pragmatism and atheism
Keith Johnson
There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
think I have misconstrued your view? I am not hiding anything up my
sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
Keith
Francois Tremblay
That's why pragmatism is not a good addition to reasoning. It can't even
justify its own existence. It's not useful to consider usefulness.
--Franc
--
**Left or right ? Different faces, same scam. FREEDOM is the only way out**
Objective Thinking web site - http://www.angelfire.com/pq/fratre/
Twitted by 29 alt.atheism kooks and counting.
The Misanthropic Bitch web site - http://bitch.shutdown.com/
hrgr...@my-deja.com
co...@pe.net wrote:
> Dear All
>
> There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your
beliefs
> be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
1. I take it as a working assumption that an external world exists (it
is boring to debate figments of my imaginations :-)).
2. I take it as a working assumption that the external world is
partially knowable, although I am willing to argue that else we would
not be here on Usenet *).
3. I take it as a default assumption that supernatural *personal*
beings do not exist or can be disregarded in talking about the external
world, making decisions etc.
If someone wants to call the universe God, it's OK with me, this is
just a question of semantics.
3. is not a consequence of 2., but makes 2. really work.
So far I plead guilty to the charge of pragmatism.
However I am at loss what you mean by "metaphysically true". This
concept to me seems to require that we can somehow lift ourselves to a
meta-universe in which I might check, f.i,. whether I am a brain in a
vat or not - by looking downward into our universe, as it were.
(Which would still leave the question if in this meta-universe I am not
actually a meta-brain in a meta-vat. To check *that* requires a meta-
meta-universe etc.).
"Metaphysical truth" seems to me akin to the existence of Sagan's
Dragon in a garage.
> Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> think I have misconstrued your view? I am not hiding anything up my
> sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
OK. Let's see....
HRG.
> Keith
>
*) Obviously the acme of human progress. From the primeval soup to
Usenet ....
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
pan
>Dear All
>
>There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
>you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
>be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
>beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
>axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
>practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
I'm not sure what 'beliefs' (specifically) you are referring to with
the term "axiomatic beliefs".
Are you including here: the view of the world we form through our five
senses?
Also: what is your definition of 'metaphysically *true*'
>
>Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
>think I have misconstrued your view? I am not hiding anything up my
>sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
>and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
>nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
>not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
>
>Keith
Keith,
I'm adding alt.agnosticism to the cross-post.
Some of the posters you are referring to as 'pragmatist',
I believe, post from that ng. (e.g.) This ng was cross-posted
to in the "Solipsism (was Burden of proof)" thread.
pan
Euri
"Keith Johnson" <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
news:388B2802...@pe.net...
> Dear All
>
> There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
okay
> you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> beliefs),
I tend not to believe unless there is evidence. And if there isnt evidence,
and its illogical I say "Probably not"
> you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> axiomatically,
nope, I neither take my beliefs or lack thereof for granted, and neither do
I ever simply believe or not believe because others do or think its
sensible.
> and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
Again, atheists tend not to believe or not believe simply because it seems
practical. We tend to use logic to justify our claims, and we dont believe
when logic says no. Metaphysics be damned.
>
> Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> think I have misconstrued your view?
You have, badly.
> I am not hiding anything up my
> sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
Yes, being practical is always wrong. How dare we think.
> and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
Most claims that theism is a delusion are basically true. Read up on
socio-anthropology.
--
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<><><>
One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making
the darkness conscious
*Carl Jung*
Atheist #1712
ICQ 21982971
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Stage/2482/
Don Kresch
that
>Dear All
>
>There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
>you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
>be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
>beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
>axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
>practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
And then there are those of us who realize that they must be
metaphysically true, as the alternative (such as solipsism) makes no sense.
How can you claim anything is incoherent when you have nothing to base
that on, given that coherency presupposes an external reality and necessarily
evidence that it exists, and you decry such evidence?
Good luck, solipsist.
Don
aa #51, Knight of BAAWA, DNRC o-, EAC Decryption squad
Atheist Minister for St. Dogbert.
"No being is so important that he can usurp the rights of another"
Picard to Data/Graves "The Schizoid Man"
Denis Loubet
>
> There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
In my case you are generally correct. Except I don't know what you mean by
"Metaphysically true."
> Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> think I have misconstrued your view?
I'm sure you've mis-construed it. You just haven't displayed where yet.
> I am not hiding anything up my
> sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> and that if it were true
There you go. The first mis-construal. "True" has nothing to do with my
pragmatism. My pragmatism is not concerned with what's true, only with what
works. My pragmatism, my axioms, are based on what has proved to be
consistant during my life, and as a result has provided me with reliable
predictive value.
> the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> nothing but delusion
Theism is unnecessary to my pragmatism. It provides no consistancy and no
predictive value. As far as I am concerned, it is delusion.
> are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
Good luck.
Denis Loubet
dlo...@io.com
http:www.io.com/~dloubet
ju...@pconline.com.spambait
: sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
: and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
: nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
: not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
Heh. An interesting point (if religion is usefull then it doesn't
matter if it's true or not to a pragmatist) but pragmatism and the
intellectual ideal of objective Truth are not inherently in
conflict. Rather, the objectivist camp pursues a particular flavor of
pragmatism--the idea that determining objective truth is the critical
first step in determing the ideas and actions that are most pragmatically
usefull. :-) You can take your car to a mechanic whenever something
doesn't work, and have faith that the problem will usually be fixed, but
you're better off if you have an objective understanding of what's wrong
with your car first. Simply, seeking objective truth isn't the 'best'
way for some vauge notion of intellectual purity or piety. It is the best
way because it is, so far as we've found, the most pragmatic way. :-)
Senebyte
>There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
>you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
>be supported by evidence
To a pragmatist belief is provisional on what has been previously verified to
pragmatic satisfaction, not some unreachable absolute measure.
>(this would require an infinite number of
>beliefs),
Why should it? There are not an infinite number of things to be
accounted for before reaching a pragmatic axiom.
>you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
>axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
>practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
They are held by default in the absence of coherent counter proposals.
Without a counter proposal that does not immediately trip over its own
implications there is no pragmatic evidence that the axiom can be
questioned in the first instance. Without that evidence it cannot be
pragmatically asserted that belief in the axiom might require support.
(And if it was it wouldn't be an axiom.)
Senebyte
Davidson
>
> Dear All
>
> There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
>
Could you give some examples of beliefs that a reasonably skeptical
atheist would have that are not suppoted by evidence?
Scott #1045
White Raven
co...@pe.net wrote:
> Dear All
>
> There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your
beliefs
> be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
I don't get the bit about an infinite number of beliefs being required.
If we limit our beliefs to evidence, and since our collection of
evidence will always be finite, shouldn't our number of beliefs be
finite? If you chose NOT to require evidence then yes, you may need an
infinite number of beliefs. Futher, I myself have no "axiomotic"
beliefs... I'm not sure I have any beliefs. As I see it, it's only
really counts as a belief if you take action based on it. I can't think
of a single time I've acted on anything other than simple facts.
> Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> think I have misconstrued your view? I am not hiding anything up my
> sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
>
> Keith
>
To me, pragmatism means I base my actions on what is most likely to
result from those actions. I don’t pray (any more) because nothing
results from that action. I use my turn signal while driving because
this act of communication allows most drivers to adjust for my coming
movements. I don’t engage in extreme sports because I find the risk
completely inappropriate to the questionable “thrill” achieved
(besides, I don’t LIKE adrenaline). In a way, all people are
pragmatists. However, there are some who have become convinced that
there is a god and an afterlife and so act in accordance with their
picture of what this god requires of them. Until I see some sign that
such a god exists, I will not act on these notions of afterlife.
--
White Raven... _._ Fact: A state or an event.
\o_o/ Theory: Our explanation of a fact.
V Beliefe: What we wish the facts were.
Keith Johnson
Euri wrote:
>
> "Keith Johnson" <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
> news:388B2802...@pe.net...
> > Dear All
> >
> > There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
>
> okay
>
> > you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> > be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> > beliefs),
>
> I tend not to believe unless there is evidence. And if there isnt evidence,
> and its illogical I say "Probably not"
That is logically impossible. One could technically question the
validity of any piece of evidence for a claim; you accept the evidence
because you BELIEVE it is valid and that it supports the original claim.
But any EVIDENCE you have to support your belief in that first piece of
evidence would need evidence to support it (if you are right that you do
not believe things without evidence). Since your brain cannot
contemplate an infinite amount of evidence, there must be at least one
piece of evidence that is unsupported by evidence or argument.
>
> > you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> > axiomatically,
>
> nope, I neither take my beliefs or lack thereof for granted, and neither do
> I ever simply believe or not believe because others do or think its
> sensible.
Then you FAIL to recognize that some of your beliefs are accepted
axiomatically; either way they ARE accepted axiomatically.
I am beginning to think you aren't a pragmatist.
>
> > and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> > practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> Again, atheists tend not to believe or not believe simply because it seems
> practical. We tend to use logic to justify our claims, and we dont believe
> when logic says no. Metaphysics be damned.
Logic says nothing one way or the other about the existence of God;
depending on which premises you accept, logic demonstrates God's
existence and his non existence.
> >
> > Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> > think I have misconstrued your view?
>
> You have, badly.
Sorry.
>
> > I am not hiding anything up my
> > sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
>
> Yes, being practical is always wrong. How dare we think.
I never claimed that being practical was incoherent; I said the
philosophy of pragmatism is incoherent.
>
> > and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> > nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> > not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
>
> Most claims that theism is a delusion are basically true. Read up on
> socio-anthropology.
You have committed the fallacy of appeal to authority.
Keith
red foster
>
>There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
>be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
>axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
>practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
>sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
>nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
>not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
I think I might be one of the people you are thinking of. Some caveats,
Keith, before you begin:
1. Each of us that you are thinking of is different from the others.
2. Whatever it is that you have in mind as a test of "coherence"; some (or
all?) of us acknowledge that our philosophies might not meet some test of
"coherence" ! In fact it might be a hallmark of such philosophies that they
don't care about this -- but we have to see this test for coherence to
decide this.
3. There is something contradictory in your statement "you recognize that
some of your beliefs are held axiomatically" since if something is held
axiomatically it is not a belief as I think you mean that word. I'd just say
that we recognize that when we justify our beliefs, we do so using
principles of thought that cannot logically be used to justify themselves.
Oh, and we admit that we have not put every one of our beliefs through this
justification process. Inconsistent? Maybe, but life is too short and some
beliefs too trivial to bother with.
4. Isn't admonishing a pragmatist to be consistent, by definition, kind of
silly?
Do you agree that theism is fundamentally different from what you describe
as pragmatism in the following sense? Its believers assert a "realist"
philosophy, i.e., they assert not just that they can operate satisfactorily
"as if" their god exists, they assert that their god *really exists*. So by
pointing out some incoherence in pragmatism, you will not put pragmatism and
theism on the same footing, thus there can still remain criticizable
differences.
Those of us who agree with Wittgenstein's observation that at the core of
every well-founded belief there is a belief that is unfounded will see our
philosophy and theism to be on the same footing but can still come to the
conclusion that in theory, some beliefs are more poorly founded than others.
But hey, it doesn't really matter. Go ahead and be a theist. Like all major
social instiutions, theism has obvious social value that can outweigh its
pitfalls if properly managed. Just leave us alone. If you want to argue with
us, that's what you'll get.
red foster
show up. I'll just say here, go for it and when you are done, if ever, we
can explore how theism and "pragmatism" as you are calling it differ
fundamentally in the mind of the theist and the mind of what you call
"pragmatists" (those who say that at the core of all swell founded beliefs
is a belief that is unfounded -- as Wittgenstein put it. This difference
makes it irrelevant to both sides whether pragmitism is epistemically no
more well founded tham theism.
red foster.
Keith Johnson wrote in message <388B2802...@pe.net>...
>Dear All
>
>There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
>you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
>be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
>beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
>axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
>practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
>Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
>think I have misconstrued your view? I am not hiding anything up my
>sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
>and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
>nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
>not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
>
>Keith
Keith Johnson
White Raven wrote:
>
> In article <388B2802...@pe.net>,
> co...@pe.net wrote:
> > Dear All
> >
> > There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> > you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your
> beliefs
> > be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> > beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> > axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> > practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> I don't get the bit about an infinite number of beliefs being required.
> If we limit our beliefs to evidence, and since our collection of
> evidence will always be finite, shouldn't our number of beliefs be
> finite? If you chose NOT to require evidence then yes, you may need an
> infinite number of beliefs. Futher, I myself have no "axiomotic"
> beliefs... I'm not sure I have any beliefs. As I see it, it's only
> really counts as a belief if you take action based on it. I can't think
> of a single time I've acted on anything other than simple facts.
Any piece of evidence is a truth claim, and you either believe the claim
is in fact true without evidence or you have OTHER evidence to support
the truth of the first piece of evidence. THAT piece of evidence is a
truth claim and the same choices which apply to the first piece of
evidence. Eventually you end with a claimed piece of evidence whose
truth you accept on the basis of nothing but your sense that it is true.
You believe those simple facts are in fact true, even though you have no
evidence they are true. That was my point.
>
> > Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> > think I have misconstrued your view? I am not hiding anything up my
> > sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> > and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> > nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> > not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
> >
> > Keith
> >
>
> To me, pragmatism means I base my actions on what is most likely to
> result from those actions. I don’t pray (any more) because nothing
> results from that action. I use my turn signal while driving because
> this act of communication allows most drivers to adjust for my coming
> movements. I don’t engage in extreme sports because I find the risk
> completely inappropriate to the questionable “thrill” achieved
> (besides, I don’t LIKE adrenaline). In a way, all people are
> pragmatists. However, there are some who have become convinced that
> there is a god and an afterlife and so act in accordance with their
> picture of what this god requires of them. Until I see some sign that
> such a god exists, I will not act on these notions of afterlife.
I would claim you have faith in your evidentiary gathering faculties'
ability to determine what is "most likely to result" from your actions.
You don't have faith in God. I would not expect you to begin to believe
in God based on MY experience.
I appreciate your civil answer to my question. Thanks
your pal
keith
red foster
your essay supporting yourmain point which seems to me to be that if
philosophical pragmatists criticize theismas being flawed in certain
respects, it is like the pot calling the kettle black. Show how it is like
that.
I suggest you start a new thread with a slightly different title. Perhaps
"Pragmatisn and theism - how they are alike" or something like that.
Red Foster
Keith Johnson wrote in message <388BD529...@pe.net>...
>
>
>Euri wrote:
>>
>> "Keith Johnson" <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
>> news:388B2802...@pe.net...
>> > Dear All
>> >
>> > There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
>>
>> okay
>>
>> > you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
>> > be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
>> > beliefs),
>>
>> I tend not to believe unless there is evidence. And if there isnt
evidence,
>> and its illogical I say "Probably not"
>
>That is logically impossible. One could technically question the
>validity of any piece of evidence for a claim; you accept the evidence
>because you BELIEVE it is valid and that it supports the original claim.
>But any EVIDENCE you have to support your belief in that first piece of
>evidence would need evidence to support it (if you are right that you do
>not believe things without evidence). Since your brain cannot
>contemplate an infinite amount of evidence, there must be at least one
>piece of evidence that is unsupported by evidence or argument.
>>
>> > you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
>> > axiomatically,
>>
>> nope, I neither take my beliefs or lack thereof for granted, and neither
do
>> I ever simply believe or not believe because others do or think its
>> sensible.
>
>Then you FAIL to recognize that some of your beliefs are accepted
>axiomatically; either way they ARE accepted axiomatically.
>
>I am beginning to think you aren't a pragmatist.
>>
>> > and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
>> > practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>>
>> Again, atheists tend not to believe or not believe simply because it
seems
>> practical. We tend to use logic to justify our claims, and we dont
believe
>> when logic says no. Metaphysics be damned.
>
>Logic says nothing one way or the other about the existence of God;
>depending on which premises you accept, logic demonstrates God's
>existence and his non existence.
>> >
>> > Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
>> > think I have misconstrued your view?
>>
>> You have, badly.
>
>Sorry.
>>
>> > I am not hiding anything up my
>> > sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
>>
>> Yes, being practical is always wrong. How dare we think.
>
>I never claimed that being practical was incoherent; I said the
>philosophy of pragmatism is incoherent.
>>
>> > and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
>> > nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
>> > not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
>>
Keith Johnson
pan wrote:
>
> On Sun, 23 Jan 2000 16:12:07 GMT, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>
> >Dear All
> >
> >There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> >you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> >be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> >beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> >axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> >practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> I'm not sure what 'beliefs' (specifically) you are referring to with
> the term "axiomatic beliefs".
> Are you including here: the view of the world we form through our five
> senses?
Included among the beliefs you hold axiomatically are that your
cognitive experience (sensory perception, memory, logical thinking etc.)
yield information about the external world.
>
> Also: what is your definition of 'metaphysically *true*'
You know what true means; the modifier "metaphysically" is intended to
differentiate between the pragmatic view that what is "true" is what
"works". I think that truth is an undeniable, a primitive concept as it
were.
your friend
Keith
Jack Thornton
Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> writes:
>You know what true means; the modifier "metaphysically" is intended to
>differentiate between the pragmatic view that what is "true" is what
>"works". I think that truth is an undeniable, a primitive concept as it
>were.
>your friend
>Keith
Metaphysical is just another word for mysticism; so a metaphysical truth is
an oxymoron. To believe something exists when it can't be measured assumes
that, some day, we'll build a device sensitive enough to measure it.
Jack Thornton, a.a. # 1499
Night Editor
EAC News Service
BAAWA; EAC Decryption Squad #49; EAC Seti Search Team #10
(The unicorn you must eliminate is not Her Pinkness!)
Keith Johnson
hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> In article <388B2802...@pe.net>,
> co...@pe.net wrote:
> > Dear All
> >
> > There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> > you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your
> beliefs
> > be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> > beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> > axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> > practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> 1. I take it as a working assumption that an external world exists (it
> is boring to debate figments of my imaginations :-)).
> 2. I take it as a working assumption that the external world is
> partially knowable, although I am willing to argue that else we would
> not be here on Usenet *).
> 3. I take it as a default assumption that supernatural *personal*
> beings do not exist or can be disregarded in talking about the external
> world, making decisions etc.
> If someone wants to call the universe God, it's OK with me, this is
> just a question of semantics.
>
> 3. is not a consequence of 2., but makes 2. really work.
>
> So far I plead guilty to the charge of pragmatism.
Since you are listing your axioms, I don't have much ARGUMENT about any
of them. I agree with (1) and (2) but disagree with (3).
Also, I would not call the universe God.
> However I am at loss what you mean by "metaphysically true". This
> concept to me seems to require that we can somehow lift ourselves to a
> meta-universe in which I might check, f.i,. whether I am a brain in a
> vat or not - by looking downward into our universe, as it were.
I use the modifier "metaphysically" true to contrast it with pragmatic
truth, which holds that an claim is true if it "works". It seems to me
that the notion of truth cannot be so flexible as to allow for two
diametrically opposed claims to be true if they happen to both work. For
example, the realism vs. brain in a vat debate: both ideas work in that
they are both consistent with our experience, both of them are
untestible, but they cannot plausibly be thought to be both true; at
least one of them is false.
Actually, it is my opinion that "truth" is a primitive concept which
cannot be defined; you either know what it is or you don't. And we know
that truth exists even if we don't know what claims are true and what
are false.
>
> (Which would still leave the question if in this meta-universe I am not
> actually a meta-brain in a meta-vat. To check *that* requires a meta-
> meta-universe etc.).
>
> "Metaphysical truth" seems to me akin to the existence of Sagan's
> Dragon in a garage.
And "metaphysical" truth seems to me to be an irresistible concept; we
surely know what it means to say "X is the way things are" whether or
not we can ever determine what X actually is.
Keith
Keith Johnson
Denis Loubet wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
> news:388B2802...@pe.net...
> > Dear All
> >
> > There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> > you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> > be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> > beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> > axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> > practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> In my case you are generally correct. Except I don't know what you mean by
> "Metaphysically true."
It is opposed to "pragmatic" truth which holds that an idea is true if
it "works". I would claim that truth is an undefinable concept; we
either know what it means or we don't.
>
> > Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> > think I have misconstrued your view?
>
> I'm sure you've mis-construed it. You just haven't displayed where yet.
>
> > I am not hiding anything up my
> > sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> > and that if it were true
>
> There you go. The first mis-construal. "True" has nothing to do with my
> pragmatism. My pragmatism is not concerned with what's true, only with what
> works. My pragmatism, my axioms, are based on what has proved to be
> consistant during my life, and as a result has provided me with reliable
> predictive value.
But you have to be concerned with truth to determine which beliefs yo
can pragmatically hold. If when you say "X is true" you mean "X works
(however you define a claim as working) you believe it is TRUE that X
works. That is the problem with defining truth pragmatically: the actual
notion of truth is always lurking even in the so-called pragmatic
definition.
>
> > the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> > nothing but delusion
>
> Theism is unnecessary to my pragmatism. It provides no consistancy and no
> predictive value. As far as I am concerned, it is delusion.
If truth is defined pragmatically, then how do you define illusion. If
you adhered to a particular religion, it what way would your theism not
be consistent, and why do you consider PREDICTIVE value to be the sole
measure of cognitive utility?
>
> > are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> > not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
>
> Good luck.
Thanks.
Keith
Keith Johnson
Senebyte wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388B2802...@pe.net>...
> >There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> >you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> >be supported by evidence
>
> To a pragmatist belief is provisional on what has been previously verified to
> pragmatic satisfaction, not some unreachable absolute measure.
Your pragmatism would be a little less that pure, I would say. You are
not DEFINING truth as "what works"; you recognize that absolute truth
exists but realize that our ability to find it is somewhat limited.
>
> >(this would require an infinite number of
> >beliefs),
>
> Why should it? There are not an infinite number of things to be
> accounted for before reaching a pragmatic axiom.
I am sorry of I was not clear. I was saying that supporting all your
beliefs with evidence requires an infinite number of beliefs, which is
why each of us eventually reaches a belief we hold axiomatically.
>
> >you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> >axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> >practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> They are held by default in the absence of coherent counter proposals.
> Without a counter proposal that does not immediately trip over its own
> implications there is no pragmatic evidence that the axiom can be
> questioned in the first instance. Without that evidence it cannot be
> pragmatically asserted that belief in the axiom might require support.
> (And if it was it wouldn't be an axiom.)
I am not sure what you mean when you talk about the absence of "a
counter proposal that does not immediately trip over its own
implications...". That SEEMS to say that IF you had such a self tripping
counter proposal you COULDN'T accept your axioms by default.
I am sure that's not what you meant to say. But for example: in the
solipsism/objective realism debate, there is no way to test to see which
view is right so you accept realism as an axiom. This is not a case
where there is no coherent counter proposal: solipsism is just as
coherent as objective realism. There is evidence that you can question
the axiom of realism: I just DID question it (I believe in realism, but
I can ask the question).
Keith
>
> Senebyte
Keith Johnson
Davidson wrote:
>
(snip)
>
> Could you give some examples of beliefs that a reasonably skeptical
> atheist would have that are not suppoted by evidence?
You believe that reason is a valid way to extend your knowledge of the
truth, for one. You also believe your memory provides knowledge about
actual past experiences and is not just (for example) programmed into
you. You believe that the world existed more than 5 seconds in the past.
keith
Keith Johnson
red foster wrote:
>
> Keith, you are responding to individual posts instead of getting on whith
> your essay supporting yourmain point which seems to me to be that if
> philosophical pragmatists criticize theismas being flawed in certain
> respects, it is like the pot calling the kettle black. Show how it is like
> that.
>
> I suggest you start a new thread with a slightly different title. Perhaps
> "Pragmatisn and theism - how they are alike" or something like that.
I considered writing such an essay and I realized that the most probable
response would be for self proclaimed pragmatists to say I have
misstated their position. I thought it would make more sense to have
pragmatists tell me their view and I could react to there comments. I
was upfront about my own position (that I expected to argue for) so that
no one would feel like I was setting up an ambush.
I was trying to be sensitive :-)
your pal
Keith
>
> Red Foster
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388BD529...@pe.net>...
> >
> >
> >Euri wrote:
> >>
> >> "Keith Johnson" <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
> >> news:388B2802...@pe.net...
> >> > Dear All
> >> >
> >> > There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> >>
> >> okay
> >>
> >> > you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> >> > be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> >> > beliefs),
> >>
> >> I tend not to believe unless there is evidence. And if there isnt
> evidence,
> >> and its illogical I say "Probably not"
> >
> >That is logically impossible. One could technically question the
> >validity of any piece of evidence for a claim; you accept the evidence
> >because you BELIEVE it is valid and that it supports the original claim.
> >But any EVIDENCE you have to support your belief in that first piece of
> >evidence would need evidence to support it (if you are right that you do
> >not believe things without evidence). Since your brain cannot
> >contemplate an infinite amount of evidence, there must be at least one
> >piece of evidence that is unsupported by evidence or argument.
> >>
> >> > you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> >> > axiomatically,
> >>
> >> nope, I neither take my beliefs or lack thereof for granted, and neither
> do
> >> I ever simply believe or not believe because others do or think its
> >> sensible.
> >
> >Then you FAIL to recognize that some of your beliefs are accepted
> >axiomatically; either way they ARE accepted axiomatically.
> >
> >I am beginning to think you aren't a pragmatist.
> >>
> >> > and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> >> > practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
> >>
> >> Again, atheists tend not to believe or not believe simply because it
> seems
> >> practical. We tend to use logic to justify our claims, and we dont
> believe
> >> when logic says no. Metaphysics be damned.
> >
> >Logic says nothing one way or the other about the existence of God;
> >depending on which premises you accept, logic demonstrates God's
> >existence and his non existence.
> >> >
> >> > Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> >> > think I have misconstrued your view?
> >>
> >> You have, badly.
> >
> >Sorry.
> >>
> >> > I am not hiding anything up my
> >> > sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> >>
> >> Yes, being practical is always wrong. How dare we think.
> >
> >I never claimed that being practical was incoherent; I said the
> >philosophy of pragmatism is incoherent.
> >>
> >> > and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> >> > nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> >> > not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
> >>
Keith Johnson
Jack Thornton wrote:
>
> In article <388C573C...@pe.net>
> Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> writes:
>
> >You know what true means; the modifier "metaphysically" is intended to
> >differentiate between the pragmatic view that what is "true" is what
> >"works". I think that truth is an undeniable, a primitive concept as it
> >were.
>
> >your friend
> >Keith
>
> Metaphysical is just another word for mysticism; so a metaphysical truth is
> an oxymoron. To believe something exists when it can't be measured assumes
> that, some day, we'll build a device sensitive enough to measure it.
I don't agree with you at all about the meaning of the word
"metaphysical"; metaphysics has nothing to do with mysticism, anymore
than it has to do with exercise and nutrition.
You yourself believe several claims which cannot be experimentally
verified.
Keith
soope...@my-deja.com
>
> There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
beliefs
> be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
Oh god, its the old tired argument.. if you cant be sure of anything
how can you be sure that god doesnt exist? Shouldnt you really
be going to church just in case?
-Scott
#1733
YOELK
>
> Dear All
>
> There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>
> Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> think I have misconstrued your view? I am not hiding anything up my
> sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
>
In mathematics proposition is either an axiom or is a theorem (with a
proof).
I don't think this can apply to general beliefs or world view in a
mathematical rigor.
This is because beliefs are always subject to criticism (at least so it
should be),
and as a result, to change (at least in principle).
OTOH , mathematical axioms are not subject to change.
There is euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry's, of course, but
those represent two distinct geometry's, so they can co-exist.
(AFAIK, Hilbert has shown that the non euclidean geometry could be
embedded
in the euclidean geometry)
Back to reality. The beliefs that can help us on the long range are
true.
If one believes that a god would protect him from fire, he could
risk himself being burnt. So practically speaking , this sort of belief
is
self damaging.
-----
YOELK
hrgr...@my-deja.com
co...@pe.net wrote:
> > > Dear All
> > >
> > > There are some you who adhere to what is generally called
pragmatism:
> > > you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your
> > beliefs
> > > be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> > > beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> > > axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen
for
> > > practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
> >
If we *by definition* cannot know which one is true, the question loses
all meaning for me. They can *both* be meaningless.
> Actually, it is my opinion that "truth" is a primitive concept which
> cannot be defined; you either know what it is or you don't.
Which truth ? Mathematical truth ? scientific truth ? Christian truth ?
Islamic truth ? ....
To me they are all different concepts. A "truth function", abstractly
speaking, is simply a mapping which associates to *some* grammatically
correct sentences a value "true" and which is closed under logical
implication - i.e. if A1,A2, ... An are "true" and B is a logical
consequence *) of the Ai, then B is "true" as well. Those sentences A
for which not-A is true we call "false". That either A or not-A
is "true" is *not* required (e.g. A = "a god exists" for scientific
truth).
*) logical consequence without using the tertium non datur-rule!
And we know
> that truth exists even if we don't know what claims are true and what
> are false.
But some claims are true[Christian], but false[Islam] - and vice versa.
> > (Which would still leave the question if in this meta-universe I am
not
> > actually a meta-brain in a meta-vat. To check *that* requires a
meta-
> > meta-universe etc.).
> >
> > "Metaphysical truth" seems to me akin to the existence of Sagan's
> > Dragon in a garage.
>
> And "metaphysical" truth seems to me to be an irresistible concept; we
> surely know what it means to say "X is the way things are" whether or
> not we can ever determine what X actually is.
Perhaps you do. I don't - not for all X. F.i. I don't know what it
means to say that Sagan's Invisible Dragon exists.
In addition to "true" (various kinds, see above) or "false" (various
kinds), IMHO there is "meaningless" - and perhaps even "undecidable" as
well.
your friend,
Hans-Richard.
> Keith
Denis Loubet
>
>
> Denis Loubet wrote:
> >
> > Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
> > news:388B2802...@pe.net...
> > >
> > > There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> > > you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your
beliefs
> > > be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
> > > beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> > > axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> > > practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
> >
by
> > "Metaphysically true."
>
> it "works".
That's not how I view pragmatism. Truth has nothing whatsoever to do with
it. It would work equally well if I was living in a total fantasy.
> I would claim that truth is an undefinable concept; we
> either know what it means or we don't.
So you claim that truth is an undefinable concept. That's real helpful.
If we can't define the word, then we cannot agree on what it means. If we
cannot agree on what it means, then let's not use the word.
> > > Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if you
> > > think I have misconstrued your view?
> >
> > I'm sure you've mis-construed it. You just haven't displayed where yet.
> >
> > > I am not hiding anything up my
> > > sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent philosophy
> > > and that if it were true
> >
> > There you go. The first mis-construal. "True" has nothing to do with my
> > pragmatism. My pragmatism is not concerned with what's true, only with
what
> > works. My pragmatism, my axioms, are based on what has proved to be
> > consistant during my life, and as a result has provided me with reliable
> > predictive value.
>
> But you have to be concerned with truth to determine which beliefs yo
> can pragmatically hold.
I cannot be concerned with truth if truth is an undefined concept. I am only
concerned with utility.
> If when you say "X is true" you mean "X works
Except my pragmatism does not make any claim that "X is true." Without a
definition of true, the statement would be meaningless anyway.
> (however you define a claim as working) you believe it is TRUE that X
> works.
I directly and consistantly experience that X works, I do not claim that X
is true because truth does not matter. Besides, you claim that truth is an
undefined concept.
>That is the problem with defining truth pragmatically: the actual
> notion of truth is always lurking even in the so-called pragmatic
> definition.
Since you claim that truth is indefinable, the above is meaningless.
Who says anyone defines truth pragmatically? I don't.
> > > the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> > > nothing but delusion
> >
> > Theism is unnecessary to my pragmatism. It provides no consistancy and
no
> > predictive value. As far as I am concerned, it is delusion.
>
> If truth is defined pragmatically,
Which I don't.
> then how do you define illusion.
As an X that doesn't work, is not consistant, and has no predictive value.
>If
> you adhered to a particular religion, it what way would your theism not
> be consistent,
If the claims of the religion did not actually work. If the claims of the
religion were internally inconsistant. If predictions based on the claims of
the religion did not work.
> and why do you consider PREDICTIVE value to be the sole
> measure of cognitive utility?
I don't. There are 2 measures of cognitive utility that my pragmatism uses.
1. That X works.
2. That X is consistant.
From 1 and 2 we can derive predictive value.
You will note that this has utility for a solipsist as well as anyone else.
Truth, whatever that means, is not an issue.
By the way, stop using the word "truth" unless you can define it.
> > > are pragmatically meaningless charges and should
> > > not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
> >
> > Good luck.
>
> Thanks.
Senebyte
>Senebyte wrote:
>>
>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388B2802...@pe.net>...
>> >There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
>> >you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
>> >be supported by evidence
>>
>> pragmatic satisfaction, not some unreachable absolute measure.
>
>Your pragmatism would be a little less that pure, I would say.
I have not mentioned truth or intentionally made implications about it. I made
comment on pragmatic belief which may or may not be associated with Truth.
>You are
>not DEFINING truth as "what works";
But to speak on the subject: the pragmatist would be happy with that definition.
>you recognize that absolute truth
>exists but realize that our ability to find it is somewhat limited.
I have made no such recognition. "not some unreachable absolute measure"
eliminates a class of measures regardless of whether or not there are any
valid entities within that class.
>> >(this would require an infinite number of
>> >beliefs),
>>
>> Why should it? There are not an infinite number of things to be
>> accounted for before reaching a pragmatic axiom.
>
>I am sorry of I was not clear. I was saying that supporting all your
>beliefs with evidence requires an infinite number of beliefs, which is
>why each of us eventually reaches a belief we hold axiomatically.
That was clear but this does not answer my question and my objection,
which rephrased is: the cut-off imposed by a pragmatic approach prevents
infinite logical regression and the debate of infinitesimal niggles.
>> >you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
>> >axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
>> >practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
>>
>> They are held by default in the absence of coherent counter proposals.
>> Without a counter proposal that does not immediately trip over its own
>> implications there is no pragmatic evidence that the axiom can be
>> questioned in the first instance. Without that evidence it cannot be
>> pragmatically asserted that belief in the axiom might require support.
>> (And if it was it wouldn't be an axiom.)
>
>I am not sure what you mean when you talk about the absence of "a
>counter proposal that does not immediately trip over its own
>implications...". That SEEMS to say that IF you had such a self tripping
>counter proposal you COULDN'T accept your axioms by default.
No, quite the reverse due to the word "not" which follows the word "does".
>I am sure that's not what you meant to say. But for example: in the
>solipsism/objective realism debate, there is no way to test to see which
>view is right so you accept realism as an axiom. This is not a case
>where there is no coherent counter proposal: solipsism is just as
>coherent as objective realism. There is evidence that you can question
>the axiom of realism: I just DID question it (I believe in realism, but
>I can ask the question).
Untestable solipsism only offers a counter proposal to a seeker of Truth not
to a pragmatist who judges it by what it can do for the usefulness of their
conceptual model of the world, finds it helps them not a whit, shoves it in the
drawer marked "Unempirical navel gazing" and proceeds with realism alone
for the reason of empirical efficiency. To the ideal pragmatist coherent logic
and practicality are the same, so an unpractical thought such as solipsism
is not logical and thus cannot be a logically coherent counter to realism
which must then be an axiom.
Senebyte
Keith Johnson
Senebyte wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388C6040...@pe.net>...
> >Senebyte wrote:
> >>
> >> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388B2802...@pe.net>...
> >> >There are some you who adhere to what is generally called pragmatism:
> >> >you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your beliefs
> >> >be supported by evidence
> >>
> >> To a pragmatist belief is provisional on what has been previously verified to
> >> pragmatic satisfaction, not some unreachable absolute measure.
> >
> >Your pragmatism would be a little less that pure, I would say.
>
> I have not mentioned truth or intentionally made implications about it. I made
> comment on pragmatic belief which may or may not be associated with Truth.
I assumed that a verified belief is one which was shown to be true; it
seems implicit in the word "verified".
>
> >You are
> >not DEFINING truth as "what works";
>
> But to speak on the subject: the pragmatist would be happy with that definition.
>
> >you recognize that absolute truth
> >exists but realize that our ability to find it is somewhat limited.
>
> I have made no such recognition. "not some unreachable absolute measure"
> eliminates a class of measures regardless of whether or not there are any
> valid entities within that class.
It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
asymptotically.
>
> >> >(this would require an infinite number of
> >> >beliefs),
> >>
> >> Why should it? There are not an infinite number of things to be
> >> accounted for before reaching a pragmatic axiom.
> >
> >I am sorry of I was not clear. I was saying that supporting all your
> >beliefs with evidence requires an infinite number of beliefs, which is
> >why each of us eventually reaches a belief we hold axiomatically.
>
> That was clear but this does not answer my question and my objection,
> which rephrased is: the cut-off imposed by a pragmatic approach prevents
> infinite logical regression and the debate of infinitesimal niggles.
I know, in fact that is my point. The question is: what do you believe
about the cut off point? The pragmatist claims not to believe his axioms
are true, he claims only to accept them axiomatically. At least that is
my impression, which is why I asked for pragmatists to clarify things.
Hans and Red have done so, and I am pondering their posts.
>
> >> >you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
> >> >axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen for
> >> >practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
> >>
> >> They are held by default in the absence of coherent counter proposals.
> >> Without a counter proposal that does not immediately trip over its own
> >> implications there is no pragmatic evidence that the axiom can be
> >> questioned in the first instance. Without that evidence it cannot be
> >> pragmatically asserted that belief in the axiom might require support.
> >> (And if it was it wouldn't be an axiom.)
> >
> >I am not sure what you mean when you talk about the absence of "a
> >counter proposal that does not immediately trip over its own
> >implications...". That SEEMS to say that IF you had such a self tripping
> >counter proposal you COULDN'T accept your axioms by default.
>
> No, quite the reverse due to the word "not" which follows the word "does".
My apologies; your sentence had one more zig than my puny brain could
digest.
>
> >I am sure that's not what you meant to say. But for example: in the
> >solipsism/objective realism debate, there is no way to test to see which
> >view is right so you accept realism as an axiom. This is not a case
> >where there is no coherent counter proposal: solipsism is just as
> >coherent as objective realism. There is evidence that you can question
> >the axiom of realism: I just DID question it (I believe in realism, but
> >I can ask the question).
>
> Untestable solipsism only offers a counter proposal to a seeker of Truth not
> to a pragmatist who judges it by what it can do for the usefulness of their
> conceptual model of the world, finds it helps them not a whit, shoves it in the
> drawer marked "Unempirical navel gazing" and proceeds with realism alone
> for the reason of empirical efficiency.
In what way is realism more pragmatically useful than solipsism? My
question is not rhetorical; I am interested in the answer.
your friend
keith
Keith Johnson
soope...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> In article <388B2802...@pe.net>,
> co...@pe.net wrote:
> > Dear All
> >
(snip)
> Oh god, its the old tired argument.. if you cant be sure of anything
> how can you be sure that god doesnt exist? Shouldnt you really
> be going to church just in case?
You are mistaken about my argument actually. I do not claim we cannot
know the truth, and I am not suggesting that anyone go to church "just
in case".
Keith
>
> -Scott
> #1733
Davidson
All of these things have worked consistently, so these "beliefs" are
backed by (but not 100% proven by) evidence.
I had hoped you had something more interesting. I suffered through
a Theory of Knowledge class with extreme skeptics, that cured
me of ever wanting to discuss it ever again.
Scott #1045
hrgr...@my-deja.com
In article <388D3EB2...@pe.net>,
co...@pe.net wrote:
>
>
> Senebyte wrote:
<snip>
> > I have made no such recognition. "not some unreachable absolute
measure"
> > eliminates a class of measures regardless of whether or not there
are any
> > valid entities within that class.
>
> It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
> existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
> asymptotically.
Not necessarily, IMHO.
Take the analogy of a hyperbola branch in the Euclidean plane. It looks
as it asymptotically approaches "something", but this "something"
doesn't exist in the plane.
Now we can add ideal points at infinity to the plane, like in
projective drawings. Then the hyperbola will approach just one of these
ideal points; but they are creations of our mind - and not "real"
points of the plane.
That's how it might be with absolute truth: added by *us* as an ideal
point at infinity (so that we can point at "something" which we hope to
approach), but not existing in the external world. Something like
absolute musical beauty .....
Regards,
Hans-Richard Grümm
<snip>
Keith Johnson
red foster wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388B2802...@pe.net>...
> >Dear All
(snip)
I agree that most theists believe God really exists, but what I am
unsure is what pragmatists believe, not just about God but about
anything. Denis Loubet has said (at least I think he way saying) that
pragmatism has nothing to do with truth, that what matters is not
whether an idea is true but whether it "works". Does that mean that
pragmatists KNOW what truth means but claim their ideas are not true, or
does it mean they define 'truth' as "what works"? How do pragmatists
define "working"? Do they think their claim that a particular
pragmatically held idea works is true, or do they think that thinking
the idea works also works?
>
> Those of us who agree with Wittgenstein's observation that at the core of
> every well-founded belief there is a belief that is unfounded will see our
> philosophy and theism to be on the same footing but can still come to the
> conclusion that in theory, some beliefs are more poorly founded than others.
But what does it mean to a pragmatist for an idea to be well founded or
poorly founded?
> But hey, it doesn't really matter. Go ahead and be a theist. Like all major
> social instiutions, theism has obvious social value that can outweigh its
> pitfalls if properly managed. Just leave us alone. If you want to argue with
> us, that's what you'll get.
I am not even sure what you mean by "that's what you'll get". I am
really not sure what you pragmatists think at all.
Keith
Keith Johnson
hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> In article <388C5A00...@pe.net>,
> co...@pe.net wrote:
> >
> >
(snip)
> > I use the modifier "metaphysically" true to contrast it with pragmatic
> > truth, which holds that an claim is true if it "works". It seems to
> me
> > that the notion of truth cannot be so flexible as to allow for two
> > diametrically opposed claims to be true if they happen to both work.
> For
> > example, the realism vs. brain in a vat debate: both ideas work in
> that
> > they are both consistent with our experience, both of them are
> > untestible, but they cannot plausibly be thought to be both true; at
> > least one of them is false.
>
> If we *by definition* cannot know which one is true, the question loses
> all meaning for me. They can *both* be meaningless.
You seem to be saying that if we cannot SHOW a claim to be true, we
cannot KNOW (in our bones, as it were) that a claim is true. And you
seems to be saying that the meaning of a claim is tied up into how one
can demonstrate the claim is true. This doesn't seem true to me. It
seems to me that you know what the difference is between an object that
continues to exist even when you are not looking at it and an object
which only exists while you are perceiving it, even though you could
never show the continued existence of the object. The question of
objective reality might seem pointless to you, but it certainly has a
meaning.
>
> > Actually, it is my opinion that "truth" is a primitive concept which
> > cannot be defined; you either know what it is or you don't.
>
> Which truth ? Mathematical truth ? scientific truth ? Christian truth ?
> Islamic truth ? ....
>
> To me they are all different concepts. A "truth function", abstractly
> speaking, is simply a mapping which associates to *some* grammatically
> correct sentences a value "true" and which is closed under logical
> implication - i.e. if A1,A2, ... An are "true" and B is a logical
> consequence *) of the Ai, then B is "true" as well. Those sentences A
> for which not-A is true we call "false". That either A or not-A
> is "true" is *not* required (e.g. A = "a god exists" for scientific
> truth).
It seems to me that truth is truth, that we know what truth is (although
we do not always no what happens to BE true) and that attempting to
define things (even attempting to define "truth") presupposes we already
know what truth is.
>
> *) logical consequence without using the tertium non datur-rule!
>
> And we know
> > that truth exists even if we don't know what claims are true and what
> > are false.
>
> But some claims are true[Christian], but false[Islam] - and vice versa.
I disagree wholeheartedly with that statement. I would say there is
conflict between what Christians say is true and what Muslims say is
true (we do have some overlapping beliefs) and that in the case of a
conflict at least ONE of us is wrong.
>
(snip)
> > And "metaphysical" truth seems to me to be an irresistible concept; we
> > surely know what it means to say "X is the way things are" whether or
> > not we can ever determine what X actually is.
>
> Perhaps you do. I don't - not for all X. F.i. I don't know what it
> means to say that Sagan's Invisible Dragon exists.
>
> In addition to "true" (various kinds, see above) or "false" (various
> kinds), IMHO there is "meaningless" - and perhaps even "undecidable" as
> well.
I would agree there are meaningless combinations of words: "A man smells
largely under the present" has the grammatical form of a truth claim,
but it is not a real statement and it consequently isn't true OR false.
I also agree there might be actual statements whose truth cannot be
rationally determined; I would call those "undecidable". But I would say
that those undecidable statements ARE either true or false.
Keith
>
> your friend,
> Hans-Richard.
>
> > Keith
Keith Johnson
Denis Loubet wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
> news:388C5D57...@pe.net...
(snip)
> > > In my case you are generally correct. Except I don't know what you mean
> by
> > > "Metaphysically true."
> >
> > It is opposed to "pragmatic" truth which holds that an idea is true if
> > it "works".
>
> That's not how I view pragmatism. Truth has nothing whatsoever to do with
> it. It would work equally well if I was living in a total fantasy.
Then it seems to me that you have a notion of truth (otherwise you
couldn't say that pragmatism isn't related to truth), but you claim that
the propositions you accept do not need to be true to be useful. It may
even be that you don't believe the propositions you accept are actually
true. Have I characterized your view accurately?
>
> > I would claim that truth is an undefinable concept; we
> > either know what it means or we don't.
>
> So you claim that truth is an undefinable concept. That's real helpful.
One cannot define every word you use, that would require circular
definitions or an infinite number of words. There must be some words
which are undefined in your vocabulary; I think truth is one of those
words.
>
> If we can't define the word, then we cannot agree on what it means. If we
> cannot agree on what it means, then let's not use the word.
I disagree; it seems to me that you DO know what truth means, when you
disagree with me it seems you are saying that my claims are not true.
(snip)
> > > There you go. The first mis-construal. "True" has nothing to do with my
> > > pragmatism. My pragmatism is not concerned with what's true, only with
> what
> > > works. My pragmatism, my axioms, are based on what has proved to be
> > > consistant during my life, and as a result has provided me with reliable
> > > predictive value.
> >
> > But you have to be concerned with truth to determine which beliefs yo
> > can pragmatically hold.
>
> I cannot be concerned with truth if truth is an undefined concept. I am only
> concerned with utility.
I don't think that follows; it would only follow if you didn't know what
truth means. That you cannot adequately define truth is not related to
the issue, it seems to me.
>
> > If when you say "X is true" you mean "X works
>
> Except my pragmatism does not make any claim that "X is true." Without a
> definition of true, the statement would be meaningless anyway.
Your pragmatism claims that "X works" is that statement TRUE, or does it
merely work? What does it mean for a claim "X works" to work?
>
> > (however you define a claim as working) you believe it is TRUE that X
> > works.
>
> I directly and consistantly experience that X works, I do not claim that X
> is true because truth does not matter. Besides, you claim that truth is an
> undefined concept.
But I do not claim that we don't know what truth means. And when you say
that you directly experience that X works, is that statement true?
>
> >That is the problem with defining truth pragmatically: the actual
> > notion of truth is always lurking even in the so-called pragmatic
> > definition.
>
> Since you claim that truth is indefinable, the above is meaningless.
>
> Who says anyone defines truth pragmatically? I don't.
That a statement is undefineable does not mean that it HAS no meaning.
Meaning comes before definitions, otherwise no now could define anything
at all since they wouldn't know what the thing meant until they had a
definition for it.
>
> > > > the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> > > > nothing but delusion
> > >
> > > Theism is unnecessary to my pragmatism. It provides no consistancy and
> no
> > > predictive value. As far as I am concerned, it is delusion.
> >
> > If truth is defined pragmatically,
>
> Which I don't.
But do you claim to have a definition of "truth"?
>
> > then how do you define illusion.
>
> As an X that doesn't work, is not consistant, and has no predictive value.
What do you mean by X working?
>
> >If
> > you adhered to a particular religion, it what way would your theism not
> > be consistent,
>
> If the claims of the religion did not actually work. If the claims of the
> religion were internally inconsistant. If predictions based on the claims of
> the religion did not work.
How would the claims of a religion not actually work?
>
> > and why do you consider PREDICTIVE value to be the sole
> > measure of cognitive utility?
>
> I don't. There are 2 measures of cognitive utility that my pragmatism uses.
>
> 1. That X works.
> 2. That X is consistant.
>
> From 1 and 2 we can derive predictive value.
I have already asked what it means for an idea to work; how does working
and consistency entail predictive value, unless making predictions is a
necessary part of working to you.
>
> You will note that this has utility for a solipsist as well as anyone else.
> Truth, whatever that means, is not an issue.
>
> By the way, stop using the word "truth" unless you can define it.
That demand makes no sense. I could make the same demand to you that you
define every word you use before you use it. That can't be done without
an infinite number of words or circular definitions.
Keith
Keith Johnson
I am not an extreme skeptic. The reason you found extreme skepticism
frustrating, I would guess is because you could not refute their claims
but you knew they were just plain wrong.
You claim that the above things I mentioned (which I will call part of
"cognitive experience") have worked consistently and are thus backed by
evidence. But for a fact to constitute evidence for a claim, it has to
be that if the fact had come out differently, the claim would be
falsified. But there is no experience you have which would falsify the
claim that our cognitive experience reflects external reality, thus no
experience can constitute evidence to support the claim that cognitive
experience DOES reflect external reality.
If you don't want to DISCUSS this anymore, I guess you won't respond to
my post. But I do want to emphasize that I am an objective realist, not
a skeptic. My interest in this topic is epistemological, not
ontological.
Keith
>
> Scott #1045
Keith Johnson
hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> Jumping in for just one point ...
>
> In article <388D3EB2...@pe.net>,
> co...@pe.net wrote:
(snip)
> Not necessarily, IMHO.
>
> Take the analogy of a hyperbola branch in the Euclidean plane. It looks
> as it asymptotically approaches "something", but this "something"
> doesn't exist in the plane.
> Now we can add ideal points at infinity to the plane, like in
> projective drawings. Then the hyperbola will approach just one of these
> ideal points; but they are creations of our mind - and not "real"
> points of the plane.
Ever the Platonist, I disagree:-). The points of the asymptotes of a
parabola exists just as much as the parabola itself. Since I cannot
conveniently write the equation of the particular parabola, I will
mention of of its asymptotes: y = x. That line exists and the parabola
never touches it, but as x approaches infinity the parabola approached
the line.
>
> That's how it might be with absolute truth: added by *us* as an ideal
> point at infinity (so that we can point at "something" which we hope to
> approach), but not existing in the external world. Something like
> absolute musical beauty .....
All I can say is that it doesn't seem that way to me. In fact, the
possibility you just mentioned seems to me to be either absolutely false
or absolutely true:-)
your friend
Keith
>
> Regards,
> Hans-Richard Grümm
>
> <snip>
red foster
Keith Johnson wrote in message <388DA7C8...@pe.net>...
....
>
>I agree that most theists believe God really exists, but what I am
>unsure is what pragmatists believe, not just about God but about
>anything. Denis Loubet has said (at least I think he way saying) that
>pragmatism has nothing to do with truth, that what matters is not
>whether an idea is true but whether it "works". Does that mean that
>pragmatists KNOW what truth means but claim their ideas are not true, or
>does it mean they define 'truth' as "what works"? How do pragmatists
>define "working"? Do they think their claim that a particular
>pragmatically held idea works is true, or do they think that thinking
>the idea works also works?
I saw you call another respondant's suggestion that you read up on
sociobiology an *appeal to authority fallacy*. Yet in order to participate
well in this discussion I looked up pragmatism (which I generally understand
pretty well) in my Oxford Companion to Philosophy and found that there are
at least three different flavors. Each of them would have somewhat different
answers to your question. The pragmatism of Charles Sanders Pierce seems
closest to that of amny on the folks on this ng; but mine is closer to that
of John Dewey.
My point is, if you ask questions that cause intelligent respondants like me
to hit the books, but call being asked to do so yourself a fallacy of
argumentation, all you are doing is getting others to do your wqrk for you,
and the answer we give you by our efforts are answers you can fund yourself,
in books that are less biased toward "pragmatism" than many og the
respondants here.
Hit the books, Keith. This is not an appeal to authority.
red foster.
red foster
Keith Johnson wrote in message <388DB595...@pe.net>...
...
>
>You claim that the above things I mentioned (which I will call part of
>"cognitive experience") have worked consistently and are thus backed by
>evidence. But for a fact to constitute evidence for a claim, it has to
>be that if the fact had come out differently, the claim would be
>falsified. But there is no experience you have which would falsify the
>claim that our cognitive experience reflects external reality, thus no
>experience can constitute evidence to support the claim that cognitive
>experience DOES reflect external reality.
You are trying to enforce a principle of thought (falsifiability) that Karl
Popper associated with science, and many if not all scientists would agree
with fir science, but is not typically associated with *pragmatism*. Some
people who are pragmatic may use or agree with the principle in science or
elsewhere (although there are parts of life where it is not a "practical"
rule, as in deciding whether someone's claim that he/she is in pain is well
founded), but your argument on the point has nothing to do with the
"coherence" of pragmatism. It makes you (and those who buy into arguing the
point with you, to be frank) somewhat unlearned. Not stupid, mind you, just
not learned in the subject you think you are discussing.
red foster
Denis Loubet
>
>
> Denis Loubet wrote:
> >
> > Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
> > news:388C5D57...@pe.net...
> (snip)
>
> > > > In my case you are generally correct. Except I don't know what you
mean
> > by
> > > > "Metaphysically true."
> > >
> > > It is opposed to "pragmatic" truth which holds that an idea is true if
> > > it "works".
> >
> > That's not how I view pragmatism. Truth has nothing whatsoever to do
with
> > it. It would work equally well if I was living in a total fantasy.
>
> Then it seems to me that you have a notion of truth (otherwise you
> couldn't say that pragmatism isn't related to truth), but you claim that
> the propositions you accept do not need to be true to be useful. It may
> even be that you don't believe the propositions you accept are actually
> true. Have I characterized your view accurately?
I do have a notion of truth, yes, but it is probably not the same as yours.
Unfortunately, since you can't define yours, we will never know what it is,
and cannot compare it to mine. That means that your above comment is
meaningless to both you and me.
I reserve the word true as a lable for things in the objective external
world, and as a lable for my own subjective state. Pragmatically, I cannot
be certain that I experience the objective external world, or even that one
exists. So the only thing I can be certain is true is my own subjective
state. Am I happy, am I thirsty, etc, and that has nothing to do with the
external world. So anything I state as pragmatically true can only deal with
my internal subjective state.
But since I'm not using your definition of true, since you don't have one, I
shouldn't be using the word true at all. Using it will only lead to
misunderstanding.
> > > would claim that truth is an undefinable concept; we
> > > either know what it means or we don't.
> >
> > So you claim that truth is an undefinable concept. That's real helpful.
>
> One cannot define every word you use, that would require circular
> definitions or an infinite number of words. There must be some words
> which are undefined in your vocabulary; I think truth is one of those
> words.
Then we can't discuss it. If it's undefined, then you might as well use the
word "poiwjf", it means exactly the same thing as "true." Both are
undefined. Actually, using the word "true" is WORSE than using the word
"poiwjf" because "poiwjf" has no common meaning associated with it.
> > If we can't define the word, then we cannot agree on what it means. If
we
> > cannot agree on what it means, then let's not use the word.
>
> I disagree; it seems to me that you DO know what truth means, when you
> disagree with me it seems you are saying that my claims are not true.
> (snip)
**Boggle** Sure, I know what truth means TO ME. But since I don't know what
it means to you, using it is pointless and misleading.
> > > > There you go. The first mis-construal. "True" has nothing to do with
my
> > > > pragmatism. My pragmatism is not concerned with what's true, only
with
> > what
> > > > works. My pragmatism, my axioms, are based on what has proved to be
> > > > consistant during my life, and as a result has provided me with
reliable
> > > > predictive value.
> > >
> > > But you have to be concerned with truth to determine which beliefs yo
> > > can pragmatically hold.
> >
> > I cannot be concerned with truth if truth is an undefined concept. I am
only
> > concerned with utility.
>
> I don't think that follows; it would only follow if you didn't know what
> truth means. That you cannot adequately define truth is not related to
> the issue, it seems to me.
Excuse me? I am not the one who said that truth is an undefined concept. You
are. I HAVE my definition for truth, but you cannot agree with it, so it's
pointless to argue about it.
> > > If when you say "X is true" you mean "X works
> >
> > Except my pragmatism does not make any claim that "X is true." Without a
> > definition of true, the statement would be meaningless anyway.
>
> Your pragmatism claims that "X works" is that statement TRUE, or does it
> merely work? What does it mean for a claim "X works" to work?
Drinking slakes thirst is an example of X works. Is it true in an objective
reality? I don't know. Nor do I care. Is it true according to my subjective
state, it seems to be, but who knows?
> > > (however you define a claim as working) you believe it is TRUE that X
> > > works.
> >
> > I directly and consistantly experience that X works, I do not claim that
X
> > is true because truth does not matter. Besides, you claim that truth is
an
> > undefined concept.
>
> But I do not claim that we don't know what truth means.
But since you cannot define it, I can never know what you mean when you use
it, and you cannot know what I mean when I use it.
> And when you say
> that you directly experience that X works, is that statement true?
Will any answer I give be meaningful if I don't know what you mean by true?
The answer to that question, according to how I use the word true, is no. I
cannot be certain that I directly experience X, it only seems that I do, and
so as far as my pragmatism goes, I might as well have directly experienced
X.
> > >That is the problem with defining truth pragmatically: the actual
> > > notion of truth is always lurking even in the so-called pragmatic
> > > definition.
> >
> > Since you claim that truth is indefinable, the above is meaningless.
> >
> > Who says anyone defines truth pragmatically? I don't.
>
> That a statement is undefineable does not mean that it HAS no meaning.
> Meaning comes before definitions, otherwise no now could define anything
> at all since they wouldn't know what the thing meant until they had a
> definition for it.
That's nice. Until I know your definition of truth, this whole discussion is
pointless.
> > > > > the usual atheistic complaints that theism is
> > > > > nothing but delusion
> > > >
> > > > Theism is unnecessary to my pragmatism. It provides no consistancy
and
> > no
> > > > predictive value. As far as I am concerned, it is delusion.
> > >
> > > If truth is defined pragmatically,
> >
> > Which I don't.
>
> But do you claim to have a definition of "truth"?
Sure.
> > > then how do you define illusion.
> >
> > As an X that doesn't work, is not consistant, and has no predictive
value.
>
> What do you mean by X working?
Drinking slakes thrist.
> > >If
> > > you adhered to a particular religion, it what way would your theism
not
> > > be consistent,
> >
> > If the claims of the religion did not actually work. If the claims of
the
> > religion were internally inconsistant. If predictions based on the
claims of
> > the religion did not work.
>
> How would the claims of a religion not actually work?
Example: If prayer didn't move mountains.
> > > and why do you consider PREDICTIVE value to be the sole
> > > measure of cognitive utility?
> >
> > I don't. There are 2 measures of cognitive utility that my pragmatism
uses.
> >
> > 1. That X works.
> > 2. That X is consistant.
> >
> > From 1 and 2 we can derive predictive value.
>
> I have already asked what it means for an idea to work; how does working
> and consistency entail predictive value, unless making predictions is a
> necessary part of working to you.
Predictions have utility.
1. I drink, my thirst is slaked.
2. Everytime I drink, my thirst is slaked.
If I am thirsty, and wish my thirst to be slaked, what should I do? I
predict, according to 1 and 2, that if I drink, my thirst will be slaked. I
drink, my thirst is slaked.
None of this necessarily has anything to do with an external reality.
> > You will note that this has utility for a solipsist as well as anyone
else.
> > Truth, whatever that means, is not an issue.
> >
> > By the way, stop using the word "truth" unless you can define it.
>
> That demand makes no sense. I could make the same demand to you that you
> define every word you use before you use it. That can't be done without
> an infinite number of words or circular definitions.
If I don't know what you mean by the word truth, then I can't very well
communicate meaningfully with you, can I? You are leaving the word truth
undefined in order to leave it slippery. This way you can semantically
weasel out of any point made by anyone else by responding to a different
definition of true than what the person intended. This willful
misunderstanding is precisely the tactic that makes many of your responses
read like non-sequiters.
Scott Davidson
>
>
>Davidson wrote:
>>
>> Keith Johnson wrote:
>> >
>> > Davidson wrote:
>> > >
>> > (snip)
>> > >
>> > > Could you give some examples of beliefs that a reasonably skeptical
>> > > atheist would have that are not suppoted by evidence?
>> >
>> > You believe that reason is a valid way to extend your knowledge of the
>> > truth, for one. You also believe your memory provides knowledge about
>> > actual past experiences and is not just (for example) programmed into
>> > you. You believe that the world existed more than 5 seconds in the past.
>> >
>> > keith
>>
>> All of these things have worked consistently, so these "beliefs" are
>> backed by (but not 100% proven by) evidence.
>
>
>>
>> I had hoped you had something more interesting. I suffered through
>> a Theory of Knowledge class with extreme skeptics, that cured
>> me of ever wanting to discuss it ever again.
>
>I am not an extreme skeptic. The reason you found extreme skepticism
>frustrating, I would guess is because you could not refute their claims
>but you knew they were just plain wrong.
To the extent that they said that we can not be 100% sure of anything,
they cannot be refuted. However I found a good refutation in terms
of probabilities of things being true, which, in the limit, becomes
statements of truth. This was expounded in J M Keynes first book
(before any on economics.) I found it in the bowels of the MIT
library, and I doubt very much it is in print, though I haven't
checked on amazon.com for it. However, my frustration was not in
the argument, but the behavior of the people giving the argument.
>
>You claim that the above things I mentioned (which I will call part of
>"cognitive experience") have worked consistently and are thus backed by
>evidence. But for a fact to constitute evidence for a claim, it has to
>be that if the fact had come out differently, the claim would be
>falsified. But there is no experience you have which would falsify the
>claim that our cognitive experience reflects external reality, thus no
>experience can constitute evidence to support the claim that cognitive
>experience DOES reflect external reality.
I would think that inexplicable inconsistencies in what we see as external
reality might be evidence (but not proof) for this view. Ed Fredkin had
a theory that reality was a computer simulation, that quanta represent the
time step used in updating the state of the simulation (since all computer
models are digitized, or quantized, and are not purely continuous) and that
miracles represent bugs in the simulation. The reduced instance of miracles
since Biblical times is due to the fact that the program is being cleaned up.
This would be a lot more believable if there was any evidence of a miracle.
It is all non-falsifiable, especially if you constrain our cognitive experience
to be consistent yet not relecting external reality.
>
>If you don't want to DISCUSS this anymore, I guess you won't respond to
>my post. But I do want to emphasize that I am an objective realist, not
>a skeptic. My interest in this topic is epistemological, not
>ontological.
>
Well, I'm glad you're not an extreme skeptic, though your example is one
that I would expect an extreme skeptic to give. The reason I asked
my question is that I feel that there are unsupported beliefs that atheists
might hold - but I can't think of any. I put in "reasonably skeptical" to
eliminate things like belief in ESP and UFOs that can be held by atheists,
but not skeptical ones. I'm still looking, since I consider the belief in an objective
reality supported by, but not proven by, the evidence.
Scott #1045
>Keith
>
>
>>
>> Scott #1045
---
Scott Davidson
Sun Microsystems
scott.d...@eng.sun.com
Senebyte
>Senebyte wrote:
>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388C6040...@pe.net>...
>> >Your pragmatism would be a little less that pure, I would say.
>>
>> I have not mentioned truth or intentionally made implications about it. I made
>> comment on pragmatic belief which may or may not be associated with Truth.
>
>I assumed that a verified belief is one which was shown to be true; it
>seems implicit in the word "verified".
No: in the case of untestable solipsism being True, the impression of an external
reality could be given that is pragmatically verifiable, believable and yet be False.
Think of someone trapped in good VR: how would they deduce the truth of the
real world, a real world that may be afflicted with fundamental uncertainty and lack
an absolute Truth?
>> >you recognize that absolute truth
>> >exists but realize that our ability to find it is somewhat limited.
>>
>> I have made no such recognition. "not some unreachable absolute measure"
>> eliminates a class of measures regardless of whether or not there are any
>> valid entities within that class.
>
>It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
>existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
>asymptotically.
That would be like tending to zero and saying this approaches the root of
minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist and not
be imaginary.
>> That was clear but this does not answer my question and my objection,
>> which rephrased is: the cut-off imposed by a pragmatic approach prevents
>> infinite logical regression and the debate of infinitesimal niggles.
>
>I know, in fact that is my point. The question is: what do you believe
>about the cut off point?
That would be revealed by practical application and the patience of the
individual pragmatist. Time constraints are real factors to all truely pragmatic
thinking.
>The pragmatist claims not to believe his axioms
>are true, he claims only to accept them axiomatically. At least that is
>my impression, which is why I asked for pragmatists to clarify things.
>Hans and Red have done so, and I am pondering their posts.
The pragmatist may not believe them True, as Truth defined by other
philosophers, but can still use them without provision for their failure
(and thus use them in the mode of a truth) due to making acceptance
of them as pragmatically true through the absence of a pragmatically
logical and coherent counter proposition.
>In what way is realism more pragmatically useful than solipsism? My
>question is not rhetorical; I am interested in the answer.
>
>your friend
>keith
Untestable solipsism tacks a useless, time and effort consuming
rider to any description of what is to all appearances external phenomena,
such as "...in addition to behaving like an external entity the widget
happens to be a figment of your extensive unconscious imagination."
The pragmatist rejects this descriptive froth as unempirical waste.
Senebyte
(missed taking up law)
stoney
]>Dear All
]>
]>There are some you who adhere to what is generally called
]>pragmatism: you recognize it is logically impossible that every one
]>of your beliefs be supported by evidence (this would require an
]>infinite number of beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs
]>are held axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are
]>chosen for practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically
]>true.
Beliefs such as? Right now you've got a gilittering generality which
means nothing.
(rest snipped until Keith clarifies his question)
Stoney
stoney
]>In article <388B2802...@pe.net>,
]> co...@pe.net wrote:
]>> Dear All
]>>
]>> There are some you who adhere to what is generally called
pragmatism:
]>> you recognize it is logically impossible that every one of your
]>beliefs
]>> be supported by evidence (this would require an infinite number of
]>> beliefs), you recognize that some of your beliefs are held
]>> axiomatically, and you claim those axiomatic beliefs are chosen
for
]>> practical reasons, not because they are metaphysically true.
]>>
]>> Could you elaborate? Could you correct any of my claims above if
you
]>> think I have misconstrued your view? I am not hiding anything up
my
]>> sleeves; I intend to argue that pragmatism is an incoherent
philosophy
]>> and that if it were true the usual atheistic complaints that
theism is
]>> nothing but delusion are pragmatically meaningless charges and
should
]>> not be advanced by any consistent pragmatist.
]>
]>Oh god, its the old tired argument.. if you cant be sure of anything
]>how can you be sure that god doesnt exist? Shouldnt you really
]>be going to church just in case?
Solipism as usual. :(
]>-Scott
]>#1733
]>
Stoney
Keith Johnson
red foster wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388DB595...@pe.net>...
> ...
> >
> >You claim that the above things I mentioned (which I will call part of
> >"cognitive experience") have worked consistently and are thus backed by
> >evidence. But for a fact to constitute evidence for a claim, it has to
> >be that if the fact had come out differently, the claim would be
> >falsified. But there is no experience you have which would falsify the
> >claim that our cognitive experience reflects external reality, thus no
> >experience can constitute evidence to support the claim that cognitive
> >experience DOES reflect external reality.
>
> You are trying to enforce a principle of thought (falsifiability) that Karl
> Popper associated with science, and many if not all scientists would agree
> with fir science, but is not typically associated with *pragmatism*. Some
> people who are pragmatic may use or agree with the principle in science or
> elsewhere (although there are parts of life where it is not a "practical"
> rule, as in deciding whether someone's claim that he/she is in pain is well
> founded), but your argument on the point has nothing to do with the
> "coherence" of pragmatism. It makes you (and those who buy into arguing the
> point with you, to be frank) somewhat unlearned. Not stupid, mind you, just
> not learned in the subject you think you are discussing.
I may be using the vocabulary of Popper (with the phrase
"falsifiability") but all I am saying is that for a fact to count as
evidence, we must be able to show that the claim it allegedly supports
is more probable GIVEN the fact than given its negation. There is no
such fact which supports the more or less reliability of cognitive
experience.
Obviously my observation doesn't have anything to do with the coherence
of pragmatism (in that sense I have been sidetracked from the original
discussion) but my remark was directed only to the claim that (the more
or less) reliability of our cognitive experience is supported by
evidence.
Keith
>
> red foster
Keith Johnson
Dear Red
Regarding sociobiology: I told some respondent that I knew plenty about
kin selection and the claimed evolution of altruism etc. Sociobiology
came up in a discussion about morality, and I didn't dispute the claim
that evolution could possibly explain the tendency to behave morally; my
argument was that morality is not the same thing as a tendency to behave
in a certain way.
I don't remember the precise context of my "appeal to authority" charge,
but the spin you bring to it in this post doesn't seem right to me.
Regarding pragmatism: I asked you guys to tell me what you mean by
pragmatism because I wanted to discuss your views; the views of Pierce
or Dewey don't interest me that much because I cannot discuss their
views with them. I am not asking any of you to do any homework, all I
asked was what those of you who call yourselves pragmatists believe. I
usually see "pragmatism" invoked as a reason we do not have to verify
our fundamental assumptions; we do not claim they are true (claim the
"pragmatists", we just claim they "work"). It is THAT view I was
wondering about, it is THAT view that I am squeamish about.
Keith
Keith Johnson
Senebyte wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
> >Senebyte wrote:
> >> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388C6040...@pe.net>...
> >> >Your pragmatism would be a little less that pure, I would say.
> >>
> >> I have not mentioned truth or intentionally made implications about it. I made
> >> comment on pragmatic belief which may or may not be associated with Truth.
> >
> >I assumed that a verified belief is one which was shown to be true; it
> >seems implicit in the word "verified".
>
> No: in the case of untestable solipsism being True, the impression of an external
> reality could be given that is pragmatically verifiable, believable and yet be False.
> Think of someone trapped in good VR: how would they deduce the truth of the
> real world, a real world that may be afflicted with fundamental uncertainty and lack
> an absolute Truth?
How would the impression of an external world be "verified" then? It
seems to me that "verified" entails that the idea is true; if you have
not shown the idea is true you have not verified it.
>
> >> >you recognize that absolute truth
> >> >exists but realize that our ability to find it is somewhat limited.
> >>
> >> I have made no such recognition. "not some unreachable absolute measure"
> >> eliminates a class of measures regardless of whether or not there are any
> >> valid entities within that class.
> >
> >It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
> >existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
> >asymptotically.
>
> That would be like tending to zero and saying this approaches the root of
> minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist and not
> be imaginary.
I do not think it is like that at all. For one thing, the root of minus
one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
>
> >> That was clear but this does not answer my question and my objection,
> >> which rephrased is: the cut-off imposed by a pragmatic approach prevents
> >> infinite logical regression and the debate of infinitesimal niggles.
> >
> >I know, in fact that is my point. The question is: what do you believe
> >about the cut off point?
>
> That would be revealed by practical application and the patience of the
> individual pragmatist. Time constraints are real factors to all truely pragmatic
> thinking.
Here's what it seems to ME you are saying: not being omniscient, we
cannot have perfect knowledge of the truth, thus depending on how
accurate we can afford to be, we choose to make working assumptions
rather than testing EVERY part of our model. My point is that no matter
how much time you have there are certain parts of your model that you
can never test.
>
> >The pragmatist claims not to believe his axioms
> >are true, he claims only to accept them axiomatically. At least that is
> >my impression, which is why I asked for pragmatists to clarify things.
> >Hans and Red have done so, and I am pondering their posts.
>
> The pragmatist may not believe them True, as Truth defined by other
> philosophers, but can still use them without provision for their failure
> (and thus use them in the mode of a truth) due to making acceptance
> of them as pragmatically true through the absence of a pragmatically
> logical and coherent counter proposition.
On this view, objective realism is NOT pragmatically accepted, since the
counter proposal of solipsism is as logical and coherent as realism.
>
> >In what way is realism more pragmatically useful than solipsism? My
> >question is not rhetorical; I am interested in the answer.
> >
> >your friend
> >keith
>
> Untestable solipsism tacks a useless, time and effort consuming
> rider to any description of what is to all appearances external phenomena,
> such as "...in addition to behaving like an external entity the widget
> happens to be a figment of your extensive unconscious imagination."
> The pragmatist rejects this descriptive froth as unempirical waste.
Realism also tacks a rider onto our experience: "in addition to behaving
as an entity created by our imaginations would, this widget happens to
have an existence independent of our minds". The solipsist rejects this
descriptive froth as an unempirical.
Keith
Keith Johnson
I think our notion of truth is the same. But implicit in your comment is
the notion that we should be able to define all of the words we use. But
since we write definitions with other words, we cannot define all our
words without either circular definitions (that's what dictionaries do)
or an infinite vocabulary. There simply has to exist terms which we
share even though they are not defined; I claim truth is one of those,
but if it isn't then we cannot communicate.
>
> I reserve the word true as a lable for things in the objective external
> world, and as a lable for my own subjective state. Pragmatically, I cannot
> be certain that I experience the objective external world, or even that one
> exists. So the only thing I can be certain is true is my own subjective
> state. Am I happy, am I thirsty, etc, and that has nothing to do with the
> external world. So anything I state as pragmatically true can only deal with
> my internal subjective state.
There are lots of potential labels for things in your subjective
experience; you cold call them "interesting" or "frightening" or "vivid"
for example. But you mean something specific when you say "it is true
that I experienced X"; you and i mean the same thing by truth in that
sense, even if I cannot know if that claim is true.
>
> But since I'm not using your definition of true, since you don't have one, I
> shouldn't be using the word true at all. Using it will only lead to
> misunderstanding.
If you are right, then we cannot talk at all until we define every word
in our vocabulary without relying on circular definitions. I find that
disappointing:-)
>
> > > > would claim that truth is an undefinable concept; we
> > > > either know what it means or we don't.
> > >
> > > So you claim that truth is an undefinable concept. That's real helpful.
> >
> > One cannot define every word you use, that would require circular
> > definitions or an infinite number of words. There must be some words
> > which are undefined in your vocabulary; I think truth is one of those
> > words.
>
> Then we can't discuss it. If it's undefined, then you might as well use the
> word "poiwjf", it means exactly the same thing as "true." Both are
> undefined. Actually, using the word "true" is WORSE than using the word
> "poiwjf" because "poiwjf" has no common meaning associated with it.
Then no one can discuss anything, because my observation about the
nature of definitions is correct; we define words by using words and if
we have to define the words in the definition, and the words in the
definition of the definition and the...we never get to the point where
we know what any word actually means.
>
> > > If we can't define the word, then we cannot agree on what it means. If
> we
> > > cannot agree on what it means, then let's not use the word.
> >
> > I disagree; it seems to me that you DO know what truth means, when you
> > disagree with me it seems you are saying that my claims are not true.
> > (snip)
>
> **Boggle** Sure, I know what truth means TO ME. But since I don't know what
> it means to you, using it is pointless and misleading.
By that reasoning, it seems to me, I cannot know what your comment above
means, since you have not defined each word in it.
(snip)
> > > I cannot be concerned with truth if truth is an undefined concept. I am
> only
> > > concerned with utility.
> >
> > I don't think that follows; it would only follow if you didn't know what
> > truth means. That you cannot adequately define truth is not related to
> > the issue, it seems to me.
>
> Excuse me? I am not the one who said that truth is an undefined concept. You
> are. I HAVE my definition for truth, but you cannot agree with it, so it's
> pointless to argue about it.
But your definition ultimately depends on undefined words (unless you
can find a flaw in my argument above) so according to your view you
cannot understand the definition of truth you have given.
>
> > > > If when you say "X is true" you mean "X works
> > >
> > > Except my pragmatism does not make any claim that "X is true." Without a
> > > definition of true, the statement would be meaningless anyway.
> >
> > Your pragmatism claims that "X works" is that statement TRUE, or does it
> > merely work? What does it mean for a claim "X works" to work?
>
> Drinking slakes thirst is an example of X works. Is it true in an objective
> reality? I don't know. Nor do I care. Is it true according to my subjective
> state, it seems to be, but who knows?
Of course it is true. If you drink your thirst will be abated, thus it
is true that drinking can quench thirst.
>
> > > > (however you define a claim as working) you believe it is TRUE that X
> > > > works.
> > >
> > > I directly and consistantly experience that X works, I do not claim that
> X
> > > is true because truth does not matter. Besides, you claim that truth is
> an
> > > undefined concept.
> >
> > But I do not claim that we don't know what truth means.
>
> But since you cannot define it, I can never know what you mean when you use
> it, and you cannot know what I mean when I use it.
This is getting repetitious. I would simply say that every time you make
a claim to me or anyone else you implicitly assume that person shares
your understanding of the word "truth". You do not ask for a definition
of such basic concepts.
>
> > And when you say
> > that you directly experience that X works, is that statement true?
>
> Will any answer I give be meaningful if I don't know what you mean by true?
>
> The answer to that question, according to how I use the word true, is no. I
> cannot be certain that I directly experience X, it only seems that I do, and
> so as far as my pragmatism goes, I might as well have directly experienced
> X.
So you are saying that you don't really know if an idea pragmatically
works, it just works to assume the idea works? I am baffled.
>
> > > >That is the problem with defining truth pragmatically: the actual
> > > > notion of truth is always lurking even in the so-called pragmatic
> > > > definition.
> > >
> > > Since you claim that truth is indefinable, the above is meaningless.
> > >
> > > Who says anyone defines truth pragmatically? I don't.
> >
> > That a statement is undefineable does not mean that it HAS no meaning.
> > Meaning comes before definitions, otherwise no now could define anything
> > at all since they wouldn't know what the thing meant until they had a
> > definition for it.
>
> That's nice. Until I know your definition of truth, this whole discussion is
> pointless.
Every claim you make to me assumes you and I agree on the definition of
truth; you would not make any claims to me at all if you didn't make
that presupposition.
>(snip)
> > > Which I don't.
> >
> > But do you claim to have a definition of "truth"?
>
> Sure.
My question was an opening for you to GIVE me that definition. How about
it?
>
> > > > then how do you define illusion.
> > >
> > > As an X that doesn't work, is not consistant, and has no predictive
> value.
> >
> > What do you mean by X working?
>
> Drinking slakes thrist.
That's an action working. How does an idea work?
>
> > > >If
> > > > you adhered to a particular religion, it what way would your theism
> not
> > > > be consistent,
> > >
> > > If the claims of the religion did not actually work. If the claims of
> the
> > > religion were internally inconsistant. If predictions based on the
> claims of
> > > the religion did not work.
> >
> > How would the claims of a religion not actually work?
>
> Example: If prayer didn't move mountains.
But since prayer does "move mountains" (just not necessarily the way you
were expecting) then the claims of MY religion DO work.
>
> > > > and why do you consider PREDICTIVE value to be the sole
> > > > measure of cognitive utility?
> > >
> > > I don't. There are 2 measures of cognitive utility that my pragmatism
> uses.
> > >
> > > 1. That X works.
> > > 2. That X is consistant.
> > >
> > > From 1 and 2 we can derive predictive value.
> >
> > I have already asked what it means for an idea to work; how does working
> > and consistency entail predictive value, unless making predictions is a
> > necessary part of working to you.
>
> Predictions have utility.
> 1. I drink, my thirst is slaked.
> 2. Everytime I drink, my thirst is slaked.
I agree that predictions often have utility, but NOT being able to yield
predictions does not entail a lack of utility, so predictability cannot
be a necessary condition for a pragmatic view of "working".
>
> If I am thirsty, and wish my thirst to be slaked, what should I do? I
> predict, according to 1 and 2, that if I drink, my thirst will be slaked. I
> drink, my thirst is slaked.
>
> None of this necessarily has anything to do with an external reality.
I agree. A solipsist would likely arrive at the same conclusion about
drinking.
>
> > > You will note that this has utility for a solipsist as well as anyone
> else.
> > > Truth, whatever that means, is not an issue.
> > >
> > > By the way, stop using the word "truth" unless you can define it.
> >
> > That demand makes no sense. I could make the same demand to you that you
> > define every word you use before you use it. That can't be done without
> > an infinite number of words or circular definitions.
>
> If I don't know what you mean by the word truth, then I can't very well
> communicate meaningfully with you, can I? You are leaving the word truth
> undefined in order to leave it slippery. This way you can semantically
> weasel out of any point made by anyone else by responding to a different
> definition of true than what the person intended. This willful
> misunderstanding is precisely the tactic that makes many of your responses
> read like non-sequiters.
I am not trying to leave the word "truth" slippery, I merely observe
that you could not imagine you have answered any of my points unless you
assume that I and you mean the same thing when we talk about truth. You
can't even meaningfully challenge my comment unless you assume that we
mean the same thing when we use the word truth. If you rely on words to
define truth and those words can only be defined by other words ad
infinitum, then if not defining a word makes communication impossible,
then communication is logically impossible. Your position seems to
devolve into (according to me:-) a verbal solipsism.
keith
red foster
Keith Johnson wrote in message <388F040A...@pe.net>...
...
>
>Regarding pragmatism: I asked you guys to tell me what you mean by
>pragmatism because I wanted to discuss your views; the views of Pierce
>or Dewey don't interest me that much because I cannot discuss their
>views with them. I am not asking any of you to do any homework, all I
>asked was what those of you who call yourselves pragmatists believe. I
>usually see "pragmatism" invoked as a reason we do not have to verify
>our fundamental assumptions; we do not claim they are true (claim the
>"pragmatists", we just claim they "work"). It is THAT view I was
>wondering about, it is THAT view that I am squeamish about.
The problem you have is that you regard statements are true or false by some
criterion (that I am not sure you have defined explicitely for us) and other
people define statements as true or false by other criteria; some of them by
a criteria of whether the proposition "works". These folks are in general
trying to test statements by some (a) naturalistic, (b) social or (c)
combined criteria of coherence with experience. Those three are like Pierce,
James and Dewey respectively, although the lines blur. But all ways of
defining truth in any sense of what "works" make you feel squeamish.
"We just claim tht they work" is a rather rigorous test. Newtonian mechanics
worked in astrophysics until about 1905 and still works today in the
construction of houses. It can be taken as true building a house and false
in the celestial mechanics. But so far, we do not pretend to have a way to
act as if we have a "true" theory of such things *except to the extent that
the theory works in the application we have in mind*. If you have a way to
know the *true* theory that should be used in both astrophysics and housing,
I'd like to see it. The problem people have with whatever you call truth is
that both the method and the results seem to be inaccible. That makes us
squeamish.
red foster
Brian F. King
>hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
>> But some claims are true[Christian], but false[Islam] - and vice versa.
>
>I disagree wholeheartedly with that statement.
Only the specific statement, or the sentiment behind it?
If the latter, then how about:
Some claims (e.g. Pineapple pizza tastes great.)
are true[Brian], but false[Keith].
> I would say there is
>conflict between what Christians say is true and what Muslims say is
>true (we do have some overlapping beliefs) and that in the case of a
>conflict at least ONE of us is wrong.
Certainly. Pineapple pizza is the best.
>(snip)
Brian F. King: Alt.Atheist #477
red foster
Keith Johnson wrote in message <388EFDC4...@pe.net>...
The validity of a claim can be defined as its passing a "test" consisting of
the criteria of a belief system. WIthin pragmatism, the criteria center
around some notion or another of workability . Workability can include
predictive accuracy, simplicity, and conformance with observations within
nature, in which case the pragmatism is tending toward scientific
pragmatism. It can include extending social equality which becomes some sort
of humanistic pragmatism. But modern pragmatism do not claim that passing
these criteria jyields "truth" as that word has been used over history.
THe criteria can also include such things as "does the claim conform to
God's word as expressed in the Bible". Even this could be construes as a
form of pragmatism if the criterion of "workability" means "will holding
this belief increase my chances of salvation, where to increase my chances,
the belief must conform to a literal reading of Genesis 1 - 11."
The essential difference is that in the case of this Christian literalist
belief system, (which I do not claim that you hold, but some do) the
Christian will ordinarily say that the content of the Bible is truth and
statements that conform to it are true. IOW they hold to the claim that
truth, not merely validity within a belief system, is tested by the Bible.
Clearly, there are people who have the same attitude toward evolution as
"truth" as these Christian literalists have toward Creationism.
You point out that if they mean some sort of Truth that goes beyond the
limitations of their belief system, they are unjustified, and if they only
mean "it works" (within the belief system called pragmatism) then their
notion of truth is inadequate because you say truth really exists
independently of any human's criterion.
I agree with you on the former, but if the latter is your position, then I
think it is poorly thought out. WHat criterion do YOU use to know if a
statement is true? If you say that criterion is not a human criterion, how
do you establish THAT? And so on. You are hoisted on your own petard.
red foster
hrgr...@my-deja.com
bri...@ncinter.net (Brian F. King) wrote:
> Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
> >hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
> >> But some claims are true[Christian], but false[Islam] - and vice
versa.
> >
> >I disagree wholeheartedly with that statement.
>
> Only the specific statement, or the sentiment behind it?
>
> If the latter, then how about:
>
> Some claims (e.g. Pineapple pizza tastes great.)
> are true[Brian], but false[Keith].
or undecidable[Hans]. I'd never touch the stuff, I'm allergic to
pineapples ... :-)
HRG.
> > I would say there is
> >conflict between what Christians say is true and what Muslims say is
> >true (we do have some overlapping beliefs) and that in the case of a
> >conflict at least ONE of us is wrong.
>
> Certainly. Pineapple pizza is the best.
>
> >(snip)
>
> Brian F. King: Alt.Atheist #477
>
hrgr...@my-deja.com
co...@pe.net wrote:
>
>
> hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
> >
> > In article <388C5A00...@pe.net>,
> > co...@pe.net wrote:
> > >
> > >
> (snip)
>
> > > I use the modifier "metaphysically" true to contrast it with
pragmatic
to
> > me
> > > that the notion of truth cannot be so flexible as to allow for two
> > > diametrically opposed claims to be true if they happen to both
work.
> > For
> > > example, the realism vs. brain in a vat debate: both ideas work in
> > that
> > > they are both consistent with our experience, both of them are
> > > untestible, but they cannot plausibly be thought to be both true;
at
> > > least one of them is false.
> >
> > If we *by definition* cannot know which one is true, the question
loses
> > all meaning for me. They can *both* be meaningless.
>
> You seem to be saying that if we cannot SHOW a claim to be true, we
> cannot KNOW (in our bones, as it were) that a claim is true.
Not exactly. It's the "by definition" in my statement above which is
essential.
Let's call X = "there exists another universe Y which cannot influence
ours either by natural or by supernatural means".
You say that X has to be true or false. I say I don't even know what X
*means*.
To give any meaning to X would require that we look at both universes
(or only at ours, if X is false) *from outside*. This we cannot do -
*by definition*.
> And you
> seems to be saying that the meaning of a claim is tied up into how one
> can demonstrate the claim is true. This doesn't seem true to me. It
> seems to me that you know what the difference is between an object
that
> continues to exist even when you are not looking at it and an object
> which only exists while you are perceiving it, even though you could
> never show the continued existence of the object. The question of
> objective reality might seem pointless to you, but it certainly has a
> meaning.
As I wrote at the beginning of this thread, objective reality is a good
working assumption, but should not be extended indiscriminately. The
universe Y, for instance, does not belong to objective reality. Nor
does Sagan's Invisible Dragon, IHMO.
> > > Actually, it is my opinion that "truth" is a primitive concept
which
> > > cannot be defined; you either know what it is or you don't.
> >
> > Which truth ? Mathematical truth ? scientific truth ? Christian
truth ?
> > Islamic truth ? ....
> >
> > To me they are all different concepts. A "truth function",
abstractly
> > speaking, is simply a mapping which associates to *some*
grammatically
> > correct sentences a value "true" and which is closed under logical
> > implication - i.e. if A1,A2, ... An are "true" and B is a logical
> > consequence *) of the Ai, then B is "true" as well. Those sentences
A
> > for which not-A is true we call "false". That either A or not-A
> > is "true" is *not* required (e.g. A = "a god exists" for scientific
> > truth).
>
> It seems to me that truth is truth, that we know what truth is
(although
> we do not always no what happens to BE true) and that attempting to
> define things (even attempting to define "truth") presupposes we
already
> know what truth is.
Truth[plane geometry] is what can be derived from Hilbert's axioms *)
using logical calculus. Voila - a definition of truth.
Truth[Roman Catholic] contains every doctrine that the Pope pronounces
ex cathedra. Voila - another definition of truth.
*) Euclid had forgotten some of them ...
> > *) logical consequence without using the tertium non datur-rule!
> >
> > And we know
> > > that truth exists even if we don't know what claims are true and
what
> > > are false.
> >
> > But some claims are true[Christian], but false[Islam] - and vice
versa.
>
> I disagree wholeheartedly with that statement. I would say there is
> conflict between what Christians say is true and what Muslims say is
> true (we do have some overlapping beliefs) and that in the case of a
> conflict at least ONE of us is wrong.
Please see Brian's pizza example.
Unless you can step outside this universe, you cannot decide *which*
one is wrong. Thus the cautious procedure is to recognize that there
are different concepts of truth.
> (snip)
>
> > > And "metaphysical" truth seems to me to be an irresistible
concept; we
> > > surely know what it means to say "X is the way things are"
whether or
> > > not we can ever determine what X actually is.
> >
> > Perhaps you do. I don't - not for all X. F.i. I don't know what it
> > means to say that Sagan's Invisible Dragon exists.
> >
> > In addition to "true" (various kinds, see above) or "false" (various
> > kinds), IMHO there is "meaningless" - and perhaps
even "undecidable" as
> > well.
>
> I would agree there are meaningless combinations of words: "A man
smells
> largely under the present" has the grammatical form of a truth claim,
> but it is not a real statement and it consequently isn't true OR
false.
No doubt. But I wasn't talking about this kind of sentences (under a
stricter concept of grammar which recognizes f.i. that not every adverb
can be fitted to every verb, they are ungrammatical).
> I also agree there might be actual statements whose truth cannot be
> rationally determined; I would call those "undecidable". But I would
say
> that those undecidable statements ARE either true or false.
Good luck stepping out of our universe. Don't lose the way back
(Ariadne-type threads may be helpful); I'd hate to lose a friend. :-)
Best regards,
Hans-Richard.
> Keith
> >
> > your friend,
> > Hans-Richard.
> >
> > > Keith
> > >
> >
hrgr...@my-deja.com
co...@pe.net wrote:
>
>
> hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
> >
> > Jumping in for just one point ...
> >
> > In article <388D3EB2...@pe.net>,
> > co...@pe.net wrote:
> (snip)
>
> > Not necessarily, IMHO.
> >
> > Take the analogy of a hyperbola branch in the Euclidean plane. It
looks
> > as it asymptotically approaches "something", but this "something"
> > doesn't exist in the plane.
> > Now we can add ideal points at infinity to the plane, like in
> > projective drawings. Then the hyperbola will approach just one of
these
> > ideal points; but they are creations of our mind - and not "real"
> > points of the plane.
>
> Ever the Platonist, I disagree:-). The points of the asymptotes of a
> parabola exists just as much as the parabola itself.
Not so, IMHO. I said "the hyperbola in the Euclidean plane". The
Euclidean plane {(x,y) | x and y real} does not contain points at
infinity. We *add* them - and then it becomes the projective plane, a
different animal.
Since I cannot
> conveniently write the equation of the particular parabola, I will
> mention of of its asymptotes: y = x.
Nitpick: you seem to be talking of the *hyperbola* x^2 - y^2 = 1.
your friend,
Hans-Richard.
That line exists and the parabola
> never touches it, but as x approaches infinity the parabola approached
> the line.
> >
> > That's how it might be with absolute truth: added by *us* as an
ideal
> > point at infinity (so that we can point at "something" which we
hope to
> > approach), but not existing in the external world. Something like
> > absolute musical beauty .....
>
> All I can say is that it doesn't seem that way to me. In fact, the
> possibility you just mentioned seems to me to be either absolutely
false
> or absolutely true:-)
>
> your friend
> Keith
> >
> > Regards,
> > Hans-Richard Grümm
> >
> > <snip>
> >
Senebyte
>Senebyte wrote:
>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
>> >I assumed that a verified belief is one which was shown to be true; it
>> >seems implicit in the word "verified".
>>
>> No: in the case of untestable solipsism being True, the impression of an external
>> reality could be given that is pragmatically verifiable, believable and yet be False.
>> Think of someone trapped in good VR: how would they deduce the truth of the
>> real world, a real world that may be afflicted with fundamental uncertainty and lack
>> an absolute Truth?
>
>How would the impression of an external world be "verified" then? It
>seems to me that "verified" entails that the idea is true; if you have
>not shown the idea is true you have not verified it.
By the normal means of pragmatic verification: consistent, repeatable, falsifiable
evidence. Why should verified mean True to a pragmatist, who does not seek or
need Truth?
>> >It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
>> >existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
>> >asymptotically.
>>
>> That would be like tending to zero and saying this approaches the root of
>> minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist and not
>> be imaginary.
>
>I do not think it is like that at all. For one thing, the root of minus
>one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
>> >> That was clear but this does not answer my question and my objection,
>> >> which rephrased is: the cut-off imposed by a pragmatic approach prevents
>> >> infinite logical regression and the debate of infinitesimal niggles.
>> >
>> >I know, in fact that is my point. The question is: what do you believe
>> >about the cut off point?
>>
>> That would be revealed by practical application and the patience of the
>> individual pragmatist. Time constraints are real factors to all truly pragmatic
>> thinking.
>
>Here's what it seems to ME you are saying: not being omniscient, we
>cannot have perfect knowledge of the truth, thus depending on how
>accurate we can afford to be, we choose to make working assumptions
>rather than testing EVERY part of our model. My point is that no matter
>how much time you have there are certain parts of your model that you
>can never test.
I have said nothing of the sort.
I have made and do not make acknowledgement of the plausibility of omniscience,
of the existence of perfect knowledge, the existence of Truth or that they have any
meaning for a pragmatist. The assumptions a pragmatist makes concerns
the conditional acceptance of prior observations and rationales over the coherent
possibility that these are unsound. But they do not equate to axioms for these
are not taken up in the face of a coherent alternative.
>> The pragmatist may not believe them True, as Truth defined by other
>> philosophers, but can still use them without provision for their failure
>> (and thus use them in the mode of a truth) due to making acceptance
>> of them as pragmatically true through the absence of a pragmatically
>> logical and coherent counter proposition.
>
>On this view, objective realism is NOT pragmatically accepted, since the
>counter proposal of solipsism is as logical and coherent as realism.
It is not because it is unempirical and offers no practical value, hence it is
illogical within the pragmatic perspective.
>> >In what way is realism more pragmatically useful than solipsism? My
>> >question is not rhetorical; I am interested in the answer.
>> >
>> >your friend
>> >keith
>>
>> Untestable solipsism tacks a useless, time and effort consuming
>> rider to any description of what is to all appearances external phenomena,
>> such as "...in addition to behaving like an external entity the widget
>> happens to be a figment of your extensive unconscious imagination."
>> The pragmatist rejects this descriptive froth as unempirical waste.
>
>Realism also tacks a rider onto our experience: "in addition to behaving
>as an entity created by our imaginations would, this widget happens to
>have an existence independent of our minds". The solipsist rejects this
>descriptive froth as an unempirical.
The solipsist must additionally offer a plausible description of the mental
attribute(s) that constrains their imagination to this illusion against the
common acceptance that imagination is an icon of lack of constraint or
boundary, or choose a more acceptable descriptive term. Pragmatic thought
will suffer no such excess through adherence to the axiom of realism.
Senebyte
Al Klein
>You seem to be saying that if we cannot SHOW a claim to be true, we
>cannot KNOW (in our bones, as it were) that a claim is true. And you
>seems to be saying that the meaning of a claim is tied up into how one
>can demonstrate the claim is true. This doesn't seem true to me. It
>seems to me that you know what the difference is between an object that
>continues to exist even when you are not looking at it and an object
>which only exists while you are perceiving it, even though you could
>never show the continued existence of the object.
Sure you can, Keith. Just off the top of my head, I can think of a
few ways to demonstrate that "object X" continued to exist when I was
out of the room.
> The question of
>objective reality might seem pointless to you, but it certainly has a
>meaning.
Questioning it is solipsism.
--
Al - Unnumbered Atheist #infinity
aklein at villagenet dot com
red foster
Senebyte wrote in message <86nlc7$6tm$1...@epos.tesco.net>...
>Keith Johnson wrote in message <388F06A2...@pe.net>...
>>Senebyte wrote:
>>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
>>> >It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
>>> >existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
>>> >asymptotically.
>>>
>>> That would be like tending to zero and saying this approaches the root
of
>>> minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist and
not
>>> be imaginary.
>>
>>I do not think it is like that at all. For one thing, the root of minus
>>one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
>
>That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
>The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
Here we see in the >> indent comment by Keith, something important to
understand in discussions with him. His criterion of whether something
exists seems to be that if we utter a statement, the nouns in the statement
refer to things that thereby exist. So when we say God is a imaginary and
Keith says God exists, both can be true within his belief system! All
rational discourse breaks down on this silly notion of existence.
red foster
Al Klein
>I may be using the vocabulary of Popper (with the phrase
>"falsifiability") but all I am saying is that for a fact to count as
>evidence, we must be able to show that the claim it allegedly supports
>is more probable GIVEN the fact than given its negation. There is no
>such fact which supports the more or less reliability of cognitive
>experience.
If you're a solipsist. If you aren't, your cognitive experience is,
itself, evidence that it's real.
Remember, Keith, solipsism is all the evidence one needs to disprove
Jeffrey A. Young
Al Klein <nxy...@ivyyntrarg.pbz> wrote:
>On Tue, 25 Jan 2000 13:59:30 GMT, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>
>Questioning it is solipsism.
Incorrect, as always.
Jeff
----
"Whether you like it or not, the square root of minus one has about as
much to do with the real world as a unicorn does." - NMS
Jeffrey A. Young
red foster <red...@mesanet.net> wrote:
>
>Senebyte wrote in message <86nlc7$6tm$1...@epos.tesco.net>...
>>>Senebyte wrote:
>>>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
>>>> >It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
>>>> >existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
>>>> >asymptotically.
>>>>
>>>> That would be like tending to zero and saying this approaches the root
>of
>>>> minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist and
>not
>>>> be imaginary.
>>>
>>>I do not think it is like that at all. For one thing, the root of minus
>>>one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
>>
>>That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
>>The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
>
>Here we see in the [>>>] indent comment by Keith, something important to
>understand in discussions with him. His criterion of whether something
>exists seems to be that if we utter a statement, the nouns in the statement
>refer to things that thereby exist. So when we say God is a imaginary and
>Keith says God exists, both can be true within his belief system! All
>rational discourse breaks down on this silly notion of existence.
Funny thing is, all I see him saying in that comment is that the
[square] root of 'minus one' exists. Do you think otherwise?
I never took you to be an NMSian atheist Red. (And strawman BTW.)
Jeffrey A. Young
Al Klein <nxy...@ivyyntrarg.pbz> wrote:
>On Wed, 26 Jan 2000 14:01:03 GMT, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>
>>I may be using the vocabulary of Popper (with the phrase
>>"falsifiability") but all I am saying is that for a fact to count as
>>evidence, we must be able to show that the claim it allegedly supports
>>is more probable GIVEN the fact than given its negation. There is no
>>such fact which supports the more or less reliability of cognitive
>>experience.
>
>If you're a solipsist. If you aren't, your cognitive experience is,
>itself, evidence that it's real.
Nope. Begs the question. Clearly.
(And you are equivocating Al. 'Real' vs. 'reliable'. Two fallacies
in one sentence. Wow. You really need to start watching that. Your
credibility is plumetting.)
Brian F. King
>red foster wrote:
>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388B2802...@pe.net>...
>> >Dear All
>(snip)
>
>> I think I might be one of the people you are thinking of. Some caveats,
>> Keith, before you begin:
>>
>> 1. Each of us that you are thinking of is different from the others.
>> 2. Whatever it is that you have in mind as a test of "coherence"; some (or
>> all?) of us acknowledge that our philosophies might not meet some test of
>> "coherence" ! In fact it might be a hallmark of such philosophies that they
>> don't care about this -- but we have to see this test for coherence to
>> decide this.
>> 3. There is something contradictory in your statement "you recognize that
>> some of your beliefs are held axiomatically" since if something is held
>> axiomatically it is not a belief as I think you mean that word. I'd just say
>> that we recognize that when we justify our beliefs, we do so using
>> principles of thought that cannot logically be used to justify themselves.
>> Oh, and we admit that we have not put every one of our beliefs through this
>> justification process. Inconsistent? Maybe, but life is too short and some
>> beliefs too trivial to bother with.
>
>> 4. Isn't admonishing a pragmatist to be consistent, by definition, kind of
>> silly?
>>
>> Do you agree that theism is fundamentally different from what you describe
>> as pragmatism in the following sense? Its believers assert a "realist"
>> philosophy, i.e., they assert not just that they can operate satisfactorily
>> "as if" their god exists, they assert that their god *really exists*. So by
>> pointing out some incoherence in pragmatism, you will not put pragmatism and
>> theism on the same footing, thus there can still remain criticizable
>> differences.
>
>I agree that most theists believe God really exists, but what I am
>unsure is what pragmatists believe, not just about God but about
>anything. Denis Loubet has said (at least I think he way saying) that
>pragmatism has nothing to do with truth, that what matters is not
>whether an idea is true but whether it "works". Does that mean that
>pragmatists KNOW what truth means but claim their ideas are not true, or
>does it mean they define 'truth' as "what works"? How do pragmatists
>define "working"? Do they think their claim that a particular
>pragmatically held idea works is true, or do they think that thinking
>the idea works also works?
I'd say it means that the pragmatist doesn't care about an
indeterminible "truth", so long as the belief itself is of utility.
On the flip side, it is obviously of utility to believe in things
which *can* be proven true.
NB: I don't see anything inherently incompatible
with the concept of a pragmatic theist.
Then again, I'm not using a definition out of
some philosophical dictionary, so...
>> Those of us who agree with Wittgenstein's observation that at the core of
>> every well-founded belief there is a belief that is unfounded will see our
>> philosophy and theism to be on the same footing but can still come to the
>> conclusion that in theory, some beliefs are more poorly founded than others.
>
>But what does it mean to a pragmatist for an idea to be well founded or
>poorly founded?
Well founded - it works reliably.
Poorly founded - it doesn't work reliably.
>> But hey, it doesn't really matter. Go ahead and be a theist. Like all major
>> social instiutions, theism has obvious social value that can outweigh its
>> pitfalls if properly managed. Just leave us alone. If you want to argue with
>> us, that's what you'll get.
>
>I am not even sure what you mean by "that's what you'll get". I am
>really not sure what you pragmatists think at all.
>
>Keith
Brian F. King: Alt.Atheist #477
Brian F. King
>
>I disagree wholeheartedly with that statement.
Only the specific statement, or the sentiment behind it?
If the latter, then how about:
Some claims (e.g. Pineapple pizza tastes great.)
are true[Brian], but false[Keith].
> I would say there is
>conflict between what Christians say is true and what Muslims say is
>true (we do have some overlapping beliefs) and that in the case of a
>conflict at least ONE of us is wrong.
Certainly. Pineapple pizza is the best.
>(snip)
Brian F. King: Alt.Atheist #477
Keith Johnson
red foster wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388EFDC4...@pe.net>...
> >
> >
> >red foster wrote:
(snip)
> >I may be using the vocabulary of Popper (with the phrase
> >"falsifiability") but all I am saying is that for a fact to count as
> >evidence, we must be able to show that the claim it allegedly supports
> >is more probable GIVEN the fact than given its negation. There is no
> >such fact which supports the more or less reliability of cognitive
> >experience.
> >
> >Obviously my observation doesn't have anything to do with the coherence
> >of pragmatism (in that sense I have been sidetracked from the original
> >discussion) but my remark was directed only to the claim that (the more
> >or less) reliability of our cognitive experience is supported by
> >evidence.
>
> The validity of a claim can be defined as its passing a "test" consisting of
> the criteria of a belief system. WIthin pragmatism, the criteria center
> around some notion or another of workability . Workability can include
> predictive accuracy, simplicity, and conformance with observations within
> nature, in which case the pragmatism is tending toward scientific
> pragmatism. It can include extending social equality which becomes some sort
> of humanistic pragmatism. But modern pragmatism do not claim that passing
> these criteria jyields "truth" as that word has been used over history.
I guess my main claim is that the notion of truth (as it has been used
over history) is implicit in every positive claim. When you say that
water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, you believe it is true
that water is made of hydrogen and oxygen. You may well admit that you
could be wrong, that the tests you use to determine a claims validity
are not infallible, but you chose the test because you believed it
points you in the right direction of truth.
>
> THe criteria can also include such things as "does the claim conform to
> God's word as expressed in the Bible". Even this could be construes as a
> form of pragmatism if the criterion of "workability" means "will holding
> this belief increase my chances of salvation, where to increase my chances,
> the belief must conform to a literal reading of Genesis 1 - 11."
>
> The essential difference is that in the case of this Christian literalist
> belief system, (which I do not claim that you hold, but some do) the
> Christian will ordinarily say that the content of the Bible is truth and
> statements that conform to it are true. IOW they hold to the claim that
> truth, not merely validity within a belief system, is tested by the Bible.
I believe that the practical pragmatist would claim that his pragmatic
tests point him in the direction of truth. Those pragmatists who claim
that truth is DEFINED as what works (or that truth has nothing to do
with "truth" claims) seem to be advocating something incoherent to me.
They claim that truth IS "what works" but then this claim itself is not
true, it merely "works". What could it mean for the claim "truth is what
works" to WORK?
>
> Clearly, there are people who have the same attitude toward evolution as
> "truth" as these Christian literalists have toward Creationism.
>
> You point out that if they mean some sort of Truth that goes beyond the
> limitations of their belief system, they are unjustified, and if they only
> mean "it works" (within the belief system called pragmatism) then their
> notion of truth is inadequate because you say truth really exists
> independently of any human's criterion.
I actually didn't say that their truth claims were unjustified; I would
claim that if their cognitive apparatus is properly functioning (my
thanks to philosopher Alvin Plantinga) their belief that "X is true" is
a justified belief. What I claimed was they couldn't demonstrate the
truth of their claim to a skeptic.
>
> I agree with you on the former, but if the latter is your position, then I
> think it is poorly thought out. WHat criterion do YOU use to know if a
> statement is true? If you say that criterion is not a human criterion, how
> do you establish THAT? And so on. You are hoisted on your own petard.
And you know how painful that can be.:-)
But my petard claimed that the truth of such things could not be
DEMONSTRATED, not that those things could not be known to be true. I
claim that ultimately everything we know is based on our intuition that
certain things are true; that intuition is as strong a ground as there
is to support our knowledge.
Keith
>
> red foster
Keith Johnson
Keith Johnson
Senebyte wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388F06A2...@pe.net>...
> >Senebyte wrote:
> >> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
> >> >I assumed that a verified belief is one which was shown to be true; it
> >> >seems implicit in the word "verified".
> >>
> >> No: in the case of untestable solipsism being True, the impression of an external
> >> reality could be given that is pragmatically verifiable, believable and yet be False.
> >> Think of someone trapped in good VR: how would they deduce the truth of the
> >> real world, a real world that may be afflicted with fundamental uncertainty and lack
> >> an absolute Truth?
> >
> >How would the impression of an external world be "verified" then? It
> >seems to me that "verified" entails that the idea is true; if you have
> >not shown the idea is true you have not verified it.
>
> By the normal means of pragmatic verification: consistent, repeatable, falsifiable
> evidence. Why should verified mean True to a pragmatist, who does not seek or
> need Truth?
The pragmatist claims that "verified" means "shown to be consistent,
repeatable...". When the pragmatist says that "X has been shown to be
consistent..." does he claim that statement is true or merely that the
statement "has been shown to be consistent..."? If he claims the
statement is true, then is is concerned with truth.
Nobody can make any assertion at all without being concerned about the
truth.
>
> >> >It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
> >> >existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
> >> >asymptotically.
> >>
> >> That would be like tending to zero and saying this approaches the root of
> >> minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist and not
> >> be imaginary.
> >
> >I do not think it is like that at all. For one thing, the root of minus
> >one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
>
> That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
> The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
You are confused by the mathematical jargon. Real numbers are no more
real than imaginary numbers; Real Numbers is just a name given to a
certain set of numbers. All numbers are imaginary in the sense of being
mental objects.
(snip)
> >> That would be revealed by practical application and the patience of the
> >> individual pragmatist. Time constraints are real factors to all truly pragmatic
> >> thinking.
> >
> >Here's what it seems to ME you are saying: not being omniscient, we
> >cannot have perfect knowledge of the truth, thus depending on how
> >accurate we can afford to be, we choose to make working assumptions
> >rather than testing EVERY part of our model. My point is that no matter
> >how much time you have there are certain parts of your model that you
> >can never test.
>
> I have said nothing of the sort.
> I have made and do not make acknowledgement of the plausibility of omniscience,
> of the existence of perfect knowledge, the existence of Truth or that they have any
> meaning for a pragmatist. The assumptions a pragmatist makes concerns
> the conditional acceptance of prior observations and rationales over the coherent
> possibility that these are unsound. But they do not equate to axioms for these
> are not taken up in the face of a coherent alternative.
I stand by my contention that every assertion implicitly recognizes the
existence of truth; when you say that I have misinterpreted your
remarks, you are not just saying that the claim "Keith misconstrued my
comments" works, you are saying I really did misconstrue your comments,
it seems to me.
>
> >> The pragmatist may not believe them True, as Truth defined by other
> >> philosophers, but can still use them without provision for their failure
> >> (and thus use them in the mode of a truth) due to making acceptance
> >> of them as pragmatically true through the absence of a pragmatically
> >> logical and coherent counter proposition.
> >
> >On this view, objective realism is NOT pragmatically accepted, since the
> >counter proposal of solipsism is as logical and coherent as realism.
>
> It is not because it is unempirical and offers no practical value, hence it is
> illogical within the pragmatic perspective.
Realism is equally unempirical; you cannot observe an object
"objectively" existing. And solipsism would have a practical value if
you wanted to be an amoral monster; the notion that the other people
around you don't really exist could assuage your conscience when you
were treating them like crap.
(snip)
> >> Untestable solipsism tacks a useless, time and effort consuming
> >> rider to any description of what is to all appearances external phenomena,
> >> such as "...in addition to behaving like an external entity the widget
> >> happens to be a figment of your extensive unconscious imagination."
> >> The pragmatist rejects this descriptive froth as unempirical waste.
> >
> >Realism also tacks a rider onto our experience: "in addition to behaving
> >as an entity created by our imaginations would, this widget happens to
> >have an existence independent of our minds". The solipsist rejects this
> >descriptive froth as an unempirical.
>
> The solipsist must additionally offer a plausible description of the mental
> attribute(s) that constrains their imagination to this illusion against the
> common acceptance that imagination is an icon of lack of constraint or
> boundary, or choose a more acceptable descriptive term. Pragmatic thought
> will suffer no such excess through adherence to the axiom of realism.
Why should the solipsist have to offer any such thing. The solipsist
claims his mind produces the illusion objectivists call reality, he
claims this as a brute fact and offers no explanation for how the mind
accomplishes this mystery. The objectivist (at least if he is an
atheist) fails to explain how it is that objective reality came into
existence nor what keeps it from just poofing away.
Keith
>
> Senebyte
Keith Johnson
hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> In article <388DB73A...@pe.net>,
> co...@pe.net wrote:
> >
> >
> > hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
> > >
> > > Jumping in for just one point ...
> > >
> > > In article <388D3EB2...@pe.net>,
> > > co...@pe.net wrote:
> > (snip)
> >
> > > Not necessarily, IMHO.
> > >
> > > Take the analogy of a hyperbola branch in the Euclidean plane. It
> looks
> > > as it asymptotically approaches "something", but this "something"
> > > doesn't exist in the plane.
> > > Now we can add ideal points at infinity to the plane, like in
> > > projective drawings. Then the hyperbola will approach just one of
> these
> > > ideal points; but they are creations of our mind - and not "real"
> > > points of the plane.
> >
> > Ever the Platonist, I disagree:-). The points of the asymptotes of a
> > parabola exists just as much as the parabola itself.
>
> Not so, IMHO. I said "the hyperbola in the Euclidean plane". The
> Euclidean plane {(x,y) | x and y real} does not contain points at
> infinity. We *add* them - and then it becomes the projective plane, a
> different animal.
I know that (seriously, I do:-) but the asymptote exists at points quite
"less than' infinity; the asymptote is a line and it has a y-intercept
which is a finite distance from the origin. What DOESN'T exist (in the
Euclidean plane) is the point where the hyperbola and the asymptote
converge.
But we may be looking to hard at a mere analogy.
>
> Since I cannot
> > conveniently write the equation of the particular parabola, I will
> > mention of of its asymptotes: y = x.
>
> Nitpick: you seem to be talking of the *hyperbola* x^2 - y^2 = 1.
And that asymptote exists in the Euclidean plane.
Similarly, I would claim that Truth exists (in all its glory) even if
particular truth claim will never actually coincide with that truth. It
seems incoherent to me to suggest that NO claim can be true, since if
that were the case that claim itself could not be said to be true.
your pal
keith
Keith Johnson
Don Kresch
that
>In article <l4ru8s4obts0188cs...@4ax.com>,
>Al Klein <nxy...@ivyyntrarg.pbz> wrote:
>>On Tue, 25 Jan 2000 13:59:30 GMT, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>>
>>Questioning it is solipsism.
>
>Incorrect, as always.
Yes, you are always incorrect, Jeffy.
Don
aa #51, Knight of BAAWA, DNRC o-, EAC Decryption squad
Atheist Minister for St. Dogbert.
"No being is so important that he can usurp the rights of another"
Picard to Data/Graves "The Schizoid Man"
Don Kresch
that
>In article <9jvu8sg27la291kev...@4ax.com>,
>Al Klein <nxy...@ivyyntrarg.pbz> wrote:
>>On Wed, 26 Jan 2000 14:01:03 GMT, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>>
>>>I may be using the vocabulary of Popper (with the phrase
>>>"falsifiability") but all I am saying is that for a fact to count as
>>>evidence, we must be able to show that the claim it allegedly supports
>>>is more probable GIVEN the fact than given its negation. There is no
>>>such fact which supports the more or less reliability of cognitive
>>>experience.
>>
>>If you're a solipsist. If you aren't, your cognitive experience is,
>>itself, evidence that it's real.
>
>Nope.
Sorry, it's true.
> Begs the question.
Nope.
>Clearly (And you are equivocating Al. 'Real' vs. 'reliable'.
That's not equivocation, you moron.
Jeffy, your lack of knowledge of fallacies is astounding.
Keith Johnson
Senebyte wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388F06A2...@pe.net>...
> >Senebyte wrote:
> >> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
> >> >I assumed that a verified belief is one which was shown to be true; it
> >> >seems implicit in the word "verified".
> >>
> >> No: in the case of untestable solipsism being True, the impression of an external
> >> reality could be given that is pragmatically verifiable, believable and yet be False.
> >> Think of someone trapped in good VR: how would they deduce the truth of the
> >> real world, a real world that may be afflicted with fundamental uncertainty and lack
> >> an absolute Truth?
> >
> >How would the impression of an external world be "verified" then? It
> >seems to me that "verified" entails that the idea is true; if you have
> >not shown the idea is true you have not verified it.
>
> By the normal means of pragmatic verification: consistent, repeatable, falsifiable
> evidence. Why should verified mean True to a pragmatist, who does not seek or
> need Truth?
The pragmatist claims that "verified" means "shown to be consistent,
repeatable...". When the pragmatist says that "X has been shown to be
consistent..." does he claim that statement is true or merely that the
statement "has been shown to be consistent..."? If he claims the
statement is true, then is is concerned with truth.
Nobody can make any assertion at all without being concerned about the
truth.
>
> >> >It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
> >> >existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
> >> >asymptotically.
> >>
> >> That would be like tending to zero and saying this approaches the root of
> >> minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist and not
> >> be imaginary.
> >
> >I do not think it is like that at all. For one thing, the root of minus
> >one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
>
> That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
> The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
You are confused by the mathematical jargon. Real numbers are no more
real than imaginary numbers; Real Numbers is just a name given to a
certain set of numbers. All numbers are imaginary in the sense of being
mental objects.
(snip)
> >> That would be revealed by practical application and the patience of the
> >> individual pragmatist. Time constraints are real factors to all truly pragmatic
> >> thinking.
> >
> >Here's what it seems to ME you are saying: not being omniscient, we
> >cannot have perfect knowledge of the truth, thus depending on how
> >accurate we can afford to be, we choose to make working assumptions
> >rather than testing EVERY part of our model. My point is that no matter
> >how much time you have there are certain parts of your model that you
> >can never test.
>
> I have said nothing of the sort.
> I have made and do not make acknowledgement of the plausibility of omniscience,
> of the existence of perfect knowledge, the existence of Truth or that they have any
> meaning for a pragmatist. The assumptions a pragmatist makes concerns
> the conditional acceptance of prior observations and rationales over the coherent
> possibility that these are unsound. But they do not equate to axioms for these
> are not taken up in the face of a coherent alternative.
I stand by my contention that every assertion implicitly recognizes the
existence of truth; when you say that I have misinterpreted your
remarks, you are not just saying that the claim "Keith misconstrued my
comments" works, you are saying I really did misconstrue your comments,
it seems to me.
>
> >> The pragmatist may not believe them True, as Truth defined by other
> >> philosophers, but can still use them without provision for their failure
> >> (and thus use them in the mode of a truth) due to making acceptance
> >> of them as pragmatically true through the absence of a pragmatically
> >> logical and coherent counter proposition.
> >
> >On this view, objective realism is NOT pragmatically accepted, since the
> >counter proposal of solipsism is as logical and coherent as realism.
>
> It is not because it is unempirical and offers no practical value, hence it is
> illogical within the pragmatic perspective.
Realism is equally unempirical; you cannot observe an object
"objectively" existing. And solipsism would have a practical value if
you wanted to be an amoral monster; the notion that the other people
around you don't really exist could assuage your conscience when you
were treating them like crap.
(snip)
> >> Untestable solipsism tacks a useless, time and effort consuming
> >> rider to any description of what is to all appearances external phenomena,
> >> such as "...in addition to behaving like an external entity the widget
> >> happens to be a figment of your extensive unconscious imagination."
> >> The pragmatist rejects this descriptive froth as unempirical waste.
> >
> >Realism also tacks a rider onto our experience: "in addition to behaving
> >as an entity created by our imaginations would, this widget happens to
> >have an existence independent of our minds". The solipsist rejects this
> >descriptive froth as an unempirical.
>
> The solipsist must additionally offer a plausible description of the mental
> attribute(s) that constrains their imagination to this illusion against the
> common acceptance that imagination is an icon of lack of constraint or
> boundary, or choose a more acceptable descriptive term. Pragmatic thought
> will suffer no such excess through adherence to the axiom of realism.
Why should the solipsist have to offer any such thing. The solipsist
Keith Johnson
dlo...@my-deja.com
co...@pe.net wrote:
>
>
> Denis Loubet wrote:
> >
> > Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
> > news:388DB12F...@pe.net...
> > >
> > >
> > > Denis Loubet wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote in message
> > > > news:388C5D57...@pe.net...
> > > (snip)
>
> I think our notion of truth is the same. But implicit in your comment
is
> the notion that we should be able to define all of the words we use.
But
> since we write definitions with other words, we cannot define all our
> words without either circular definitions (that's what dictionaries
do)
> or an infinite vocabulary. There simply has to exist terms which we
> share even though they are not defined; I claim truth is one of those,
> but if it isn't then we cannot communicate.
Nonesense. All you have to do is define words until the other person
says enough. I need to know what you mean by true because I need to
know what you think it applies to. If I say that an internal state of
mine is true, will you turn around and claim that I'm making a
statement about external reality? Or visa-versa? That's what I mean by
slippery.
> > I reserve the word true as a lable for things in the objective
external
> > world, and as a lable for my own subjective state. Pragmatically, I
cannot
> > be certain that I experience the objective external world, or even
that one
> > exists. So the only thing I can be certain is true is my own
subjective
> > state. Am I happy, am I thirsty, etc, and that has nothing to do
with the
> > external world. So anything I state as pragmatically true can only
deal with
> > my internal subjective state.
>
> There are lots of potential labels for things in your subjective
> experience; you cold call them "interesting" or "frightening"
or "vivid"
> for example. But you mean something specific when you say "it is true
> that I experienced X"; you and i mean the same thing by truth in that
> sense, even if I cannot know if that claim is true.
Do we? I can't tell, from what you've written above, whether you are
suggesting that X is objective or subjective, whether I should believe
that X could be real or not, or that it matters. I can't say "it is true
that I experienced X" to you without fear that you will completely
misunderstand me.
Do you get it now?
> > But since I'm not using your definition of true, since you don't
have one, I
> > shouldn't be using the word true at all. Using it will only lead to
> > misunderstanding.
>
> If you are right, then we cannot talk at all until we define every
word
> in our vocabulary without relying on circular definitions. I find that
> disappointing:-)
We can abandon using the word true. Would that be so damaging to the
point you are trying to make? Of all the words to insist remain
undefined, why choose one so crucial to what you are trying to say? If
you define how you intend to use the word true, I will most likely not
ask for a definition of a word in that definition. I may ask for
clarification on some points though. But it seems you are intent on
utilizing reducto-ad-absurdum as an argument to refrain from defining a
crucial term.
(SNIP)
(snip)
> >
> > **Boggle** Sure, I know what truth means TO ME. But since I don't
know what
> > it means to you, using it is pointless and misleading.
>
> By that reasoning, it seems to me, I cannot know what your comment
above
> means, since you have not defined each word in it.
Sigh. What words are giving you trouble?
(snip)
(SNIP)
> > Excuse me? I am not the one who said that truth is an undefined
concept. You
> > are. I HAVE my definition for truth, but you cannot agree with it,
so it's
> > pointless to argue about it.
>
> But your definition ultimately depends on undefined words
Nonesense, the dictionary is full of them. Perhaps you will not have a
problem with any of the words I choose to use in the definition.
(SNIP)
> > > > > If when you say "X is true" you mean "X works
> > > >
> > > > Except my pragmatism does not make any claim that "X is true."
Without a
> > > > definition of true, the statement would be meaningless anyway.
> > >
> > > Your pragmatism claims that "X works" is that statement TRUE, or
does it
> > > merely work? What does it mean for a claim "X works" to work?
> >
> > Drinking slakes thirst is an example of X works. Is it true in an
objective
> > reality? I don't know. Nor do I care. Is it true according to my
subjective
> > state, it seems to be, but who knows?
>
> Of course it is true. If you drink your thirst will be abated, thus it
> is true that drinking can quench thirst.
Nonsense. Something completely unrelated to my drinking could be
slaking my thirst. I wouldn't know. So it only SEEMS that drinking
slakes thirst, and that's why I claim that it works, without claiming
that it is true.
> > > > > (however you define a claim as working) you believe it is
TRUE that X
> > > > > works.
> > > >
> > > > I directly and consistantly experience that X works, I do not
claim that
> > X
> > > > is true because truth does not matter.
Do you understand that now?
(SNIP)
> > > And when you say
> > > that you directly experience that X works, is that statement true?
> >
> > Will any answer I give be meaningful if I don't know what you mean
by true?
> >
> > The answer to that question, according to how I use the word true,
is no. I
> > cannot be certain that I directly experience X, it only seems that
I do, and
> > so as far as my pragmatism goes, I might as well have directly
experienced
> > X.
>
> So you are saying that you don't really know if an idea pragmatically
> works, it just works to assume the idea works? I am baffled.
No, I am saying that if it seems that the idea works, that's good
enough. The idea does not have to be true in any sense of the word.(I
hope.)
(SNIP)
> > > But do you claim to have a definition of "truth"?
> >
> > Sure.
>
> My question was an opening for you to GIVE me that definition. How
about
> it?
I'll show you mine if you show me yours. Why should I put myself at
such a disadvantage if you won't do the same?
> > > > > then how do you define illusion.
> > > >
> > > > As an X that doesn't work, is not consistant, and has no
predictive
> > value.
> > >
> > > What do you mean by X working?
> >
> > Drinking slakes thrist.
>
> That's an action working. How does an idea work?
Everything's an idea. It seems that I drink, but it could be my
imagination. The drinking seems to slake my thirst, but that could be
due to something unrelated. However, "seems" is good enough,
pragmatically speaking. But I make no truth statements.
This works if I'm experiencing an external reality, it works if it's
all in my head. It doesn't matter.
> > > > >If
> > > > > you adhered to a particular religion, it what way would your
theism
> > not
> > > > > be consistent,
> > > >
> > > > If the claims of the religion did not actually work. If the
claims of
> > the
> > > > religion were internally inconsistant. If predictions based on
the
> > claims of
> > > > the religion did not work.
> > >
> > > How would the claims of a religion not actually work?
> >
> > Example: If prayer didn't move mountains.
>
> But since prayer does "move mountains" (just not necessarily the way
you
> were expecting) then the claims of MY religion DO work.
Or prayer doesn't move mountains and you are interpreting the claims of
your religion to pretend it does.
However, since we're discussing pragmatism, I am all that counts. So if
the claims of the religion don't seem to work for me, then that's good
enough for me to dismiss them.
> > > > > and why do you consider PREDICTIVE value to be the sole
> > > > > measure of cognitive utility?
> > > >
> > > > I don't. There are 2 measures of cognitive utility that my
pragmatism
> > uses.
> > > >
> > > > 1. That X works.
> > > > 2. That X is consistant.
> > > >
> > > > From 1 and 2 we can derive predictive value.
> > >
> > > I have already asked what it means for an idea to work; how does
working
> > > and consistency entail predictive value, unless making
predictions is a
> > > necessary part of working to you.
> >
> > Predictions have utility.
> > 1. I drink, my thirst is slaked.
> > 2. Everytime I drink, my thirst is slaked.
>
> I agree that predictions often have utility, but NOT being able to
yield
> predictions does not entail a lack of utility, so predictability
cannot
> be a necessary condition for a pragmatic view of "working".
Granted. But in the pragmatic search for utility, predictive value is a
crucial element.
> > If I am thirsty, and wish my thirst to be slaked, what should I do?
I
> > predict, according to 1 and 2, that if I drink, my thirst will be
slaked. I
> > drink, my thirst is slaked.
> >
> > None of this necessarily has anything to do with an external
reality.
>
> I agree. A solipsist would likely arrive at the same conclusion about
> drinking.
> >
> > > > You will note that this has utility for a solipsist as well as
anyone
> > else.
> > > > Truth, whatever that means, is not an issue.
(SNIP)
> > If I don't know what you mean by the word truth, then I can't very
well
> > communicate meaningfully with you, can I? You are leaving the word
truth
> > undefined in order to leave it slippery. This way you can
semantically
> > weasel out of any point made by anyone else by responding to a
different
> > definition of true than what the person intended. This willful
> > misunderstanding is precisely the tactic that makes many of your
responses
> > read like non-sequiters.
>
> I am not trying to leave the word "truth" slippery, I merely observe
> that you could not imagine you have answered any of my points unless
you
> assume that I and you mean the same thing when we talk about truth.
You
> can't even meaningfully challenge my comment unless you assume that we
> mean the same thing when we use the word truth. If you rely on words
to
> define truth and those words can only be defined by other words ad
> infinitum,
Or at least until I'm satisfied that the words used in the definition
are agreed between us. I'm not likely to question your use of the
word "The."
> then if not defining a word makes communication impossible,
> then communication is logically impossible. Your position seems to
> devolve into (according to me:-) a verbal solipsism.
Only in your reducto-ad-absurdum world.
Denis Loubet
dlo...@io.com
http:www.io.com/~dloubet
>
Keith Johnson
Scott Davidson wrote:
>
> In article C688...@pe.net, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> writes:
> >
(snip)
> >> I had hoped you had something more interesting. I suffered through
> >> a Theory of Knowledge class with extreme skeptics, that cured
> >> me of ever wanting to discuss it ever again.
> >
> >I am not an extreme skeptic. The reason you found extreme skepticism
> >frustrating, I would guess is because you could not refute their claims
> >but you knew they were just plain wrong.
>
> To the extent that they said that we can not be 100% sure of anything,
> they cannot be refuted. However I found a good refutation in terms
> of probabilities of things being true, which, in the limit, becomes
> statements of truth. This was expounded in J M Keynes first book
> (before any on economics.) I found it in the bowels of the MIT
> library, and I doubt very much it is in print, though I haven't
> checked on amazon.com for it. However, my frustration was not in
> the argument, but the behavior of the people giving the argument.
But how do you demonstrate that your cognitive experience PROBABLY
reflects external reality?
> >
> >You claim that the above things I mentioned (which I will call part of
> >"cognitive experience") have worked consistently and are thus backed by
> >evidence. But for a fact to constitute evidence for a claim, it has to
> >be that if the fact had come out differently, the claim would be
> >falsified. But there is no experience you have which would falsify the
> >claim that our cognitive experience reflects external reality, thus no
> >experience can constitute evidence to support the claim that cognitive
> >experience DOES reflect external reality.
>
> I would think that inexplicable inconsistencies in what we see as external
> reality might be evidence (but not proof) for this view. Ed Fredkin had
> a theory that reality was a computer simulation, that quanta represent the
> time step used in updating the state of the simulation (since all computer
> models are digitized, or quantized, and are not purely continuous) and that
> miracles represent bugs in the simulation. The reduced instance of miracles
> since Biblical times is due to the fact that the program is being cleaned up.
> This would be a lot more believable if there was any evidence of a miracle.
Assuming that miracles have reduced in frequency since Bible times,
Fredkin's theory (not having read this theory I am guessing it is tongue
in cheek, actually) would be consistent with the data. But that is the
problem: there are a lot of theories which would be consistent with the
data of our experience. If our experience were filled with
inconsistencies, how would that be more supportive of the view that
"reality" is a delusion than that that's just the way objective reality
is?
>
> It is all non-falsifiable, especially if you constrain our cognitive experience
> to be consistent yet not relecting external reality.
It is all non-falsifiable, solipsism, objective reality, the
computer-induced fantasy, all of it. You cannot falsify any such view
and consequently nothing can serve as objective EVIDENCE for any of
those views. But that doesn't mean you can't know that objective realism
is true, just that you could not prove it to an annoying skeptic.
> >
> >If you don't want to DISCUSS this anymore, I guess you won't respond to
> >my post. But I do want to emphasize that I am an objective realist, not
> >a skeptic. My interest in this topic is epistemological, not
> >ontological.
> >
> Well, I'm glad you're not an extreme skeptic, though your example is one
> that I would expect an extreme skeptic to give. The reason I asked
> my question is that I feel that there are unsupported beliefs that atheists
> might hold - but I can't think of any. I put in "reasonably skeptical" to
> eliminate things like belief in ESP and UFOs that can be held by atheists,
> but not skeptical ones. I'm still looking, since I consider the belief in an objective
> reality supported by, but not proven by, the evidence.
And I would claim that no belief that cannot in principle be falsified
can be supported by evidence. Since any experience whatsoever is
consistent with solipsism or objective realism, there can be no evidence
pushing you in one direction or the other. The only thing that can push
you is your intuition that the real world is objectively real, your
sense that it is true. That's the reason (I assert) that you DO believe
in objective realism; nobody except philosophers ever SERIOUSLY ponder
the any other alternative.
Keith
Keith Johnson
red foster wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388EFDC4...@pe.net>...
> >
> >
> >red foster wrote:
(snip)
> >I may be using the vocabulary of Popper (with the phrase
> >"falsifiability") but all I am saying is that for a fact to count as
> >evidence, we must be able to show that the claim it allegedly supports
> >is more probable GIVEN the fact than given its negation. There is no
> >such fact which supports the more or less reliability of cognitive
> >experience.
> >
Keith Johnson
"Brian F. King" wrote:
>
> Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
> >hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
> >> But some claims are true[Christian], but false[Islam] - and vice versa.
> >
> >I disagree wholeheartedly with that statement.
>
> Only the specific statement, or the sentiment behind it?
>
> If the latter, then how about:
>
> Some claims (e.g. Pineapple pizza tastes great.)
> are true[Brian], but false[Keith].
Given that taste is relative to the taster, the sentence "pizza tastes
great" is meaningless unless there is a way to determine who the taster
is. But this is not the case generally with statements, specifically it
is not that way with claims of facts.
>
> > I would say there is
> >conflict between what Christians say is true and what Muslims say is
> >true (we do have some overlapping beliefs) and that in the case of a
> >conflict at least ONE of us is wrong.
>
> Certainly. Pineapple pizza is the best.
Now you're talking crazy. :-)
Keith
Brian F. King
Keith Johnson
dlo...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> In article <388F1202...@pe.net>,
> co...@pe.net wrote:
>(snip)
> > I think our notion of truth is the same. But implicit in your comment
> is
> > the notion that we should be able to define all of the words we use.
> But
> > since we write definitions with other words, we cannot define all our
> > words without either circular definitions (that's what dictionaries
> do)
> > or an infinite vocabulary. There simply has to exist terms which we
> > share even though they are not defined; I claim truth is one of those,
> > but if it isn't then we cannot communicate.
>
> Nonesense. All you have to do is define words until the other person
> says enough. I need to know what you mean by true because I need to
> know what you think it applies to. If I say that an internal state of
> mine is true, will you turn around and claim that I'm making a
> statement about external reality? Or visa-versa? That's what I mean by
> slippery.
When you said my claim was nonsense, you were saying that my claim was
not true, which meant that you say my claim does not represent the way
our language really works. It is that correspondence to reality which is
reflected in the claim that "X is true". That's what we both mean when
we say "X is true; we mean that X corresponds to reality". We can surely
recognize our own fallibility, we can recognize that not everything we
accept as true really is true, but truth itself can mean nothing but
correspondence to reality.
I hope that clarifies my view to you.
Maybe? When you say "I experienced X" I interpret that as a report of
your internal state. If you said "I saw a tree in my back yard (and I
assumed you were not lying or insane) I would assume there really was a
tree in your yard as well.
>
> > > But since I'm not using your definition of true, since you don't
> have one, I
> > > shouldn't be using the word true at all. Using it will only lead to
> > > misunderstanding.
> >
> > If you are right, then we cannot talk at all until we define every
> word
> > in our vocabulary without relying on circular definitions. I find that
> > disappointing:-)
>
> We can abandon using the word true. Would that be so damaging to the
> point you are trying to make? Of all the words to insist remain
> undefined, why choose one so crucial to what you are trying to say? If
> you define how you intend to use the word true, I will most likely not
> ask for a definition of a word in that definition. I may ask for
> clarification on some points though. But it seems you are intent on
> utilizing reducto-ad-absurdum as an argument to refrain from defining a
> crucial term.
That was not my intention. You seem to agree that there has to already
exist an agreed upon basic vocabulary from which we build our
definitions in order to have a chance to communicate. You just weren't
sure that "truth" was one of those words. It seems to me obvious that
the word "truth" implies "correspondence with they way things really
are"; if all you experienced was the product of your mind, then
solipsism would be true, if your experience reflects the existence of a
reality independent of your mind, objective realism would be true. My
claim is that "truth" cannot mean "that which works".
(snip)
> (SNIP)
> > > Excuse me? I am not the one who said that truth is an undefined
> concept. You
> > > are. I HAVE my definition for truth, but you cannot agree with it,
> so it's
> > > pointless to argue about it.
> >
> > But your definition ultimately depends on undefined words
>
> Nonesense, the dictionary is full of them. Perhaps you will not have a
> problem with any of the words I choose to use in the definition.
Which was MY point exactly.
(snip)
> > > > Your pragmatism claims that "X works" is that statement TRUE, or
> does it
> > > > merely work? What does it mean for a claim "X works" to work?
> > >
> > > Drinking slakes thirst is an example of X works. Is it true in an
> objective
> > > reality? I don't know. Nor do I care. Is it true according to my
> subjective
> > > state, it seems to be, but who knows?
> >
> > Of course it is true. If you drink your thirst will be abated, thus it
> > is true that drinking can quench thirst.
>
> Nonsense. Something completely unrelated to my drinking could be
> slaking my thirst. I wouldn't know. So it only SEEMS that drinking
> slakes thirst, and that's why I claim that it works, without claiming
> that it is true.
If drinking is not part of the cause of your thirst being quenched, then
it is only a coincidence that drinking is correlated with quenching
thirst. In that case, how does drinking WORK to quench your thirst. My
son used to play video games at the arcade (when he was 5 years old)
without putting any money into the slot; he merely pushed the buttons
and watched the images. To him, it appeared that he was affecting the
action, but in fact he was a passive observer; his actions did not work.
If drinking doesn't cause your thirst to be quenched, then how does
drinking work?
>
> > > > > > (however you define a claim as working) you believe it is
> TRUE that X
> > > > > > works.
> > > > >
> > > > > I directly and consistantly experience that X works, I do not
> claim that
> > > X
> > > > > is true because truth does not matter.
>
> Do you understand that now?
You stated above that you directly and consistently experience that X
works. Thus you think it is TRUE that you have directly and consistently
experienced that X works, you think that your statement reflects the way
things really are.
(snip)
> > > Will any answer I give be meaningful if I don't know what you mean
> by true?
> > >
> > > The answer to that question, according to how I use the word true,
> is no. I
> > > cannot be certain that I directly experience X, it only seems that
> I do, and
> > > so as far as my pragmatism goes, I might as well have directly
> experienced
> > > X.
> >
> > So you are saying that you don't really know if an idea pragmatically
> > works, it just works to assume the idea works? I am baffled.
>
> No, I am saying that if it seems that the idea works, that's good
> enough. The idea does not have to be true in any sense of the word.(I
> hope.)
But then you believe that it is TRUE that the idea seems to work (in the
sense that the idea seeming to work is the way things really are).
Please don't tell me that "it seems that the idea 'X seems to work'
itself seems to work.
>
> (SNIP)
> > > > But do you claim to have a definition of "truth"?
> > >
> > > Sure.
> >
> > My question was an opening for you to GIVE me that definition. How
> about
> > it?
>
> I'll show you mine if you show me yours. Why should I put myself at
> such a disadvantage if you won't do the same?
If communication is the goal, we both gain from understanding each
other's position. Any advantage is shared by both of us.
(snip)
> > That's an action working. How does an idea work?
>
> Everything's an idea. It seems that I drink, but it could be my
> imagination. The drinking seems to slake my thirst, but that could be
> due to something unrelated. However, "seems" is good enough,
> pragmatically speaking. But I make no truth statements.
>
> This works if I'm experiencing an external reality, it works if it's
> all in my head. It doesn't matter.
Is it really true that it doesn't matter? :-)
The thing is, it seems to me you DO make truth statements when you say
that X seems to work, you are saying that "X seeming to work" is the way
things really are. In that sense, you are saying you cannot really know
if objective realism is true and your pragmatism translates to mean that
it makes no practical difference whether realism or solipsism or
whatever other view you could conjure is true.
Or at least that's what I get from your comments.
Supposing I said you can know that objective realism is true, you just
can't demonstrate that fact to a skeptic. Is my statement TRUE or FALSE?
(snip)
> > > > How would the claims of a religion not actually work?
> > >
> > > Example: If prayer didn't move mountains.
> >
> > But since prayer does "move mountains" (just not necessarily the way
> you
> > were expecting) then the claims of MY religion DO work.
>
> Or prayer doesn't move mountains and you are interpreting the claims of
> your religion to pretend it does.
>
> However, since we're discussing pragmatism, I am all that counts. So if
> the claims of the religion don't seem to work for me, then that's good
> enough for me to dismiss them.
Actually, I agree with you on this one. BUT I would ask you to have an
open mind on the subject. I would also advise seriously experimenting
with Christianity, but that might be asking too much. If you have
already tried Christianity, I would suggest you try again.
(snip)
> > > Predictions have utility.
> > > 1. I drink, my thirst is slaked.
> > > 2. Everytime I drink, my thirst is slaked.
> >
> > I agree that predictions often have utility, but NOT being able to
> yield
> > predictions does not entail a lack of utility, so predictability
> cannot
> > be a necessary condition for a pragmatic view of "working".
>
> Granted. But in the pragmatic search for utility, predictive value is a
> crucial element.
But in the pragmatic search for utility, wouldn't there possibly be
cases where an idea was useful even though it yielded no testable
predictions?
(snip)
> > I am not trying to leave the word "truth" slippery, I merely observe
> > that you could not imagine you have answered any of my points unless
> you
> > assume that I and you mean the same thing when we talk about truth.
> You
> > can't even meaningfully challenge my comment unless you assume that we
> > mean the same thing when we use the word truth. If you rely on words
> to
> > define truth and those words can only be defined by other words ad
> > infinitum,
>
> Or at least until I'm satisfied that the words used in the definition
> are agreed between us. I'm not likely to question your use of the
> word "The."
Then I can infer you are the President of the United States.:-)
>
> > then if not defining a word makes communication impossible,
> > then communication is logically impossible. Your position seems to
> > devolve into (according to me:-) a verbal solipsism.
>
> Only in your reducto-ad-absurdum world.
I find that we are in substantial agreement about the principle of
language, you were merely trying to clarify my use of a particular word.
I define truth as "conforming to the way things really are". When we
claim that some untestible thing is true, we are in effect betting that
it is true, we are not saying that there is zero probability that we are
wrong, we are not claiming infallibility.
I do hope we have gotten past the language game, however. Then we can
get to the meat of what you are calling pragmatism. I am sorry if I
caused the discussion to be sidetracked for so long; my
"reducto-ad-absurdum-ism" can be attributed to my view that the notion
of truth is inseparable from any assertion and that you cannot even
declare a pragmatic world view without assuming that Truth (in the
classic sense) exists. But you can declare that we do not KNOW the
actual truth about particular empirical claims but that you accept
those claims on account of their utility.
That's what I would like to discuss when we have more time.
your friend
Keith
Keith Johnson
red foster wrote:
>
> Senebyte wrote in message <86nlc7$6tm$1...@epos.tesco.net>...
> >Keith Johnson wrote in message <388F06A2...@pe.net>...
> >>Senebyte wrote:
> >>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
> ...
> >>> >It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
> >>> >existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
> >>> >asymptotically.
> >>>
> >>> That would be like tending to zero and saying this approaches the root
> of
> >>> minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist and
> not
> >>> be imaginary.
> >>
> >>I do not think it is like that at all. For one thing, the root of minus
> >>one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
> >
> >That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
> >The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
> ...
>
> Here we see in the >> indent comment by Keith, something important to
> understand in discussions with him. His criterion of whether something
> exists seems to be that if we utter a statement, the nouns in the statement
> refer to things that thereby exist. So when we say God is a imaginary and
> Keith says God exists, both can be true within his belief system! All
> rational discourse breaks down on this silly notion of existence.
I am afraid your comment betrays an ignorance of mathematics, red (at
least in this context). The so-called imaginary numbers exist every bit
as much as the Reals do; both of them are abstractions which have
application to real world phenomenon. Imaginary numbers play a role in
Quantum mechanics and in the study of electrical circuitry.
I don't think your comment is accurate in any event, but in this case it
is way of the mark.
keith
>
> red foster
Brian F. King
>Scott Davidson wrote:
>><snip>
>> to be consistent yet not relecting external reality.
>
>It is all non-falsifiable, solipsism, objective reality, the
>computer-induced fantasy, all of it. You cannot falsify any such view
>and consequently nothing can serve as objective EVIDENCE for any of
>those views. But that doesn't mean you can't know that objective realism
>is true, just that you could not prove it to an annoying skeptic.
What do you think the difference is between the words
"know" and "believe"?
>> >If you don't want to DISCUSS this anymore, I guess you won't respond to
>> >my post. But I do want to emphasize that I am an objective realist, not
>> >a skeptic. My interest in this topic is epistemological, not
>> >ontological.
>> >
>> Well, I'm glad you're not an extreme skeptic, though your example is one
>> that I would expect an extreme skeptic to give. The reason I asked
>> my question is that I feel that there are unsupported beliefs that atheists
>> might hold - but I can't think of any. I put in "reasonably skeptical" to
>> eliminate things like belief in ESP and UFOs that can be held by atheists,
>> but not skeptical ones. I'm still looking, since I consider the belief in an objective
>> reality supported by, but not proven by, the evidence.
>
>And I would claim that no belief that cannot in principle be falsified
>can be supported by evidence. Since any experience whatsoever is
>consistent with solipsism or objective realism, there can be no evidence
>pushing you in one direction or the other. The only thing that can push
>you is your intuition that the real world is objectively real, your
>sense that it is true.
Or a pragmatic sense that we should take things at face value.
>That's the reason (I assert) that you DO believe
>in objective realism; nobody except philosophers ever SERIOUSLY ponder
>the any other alternative.
The reason I believe in objective reality is because all the figments
of my imagination insist that they exist and start calling me an
idiotic solipsist if I tell them otherwise... ;-)
Brian F. King
>"Brian F. King" wrote:
>> Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>> >hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
>> >> But some claims are true[Christian], but false[Islam] - and vice versa.
>> >
>> >I disagree wholeheartedly with that statement.
>>
>> Only the specific statement, or the sentiment behind it?
>>
>> If the latter, then how about:
>>
>> Some claims (e.g. Pineapple pizza tastes great.)
>> are true[Brian], but false[Keith].
>
>Given that taste is relative to the taster, the sentence "pizza tastes
>great" is meaningless unless there is a way to determine who the taster
>is.
Given that moral beliefs are relative to the person, the sentence
"murder is immoral" is meaningless unless there is a way to determine
who the belief-holding person is.
>But this is not the case generally with statements, specifically it
>is not that way with claims of facts.
But what exactly *is* a "fact"?
A simple concept, but IMO hard to define precisely.
Which of the following are factual claims, and why?
Also, how should we test the truth of the claim?
"Rocks are hard."
"Rubies are harder than diamonds."
"The sky is blue."
"The sky is blue on a cloudless sunny day."
"The Catholic religion is the correct one."
"Potato chips are salty."
"Murder is immoral".
"Pineapple pizza tastes lousy."
"Pragmatism is a valid philosophy."
"An invisible dragon lives in my garage."
"HRG's cat created the universe last Thursday."
><snip>
Brian F. King
>> ><SNIP>
>Similarly, I would claim that Truth exists (in all its glory)
Truth(tm)? As a concept, certainly.
Truth(tm) as the set of all "truths"?
Is that even coherent?
> even if particular truth claim will never actually coincide with that truth.
> It seems incoherent to me to suggest that NO claim can be true, since if
>that were the case that claim itself could not be said to be true.
That last claim would only be true[logical]. ;-)
>your pal
>keith
Brian F. King
><snip>
>Nobody can make any assertion at all without being concerned about the
>truth.
Untrue. =-)
><snip>
hrgr...@my-deja.com
co...@pe.net wrote:
>
>
> "Brian F. King" wrote:
> >
> > Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
> > >hrgr...@my-deja.com wrote:
> > >> But some claims are true[Christian], but false[Islam] - and vice
versa.
> > >
> > >I disagree wholeheartedly with that statement.
> >
> > Only the specific statement, or the sentiment behind it?
> >
> > If the latter, then how about:
> >
> > Some claims (e.g. Pineapple pizza tastes great.)
> > are true[Brian], but false[Keith].
>
> Given that taste is relative to the taster, the sentence "pizza tastes
> great" is meaningless unless there is a way to determine who the
taster
> is.
And "Schubert wrote better Lieder than Brahms" is *relative* to the
listener, "Keats wrote better poetry than Rilke" is *relative* to the
reader etc. etc.
But funnily enough, "Homosexual acts are wrong" is *objectively* true
or false, according to Keith .....
But this is not the case generally with statements, specifically it
> is not that way with claims of facts.
Absolutely true. However I count much less statements as "facts" than
you probably do. "Water boils at 100 degrees" is a fact. "In general,
killing is wrong" is true in almost all moral systems, but it is not a
*fact*.
HRG.
> > > I would say there is
> > >conflict between what Christians say is true and what Muslims say
is
> > >true (we do have some overlapping beliefs) and that in the case of
a
> > >conflict at least ONE of us is wrong.
> >
> > Certainly. Pineapple pizza is the best.
>
> Now you're talking crazy. :-)
>
> Keith
>
Jeffrey A. Young
Don Kresch <rot13....@xeylax.pbz.getridof.com> wrote:
>On 26 Jan 2000 18:58:59 -0500, in alt.atheism, Jeffrey A. Young told us all
>that
>
>>In article <9jvu8sg27la291kev...@4ax.com>,
>>Al Klein <nxy...@ivyyntrarg.pbz> wrote:
>>>On Wed, 26 Jan 2000 14:01:03 GMT, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>>"falsifiability") but all I am saying is that for a fact to count as
>>>>evidence, we must be able to show that the claim it allegedly supports
>>>>is more probable GIVEN the fact than given its negation. There is no
>>>>such fact which supports the more or less reliability of cognitive
>>>>experience.
>>>
>>>itself, evidence that it's real.
>>
>>Nope.
<snip unsupported false assertion>
>> Begs the question.
<snip unsupported false assertion>
>>Clearly (And you are equivocating Al. 'Real' vs. 'reliable'.
<snip unsupported false assertions>
Oops. Donny has said nothing once again.
Senebyte
>red foster wrote:
>> Senebyte wrote in message <86nlc7$6tm$1...@epos.tesco.net>...
>> >Keith Johnson wrote in message <388F06A2...@pe.net>...
>> >>one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
>> >That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
>> >The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
>> understand in discussions with him. His criterion of whether something
>> exists seems to be that if we utter a statement, the nouns in the statement
>> refer to things that thereby exist. So when we say God is a imaginary and
>> Keith says God exists, both can be true within his belief system! All
>> rational discourse breaks down on this silly notion of existence.
>
>I am afraid your comment betrays an ignorance of mathematics, red (at
>least in this context). The so-called imaginary numbers exist every bit
>as much as the Reals do; both of them are abstractions which have
>application to real world phenomenon. Imaginary numbers play a role in
>Quantum mechanics and in the study of electrical circuitry.
>
>I don't think your comment is accurate in any event, but in this case it
>is way of the mark.
This perspective robs the term "non-existent" of meaning for the term
"application" can mean any correspondence under the sun. To give this
conventional term some back, it is logical to apply empiricism to weed
out the impractical numerical relationships. Thus if we can do without
a class of number in our efforts to explain all things then we have pragmatic
grounds to label that class non-existent. For example: we need the set
of natural numbers but could get by without infinity. While i appears in
many physical and engineering equations and that without it we would
have a tough time redefining math concepts from the extra dimension of
complex numbers to an explicitly two dimensional format made of real
numbers, I don't think it has been proven that it could not be done. Have
you any evidence to contrary?
Senebyte
Senebyte
>In article <D7Kj4.1852$ht4.1...@tw12.nn.bcandid.com>,
>red foster <red...@mesanet.net> wrote:
>>Here we see in the [>>>] indent comment by Keith, something important to
>>understand in discussions with him. His criterion of whether something
>>exists seems to be that if we utter a statement, the nouns in the statement
>>refer to things that thereby exist. So when we say God is a imaginary and
>>Keith says God exists, both can be true within his belief system! All
>>rational discourse breaks down on this silly notion of existence.
>
>[square] root of 'minus one' exists. Do you think otherwise?
>I never took you to be an NMSian atheist Red. (And strawman BTW.)
>
>Jeff
I am curious, Jeff: what meaning do you give to the term "Does not exist"?
When does something not exist for you?
S
Denis Loubet
That actually helps a great deal. But it's going to get messy.
This is the essence of the misunderstanding. The only thing you should
assume from my statement "I saw a tree in my backyard" is that I claim to
have seen a tree in my backyard. Whether there is actually a tree in my
backyard is unimportant to pragmatism as long as I seem to see one. You
yourself admit the statement is a report of my internal state. Why should
that internal state have anything at all to do with reality?
> > > > But since I'm not using your definition of true, since you don't
> > have one, I
> > > > shouldn't be using the word true at all. Using it will only lead to
> > > > misunderstanding.
> > >
> > > If you are right, then we cannot talk at all until we define every
> > word
> > > in our vocabulary without relying on circular definitions. I find that
> > > disappointing:-)
> >
> > We can abandon using the word true. Would that be so damaging to the
> > point you are trying to make? Of all the words to insist remain
> > undefined, why choose one so crucial to what you are trying to say? If
> > you define how you intend to use the word true, I will most likely not
> > ask for a definition of a word in that definition. I may ask for
> > clarification on some points though. But it seems you are intent on
> > utilizing reducto-ad-absurdum as an argument to refrain from defining a
> > crucial term.
>
> That was not my intention. You seem to agree that there has to already
> exist an agreed upon basic vocabulary from which we build our
> definitions in order to have a chance to communicate. You just weren't
> sure that "truth" was one of those words. It seems to me obvious that
> the word "truth" implies "correspondence with they way things really
> are";
Does that include purely subjective states?
> if all you experienced was the product of your mind, then
> solipsism would be true, if your experience reflects the existence of a
> reality independent of your mind, objective realism would be true. My
> claim is that "truth" cannot mean "that which works".
Ahh. Fortunately, my pragmatism operates equally well in an objective
reality as it does in a solipsistic mindset. My pragmatism does not
distinguish between the two. Since I cannot be certain that there even IS an
objective reality, my pragmatism is assumed to be dealing with default
solipsism. That being the case, there IS no objective reality as far as my
pragmatism is concerned. If there is no objective reality, pragmatically
speaking, there can be no statements of truth, pragmatically speaking,
according to your definition of truth.
All that can be granted in my pragmatism is whether things seem to work or
not.
(SNIP)
> (snip)
>
> > > > > Your pragmatism claims that "X works" is that statement TRUE, or
> > does it
> > > > > merely work? What does it mean for a claim "X works" to work?
> > > >
> > > > Drinking slakes thirst is an example of X works. Is it true in an
> > objective
> > > > reality? I don't know. Nor do I care. Is it true according to my
> > subjective
> > > > state, it seems to be, but who knows?
> > >
> > > Of course it is true. If you drink your thirst will be abated, thus it
> > > is true that drinking can quench thirst.
> >
> > Nonsense. Something completely unrelated to my drinking could be
> > slaking my thirst. I wouldn't know. So it only SEEMS that drinking
> > slakes thirst, and that's why I claim that it works, without claiming
> > that it is true.
>
> If drinking is not part of the cause of your thirst being quenched, then
> it is only a coincidence that drinking is correlated with quenching
> thirst.
That is exactly the case.
> In that case, how does drinking WORK to quench your thirst.
I'm not concerned with how. All I know is that drinking seems to quench it,
whether it actually has anything to do with the quenching or not.
> My
> son used to play video games at the arcade (when he was 5 years old)
> without putting any money into the slot; he merely pushed the buttons
> and watched the images. To him, it appeared that he was affecting the
> action, but in fact he was a passive observer; his actions did not work.
To YOU they did not work. But to your son they did. Your son was operating
on exactly the principle I'm trying to get across to you. He understands it
better than you do. To him, operating the controls worked to provide
entertainment. That's the essence of utility. That his actions, in reality,
had no effect, is completely beside the point. What's true is not important,
what seems to work is all that matters.
> If drinking doesn't cause your thirst to be quenched, then how does
> drinking work?
Who cares? If drinking seems to quench my thirst, then that's good enough
for my pragmatism.
> > > > > > > (however you define a claim as working) you believe it is
> > TRUE that X
> > > > > > > works.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I directly and consistantly experience that X works, I do not
> > claim that
> > > > X
> > > > > > is true because truth does not matter.
> >
> > Do you understand that now?
>
> You stated above that you directly and consistently experience that X
> works. Thus you think it is TRUE that you have directly and consistently
> experienced that X works,
Yes. The internal state "X works" exists.
> you think that your statement reflects the way
> things really are.
No. My internal state does not necessarily have anything whatsoever to do
with external reality.
Do you see the difference?
> (snip)
>
> > > > Will any answer I give be meaningful if I don't know what you mean
> > by true?
> > > >
> > > > The answer to that question, according to how I use the word true,
> > is no. I
> > > > cannot be certain that I directly experience X, it only seems that
> > I do, and
> > > > so as far as my pragmatism goes, I might as well have directly
> > experienced
> > > > X.
> > >
> > > So you are saying that you don't really know if an idea pragmatically
> > > works, it just works to assume the idea works? I am baffled.
> >
> > No, I am saying that if it seems that the idea works, that's good
> > enough. The idea does not have to be true in any sense of the word.(I
> > hope.)
>
> But then you believe that it is TRUE that the idea seems to work (in the
> sense that the idea seeming to work is the way things really are).
Aargh. NO. Did I say anything at all about the way things really are? No I
didn't. Stop putting words in my mouth that I didn't say.
I said the idea does not have to be true in any sense of the word, and I
mean it, even in the way you claim to define truth. The way things seem to
work does not necessarily have anything at all to do with "the way things
really are". The way things really are is completely irrelevant. The way you
define truth makes it an irrelevant term as far as my pragmatism is
concerned. Truth does not matter to my pragmatism.
> Please don't tell me that "it seems that the idea 'X seems to work'
> itself seems to work.
> >
> > (SNIP)
> > > > > But do you claim to have a definition of "truth"?
> > > >
> > > > Sure.
> > >
> > > My question was an opening for you to GIVE me that definition. How
> > about
> > > it?
> >
> > I'll show you mine if you show me yours. Why should I put myself at
> > such a disadvantage if you won't do the same?
>
> If communication is the goal, we both gain from understanding each
> other's position. Any advantage is shared by both of us.
I will use your definition of truth which seems to apply only to statements
about the real world. That's simple and straightforward.
> (snip)
>
> > > That's an action working. How does an idea work?
> >
> > Everything's an idea. It seems that I drink, but it could be my
> > imagination. The drinking seems to slake my thirst, but that could be
> > due to something unrelated. However, "seems" is good enough,
> > pragmatically speaking. But I make no truth statements.
> >
> > This works if I'm experiencing an external reality, it works if it's
> > all in my head. It doesn't matter.
>
> Is it really true that it doesn't matter? :-)
>
> The thing is, it seems to me you DO make truth statements when you say
> that X seems to work, you are saying that "X seeming to work" is the way
> things really are.
Not at all. It's merely a reporting of my internal state.
> In that sense, you are saying you cannot really know
> if objective realism is true and your pragmatism translates to mean that
> it makes no practical difference whether realism or solipsism or
> whatever other view you could conjure is true.
> Or at least that's what I get from your comments.
I'll hesitantly say you have a glimmer of what I mean. But my pragmatism
makes NO statements concerning objective reality.
> Supposing I said you can know that objective realism is true, you just
> can't demonstrate that fact to a skeptic. Is my statement TRUE or FALSE?
If you're addressing my pragmatism for an answer, it will say that since it
cannot tell if there is an objective reality the question is pointless.
> (snip)
>
> > > > > How would the claims of a religion not actually work?
> > > >
> > > > Example: If prayer didn't move mountains.
> > >
> > > But since prayer does "move mountains" (just not necessarily the way
> > you
> > > were expecting) then the claims of MY religion DO work.
> >
> > Or prayer doesn't move mountains and you are interpreting the claims of
> > your religion to pretend it does.
> >
> > However, since we're discussing pragmatism, I am all that counts. So if
> > the claims of the religion don't seem to work for me, then that's good
> > enough for me to dismiss them.
>
> Actually, I agree with you on this one. BUT I would ask you to have an
> open mind on the subject. I would also advise seriously experimenting
> with Christianity, but that might be asking too much. If you have
> already tried Christianity, I would suggest you try again.
Stepping out of pragmatism mode.
I have never experimented with any religion. Until there is evidence, or an
observation, that can only be resolved with a theistic explanation, I am not
likely to go there.
> (snip)
>
> > > > Predictions have utility.
> > > > 1. I drink, my thirst is slaked.
> > > > 2. Everytime I drink, my thirst is slaked.
> > >
> > > I agree that predictions often have utility, but NOT being able to
> > yield
> > > predictions does not entail a lack of utility, so predictability
> > cannot
> > > be a necessary condition for a pragmatic view of "working".
> >
> > Granted. But in the pragmatic search for utility, predictive value is a
> > crucial element.
>
> But in the pragmatic search for utility, wouldn't there possibly be
> cases where an idea was useful even though it yielded no testable
> predictions?
Such as?
> (snip)
(SNIP)
> > > then if not defining a word makes communication impossible,
> > > then communication is logically impossible. Your position seems to
> > > devolve into (according to me:-) a verbal solipsism.
> >
> > Only in your reducto-ad-absurdum world.
>
> I find that we are in substantial agreement about the principle of
> language, you were merely trying to clarify my use of a particular word.
> I define truth as "conforming to the way things really are". When we
> claim that some untestible thing is true, we are in effect betting that
> it is true, we are not saying that there is zero probability that we are
> wrong, we are not claiming infallibility.
That is the definition I am applying to "true" in my answers above.
> I do hope we have gotten past the language game, however. Then we can
> get to the meat of what you are calling pragmatism. I am sorry if I
> caused the discussion to be sidetracked for so long; my
> "reducto-ad-absurdum-ism" can be attributed to my view that the notion
> of truth is inseparable from any assertion and that you cannot even
> declare a pragmatic world view without assuming that Truth (in the
> classic sense) exists.
But I do declare that a pragmatic world view exists without assuming that
truth exists. The pragmatic world view is entirely internal, and thus says
nothing at all about external reality, and thus nothing about truth, which
depends on external reality.
> But you can declare that we do not KNOW the
> actual truth about particular empirical claims but that you accept
> those claims on account of their utility.
There you go.
> That's what I would like to discuss when we have more time.
Ok.
Scott Davidson
>
>
>Scott Davidson wrote:
>>
>> In article C688...@pe.net, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> writes:
>> >
>(snip)
>
>> >> I had hoped you had something more interesting. I suffered through
>> >> a Theory of Knowledge class with extreme skeptics, that cured
>> >> me of ever wanting to discuss it ever again.
>> >
>> >I am not an extreme skeptic. The reason you found extreme skepticism
>> >frustrating, I would guess is because you could not refute their claims
>> >but you knew they were just plain wrong.
>>
>> To the extent that they said that we can not be 100% sure of anything,
>> they cannot be refuted. However I found a good refutation in terms
>> of probabilities of things being true, which, in the limit, becomes
>> statements of truth. This was expounded in J M Keynes first book
>> (before any on economics.) I found it in the bowels of the MIT
>> library, and I doubt very much it is in print, though I haven't
>> checked on amazon.com for it. However, my frustration was not in
>> the argument, but the behavior of the people giving the argument.
>
>
>But how do you demonstrate that your cognitive experience PROBABLY
>reflects external reality?
Through reasoning alone, the more diverse experiments that do not
refute the theory of an objective reality, the more likely it is. Also,
by Occam's Razor (a heuristic, not a rule) the hypothesis that there is an
objective reality that we see more or less directly (filtered by our
senses, of course) is more likely than the hypothesis that there is a second
filter between us and the "real" objective reality which we do not see.
>> >
>> >You claim that the above things I mentioned (which I will call part of
>> >"cognitive experience") have worked consistently and are thus backed by
>> >evidence. But for a fact to constitute evidence for a claim, it has to
>> >be that if the fact had come out differently, the claim would be
>> >falsified. But there is no experience you have which would falsify the
>> >claim that our cognitive experience reflects external reality, thus no
>> >experience can constitute evidence to support the claim that cognitive
>> >experience DOES reflect external reality.
>>
>> I would think that inexplicable inconsistencies in what we see as external
>> reality might be evidence (but not proof) for this view. Ed Fredkin had
>> a theory that reality was a computer simulation, that quanta represent the
>> time step used in updating the state of the simulation (since all computer
>> models are digitized, or quantized, and are not purely continuous) and that
>> miracles represent bugs in the simulation. The reduced instance of miracles
>> since Biblical times is due to the fact that the program is being cleaned up.
>> This would be a lot more believable if there was any evidence of a miracle.
>
>Assuming that miracles have reduced in frequency since Bible times,
>Fredkin's theory (not having read this theory I am guessing it is tongue
>in cheek, actually) would be consistent with the data. But that is the
>problem: there are a lot of theories which would be consistent with the
>data of our experience. If our experience were filled with
>inconsistencies, how would that be more supportive of the view that
>"reality" is a delusion than that that's just the way objective reality
>is?
>
Fredkin really offered this as a viable hypothesis - I don't know if he
really believed it. He mentioned it when he spoke to our class in 1973, and
he is the subject of one of the pieces in "Three Scientists and Their Gods,".
A universe in which reality is inconsistent would be a very interesting
one. Good idea for an sf story!
>
>>
>> It is all non-falsifiable, especially if you constrain our cognitive experience
>> to be consistent yet not relecting external reality.
>
>It is all non-falsifiable, solipsism, objective reality, the
>computer-induced fantasy, all of it. You cannot falsify any such view
>and consequently nothing can serve as objective EVIDENCE for any of
>those views. But that doesn't mean you can't know that objective realism
>is true, just that you could not prove it to an annoying skeptic.
>
Well, if you don't believe anything objective exists, then you certainly
will not accept anything as objective evidence. However, there IS
objective evidence for the solipistic view.
Consider how our internal reality differs from external, objective reality.
Examples include optical illusions and untrustworthy witnesses
(not deliberate liars, but those who honestly saw something that did not
happen.) I content that without this evidence of how two views of reality differ,
solipism would either never be thought of or would not be so popular.
Now, our explanation for these inconsistencies lies in our sensory
equipment, and the wiring of our brain. So there are better explanations
for them than that objective reality does change. However, consider if two
people taking photographs of the same object at the same time get different
results. That would be evidence for solipism. Now, clearly solipsim cannot
be falsified even if there is no evidence, but that does not imply that
there cannot be evidence. After all, objective reality cannot be falsified
either, and there is plenty of evidence for that.
>
>> >
>> >If you don't want to DISCUSS this anymore, I guess you won't respond to
>> >my post. But I do want to emphasize that I am an objective realist, not
>> >a skeptic. My interest in this topic is epistemological, not
>> >ontological.
>> >
>> Well, I'm glad you're not an extreme skeptic, though your example is one
>> that I would expect an extreme skeptic to give. The reason I asked
>> my question is that I feel that there are unsupported beliefs that atheists
>> might hold - but I can't think of any. I put in "reasonably skeptical" to
>> eliminate things like belief in ESP and UFOs that can be held by atheists,
>> but not skeptical ones. I'm still looking, since I consider the belief in an objective
>> reality supported by, but not proven by, the evidence.
>
>And I would claim that no belief that cannot in principle be falsified
>can be supported by evidence. Since any experience whatsoever is
>consistent with solipsism or objective realism, there can be no evidence
>pushing you in one direction or the other. The only thing that can push
>you is your intuition that the real world is objectively real, your
>sense that it is true. That's the reason (I assert) that you DO believe
>in objective realism; nobody except philosophers ever SERIOUSLY ponder
>the any other alternative.
>
>Keith
I'm writing a story about two kids who live in a computer model, and
what happens when the rules of the model get changed. They see
evidence of this, and get pushed into not accepting their objective
reality.
There is definitely evidence of objective reality. Now, one can reject the
evidence, or construct ad hoc explanations for it in terms of
a desired theory, but the evidence is there nonetheless.
BTW - I note that this discussion is exactly what I expected - just plain
old extreme skepticism. Nothing really new at all.
Scott #1045
Don Kresch
>In article <3893cbad...@news.usenetserver.com>,
>Don Kresch <rot13....@xeylax.pbz.getridof.com> wrote:
>>On 26 Jan 2000 18:58:59 -0500, in alt.atheism, Jeffrey A. Young told us all
>>that
>>
>>>In article <9jvu8sg27la291kev...@4ax.com>,
>>>Al Klein <nxy...@ivyyntrarg.pbz> wrote:
>>>>On Wed, 26 Jan 2000 14:01:03 GMT, Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>I may be using the vocabulary of Popper (with the phrase
>>>>>"falsifiability") but all I am saying is that for a fact to count as
>>>>>evidence, we must be able to show that the claim it allegedly supports
>>>>>is more probable GIVEN the fact than given its negation. There is no
>>>>>such fact which supports the more or less reliability of cognitive
>>>>>experience.
>>>>
>>>>If you're a solipsist. If you aren't, your cognitive experience is,
>>>>itself, evidence that it's real.
>>>
>>>Nope.
>
><snip unsupported false assertion>
Which, of course, they were neither unsupported nor false.
Jeffy the petulant child is just unable to understand them, so Jeffy
the petulant child claims they are false.
>
>>> Begs the question.
>
><snip unsupported false assertion>
Same as above.
>
>>>Clearly (And you are equivocating Al. 'Real' vs. 'reliable'.
>
><snip unsupported false assertions>
Same as above.
Looks like Jeffy failed to support his position--again.
Don
aa #51, Knight of BAAWA, DNRC o-, EAC Decryption Squad
Atheist Minister for St. Dogbert
Jeffrey A. Young
Senebyte <wh...@oil.beef.hooked> wrote:
>Jeffrey A. Young wrote in message <86o1gr$fco$1...@ultra0.rdrc.rpi.edu>...
>>In article <D7Kj4.1852$ht4.1...@tw12.nn.bcandid.com>,
>>red foster <red...@mesanet.net> wrote:
>>>Here we see in the [>>>] indent comment by Keith, something important to
>>>understand in discussions with him. His criterion of whether something
>>>exists seems to be that if we utter a statement, the nouns in the statement
>>>refer to things that thereby exist. So when we say God is a imaginary and
>>>Keith says God exists, both can be true within his belief system! All
>>>rational discourse breaks down on this silly notion of existence.
>>
>>Funny thing is, all I see him saying in that comment is that the
>>[square] root of 'minus one' exists. Do you think otherwise?
>>I never took you to be an NMSian atheist Red. (And strawman BTW.)
>
>When does something not exist for you?
Sorry if the following seems like nitpicking or word games, but I say
it is required in order to give you an accurate response to your
question. (And you did want _my_ answer, right?)
First of all there is no "thing" or "something" which does not exist,
because the terms "thing" and "something" entail existence. (If you
think otherwise, you will quickly be tied in knots by folks like
Dr. Sinister.) So we have a language problem from the get-go. And my
answer to the literal question is that there is no "thing" which does
not exist. Thus I take it that your question for me really is "Which
terms _refer_ to _things_, and which terms fail to _refer_ to
_things_?" And that brings us right to the problem of "reference" in
language. (I hope this answers both of your questions above.) Does
the term "X" refer, or fail to refer? And is our language even
sufficient for trying to answer questions about language itself such
as this? These are real difficulties that the simple-minded would
just like dogmatically to dismiss as "nonsense". But any even
half-hearted investigation quickly runs smack into them, whether it
wants to or not.
To summarize: at the present time, there appears to be no definitive
answer to the question of which terms refer and which do not; and any
minimal investigation reveals that at present the practical answer to
the question always comes down to simple agreement -- a term is said
to refer when a set of people agree that it refers -- i.e. it is
a group-subjective concept. Simple as that.
If you want evidence, just look at all the disagreements in a.a
that end up getting reduced to the definitions of the words
being used.
Here is a bonus question back to you: To what, if anything, does
the word 'refer' refer? I.e. does reference-in-language exist
or not? And if so, how?
Jeffrey A. Young
Senebyte <wh...@oil.beef.hooked> wrote:
>For example: we need the set
>of natural numbers but could get by without infinity.
Holy cow, I thought this was completely refuted a few hundred years back!
One word: Calculus.
(Poll please: who reading this
1) thinks I have made the case completely;
2) thinks I am completely full of it on this question;
3) thinks I need to explain the connection between Calculus and
infinity;
4) other, please explain.
Thanks.)
Jeff Heidman
Color me simple-minded then.
I think it is a bunch of bullshit that people like Silly-String and Jeffy come up
with in order to avoid having to answer the hard questions about their
god-beliefs.
Something akin to "Why is your God such an asshole?" -- Answer from Young "What do
you mean by God? Blah, blah, blah, atheist do not exist, what does "refer" mean,
watch me write six paragraphs that say nothing, yadda, yadda, yadda..."
Then, when you try to pin the syphilitic turd down, he whips out his
Dial-A-Fallacy and starts screaming out fallacies in the vain hope that someone,
anyone, will be impressed with his ability to call anything and everything a
fallacy.
--
Jeff Heidman
People who want to share their religious views with you almost never want you to
share yours with them.
--Dave Barry
red foster
Brian F. King wrote in message <389081f6....@news.ncinter.net>...
>Keith Johnson <co...@pe.net> wrote:
>>> ><SNIP>
>>Similarly, I would claim that Truth exists (in all its glory)
>
>Truth(tm)? As a concept, certainly.
>
An undescribed or incoherent utterance is not a concept, any more than an
untested hypothesis is a theory. At least, when I look at "concept" that's
what I conclude. Whether Truth (upper case T supplied by Keith,
distinguishing it from truth) exists as a concept depends on whether Keith
can describe it coherently.
red foster
Keith Johnson wrote in message <38904CE7...@pe.net>...
...>
>Given that taste is relative to the taster, the sentence "pizza tastes
>great" is meaningless unless there is a way to determine who the taster
>is not that way with claims of facts.
That's because you are setting up a straw man or false analogy. THe sentence
"pizza tastes great is given meaning not by knowing who the taster is, but
by knowing what the criteria of "tastes great" are. Of course, the
experience of mouthwatering is one relatively common measure. The same is
true in evaluation "Statement A is true". Not that it's mouthwatering, but
that the criteria are important and we can have common criteria. Predictive
accuracy is one common criterion within science. "Agrees with Genisis 1 to
11 is a common criterion within Bible literalism." What are *your* criteria?
What are *The* criteria, if there are absolute criteria?
red foster
Keith Johnson wrote in message <38906337...@pe.net>...
>
>
>red foster wrote:
>>
>> Senebyte wrote in message <86nlc7$6tm$1...@epos.tesco.net>...
>> >>Senebyte wrote:
>> >>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
>> ...
>> >>> >It seems to me that the notion of "provisional" truth implies the
>> >>> >existence of an absolute truth, even if we only approach it
>> >>> >asymptotically.
>> >>>
root
>> of
>> >>> minus one over infinity therefore that root of a negative must exist
and
>> not
>> >>> be imaginary.
>> >>
>> >>one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
>> >
>> >That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
>> >The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
>>
>> Here we see in the >> indent comment by Keith, something important to
>> understand in discussions with him. His criterion of whether something
>> exists seems to be that if we utter a statement, the nouns in the
statement
>> refer to things that thereby exist. So when we say God is a imaginary and
>> Keith says God exists, both can be true within his belief system! All
>> rational discourse breaks down on this silly notion of existence.
>
>least in this context). The so-called imaginary numbers exist every bit
>as much as the Reals do; both of them are abstractions which have
>application to real world phenomenon. Imaginary numbers play a role in
>Quantum mechanics and in the study of electrical circuitry.
>
>I don't think your comment is accurate in any event, but in this case it
>is way of the mark.
I didn't say anything about the existence or nonexistence of imaginary
numbers. I said your notion of existence is silly.
Sniper
>
> In article <86q44i$33r$2...@barcode.tesco.net>,
> Senebyte <wh...@oil.beef.hooked> wrote:
> >Jeffrey A. Young wrote in message <86o1gr$fco$1...@ultra0.rdrc.rpi.edu>...
> >>In article <D7Kj4.1852$ht4.1...@tw12.nn.bcandid.com>,
> >>red foster <red...@mesanet.net> wrote:
> >>>understand in discussions with him. His criterion of whether something
> >>>exists seems to be that if we utter a statement, the nouns in the statement
> >>>refer to things that thereby exist. So when we say God is a imaginary and
> >>>Keith says God exists, both can be true within his belief system! All
> >>>rational discourse breaks down on this silly notion of existence.
> >>
> >>[square] root of 'minus one' exists. Do you think otherwise?
> >>I never took you to be an NMSian atheist Red. (And strawman BTW.)
> >
> >I am curious, Jeff: what meaning do you give to the term "Does not exist"?
> >When does something not exist for you?
>
> Sorry if the following seems like nitpicking or word games, but I say
> it is required in order to give you an accurate response to your
> question. (And you did want _my_ answer, right?)
>
> First of all there is no "thing" or "something" which does not exist,
> because the terms "thing" and "something" entail existence. (If you
> think otherwise, you will quickly be tied in knots by folks like
> Dr. Sinister.) So we have a language problem from the get-go. And my
> answer to the literal question is that there is no "thing" which does
> not exist. Thus I take it that your question for me really is "Which
> terms _refer_ to _things_, and which terms fail to _refer_ to
> _things_?" And that brings us right to the problem of "reference" in
> language. (I hope this answers both of your questions above.) Does
> the term "X" refer, or fail to refer? And is our language even
> sufficient for trying to answer questions about language itself such
> as this? These are real difficulties that the simple-minded would
> half-hearted investigation quickly runs smack into them, whether it
> wants to or not.
Fine, then drop the word "thing" or "something" and answer this:
What does not exist, in your opinion? Please don't tell me about
all the possible different meanings of the word "opinion", just
tell me what _you_ think does _not_ exist.
P.S.: I'm not being hostile, just asking. :-)
[snip]
Senebyte
>Senebyte wrote:
>> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388F06A2...@pe.net>...
>> >Senebyte wrote:
>> >> Keith Johnson wrote in message <388D3EB2...@pe.net>...
>> >> >seems implicit in the word "verified".
>> >>
>> >> No: in the case of untestable solipsism being True, the impression of an external
>> >> reality could be given that is pragmatically verifiable, believable and yet be False.
>> >> Think of someone trapped in good VR: how would they deduce the truth of the
>> >> real world, a real world that may be afflicted with fundamental uncertainty and lack
>> >> an absolute Truth?
>> >
>> >How would the impression of an external world be "verified" then? It
>> >seems to me that "verified" entails that the idea is true; if you have
>> >not shown the idea is true you have not verified it.
>>
>> By the normal means of pragmatic verification: consistent, repeatable, falsifiable
>> evidence. Why should verified mean True to a pragmatist, who does not seek or
>> need Truth?
>
>The pragmatist claims that "verified" means "shown to be consistent,
>repeatable...". When the pragmatist says that "X has been shown to be
>consistent..." does he claim that statement is true or merely that the
>statement "has been shown to be consistent..."? If he claims the
>statement is true, then is is concerned with truth.
[Copy and paste time]
Why should verified mean True to a pragmatist, who does not seek or
need Truth?
>Nobody can make any assertion at all without being concerned about the
>truth.
Wrong: assertions may be tools of purpose alone and be unsupported by truth.
>> >I do not think it is like that at all. For one thing, the root of minus
>> >one DOES exist; it is just not part of the set of Real Numbers.
>>
>> That which is not real does not exist, by definition. It is a tool only.
>> The root of minus one is given the symbol "i" because it is Imaginary.
>
>You are confused by the mathematical jargon. Real numbers are no more
>real than imaginary numbers; Real Numbers is just a name given to a
>certain set of numbers. All numbers are imaginary in the sense of being
>mental objects.
All concepts are mental objects and by your terms of definition nothing is
real. This is unhelpful and uncommunicative. Convention holds that not all
numbers are vital for the description of what we observe. As description
develops we cannot assert that these numbers of convenience will remain
with us so we cannot grant them the appellation "real".
>> >Here's what it seems to ME you are saying: not being omniscient, we
>> >cannot have perfect knowledge of the truth, thus depending on how
>> >accurate we can afford to be, we choose to make working assumptions
>> >rather than testing EVERY part of our model. My point is that no matter
>> >how much time you have there are certain parts of your model that you
>> >can never test.
>>
>> I have said nothing of the sort.
>> I have made and do not make acknowledgement of the plausibility of omniscience,
>> of the existence of perfect knowledge, the existence of Truth or that they have any
>> meaning for a pragmatist. The assumptions a pragmatist makes concerns
>> the conditional acceptance of prior observations and rationales over the coherent
>> possibility that these are unsound. But they do not equate to axioms for these
>> are not taken up in the face of a coherent alternative.
>
>I stand by my contention that every assertion implicitly recognizes the
>existence of truth; when you say that I have misinterpreted your
>remarks, you are not just saying that the claim "Keith misconstrued my
>comments" works, you are saying I really did misconstrue your comments,
>it seems to me.
That message would require a world view shared between us both as it deals
with the ultimate foundations of world views (Truth). I have no evidence to that
effect and considerable weighing against it so I cannot and have not raised
the issue of Truth as regards you.
>> >On this view, objective realism is NOT pragmatically accepted, since the
>> >counter proposal of solipsism is as logical and coherent as realism.
>>
>> It is not because it is unempirical and offers no practical value, hence it is
>> illogical within the pragmatic perspective.
>
>Realism is equally unempirical; you cannot observe an object
>"objectively" existing.
"Object" is laden with preconceptions of separate-ness and the neutrality
of the ideal observer. The pragmatist observes phenomena and begins with
the precept that the source of some or all are beyond the mind, which is
taken up unchallenged.
>And solipsism would have a practical value if
>you wanted to be an amoral monster; the notion that the other people
>around you don't really exist could assuage your conscience when you
>were treating them like crap.
As such is not required by all (or most) who wish to be monsters the value
must be connected to individual states of mind not general classifications
of philosophy such as "pragmatist" or "solipsist" and so offers support for
neither.
>> The solipsist must additionally offer a plausible description of the mental
>> attribute(s) that constrains their imagination to this illusion against the
>> common acceptance that imagination is an icon of lack of constraint or
>> boundary, or choose a more acceptable descriptive term. Pragmatic thought
>> will suffer no such excess through adherence to the axiom of realism.
>
>Why should the solipsist have to offer any such thing. The solipsist
>claims his mind produces the illusion objectivists call reality, he
>claims this as a brute fact and offers no explanation for how the mind
>accomplishes this mystery. The objectivist (at least if he is an
>atheist) fails to explain how it is that objective reality came into
>existence nor what keeps it from just poofing away.
Both the objectivist and the solipsist may reasonably hold that some
matters stand unrevealed but are potentially explainable. But the solipsist
has in addition presented an actual paradox in that they claim
fundamental oneness with the source of phenomena but must also claim
to be profoundly apart and out of control of the mind that is supposedly
theirs.
Senebyte
Senebyte
>In article <86q44h$33r$1...@barcode.tesco.net>,
>Senebyte <wh...@oil.beef.hooked> wrote:
>
>>For example: we need the set
>>of natural numbers but could get by without infinity.
>
>Holy cow, I thought this was completely refuted a few hundred years back!
>
>One word: Calculus.
A little too much brevity, perhaps. State any term in calculus that cannot
be restated without recourse to the term "infinity".
Senebyte