So Long, Dr. Strangelove
Gandalf Grey
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Kevin Mattson, History News Network
To get a sense of just how much the Iraq War has radically altered the
political landscape, consider the recent string of retired generals
criticizing Donald Rumsfeld and calling for his resignation. One after the
other the generals appeared in the press lobbing criticisms at the Secretary
of Defense - the Bush appointee who serves as the civilian overseer of
military action. Marine General Anthony Zinni, for instance, called Rumsfeld
"incompetent, strategically, operationally, and tactically." The statement
generated echoes that Newsweek called the "Revolt of the Retired Generals."
What we are seeing is a profound inversion of the ordinary assumptions about
the relationship between the military and the government in post-war
American history. It suggests just how transformative Bush's decision to
topple the Iraqi regime has been. Personally I've witnessed some of my
liberal friends suddenly praising those they would never have considered
heroes before, and I've heard conservatives denouncing the top brass they
used to love. It's been profoundly surreal.
That's because throughout the postwar period, it's been Generals who seem
most willing and eager to extend American power abroad. And it's been
civilian leadership that has reeled them in.
Consider MacArthur's desire to rollback communist power in North Korea and
then open a new front with China. Truman was right to put the kibosh on that
desire, no matter what damage it did to his presidency's standing in the
eyes of the American public (MacArthur was granted hero status). Then JFK -
remembering the bad advice offered him before the Bay of Pigs - shot down
the suggestion of Curtis LeMay who wanted a strategic take-out of the
recently discovered Cuban missiles. Diplomacy trumped military action, and
the tough generals went sulking away. Or, in the case of LeMay, tried to
enter politics. In 1968 LeMay threw in his hat as the vice presidential
candidate when George Wallace ran for president. What was his solution to
the Vietnam problem? To "bomb North Vietnam back into the Stone Age."
Those on the left-liberal end of the spectrum feared this extension of
military power. Social critics like C. Wright Mills believed military
leaders planning nuclear war suffered from "crackpot realism." The left
feared that technical competence stemming from military experience
substituted for serious debate about the legitimate or illegitimate use of
the American military.
You don't have to read critics like C. Wright Mills to get a sense of this.
Just watch Stanley Kubrick's classic film, "Dr. Strangelove." We typically
appreciate the film for its dark comedy. But we sometimes forget how central
the theme of the military's relationship to civilian government is in the
film. The decision to use preemptive force against the Soviet Union is made
by the movie's character, General Jack Ripper. Most remember Ripper's
rantings about the Communists trying to "sap" and "impurify" his "bodily
fluids." But the scariest lines are those he speaks to the British Air Force
commander who questions his decision to unleash military force on Soviet
Russia. Ripper explains that "war is too important to be left to the
politicians" who lack any capacity for "strategic thought." The rest of the
film shows the president of the United States desperately trying to correct
for Ripper's dangerous gamble.
I've used "Dr. Strangelove" in courses that I teach on history and film. And
I think that with today's political culture, the film would make little
sense to audiences. After all, it's our civilian leaders who desire to test
out their theories of military force - most famously Bush's doctrine of
preemptive force and Rumsfeld's theory of a lean and mean military taking
swift action. And now it's the generals who are offering words of warning
and, most weirdly, words of caution.
I worry how quickly some have granted the generals' such a large voice in
the debate over the Iraq War. No doubt we should listen to military
commanders when they talk about strategy and what's necessary technically to
fight a war. But they don't deserve any special standing in our debates
about the legitimate or illegitimate use of military force abroad. That's
what worries me about the recent inversion I've just described. It gives
generals too much power in their new-found role as critics of the Bush
administration. And it narrows the debate to focus solely on technical
know-how and strategy.
We would do well to remember today why critics in the past feared listening
to the highest ranking officers in the past. And we would do well to enliven
a debate about American foreign policy that doesn't center on the words of
our military leaders but on our values as a nation.
Mr. Mattson is Connor Study Professor of Contemporary History at Ohio
University and author most recently of Upton Sinclair and the Other American
Century.
Source: History News Network
http://hnn.us/articles/24468.html
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"A little patience and we shall see the reign of witches pass over, their
spells dissolve, and the people recovering their true sight, restore their
government to its true principles. It is true that in the meantime we are
suffering deeply in spirit,
and incurring the horrors of a war and long oppressions of enormous public
debt. But if the game runs sometimes against us at home we must have
patience till luck turns, and then we shall have an opportunity of winning
back the principles we have lost, for this is a game where principles are at
stake."
-Thomas Jefferson