truth of that philosophy is necessary to avoid a stagnating
system...
> > >
> > > Once observation is tossed aside?
> >
> > No, I meant that the false philosophies could be discarded.
>
> Okay how do you determine a false philosophy? you have to identify it as
> such before throwing it away. You don't want to toss out something
> actually worthwhile.
With every test of accuracy at your command. If it fails one like logic,
it is gone immediately; a lesser test, like comparing it to current
beliefs or a current interpretation of observation, works, though
without absolute certainty.
> > > > How does it do the work of imagination, then? Or do I recall falsely
> > > > that you said reason included only logic and observation...
> > >
> > > You remember correctly.
> > >
> > > First shot at it? The player takes pieces of observational data and
> > > assembles them in new ways. For example, we have observations of horses,
> > > and more of people. Juxtapose the two sets together, try to match them
> > > up, and you have the Centaur.
> >
> > But, from whence come those new ways? What evidence was there at a human
> > torso could be stuck on a horse's body? What made them do it? Not logic,
> > unless you've also made that a huge definition...
>
> Never forget the power of bad observation. Suppose from a distance you
> saw a man on a horse from the back. Did not see the horse's head, just
> its body. Or maybe its silhouette. You have just seen a centaur.
And current modifications to these forms? Where did the revision come
from? And what about ideas and creatures that have only a tenuous
connection to existing things?
> I have a hypothesis that many song parodies are created this way.
> Mishearing the lyrics.
Don't go around toniiight
'Cause you're bound to take a fright
Theeere's a bathroom on the right
> > > Its only a first guess. You try it. :)
> >
> > Resorting to a random generator - or some faxsimile - and analyzing the
> > results.
>
> Would that be imagination? The random generation, plus selection
> criteria?
Provided the random generation was a part of the person (or in your
case, one of the more intimate pieces). And that, and the building on
past experiences, is still not all there is to imagination.
> > You think that the fact of the dream might not be mirrored in the dream?
> > Every one I have ever dreamt had some dreamlike qualities, even if I was
> > too sleepy to notice it at the time. How can it be a dream if the dream
> > never wakes nor stirs?
>
> I have had many dreams where I had no idea that it was a dream. Had to
> make sure the wife and kids were okay and such, that 'reality' was back
> to normal afterwards. (Sometimes it comes as a disappointment, sometimes
> as a relief) Because the dreams were so real.
What about lucid dreams? I have had those, and can find no other cause
than my own actions and thoughts within the dream. Then I know I'm in
one, though the couple of times it's happened the dream doesn't last
long after.
However, if this world is a dream of some kind, it'd be interesting to
see what a lucid dreamer is like...
> And might not death be the point where you wake from this dream? :)
Then that would be the way in which you know the dream...
> > > The fact that 'science' (in point of fact, a specific theoretical model
> > > of how the universe works which itself was formed by means of the above
> > > method.) give us information about one of the parts of the game (the
> > > board), I think is rather encouraging.
> > >
> > > There is a problem in metaphysics in that the above epistemology is
> > > quite effective. It should be noted that cosmology was once part of
> > > metaphysics instead of a sub branch of astronomy that it is today. So
> > > the boundaries of what are the first principles keeps getting moved.
> > > This is a specific metaphysical model by which the universe, both the
> > > external as well as internal 'game' can be understood. A "metamodel", if
> > > you will. Hopefully, it can get rid of some of the mess involved with
> > > the many disparate models we have of say QM, the mind, et.al. Time will
> > > tell.
> >
> > Hmm... well, would there be a difference between how you treat reason
> > now, if you were to believe it a part of the player?
>
> Or a Piece of the Player? :) Recursions upon recursions....
>
> I don't see how it is a "part of the player". I have seen too much
> irrational behavior to expect it to be.
Yeah, but would there be a difference?
However, you seem to imply that both reason and the player cannot be
flawed. Either the player is always good but can work on flawed reason,
or reason is something true, but that can be discarded by the player.
But what happens if both reason and the player can act with flaws, or be
flawed?
Anyway, I place reason within a person because otherwise 'e could be
responsible for deciding whether or not to act on it - but 'e wouldn't
take part in its processes, or derive any benefit directly from it, or
be responsible for its progression. It would forcibly remove reason from
the sphere of free will, denying its myriad ways and convolutions.
Finally, and most importantly, it would remove the necessity for a
player with free will - it is a small step between saying a self-guiding
player uses reason to act, and saying a self-guiding reason (still a
piece, though) acts... with the illusion of free will.
It gets back down to the fact that you cannot remove everything from a
soul and expect it to retain free will. Furthermore, I do not believe
that either the soul or its tools lack flaws.
> > > > But a tigerish human could. Acts of will such as that are not to be
> > > > expected of most animals...
> > >
> > > Why not? :)
> >
> > They're a bit more stupid, and less complex. *grins* Unless that's all a
> > charade.
>
> Grin. And that fact right there is not a good thing. Stupid people are
> at a severe disadvantage, both in our society and in the raw world
> outside of it. humans have gotten where they are not by being the
> strongest, nor swiftest, nor most procreative, but by the power of our
> brains. That is what makes humans a successful species.
The ability to change oneself is good, especially in the form of
adaptation - but not if it is regression!
> > > > Was that a question? Well, I simply expanded the definition of the
> > > > player to include some of the things you considered pieces. The
> > > > decisions of the player must have a basis, right? If you separate any
> > > > possible basis for decision from the player, then the player would
> > > > become an arbitrary middle-man, one whose existence is in no wise
> > > > ensured...
> > >
> > > Ah so in other words, to be conscious means to be conscious of some
> > > thing. Consciousness requires a context? Hmmm.... most interesting.
> >
> > Yes, though that's changing the context. My points were: A valuer
> > requires something valued, and something valued requires a reason to be
> > valued.
>
> Such as say, the life of the valuer? What effect does the presence of
> the valued item have on the valuer's life, its existence? And does not
> that value change with regard to context, as demonstrated by the rock
> example earlier?
Among other things. To assume that a valuer is the only possible source,
object, and alterer of value is to assume that one can exist in
isolation.
> > > I see your point. I am concerned with what happens to free will at the
> > > point of "improvement", will that get dispensed with when a person acts
> > > completely and totally rational?
> >
> > I don't think so... but that's what I don't like about your logic plus
> > observation definition of reason. Hegel had a similar theory (I think -
> > I can't really be sure)... in essence, free will was a stage, a flaw, a
> > wild emotion. And I can see no way to get around this, if reason is the
> > only true guide (your definition of reason, of course). This may have
> > been the point I was trying to get to with the talk about imagination -
> > how can there be novelty in a method of logic? It goes against its very
> > being.
>
> I think I see what you are driving at. If one obeyed reason exclusively,
> then it can be used to your detriment. Suppose someone wanted to kill
> you and knew you always behaved rationally. It makes their job easier
> and alot more likely to succeed. But to behave rationally in that
> situation, would be detrimental to you and your values. What do you do?
No, not that! There is no good that requires reason of any and all sorts
to be repressed. Reason is not a static thing, but one that can evolve -
thus the difference in this case can be one of the _degree_ of reason,
not the lack of it. That is, a reasonable and observant enough person
will notice that their activities are predictable, and see this as
harmful - then it would be more reasonable to act unpredictably. A
person with a less developed reason would not see this, and one far
below would be unpredictable, but just by chance. So what if, as reason
evolves, it works against what it was formerly?
This does not mean that reason (as I define it) is the sole determinant
of morality.
> Chess is like this sometimes. While it is mostly a very rational game,
> there is an effective means of playing irrationally that is sometimes
> more effective. Because of its unpredictable nature.
*grins* I play randomly until I see a reason not to. And I send my pawns
on kamikaze missions against queens and knights...
> > You could evade it as Kant did, in one of the most idiotic theories I've
> > seen - he said that history was predetermined, but that every soul is
> > free. That is a contradiction, but he ignored it. So you could say that
> > logic can include free will. Or you can say that a 'soul' sits off to
> > the side, separated from logic and observation, but exuding a magical
> > quality called 'free will'.
>
> That is the central defining characteristic of the 'player', free will.
> It can choose to listen to reason, or emotion, or imagination or memory
> or faith or whatever else it chooses to listen to. It can freely choose
> which sensory data to collide to form new concepts, or which to ignore.
> Or even which to give more meaning to, to concentrate on or focus on.
I agree. But it is _not_ a defining characteristic that the soul must be
separate from its mind and thoughts, and emotions... these can also be
involved in free will.
> > You might have wondered about the profusion of infinities of the
> > non-moral sort in my philosophy, and this is why: I cannot envisage a
> > finite metaphysics in which both free will and reason exist and are
> > true. In any limited system, there is a single best way to act... and if
> > that exists, free will is doomed.
>
> Even if their was an infinite system, there still may be only one "best
> way" to act in a particular situation.
The tendency of finite systems, as they grow more and more advanced, is
for the 'one best way' to lose significance. Eventually, the best way
itself becomes capable of flaws - ie, imagining the situation a game,
there are defenses against the best way, just fewer than against any
other way. As the complexity increases, the flaws of the 'best way'
become ever more numerous - until it reaches a point where a best way
cannot be found. Take the games of tictactoe, checkers, and chess... any
situation you find yourself in in the first has a single best way.
Sometimes this way can be reduced to a stalemate, but there are methods
of tictactoe that, if taken, are impossible to actually win against.
Now, with checkers, there are often best ways - computers are more
suited to the analysis, here - but flaws in the best ways begin to show
up, and the difference between the best way and its runner-ups diminish.
Finally, with chess, a single best way can only be found in specific
configurations, whether by computer or by human. A macroscopic best way
has not yet been found. And any move taken at the beginning of the game,
no matter what, can be exploited, and the number of alternate, but
equally effective, strategies increase.
So, with increasing complexity, the significance and obtainability of a
best way decrease, while the number of amount of diversity increases.
Thus, if I assume that this trend continues - and it is reasonable to do
so - then it becomes clear that the best way becomes nothing more than
an unreachable point in infinity, while in every real circumstance
diversity of options is bound to increase as complexity and development
do.
So, saying a single best way is actually attainable is like saying that
you can get to infinity by adding one to a number, over and over again.
> I note that the universe is a logical place. (Or at least it appears so,
> and whether that appearance is an accurate reflection of what is real or
> not is irrelevant. I still have to deal with the sensory data that comes
> in, and I either behave as if it were logical, or not. And each choice
> has an effect on that sensory data) I see no evidence of an infinity,
> either in morality or in the product of scientific methodology. Nor any
> need for such. While what is moral or rational may limit what a person
> "should" do, the person still has a choice of what he *will* do or does
> do. It is the very fact that we have free will in the first place that
> morality is needed, that we have a near infinite variety of options that
> those options require some form of guide so we don't end up killing
> ourselves off. (Or making ourselves miserable, etc.)
I see evidence, because I have reason to believe that is the universe is
finite, then one must be an illusion - free will, or the rationality of
existence. Infinite diversity in existence allows the existence of both.
> If there is an infinity at all, it comes into play because you have free
> will, it is created by that fact. Free will does not depend on infinity,
> rather, infinity is created by free will.
They are inseparable; they depend on each other only in that neither
could not be absent. I see no need to make one supreme.
> > > I am trying to make a point, and going the long way to get there.
> > > (Scenic route) The value is not part of the rock. The value is not
> > > really part of the valuer, since the same rock can be valued differently
> > > to the same valuer. The value is in the relationship, between you the
> > > valuer and the rock.
> >
> > That's a pretty one. But I see problems with it: most notably, you
> > cannot treat the relationship as an object. You can work for an object,
> > or for yourself, or both, but you cannot work for the relationship
> > except by working for both. Thus I will continue to say that the value
> > is in both the valuer and the valued.
>
> Grin why can't I treat the relationship like an object? Does the rock
> have an effect on you? And isn't that effect dependent on something
> besides the rock?
You can treat it as an object theoretically, but I can think of too many
situations where it would be impossible to act on the relationship
except by acting on something other than the relationship. That is to
say... you cannot affect the relationship as directly as you can the
object and the valuer. The former is dependant on the latter, but not
vice-versa; thus I cannot say that the relationship is the reality of
the value.
> > > In the above example, is the value placed on the rock dependent on what
> > > the rock is? Or is it dependent on what effects the property of that
> > > rock can generate in relation to your life?
> >
> > Both, since the latter depends on the former.
>
> And since the latter depends on the former, if you had to pick one, you
> pick the latter, since that gets you the former.
The same applies to the converse. I can pick the rock and get its
implications, or I can pick the implications and get the rock. It
doesn't matter which.
> > And what is the player, apart from all pieces? And if you answer with
> > 'that which judges', then whence comes that judgment? If something
> > originates with a piece, and ends in a piece, then why stick a player in
> > the middle?
>
> Without the player, all you have is rules, board and pieces. you have a
> machine and not a game. That is the difference between the two. The
> ability to choose, the agent of free will is what makes you a person and
> not a machine.
You didn't answer the questions.
On a side issue: Do you believe that free will is either beyond logic or
completely unexplainable?
> > > It is a bit more complicated than I have explained in the brief passage
> > > here. Its a bit weird, a cult of personality surrounding a person who
> > > all but demonized such a concept.
> >
> > Ah. She was trying to combat that fact?
>
> She wrote at length on the dangers of a cult of personality. Of just how
> detrimental it is.
It seems like appointing a successor would be detrimental to that,
though. Can you imagine what would result if that continued as a
tradition?
> > > > Oh. How many of these do you know, and how many do you just see? That
> > > > is... such shallowness might be only a surface detail, in both the
> > > > "LL's" and the others.
> > >
> > > This is not shallowness, this is the problem with altruism in general.
> > > That it is a system of morality that cannot be depended on to maintain a
> > > person's life.
> >
> > This I agree with... but the same goes for selfishness.
>
> I disagree. :) Acting in one's own self interest is essential to
> maintaining one's own life. That is exactly how you do maintain it, by
> acting in your own best interest.
You keep saying things I don't disagree with. I just say there is more!
> > Figure it out. If the person realizes that the only reason they feel
> > guilty is public opinion...
>
> Its a big if, especially when you have religion, and philosophers such
> as Kant telling you otherwise. There are more of them than there are of
> you.
*grins* Then they have cowardice to overcome. But that, like ignorance,
can be done. And, many do.
> > > In other words, being forced to pretend you are something you are not?
> > > You exist as something and not as something else. You have certain ways
> > > you can interact with your environment and certain ways you cannot. You
> > > cannot jump from the Sears Tower and hope to survive the fall. Yet birds
> > > do it all the time. Pretending you are a bird does not make you one, and
> > > just makes it more likely that you will be put you in situations where
> > > you are forced to jump off a building.
> > >
> > > You are a person, with free will, that is central to your identity as
> > > well as your means of survival. You are unique in that no one else is
> > > like you. By conforming, whether by coercion or otherwise, by pretending
> > > you are like everyone else, you are pretending to be something you are
> > > not. And again sooner or later, the universe catches up with such
> > > pretensions.
> >
> > The universe catches up to incomformists more quickly, if the situation
> > is right. There are situations in which noncomformity would invite death
> > - from a purely artificial situation, granted, but a nevertheless real
> > one.
>
> Grin, so you are saying that if you were in a population that was
> different than you, who would act in a xenophobic manner to your
> detriment if they figured out you were different, it would be better to
> "pretend"?
No. I am saying that there are evils which represent the best path _to
avoid death_. Thus, physical survival itself is not the only vital thing
in ethics...
> > Aye. But have you seen their contentment?
>
> The smile of a corpse?
Of the comatose.
> Ben
> aka Drakon@work
Lhexa
Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott
Lhexa thoughtfully scribed:
> Tad 'Baxil' Ramspott wrote:
>> Lhexa:
>> > You could evade it as Kant did, in one of the most idiotic theories
>> > I've seen - he said that history was predetermined, but that every
>> > soul is free.
>
>> science fiction, mind you -- is that history is immutable *on the
>
>> ... there are certain slots, "roles" if you will, that must be
>> filled -- and that there are more actors than roles, thus no
>> individual actor is predetermined, but can "walk off the stage" so
>> long as *someone*, anyone, runs on in their place.
>
> free will. However, I believe mine is the correct interpretation because
> Kant argues from a mechanistic standpoint - ie, on its lowest level
> nature is rigidly determined, therefore a human body, being composed of
> such components, is also determined, therefore the actions of a body is
> determined, therefore history is predetermined. That argument clashed
> pretty clearly with free will, because the same argument would be
> applicable to both a macroscopic and a microscopic viewpoint.
And Drakon pitched in:
> But the actions of the body are not predetermined, they are chosen by
> you. (for your body at least) You can type any bloody thing you want in
> response, even nonsense. While their may be a mechanistic means by which
> your brain signals your fingers to hit the keys..etc., it is still your
> choice as to whether to hit the keys or not.
OK. First of all: Like I said, I picked my particular argument
(perhaps even example, I don't remember) from science fiction. So yes,
Lhexa's interpretation of *Kant* is probably correct.
Second: Kant's argument, by now, has been invalidated by QM
anyway. ;) Of course, it was potentially valid at the time, so it's
still worth discussing in that context.
Third: As for Drakon's question elsewhere in the thread, which I
couldn't cut and paste into here, of "So by what mechanism does the
universe reconcile the individual actors with the available roles?" -- I
don't know! :) Philosophically speaking, it might as well be the Magic
Toe Cheese Fairy, looking in her Book of Nosewarts, who Back Before The
Beginning Of Time picked out a path such that there would never be a role
which went unfilled, and did some cross-checking on her slide rule.
Fourth: as for the argument that a body's actions are not
predetermined: Historically, the mechanistical view of life (bax before
QM, anyway) held *not* that choices could be restricted (yes, at any given
moment, I have the "choice" to either type this, or fhqlwehdagag, or
banana creme blue moving syntax dry call fnord), but that -- since nature
is rigidly determined on its lowest level, that by sufficient observation
one could *determine* what these choices were going to be, with perfect
accuracy, for any situation. This was the goal of science for a good,
long while, and we've only recently discovered that (due to some niggling
little details, like Heisenberg uncertainty), this is impossible.
But historically this was held by a great many rational thinkers,
and no, saying "But I have choice!" wouldn't have convinced them. So
thank goodness for Heisenberg.
>> -- Baxil, still following this thread, yay me. ;)
>
> *grins* You going to reply to that other part?
I'm trying to interject comments when I can, rather than respond
to whole posts at once, because that leaves me *some* free time to play
quantum-physical chaos mind games at myself. ;) But if you had a
particular "other part" that you were curious about my potential response
to, remind me what it was and I'll try to go bax to it.
Dream well,
Bax