Need a simple, secure way to transport & access sensitive data?
Prof Wonmug
secure, compact device that can be accessed by Windows PCs (XP and
later).
I'm thinking that some sort of encrypted external device, like a USB
drive, would be ideal. I don't want to put the data on my laptop in
case it's lost or stolen and I don't want to rely on the Internet.
The data is a mix of small documents (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) and
large documents (databases, demo videos, and slide shows). It's
currently about 6GB, but could grow to double that or more.
I need the data encrypted, but I don't want to have to enter a
password every time a file is accessed or opened.
I have been looking at USB Flash Drives. Some have hardware
encryption, some have software encryption, and some have no encryption
at all. I ma trying to decide whether the hardware encryption is worth
the extra price or go with an unencrypted device and use TrueCrypt.
Here's what I have found. I would appreciate any comments or
suggestions.
1. SanDisk Cruzer Micro 16 GB USB 2.0 Flash Drive SDCZ6-016G-A11
At $30, this is a bargain. I like the retractible port (no cap to
lose). I would install TrueCrypt or something to get the security.
Question: From reading the TrueCrypt specs, I believe that it is
possible to encrypt the entire flash drive so that it asks for a
password once when the device is mounted and files are decrypted when
read and encrypted when written. Is that correct?
2. Apricorn Padlock A25-PL128-250 250 GB Secure 128-bit AES Hardware
Encrypted Portable USB Drive
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B002LE8CI0/ref=asc_df_B002LE8CI0994674?smid=ATVPDKIKX0DER&tag=googlecom09c9-20&linkCode=asn&creative=380341&creativeASIN=B002LE8CI0
At $90 for 250 GB with hardware encryption, this is a great bargain.
The only drawback that I can see is that it's much larger (like a
large, thin, and heavy deck of cards). This is a spinning disk, not a
flash drive. I couldn't find any R/W data rate specs.
Question: Is this likely to be slower than a flash drive?
Question: Are there any disadvantages of this vs flash (other than
size)?
3. Corsair Flash Voyager 16 GB USB 2.0 Flash Drive CMFUSB2.0-16GB
http://www.amazon.com/Corsair-Flash-Voyager-Drive-CMFUSB2-0-16GB/dp/B000LXTUT8/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=electronics&qid=1262227045&sr=8-2
This appears to be roughly equivalent to the SanDisk. The specs appear
to indicate that it is as much as twice as fast. At $40, that would be
a good deal. There's also a hardened version for $10 more.
4. IronKey https://www.ironkey.com/
This is clearly the most secure and also the most expensive. I don't
think I need this level of security. I would be willing to pay the
extra if is is easier to use.
5. CMS 16GB Vault OTG Secure Encrypted Flash Drive
http://www.cmsproducts.com/detail.aspx?ID=1297
I believe this uses software encryption. At $150, I would probably
spend the extra $100 and get the IronKey.
Question: Does this provide anything significantly better than one of
the unencrypted flasg drives plus TrueCrypt?
Question: Are there other options that I should consider?
Thanks
VanguardLH
> I need a mechanism for storing up to 10-12 GB of sensitive data on a
> secure, compact device that can be accessed by Windows PCs (XP and
> later).
TrueCrypt. It has a portable version, too. And it's free.
Prof Wonmug
>Prof Wonmug wrote:
>
>> I need a mechanism for storing up to 10-12 GB of sensitive data on a
>> secure, compact device that can be accessed by Windows PCs (XP and
>> later).
>
>TrueCrypt.
So I would buy a regular flash drive, such as the SanDisk or Corsair,
then install TrueCrypt, right?
Once installed, will TrueCrypt intercept all access to the drive so
that I just enter the password once, when it's mounted, and then fils
will be decrypted when read from and encrypted when written to the
flash drive?
>It has a portable version, too.
Does this mean that I can install it on the flash drive so that I can
use it on any PC without having to install software?
VanguardLH
> VanguardLH wrote:
>
>> Prof Wonmug wrote:
>>
>>> I need a mechanism for storing up to 10-12 GB of sensitive data on a
>>> secure, compact device that can be accessed by Windows PCs (XP and
>>> later).
>>
>> TrueCrypt.
>> It has a portable version, too.
>
> So I would buy a regular flash drive, such as the SanDisk or Corsair,
> then install TrueCrypt, right?
>
> Once installed, will TrueCrypt intercept all access to the drive so that
> I just enter the password once, when it's mounted, and then fils will be
> decrypted when read from and encrypted when written to the flash drive?
>
> Does this mean that I can install it on the flash drive so that I can use
> it on any PC without having to install software?
I haven't used the portable version. As I recall, you don't install
anything to just use the portable version. You merely copy the program's
files to the removable drive. You then use it to create an encrypted
container (a file) on that removable drive into which you store your
protected files.
When you open the container, you need to supply the password. The
container remains open until you close it, so you only need to enter the
password once per use of that container.
http://www.truecrypt.org/faq "How can I use TrueCrypt on a USB flash
drive?"
nemo_outis
news:pconj5tnuu9toscnn...@4ax.com:
...snipped for brevity...
You have not fully specified your problem before going about making an
inventory of possible solutions. For instance, what (who, where, when,
why, etc.) are the risks and threats and what are the capabilities and
resources of your adversaries? (e.g. family members, friends, business
associates, hackers/malware, system admins, police forces, major
intelligence services). Do you need portability for use on other
(potentially insecure or even hostile) computers? Will you cross
international borders? Etc., etc.
If all you're looking for is security against low-level threats
(essentially you just want to keep honest people honest) then any of your
listed alternatives should do. If you want security against more serious
threats then Ironkey is clearly the best. But note and note well - any or
all of these "solutions" (from Truecrypt to Ironkey) only protects data "at
rest"; each can easily be compromised if used on some hostile computer.
Once you enter that password (PIN, etc.) and begin to *actually use* the
data you are "at risk" - *severely* at risk if you haven't vetted the
computer (including your own!). In short, we must always remember that
"we" are not the users of a computer - the hardware, OS and applications
are the real "user." All our computing activities are intermediated by
these and if they're corrupt, we're fucked. (IOW you may be
overconcentrating on an aspect - security of data at rest - that is not the
most serious risk.)
Incidentally, while I have some personal reservations about the
trustworthiness of Truecrypt, many others are satisfied by its (quasi)
open-source nature. Unless you're a member of the lunatic fringe (like me
:-) its cryptographic aspects should be entirely satisfactory. But
Truecrypt does have one "gotcha" that applies to its use on others'
computers: you *must have administrator rights on the (Windows) computer on
which it will be used* in order to use it (yes, even for the portable
version). This is because decryption requires installation of a driver
(temporarily in the case of the portable version) and installing a driver
needs admin rights. This problem is not unique to Truecypt and applies to
several other such encryption programs. It can severely limit portablity
(e.g., internet cafes, etc. which seldom grant admin rights to casual
users). The only solution to the "driver probem" is a device with its own
crypto processor (e.g., "special" usb stick, Apricorn, Seagate encrypted
HD, etc.).
Regards,
♥Ari♥
> Are there other options that I should consider?
Consider laying out all the details if you expect a detailed answer.
--
A fireside chat not with Ari!
http://tr.im/holj
Motto: Live To Spooge It!
Frank Merlott
> This problem is not unique to Truecypt and applies to
> several other such encryption programs. It can severely limit portablity
> (e.g., internet cafes, etc. which seldom grant admin rights to casual
> users). The only solution to the "driver probem" is a device with its
> own > crypto processor (e.g., "special" usb stick, Apricorn, Seagate
> encrypted
> HD, etc.).
>
FreeOTFE Explorer doesn't need admin rights and runs in portable mode.
--
Privacylover: http://www.privacylover.com
Prof Wonmug
>Prof Wonmug <won...@e.mcc> wrote in
>news:pconj5tnuu9toscnn...@4ax.com:
>
>...snipped for brevity...
>
>You have not fully specified your problem before going about making an
>inventory of possible solutions. For instance, what (who, where, when,
>why, etc.) are the risks and threats and what are the capabilities and
>resources of your adversaries? (e.g. family members, friends, business
>associates, hackers/malware, system admins, police forces, major
>intelligence services). Do you need portability for use on other
>(potentially insecure or even hostile) computers? Will you cross
>international borders? Etc., etc.
OK. This is NOT the launch codes. Interpol will not be interested in
this data. ;-)
Seriously, it's company information. Most of it is not all that
sensitive. I'm mainly interested in preventing someone who happens to
find or steal the laptop from easily being able to read the data.
That said, if I can get much better protection for a few buck more and
not too many additional complexities, I'd take it.
>If all you're looking for is security against low-level threats
>(essentially you just want to keep honest people honest) then any of your
>listed alternatives should do. If you want security against more serious
>threats then Ironkey is clearly the best. But note and note well - any or
>all of these "solutions" (from Truecrypt to Ironkey) only protects data "at
>rest"; each can easily be compromised if used on some hostile computer.
>Once you enter that password (PIN, etc.) and begin to *actually use* the
>data you are "at risk" - *severely* at risk if you haven't vetted the
>computer (including your own!). In short, we must always remember that
>"we" are not the users of a computer - the hardware, OS and applications
>are the real "user." All our computing activities are intermediated by
>these and if they're corrupt, we're fucked. (IOW you may be
>overconcentrating on an aspect - security of data at rest - that is not the
>most serious risk.)
I'm willing to trust that the hardware and OS is free of malware. I
take reasonable precautions.
>Incidentally, while I have some personal reservations about the
>trustworthiness of Truecrypt, many others are satisfied by its (quasi)
>open-source nature. Unless you're a member of the lunatic fringe (like me
>:-) its cryptographic aspects should be entirely satisfactory. But
>Truecrypt does have one "gotcha" that applies to its use on others'
>computers: you *must have administrator rights on the (Windows) computer on
>which it will be used* in order to use it (yes, even for the portable
>version). This is because decryption requires installation of a driver
>(temporarily in the case of the portable version) and installing a driver
>needs admin rights. This problem is not unique to Truecypt and applies to
>several other such encryption programs. It can severely limit portablity
>(e.g., internet cafes, etc. which seldom grant admin rights to casual
>users). The only solution to the "driver probem" is a device with its own
>crypto processor (e.g., "special" usb stick, Apricorn, Seagate encrypted
>HD, etc.).
Thanks
Prof Wonmug
wrote:
>On Wed, 30 Dec 2009 19:26:03 -0800, Prof Wonmug wrote:
>
>> Are there other options that I should consider?
>
>Consider laying out all the details if you expect a detailed answer.
I tried to. I added more in a reply to nemo. What else should I say?
nemo_outis
> On Fri, 01 Jan 2010 20:32:47 GMT, "nemo_outis" <a...@xyz.com> wrote:
>
>>Prof Wonmug <won...@e.mcc> wrote in
>>news:pconj5tnuu9toscnn...@4ax.com:
>>
>>...snipped for brevity...
>>
>>You have not fully specified your problem before going about making an
>>inventory of possible solutions. For instance, what (who, where,
>>when, why, etc.) are the risks and threats and what are the
>>capabilities and resources of your adversaries? (e.g. family members,
>>friends, business associates, hackers/malware, system admins, police
>>forces, major intelligence services). Do you need portability for use
>>on other (potentially insecure or even hostile) computers? Will you
>>cross international borders? Etc., etc.
>
> OK. This is NOT the launch codes. Interpol will not be interested in
> this data. ;-)
>
> Seriously, it's company information. Most of it is not all that
> sensitive. I'm mainly interested in preventing someone who happens to
> find or steal the laptop from easily being able to read the data.
OK - I take it from your response that we're talking about only one machine (a
laptop), not any questions of data portability to other machines, etc. In which
case the obvious question is why a removable device? (e.g., USB stick, etc.). Why
not instead encrypt the whole laptop itself (i.e., encrypt all its drives with
whole-disk encryption - not just partitions or container files - using truecrypt,
bestcrypt, PGP wholedisk, drivecrypt, free compusec, etc.)? This gives
significantly better protection.
> I'm willing to trust that the hardware and OS is free of malware. I
> take reasonable precautions.
While the following comment is a somewhat facetious paradox, it does make a point:
"If the physical security of the laptop was adequate there'd be no need for
encryption." While I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm urging you to reflect
carefully on your statement, "I'm willing to trust that the hardware and OS is
free of malware."
For example, a cogent question is whether you're only worried about "single
event" security breaches or "multiple event" ones. Laptop theft, single
opportunistic exam, etc. fall under the single-event scenario and are fairly easy
to protect against with the available tools; two-event breaches (one surreptitious
event to plant malware, corrupt the OS, install a HW keylogger, etc. and a second
event to harvest the data, passwords, etc.) are a much more difficult situation
requiring far greater physical security as a preventative measure. I suggest that
the minimally adequate protection for a laptop not stored in a locked room (or
safe!) between uses is whole-disk encryption, an MBR restorer/checker, and tamper-
indicating seals to disclose if the case has been opened.
Regards,
Prof Wonmug
>Prof Wonmug <won...@e.mcc> wrote in
>news:mqi0k5hgpl2n04rac...@4ax.com:
>
>> On Fri, 01 Jan 2010 20:32:47 GMT, "nemo_outis" <a...@xyz.com> wrote:
>>
>>>Prof Wonmug <won...@e.mcc> wrote in
>>>news:pconj5tnuu9toscnn...@4ax.com:
>>>
>>>...snipped for brevity...
>>>
>>>You have not fully specified your problem before going about making an
>>>inventory of possible solutions. For instance, what (who, where,
>>>when, why, etc.) are the risks and threats and what are the
>>>capabilities and resources of your adversaries? (e.g. family members,
>>>friends, business associates, hackers/malware, system admins, police
>>>forces, major intelligence services). Do you need portability for use
>>>on other (potentially insecure or even hostile) computers? Will you
>>>cross international borders? Etc., etc.
>>
>> OK. This is NOT the launch codes. Interpol will not be interested in
>> this data. ;-)
>>
>> Seriously, it's company information. Most of it is not all that
>> sensitive. I'm mainly interested in preventing someone who happens to
>> find or steal the laptop from easily being able to read the data.
>
>OK - I take it from your response that we're talking about only one machine (a
>laptop), not any questions of data portability to other machines, etc. In which
>case the obvious question is why a removable device? (e.g., USB stick, etc.).
Not just one machine, but probably only a few (2-3) and all machines I
own. Maybe occasionally a customer machine.
>Why
>not instead encrypt the whole laptop itself (i.e., encrypt all its drives with
>whole-disk encryption - not just partitions or container files - using truecrypt,
>bestcrypt, PGP wholedisk, drivecrypt, free compusec, etc.)? This gives
>significantly better protection.
I do need portable data, but this is an interesting idea independent
of my original question. I'll post a separate question about this.