Much is written and discussed about NSAMs #263 and #273 in terms of
what they meant for Vietnam, but not as much is discussed or written
about NSAMs #55, #56 & #57.  These are key memos, written in June
1961. These memos took the steps of replacing the CIA's covert
operations, which had been running unchalleged for many years, with
the military being in charge of ALL "Cold War" operations.

NSAM #55 stated JFK regarded the Joint Chiefs of Staff as his
principal military advisors responsible for initiating advice and
repsonding to requests for advice, and JFK expected this to reach him
direct and "unfiltered."  It went on to state that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff had a responsibility to the nation in the Cold War similar to
that in conventional hostilities.  It called for them to know the
military and paramilitary forces and resources available to the
Department of Defense; verfiy their readiness; report on their
adequacy; and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and
improvement.  It is key to point out that "paramilitary" is a
reference to non-conventional forces and this is the area the CIA had
been expanding into for some time.  The failure of the Bay of Pigs had
left a feeling of being had with JFK and he was not going to let it
happen again, therefore, he was determined to move these areas to the
military.

The key sentence is, "I look to the Chiefs to contribute dynamic and
imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military
and paramilitary aspects of the Cold War programs."  There it is, he
is replacing the covert operations area with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.  The problems facing this change were enormous.  Firstly, the
CIA was pissed, as they saw the area of covert operations/paramilitary
operations as theirs, and they had plans of massive expansion in the
works.  Secondly, JFK was passing more repsonsibility to men who, for
the most part, hated his guts. JFK was not liked among many of the
military circles and his reluctance to go into Cuba did not help this
situation at all.  JFK signed this memo to show the seriousness of it
and it was sent to just the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

NSAM #56 was released by McGeorg Bundy and contained one vital
paragraph:

"It is important that we anticipate now our possible future
requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary
operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary
assests we have in the United States Armed Forces, consider varioius
areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require
indeginous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of
the goals which we should act in this field.  Having determined the
assests and the possible requirements, it would then become a matter
of developing a plan to meet the deficit."

It called for the Department of State and the CIA to review these
matters and make recommendations.  It could be viewed as a "getting
the house in order" memo.

NSAM #57 would be a big one. Short, sweet and to the point.  It called
for the Special Group, 5412 Committee (CIA) to perform the functions
assigned in the recommendations to the Strategic Resources Group.
This memo was tied to a very long paper that outlined what these
recommendations were. Fletcher Prouty outlined this memo very well:

"The principle behind NSAM #57 is absolutely fundamental to the whole
concept of clandestine operations. It not only restates the idea that
clandestine operations should be secret and deniable, but it goes
beyond that to state that they should be small. It plays on the
meaning of "small", in two areas of interest: First, unless they are
very small they should not be assigned to the CIA; and second, if they
are not as small as possible they have no chance of remaining secret
and therefore have no chance, by definition, of being successful
clandestine operations.

This latter issue flies right in the face of the CIA, which had been
working for years to define all sorts of operations, large and small,
secret or not, as clandestine in order that they would then, by
arbitrary definition, be assigned to the CIA. This was an erosion of
the principle, but it had been going on for so long and the CIA had
used the game so blatantly for so long that it had become almost a
matter of course. The CIA managed to declare in 1962 that the training
of the border patrol police on the India­-China border was a
clandestine activity; then, because it was "clandestine", the whole
job was assigned to the CIA."

The CIA was moving into non-secret operations as anything beyond small
could not be kept secret, and this was not their mandate when they
were created.  This had been, and would always be, the military's
area, and JFK took action to restore this normal order of
responsibility.  Prouty explains:

"Thus, by the very size of its activities in so many areas, the CIA
had exceeded all reasonable definitions of clandestine. This new
Kennedy directive hit right at the most vulnerable point in the ST
game at that time. No sooner had this directive been received in the
Pentagon than heated arguments sprang up, wherever this order was
seen, as to what was "large" and what was "small" in clandestine
activities. Oddly enough the rather large and fast-growing contingent
of DOD officials and personnel who had found a most promising and
interesting niche in the special operations business were the loudest
in support of "small" being "large". In other words, they were much in
support of more Bay of Pigs operations, and even by June 1961 there
had been really significant moves of Bay of Pigs men and equipment
from Latin America and the bases in the States to Vietnam. For them,
it was onward and upward. What was a small Cuban failure or two?
Indochina offered new horizons."

It was all circumvented anyway by a shrewd Dulles, so in the end all
that was accomplished may have been a death warrant for JFK.  Let's
finish with Prouty:

"It was never really settled, anyhow. Allen Dulles and his quietly
skillful team had foreseen this possibility and had laid the
groundwork to circumvent it. Opposing Dulles was like fighting your
adversary on the brink of a cliff. He was willing to go over as long
as he brought his opponents with him. He believed the handwriting on
the wall, and he had sounded out the Kennedys. He knew that they had
learned a lot from the Bay of Pigs; and he now knew where the
Kennedys' Achilles' tendon was, and he had hold of that vital spot."