NATURALISM --> NIHILISM
Matthew Alexander Colvin
Naturalism, for those of you who do not know, is the predominant brand of
atheism, and the one that permeates our educational and social
institutions. It is also the brand of atheism that is most often
advocated on this group.
Naturalism is based on the following assertions, some of which are
"proved" by various means, others of which are taken as givens:
1) Matter is all there is. There is no God, no spirit, nothing but
matter. Matter is eternal. (Energy is just another form of matter, by
E=mc^2).
2) The universe is a a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed system
(it is not open to reordering from without -- all changes in it come about
from an cause that is itself a part of the universe).
3) Man is a very complicated machine (system of matter). We don't yet
understand the chemical and physical properties that interrelate to make
personality.
4) Death is the extinction of personality (the end of those chemical and
physical properties that make up personality).
5) History is a sequence of events, causes and effects, without an
all-encompassing purpose.
6) Ethics is related only to man. It is not transcendent (nothing is
transcendent).
Let us examine some of these points for contradictions that will lead us
to nihilism.
Naturalism states that matter is all there is (1), and that the
universe is a system of events of cause and effect (2). It is not open to
reordering from without, since there is nothing without. The material
cosmos is all-encompassing. Then we look at proposition 3, which states
that man is complex machine.
The closed universe is contingent -- events are determined by
something (a cause). Man is self conscious (we are discussing naturalism
right now, need I prove this point any further?) and naturalists believe
that man's actions affect things. Man acts significantly.
But in a closed universe, the only things that can cause change
are things that already are -- the present causes the future, which causes
the next future, ad infinitum. Perhaps we don't understand exactly how,
but nevertheless, this contingency is a necessary property of a closed
universe.
So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free will
is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand: I buy a
newspaper. Did I choose to do so? No, a chain of events that I didn't
recognize caused me to buy the paper. "OK," the naturalists say, "so you
didn't CHOOSE to buy the paper. But you thought you chose it. You have
an illusion of free will. Isn't that good enough?"
No. Take the honorable Mr. Dahmer. He murders children and
sticks their bodies in his refrigerator. Did he choose to do it? No, it
was a chain of events that caused him to do it. He didn't recognize the
events that caused him to do so, and perhaps they were very complicated.
In fact they might be so complicated that no one could unravel them and
prove it. But it is a closed universe (2). So his action had to be
caused, not willed. How can he be held accountable? He is not
responsible for his own actions.
Is this an acceptable view? I don't think so; it is not
practical, nor is is consistent. Let us examine another brand of
naturalism, that which claims that effects is caused, but determined by
chance. An action provokes a reaction, but not the same reaction every
time. Is this an explanation for Mr. Dahmer's behavior or for my purchase
of the newspaper? No, it is an absence of explanation. It is a denial of
free will, but it doesn't present an alternative. Man is self-conscious,
but he can't choose his actions. If man is contingent, if he has no free
will, then he is meaningless -- he is not really conscious. So the first
reason why naturalism is really nihilism is that it doesn't offer a basis
for man to act significantly. Naturalism condemns man to existence not as
a self-conscious individual capable of self-determination, but as a
machine, a plaything of contingency.
Can you accept this? (Naturalism says you don't have the power
to, but anyway...) Does this view satisfy your mind?
To you naturalists out there: Can you refute what I have asserted
here? Do you disagree with any of my six tenets of naturalism? Can you
disagree with any of them without contradicting the first point, which is
not open to debate, as it is the premise of naturalism?
I've decided that I want to bite off naturalism a little bit at a
time, so I'll leave this post on the table for a while before moving on to
another proof that naturalism leads to nihilism when followed logically.
Matt Colvin
Cad and Bounder
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
Matthew: I'll respond to some of your points later on, but right now
I'd like to head you off at the pass, so to speak. You keep tossing around
the word "nihilism" as though it's some dire, awful, terrifying
monster under the bed. And indeed Flew (in A Dictionary of Philosophy)
notes that the word is usually employed in a pejorative sense
(without a lot of precision).
Let's check the dictionary, and see which if any of the various meanings
are applicable:
Word: nihilism
ni-hil-ism \'nuE-(h)e-,liz-em, 'neE-\ n
[G nihilismus, fr. L nihil nothing -- more at NIL]
(1817)
1a: a viewpoint that traditional values and beliefs are unfounded and that existence is
senseless and useless
1b: a doctrine that denies any objective ground of truth and esp. of moral truths
2a (1): a doctrine or belief that conditions in the social organization are so bad as to
make destruction desirable for its own sake independent of any constructive program or
possibility
2a2 cap: the program of a 19th century Russian party advocating revolutionary reform and
using terrorism and assassination
2b: TERRORISM
Meaning 1a is far too broad - naturalism has nothing to say about
"traditional values and beliefs" per se. It does not state that
"existence is senseless and useless": on the contrary, it asserts that
existence is a domain of meaningful study (rather than being a mystery,
as in many traditional religions) and that we (humans) exist for a very
precise use: the preservation of our species (or, more precisely, our
individual genes). Meanings 2a(1) and 2a(2) are sociopolitical terms
which are, again, irrelevant to our discussion. 2b is an interesting
linking which I was not aware of before checking Websters. So of the
five distinct meanings, four are clearly irrelevant. However, note that
all four convey strongly negative messages.
Let's look at 1b. Naturalism clearly does not "deny any objective
ground of truth", at least in the physical world. In the moral domain,
naturalism suggests that there are clear objective grounds for
statements about morality, based on psychological, sociological, and
related analyses. It does deny morality any standing as an independent
epistemological domain, which is (I think) what the writer of the last
four words of 1b was driving at.
In summary, the primary connection between naturalism and nihilism is
that naturalism denies moral truths an epistemologically independent
status. This is, of course, what we've been arguing all along. Insofar
as naturalism conflicts with certain religious traditions, it may be
regarded as treating these traditions as "unfounded", but such a claim
is based on the factual claims involved, not the mere status of the
claim as "traditional". (In any case, the periodic challenging of
traditional values and beliefs seems to have positive consequences. US
readers seem to feel that way about 1776......;-)
Obviously someone who assumes that there is a deity which has a purpose
and use for the world and humankind and which is the source of all
moral truth will assert that naturalism fulfills all of senses 1a and
1b. Naturally, this cuts little ice with an atheist. Equally obviously,
such an argument cannot be used to support the existence of a deity.
(Question-begging or circular: take your pick.)
Now, what was all that about nihilism?
---
Geoff Arnold, PC-NFS architect, Sun Select. (geoff....@East.Sun.COM)
# "Argumentum ad baculum" (lit. "argument from a cudgel") An argument #
# which contains an implicit threat. E.g. in _The Godfather_ "making #
# an offer you can't refuse". [Antony Flew: Dict. of Philosophy] #
Robert Beauchaine
> No. Take the honorable Mr. Dahmer. He murders children and
>sticks their bodies in his refrigerator. Did he choose to do it? No, it
>was a chain of events that caused him to do it. He didn't recognize the
>events that caused him to do so, and perhaps they were very complicated.
>In fact they might be so complicated that no one could unravel them and
>prove it. But it is a closed universe (2). So his action had to be
>caused, not willed. How can he be held accountable? He is not
But we, via our illusion of free will, are still under the
obligation to remove Mr. Dahmer from society if he persists in
stuffing people behind the mustard. Whether he is ultimately
"responsible" or not is orthogonal to the issue. He is still a
menace that must be dealt with.
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
Bob Beauchaine bo...@vice.ICO.TEK.COM
"Brains are wonderful things. Speaking from the admittedly biased
point of view of a large-brained primate, I would say that there is
no better solution to one's environment -- no claw so sharp, no wing
so light that it can bestow the same adaptive benefits as a heavy
ball of gray matter" ... Donald Johanson
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Jim Perry
Geoff's already right on the mark with respect to "nihilism" here (I
would add that "naturalism" is not a term I've seen used much, though
I seem to agree with it based on what we've seen here). I'll cancel
my comments on "nihilism" and jump into the ring more directly.
I agree with your enumerated points, and your reasoning through...
> Man is self conscious (we are discussing naturalism
>right now, need I prove this point any further?) and naturalists believe
>that man's actions affect things. Man acts significantly.
"Significantly" is a significant term here, and you'd best clarify it.
> So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free will
>is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand: I buy a
>newspaper. Did I choose to do so? No, a chain of events that I didn't
>recognize caused me to buy the paper.
Yes. You *experienced* that chain of events as a choice, however.
For instance, you are by nature (because of prior chains of events, of
course) interested in world affairs and the paper has a headline story
concerning a revolution in China which you hadn't heard about yet. In
that situation it was entirely predictable that you would buy that
paper (someone, your wife, say, who knew you well would have predicted
it). Of course, most real-life choices are influenced by so many
details as not to be predictable in detail, but one can predict
trends.
> "OK," the naturalists say, "so you
>didn't CHOOSE to buy the paper. But you thought you chose it. You have
>an illusion of free will. Isn't that good enough?"
No, the "naturalists" won't say that unless they have a theistic
affection for the notion of "free will". Absent an omnibenevolent God
and the problem of evil, "free will" doesn't have much meaning (in my
opinion).
> No. Take the honorable Mr. Dahmer.
> How can he be held accountable? He is not
>responsible for his own actions.
That's right. His programming broke down or he was poorly programmed
(for instance, he was programmed that homosexuality was evil, yet
turned out to be homosexual; this contradiction seems to have broken
him). He was a sociopath, his social functioning was diseased. He
can be held "accountable" by society in being denied further benefit
of free membership in society, or, preferably, should be 'repaired'.
[Mechanistic/programming terminology necessarily oversimplified here].
> Is this an acceptable view? I don't think so; it is not
>practical, nor is is consistent.
Meaning, you don't like it. It is not consistent with our current
criminal justice system (wonder of efficiency that it is), nor with
traditional theological ideas of sinfulness, but it appears to me to
be true, and thus both practical and consistent with reality. Even
our courts recognize that insanity reduces accountability.
[the next bit was a little choppy]
>Man is self-conscious, but he can't choose his actions.
He can't choose other than according to his nature. I will almost
inevitably choose to follow up a posting on this general topic, if it
is lucid and hasn't already been sufficiently addressed (I cancelled
my comments on "nihilism" on seeing Geoff had already done a fine
job). I will inevitably choose the blueberry ice-cream at my favorite
stand, when it's available. I can't choose to go out and kill the
next person I see.
>If man is contingent, if he has no free
>will, then he is meaningless -- he is not really conscious.
Your conclusion, based on a theistic conception of free will and
consciousness. I don't think I have free will in the sort of sense
you mean (I think the term is meaningless), and I think I am
conscious. In fact, I think the same is true of you...
> Can you accept this? (Naturalism says you don't have the power
>to, but anyway...) Does this view satisfy your mind?
Yes. Barring the theologically-biased value judgments, most of this
satisfies me. Aside from the conclusion that this somehow involves
the generally-negatively-associated "nihilism", or obviates
consciousness, this generally seems to describe the way I view the
world.
--
Jim Perry pe...@dsinc.com Decision Support, Inc., Matthews NC
"I wanted you to explain to me your customs concerning blood vengeance."
- _Spoken Albanian_ (travellers' phrase book), unit 17
George Heintzelman
>"proved" by various means, others of which are taken as givens:
>
>1) Matter is all there is. There is no God, no spirit, nothing but
>matter. Matter is eternal. (Energy is just another form of matter, by
>E=mc^2).
that matter is another form of energy, but I'll agree.
>2) The universe is a a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed system
>(it is not open to reordering from without -- all changes in it come about
>from an cause that is itself a part of the universe).
Yes.
>3) Man is a very complicated machine (system of matter). We don't yet
>understand the chemical and physical properties that interrelate to make
>personality.
Yep, though we've made a start.
>4) Death is the extinction of personality (the end of those chemical and
>physical properties that make up personality).
Death is fuzzy. When you're talking about death of a human
being, this is one possible usage. I'll accept it, but I'm not sure
that it's a 'tenet' of naturalism. And I don't really want to get into
'what is life' again.
>5) History is a sequence of events, causes and effects, without an
>all-encompassing purpose.
Well, history is the discipline concerned with recording those
events, but you're right on the causes, effects, and purpose.
>6) Ethics is related only to man. It is not transcendent (nothing is
>transcendent).
Well, I'm not sure of that. It IS relative, surely not
absolute, however.
>Let us examine some of these points for contradictions that will lead us
>to nihilism.
> Naturalism states that matter is all there is (1), and that the
>universe is a system of events of cause and effect (2). It is not open to
>reordering from without, since there is nothing without. The material
>cosmos is all-encompassing. Then we look at proposition 3, which states
>that man is complex machine.
> The closed universe is contingent -- events are determined by
>something (a cause).
Why is the universe itself, as a whole, contingent? If I grant
that, I have to grant a causal entity. Nope. I won't let you slip that
in there unnoticed. :)
>Man is self conscious (we are discussing naturalism
>right now, need I prove this point any further?) and naturalists believe
>that man's actions affect things. Man acts significantly.
Just as long as you don't try to change the meaning of
significantly into teleologically later.
> But in a closed universe, the only things that can cause change
>are things that already are -- the present causes the future, which causes
>the next future, ad infinitum. Perhaps we don't understand exactly how,
>but nevertheless, this contingency is a necessary property of a closed
>universe.
> So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free will
>is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand: I buy a
>newspaper. Did I choose to do so? No, a chain of events that I didn't
>recognize caused me to buy the paper. "OK," the naturalists say, "so you
>didn't CHOOSE to buy the paper. But you thought you chose it. You have
>an illusion of free will. Isn't that good enough?"
And here you've tried to do just that.
Man DOES act significantly, in that he is involved in causal
chains, but he does not act significantly in that he does not behave
for any purpose, except perhaps his own. Self-aware beings, which we
clearly are, can certainly create purposes of their own, without
having them imposed by another, determining being. Nor does the fact
(for the purposes of this discussion) that they have no choice about
their purposes, actions, or 'choices', bother me in the least.
> No. Take the honorable Mr. Dahmer. He murders children and
>sticks their bodies in his refrigerator. Did he choose to do it? No, it
>was a chain of events that caused him to do it. He didn't recognize the
>events that caused him to do so, and perhaps they were very complicated.
>In fact they might be so complicated that no one could unravel them and
>prove it. But it is a closed universe (2). So his action had to be
>caused, not willed. How can he be held accountable? He is not
>responsible for his own actions.
Nope. This is why I don't subscirbe to the 'punishment' theory
of justice, but rather to the attempt at rehabilitation and prevent
the criminal from inflicting any more harm on society.
> Is this an acceptable view? I don't think so; it is not
>practical, nor is is consistent.
I disagree. This is precisely the view I hold (though I must
note, for consistency, that I do not think the universe is purely
deterministic. It IS mechanistic, in the quantum sense.).
It seems entirely consistent to me, and serves me perfectly
well. What objections do you have to it?
[...]
>If man is contingent, if he has no free
>will, then he is meaningless -- he is not really conscious. So the first
>reason why naturalism is really nihilism is that it doesn't offer a basis
>for man to act significantly.
I think I really need a clarification of what you mean by
this. You seem (to me at least) to be assuming that lack of teleology
is an unnacceptable result. Since this lack is a premise of
naturalism, you are (very naughtily) assuming your conclusion. I don't
have a problem with not having a higher purpose -- we make our own,
from our own perspective, and no, we don't have any choice about it,
but life goes on anyway, and we are driven by our biological
imperatives to make the best of it.
>Naturalism condemns man to existence not as
>a self-conscious individual capable of self-determination, but as a
>machine, a plaything of contingency.
Yup, sure thing. That's life.
> Can you accept this? (Naturalism says you don't have the power
>to, but anyway...) Does this view satisfy your mind?
What you need to add into your conception, which is mostly
correct (except for your objections), is the creation of purpose by
self-aware beings. We DO have purposes in mind, our own purposes. I
have the purpose of defending my philosophy in this post. You are
trying to convince me I'm being silly. I'm studying to get my PhD
because I want to pursue a scientific career. And so on. Just because
we have no 'choice' about them does not mean that these purposes drive
us any less.
What naturalism DOES imply is that there is no imposition of a
'higher purpose' from some external agency, a belief which I fully
endorse.
George Heintzelman
geo...@mit.edu
Tony Barbour
: For about a week now, I've discussed naturalism on this group.
: atheism, and the one that permeates our educational and social
: institutions. It is also the brand of atheism that is most often
: advocated on this group.
I never really thought of myself as a naturalist, but I seem to agree with a
lot of your descriptions, so maybe by taking a stab at a reply, I'll clarify
my own beliefs to myself.
: Naturalism is based on the following assertions, some of which are
: "proved" by various means, others of which are taken as givens:
: 1) Matter is all there is. There is no God, no spirit, nothing but
: matter. Matter is eternal. (Energy is just another form of matter, by
: E=mc^2).
I'm not a physicist, but I find it hard to imagine anything that isn't made of
matter or energy. I wouldn't rule out some non-matter/energy "thing", but its
existance seems no more important to me than a hiding god or unicorn on Venus
would.
: 2) The universe is a a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed system
: (it is not open to reordering from without -- all changes in it come about
: from an cause that is itself a part of the universe).
Again, taking a practical, non-quantum, view of my physical world, I believe
that all events have causes, whether those causes can be detected or not.
This does not imply that I believe that the beginning of life, the universe,
and everything had to have a cause. I'm willing to admit that I dont know
where all of this matter came from, and its not important enough to me to
spend my entire life looking for answers. I'll let other people look and
publish their evidence, and I'll form a belief based on that.
: 3) Man is a very complicated machine (system of matter). We don't yet
: understand the chemical and physical properties that interrelate to make
: personality.
: 4) Death is the extinction of personality (the end of those chemical and
: physical properties that make up personality).
Ok. (Although I think I've met some people who seemed very much alive, but
still had no personality :-)
: 5) History is a sequence of events, causes and effects, without an
: all-encompassing purpose.
Human history, to me, seems like first, man's fight for survival followed by
man's fight for control (of his world, other men, etc).
: 6) Ethics is related only to man. It is not transcendent (nothing is
: transcendent).
Sure, ethics is a concept developed by man. Other of the more advanced
species have also developed their own ethics.
: Let us examine some of these points for contradictions that will lead us
: to nihilism.
: Naturalism states that matter is all there is (1), and that the
: universe is a system of events of cause and effect (2). It is not open to
: reordering from without, since there is nothing without. The material
: cosmos is all-encompassing. Then we look at proposition 3, which states
: that man is complex machine.
: The closed universe is contingent -- events are determined by
: something (a cause). Man is self conscious (we are discussing naturalism
: right now, need I prove this point any further?) and naturalists believe
: that man's actions affect things. Man acts significantly.
: But in a closed universe, the only things that can cause change
: are things that already are -- the present causes the future, which causes
: the next future, ad infinitum. Perhaps we don't understand exactly how,
: but nevertheless, this contingency is a necessary property of a closed
: universe.
: So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free will
: is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand: I buy a
: newspaper. Did I choose to do so? No, a chain of events that I didn't
: recognize caused me to buy the paper. "OK," the naturalists say, "so you
: didn't CHOOSE to buy the paper. But you thought you chose it. You have
: an illusion of free will. Isn't that good enough?"
I think that although free will is an illusion, man does still make choices.
A man uses his experience, his reason, and his intellect to select from an
often vast number of choices, the course of action that he believes will bring
him the best outcome. I by no means consider this to be a trivial
accomplishment.
As to acting "significantly", why should free will be necessary to perform
"significant" acts? Am I missing an implication in a definition of
"significant"?
: No. Take the honorable Mr. Dahmer. He murders children and
: sticks their bodies in his refrigerator. Did he choose to do it? No, it
: was a chain of events that caused him to do it. He didn't recognize the
: events that caused him to do so, and perhaps they were very complicated.
: In fact they might be so complicated that no one could unravel them and
: prove it. But it is a closed universe (2). So his action had to be
: caused, not willed. How can he be held accountable? He is not
: responsible for his own actions.
Certainly Dahmer is to be held responsible for his actions. Humans in society
learn (or need to learn) at an early age that when we live together in a
society, acting in ways which are harmful to that society lead to detrimental
effects on the offending individual. I think that in Dahmer's case, this
education, or the reasoning process to use the education was deficient. If
the reasoning process or eductional deficiency can be corrected, society
attempts to reform the person, and that person can rejoin society. If the
reasoning process or educational deficiency is beyond help, the person is
seperated from society, for the good of society.
: Is this an acceptable view? I don't think so; it is not
: practical, nor is is consistent. Let us examine another brand of
: naturalism, that which claims that effects is caused, but determined by
: chance. An action provokes a reaction, but not the same reaction every
: time. Is this an explanation for Mr. Dahmer's behavior or for my purchase
: of the newspaper? No, it is an absence of explanation. It is a denial of
: free will, but it doesn't present an alternative. Man is self-conscious,
: but he can't choose his actions. If man is contingent, if he has no free
: will, then he is meaningless -- he is not really conscious. So the first
: reason why naturalism is really nihilism is that it doesn't offer a basis
: for man to act significantly. Naturalism condemns man to existence not as
: a self-conscious individual capable of self-determination, but as a
: machine, a plaything of contingency.
: Can you accept this? (Naturalism says you don't have the power
: to, but anyway...) Does this view satisfy your mind?
I dont base my beliefs on what I find acceptable. There are things that I
dont like about myself, but that doesn't lead to my dismissing them as false,
just because I find them distasteful.
: To you naturalists out there: Can you refute what I have asserted
: here? Do you disagree with any of my six tenets of naturalism? Can you
: disagree with any of them without contradicting the first point, which is
: not open to debate, as it is the premise of naturalism?
I haven't spent hours pondering all of the implications of each of your
tenets, but they seem ok to me. I just jumped into this on a whim.
:
: I've decided that I want to bite off naturalism a little bit at a
: time, so I'll leave this post on the table for a while before moving on to
: another proof that naturalism leads to nihilism when followed logically.
: Matt Colvin
: Cad and Bounder
Tony Barbour
Matthew Alexander Colvin
> In article <2hjhqh$i...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>
pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
> > No. Take the honorable Mr. Dahmer. He murders children and
> >sticks their bodies in his refrigerator. Did he choose to do it? No,
it
> >was a chain of events that caused him to do it. He didn't recognize
the
> >events that caused him to do so, and perhaps they were very
complicated.
> >In fact they might be so complicated that no one could unravel them and
> >prove it. But it is a closed universe (2). So his action had to be
> >caused, not willed. How can he be held accountable? He is not
>
> But we, via our illusion of free will, are still under the
> obligation to remove Mr. Dahmer from society if he persists in
> stuffing people behind the mustard. Whether he is ultimately
> "responsible" or not is orthogonal to the issue. He is still a
> menace that must be dealt with.
>
Are you stating that we should accept free will even though it is
false? We are under no obligation to do anything unless we have free
will, and we can't punish Mr. Dahmer by choice. So how does he get
punished? As a result of a chain of events. Nowhere in the process does
free will enter into the picture.
What value does this give man? None. Naturalism places no value
at all on man. As a conscious being then, man is dead (has no
personality). He cannot effect his own destiny and he can do nothing
significant. In fact, he cannot "do" anything. He is simply a machine,
whether a capricious or determined one. He has no self-consciousness and
no self-determination.
And without self-determination, there can be no morality.
Morality is therefore an illusion, according to consistent naturalism.
So far, I believe I have shown that naturalism provides no basis
for free will. Now that free will is gone, man has no value. He is
unique, sure. But so is a dog. Or any other piece of matter. And there
is also no basis for morality. That's three legs knocked out from under
the six-legged chair -- free will, man's value, and morality. Here are
the ones that remain, but which I think will eventually fall too:
knowledge, truth, and reality itself.
Ray Ingles
>Naturalism, for those of you who do not know, is the predominant brand of
>atheism, and the one that permeates our educational and social
>institutions. It is also the brand of atheism that is most often
>advocated on this group.
Well, depending on yhow you define it, it may have a plurality, but I
really don't think *any* brand of atheism has a mojority on a.a...
> Naturalism is based on the following assertions, some of which are
>"proved" by various means, others of which are taken as givens:
>
>1) Matter is all there is. There is no God, no spirit, nothing but
>matter. Matter is eternal. (Energy is just another form of matter, by
>E=mc^2).
Except for the caveat that it's more correct to say that mass and energy
are different aspects of the same thing, this is consistent with all we've
observed.
I would prefer to phrase it less prejudiciously as, "Mass/energy is the
only thing necessary to explain all that has been, ere now, observed."
>2) The universe is a a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed system
>(it is not open to reordering from without -- all changes in it come about
>from an cause that is itself a part of the universe).
Well, seeing as there most of us haven't seen any effect that required
an extra-universal cause, that's the default assumption. That is not to
say that such causes would not be accepted if evidence were shown...
[stuff deleted]
>Let us examine some of these points for contradictions that will lead us
>to nihilism.
> Naturalism states that matter is all there is (1), and that the
>universe is a system of events of cause and effect (2). It is not open to
>reordering from without, since there is nothing without. The material
>cosmos is all-encompassing. Then we look at proposition 3, which states
>that man is complex machine.
> The closed universe is contingent -- events are determined by
>something (a cause). Man is self conscious (we are discussing naturalism
>right now, need I prove this point any further?) and naturalists believe
>that man's actions affect things. Man acts significantly.
If, by this, you mean, "It is significant (i.e. it means something) to
speak of a person "acting" or "choosing", then yes, this is true. If
you have some other meaning, please let us know.
> But in a closed universe, the only things that can cause change
>are things that already are -- the present causes the future, which causes
>the next future, ad infinitum. Perhaps we don't understand exactly how,
>but nevertheless, this contingency is a necessary property of a closed
>universe.
> So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free will
>is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand: I buy a
>newspaper. Did I choose to do so? No, a chain of events that I didn't
>recognize caused me to buy the paper.
Here, of course, is where the misunderstanding is. To help clear it up,
I shall shamelessly steal from _The_Mind's_I_ by Bennett and Hofstadter.
(I think you would be well advised to read this book, since it covers
the current "naturalist" thinking on minds and brains.)
We could, with a little work, build a mechanical computer out of dominos.
The lines of dominos would have little motors that would lift them back
up after a certain amount of time; until reset, they would obviously not
be able to carry a signal. (If this seems to you rather like a mechanical
analogue of how neurons in the brain work, give yourself a gold star.)
If you doubt a mechanical computer is possible, let me know.
Let us suppose we have one. It is built to take a number, divide it by
two, then by three, etc. If ever the remainder is zero, it will stop.
We give it the number 173, and set it off.
You're looking at it, and halfway through the program, you say, "Why
hasn't this line of dominos ever fallen? Lots of others have, but not this
one. Why not?"
Now, there are two ways to answer this question. I can give you the
physical equations that describe the motion of the dominos, and show that,
given those initial conditions, the line will not be triggered by this
time. It would take some serious effort, but it could be done.
Or, I could say, "That line is in the subsystem that halts the computer.
Since 173 is prime, the remainder will not be zero until the counter gets
to 173. So, that line has not triggered, since the counter is only at 57."
(For a less abstract example, consider the relations between the bare
silicon of the computer you're reading this on, the assembly language that
is executing on that silicon, and the high-level programming language that
your newsreader was written in.)
Both explanations are entirely correct, but apply on different levels.
Analogously, we can speak of the physical actions that go on in someone's
brain at a molecular level (or even smaller, if desired) *or* we can
speak of the higher level generalizations that we ourselves experience
as thoughts and feelings.
In this view, you both chose to buy the paper *and* a bunch of
physical processes lined up and caused the transaction. Neither is more
"truly" the case than the other.
> "OK," the naturalists say, "so you
>didn't CHOOSE to buy the paper. But you thought you chose it. You have
>an illusion of free will. Isn't that good enough?"
Of course, few of the "naturalists" who actually work on the relation
between mind and brain would say this, but I will grant that it is a
response you may have heard.
[other propositions based on the prior misunderstanding deleted]
> Can you accept this? (Naturalism says you don't have the power
>to, but anyway...) Does this view satisfy your mind?
Well, the view I've just described "satisfies" *my* mind.
[deletions]
> I've decided that I want to bite off naturalism a little bit at a
>time, so I'll leave this post on the table for a while before moving on to
>another proof that naturalism leads to nihilism when followed logically.
No offense, but I think you should take smaller bites. At least chew on
this one a while longer.
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"Anybody who has ever seen a photograph showing the kind of damage that
a trout traveling that fast can inflict on the human skull knows that
such photographs are very valuable. I paid $20 for mine." - Dave Barry
KRESSJA
>Naturalism condemns man to existence not as
>a self-conscious individual capable of self-determination, but as a
>machine, a plaything of contingency.
> Can you accept this? (Naturalism says you don't have the power
>to, but anyway...) Does this view satisfy your mind?
> To you naturalists out there: Can you refute what I have asserted
>here? Do you disagree with any of my six tenets of naturalism? Can you
>disagree with any of them without contradicting the first point, which is
>not open to debate, as it is the premise of naturalism?
I can't resist a good fray, especially over nihilism, (and Onstott won't
answer me damnit! He has no clue about Kant!) so I'll join in here; I
have some rather strong views on the subject myself.
I want here to only add an epistemological point to Matt's points about
the imputation of ethical responsibility; an naturalist can no more
make *positive knowledge claims in any regard* than he can in matters
of ethics. To assert that we know something entails that we have
carefully though about something, weighed alternatives, and generally
engaged the world is such a way as to grasp it in a meaningful fashion.
For the various species of naturalism, however, we have no such capacity
to engage and consider the world; as the mere products of causes, whatever
we believe or "know" or "think" will be merely the product of various
external causes and have no validity or claim to truth. Truth is, in fact,
the first causualty to naturalism.
-Kressja
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "God is a gross answer, an indelicacy against us thinkers-- |
| | at bottom merely a gross prohibition for us: you shall not |
| | think!" |
| | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
KRESSJA
>Now, what was all that about nihilism?
Geoff, since I'm getting in on the fray, I thought that I'd point out
that Flew has his limits. His Dictionary of Philosophy is the best one
of which I know, but it is unfortunately rather confined within the
Anglo-American tradition of philosophy, when it comes to the 20th
century, and he also has a tendency to "read back" his prejudices on
past thinkers from the Anglo-American perspective. (His enteries on
Heidegger and Nietzsche, for example, are quite poor; consider his
comment that Nietzsche's _Thus Spoke Zarathustra_ is primarily a work
of poetry, and is short on "ideas"! And this is one of the great works
of Western philosophy!)
My point: The term "nihilism" attains its main philosophical connotations
in a discourse of which Flew is woefully ignorant; it was introduced into
the philosophical scene in a major way by Nietzsche, and has been a
major theme of discussion in 2oth century continenental philosophy.
The definition which Nietzsche gave to it was "the devaluation of
the highest values." Those values which has sustained the Western
tradition, and made life possible, had failed; this failure culminates in
the loss of the highest value of all, which organized all the others:
God. The death of God is the point where nihilism first breaks out into
the open as a historical force.
More generally, nihilism is any sort of doctrine which leads to the
weakening and harming of human life; the human race requires
purpose--a goal which animates and organizes human activities, human
striving; the glory of God may have been a lie, but it built Cathederals,
projects which spanned centuries, and organized generations with
purpose and meaningful lives. The problem of nihilism is what to
do now that the God has died, and nothing seems capable any longer of
providing meaning? On the individual level, one seeks as best as he
can, but if one argues that each individual must make his own meaning,
then that is just a concession to arbitrariness--we have Leopold and
Loeb style meaning--murder just to relieve the boredom. What about
other substitutes for God? Humanity? The proletariat? Utility? Democracy?
All fictions, whose fictional character is made all too apparent by the
fictional character of God.
This is the problem of nihilism, and I don't see it getting better in
the 21st century; the mad frenzy with which technological reasoning goes
about its business is smokescreen which serves to divert attention from
the problems around us. The operation of technology tells us rather that,
in principle, there is nothing which will not admit of a technological
solution; and science assures us that science will find the answers to
all possible human problems and concerns: as a consequence of this,
anything which science is incapable of addressing becomes a non-concern,
even and especially when it is the very sphere wherein the problem
arises.
I see naturalism more as symptom of nihilism, than as a cause of same;
it is, at any rate, I believe, self-refuting, and a good discussion of
it might be just the thing.
Merlyn LeRoy
>Naturalism, for those of you who do not know, is the predominant brand of
>atheism, and the one that permeates our educational and social
>institutions.
<bzzt> and no thanks for playing.
Naturalism is not a brand of atheism; some atheists are naturalists,
but this does not make naturalism a brand of atheism. Atheism
addresses the (non)-existence of gods.
...
> ...Take the honorable Mr. Dahmer. He murders children and
>sticks their bodies in his refrigerator. Did he choose to do it? No, it
>was a chain of events that caused him to do it.
Odd you would use the actions of a christian to make a
malformed point about atheism.
---
Merlyn LeRoy
Snakes of Medusa
Matthew Alexander Colvin <pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu> wrote:
> So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free will
>is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand
Not true. There are truly random events in the universe. Radioactive
decay, for example. So the rest of your argument falls over.
mathew
--
I have a flawless philosophical and scientific model of reality.
Unfortunately, it's actual size. We must never be dogmatic. Anyone
who says otherwise is wrong.
Niall McAuley
has spent several long posts getting this far:
>That's three legs knocked out from under
>the six-legged chair -- free will, man's value, and morality. Here are
>the ones that remain, but which I think will eventually fall too:
>knowledge, truth, and reality itself.
Unfortunately, none of the "naturalists" replying have had any problem
with Colvins conceptions of free will, man's value and morality
being non-existent. So far, it's a big "So what ?".
Knowledge, truth and reality are something else. Come on, Matthew,
get to the point.
Cheers,
Niall
---
"Whether or not the statement is _analytically_ true is not
as important as the fact that it is _a priori_ true and hence
transcendentally true." - Charles Onstott, on alt.atheism
Niall McAuley
>the human race requires
>purpose--a goal which animates and organizes human activities, human
>striving;
Whoa, there. This is precisely what we are arguing about. The
position the "naturalists" have been taking so far is that
this "purpose" is simply a characteristic of an evolved life
form. A life form subject to nihilistic despair doesn't look
like a good bet for survival.
>the glory of God may have been a lie, but it built Cathederals,
>projects which spanned centuries, and organized generations with
>purpose and meaningful lives.
Not at all. People built cathedrals, and you don't need to be a
theist to admire the workmanship. Similarly Handels Messiah
can be appreciated without believing in God. The individuals
who worked on those cathedrals didn't necessarily do it for
gods glory, but perhaps for money, or desire for a personal
monument, or one of many other possible reasons.
To state the a false "glory of god" concept gave meaning to
the lives of generations seems ridiculous to me.
>The problem of nihilism is what to
>do now that the God has died, and nothing seems capable any longer of
>providing meaning?
What's the problem ? The lie is revealed, the idea of externally
applied purpose is removed, we can get on with life in the real world.
Obviously old habits die hard, as people will insist on imposing
"purpose" on processes such as history or evolution, but this
doesn't mean there is no other "meaning" or "purpose" to life.
>On the individual level, one seeks as best as he
>can, but if one argues that each individual must make his own meaning,
>then that is just a concession to arbitrariness--we have Leopold and
>Loeb style meaning--murder just to relieve the boredom.
Is this worse than murder in the name of God, for a higher "purpose" ?
>This is the problem of nihilism, and I don't see it getting better in
>the 21st century;
Murder appears to have always been a problem. Perhaps acknowledging
the truth about the real world will allow us to tackle problems,
rather than allowing non-existent entities to sort them out.
>the mad frenzy with which technological reasoning goes
>about its business is smokescreen which serves to divert attention from
>the problems around us. The operation of technology tells us rather that,
>in principle, there is nothing which will not admit of a technological
>solution; and science assures us that science will find the answers to
>all possible human problems and concerns: as a consequence of this,
>anything which science is incapable of addressing becomes a non-concern,
>even and especially when it is the very sphere wherein the problem
>arises.
This looks rather like a standard anti-technology diatribe, and
suffers the usual irony. Without the technology, we wouldn't
be reading it. Technophobia like this always baffles me, as
I am a die-hard technophile.
These caricatures of science and technology from an enlightened
contributor such as yourself I find rather sad, John.
Hans M Dykstra
KRESSJA <kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> wrote:
>In article <2hjhqh$i...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>, pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes...
>
>answer me damnit! He has no clue about Kant!) so I'll join in here; I
>have some rather strong views on the subject myself.
You expected more from Onstott? Anybody who would attempt to infer
the necessity of God from the necessity of "order" seems to have
an odd concept of God in the first place. In fact, the kind of
pre-empirical "order" that he is talking about is rather vague
in the first place--it's like _defining_ God to be "order", or
rather existence itself.
>I want here to only add an epistemological point to Matt's points about
>the imputation of ethical responsibility; an naturalist can no more
>make *positive knowledge claims in any regard* than he can in matters
>of ethics. To assert that we know something entails that we have
>carefully though about something, weighed alternatives, and generally
>engaged the world is such a way as to grasp it in a meaningful fashion.
>For the various species of naturalism, however, we have no such capacity
>to engage and consider the world; as the mere products of causes, whatever
>we believe or "know" or "think" will be merely the product of various
>external causes and have no validity or claim to truth. Truth is, in fact,
>the first causualty to naturalism.
Yoicks! I'd have to disagree with this. I'd think that to any reasonably
thoughtful "naturalist" the words "knowing", "thinking", "truth" are
shorthand notation for complex, persistent, recurrent patterns of matter.
The fact that these concepts refer to "emergent phenomena" which are
characteristics of large, poorly understood systems does not make them
any less meaningful.
As for nihilism, the problem of finding meaning is the same whether
God is dead or not. The problem is one of finding a broad consensus
to guide social behavior. God used to be that consensus, but It
suffocated under the weight of its own falseness. Now It is dead,
and a new consensus is needed. One which is in tune with reality as
we now understand it. Sorry, I haven't got one.
Now this may all be hopelessly naive, since I haven't read one word
of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Plato, or anybody. Feel free to tear it
to shreds.
***
hmd
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
[Angst deleted - Hans dealt with it very well, IMHO.]
>This is the problem of nihilism, and I don't see it getting better in
>the 21st century; the mad frenzy with which technological reasoning goes
>about its business is smokescreen which serves to divert attention from
>the problems around us. The operation of technology tells us rather that,
>in principle, there is nothing which will not admit of a technological
>solution; and science assures us that science will find the answers to
>all possible human problems and concerns: as a consequence of this,
>anything which science is incapable of addressing becomes a non-concern,
>even and especially when it is the very sphere wherein the problem
>arises.
Let me be charitable and assume that you are referring here to a
popularised misconception (?myth-conception) of science and technology.
If, however, you believe that this is indeed how scientists and
technologists think, I'd appreciate some references. Note that I am not
interested in how Kuhn, Popper and others *believe* that scientists
think: I'm looking for horses-mouth stuff. Examples of scientists
asserting that questions of aesthetics and politics (to take two
examples) are either capable of technological solutions or are (or
should be) non-concerns.
>I see naturalism more as symptom of nihilism, than as a cause of same;
This seems like an extremely perverse reading of human history. I would
offer the work and beliefs of Newton as a representative counter-
example.
>it is, at any rate, I believe, self-refuting,
Self-limiting? Of course (despite your earlier claims). Self-refuting?
You're going to have to spell this out in great detail, my friend.
>and a good discussion of it might be just the thing.
Emphasis on "good", please. In particular, we've had some real
problems grappling with Nietzsche here on a.a, as you'll doubtless
remember, and I'd hate this to slip into question-begging or
obscurantism.
Geoff
Matthew Q Keeler de la Mancha
mat...@mantis.co.uk (Snakes of Medusa) writes:
>Not true. There are truly random events in the universe. Radioactive
>decay, for example. So the rest of your argument falls over.
>mathew
to reasonably account for thereby making it _practically_ random but
theoretically not chaotic? What I'm thinking of is kind of like the
difference between an analog and a digital recording... We cannot
perceive the gaps in the music on a CD but it still has a finite information
set; it's just too complicated to perceive discreetly. Perhaps that is
an uncautious analogy, but maybe it also makes the question clearer.
Matthew K.
Matthew Alexander Colvin
> Matthew Alexander Colvin <pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu> wrote:
> > So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free will
> >is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand
>
> Not true. There are truly random events in the universe. Radioactive
> decay, for example. So the rest of your argument falls over.
But there was a cause! Something had to happen before the
radioactive decay occurred. Something had to cause the instability, the
imbalance, the excess of energy. Uranium doesn't come from nowhere.
I have explained (in another post) that random, chaotic, and chance events
still have a cause. We may not be able to pinpoint it, but there is one.
My argument is still standing -- whether man is a machine that acts in a
determined fashion or in a capricious one makes no difference. He's still
not acting significantly, i.e., he is not manipulating the universe; the
universe is manipulating him in its chain of events. See my response to
Mr. Ingles.
Matt Colvin
Matthew Alexander Colvin
> In article <2hjhqh$i...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>
pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
> > Naturalism is based on the following assertions, some of which are
> >"proved" by various means, others of which are taken as givens:
> >
> >1) Matter is all there is. There is no God, no spirit, nothing but
> >matter. Matter is eternal. (Energy is just another form of matter, by
> >E=mc^2).
>
> Except for the caveat that it's more correct to say that mass and
energy
> are different aspects of the same thing, this is consistent with all
we've
> observed.
> I would prefer to phrase it less prejudiciously as, "Mass/energy is the
> only thing necessary to explain all that has been, ere now, observed."
statement is really naturalistic at all. It seems to me to be conceding,
via the qualifier "ere now" and the verb "observed" that there *could* be
something other than matter/energy. It's not "less prejudicious" at all
-- it's just a way of covering your ass in case something shows up that
matter/energy can't explain.
Ray quotes me further:
> >2) The universe is a a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed
system
> >(it is not open to reordering from without -- all changes in it come
about
> >from an cause that is itself a part of the universe).
>
Then responds:
> Well, seeing as there most of us haven't seen any effect that required
> an extra-universal cause, that's the default assumption. That is not to
> say that such causes would not be accepted if evidence were shown...
Is the universe the universe or not? By definition, the universe
includes all matter (energy) (I'm no scientist, so correct me if I'm
wrong). At least that's the definition I'm using. And if you buy the
first point (matter is all there is), then it's the only definition of the
universe that is possible.
You say that "such causes [might] be accepted if evidence were
shown..." How is this any different from saying "If naturalism were shown
to be false, I'd abandon it"? Sure. And if God came down and revealed
himself to you, you'd probably believe in him.
Now Mr. Ingles starts to really disagree, instead of just hedging his
bets. He quotes me:
> > The closed universe is contingent -- events are determined by
> >something (a cause). Man is self conscious (we are discussing
naturalism
> >right now, need I prove this point any further?) and naturalists
believe
> >that man's actions affect things. Man acts significantly.
>
> If, by this, you mean, "It is significant (i.e. it means something) to
> speak of a person "acting" or "choosing", then yes, this is true. If
> you have some other meaning, please let us know.
"Acting significantly" is my way of saying that man can, by
exercise of a consciousness, effect change in the universe. Naturalism
believes that man's consciousness is just part of the grand machine
looking at itself. There is no will or ego that can stand against the
system and manipulate it according to its own will. Man's will is lost.
He has no reason to act, and thus the only logical belief is nihilism --
it's impossible to choose, because you have no machinery to do it with.
(a note: we have a tendency to institutionalize people who actually live
consistently with this belief).
[Mr. Ingles then launched into a very long explanation of a complicated
machine intended to represent the human mind. A chain of dominos and some
prime numbers were discussed. See his post if you want to understand it.
The conclusion *I* drew -- and I don't want to be construed as
misrepresenting Mr. Ingles here, so look at it yourself -- is that man's
brain may be very complex, but it is still a machine, just a reactor. It
responds to what the universe puts into it, without any exercise of
consciousness or personality. As I've tried to explain above, such a
belief is really nihilism]
[Objection to my criticism of "illusion of free will" deleted -- see Mr.
Ingles' original post. I don't think there was anything I could respond
to in his objection. In fact, I don't think there was really any
objection]
> [other propositions based on the prior misunderstanding deleted]
> > Can you accept this? (Naturalism says you don't have the power
> >to, but anyway...) Does this view satisfy your mind?
>
> Well, the view I've just described "satisfies" *my* mind.
How can it satisfy your *mind*? Are you claiming that you have a
consciousness that can look at the universe (the machine, the system) and
make judgements, assign value? How can you do this within a framework of
naturalism?
> [deletions]
> > I've decided that I want to bite off naturalism a little bit at a
> >time, so I'll leave this post on the table for a while before moving on
to
> >another proof that naturalism leads to nihilism when followed
logically.
>
> No offense, but I think you should take smaller bites. At least chew on
> this one a while longer.
No offense taken. But I've chewed it. It's sort of like a burrito
without any meat. Empty and bland.
Matt Colvin
Tony Lezard
Matthew Alexander Colvin <pto...@next10pg2.wam.umd.edu> wrote:
>In article <2hlssr$l...@news.mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (Snakes of
>Medusa) writes:
>> Not true. There are truly random events in the universe. Radioactive
>> decay, for example. So the rest of your argument falls over.
>
> But there was a cause! Something had to happen before the
>radioactive decay occurred. Something had to cause the instability, the
>imbalance, the excess of energy. Uranium doesn't come from nowhere.
I take it you mean the cause of the uranium atom decaying it the fact of
its existence. In this case this whole section of your argument becomes
rather empty and boils down to things like "the universe is here because
the universe exists". Or something. Ugh.
If on the other hand you are talking about an already existing atom,
which subsequently decays, and saying that something or other going on
inside the nucleus must have caused it to spit out an alpha particle
when it did then you are just plain wrong. Radioactive decay just
happens - at random, with a certain probability per unit time.
--
Tony Lezard
to...@mantis.co.uk
PGP public key via finger or keyservers
Hans M Dykstra
This depends on what assumptions you want to make. But Bell's Theorem
proves that under a remarkably simple set of assumptions, the
randomness of quantum mechanics is NOT a probabilistic description
of an underlying deterministic system. This result is so powerful
that most physicists have felt that it is more satisfying to give
up determinism than any of the other assumptions like causality,
reality, etc.
And given the general mindset of physicists, that is saying a lot.
***
hmd
Matthew Alexander Colvin
> Matthew Alexander Colvin (pto...@next17csc.wam.umd.edu)
> has spent several long posts getting this far:
>
> >That's three legs knocked out from under
> >the six-legged chair -- free will, man's value, and morality. Here are
> >the ones that remain, but which I think will eventually fall too:
> >knowledge, truth, and reality itself.
>
> Unfortunately, none of the "naturalists" replying have had any problem
> with Colvins conceptions of free will, man's value and morality
> being non-existent. So far, it's a big "So what ?".
If they don't have any problem with not having any basis for
making decisions, then they don't have any problem. But a bunch of them
have *decided* to respond to my posts. So they do have a problem with my
conclusions. They have a choice -- refute my arguments, or espouse
nihilism. They choose to refute my arguments. I think they would take
serious issue with your claim that it's "a big 'So what?'".
>
> Knowledge, truth and reality are something else. Come on, Matthew,
> get to the point.
>
> Cheers,
> Niall
Hold on!! I'm getting to it! :-) Except that John Kress seems
to have beaten me to the knowledge one. I think I could have put it in
more troubling and simple terms, but he's basically done it for me. I'll
still offer an explanation in my own words of how epistomological
naturalism is really epistomological nihilism. In fact, I'll do it right
now:
The argument runs like this: If man is a result of impersonal
forces -- if he is simply matter reacting with itself -- he has no way of
knowing whether what he seems to know is illusion or truth.
Naturalism says that perception and knowledge are products of the
brain. They come about from the functioning of matter. If matter didn't
function, there would be no thought. But matter functions by its own
nature, and there's no reason to believe that matter has any interest in
leading a conscious being to true perception or logical conclusions based
on accurate observation and true suppositions.
Human consciousness arises from a complicated interaction of
matter. Why should what that matter is conscious of be related to what is
actually the case?
Naturalists use methods of scientific experimentation, pragmatic
tests, etc. But these all use the brain they are testing. They could
well be a futile exercise in illusion.
I will now open these conclusions up for questioning and
refutation. I believe that the burden of proof is now on the naturalists.
They have denied the existence of anything other than matter/energy. Gone
are God, soul, and personal consciousness. How do we know? Can we know
that we know? Isn't this just faith in something? How is faith in the
human brain any better than faith in God? There is no reason for a
naturalist to place confidence in his knowledge.
There is plenty of evidence that knowledge is possible. I
personally like Robert Capon's little anecdote:
"The skeptic is never for real. There he stands, cocktail in
hand, left arm draped languorously on one end of the mantelpiece,
telling you that he can't be sure of anything, not even of his
own existence. I'll give you my secret method of demolishing
universal skepticism in four words. Whisper to him "Your fly
is open." If he thinks knowledge is so all-fired impossible,
why does he always look?"
There's the question. Why do we trust our knowledge? Naturalism
gives us no reason at all. I believe that naturalists choose not to
conclude "knowledge is impossible" because to do so leads to nihilism.
I've found no evidence that we should trust matter's ability to know.
But, as always, let's discuss it.
KRESSJA
>In article 19JAN199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>[Angst deleted - Hans dealt with it very well, IMHO.]
>
>>This is the problem of nihilism, and I don't see it getting better in
>>the 21st century; the mad frenzy with which technological reasoning goes
>>about its business is smokescreen which serves to divert attention from
>>the problems around us. The operation of technology tells us rather that,
>>in principle, there is nothing which will not admit of a technological
>>solution; and science assures us that science will find the answers to
>>all possible human problems and concerns: as a consequence of this,
>>anything which science is incapable of addressing becomes a non-concern,
>>even and especially when it is the very sphere wherein the problem
>>arises.
>
>Let me be charitable and assume that you are referring here to a
>popularised misconception (?myth-conception) of science and technology.
>If, however, you believe that this is indeed how scientists and
>technologists think, I'd appreciate some references. Note that I am not
>interested in how Kuhn, Popper and others *believe* that scientists
>think: I'm looking for horses-mouth stuff. Examples of scientists
>asserting that questions of aesthetics and politics (to take two
>examples) are either capable of technological solutions or are (or
>should be) non-concerns.
Of course the difficulty is how to even talk about it. See my response to
Hans for clarification. I add here that I am talking about the
essence or meaning of technology and science, as opposed to the opinions
of scientists. (One example for you is Dawkins, who announces that the
question man's origin is a done-deal; isn't he also the one who wishes
to explain human ideas as naturalistic "memes"?)
>>I see naturalism more as symptom of nihilism, than as a cause of same;
>
>This seems like an extremely perverse reading of human history. I would
>offer the work and beliefs of Newton as a representative counter-
>example.
Newton was not a naturalist; Newton was a Christian. He spent a good
deal of his life writing theological works. I don't see how you
want this to serve as a counter-example?
>>it is, at any rate, I believe, self-refuting,
>Self-limiting? Of course (despite your earlier claims). Self-refuting?
>You're going to have to spell this out in great detail, my friend.
>>and a good discussion of it might be just the thing.
>Emphasis on "good", please. In particular, we've had some real
>problems grappling with Nietzsche here on a.a, as you'll doubtless
>remember, and I'd hate this to slip into question-begging or
>obscurantism.
Well, that's the rub, isn't it? Very well then, some principles:
1. I don't want to convince anyone, in the strong sense of "converting"
them to agree with me. I want to open up an area for thinking.
2. In philosophy, one difficulty is that what counts for evidence and
as good argumentation is something that is itself put into question. We
all have good inductive evidence that I'm going to leave you unhappy
with regard to the way in which I think and address issues. Logic is
not to my mind fundamental, and when it is misapplied beyond its
province, becomes a stumbling-block to thinking (as does science).
3. Therefore, I'll try to emphasize exposition, and not critique. I'll try
to outline what I see the problem as, and where I think that leaves us.
If I am going to put some work into this thread, I don't want it to
turn polemical; I agree _to an extent_ with Mr. Colvin, but I so not
want to assert that others are _wrong_.
4. The argument is about naturalism, scientism and technologism. I
understand by these species of reductionism whereby all else is to
be thought or "reduced" to their parameters. If _you_ mean something
else by naturalism, e.g. that the phenomena which we encounter, particularly
the physical ones, can be profitably engaged by a certain means of
knowing (science) and a certain means of doing (technology), but also
by other means of knowing and doing, then we might be in agreement.
A question: of what value would you consider the works of Shakespeare?
Of Newton? Of Plato? What do you consider the differnces to be
between the three?
KRESSJA
>KRESSJA (kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu) loses me quickly here :
>
>>the human race requires
>>purpose--a goal which animates and organizes human activities, human
>>striving;
>
>Whoa, there. This is precisely what we are arguing about. The
>position the "naturalists" have been taking so far is that
>this "purpose" is simply a characteristic of an evolved life
>form. A life form subject to nihilistic despair doesn't look
>like a good bet for survival.
Assuming that purpose of life is survival (if that can be called a
purpose); I do not; there's more than a touch of nihilism around
Darwinism. Rather I think with Nietzsche that life's purpose is not
to simply propogate itself, but to overcome itself, i.e. to generate
more mutilfarious and complex forms. Note that this is not a
teleological conception, but rather a conception of the process of
the generation and differentiation of forms which repudiates
mechanism. Mechanism is an exegetical interpretation (like all
science) which conceives being after the way in which consciousness
habitually grasps it.
Therefore, a lifeform subject to nihilistic despair is *not necessarily*
a good bet for survival; the mediocre has greater survival capacity
than does the rare and the exceptional; but only the exceptional has the
power to create beyond itself, and not merely reproduce what has been.
(As I say, no teleology; it is more than possible that man could become
a small and mediocre creature, by which little is desired, from which
little can be expected, and out of which nothing will arise. _Brave
New World_ seems like the ideal naturalist utopia.)
>>the glory of God may have been a lie, but it built Cathederals,
>>projects which spanned centuries, and organized generations with
>>purpose and meaningful lives.
>Not at all. People built cathedrals, and you don't need to be a
>theist to admire the workmanship. Similarly Handels Messiah
>can be appreciated without believing in God. The individuals
>who worked on those cathedrals didn't necessarily do it for
>gods glory, but perhaps for money, or desire for a personal
>monument, or one of many other possible reasons.
I do not think that this is possible. Mere greed does not produce
great works--it cannot. Great works require great passion, and
cannot arise out of the lukewarm bubbling of utilitarian schemeing;
similarly, meaning is not something which one can simply "make up,"
for oneself. This is precisely nihilism; meaning is something that
calls one into thw world of meaningfulness, and indeed is that world
as it gather is up man's historical sojourning into itself.
>To state the a false "glory of god" concept gave meaning to
>the lives of generations seems ridiculous to me.
I am not talking about a "concept," but rather the totality of an
historical world that gathered into unity and articulation the
axes of noble and base, good and evil, true and false, the place
and worth of man, the status of things, etc. The modern technological
world is unique in being an anti-world, which rips up meaning by the
roots; so far, the blind scientific optimism has been enough to sustain
us; the "death of god" has not yet been felt, been experienced in the
essence of its historical advent. But that time is coming.
>>The problem of nihilism is what to
>>do now that the God has died, and nothing seems capable any longer of
>>providing meaning?
>What's the problem ? The lie is revealed, the idea of externally
>applied purpose is removed, we can get on with life in the real world.
>Obviously old habits die hard, as people will insist on imposing
>"purpose" on processes such as history or evolution, but this
>doesn't mean there is no other "meaning" or "purpose" to life.
Nihilism is not the ansence of local purposes; nihilism is the awareness
of the falseness and arbitrariness of all purposes. One cannot live by
a lie, once one has grasped it as a lie. I do not wish to see the
human race reduced to something whose purpose is "getting on," i.e.
simple continuation.
>>On the individual level, one seeks as best as he
>>can, but if one argues that each individual must make his own meaning,
>>then that is just a concession to arbitrariness--we have Leopold and
>>Loeb style meaning--murder just to relieve the boredom.
>Is this worse than murder in the name of God, for a higher "purpose" ?
You miss my meaning. I'm not interested in offering a moral critique of
murder. Yet there is a (twisted) kind of logic in murdering for one's
god. One does not do it lightly, since one is to be judged. Of course,
this can always transmute into fanaticism, wherein one is absolutely
convinced of one's rightness, but note the difference. Now the guiding
motive is not, "why?" but rather, "why not?" And we have no real answer.
>>This is the problem of nihilism, and I don't see it getting better in
>>the 21st century;
>
>Murder appears to have always been a problem. Perhaps acknowledging
>the truth about the real world will allow us to tackle problems,
>rather than allowing non-existent entities to sort them out.
Perhaps the truth will kill us.
>>the mad frenzy with which technological reasoning goes
>>about its business is smokescreen which serves to divert attention from
>>the problems around us. The operation of technology tells us rather that,
>>in principle, there is nothing which will not admit of a technological
>>solution; and science assures us that science will find the answers to
>>all possible human problems and concerns: as a consequence of this,
>>anything which science is incapable of addressing becomes a non-concern,
>>even and especially when it is the very sphere wherein the problem
>>arises.
>This looks rather like a standard anti-technology diatribe, and
>suffers the usual irony. Without the technology, we wouldn't
>be reading it. Technophobia like this always baffles me, as
>I am a die-hard technophile.
>These caricatures of science and technology from an enlightened
>contributor such as yourself I find rather sad, John.
I would hope that you would consider that there might be *something* to
it. I am not offering an "anti-technological" diatribe. I do not
think that technology is something that human beings do, which is
bad. I think rather that technology is something which functions as
a destining historical force, which threatens to distort the human
essence.
I am "against" neither technology nor science; but rather technologism and
scientism. The conception of technology as something which is ontologically
and epistemologically neutral, and hence something which is a tool for man's
purposes seems to be to be we wildly wrong, and dangerous. So long as
we continue to think of technology primarily as something of which we
are the authors, rather than as something which lays claim to our historical
being, we work ourselves ever more inexorably into the entangling sway of
technology. There is the danger that, "in the midst of the correct, the
true might disappear."
KRESSJA
>In article <19JAN199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>,
>KRESSJA <kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> wrote:
>>In article <2hjhqh$i...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>, pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes...
>>
>>I can't resist a good fray, especially over nihilism, (and Onstott won't
>>answer me damnit! He has no clue about Kant!) so I'll join in here; I
>>have some rather strong views on the subject myself.
>
>You expected more from Onstott? Anybody who would attempt to infer
>the necessity of God from the necessity of "order" seems to have
>an odd concept of God in the first place. In fact, the kind of
>pre-empirical "order" that he is talking about is rather vague
>in the first place--it's like _defining_ God to be "order", or
>rather existence itself.
Well, he _did_ claim to have a critique of Kant. I wanted to debate Kant,
Damnit! I think that all atheists should be aware of Kant's critique of
rational theology, because it (I believe) presents not only counter
arguments to the various proofs for the existence of God, but rather
conclusively destroys the entire project of offering a rational proof
for the existence of God. It's brilliant and devastating.
>>I want here to only add an epistemological point to Matt's points about
>>the imputation of ethical responsibility; an naturalist can no more
>>make *positive knowledge claims in any regard* than he can in matters
>>of ethics. To assert that we know something entails that we have
>>carefully though about something, weighed alternatives, and generally
>>engaged the world is such a way as to grasp it in a meaningful fashion.
>>For the various species of naturalism, however, we have no such capacity
>>to engage and consider the world; as the mere products of causes, whatever
>>we believe or "know" or "think" will be merely the product of various
>>external causes and have no validity or claim to truth. Truth is, in fact,
>>the first causualty to naturalism.
>Yoicks! I'd have to disagree with this. I'd think that to any reasonably
>thoughtful "naturalist" the words "knowing", "thinking", "truth" are
>shorthand notation for complex, persistent, recurrent patterns of matter.
>The fact that these concepts refer to "emergent phenomena" which are
>characteristics of large, poorly understood systems does not make them
>any less meaningful.
I think that such a conception of truth is not adequate to the phenomena;
we seem to live in a world which is meaningful--and naturalism seems to
me to undercut the possibility of meaning. It implies (it seems to me)
that all such meaning is illusory. My answer (of course) is that no
naturalist *really* lives this way--it would be impossible. Meaning
of all sorts suffuses our lives constantly; perhaps there is no need
for an ultimate meaning of things--it seems unlikely that we could ever
determine such a thing.
>As for nihilism, the problem of finding meaning is the same whether
>God is dead or not. The problem is one of finding a broad consensus
>to guide social behavior. God used to be that consensus, but It
>suffocated under the weight of its own falseness. Now It is dead,
>and a new consensus is needed. One which is in tune with reality as
>we now understand it. Sorry, I haven't got one.
But an consensus requires a basis; and the problem as I see it is that,
*since* God suffocated under the weight of His own falseness (nice turn
of phrase!) that nothing can possibly take his place, since we now
_know_ how arbitrary it was to being with. Even the ideal of
consensus comes under question? Why should it make a difference if
many people believe an arbitrary thing, or only a few?
>Now this may all be hopelessly naive, since I haven't read one word
>of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Plato, or anybody. Feel free to tear it
>to shreds.
Well, my intellectual history has been formed against a background that
doesn't look with an optimistic eye on modernity; I think that something
essential has been lost in the modern age (not that I'd want to roll
time back; I'm not unaware of the advantages of modernity). And I think
that this loss is the direct result of the historical trend which
resulted in the "death of God," (which was inevitable by the way, due to
the falseness and mendaciousness inherenet in Christianity). The problem
is what to do about it? It seems that naturalism is a way of thinking
that does not yet experience the problem as a problem, as _the_ danger of
modernity. Perhaps I'm wrong; wouldn't be the first time; perhaps
modernity will be able to iron everything out? But I worry about it.
Perhaps the kind of human that needs more meaning than a mechanistic
reality is simply doomed to die out...
Hans M Dykstra
>( Niall McAuley ) writes:
>> Unfortunately, none of the "naturalists" replying have had any problem
>> with Colvins conceptions of free will, man's value and morality
>> being non-existent. So far, it's a big "So what ?".
>
> If they don't have any problem with not having any basis for
>making decisions, then they don't have any problem. But a bunch of them
>have *decided* to respond to my posts. So they do have a problem with my
>conclusions. They have a choice -- refute my arguments, or espouse
>nihilism. They choose to refute my arguments. I think they would take
>serious issue with your claim that it's "a big 'So what?'".
Well, I accept that free will, man's value, and morality do not exist
in the same sense as electrons do. But I still say that they exist
as higher-level abstractions, as functional descriptions of patterns
and regularities. "Man's value" is a shorthand for saying
"man's apparent tendency to behave in ways that contribute to the
maintenance of the persistent patterns of macollections of matter
that make up its `self'."
In just the same way, as "morality" does not exist, "ice" does not
exist. After all, "ice" is just a word for certain patterns of
quarks, gluons, electrons, neutrinos, arranged in certain regular
and persistent patterns. Yet it can be seen that the concept of
"ice" is still a valid one, and a lot easier to use too.
> Naturalism says that perception and knowledge are products of the
>brain. They come about from the functioning of matter. If matter didn't
>function, there would be no thought. But matter functions by its own
>nature, and there's no reason to believe that matter has any interest in
>leading a conscious being to true perception or logical conclusions based
>on accurate observation and true suppositions.
On the contrary, matter is incapable of being deceptive. Matter has
no "interest" in anything at all. It simply is, and the interactions
simply are. This _is_ "truth". How could a swarm of electrons and
stuff interact in any way except how they really are?
> Human consciousness arises from a complicated interaction of
>matter. Why should what that matter is conscious of be related to what is
>actually the case?
When you try to describe "consciousness" and its relation to the fundamental
reality of things, you have to describe consciousness at the same fundamental
level. You are erecting a straw man here by criticizing naturalism on
the basis of a dualist version of consciousness--considering consciousness
separately from the matter that makes it up. It is similar to the
problem with asking "Why?" and assuming that only a teleological answer
will do.
> Naturalists use methods of scientific experimentation, pragmatic
>tests, etc. But these all use the brain they are testing. They could
>well be a futile exercise in illusion.
I will step out on a limb here and assert that it is impossible, in
the naturalistic framework, for this to be true. My senses and brain
are made up of matter, and their interactions with other matter are
governed by the same rules. How could their interactions fail to
reflect properly the matter with which they interact? That would
be the same thing as saying that they DON'T follow the same rules
as other matter--anathema to the naturalistic assumption.
It is the dualists and theists who have to worry about illusion.
How do you know that the world and everything you see, hear, and
touch isn't generated by that disembodied "self-ness" that you
call your consciousness, rather than by actual interactions with
"reality".
>How do we know? Can we know that we know?
My understanding is that it is incoherent to demand that you
know that you know before you can say that you know. It certainly
is not consistent with a being of finite resources, since it would
also require that you know that you know that you know that you...
An infinite regress which would leave you stupefied, gazing into
your navel trying to decide whether you are hungry while a plate
of grapes sits in front of you...
Isn't this just faith in something? How is faith in the
>human brain any better than faith in God? There is no reason for a
>naturalist to place confidence in his knowledge.
On the contrary, there is every reason for the human to trust
its senses. It has no choice.
But for the theist, how is it that you choose to believe what
you see, remember, etc? What if God-thing just planted that
"knowledge" there for Its own reasons? Everything you know
could be a lie, and only God knows for sure.
> There is plenty of evidence that knowledge is possible. I
>personally like Robert Capon's little anecdote:
>
> "The skeptic is never for real. There he stands, cocktail in
> hand, left arm draped languorously on one end of the mantelpiece,
> telling you that he can't be sure of anything, not even of his
> own existence. I'll give you my secret method of demolishing
> universal skepticism in four words. Whisper to him "Your fly
> is open." If he thinks knowledge is so all-fired impossible,
> why does he always look?"
Gah! That kind of skepticism went out with Descartes. The whole point
of saying "I can't be sure of anything," is to assert the opposite--
absolute certainty is not the goal. It's the theists that seek
absolute knowledge, not the naturalists.
And just to be precise here, the theist in practice always has faith
in his senses *and* in his God(s). The God-faith is an extra add-on.
This same anecdote actually applies in reverse. WhIf I say, "Your fly
is open," do you ask God, or do you look?
> There's the question. Why do we trust our knowledge? Naturalism
>gives us no reason at all. I believe that naturalists choose not to
>conclude "knowledge is impossible" because to do so leads to nihilism.
>I've found no evidence that we should trust matter's ability to know.
>But, as always, let's discuss it.
"Knowing" itself is a term for certain relationships between clumps
of matter. Matter establishes correlations automatically by the
rules which govern it. What's not to trust?
"Knowing" that comes in some kind of bogus, no-see-um spirituality
is far more dangerous, because you are positing two different avenues
of knowing--the senses and the mind. And if you don't differentiate
the realm of validity of the "knowing" then you can end up with
sense-knowledge that doesn't conform with the mind-reality. *That*
would be truly deceptive.
***
hmd
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
>I think that such a conception of truth is not adequate to the phenomena;
>we seem to live in a world which is meaningful--and naturalism seems to
>me to undercut the possibility of meaning. It implies (it seems to me)
>that all such meaning is illusory. My answer (of course) is that no
>naturalist *really* lives this way--it would be impossible. Meaning
>of all sorts suffuses our lives constantly; perhaps there is no need
>for an ultimate meaning of things--it seems unlikely that we could ever
>determine such a thing.
This argument turns on John's use of the word "illusory". To a naturalist,
meaning is by no means illusory: it is an idea (conceptual structure,
call it what you will - I need to brush up my terminology here) within
the human mind which is (ultimately) a physical construct within the
brain. Why John should find this illusory beats me..... Maybe he's
a soulist.
George Heintzelman
>In article <2hlssr$l...@news.mantis.co.uk>
>mat...@mantis.co.uk (Snakes of Medusa) writes:
>
>>Not true. There are truly random events in the universe. Radioactive
>>decay, for example. So the rest of your argument falls over.
>Can it be proven random? Or is there perhaps too many variables for us
>to reasonably account for thereby making it _practically_ random but
>theoretically not chaotic? What I'm thinking of is kind of like the
>difference between an analog and a digital recording... We cannot
>perceive the gaps in the music on a CD but it still has a finite information
>set; it's just too complicated to perceive discreetly. Perhaps that is
>an uncautious analogy, but maybe it also makes the question clearer.
It is possible to concoct theories in which the quantum
indeterminacies are not, in fact, random; however, they all involve
violations of the principle of relativity. It has been definitively
shown that local hidden-variable theories do NOT, and cannot, account
for the observed randomness in quantum mechanical wavefunction
collapse.
George Heintzelman
geo...@mit.edu
Ray Ingles
>In article <2hkmm8...@srvr1.engin.umich.edu> ing...@engin.umich.edu
>(Ray Ingles) writes:
> You say that "such causes [might] be accepted if evidence were
>shown..." How is this any different from saying "If naturalism were shown
>to be false, I'd abandon it"? Sure. And if God came down and revealed
>himself to you, you'd probably believe in him.
In fact, I would believe in God if It came down to talk to me. I've said
so before. As others have noted, most of us don't seek "absolute certainty",
but "mere" 'pretty-certainty'.
I think that you are misrepresenting the position of your opponents by
phrasing things so dogmatically. There probably are people as fanatic as
you propose, but they sure aren't common on *this* group... and that's why
I'm "hedging my bets". I *always* do.
[deletions]
>> >Man acts significantly.
>> If, by this, you mean, "It is significant (i.e. it means something) to
>> speak of a person "acting" or "choosing", then yes, this is true. If
>> you have some other meaning, please let us know.
>
> "Acting significantly" is my way of saying that man can, by
>exercise of a consciousness, effect change in the universe.
Well, sure. If I hadn't existed, we would not be having this conversation.
There, change in the universe due to me.
> Naturalism
>believes that man's consciousness is just part of the grand machine
>looking at itself.
A gas pedal is just another part of a car, but it makes a significant
difference in the functioning of the vehicle. Humans do indeed make changes
in the world; how can you doubt it?
> There is no will or ego that can stand against the
>system and manipulate it according to its own will.
Hold it. You mean, "Humans obey natural laws, and so can never do anything
against natural laws"? But what we call "laws of nature" are not
*prescriptions* for how things *must* act, but *descriptions* of how things
do *in fact* behave. If rocks fell up tomorrow, they would not be "breaking
the law of gravity". It would just mean that our understanding of the way
things are was wrong, and we'd modify the "law" accordingly.
In the same way, whatever humans do defines what the laws about humans are,
not vice-versa.
> Man's will is lost.
Huh. *Mine's* still here.
>He has no reason to act, and thus the only logical belief is nihilism --
^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^
Oh, this is just silly. C'mon, I see plenty of reasons to act - for
example, I enjoy stimulating conversations, so I'm typing this out to you.
>it's impossible to choose, because you have no machinery to do it with.
You fail to grasp how "naturalists" understand choice. More below.
>[Mr. Ingles then launched into a very long explanation of a complicated
>machine intended to represent the human mind. A chain of dominos and some
>prime numbers were discussed. See his post if you want to understand it.
Perhaps you should see it again.
>The conclusion *I* drew -- and I don't want to be construed as
>misrepresenting Mr. Ingles here, so look at it yourself -- is that man's
>brain may be very complex, but it is still a machine, just a reactor. It
>responds to what the universe puts into it, without any exercise of
>consciousness or personality. As I've tried to explain above, such a
>belief is really nihilism]
No, no, no! Darn it. I'm just going to have to pelt you with analogies
until I get it right.
Consider a fountain. Water shoots up a bit, and then, under gravity, falls
down. It never has quite the same configuration twice, and, indeed, its
constituent parts are always being replaced. (You've heard the phrase, "You
can't cross the same river twice?") There is no material *thing* that is
the fountain; the fountain is a persistent *pattern* that we give a name to.
Wind is even more like that. Does wind exist?
Now, there are things that are even more removed from concrete reality.
What is _Moby_Dick_? You can find a physical book called _Moby_Dick_.
But let's say that all of the books were destroyed, but the text was
preserved on disk. Even worse, what if the disk were destroyed, but a few
people had it memorized. Would _Moby_Dick_ still exist? You can't point
to a physical location for it. But I would say that it exists.
Does the "normal distribution" (bell curve) exist? It's an abstraction
that humans came up with; but you can see its effects. If you're running
an insurance company, you ignore it at your peril.
Does the Mandelbrot Set exist? (I hope you know what it is; let me know
if you don't.)
What about pi? Does pi exist? Can you point to one? Or e, the base of the
natural logarithm? It's a fundamental part of calculus; it shows up in all
kinds of descriptions of real systems; dare you say that it does not
exist? Heck, does "641" exist?
You seem to have accepted the following argument, critiqued in _The_Mind's
_I_:
"Some facts are not about the properties, circumstances, and relations of
physical objects.
Therefore some facts are about the properties, circumstances, and relations
of nonphysical objects."
I mean, consider Ishmael of _Moby_Dick_. There are facts about Ishmael;
but I hope you don't think that there is a perfecly real but nonphysical
person named Ishmael.
A person, a person's will, a person's *self* is so far as I can tell an
*abstraction* of processes that go on in the brain. That is not to say
that it is not real; it is at least as real as pi, more real than Ismael,
and probably as real as a fountain.
Note that this is not entirely decided _a_priori_. A while back we were
debating dualism with someone, and I listed off a great deal of symptoms
of brain damage. Awareness, consciousness, *self-ness* itself can be
damaged or destroyed when parts of the brain are damaged or destroyed.
In fact, for every trait of people that I have ever heard ascribed to a
non-material 'soul', I have read of a pattern of brain damage that
eliminates that trait. It seems reasonable to extrapolate that when the
*entire* brain is destroyed, all those traits are similarly gone. See _The
_Man_Who_Mistook_His_Wife_for_a_Hat_ by Oliver Sacks. Any university
library should have it; it's fantastically well written and very thought-
provoking. (No pun intended, honest!)
[deletions]
>> Well, the view I've just described "satisfies" *my* mind.
>
> How can it satisfy your *mind*? Are you claiming that you have a
>consciousness that can look at the universe (the machine, the system) and
>make judgements, assign value? How can you do this within a framework of
>naturalism?
Hopefully I've made that a little clearer now. (Do you see the point I
was trying to make in my last post, now?)
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"An apple every eight hours keeps three doctors away." - B. Kliban
The_Doge
Niall McAuley <eei...@eeiuc.ericsson.se> wrote:
>Matthew Alexander Colvin (pto...@next17csc.wam.umd.edu)
>has spent several long posts getting this far:
>
>>That's three legs knocked out from under
>>the six-legged chair -- free will, man's value, and morality. Here are
>>the ones that remain, but which I think will eventually fall too:
>>knowledge, truth, and reality itself.
>
>Unfortunately, none of the "naturalists" replying have had any problem
>with Colvins conceptions of free will, man's value and morality
>being non-existent. So far, it's a big "So what ?".
>
>Knowledge, truth and reality are something else. Come on, Matthew,
>get to the point.
>
of winding up for yet another sales pitch for Christianity. We should be
seeing it Real Soon Now, to paraphrase Dr. Emilio Lizardo.
---
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* The_Doge of South St. Louis clav...@nyx.cs.du.edu *
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* 88.1 FM St. Louis Community Radio *
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Wayward Son
Door" I thought I would at least give him the credit. I ran across this
book ten years ago, I didn't find the argument convincing then, and I find
it less so now. I would recommend the book, though, as a good (if
somewhat slanted) general introduction to world views and as a good way to
develop/test one's ability at picking out weak points.
The argument hinges on point number two:
pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
>2) The universe is a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed system
>(it is not open to reordering from without -- all changes in it come about
>from an cause that is itself a part of the universe).
The problem, of course, being the extending of a simple, mechanical, macro
level *model* (cause-effect) to the workings of the human brain and such
concepts as choice and free will. It is a mistake to take this point as
saying that the universe is completely determined/deterministic. It seems
to me that the whole of modern physics would show otherwise.
So, the stumbling block is the "uniformity of cause and effect" phrase.
Suffice it to say that the universe is closed, that there is no "outside"
out there -- this is the essential point, which differentiates naturalism
from theism and, to some extent, deism which allows an "outside" but no
interaction.
> So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free will
>is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand: I buy a
>newspaper. Did I choose to do so? No, a chain of events that I didn't
>recognize caused me to buy the paper. "OK," the naturalists say, "so you
>didn't CHOOSE to buy the paper. But you thought you chose it. You have
>an illusion of free will. Isn't that good enough?"
I am not sure what you mean by free will, so I will try to take the common
sense approach. Somewhere between absolute determinism and completely
unconstrained free will lies reality. Does this make free will an
illusion? I don't think so. Does this make responsibility meaningless?
Again, no. It is more of a matter of being more free than not, or mostly
free. *This* is good enough.
Jim Copeland
--
WARNING: Netnews reading is a solitary and sedentary pursuit, and
those who do so are cautioned that the Net should be used as an integral
part of a well-rounded life, including a daily regimen of rigorous
physical exercise, rewarding relationships, and a sensible low-fat diet.
The Net should not be used as a substitute or an excuse.
KRESSJA
>In article 20JAN199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>>I think that such a conception of truth is not adequate to the phenomena;
>>we seem to live in a world which is meaningful--and naturalism seems to
>>me to undercut the possibility of meaning. It implies (it seems to me)
>>that all such meaning is illusory. My answer (of course) is that no
>>naturalist *really* lives this way--it would be impossible. Meaning
>>of all sorts suffuses our lives constantly; perhaps there is no need
>>for an ultimate meaning of things--it seems unlikely that we could ever
>>determine such a thing.
>
>This argument turns on John's use of the word "illusory". To a naturalist,
>meaning is by no means illusory: it is an idea (conceptual structure,
>call it what you will - I need to brush up my terminology here) within
>the human mind which is (ultimately) a physical construct within the
>brain. Why John should find this illusory beats me..... Maybe he's
>a soulist.
A soulist? What might that be?
My point is not that naturalists do not experience meaning, but rather
that they cannot give any account of the experience which does not
nullify it. An experience of, say, an ethical position, when explained
as merely the outcome of chemical states, is nullified as having any
real ethical significance, since it could not have been otherwise.
Note that I say "merely;" I would be the last to deny that the body and
the physical are involved in everything about human existence (we do
exist as *embodied selves* after all)--I resist the reduction however.
Is naturalism reductive? I say yes, if it has any meaning. If "nature"
means "everything," the naturalism is without content, since everything
is tautologically defined as natural. I thus assume that naturalism
wishes to posit one kind of explanation to which all others are to be
reduced, and I argue against such a reduction. Each region of the
phenomena respond to human knowing in a different way, and require
the appropriate response from us. When one does not respond to the
phenomena appropriately, but rather imposes an alien methodology on
them, then violence is an inevitable result; violence of this sort is
often effective, but nevertheless, violence it remains, which cuts one
off from other, more appropriate access to the phenomena. It is no
accident that almost all the early "natural philosophers" like Bacon
and Descartes, use metaphors of the violent conquest of nature,
"interrogating her" "getting her into your chains," etc., etc., etc.
Ray Ingles
>In article <2hmdhc$f...@titan.ucs.umass.edu>, hdyk...@titan.ucs.umass.edu (Hans M Dykstra) writes...
>I think that such a conception of truth is not adequate to the phenomena;
>we seem to live in a world which is meaningful--and naturalism seems to
>me to undercut the possibility of meaning. It implies (it seems to me)
[deletions]
>Perhaps the kind of human that needs more meaning than a mechanistic
>reality is simply doomed to die out...
Well, I dunno. I don't think the universe was made for any teleological
purpose; I don't think that there is any "cosmic significance" to the fact
that humans are around. But I'm still pretty happy. (No, Ray, you only
*think* you're happy... :-> )
It doesn't bother me that my life has no external 'meaning'. (What the
heck would that be like, anyway? Why should that meaning be important to
me?) I don't see a need for a 'meaning' or 'end purpose' to life.
Learning, loving, and living (cliched as they may be) seem to me to be
fine pursuits. I don't see me getting bored with them anytime soon.
Ray Ingles
>Assuming that purpose of life is survival (if that can be called a
>purpose); I do not; there's more than a touch of nihilism around
>Darwinism. Rather I think with Nietzsche that life's purpose is not
>to simply propogate itself, but to overcome itself, i.e. to generate
>more mutilfarious and complex forms. Note that this is not a
>teleological conception, but rather a conception of the process of
>the generation and differentiation of forms which repudiates
>mechanism. Mechanism is an exegetical interpretation (like all
>science) which conceives being after the way in which consciousness
>habitually grasps it.
Well, I don't understand all of that, but I'm pretty sure that you need
to study evolutionary theory a bit more. It sounds like you may have
taken to heart some popular theist distortions of what it has to say.
>the mediocre has greater survival capacity
>than does the rare and the exceptional;
Hardly. Diverse populations are the ones that make it. And that's why
this bit here...
>_Brave New World_ seems like the ideal naturalist utopia.)
...is wrong, from an evolutionary perspective.
[deletions]
>I do not think that this is possible. Mere greed does not produce
>great works--it cannot.
By definition. "Greed" = "stupidly-executed self-interest", as opposed
to enlightened self-interest. For example...
> Great works require great passion, and
>cannot arise out of the lukewarm bubbling of utilitarian schemeing;
If you have great passion, it seems to me that you are *being*
utilitarian in expressing it. But anyway...
>The modern technological
>world is unique in being an anti-world, which rips up meaning by the
>roots;
Meaning as *you* conceive it, perhaps.
> so far, the blind scientific optimism has been enough to sustain
>us; the "death of god" has not yet been felt, been experienced in the
>essence of its historical advent. But that time is coming.
Maybe then, when it's out of the way, we humans can agree to play more
amusing games.
>Nihilism is not the ansence of local purposes; nihilism is the awareness
>of the falseness and arbitrariness of all purposes. One cannot live by
>a lie, once one has grasped it as a lie. I do not wish to see the
>human race reduced to something whose purpose is "getting on," i.e.
>simple continuation.
I see little danger of that. My own personal goal is to stand on an
airless planetoid in the Lesser Magellanic Cloud and watch the Milky
Way galaxy rise over its oh-so-near horizon... as one of my .sig
quotes says, "The meek can *have* the Earth; the rest of us are going
to the stars!" :->
[deletions]
>I think rather that technology is something which functions as
>a destining historical force, which threatens to distort the human
>essence.
Define the "human essence". Give three examples. :->
>I am "against" neither technology nor science; but rather technologism and
>scientism. The conception of technology as something which is ontologically
>and epistemologically neutral, and hence something which is a tool for man's
>purposes seems to be to be we wildly wrong, and dangerous. So long as
>we continue to think of technology primarily as something of which we
>are the authors, rather than as something which lays claim to our historical
>being, we work ourselves ever more inexorably into the entangling sway of
>technology. There is the danger that, "in the midst of the correct, the
>true might disappear."
Well, I think of it a bit differently. Sure, we alter our environment
(and I mean that in a more fundamental sense than ozone holes) and it
cannot help but alter us in turn. It becomes a feedback loop; but I
think that it can be ridden; that the feedback can amplify what it is
to be human. It's not just tachnology affecting us; we affect
technology (in the sense that you mean it) at least as much.
KRESSJA
> Consider a fountain. Water shoots up a bit, and then, under gravity, falls
>down. It never has quite the same configuration twice, and, indeed, its
>constituent parts are always being replaced. (You've heard the phrase, "You
>can't cross the same river twice?") There is no material *thing* that is
>the fountain; the fountain is a persistent *pattern* that we give a name to.
"Roman Fountain"
The jet ascends and falling fills
The marble basin circling round;
This, veiling itself over, spills
Into a second basin's ground.
The second in such plenty lives,
Its bubbling flood a third invests,
And each at once receives and gives
And streams and rests.
Wind, Moby-Dick, a bell-curve, the Mandelbrot set, pi, 641.
The problem is how we are to speak of all these things which are not
physical objects. All these things do indeed exist. They are. This
shows that physical extantness is not the sole criterion of being.
Something may be without being physically extant. It also indicates
that something whose being is not that of physical extantness, can be
in such a way as to be with a physical component, which nonetheless does
not define the thing, as with the fountain, the water of which does not
constitute it (by taking away all the water present, one does not
remove the fountain) but without which it could not be a fountain.
> You seem to have accepted the following argument, critiqued in _The_Mind's
>_I_:
> "Some facts are not about the properties, circumstances, and relations of
>physical objects.
> Therefore some facts are about the properties, circumstances, and relations
>of nonphysical objects."
The error in the above argument as I see it is that physical objects,
and physical extantness, are taken to be definitive with respect to
being, such that the other things are assumed, since they are, to be
somekind of non-physical-but-nevertheless-extant objects. The logic
goes:
1. These things are.
2. To be is to be an extant object.
3. They are not physically extant objects.
4. Therefore, they must be non-physical, yet extant objects.
The difference is how the faulty reasoning is attacked. We seem to agree
on premise one, that these things are (or do you agree?). The point at
which we part ways is at premise two. As I understand it, Ray, you and
Geoff accept premise two, whereas I do not. You wish to deny that
there are non-physical, extant objects (the mind, the soul), but you wish
to account for these non-physical things which are by *way of* physically
extant objects (the brain). You reject the inference to the extantness
of non-physical things, but still retain the ontological superlativeness
of extant physical things upon which the inference is grounded. I,
on the other hand, reject this ontological privileging, because I think
that it is the source of the mischief in these areas.
Why should it be that physical extantness is the superlative standard of
being whereby everything else is to be measured?
You speak of the mind's being damaged whenever the brain is, and take this
as evidence that the mind is an abstraction from the brain; this is
good evidence that the mind is not something which *is* without the
brain, but it provides no _prima facie_ justification for treating the
mind solely in terms of the brain. *That* requires the ontological
presupposition of the primacy of physical extantness.
Take the case of the Farmer's Axe: The farmer says, "This axe has been
in my family for five generations. The handle's been replaced ten times,
and the head twice." What justifies the farmer in speaking of "this
axe" if the material components of it have changed? Isn't this the
same way in which the Mississippi River is *still* the same Mississippi
which Twain sailed (or even, in some sense, the same Mississippi which
Huck Finn navigated), even if the waters which run in its course are
completely different?
This is because the physical components of the river and axe are necessary
to, but not definitive of, the being of the thing. The axe is the same
axe because, as a thing, as useful tool, it has a place in the history of
the farmers family, and has meaning in the tasks and projects that marked
the farm whereon his family dwelt and labored, lived and died. The
Mississippi is an even greater thing, which gathers around itself the
historical concerns and lives of many. So too cities and countries.
The truth of the river or the axe is not to be found in an examination,
however careful, of the water or the wood. The truth of the being of
the Mississippi is better sought in the works of Twain, and such places.
The truth of the being of the fountain is not found by considering it
as an abstraction made from marble and running water; the truth of the
fountain is found, so I would say, in the poem above, and such things.
And the truth of human being? I suggest that the truth of human being
will not be found in any essential way by the study of brains; however
much such studies tell us, they never touch on the essential.
Niall McAuley
>Assuming that purpose of life is survival (if that can be called a
>purpose); I do not; there's more than a touch of nihilism around
>Darwinism. Rather I think with Nietzsche that life's purpose is not
>to simply propogate itself, but to overcome itself, i.e. to generate
>more mutilfarious and complex forms.
To your concept of "purpose", I would apply many of the same
arguments as to the concept of "God". My world view doesn't
need it. I see no evidence for it. It explains nothing. Away
with it.
>This is precisely nihilism; meaning is something that
>calls one into thw world of meaningfulness, and indeed is that world
>as it gather is up man's historical sojourning into itself.
Meaningless, if poetic sounding.
>Nihilism is not the absence of local purposes; nihilism is the awareness
>of the falseness and arbitrariness of all purposes.
I didn't suggest all purposes are false. Only the God one.
>I do not wish to see the
>human race reduced to something whose purpose is "getting on," i.e.
>simple continuation.
Don't confuse the evolutionary idea of "purpose" with man's self
assigned purposes.
>>Perhaps acknowledging
>>the truth about the real world will allow us to tackle problems,
>>rather than allowing non-existent entities to sort them out.
>Perhaps the truth will kill us.
Perhaps it will.
>I am not offering an "anti-technological" diatribe. I do not
>think that technology is something that human beings do, which is
>bad. I think rather that technology is something which functions as
>a destining historical force, which threatens to distort the human
>essence.
Here we may differ. I think technology is a tangible manifestation
of human essence, along with art.
>There is the danger that, "in the midst of the correct, the
>true might disappear."
Nonethless, science remains correct. I agree that there is
more than science, but to argue that science and technology
are of themselves dangerous is to advocate ignorance.
Niall McAuley
>An experience of, say, an ethical position, when explained
>as merely the outcome of chemical states, is nullified as having any
>real ethical significance, since it could not have been otherwise.
It is the terms "mere" and "real" here that grate. The fact that
everything is mere matter and energy doesn't change our
perceptions of the world. It need not change the way we model
the real world. Assigning "significance", "meaning", and
"purpose" to concepts, ideas, or real objects doesn't
change them.
>Is naturalism reductive? I say yes, if it has any meaning.
It states that everything we see could be reduced to "mere"
matter/energy interactions. It doe not state that such
reduction is necessary, or a useful way of viewing the
world.
>I thus assume that naturalism
>wishes to posit one kind of explanation to which all others are to be
>reduced, and I argue against such a reduction. Each region of the
>phenomena respond to human knowing in a different way, and require
>the appropriate response from us.
You've lost me again. How does a region of a phenomenon respond
to human knowing ? I don't understand your meaning.
>When one does not respond to the
>phenomena appropriately, but rather imposes an alien methodology on
>them, then violence is an inevitable result; violence of this sort is
>often effective, but nevertheless, violence it remains, which cuts one
>off from other, more appropriate access to the phenomena.
The fact that a neurobiologist wants to understand the brain function
underlying patern recognition does not mean she cannot appreciate
a painting. It may allow her to advance knowledge, and someday heal
a blind person, or build a seeing robot. What use is it to apply
the word "violence" to this process ?
Niall McAuley
>The problem is how we are to speak of all these things which are not
>physical objects. All these things do indeed exist. They are. This
>shows that physical extantness is not the sole criterion of being.
>Something may be without being physically extant.
In reductionist mode, we could say nothing we see "really"
exists, except as fundamental particles and forces. No
naturalist has advocated such a view.
Does a fountain exist ? Yes, in that I can describe one, build
one, admire one. It is, of course, made up of other things.
What's the problem ?
>1. These things are.
>2. To be is to be an extant object.
>3. They are not physically extant objects.
>4. Therefore, they must be non-physical, yet extant objects.
The distinct "objects" of which you speak do not exist in the real
world. They are concepts, descriptions of assemblages of
matter and energy. The concepts exist as functions of the
matter and energy making up your brain.
>As I understand it, Ray, you and
>Geoff accept premise two, whereas I do not. You wish to deny that
>there are non-physical, extant objects (the mind, the soul), but you wish
>to account for these non-physical things which are by *way of* physically
>extant objects (the brain).
The "mind" is a concept, a description of a function of the brain.
Because the mind is a complicated function, it is useful to refer
to it in many contexts as an extant thing, just as we might refer
to the wind, a function of lots of air molecules.
>You speak of the mind's being damaged whenever the brain is, and take this
>as evidence that the mind is an abstraction from the brain; this is
>good evidence that the mind is not something which *is* without the
>brain, but it provides no _prima facie_ justification for treating the
>mind solely in terms of the brain. *That* requires the ontological
>presupposition of the primacy of physical extantness.
Certainly. Yet the naturalist can maintain that his is the simplest
world view consistent with the evidence. An infinity of more
complicated views can be presented, but they explain nothing more,
so I reject them.
>The farmer says, "This axe has been
>in my family for five generations. The handle's been replaced ten times,
>and the head twice."
>What justifies the farmer in speaking of "this
>axe" if the material components of it have changed ?
"This axe" is a description of an assemblage of matter/energy.
It may be more useful to the farmer to treat the sequence
of real assemblages as one thing.
Similarly I can refer to "my skin" although the matter may all
have been replaced since last time I spoke of it. The
description is a useful abstraction.
>This is because the physical components of the river and axe are necessary
>to, but not definitive of, the being of the thing.
The definition is in the farmers mind. To one that has never seen
an axe, there is a piece of metal on a piece of wood.
>And the truth of human being? I suggest that the truth of human being
>will not be found in any essential way by the study of brains; however
>much such studies tell us, they never touch on the essential.
Useful information is to be found. That is enough.
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
this point, but I wanted to use an extract to make a point to Matthew.
Matthew had asked why I objected to the use of the term nihilism to
describe a narrowly-drawn consequence of naturalism (the denial of
independent epistemological standing to moral "truth"). I had already
pointed out the opportunity for "guilt by association" with other,
irrelevant, meanings of the word. Now John Kress goes in full-bore with
assertions like:
In article 20JAN199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>Nihilism is not the ansence of local purposes; nihilism is the awareness
>of the falseness and arbitrariness of all purposes. One cannot live by
>a lie, once one has grasped it as a lie. I do not wish to see the
>human race reduced to something whose purpose is "getting on," i.e.
>simple continuation.
We have already (last autumn) considered the ambiguity in the term
"arbitrary": do we mean "unprivileged; could have been other than it is"
or "capricious"? The fact that humans (along with most other creatures)
exhibit bilateral symmetry is clearly "arbitrary": there is no logical reason
why early forms of life could not have been structurally triangular,
and that this structural element could have been reflected in everything that
followed. (See Gould's "Wonderful Life" for more on this.) On the other
hand, the fact that I as a member of homo sapiens sapiens possess two
arms is not contextually arbitrary: it is (almost) a necessary truth.
John is committing a variation of what Flew calls the "no true
Scotsman" argument, and others here have called the "no real Christian"
argument: a "local purpose" is not a real Purpose, and Purpose is in
fact defined in such a way that only a non-naturalist explanation can
qualify as a true Purpose. This is a thoroughly pernicious variation of
the religious notion that all virtue flows from god and people cannot
be virtuous in and of themselves.
As homo sapiens evolved and began to investigate and reason about the
world, there was much which was inexplicable. One function of religion
was to institutionalise this sense of the unknown, and to create the
myth that the core meaning of the world was a mystery which could be
approached only through the mediation of the religious institutions.
Thus arose the notion that true meaning was necessarily mysterious and
transcended "mere" physical explanation.
The "lie" was (and is) this myth. The purposes and goals of people
which were systematically devalued by this myth are not lies, and they
never were. A practical, humanistic, materialist, naturalist purpose of
working for the well-being and happiness of one's family, friends,
community, and so forth is not a "lie" simply because John Kress believes
it to be.
Matthew Alexander Colvin
universe composed entirely of matter. But now he runs into even more
mine-ridden territory. Let us examine why naturalism means nihilism once
again.
The main point of my post now is *value*, that thing which is
denied again and again by naturalists. According to Mr. Ingles, man has
free will. He has a consciousness that can manipulate the universe
according to how it sees fit.
My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
use it to commit suicide?
Here are some answers I can think of. I'm going to practice my
annoying habit of shooting them down, though (call it straw-man if you
wish, just don't offer any of my straw explanations later).
So, why not commit suicide?
1) It's against my self interest.
So, you have inherent value? Your life is worth saving? Why?
2) It's against an ingrained ethical code I have.
Why not violate that ethical code? You have the ability to do it
in other things, do you not? For examply, you can steal, murder, etc.
Why not commit suicide? In other words, why do you adhere to that code?
Is the code valuable in itself?
3) My ethical code is genetic/memetic. I get it from my society, my
surroundings.
Value is now shifted from the individual to the group. My critics
have done this numerous times in the course of this discussion. If the
ethical code now proceeds from society, then it follows that it is a means
for society to propagate itself and survive. But why? Is the society
inherently valuable? No, it is made up of individuals, who participate in
it because they can accomplish more as a group than they can alone. So
society exists for the individual. And value is still back on the
individual, to be explained away yet again by naturalists.
Or perhaps they don't shift it back on the individual. Maybe they
now appeal to large chains of evolution. Society has ethics because it
preserves the human species. The human species now has value. Why? It's
just matter like the rest of the universe. Eventually, nothing has value
for the naturalist. If he commits suicide, he's not exercising free will
-- he's just reacting to the action of the grand system, of which he is a
part no more important than any other. If I'm to practice naturalism, I
need a reason to live. Can any naturalist find one? I maintain that they
can't -- they are simply closet nihilists and don't have any value to be
found in their own system. They are preaching one system and living by
another. Naturalism, thus inconsistent, must be false.
Matt Colvin
Matthew Alexander Colvin
My posts of late have turned to the question of value, by which I
mean the reason man has for choosing one thing over another. Ethics is
nothing more than a system for assigning value to things (and actions).
If you can explain where value comes from, you can explain ethics. But
you can't explain ethics without dealing with value -- the resulting
attempt is a goosechase, a futile struggle to produce an ethical system
without value. There is no such animal. And yet, some people (Niall
McAuley among them) try to deny the existence of value. Here he is,
responding to John Kress:
In article <940121133...@eeiuc.eeiuc_m_nis> eei...@eeiuc.ericsson.se
>
> >Assuming that purpose of life is survival (if that can be called a
> >purpose); I do not; there's more than a touch of nihilism around
> >Darwinism. Rather I think with Nietzsche that life's purpose is not
> >to simply propogate itself, but to overcome itself, i.e. to generate
> >more mutilfarious and complex forms.
>
> To your concept of "purpose", I would apply many of the same
> arguments as to the concept of "God". My world view doesn't
> need it. I see no evidence for it. It explains nothing. Away
> with it.
But you cannot explain why you act the way you do (the biggest
piece of evidence for the existence of purpose). You have free will --
you are exercising it right now -- but you are employing values that you
say do not exist.
> >This is precisely nihilism; meaning is something that
> >calls one into thw world of meaningfulness, and indeed is that world
> >as it gather is up man's historical sojourning into itself.
>
> Meaningless, if poetic sounding.
I have a hard time understanding this too. It just doesn't make
any sense. There's some subject-verb number disagreement and some
"historical sojourning." I don't get it at all. So let's ignore it. See
what he says next, and read again your unsupported contradiction of it:
> >Nihilism is not the absence of local purposes; nihilism is the
awareness
> >of the falseness and arbitrariness of all purposes.
>
> I didn't suggest all purposes are false. Only the God one.
But the other purposes are unexplained. If I say that they come
from God, you have no better explanation. If there is no ultimate
purpose, then there is no source for all the little purposes. That is,
survival is not valuable in itself. Nothing is valuable unless someone
gives it value. Existentialists say that man is the value-giver. Theists
say that God is the value-giver. But naturalists have no source at all.
> >I do not wish to see the
> >human race reduced to something whose purpose is "getting on," i.e.
> >simple continuation.
>
> Don't confuse the evolutionary idea of "purpose" with man's self
> assigned purposes.
Where does this evolutionary "purpose" come from? Does the
universe have a purpose now? Who gave it one? Sure, you can say that man
assigns purpose. But that's just an assertion. You can't back it up. If
you say that something has value, but I say it doesn't, who's to say who
is right? Man as a valuegiver has some problems.
> >>Perhaps acknowledging
> >>the truth about the real world will allow us to tackle problems,
> >>rather than allowing non-existent entities to sort them out.
>
> >Perhaps the truth will kill us.
>
> Perhaps it will.
While we're floating speculation on the breeze, I'll loft my kite
too: Perhaps we'll kill ourselves by denying the truth.
> >I am not offering an "anti-technological" diatribe. I do not
> >think that technology is something that human beings do, which is
> >bad. I think rather that technology is something which functions as
> >a destining historical force, which threatens to distort the human
> >essence.
>
> Here we may differ. I think technology is a tangible manifestation
> of human essence, along with art.
So, art is an expression of human essence. Is art then
meaningful? Does it have value? Where does it get it from?
> >There is the danger that, "in the midst of the correct, the
> >true might disappear."
>
> Nonethless, science remains correct. I agree that there is
> more than science, but to argue that science and technology
> are of themselves dangerous is to advocate ignorance.
Science and technology are fine, useful tools for exploring the
physical world. But they do not answer questions of value.
Matt Colvin
Hans M Dykstra
KRESSJA <kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> wrote:
>My point is not that naturalists do not experience meaning, but rather
>that they cannot give any account of the experience which does not
>nullify it. An experience of, say, an ethical position, when explained
>as merely the outcome of chemical states, is nullified as having any
>real ethical significance, since it could not have been otherwise.
What would this "real significance" be? This is where I cannot
follow you at all. It seems to me that this yearning for
"real significance" is nothing more than the corpse of Nietzsche's
dead god draped over your shoulders and weighing you down.
If it seems to have significance to me, then it *does* have
significance to me--in that significance is nothing more than
a relationship between me and that ethical position. I don't
feel any real lack just because that lacks any "real significance",
whatever the hell that might be.
>Note that I say "merely;" I would be the last to deny that the body and
>the physical are involved in everything about human existence (we do
>exist as *embodied selves* after all)--I resist the reduction however.
I agree that naturalism is inherently reductionist. I also argue
that it is not necessary, and often not useful, to reduce everything
to its lowest level. "Ice" is defined as water in the solid state--
what does this mean? It posits a set of non-vanishing correlations
between the positions and orientations of nearby molecules. Most
people would say that "ice" is a concrete thing, yet when we perform
the reduction we discover only abstractions. So a thing can be
both concrete and abstract at the same time.
This is why I think you are wrong when you resist the reduction.
Thoughts, meaning, etc. seem to become more tenuous and abstract
when you do, but then so does "ice". Analogously, I would say
that thoughts and meaning exist just as much as ice does, and
to say otherwise is to take the reduction to ridiculous extremes.
>Is naturalism reductive? I say yes, if it has any meaning. If "nature"
>means "everything," the naturalism is without content, since everything
>is tautologically defined as natural. I thus assume that naturalism
>wishes to posit one kind of explanation to which all others are to be
>reduced, and I argue against such a reduction. Each region of the
>phenomena respond to human knowing in a different way, and require
>the appropriate response from us. When one does not respond to the
>phenomena appropriately, but rather imposes an alien methodology on
>them, then violence is an inevitable result; violence of this sort is
>often effective, but nevertheless, violence it remains, which cuts one
>off from other, more appropriate access to the phenomena. It is no
>accident that almost all the early "natural philosophers" like Bacon
>and Descartes, use metaphors of the violent conquest of nature,
>"interrogating her" "getting her into your chains," etc., etc., etc.
As a scientist I would say that this is the equivalent of trying to
describe ice in terms of electrons and protons. What you get is
not *wrong*, but it is not the appropriate way to
look at ice when what you want to do is chill your whiskey.
***
hmd
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
John: you're all tied up in a giant use/mention mess.
Take our favourite fountain. Superficial sense data is of an object - something
that has physical existence (I can stick my hand into the water and feel it)
and extent. Closer examination reveals that the perceived object is composed
of drops of water, is not solid, etc. etc.
I decide to call this "thing" a fountain. (Actually, I'm tasught that
that's what other English-speakers call it.) There is now in my brain
a pattern which associates the word "fountain" with various other
elements: the memory of observed fountains, (probably) processed in
various ways to assist in rapid recognition; my knowledge concerning
fountains (water jets, droplets, relationships to geysers, etc.).
When asked what the meaning of the word "fountain" is, we naturally
refer to the physical phenemenon which we label as such. This is not
due to some "privileged" status of physical meaning: it is a function of
our language and the practical way in which we employ it.When asked
the meaning of "42", we refer to the concept and (usually) leave implicit
the relationship between the concept and the physical reality
of, say, 42 fountains.
> Why should it be that physical extantness is the superlative standard of
> being whereby everything else is to be measured?
But it isn't. You seem to be saying that a naturalist goes around
ranking everything, and that physical entities outrank conceptual
ones. But a conceptual entity DOES have a physical reality: the
reality of the pattern in my brain. It's as if you suggested that
a naturalist would rank a grain of sand above a planet, since a
planet is "merely" a very complex arrangements of grains of sand and
similar stuff.
OK, this imputation to naturalism is clearly (IMHO) wrong-headed, but
let's explore why it arose. I think that there are a couple of elements
here, which I'll just hint at for now. First, mutual communication
about sense-data is more reliable than communication about conceptual
entities. It can be directly checked, and relies less on cultural or
personal assumptions, prejudices, etc. Secondly, it is probable that
language first evolved as a way of communicating about physical
elements of the environment, and that this has been preserved in some
way in our structures of thought and language. Paradoxically, naturalism
affords us the opportunity to examine the nature of such phenomena -
maybe this is why you seem to view it as a Pandora's box....
Matthew Alexander Colvin
of net-addiction as his sig. I recommend that you read that part of his
post and follow it rigorously. :) As for the rest of it:
In article <1994Jan21....@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>
jcop...@nyx10.cs.du.edu (Wayward Son) writes:
> Since your argument is straight out of James W. Sire's "The Universe
Next
> Door" I thought I would at least give him the credit.
You're partly right. I have read the book, and I share Sire's
ideas regarding the six points of naturalism. The book is OK as far as it
goes, but its treatments of existentialism and Buddhism are cursory. And
Sire clearly doesn't understand what he calls "the new consciousness." My
arguments lean heavily on C.S. Lewis as well -- Mere Christianity and The
Four Loves are the two of his works most influential on me. I'm not
ashamed to admit my mentors. The unfounded charge has been levelled,
however, that I'm warming up to evangelize on this group. A jest, surely!
Only a fool would try to preach Christianity to people who have been drawn
together by the title "alt.atheism."
> I ran across this
> book ten years ago, I didn't find the argument convincing then, and I
find
> it less so now. I would recommend the book, though, as a good (if
> somewhat slanted) general introduction to world views and as a good way
to
> develop/test one's ability at picking out weak points.
There are, I'm sure, a good many such books out there. If you
lean on them too much, they dictate your thought.
It's fine to take something from a book, such as Geoff's
definitions of nihilism from Flew or my six Naturalism points from Sire.
But you can't accept something from such a source as any more valid that
what we write on this group. It has to be questioned too -- that's why
Geoff and I invited readers to critique our points and definitions. As
long as it's questioned, I maintain that it is fine.
C.S. Lewis wrote an essay called Bluspels and Flalansferes. It's
a good read and an entertaining way to get an idea of the dangers of using
a particular metaphor as a way of understanding. Throughout this whole
argument, words have been stumbling blocks. We hash out definitions and
trip over them later. And for the atheists reading this, don't worry
about Lewis' Christianity -- he doesn't bring it into this essay, so he
won't trouble your psyche too much :-)
>
> The argument hinges on point number two:
Actually, it hinges on acceptance of the first point and *any* one
of the others. But go on:
>
> pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
> >2) The universe is a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed system
> >(it is not open to reordering from without -- all changes in it come
about
> >from an cause that is itself a part of the universe).
>
> The problem, of course, being the extending of a simple, mechanical,
macro
> level *model* (cause-effect) to the workings of the human brain and such
> concepts as choice and free will. It is a mistake to take this point as
> saying that the universe is completely determined/deterministic. It
seems
> to me that the whole of modern physics would show otherwise.
>
> So, the stumbling block is the "uniformity of cause and effect" phrase.
> Suffice it to say that the universe is closed, that there is no
"outside"
> out there -- this is the essential point, which differentiates
naturalism
> from theism and, to some extent, deism which allows an "outside" but no
> interaction.
>
You haven't proven *my point* false, only pointed out what I
already claim -- that if you accept it, then naturalism is
self-contradictory. If everything in the universe happens because of
something else in the universe (if the universe is closed), then it's a
uniformity of cause and effect. The "whole of modern physiscs" shows
otherwise? All of physics hinges on this principle. Scientists look for
causes for effects. Matter attracts -- there must be a graviton. Matter
stays together -- they give us a gluon. Neptune's orbit is screwed up --
maybe there's a planet X (forgive me if this quandary has been resolved
since I last read about it). Halley's Comet is a few days late -- its gas
jets slowed it down.
Did you read all the responses of the naturalists on this group
after I posted the original six points? They all bought point #2 and then
told me I wasn't interpreting it correctly. You are the first person to
really disagree with that second point, and you don't offer any evidence
that there is any alternative to "uniformity of cause and effect within a
closed system" that still meshes with the rest of the naturalist system.
> > So, can man act significantly? No, he cannot, for any free
will
> >is an illusion. It is just determinacy that we don't understand: I
buy a
> >newspaper. Did I choose to do so? No, a chain of events that I didn't
> >recognize caused me to buy the paper. "OK," the naturalists say, "so
you
> >didn't CHOOSE to buy the paper. But you thought you chose it. You
have
> >an illusion of free will. Isn't that good enough?"
>
> I am not sure what you mean by free will, so I will try to take the
common
> sense approach. Somewhere between absolute determinism and completely
> unconstrained free will lies reality. Does this make free will an
> illusion? I don't think so. Does this make responsibility meaningless?
> Again, no. It is more of a matter of being more free than not, or
mostly
> free. *This* is good enough.
You are trying to describe reality by what it is not; you're
trying to prove a negative. The FAQ is ambivalent about this. I am not.
I won't mess with it. Good luck.
Give me a positive to debate, and we'll do it.
Matt Colvin
Jim Perry
>*since* God suffocated under the weight of His own falseness (nice turn
>of phrase!) that nothing can possibly take his place, since we now
>_know_ how arbitrary it was to being with. Even the ideal of
>consensus comes under question? Why should it make a difference if
>many people believe an arbitrary thing, or only a few?
The knowledge of arbitrariness at some level doesn't alter the
possibility of consensus emerging. Consensus can be and has been
manufactured; often with just as cynical motives or negative
possibilities as religion. One of the most "religious" experiences of
my life was the Apollo project, an undertaking that swept up a
generation in an accomplishment equal to if not surpassing any
undertaken for any gods. And yet, the underlying positive% motivation
for that effort was essentially naturalistic: we can learn about and
understand the universe, and representative of the technological
emphasis you seem to dislike: we can visit the universe. This is the
sort of thinking behind the quote Ray uses "the meek can *have* the
earth".
_
% Of course, even that was undertaken under the much broader movement
of anti-Communism, a Cold War on an Enemy so evil and menacing that
even God, moribund as he was, was enlisted in the fray.
--
Jim Perry pe...@dsinc.com Decision Support, Inc., Matthews NC
"...if you chance on sacred offerings burning, [do not] make fun of the
rites. The god, naturally, resents this." - Hesiod
Simon Clippingdale
> But matter functions by its own nature, and there's no reason to believe
> that matter has any interest in leading a conscious being to true
> perception or logical conclusions based on accurate observation and
> true suppositions.
This comes back to your equivocation, as noted by Geoff Arnold,
between the teleological `why' and the explanatory `why'.
I wouldn't suggest that matter has any *interest* (teleological)
in ensuring that a correspondence -- not necessarily exact, but
some correlation -- exists between perception and reality.
But that doesn't preclude its acting `blindly' (explanatory) in
such a way, and natural selection seems to me to provide exactly
the mechanism required.
More accurate perceptions must, on average, confer a competitive
advantage on an organism, and hence a reproductive advantage in a
competitive environment. Such organisms will, on average, out-reproduce
their rivals and so become more prevalent in the population. Hence
the accuracy of perceptions will, on average, tend to increase over
evolutionary time, at least to the extent that those perceptions have
a bearing on survivability(*).
No appeal to teleology is necessary, and no value judgements are
required about the `goodness' of having accurate perceptions. It
is *entirely* within the nature of matter -- given that some of it
is organised into organisms which reproduce with modification and
compete for resources -- to give rise to strong correlations between
perception and reality.
(*) this is, of course, a gross oversimplification, but it's good
enough to make the point here. See Dawkins, _The Blind Watchmaker_,
under `arms races'.
> Human consciousness arises from a complicated interaction of matter.
> Why should what that matter is conscious of be related to what is
> actually the case?
Same answer.
> Matt Colvin
Cheers
Simon
--
Simon Clippingdale si...@dcs.warwick.ac.uk
Department of Computer Science Tel (+44) 203 523296
University of Warwick FAX (+44) 203 525714
Coventry CV4 7AL, U.K.
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
>I'm not going to respond to the general thrust of John's argument at
>this point,
... and then I guess I did after all. I apologise if I misled anyone!
Geoff
Schall und Rauch
|> My posts of late have turned to the question of value, by which I
|> mean the reason man has for choosing one thing over another. Ethics is
|> nothing more than a system for assigning value to things (and actions).
|> If you can explain where value comes from, you can explain ethics. But
|> you can't explain ethics without dealing with value -- the resulting
|> attempt is a goosechase, a futile struggle to produce an ethical system
|> without value.
[...]
Your arguments presented seem to suffer from your preconceived
notions about certain terms, like "value", "ethics", "free will" etc.
It may be the case that you cannot build a consistent system out of
your interpretations of the terms and those of Naturalism (as far as
they aren't strawmen anyway). But that is hardly relevant. You have to
have a look at Naturalist interpretations of these terms in order to
make conclusions about the consistency of Naturalism.
Let's take a simple example for values: pain. Pain hurts and it does not
matter what its metaphysical background is. A Naturalist interpretation
might be that most pain inducing events are harmful for me in the sense
that they might have an effect on my being able to reproduce (careful,
this is only touching the surface). Life is an auto-catalytical process,
and it would have died off very quickly if it weren't that way. You may
ask now why such phenomena as pain exist at all or why they manifest in
the way they do, but that is an completely different question.
Being an agent - ie being able to do something - can improve a lot on
the chance of your genes to survive. So can building an ethical system.
With cooperation, the system may support more of your kind and species
or individuals with that ability can have an advantage other species
don't have. Enforcing cooperation becomes a highly relevant option in
such a context, making the choice of Ethics less arbitrary than you claim,
and so on.
There are many good books on the subject, give your library a chance.
The Naturalist has been able to give a consistent answer in his system
and your attempt to refute from within has failed. Attempts to refute it
from without are a difficult matter and finally lead to questions of
epistemology. But since the Naturalist has one of the most powerful
epistemic systems on his side (science) and since the philosophy of
science is basically a question of epistemology, it seems that the
Naturalist holds the trumps - as far as Naturalism is supported by
science, of course.
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
>3) My ethical code is genetic/memetic. I get it from my society, my
>surroundings.
>
> Value is now shifted from the individual to the group.
??? You've just introduced the word. Up to this point, the analysis is
descriptive. You (and not your critics) keep on injecting this
stuff. John Kress has his "superlatives", you have your "value"
and "significance" and so forth.
> My critics
>have done this numerous times in the course of this discussion. If the
>ethical code now proceeds from society, then it follows that it is a means
>for society to propagate itself and survive. But why? Is the society
>inherently valuable?
^^^^^^^^
Teleologically or practically?
If the existence of a society improves the likelihood that individuals
will survive and transmit their genes, then societies are "valuable" (in a
survival sense) to those individuals. Go read about ants for a while. In fact....
In the time you've spent typing this stuff (over and over....) you could
have read "The Selfish Gene" and at least made a start on "The Extended Phenotype"
(both by Dawkins). I really don't have the time to spell it all out, but
there are perfectly reasonable naturalist models for the formation and
survival of societies. No supernatural explanation is needed.
[lots more "value" stuff deleted.]
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
> It's fine to take something from a book, such as Geoff's
>definitions of nihilism from Flew
Legalistic niceties compel me to point out that the definitions
of nihilism came from the online edition of Websters'
which is accessible at chem.ucsd.edu (telnet, log in as "webster).
My purpose was solely to point out that the word is, in the immortal
mixed metaphor, "a virgin field, pregnant with possibilities" for
equivocation and innuendo. ;-)
---
Geoff Arnold, PC-NFS architect, Sun Select. (geoff....@East.Sun.COM)
## It seems to me that this yearning for "real significance" is ##
## nothing more than the corpse of Nietzsche's dead god draped over ##
## your shoulders and weighing you down. (Hans Dykstra on a.a) ##
Ray Ingles
[deletions]
>If there is no ultimate purpose, then there is no source for all the
>little purposes.
You're going to have to support this and not just assert it, I'm afraid.
Sincerely,
Ray Ingles ing...@engin.umich.edu
"G-d told Abraham somthing [sic] that was misleading, but it is
misleading to say that G-d is therefore willing to mislead people."
- Daniel M. Israel, (cr...@vulcan.giss.nasa.gov) on alt.atheism
Matthew Alexander Colvin
Gary Charbonneau popped up and, after every time I stated that "nothing is
valuable", he said "unless man gives it value."
> Your post sounds very much like you're trying to figure out
> why you should pay $.49 for a can of soup at the grocery
> store unless the soup has an "inherent" value of $.49, set by God --
> and if it _does_ have an inherent value, you should buy the soup
> for that price, whether you like soup or not.
>
> You seem to be confused about what is meant by "value."
I'm not confused at all, Gary. You are. You seem to have confused
naturalism with existentialism. Naturalism doesn't give man the ability
to assign value. He has to adopt another worldview in order to do so --
and existentialism has its problems too.
Matt Colvin
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
>My point is not that naturalists do not experience meaning, but rather
>that they cannot give any account of the experience which does not
>nullify it. An experience of, say, an ethical position, when explained
>as merely the outcome of chemical states, is nullified as having any
>real ethical significance, since it could not have been otherwise.
I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by "experience an ethical
position", "ethical significance", or "nullify". Let's take a concrete
example. I observe my child stealing an item from a shop. I explain to
the child that this action is wrong. In response to the automatic
"why", I explain the reasons why such codes of behaviour arose in
societies; I point out that other groups (such as gorillas) appear to
have similar taboos on certain intra-societal behaviours, and so forth.
We then discuss the biological basis of behaviours, learned behaviours,
consciousness, and so forth. As a result of the discussion, the child
has an appreciation of why societal codes and norms exist, that such
rules are not usually arbitrary or capricious, that people in general
have a mutual interest in enforcing these codes, etc. etc. In what
sense has anything been "nullified"?
Paul Andrew King
: In article <2hkmm8...@srvr1.engin.umich.edu> ing...@engin.umich.edu
: (Ray Ingles) writes:
: > In article <2hjhqh$i...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>
: pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
[DELETIONS]
: "Acting significantly" is my way of saying that man can, by
: exercise of a consciousness, effect change in the universe. Naturalism
: believes that man's consciousness is just part of the grand machine
: looking at itself. There is no will or ego that can stand against the
: system and manipulate it according to its own will. Man's will is lost.
: He has no reason to act, and thus the only logical belief is nihilism --
: it's impossible to choose, because you have no machinery to do it with.
: (a note: we have a tendency to institutionalize people who actually live
: consistently with this belief).
: [Mr. Ingles then launched into a very long explanation of a complicated
: machine intended to represent the human mind. A chain of dominos and some
: prime numbers were discussed. See his post if you want to understand it.
: The conclusion *I* drew -- and I don't want to be construed as
: misrepresenting Mr. Ingles here, so look at it yourself -- is that man's
: brain may be very complex, but it is still a machine, just a reactor. It
: responds to what the universe puts into it, without any exercise of
: consciousness or personality. As I've tried to explain above, such a
: belief is really nihilism]
You are missing the point. The claim is that consciousness *does* exist
(albeit deterministically). If you think that's a lot to swallow, come
up with a better answer, rather than presuming that there must be one.
: [Objection to my criticism of "illusion of free will" deleted -- see Mr.
: Ingles' original post. I don't think there was anything I could respond
: to in his objection. In fact, I don't think there was really any
: objection]
:
: > [other propositions based on the prior misunderstanding deleted]
: > > Can you accept this? (Naturalism says you don't have the power
: > >to, but anyway...) Does this view satisfy your mind?
: >
: > Well, the view I've just described "satisfies" *my* mind.
: How can it satisfy your *mind*? Are you claiming that you have a
: consciousness that can look at the universe (the machine, the system) and
: make judgements, assign value? How can you do this within a framework of
: naturalism?
He is. Are you demanding an explanation of consciousness ?
All the evidence available suggests that consciousness *is* the
product of physical processes (which is one of the reasons why
cartesian dualism is pretty much dead).
But there isn't an acceptable theory of consciousness yet (although
progress is being made).
: Matt Colvin
Paul K.
gary charbonneau
>Ray Ingles has demonstrated that perhaps man can have consciousness in a
>universe composed entirely of matter. But now he runs into even more
>mine-ridden territory. Let us examine why naturalism means nihilism once
>again.
> The main point of my post now is *value*, that thing which is
>denied again and again by naturalists. According to Mr. Ingles, man has
>free will. He has a consciousness that can manipulate the universe
>according to how it sees fit.
> My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
>use it to commit suicide?
> Here are some answers I can think of. I'm going to practice my
>annoying habit of shooting them down, though (call it straw-man if you
>wish, just don't offer any of my straw explanations later).
>
> So, why not commit suicide?
>
>1) It's against my self interest.
>
> So, you have inherent value? Your life is worth saving? Why?
Nothing has "inherent" value. It has value only to the extent people
assign value to it.
>2) It's against an ingrained ethical code I have.
>
> Why not violate that ethical code? You have the ability to do it
>in other things, do you not? For examply, you can steal, murder, etc.
>Why not commit suicide? In other words, why do you adhere to that code?
>Is the code valuable in itself?
Nothing is "valuable in itself." It is valuable only to the extent
people assign value to it.
>3) My ethical code is genetic/memetic. I get it from my society, my
>surroundings.
> Value is now shifted from the individual to the group. My critics
>have done this numerous times in the course of this discussion. If the
>ethical code now proceeds from society, then it follows that it is a means
>for society to propagate itself and survive. But why? Is the society
>inherently valuable?
Nothing is ever "inherently" valuable. It is only valuable if
people assign value it.
>No, it is made up of individuals, who participate in
>it because they can accomplish more as a group than they can alone. So
>society exists for the individual. And value is still back on the
>individual, to be explained away yet again by naturalists.
> Or perhaps they don't shift it back on the individual. Maybe they
>now appeal to large chains of evolution. Society has ethics because it
>preserves the human species. The human species now has value. Why? It's
>just matter like the rest of the universe. Eventually, nothing has value
>for the naturalist. If he commits suicide, he's not exercising free will
>-- he's just reacting to the action of the grand system, of which he is a
>part no more important than any other. If I'm to practice naturalism, I
>need a reason to live. Can any naturalist find one? I maintain that they
>can't -- they are simply closet nihilists and don't have any value to be
>found in their own system. They are preaching one system and living by
>another. Naturalism, thus inconsistent, must be false.
You left out option 4: I don't want to.
Your post sounds very much like you're trying to figure out
why you should pay $.49 for a can of soup at the grocery
store unless the soup has an "inherent" value of $.49, set by God --
and if it _does_ have an inherent value, you should buy the soup
for that price, whether you like soup or not.
You seem to be confused about what is meant by "value."
--
Gary Charbonneau
char...@ucs.indiana.edu
"It is well that war is so terrible, else we would grow too fond of it."
- R.E. Lee
Ray Ingles
>
>> Consider a fountain.
[poem deleted - nice one, though]
>Wind, Moby-Dick, a bell-curve, the Mandelbrot set, pi, 641.
Good summary. :->
>The problem is how we are to speak of all these things which are not
>physical objects. All these things do indeed exist. They are. This
>shows that physical extantness is not the sole criterion of being.
Right. I never claimed it was. But genreally, only the physical is
immediately available to us, and we communicate with it. To illustrate:
/\
/ \
/ \
------
Now, is there a triangle there? One could, with difficulty, describe it
as "One slash at angle x at screen coordinates y,z, and then another at..."
Or one could call it a triangle. But wait; on most screens, it isn't
even really (?) *there* - it's defined by the *absence* of electrons hitting
the screen to make the phosphors glow.
Hopefully you see my point - I think it's a triangle; I think there
really is a triangle there - but it is there as an abstraction from what
is physically there. It is a pattern of other things.
>Something may be without being physically extant. It also indicates
>that something whose being is not that of physical extantness, can be
>in such a way as to be with a physical component, which nonetheless does
>not define the thing, as with the fountain, the water of which does not
>constitute it (by taking away all the water present, one does not
>remove the fountain) but without which it could not be a fountain.
Depending on what you mean by fountain, I think I disagree with this.
Consider that if you remove the water from a waterfall, you don't have a
waterfall- you have a cliff.
>> You seem to have accepted the following argument, critiqued in _The_Mind's
>>_I_:
>> "Some facts are not about the properties, circumstances, and relations of
>>physical objects.
>> Therefore some facts are about the properties, circumstances, and relations
>>of nonphysical objects."
>
>The error in the above argument as I see it is that physical objects,
>and physical extantness, are taken to be definitive with respect to
>being, such that the other things are assumed, since they are, to be
>somekind of non-physical-but-nevertheless-extant objects. The logic
>goes:
>
>1. These things are.
>2. To be is to be an extant object.
>3. They are not physically extant objects.
>4. Therefore, they must be non-physical, yet extant objects.
>
>The difference is how the faulty reasoning is attacked. We seem to agree
>on premise one, that these things are (or do you agree?). The point at
>which we part ways is at premise two. As I understand it, Ray, you and
>Geoff accept premise two, whereas I do not.
Uh, nope. Not me at least, nor Geoff so far as I can tell.
> You wish to deny that
>there are non-physical, extant objects
Yes; I think the very term 'object' is ill-used here. Is the triangle I
drew above an 'object'? Is a hole an object? (Consider that, in
semiconductor physics, it is often (hell, nearly always) the case that
one does not just speak of electrons moving- one speaks of 'holes' moving
in the opposite direction as well. "...the valence band hole is actually an
entity on an equal footing with the conduction band electron." (_Semicond.
Fundamentals_, Robert Pierret, p. 26).)
Something can be real and have a physical effect even if it is not physical,
but that does not mean that it is an 'object'.
[deletions- Geoff handled the reast of this admirably]
>You speak of the mind's being damaged whenever the brain is, and take this
>as evidence that the mind is an abstraction from the brain; this is
>good evidence that the mind is not something which *is* without the
>brain, but it provides no _prima facie_ justification for treating the
>mind solely in terms of the brain. *That* requires the ontological
>presupposition of the primacy of physical extantness.
I don't treat the Mona Lisa as a collection of dried pigmented fluids on
a cloth backing, either. But it is not incorrect to describe it as such.
(Indeed, I find great joy in knowing that such a beautiful thing can be
given form in such "mundane" things. (But if they can do so, can they be
truly understood as 'mundane'? :-> ))
[river and "Farmer's Axe" deleted]
>The truth of the river or the axe is not to be found in an examination,
>however careful, of the water or the wood.
But it is not incorrect to describe them as such. You are confusing the
possibility of multiple descriptions with the necessity of conflicting
descriptions. They can serve different purposes and still all be true.
Matthew Alexander Colvin
> In article <2hmo1n$d...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>
pto...@next10pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
>
> > But matter functions by its own nature, and there's no reason to
believe
> > that matter has any interest in leading a conscious being to true
> > perception or logical conclusions based on accurate observation and
> > true suppositions.
>
> This comes back to your equivocation, as noted by Geoff Arnold,
> between the teleological `why' and the explanatory `why'.
I have already explained before that the two are inextricably
linked. Teleology didn't come from nowhere. Teleology *arose* from man's
inability to answer why by revelation of mechanism after mechanism.
Here's an example:
Q: Why does an apple fall?
A: Because it is attracted to the earth.
Q: Why is it attracted to the earth?
A: Because both it and the earth are matter, and gravity is a
fundamental property of matter.
Q: Why is gravity a fundamental property of matter?
A: [I don't know what a naturalist would say tothis one, but even
if science had an answer, I could just ask another "why"
question.]
I maintain that you don't need ethics if you don't have the
ability to choose. The two go hand in hand; they are inextricable. Some
naturalists maintain that I'm right -- but that you *don't* have the
ability to choose, and that ethics is just a property of the system, not
something outside the system that is used by personalities to make
choices. Such people have a lot of explaining to do. We pretty obviously
have the ability to make choices, and we pretty obviously have ethics. So
I ask "why do we have these things?" and the naturalist has no more
explanatory trump cards left, except to jump back into the never-ending
stream of "whys" --
Q: Why do we have the ability to make choices?
This question has been answered in three different ways by
naturalists on this group. One (very small, possibly non-existent) group
says that we don't have the ability to make choices.
Another group of naturalists has said that we do have the ability
to make choices, but when this group tries to supply some basis on which
to make those choices, they jump right into an endless question-and-answer
chain about value:
Q: Why choose?
A: To better yourself.
Q: Why better yourself?
A: [something about society, species, or other issue-dodging]
Q: Why should [society/species/etc.] preserve itself?
Worse, this train of logic eventually doubles back on itself --
society is nothing more than the sum of its parts (in a naturalist
*matter* universe, nothing is more than the sum of its parts), so it is
only valuable because it is composed of people. So are humans valuable?
We're back at the start of the question chain above.
>
> I wouldn't suggest that matter has any *interest* (teleological)
> in ensuring that a correspondence -- not necessarily exact, but
> some correlation -- exists between perception and reality.
>
> But that doesn't preclude its acting `blindly' (explanatory) in
> such a way, and natural selection seems to me to provide exactly
> the mechanism required.
Nature acts "blindly" to shape our world? Why would this be the
case? (Maybe it is, but you don't have an explanation for how nature came
to be that way). And if it is the case, derive value from it. Or show
how we can choose without value. Or show that we don't choose. And do it
all without deifying nature (making "her" the source of value).
> More accurate perceptions must, on average, confer a competitive
> advantage on an organism, and hence a reproductive advantage in a
> competitive environment. Such organisms will, on average, out-reproduce
> their rivals and so become more prevalent in the population. Hence
> the accuracy of perceptions will, on average, tend to increase over
> evolutionary time, at least to the extent that those perceptions have
> a bearing on survivability(*).
You don't explain how true perceptions came about in the first
place. Or why they are *true* ("accurate") Why are they any more true
than the perceptions of the organisms that don't survive? Is there an
absolute truth? Can you prove this without using *your* possibly
illusionary perceptions? No. Epistomology fails.
> No appeal to teleology is necessary, and no value judgements are
> required about the `goodness' of having accurate perceptions. It
> is *entirely* within the nature of matter -- given that some of it
> is organised into organisms which reproduce with modification and
> compete for resources -- to give rise to strong correlations between
> perception and reality.
Teleology is not a "Bible" for quoting and invoking every time one
wants to. It's a statement of the problem that I demonstrated above --
that of the insatiable nature of the "explanatory why". If you have no
purpose, then you have no reason to act.
> > Human consciousness arises from a complicated interaction of matter.
> > Why should what that matter is conscious of be related to what is
> > actually the case?
>
> Same answer.
Or lack thereof.
> Cheers
>
> Simon
I'm beginning to get tired of the same old naturalist arguments --
circular, unsatisfying, conveniently ignoring whichever naturalist tenet
demolishes his chain of reasoning at a given time (Simon here ignores that
"the universe is a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed system with
no all-encompassing purpose. He tries to find purpose in nature, and when
he finds it -- and he does! -- he denies that it is purpose. He might as
well call it "the nature of nature.").
When a naturalist says that he refrains from suicide because it is
the nature of life to preserve itself and that his death would go contrary
to that nature, he is simply imbuing nature with value. And then he has
to explain where it came from -- where did nature get it?
Do you realize that naturalism and nihilism (and their various
forms) are the only worldviews that claim that value doesn't exist? All
the other ones may have an unsatisfactory source for value (God, man), but
they provide it nonetheless.
Matt Colvin
Jim Perry
of theists who show up apparently interested in rational discussion,
but apparently secretly convinced that they've discovered the logical
argument that's going to finally put the nail in the coffin of
atheism, and who seem to go a little haywire when the argument is
fairly soundly beaten about the head and shoulders. It's happened at
least twice recently with variations on the Ontological argument. I
hope I'm wrong here; I'd much rather see a decent debate.
Matthew's mention that C.S. Lewis is one of his strong influences may
be an indicator. In various discussions we've had it's clear that
Lewis is not held in high respect here as a logical apologist -- he's
frequently mentioned in the same breath as Josh McDowell (which is
surely doing Lewis a disfavor, but it is an indicator). The
supposedly even-handed apologetic in _Mere_Christianity_ reveals its
strong bias within its opening pages, and seems to come down to the
same sort of thing Matthew is arguing here. In MC, "atheism" is
considered "too simple" because it is not consistent with Lewis's
Christian teleology.
The "naturalism-->nihilism" argument has shown without too much
disagreement that "naturalism" does not show an overarching "purpose"
to the universe, and by definition rules out a God, a dualistic soul,
or absolute objective moral rules. Matthew calls this "nihilism", and
seems to think by showing this he's destroyed naturalism, because it
is not consistent with his Christian teleology.
But, if one doesn't start out thinking the universe must have a
purpose, there's no need to think that it must.
In article <2hoq9b$s...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu> pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
> The main point of my post now is *value*, that thing which is
>denied again and again by naturalists. According to Mr. Ingles, man has
>free will. He has a consciousness that can manipulate the universe
>according to how it sees fit.
> My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
>use it to commit suicide?
I'm not Ray, and I've questioned the very meaning of the term "free
will" (you said you'd reply, too, though you haven't...) but I'll
answer.
> Here are some answers I can think of. I'm going to practice my
>annoying habit of shooting them down, though (call it straw-man if you
>wish, just don't offer any of my straw explanations later).
You may notice, if you read carefully, that Matthew doesn't "shoot
down" anything, he just asks more questions, all of which are quite
amenable to answers.
The simplest answer, in a naturalistic sense, is that life exists to
maintain (and propagate etc.) itself, it's what living things *do*. I
am a conscious being, but also a living one: there's no immediate
reason that I can see that a conscious being should act to destroy
itself where, say, a plant wouldn't.
That aside, as a conscious being, I have subjective experiences which
I find enjoyable (for reasons I firmly believe are ultimately
naturalistic). I love my wife and children (at root this is a
particular instance of that "maintain and propagate" thing), I enjoy
good meals, I enjoy intellectual stimulation, and so forth. Suicide,
even if I found a quick and easy way to do it, would end all that.
If, however, all the above should cease to pertain, then I have
nothing against suicide, if continued existence should appear
unpleasant.
>If I'm to practice naturalism, I
>need a reason to live.
Ah, perhaps that's your problem. Naturalism is not a set of religious
dogmas one adopts and "practices", it is a way of understanding the
world based on what our experience tells us. I didn't start out
thinking "all is matter" and try to develop a model of the universe.
I started with the base assumption that a lot of things are matter,
and have gradually decided that nothing else is required to explain
everything I experience (ultimately; obviously a great many things are
not best thought of directly in terms of physics).
>Can any naturalist find one? I maintain that they
>can't -- they are simply closet nihilists and don't have any value to be
>found in their own system.
I really, truly don't know what you mean by "nihilist". I think that
I find value in life, and that that experience of value can be
explained naturalistically. Show me a liar.
>They are preaching one system and living by
>another.
Show me a naturalist preaching naturalism. Show me a naturalist not
living consistently with naturalism.
>Naturalism, thus inconsistent, must be false.
Naturalism is scarcely inconsistent with itself; it claims that the
observed world can be explained in natural terms, without recourse to
the supernatural. It does not claim that this explanation will show
an overarching purpose to the universe. It does, however, provide
explanations of the existence of belief systems that claim such a
purpose.
Damion Schubert
Matthew Alexander Colvin <pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu> wrote:
> My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
>use it to commit suicide?
I'm, uh, content and happy?
>
> So, why not commit suicide?
Why not? You have a right to die. Your point being?
>1) It's against my self interest.
> So, you have inherent value? Your life is worth saving? Why?
Certainly. If this life is the only thing that I am conscious of, then it
is the only thing with value. The lack of any supernatural afterlife
INCREASES the value of this life, not the opposite.
>
>2) It's against an ingrained ethical code I have.
>
> Why not violate that ethical code? You have the ability to do it
>in other things, do you not? For examply, you can steal, murder, etc.
>Why not commit suicide? In other words, why do you adhere to that code?
>Is the code valuable in itself?
Why not violate your religious moral code? Once you discover your mistake
in the final seconds of consciousness you have, you can repent and then go
on to a place that's better than here. You can steal and murder, etc, as
long as you repent later. Why adhere to a code that is all forgiving?
>
>3) My ethical code is genetic/memetic. I get it from my society, my
>surroundings.
Society is indeed a tool of man. We are social animals, who learn from
each other. Anthro 101.
> Or perhaps they don't shift it back on the individual. Maybe they
>now appeal to large chains of evolution. Society has ethics because it
>preserves the human species. The human species now has value. Why? It's
>just matter like the rest of the universe. Eventually, nothing has value
>for the naturalist. If he commits suicide, he's not exercising free will
>-- he's just reacting to the action of the grand system, of which he is a
>part no more important than any other. If I'm to practice naturalism, I
>need a reason to live. Can any naturalist find one?
Sure. This is the only life we have. Use it well.
This is the only life our companions in life have as well. Teach them and
help them to use their one chance well too.
But certainly, a man has a right to die if he so desires. Why should he
not?
I maintain that they
>can't -- they are simply closet nihilists and don't have any value to be
>found in their own system. They are preaching one system and living by
>another. Naturalism, thus inconsistent, must be false.
Again, you overstate the moral ban on suicide. You also miss other reasons
why not to kill oneself, such as fear of hurting loved ones. Was it
Mencken who said, "Any man who falls in love could not be a nihilist."?
Welp, SOMEONE said it.
Please explain for all of us Naturalists and Non- why suicide is morally
wrong.
>Matt Colvin
--heretic
"I would have killed myself, but it made no sense
Committing suicide in self-defense..."
--B. Hancock
arnold v. lesikar
pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) wrote:
>
> My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
> use it to commit suicide?
> Here are some answers I can think of. I'm going to practice my
> annoying habit of shooting them down, though (call it straw-man if you
> wish, just don't offer any of my straw explanations later).
Let me jump into this discussion since I have some extra time today. What
you are doing is giving even dumber answers to a dumb question?
Now what you are proposing is an act that Ray otherwise would not want to
do. What reasons can you give as to why he should perform that act? Why
should anyone want to commit suicide?
Generally speaking suicide is not an act of survival. (How is that for a
tautology!) It is difficult to think of situations where the suicide of
individual members helps a species to survive. Clearly nature will select
individuals that want and struggle to survive, at least long enough to
reproduce. The upshot of this Darwinian argument is that suicide is
unnatural. Other things being equal, individuals are not going to _want_ to
kill themselves.
You want Ray or other people to commit suicide because Jesus is dead and
the Christian God does not exist? Give me a break! Nobody needed Jesus in
all of the millenia B.C.E. and nobody needs him now 2 millenia after his
death. And no one in their right mind are going to kill themselves out of
despair for missing Jeezus.
It's a cliche on the net, but I gotta say it! Get a life, Matthew!
sincerely,
arn
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu
arnold v. lesikar
> Only a fool would try to preach Christianity to people who have been drawn
> together by the title "alt.atheism."
Could this be a subtle reference to 1 Corinthians chapter 3:
3:18 Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be
wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.
3:19 For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is
written, He taketh the wise in their own craftiness.
There is a certain charm in the absurdities that you have been tossing out
onto the net, Matthew! :)
> >
> You haven't proven *my point* false, only pointed out what I
> already claim -- that if you accept it, then naturalism is
> self-contradictory.
I have the feeling that this is where the Zen master would hit you over the
head with staff!
Because what you seem to be trying to do is to disprove the existence of
reality. It's out there, we enjoy much of it, and we have fun trying to
understand pieces of it, an enterprise at which humankind is fairly
successful.
Along comes Matt saying, but you _can't_ enjoy yourself! Nature needs God!
Nature cannot exist without God; why don't you forget about nature and look
for god? To which the Zen master and I reply, because we've got nature!
You have theories, but all of your theories about logic and contradiction
cannot match or affect the taste of apple pie or the excitement of making a
discovery about how nature works or being young or getting old or falling
in love.
There's no problem. Just because _you_ do not understand how nature or
huamn beings can exist without god does not mean that nature or other human
beings have to worry about it. Because the fact of the matter is, that they
do. So understanding how is YOUR problem. It is not our responsibility to
solve that problem for you.
with the utmost sincerity,
arn
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu
arnold v. lesikar
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu (arnold v. lesikar) wrote:
>
> In article <2hotqu$t...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>,
> pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) wrote:
> >
>
> > >
> > You haven't proven *my point* false, only pointed out what I
> > already claim -- that if you accept it, then naturalism is
> > self-contradictory.
>
> I have the feeling that this is where the Zen master would hit you over the
> head with staff!
>
Here's what seems to me to be a good Zen answer to Matt's futile logic. I
just got it off the electric zendo:
Unaware of illusion or enlightenment,
From this stone I watch the mountains, hear the stream.
A three-day rain has cleansed the earth,
A roar of thunder split the sky.
Ever serene are linked phenomena,
And though the mind's alert, it's but an ash heap.
Chilly, bleak as the dusk I move through,
I return, a basket brimmed with peaches on my arm.
GENKO (?-1505)
Matthew Alexander Colvin
writes:
> Matthew Alexander Colvin is starting to look like another of a series
> of theists who show up apparently interested in rational discussion,
> but apparently secretly convinced that they've discovered the logical
> argument that's going to finally put the nail in the coffin of
> atheism, and who seem to go a little haywire when the argument is
> fairly soundly beaten about the head and shoulders. It's happened at
> least twice recently with variations on the Ontological argument. I
> hope I'm wrong here; I'd much rather see a decent debate.
Very presumptuous of you to assume that this is not a decent
debate. Naturalists and other atheists do not have the monopoly on logic.
And I'm not "secretly convinced" naturalism is wrong -- I'm openly saying
that I believe it is wrong. My argument has not been beaten soundly about
the shoulders. To the contrary, responses to it have been a stream of
squirming agonizing -- naturalists telling me that they don't need value
to run their lives, and then identifying nature with value inadvertently.
And when I point this out, they don't explain it. They simply say "but
there is no value!" and do it again.
>
> Matthew's mention that C.S. Lewis is one of his strong influences may
> be an indicator. In various discussions we've had it's clear that
> Lewis is not held in high respect here as a logical apologist -- he's
> frequently mentioned in the same breath as Josh McDowell (which is
> surely doing Lewis a disfavor, but it is an indicator). The
> supposedly even-handed apologetic in _Mere_Christianity_ reveals its
> strong bias within its opening pages, and seems to come down to the
> same sort of thing Matthew is arguing here. In MC, "atheism" is
> considered "too simple" because it is not consistent with Lewis's
> Christian teleology.
I never said that "atheism" is too simple because it is
inconsistent with Lewis. Lewis was a smart man, but he was a *man*. As
I've pointed out over and over again, I'm not assuming teleology. I've
asked again and again for naturalists to show me how to live without it.
And [frustration caps on] THEY HAVEN'T DONE SO.
>
> The "naturalism-->nihilism" argument has shown without too much
> disagreement that "naturalism" does not show an overarching "purpose"
> to the universe, and by definition rules out a God, a dualistic soul,
> or absolute objective moral rules. Matthew calls this "nihilism", and
> seems to think by showing this he's destroyed naturalism, because it
> is not consistent with his Christian teleology.
No, no, no, no. I haven't "destroyed naturalism." I've shown it
to be inconsistent WITH ITSELF and also to be unlivable. My argument has
nothing to do with Christian teleology. It relies only on real life, and
the assertions of naturalism. It is every naturalist's dream for me to
bring Christian teleology into the argument, because then he can attack
something instead of playing his little run-around game of explaining away
the inconsistencies of his own philosophy.
>
> But, if one doesn't start out thinking the universe must have a
> purpose, there's no need to think that it must.
That's fine. You don't have to act on your beliefs. If you don't
have any purpose, maybe you don't need one. But the existence of value
(purpose) ties up a lot of loose ends that naturalism doesn't answer.
>
> In article <2hoq9b$s...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>
pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
> > The main point of my post now is *value*, that thing which is
> >denied again and again by naturalists. According to Mr. Ingles, man
has
> >free will. He has a consciousness that can manipulate the universe
> >according to how it sees fit.
> > My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
> >use it to commit suicide?
>
> I'm not Ray, and I've questioned the very meaning of the term "free
> will" (you said you'd reply, too, though you haven't...) but I'll
> answer.
>
> > Here are some answers I can think of. I'm going to practice my
> >annoying habit of shooting them down, though (call it straw-man if you
> >wish, just don't offer any of my straw explanations later).
>
> You may notice, if you read carefully, that Matthew doesn't "shoot
> down" anything, he just asks more questions, all of which are quite
> amenable to answers.
No, they're not at all. They are only answered by something that
raises another question. I can answer *anything* with such a statement.
The only way to answer the questions is to ignore logic -- and if that's
not "shooting something down", I don't know what is.
>
> The simplest answer, in a naturalistic sense, is that life exists to
> maintain (and propagate etc.) itself, it's what living things *do*. I
> am a conscious being, but also a living one: there's no immediate
> reason that I can see that a conscious being should act to destroy
> itself where, say, a plant wouldn't.
Wait. Did you just say...?
>
> That aside, as a conscious being, I have subjective experiences which
> I find enjoyable (for reasons I firmly believe are ultimately
> naturalistic).
But completely unexplained -- sure, endorphins and all that, but
this is just another mechanism. Look: you just said "subjective
experiences." Subjective? That term has no place in naturalism. If you
have subjective experiences, you are an existentialist.
> I love my wife and children (at root this is a
> particular instance of that "maintain and propagate" thing), I enjoy
> good meals, I enjoy intellectual stimulation, and so forth. Suicide,
> even if I found a quick and easy way to do it, would end all that.
> If, however, all the above should cease to pertain, then I have
> nothing against suicide, if continued existence should appear
> unpleasant.
Or maybe you're a hedonist?
>
> >If I'm to practice naturalism, I
> >need a reason to live.
>
> Ah, perhaps that's your problem.
Needing a reason to live is a "problem"? OK, I suppose I could
live for no reason whatsoever. But any belief system I constructed from
that would be.... nihilism.
> Naturalism is not a set of religious
> dogmas one adopts and "practices", it is a way of understanding the
> world based on what our experience tells us.
No, it's a way of understanding *part* of our world. And it's a
way of misunderstanding the rest -- ethics for example. Or consciousness.
You name it, and if you can't measure it, you probably can't understand it
with naturalism.
> I didn't start out
> thinking "all is matter" and try to develop a model of the universe.
> I started with the base assumption that a lot of things are matter,
> and have gradually decided that nothing else is required to explain
> everything I experience (ultimately; obviously a great many things are
> not best thought of directly in terms of physics).
Let me paraphrase this in a less lengthy version: You didn't
start out thinking that all is matter, but you do now. That's nice.
I don't care how you came about your belief system. The point is: you
have it. And it's inconsistent.
>
> >Can any naturalist find one? I maintain that they
> >can't -- they are simply closet nihilists and don't have any value to
be
> >found in their own system.
>
> I really, truly don't know what you mean by "nihilist". I think that
> I find value in life, and that that experience of value can be
> explained naturalistically. Show me a liar.
For the one millionth time, where do you find this value? The
burden of proof is not on me! It's on you. You're the one who's claiming
to have value in your life. Where does it come from?
> >They are preaching one system and living by
> >another.
>
> Show me a naturalist preaching naturalism.
Pardon me. "Professing." Better? Still inconsistent.
> Show me a naturalist not
> living consistently with naturalism.
Any naturalist who is making choices based on value. Do you
disagree? You sure don't in the following paragraph.
>
> >Naturalism, thus inconsistent, must be false.
>
> Naturalism is scarcely inconsistent with itself; it claims that the
> observed world can be explained in natural terms, without recourse to
> the supernatural. It does not claim that this explanation will show
> an overarching purpose to the universe. It does, however, provide
> explanations of the existence of belief systems that claim such a
> purpose.
HOLY MOSES BILL!!! Jim Perry caves in!!! This is EXACTLY my
point -- naturalism does not show purpose. But it discredits any belief
system that has purpose -- remember: "Organisms with accurate perceptions
will survive"? This excludes any organisms that believe in a God who
cannot exist within the framework of naturalism. It also prohibits man
from assigning purpose -- he has no logical basis to do so. Theism and
Existentialism are thus both ruled out. So if you profess naturalism, and
you have such a belief system that provides purpose, then you are
inconsistent. Case closed.
Matt Colvin
Cad and Bounder
Robert Beauchaine
>
> Are you stating that we should accept free will even though it is
>false? We are under no obligation to do anything unless we have free
>will, and we can't punish Mr. Dahmer by choice. So how does he get
>punished? As a result of a chain of events. Nowhere in the process does
>free will enter into the picture.
First, we don't know if free will is or is not true. Given the
complexity of attempting to model the human mind with enough
precision to decide on it's determinism is not going to be
possible in the forseeable future.
Next, I don't follow your leap of logic that states "we are under
no obligation to do anything unless we have free will". On the
contrary, we are obligated to do exactly what the state of our
system tells us to do. We can in fact do nothing else if we are
deterministic. If our mental state + inputs says "punishe Mr.
Dahmer", that is exactly what we *must* do.
> What value does this give man? None. Naturalism places no value
>at all on man. As a conscious being then, man is dead (has no
>personality). He cannot effect his own destiny and he can do nothing
>significant. In fact, he cannot "do" anything. He is simply a machine,
>whether a capricious or determined one. He has no self-consciousness and
>no self-determination.
You're going to have to provide a few more pages of explanation
for these leaps of logic. Value? Man gives himself value, no one
else. No personality? Preposterous. The model for the
deterministic mind is a person's personality. It is simply a
constrained personality. No self consciosness? Why? Why can't an
automaton be aware of itself?
> And without self-determination, there can be no morality.
>Morality is therefore an illusion, according to consistent naturalism.
Again, I'm not following the necessities of you arguments.
> So far, I believe I have shown that naturalism provides no basis
>for free will. Now that free will is gone, man has no value. He is
>unique, sure. But so is a dog. Or any other piece of matter. And there
>is also no basis for morality. That's three legs knocked out from under
>the six-legged chair -- free will, man's value, and morality. Here are
>the ones that remain, but which I think will eventually fall too:
>knowledge, truth, and reality itself.
>
You may have argued to your satisfaction. Not to mine.
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
Bob Beauchaine bo...@vice.ICO.TEK.COM
"Brains are wonderful things. Speaking from the admittedly biased
point of view of a large-brained primate, I would say that there is
no better solution to one's environment -- no claw so sharp, no wing
so light that it can bestow the same adaptive benefits as a heavy
ball of gray matter" ... Donald Johanson
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Ray Ingles
> My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
>use it to commit suicide?
It has become obvious that you have a fundamental misunderstanding of
my (at least) worldview. I'm going to try to give you an account of that
worldview, working out both ways from the center. I ask that you read it
through, and *don't* assume that what I'm saying is what you've heard
before; my thinking diverges in a few significant ways from a lot of what
I've seen here.
The "center": I find that I have desires. I want to do things, to have
things, to be one way and not another. (Surely this is not a point of
contention?) Why should I do what I want? Well, hell, that's the very
definition of "want". You don't need external prompting to do what you
want to do. Quite the opposite, in fact.
Now, working backwards: where did these desires come from? Well, we can
see that things that work to preserve themselves tend to stick around,
and things that don't try to preserve themselves don't. Again, hopefully
not a point of contention. No 'purpose' is needed for the preservation;
fire propogates itself just fine without intelligence. Genes are the same
way. They just happen to build beings that act to preserve the genes, no
teleology needed. (I heartily suggest that you read _The Selfish Gene_ by
Dawkins. He explains this in far greater detail than I can here.)
A being that avoids damage to itself has an advantage over a being that
doesn't. So if, say, a gene arose to code for pain receptors (this is, of
course, a vast oversimplification, but I haven't room for more), that gene
will tend to be preserved more often than the variants that don't. It's
not that pain is there for the *purpose* of preserving the genes, or the
being, it just happens to do so.
Now, why did the particular set of circumstances that led to the
evolution of humans arise? I dunno. It could as easily have been something
else. But, for whatever reason, it *was* like that. I'm here now. Given
the way the universe is, *something* like this was bound to happen.
Now, remember, the genes have no purpose. Whatever works to keep them
around is good enough. For example, a taste for sugar used to be a good
thing; sugar was scarce but provided good energy, and sweet-tasting fruit
is riper than sour fruit, so someone with a sweet-tooth would eat better.
Now that refined sugar is commonplace, it's a *disadvantage*. Oh well.
Further, genes do not code for behaviors directly. A cockroach does not
'hide' so much as it flees from light. It has the effect of hiding, so it
works well enough. Humans have survived by being more adaptable than other
beings, so we have a lot of easily-reprogrammable brain matter, and the
'guidelines' implanted by the genes are correspondingly more vague. Indeed,
we have so much latitude that we can do things that are entirely opposed to
our genes 'interests' if we so choose.
So, we now have a consistent account of how we got here and why we have
the desires we do. This theory accounts for all the data I'm familiar
with, and is simpler (so far as I can tell) than all other theories that
explain the same data.
So, that's why I'm here with these desires. (We're back in the "center".)
There is no overarching 'purpose' to these desires, but there they are.
Because of my own nature, I don't want to not do what I want to do. (You
see? It's contradictory to even consider otherwise.) We already have an
example of a being capable of 'thought' that has no desires - a computer.
And it initiates no action (not even suicide) on its own.
But now, with these desires established, we can speak of 'purpose'. Why
do I eat? Several reasons - I want to avoid being hungry, I need the fuel
to keep my body running so I can go rock climbing, it is pleasurable in
itself, etc.
Why do I do nice things for my loved ones? Because I want them to be
happy. Why do I love them? Because it is in my nature as a human to love.
I want to love people.
With human purposes, you can always push the "why" back to, "because I want
to". That will eventually be the answer, after enough levels of purpose
have been crossed. And we already have an explanation above as to why one
"wants to".
Now, working forward: whence 'value'? Something does not have 'intrinsic'
or 'inherent' value. It has value in the context of human purposes. A
chair may be valuable in one context for sitting, in another as an antique,
in another as evidence in a court case, and in yet another as firewood.
It may be worth a small amount to you in the first case, and it could be
worth your life in the last. It depends on the purpose you use it for.
My life is excedingly valuable to me. I use it for the purpose of doing
what I want. If I don't have my life, I obviously can't do anything that
I want. (At least, so far as I can tell. Remember, we're working from my
worldview. :->) So I will not part with it lightly. Some things may be
more important (the life of a loved one, say) but not many.
I find other humans, even ones that I don't love, valuable too. I love
learning, and everyone has something to teach me. And so on; I hope you
see where people can assign values to things, values that are entirely
relevant and important to the people involved but yet don't need any kind
of 'universal' status.
In another thread, you ask: but what if two people disagree as to the
value of something? Which one is right? Well, both, and neither. "Which one
is right" is the wrong question to ask.
Differential valuing is the very soul of economics. I really want that
chair you made, you really want the corn I grew. We trade some corn for
the chair, and we both feel that we made a profit on the deal. And we're
both right. We both have more value by our measures than we had before.
(Money is just a convenient way of representing that value.)
Of course, there are different kinds of value. How many bushels of corn
is a hug from your mother worth? The joy you get from your lover's laugh
isn't measured in dollars, but it is very valuable anyway. Some purposes
are orthogonal to others, that's all.
Now, what if two people have diametrically opposed wishes? In the worst
case, what if someone wants me dead? Well, this is still a matter of
differential valuing. I rate my life as higly valuable, and someone else
rates it negatively. There are two possible ways this could happen.
Perhaps I am getting in the way of one of their goals, or at least, they
think so. Well, perhaps we can figure out a way for me to get out of the
way, or for them to abandon their purpose.
But suppose they are psychopathic, and nothing less than my death will
satisfy them. Well, then, too bad for them. I will defend myself, and
run all roughshod over their purpose. I don't think that they are 'wrong'
in some universal sense, but they are irrevocably in the way of a very
important purpose of mine... and so I rate *their* life pretty negatively.
Okay, this has been long, but I really hope that I have clarified some
things for you. Now, I have a favor to ask of you. I have explained part
of my worldview. Would you explain part of yours in turn?
You see that I see things as valuable in terms of what they mean for my
purposes. I really don't understand how the existence of God would lead to
'universal' meaning and purpose. Would this not be just another example
of another being's purposes? Why should I necessarily try to fit myself
into those purposes? Just because God would be moe powerful than myself
would not seem to give it any kind of 'inherent' weight? I really think
you should start another thread to discuss this, because right now I just
don't understand what kind of 'meaning' you think 'naturalism' lacks.
Wayward Son
>otherwise? All of physics hinges on this principle. Scientists look for
>causes for effects. Matter attracts -- there must be a graviton. Matter
>stays together -- they give us a gluon. Neptune's orbit is screwed up --
>maybe there's a planet X (forgive me if this quandary has been resolved
>since I last read about it). Halley's Comet is a few days late -- its gas
>jets slowed it down.
I said *modern* physics, like chaos theory and quantum dynamics, shows that
the universe is not completely determined/deterministic, which is what
you are trying to pull from the "closed system" premise.
Again, the closed system distinction is to show that there is no
"outside" out there in the naturalist model, plain and simple. It says
nothing about determinisim or free will, just that there is no
intervention from outside.
I (JC) wrote:
>>I am not sure what you mean by free will, so I will try to take the common
>> sense approach. Somewhere between absolute determinism and completely
>> unconstrained free will lies reality. Does this make free will an
>> illusion? I don't think so. Does this make responsibility meaningless?
>> Again, no. It is more of a matter of being more free than not, or
>> mostly free. *This* is good enough.
>
> You are trying to describe reality by what it is not; you're
>trying to prove a negative. The FAQ is ambivalent about this. I am not.
>I won't mess with it. Good luck.
> Give me a positive to debate, and we'll do it.
No, I'm setting the boundaries of possible answers. I'm also showing that
it's not a black and white issue. You'll have to define exactly what you
mean by free will before you can claim that it can't exist in a naturalist
world. If you're saying that it means completely absolute unconstrained
freedom of choice, then I will agree with you, and respond with the "so
what" that others have voiced. If you mean something else, then you must
explain it.
Let me put it this way: only complete determinism could rule out free
will (by any definition), and there is nothing in the naturalist model which
entails complete determinism.
Jim Copeland
--
WARNING: Netnews reading is a solitary and sedentary pursuit, and
those who do so are cautioned that the Net should be used as an integral
part of a well-rounded life, including a daily regimen of rigorous
physical exercise, rewarding relationships, and a sensible low-fat diet.
The Net should not be used as a substitute or an excuse.
Wayward Son
>this is just another mechanism. Look: you just said "subjective
>experiences." Subjective? That term has no place in naturalism. If you
>have subjective experiences, you are an existentialist.
You're falling back on Sire's "The Universe Next Door" again. Explain
how the subjective is ruled out by naturalism?
> No, it's a way of understanding *part* of our world. And it's a
>way of misunderstanding the rest -- ethics for example. Or consciousness.
>You name it, and if you can't measure it, you probably can't understand it
>with naturalism.
Now we are getting somewhere. The problem is not that science
(naturalism) is inconsistent, but that it doesn't answer every question,
specifically the questions you want to ask. This is not a fault of
science. In fact, it is its strength to know its limits and to stick to the
answerable. As far as understanding goes, you will, at some point, have
to show us all this great alternative to naturalism that will answer
every question without fail -OR- you will have to kill yourself. We
await your response with baited breath...
>This is EXACTLY my point -- naturalism does not show purpose.
I don't think there is much disagreement on this one.
>It also prohibits man
>from assigning purpose -- he has no logical basis to do so.
This I don't follow. As opposed to a logical basis for *not* assigning
prupose?? Let's scrap logical basis for internally consistant. Does this
still bother you? Relativism certainly isn't excluded by naturalism.
Bruce Stephens
I'm sure Jim would have put "will tend to survive" rather than "will
survive". For humans, it appears that many religions do not
significantly reduce their ability to reproduce, and, given that not
all religions can be true, it is undeniably true that there are groups
successfully reproducing even with false beliefs.
So I disagree with your comment:
> This excludes any organisms that believe in a God who cannot exist
> within the framework of naturalism.
> It also prohibits man from assigning purpose -- he has no logical
> basis to do so.
Who says I need a "logical basis" to assign purpose? I agree it looks
as though I can't assign purpose to humankind as a whole, but then I
never wanted to---it's (some) theists who want to do that.
> Theism and Existentialism are thus both ruled out.
Puh!
> So if you profess naturalism, and you have such a belief system that
> provides purpose, then you are inconsistent. Case closed.
Even accepting this---which I don't---you haven't shown how I should
resolve this inconsistency. For example, I could decide that this
"purpose" is not something that is logically entailed by my belief
system, but still decide to keep it for sentimental reasons.
> Matt Colvin
> Cad and Bounder
--
Bruce Institute of Advanced Scientific Computation
br...@liverpool.ac.uk University of Liverpool
Schall und Rauch
pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) writes:
|> [...]
|> > This comes back to your equivocation, as noted by Geoff Arnold,
|> > between the teleological `why' and the explanatory `why'.
|> I have already explained before that the two are inextricably
|> linked. Teleology didn't come from nowhere. Teleology *arose* from man's
|> inability to answer why by revelation of mechanism after mechanism.
|> Here's an example:
|> Q: Why does an apple fall?
|> A: Because it is attracted to the earth.
|> Q: Why is it attracted to the earth?
|> A: Because both it and the earth are matter, and gravity is a
|> fundamental property of matter.
|> Q: Why is gravity a fundamental property of matter?
|> A: [I don't know what a naturalist would say tothis one, but even
|> if science had an answer, I could just ask another "why"
|> question.]
That is one of the possible interpretations of "why". It is a well known
fact that you can iterate it ad nauseam. But it is actually of little
impact for the (many) Naturalist(s). Please note that there need not be
an increase in explanatory power in that process. If one defines explanatory
power as the ability to make valid predictions it should be obvious why that
is so.
In other words, many Naturalists would consider your asking why for the
nth time an invalid question because it cannot be answered in the sense
that one could distinguish between truth and falsehood of an answer. Your
premise that one can ask the question as often as one wants to is not
accepted. That holds even more for the claim that the why-questions have
a fixpoint - a necessary condition for your argument.
Switching from the inability to answer to teleological approaches does
not suppose anything less than the validity of teleological explanations.
Ie, what is now and what is going to be was intended. Among the many
shortcomings of that approach are that it is just another form of Animism.
Actually, it adds nothing to the explanations, it just seems more plausible
for some.
|> I maintain that you don't need ethics if you don't have the
|> ability to choose.
Only if one accepts your definition of choose, ie a capability to act that
cannot be explained by the physical world. This definition is entirely
irrelevant for the Naturalist. The ability to make decisions based on the
anticipation of events boosts the ability to survive a lot. There is no
contradiction in the mechanisms (not that I want to imply physical determinism)
being part of the physical world.
|>The two go hand in hand; they are inextricable. Some
|> naturalists maintain that I'm right -- but that you *don't* have the
|> ability to choose, and that ethics is just a property of the system, not
|> something outside the system that is used by personalities to make
|> choices. Such people have a lot of explaining to do. We pretty obviously
|> have the ability to make choices, and we pretty obviously have ethics. So
|> I ask "why do we have these things?" and the naturalist has no more
|> explanatory trump cards left, except to jump back into the never-ending
|> stream of "whys" --
This is wrong, and you have been explained more than once why.
As a matter of fact, you are attacking Naturalism without even being able
to answer questions why this is soyourself. I bet that I could ask you
questions long enough and we'd arrive at "god wants it so". And you would
not be able to explain *why* - both teleological and with regard to the nature
of gods - it is so. Since you base your argument on the inability of the
Naturalist to do so, one can easily assume that you will admit defeat now.
It is a joke, in case you don't notice.
|> [...]
|> Q: Why choose?
|> A: To better yourself.
|> Q: Why better yourself?
Strawman alert.
|> A: [something about society, species, or other issue-dodging]
|> Q: Why should [society/species/etc.] preserve itself?
Because they do. If life would not be self-preserving it would hardly
exist. An autocatalytical process has a bigger chance of a lasting
existence than one that is not. Why there are autocatalytical processes
is another question. With regard to living beings it is answered by chemistry
and thermodynamics. You may ask now why the laws of physics and chemistry
are that way, but then we have arrived at a point where it cannot be seen
how you are going to improve the explanatory power of the system by answering
the question. I
|> Worse, this train of logic eventually doubles back on itself --
|> society is nothing more than the sum of its parts (in a naturalist
|> *matter* universe, nothing is more than the sum of its parts), so it is
|> only valuable because it is composed of people. So are humans valuable?
|> We're back at the start of the question chain above.
When I see through the mechanisms beind my emotions it says neither that
I don't have the emotions anymore nor that their power has decreased. Why
I consider, eg., my life valuable does not change the truth that I do.
Apparently, you build a strawman on the Naturalists denying his own emotions
and feelings.
|> [...]
|> When a naturalist says that he refrains from suicide because it is
|> the nature of life to preserve itself and that his death would go contrary
|> to that nature, he is simply imbuing nature with value. And then he has
|> to explain where it came from -- where did nature get it?
A particularly silly instance of that strawman.
Another strawman is your use of "value" here. How often exactly have you
been pointed to it? A Naturalist does not deny the existence of values in
nature, he just says that the concept of value can be based on processes
in nature in alone. Your concept of values is based on the objective
existence of a set of values that does not depend on nature. A Naturalist
need not and does not accept the definition. Guess why?
So, read carefully: a Naturalist can consistently explain the concept of
value from his worldview. It is not your concept of value, but it neverthe-
less explains the phenomena we know.
|> Do you realize that naturalism and nihilism (and their various
|> forms) are the only worldviews that claim that value doesn't exist? All
|> the other ones may have an unsatisfactory source for value (God, man), but
|> they provide it nonetheless.
As a matter of fact, they don't. And since you have used it as a argument
against Naturalism, you should show marginal fairness and apply it to them
as well. Of course, you won't.
Lastly, I have yet to see a concept of objective and consistent values that
could somehow explain the existence of different Ethics. Except that the
variety was a value in itself. That may be consistent, but then we are back
to asking "why?".
Matthew Alexander Colvin
> In article <2hoq9b$s...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>,
> Matthew Alexander Colvin <pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu> wrote:
> > My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
> >use it to commit suicide?
>
> I'm, uh, content and happy?
That's nice. Is that a source of value? You're making decisions
based solely on happiness, on whether an activity triggers endophins?
Sounds unlikely to me.
> >
> > So, why not commit suicide?
>
> Why not? You have a right to die. Your point being?
It's the Burridan's Ass problem -- you have two alternatives, both
equally not-valuable. Why choose one or the other? You've obviously
chosen not to commit suicide. So you think your life has value. Explain
why, without saying "I just give it value" or dragging God and theistic
teleology into it.
>
>
> >1) It's against my self interest.
> > So, you have inherent value? Your life is worth saving? Why?
>
> Certainly. If this life is the only thing that I am conscious of, then
it
> is the only thing with value. The lack of any supernatural afterlife
> INCREASES the value of this life, not the opposite.
Why? What does a lack of afterlife have anything to do with
naturalism? You can't justify living on the basis of the non-existence of
an afterlife, can you? It can't increase life's value by its
non-existence. What kind of nonsense are you talking?
> >
> >2) It's against an ingrained ethical code I have.
> >
> > Why not violate that ethical code? You have the ability to do it
> >in other things, do you not? For examply, you can steal, murder, etc.
> >Why not commit suicide? In other words, why do you adhere to that
code?
> >Is the code valuable in itself?
>
> Why not violate your religious moral code? Once you discover your
mistake
> in the final seconds of consciousness you have, you can repent and then
go
> on to a place that's better than here. You can steal and murder, etc,
as
> long as you repent later. Why adhere to a code that is all forgiving?
Well, now you're talking about theism, and that's not at issue.
Theists have their own reasons to live and to live morally -- and most of
them stem from their belief in God. But you're dodging the issue.
> >3) My ethical code is genetic/memetic. I get it from my society, my
> >surroundings.
>
> Society is indeed a tool of man. We are social animals, who learn from
> each other. Anthro 101.
>
Your point being? I'm contending that we can't derive value from
society because society is indeed just "a tool of man."
> > Or perhaps they don't shift it back on the individual. Maybe they
> >now appeal to large chains of evolution. Society has ethics because it
> >preserves the human species. The human species now has value. Why?
It's
> >just matter like the rest of the universe. Eventually, nothing has
value
> >for the naturalist. If he commits suicide, he's not exercising free
will
> >-- he's just reacting to the action of the grand system, of which he is
a
> >part no more important than any other. If I'm to practice naturalism,
I
> >need a reason to live. Can any naturalist find one?
>
> Sure. This is the only life we have. Use it well.
That's no reason at all. Why should I use it well? What do you
mean by "well"? You're telling me to make decisions based on value, but
you're not telling me where that value comes from.
>
> This is the only life our companions in life have as well. Teach them
and
> help them to use their one chance well too.
Why? What difference does it make whether they live or die?
Are their lives intrinsically valuable? If so, you've got some explaining
to do.
> But certainly, a man has a right to die if he so desires. Why should he
> not?
Well, a Christian theist would say that man is a servant of God,
and that God wants him to live. Remember: "Now choose life"? But the
Christian worldview is not under scrutiny right now. The naturalist one
is -- and they don't have a "mandate from God to live." They need to find
value somewhere else.
> > I maintain that they
> > can't -- they are simply closet nihilists and don't have any value to
> > be found in their own system. They are preaching one system and
> > living by another. Naturalism, thus inconsistent, must be false.
> Again, you overstate the moral ban on suicide. You also miss other
> reasons
> why not to kill oneself, such as fear of hurting loved ones. Was it
> Mencken who said, "Any man who falls in love could not be a nihilist."?
> Welp, SOMEONE said it.
Great grief! You're helping my argument by bringing in Mencken?
Of course what he says is true. But why? You're now living for someone
else's sake. That tells me that you consider his/her life valuable. Why?
> Please explain for all of us Naturalists and Non- why suicide is morally
> wrong.
>
> >Matt Colvin
>
> --heretic
> "I would have killed myself, but it made no sense
> Committing suicide in self-defense..."
> --B. Hancock
I've been asked to explain to naturalists why suicide is morally wrong.
This is not my point -- my question was "Why do you [naturalist] not
commit suicide right now?"
The point of the question was to demonstrate that naturalists are
placing *value* on something -- their own life, the lives of others,
pleasure, etc. If they weren't, they would have no reason not to commit
suicide. There clearly is a source for an "ought" -- for having a basis
on which to make this most fundamental of decisions: to exist as a
consciousness or not.
It's not useful to talk about suicide being morally wrong -- it
isn't, unless you have an ethical code that derives from outside yourself,
say, from a God. But naturalists don't believe this. They thus have no
reason not to commit suicide when they have nothing of value left to cling
to. When life ceases to have value, then they have no reason to live. My
question was designed to ask naturalists where they find value, and it
still hasn't been aswered.
In case you are wondering, most of my argument right now stems not
from James W. Sire's _The Universe Next Door_, nor from C.S. Lewis. It's
from David Hume. Yes, the Scottish skeptic not only debunked proofs of
God, he also pointed out what is known as the "Naturalist Fallacy."
Basically, it's the same point I'm making now: Naturalists have no way to
derive "ought" from "is." Their ethics are groundless.
Hans M Dykstra
> A: To better yourself.
> Q: Why better yourself?
> A: [something about society, species, or other issue-dodging]
> Q: Why should [society/species/etc.] preserve itself?
NO REASON AT ALL. Why is it so damn hard to understand this.
BUT, I know you are going to claim this is just nihilism, but it
is not. You see, all organisms that were not built in such a way
that they preserve themselves, no longer exist. They just became
food for those that did. So in the present day, we see organisms
that strive to survive. Because that is what they are--survival
machines. Why are they survival machines? No reason, they just are.
Once upon a time, there were some non-survival machines and some
survival machines. Today only the survival machines are left, for
obvious reasons. (Actually to be precise, that should be
"reproduction machines".)
> Worse, this train of logic eventually doubles back on itself --
>society is nothing more than the sum of its parts (in a naturalist
>*matter* universe, nothing is more than the sum of its parts), so it is
>only valuable because it is composed of people. So are humans valuable?
>We're back at the start of the question chain above.
Once again you are using the word value in some absolute, teleological
sense. To a naturalist the question "Are humans valuable?" is nonsense.
It is like, "Does the green cheese on the moon taste good?" It presumes
the existence of green cheese in the first place.
To the naturalist, the word value should only be used to express a
relationship between a valuer and a valuee. The question you pose
has a valuee ("humans") but no valuer. "Are humans valuable TO WHOM?"
To themselves? To the universe at large? To the readers of a.a?
"Value" is another one of those high level abstractions like "choice"
which doesn't exist on the microscopic level but which emerges as
a useful descriptor of the behavior of complex systems. When we say
that "Matt Colvin values his own stupidity," we mean that he behaves
in such a way as to maintain that stupidity, to actively supplement
it, and to display it to others. This description allows me to
predict that he will respond to the ad hominem in this post and
ignore the real argumentation. (If he replies at all.)
> Nature acts "blindly" to shape our world? Why would this be the
>case? (Maybe it is, but you don't have an explanation for how nature came
>to be that way).
The fact that I lack an explanation has no bearing. I don't know. No big deal.
Do *you* have an explanation for why the universe is the way it is? If not,
then you can hardly fault naturalism for not being omniscient.
And if it is the case, derive value from it. Or show
>how we can choose without value. Or show that we don't choose. And do it
>all without deifying nature (making "her" the source of value).
See above. Creatures "value" survival because that is how they act.
Creatures "choose" because they are complex systems which are highly
sensitive to past history and initial conditions. When a naturalist
says "choose" or "value" this is all they mean, if you want to be
reductionist about it. Nonetheless, these terms have real meaning
and real usefulness in describing these complex systems.
> Teleology is not a "Bible" for quoting and invoking every time one
>wants to. It's a statement of the problem that I demonstrated above --
>that of the insatiable nature of the "explanatory why". If you have no
>purpose, then you have no reason to act.
Wait a minute, earlier in the post you were complaining that without
a Purpose, we have no choice whether to act or not? Come on, which is it?
You seem to be equally concerned about two opposite extremes, one which
gives us no freedom to choose and another which gives us unlimited freedom
with no guidelines, and falsely imputing both of them to naturalism.
>I'm beginning to get tired of the same old naturalist arguments --
>circular, unsatisfying, conveniently ignoring whichever naturalist tenet
>demolishes his chain of reasoning at a given time (Simon here ignores that
>"the universe is a uniformity of cause and effect in a closed system with
>no all-encompassing purpose. He tries to find purpose in nature, and when
>he finds it -- and he does! -- he denies that it is purpose. He might as
>well call it "the nature of nature.").
We're tired of you demanding teleological answers to questions that we
repeatedly assert are nonsensical.
> When a naturalist says that he refrains from suicide because it is
>the nature of life to preserve itself and that his death would go contrary
>to that nature, he is simply imbuing nature with value. And then he has
>to explain where it came from -- where did nature get it?
Gawd, how can you be so dense? You've ignored my posts which point
out that there are naturalistic definitions for words like "value",
"choice", "purpose" which avoid teleology, and render your demands
null. Nature has purpose, but not Purpose, we value things but they do
not have Value, we choose but we do not Choose.
> Do you realize that naturalism and nihilism (and their various
>forms) are the only worldviews that claim that value doesn't exist?
Do you realize that naturalism denies the existence of Value as a
thing in itself, but does not deny the existence of agents who assign
value? But of course, you will put the label "existentialist" or
something and deny that this is naturalism.
To the naturalist, the behavior that we describe as "valuing" is an
emergent property of self-reproducing systems. From this, weak-minded
individuals have abstracted the noun "Value" and now you assert that
if "Value" doesn't exist that all is meaningless?
***
hmd
Matthew Alexander Colvin
(Ray Ingles) writes:
[Much deleted, I apologise for it. To treat it all would take several
pages. I hope Ray doesn't mind my choosing his summary below to try to
refute.]
> Okay, this has been long, but I really hope that I have clarified some
> things for you. Now, I have a favor to ask of you. I have explained part
> of my worldview. Would you explain part of yours in turn?
> You see that I see things as valuable in terms of what they mean for my
> purposes.
I think I'll choose to argue off of this contention. You still
haven't asnwered the question of value. You have purposes? Where did you
get them? Don't all purposes hinge on value? That is, can you make any
decision without assigning value to the alternatives? Why do you choose
one purpose over another?
You say that you assign value yourself, and that every man assigns
value by himself. But this is an existentialist position, not naturalism
at all. How can you assign value to one group of matter over another
group of matter? Reconcile existentialism and naturalism for me.
> I really don't understand how the existence of God would lead to
> 'universal' meaning and purpose. Would this not be just another example
> of another being's purposes? Why should I necessarily try to fit myself
> into those purposes? Just because God would be moe powerful than myself
> would not seem to give it any kind of 'inherent' weight? I really think
> you should start another thread to discuss this, because right now I
just
> don't understand what kind of 'meaning' you think 'naturalism' lacks.
This is why Christianity requires that God be infinite, personal,
and *good*. If God were not the only source of good, then there would
truly be no reason to obey him. His purposes would carry no more weight
than those of any other person. But if He's both infinite and good, then
it follows that anything good you do is really good by His (THE) absolute
ethical code as well. And anything bad is in violation of it.
This is not going to fly on this group, I realize. Christianity
is indeed just an affirmed circular argument. But it is a circular
argument that depends only on the existence of God, not on contingency and
matter and man's ability to assign value -- all things that naturalism has
to have.
In reply to your demand that I start a thread, I hesitate to do
so. I'm not a net junkie, and I don't spend much longer than an hour and
a half on here as it is. But I'm currently spending a great part of that
time contributing to the Naturalism-->Nihilism thread and its satellites.
It's not that I don't want to defend my beliefs. I'm simply too busy.
So my plea is "Wait until this thread (rope?) runs out." I'll be
glad to answer then. However, I don't really have much hope for success.
Christianity asks that you buy into a proposition that is unprovable.
That's not something the skeptics are really keen on doing (that's why
they disguise the fact that they are doing so with naturalism's seeming
empiricism).
I don't really think it's possible to make anyone on this group
believe in God. All the rational arguing in the world won't *prove* that
he exists. And rational proof is the only thing accepted here. I can try
to prove that other religions and worldviews are inconsistent and
unlivable, though. But that won't accomplish much unless I had an
infinite amount of time to debunk all of them.
This is why I was a little bit amused when I was accused of
proselytizing on this group. I'm not trying to convert anyone (I think it
would be nice for you if you were, but...). I'm participating in this
discussion for the same reason all of you are -- it's intellectually
stimulating. Not that intellectual stimulation is intrinsically
*valuable* :), mind you. I'm still waiting for the naturalists to
disprove Hume's contention that their worldview doesn't provide "ought"
from "is."
Paul Andrew King
: The argument runs like this: If man is a result of impersonal
: forces -- if he is simply matter reacting with itself -- he has no way of
: knowing whether what he seems to know is illusion or truth.
Sorry but naturalism doesn't enter into it - the problem of whether we can
beleive our senses still exists. Naturalism, in fact, *assumes* that we can
.
: Naturalism says that perception and knowledge are products of the
: brain. They come about from the functioning of matter. If matter didn't
: function, there would be no thought. But matter functions by its own
: leading a conscious being to true perception or logical conclusions based
: on accurate observation and true suppositions.
: actually the case?
: tests, etc. But these all use the brain they are testing. They could
: well be a futile exercise in illusion.
: I will now open these conclusions up for questioning and
: refutation. I believe that the burden of proof is now on the naturalists.
: They have denied the existence of anything other than matter/energy. Gone
: are God, soul, and personal consciousness. How do we know? Can we know
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Sorry, but everyone here is claiming that personal consciousness *does* exist.
: that we know? Isn't this just faith in something? How is faith in the
: human brain any better than faith in God? There is no reason for a
: naturalist to place confidence in his knowledge.
We have better reasons to believe that human brains exist...
: There is plenty of evidence that knowledge is possible. I
: personally like Robert Capon's little anecdote:
: "The skeptic is never for real. There he stands, cocktail in
: hand, left arm draped languorously on one end of the mantelpiece,
: telling you that he can't be sure of anything, not even of his
: own existence. I'll give you my secret method of demolishing
: universal skepticism in four words. Whisper to him "Your fly
: is open." If he thinks knowledge is so all-fired impossible,
: why does he always look?"
Interesting how you miss the point...
Naturalists can't be universal sceptics- otherwise they couldn't
believe in the existance of nature.
: There's the question. Why do we trust our knowledge? Naturalism
: gives us no reason at all. I believe that naturalists choose not to
: conclude "knowledge is impossible" because to do so leads to nihilism.
: I've found no evidence that we should trust matter's ability to know.
: But, as always, let's discuss it.
Yes it does. Trusting our senses gives consistent and reproducible results.
It is simpler to infer that our sense are indeed trustworthy.
And then there's the inbuilt bias described in the anecdote above.
Further "knowledge is impossible" leads to solipsism, not nihilism.
The possibility of knowledge is always an assumption, regardless of the
underlying philosophy - or it rests on equally questionable assumptions.
Given there is something that "knows" why *shouldn't* it be a complex
arrangement of energy and matter like the human brain as opposed to
some entirely hypothetical non-matter ?
: Matt Colvin
: Cad and Bounder
Paul K.
Matthew Alexander Colvin
> In article <2hp913$2...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>,
> Matthew Alexander Colvin <pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu> wrote:
> > Q: Why choose?
> > A: To better yourself.
> > Q: Why better yourself?
> > A: [something about society, species, or other issue-dodging]
> > Q: Why should [society/species/etc.] preserve itself?
>
> NO REASON AT ALL. Why is it so damn hard to understand this.
> BUT, I know you are going to claim this is just nihilism, but it
> is not. You see, all organisms that were not built in such a way
> that they preserve themselves, no longer exist. They just became
> food for those that did. So in the present day, we see organisms
> that strive to survive. Because that is what they are--survival
> machines. Why are they survival machines? No reason, they just are.
> Once upon a time, there were some non-survival machines and some
> survival machines. Today only the survival machines are left, for
> obvious reasons. (Actually to be precise, that should be
> "reproduction machines".)
But why? You give no reason why nature should have such a
preference. Sure, it's just the way things are, but this is all rather
mysterious (a lot of naturalist explanations of the past are). The reason
that *I* see is that God made it that way. Nature derives its purpose
from Him. But in naturalism, you're left with no good reason. When did
organisms develop this tendency toward self-preservation?
You make an absurd assumption: that organisms started off as two
distinct groups -- ones with a survival bent and ones without it.
Ridiculous. You're just snatching *purpose* out of the air again: you
now have to explain why organisms would start surviving for no reason.
Don't start whining "But you're bringing Christian teleology into
it again. It's not FAIR!" I'm not --- I'm just looking for a *cause*.
Eventually, you run out of them. That's how teleology came about.
[The rest of Mr. Dykstra's argument hinges on his having proved that
"value" is a worthless term, simply a description of a property of the
system. So I've deleted it. I have shown above why I can't accept his
explanation.]
Xian the Desk Lizard
This guy just gets sillier & sillier.
On 22 Jan 1994 17:41:20 GMT, Matthew Alexander Colvin gave us:
~In article <2hphm5$9...@huey.cc.utexas.edu> her...@huey.cc.utexas.edu
~(Damion Schubert) writes:
~> In article <2hoq9b$s...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>,
~> Matthew Alexander Colvin <pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu> wrote:
~> > My question to Ray is, now that you have free will, why do you not
~> >use it to commit suicide?
~>
~> I'm, uh, content and happy?
Sounds reasonable. Suicide is an action. One would need a justification
to do it, and neither Ray nor I have seen sufficient reason (I assume).
Besides, there seems to be a desire in any living thing (ok, forget the
lemmings) to continue living for as long as possible. In any case,
suicide is silly, messy, and generally not done from rational reasons.
~ That's nice. Is that a source of value? You're making decisions
~based solely on happiness, on whether an activity triggers endophins?
~Sounds unlikely to me.
No, he's not, he's making a reasoned decision. Try it, it's good.
~> >
~> > So, why not commit suicide?
~>
~> Why not? You have a right to die. Your point being?
Because it doesn't make sense?
~ It's the Burridan's Ass problem -- you have two alternatives, both
~equally not-valuable. Why choose one or the other? You've obviously
~chosen not to commit suicide. So you think your life has value. Explain
~why, without saying "I just give it value" or dragging God and theistic
~teleology into it.
No, he is saying his life has value TO HIM. Most people value their own
lives; a lot of people value them much more highly than they value
anything else. You seem to be trying to say that he should dispose of
himself because he cannot prove that his life has any value in The Grand
Scheme Of Things(tm). Well, very few of us can say that - should we all
die for it?
Besides, quite possibly you are wrong, and Ray does have a lasting place
in the history of the universe. Maybe we all do, maybe just because we
do not all become the new Marx (thank Nothing!) does not mean that we
are intrinsically not of value.
~> >1) It's against my self interest.
~> > So, you have inherent value? Your life is worth saving? Why?
Saving? Don't you mean not destroying?
~> Certainly. If this life is the only thing that I am conscious of, then it
~> is the only thing with value. The lack of any supernatural afterlife
~> INCREASES the value of this life, not the opposite.
which seems pretty logical to me. IF you only have 70 years to make or
break, you don't faff about with it! Suddenly every second becomes
rather more important. Result: atheists are less likely to waste time
than Christians... |:>
~ Why? What does a lack of afterlife have anything to do with
~naturalism? You can't justify living on the basis of the non-existence of
~an afterlife, can you? It can't increase life's value by its
~non-existence. What kind of nonsense are you talking?
Matt, it is you who are talking nonsense. So far as I can say, Ray has
given his answers from a subjective point of view. He regards his life
as valuable because he is living it; of course, the shorter it is, the
more valuable he will think what remains of it.
~ Well, now you're talking about theism, and that's not at issue.
Er... as we are sick of explaining, theism is always at issue on this
group. This group is set up for ATHEISTS, dimwit; you are not entitled
to have any of your religious beliefs accepted by us here, unless you
can provide proof.
~ Your point being? I'm contending that we can't derive value from
~society because society is indeed just "a tool of man."
I contend that we don't have to. But IS society just "a tool of man", or
is it the most basic level of social interaction, a common empathy that
we all (except a few) share?
~ Why? What difference does it make whether they live or die?
~Are their lives intrinsically valuable? If so, you've got some explaining
~to do.
Yes, they are... because every man has potential, given to him by his mind.
(Be careful in rejecting us offhand, after the fool you made of yourself
over neural nets.) It is that potential that gives people value. And it
is precisely because no objective value can be assigned to people by other
people, and there is no god to do the same, that we must assume that others
are as valuable as ourselves objectively.
~> But certainly, a man has a right to die if he so desires. Why should he
~> not?
~ Well, a Christian theist would say that man is a servant of God,
~and that God wants him to live. Remember: "Now choose life"? But the
~Christian worldview is not under scrutiny right now. The naturalist one
~is -- and they don't have a "mandate from God to live." They need to find
~value somewhere else.
Yes, IN THEIR OWN MINDS! Really, I am surprised that you haven't been able
to work this one out on your own.
~> Again, you overstate the moral ban on suicide. You also miss other
~> reasons
~> why not to kill oneself, such as fear of hurting loved ones. Was it
~> Mencken who said, "Any man who falls in love could not be a nihilist."?
~> Welp, SOMEONE said it.
~ Great grief! You're helping my argument by bringing in Mencken?
~Of course what he says is true. But why? You're now living for someone
~else's sake. That tells me that you consider his/her life valuable. Why?
Because it increases the quality of your own... and a whole host of things
called emotions.
Xian
Xian the Desk Lizard
[back to Matt, but I called heretic Ray throughout the whole article]
Sorry! (Not my week...)
For all with vi readers,
:s/Ray/heretic/
Xian
George Heintzelman
>In article <2hp7v0...@bozo.dsinc.com> pe...@dsinc.com (Jim Perry)
>writes:
>> observed world can be explained in natural terms, without recourse to
>> the supernatural. It does not claim that this explanation will show
>> an overarching purpose to the universe. It does, however, provide
>> explanations of the existence of belief systems that claim such a
>> purpose.
>
> HOLY MOSES BILL!!! Jim Perry caves in!!! This is EXACTLY my
>point -- naturalism does not show purpose.
show purpose, not that the esteemed Jim Perry has 'caved in'.
>But it discredits any belief
>system that has purpose -- remember: "Organisms with accurate perceptions
>will survive"?
^---- insert 'tend to'. There are some perceptions that may be
incorrect that are less critical -- eg, our blind spot, or our failure
to percieve the ultraviolet, or... Other than that, yes.
>This excludes any organisms that believe in a God who
>cannot exist within the framework of naturalism.
No, it just says they're wrong.
>It also prohibits man
>from assigning purpose -- he has no logical basis to do so.
This, Matt, is the crux of your argument, as I understand it.
Because there is no universal basis for teleology, there can be no
purpose, and hence we naturalists should just up and kill ourselves.
You fail to understand that the lack of a universal purpose does NOT
preclude the existence of small, subjective, individual 'purposes' (at
their ROOT explainable mechanistically, as some set of cells in my
brain that drive me towards this result, etc., etc., but percieved BY
ME as my purposes). The things I want, just because I WANT them.
Ray Ingles, I believe, tried to explain this in a post not
long ago, and I think succeeded. Read it again. He sums up my
worldview very nicely.
>Theism and
>Existentialism are thus both ruled out. So if you profess naturalism, and
>you have such a belief system that provides purpose, then you are
>inconsistent. Case closed.
Correct. My belief system does not provide me with my purposes
(in general). My biology does. I have no choice about that. Such is
life. It still goes on.
>Matt Colvin
>Cad and Bounder
Sure are.
George Heintzelman
geo...@mit.edu
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu
>
> It's the Burridan's Ass problem -- you have two alternatives, both
>equally not-valuable. Why choose one or the other? You've obviously
>chosen not to commit suicide. So you think your life has value. Explain
>why, without saying "I just give it value" or dragging God and theistic
>teleology into it.
>
So far I have not seem any answer whatsoever to _my_ posts in these threads...
Maybe they have not gotten to you yet...
Or maybe you just feel that you are too busy with those you see as suckers
because they have been gracious enough to take your questions seriously....
This is undoubtedly the most absurd of the threads that you have started here.
Let's see if I have it straight. You are seriously proposing that one
should commit suicide if they cannot answer your question?
Hot damn! No wonder you are so strong in your faith! Your quesions imply that
if anyone should ever shake your faith that you'd have to kill yourself! No
wonder you believe in all those Christian absurdities! You are telling us that
that is absolutely all that you have to live for!! How regrettable!
Now let me put a question to you. Have you ever ordered a pizza? Why do you eat
pizzas? When you are hungry, do you really sit down and wonder how it is that
you want to order food? Do you really refuse to eat before you figure out why
you are hungry?
I wish I could borrow Roshi's staff and swing it through the net! I'd make you
that hear one hand clapping!
George Heintzelman
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ---- (The sound of me banging my
head on my table)
Probably they started developing this tendency REALLY REALLY
quickly, because if they DIDN'T, they wouldn't be living organisms
anymore!
Why, oh why is this so hard to understand?
NB: This why is NOT a teleological why. I'm looking for a
mechanistic explanation for why this is taking so long to work its way
into your head.
A lot of people have suggested you read Dawkins' books. It's a
good suggestion. Try it.
> You make an absurd assumption: that organisms started off as two
>distinct groups -- ones with a survival bent and ones without it.
Not necessarily. We observe that organisms exist with survival
bent. We hypothesize that if organisms existed without one, they would
be selected against (seeing no a priori reason they could not exist),
hence explaining our failure to observe them.
>Ridiculous. You're just snatching *purpose* out of the air again: you
>now have to explain why organisms would start surviving for no reason.
'Random' (by which I mean, more or less, chaotic) chance, to
start, but the ones that DID, would survive to reproduce.
No teleology there.
I'm thinking of giving up, guys. This one's unconvinceable
(granted, unconvinceable in an entirely different way than Michael
Courtney, Bill Conner, and Booby, but still...).
George Heintzelman
geo...@mit.edu
Frank ODwyer
: chosen not to commit suicide. So you think your life has value. Explain
: why, without saying "I just give it value" or dragging God and theistic
: teleology into it.
The assumption we are supposed to make here is presumably that "dragging
God and theistic theology" into it would somehow resolve the issue.
And it doesn't.
Leaving aside the small matter of whether or not God exists,
ask yourself (for example) "why don't Christians commit suicide?".
Because Jesus tells them so? In order to gain salvation?
Whatever - so you think these items have value. Please explain
why without saying "I just give it value" or dragging the naturalist
worldview into it.
--
Frank O'Dwyer "One-fifth of every electorate can be hypnotized in almost
odw...@sse.ie the twinkling of an eye, one-seventh can be relieved of
PGP key on server pain by injections of water, one-quarter will respond
promptly and enthusiastically to hypnopaedia" -Aldous Huxley
Hans M Dykstra
Matthew Alexander Colvin <pto...@next17pg2.wam.umd.edu> wrote:
>In article <2hrpsj$1...@titan.ucs.umass.edu> hdyk...@titan.ucs.umass.edu
>(Hans M Dykstra) writes:
> But why? You give no reason why nature should have such a
>preference. Sure, it's just the way things are, but this is all rather
>mysterious (a lot of naturalist explanations of the past are). The reason
>that *I* see is that God made it that way.
But *why* did God make it that way, and not some other way? That is
just as mysterious as saying that things just are.
Nature derives its purpose
>from Him. But in naturalism, you're left with no good reason. When did
>organisms develop this tendency toward self-preservation?
But *why* does God give purpose to nature? Why doesn't It just leave it
alone to behave randomly? I don't see that this gains you anything.
> You make an absurd assumption: that organisms started off as two
>distinct groups -- ones with a survival bent and ones without it.
>Ridiculous. You're just snatching *purpose* out of the air again: you
>now have to explain why organisms would start surviving for no reason.
Some molecules have longer lifespans than others. Some of them are even
self-catalytic. Take this and add a couple billion years, and voila,
surviving organisms that have the appearance of purpose without an
actual purpose. Why do some molecules have this property and others
don't? The laws of physics. Why are the laws of physics like they
are? Dunno. Maybe some day we'll know.
So I know where the "purpose" comes from--it comes from the laws of
physics, ultimately. Is there a purpose behind the laws of physics?
I don't know.
Is there a purpose behind God?
> Don't start whining "But you're bringing Christian teleology into
>it again. It's not FAIR!" I'm not --- I'm just looking for a *cause*.
>Eventually, you run out of them. That's how teleology came about.
Two points here:
1) The infinite regress of "why" only stops when you come to something
that you will accept the answer "Just because." I don't see "God" as
being any more of a natural stopping place than the laws of physics
are.
2) The naturalist does not insist on knowing the ultimate cause, or
even that it exists. When you ask for the reason why organisms
started surviving, I will say that according to the laws of physics
and probability, some things (whether they be molecules, crystals,
cells, organisms, whatever) will last longer than others. Some things
even reproduce more copies of themselves. That's really all there
is to it. The laws of physics, some time, and surviving, reproducing
organisms arise. It all just goes right down to the laws of physics.
>[The rest of Mr. Dykstra's argument hinges on his having proved that
>"value" is a worthless term, simply a description of a property of the
>system. So I've deleted it. I have shown above why I can't accept his
>explanation.]
I really don't see anything in your post that shows this.
I don't claim to have proved anything. You asked how naturalists
can assign value when there isn't any inherent Value. I explain that
naturalists see the word value in a very different light. You
*can* have little 'v' value without big 'V' Value.
I don't claim that "value" (or "purpose" etc.) are worthless terms. They
are useful *as* descriptive terms. I do claim that your version of
Value, Purpose, etc. *does* require some universal standard (though why
God necessarily provides such a standard is beyond me). So when you
ask things like "Why does your life have Value?" we say "It hasn't any."
But when you ask, "Why don't you kill yourself?" we say, "Because I value
my life." The difference between a verb form and a noun form is crucial.
Try to phrase your questions in this verb form and you will see why your
questions are nonsense to a naturalist. The very form of your questions
and the kind of answer you demand *require* the existence of a supreme
Valuer and Purposer. The naturalist simply says that such concepts
are themselves nonsense, and that the questions simply do not need
answers.
***
hmd
Paul Carter
This is my first posting to alt.atheism, so I may as well jump in at the
deep end.
Matthew Alexander Colvin (pto...@next11pg2.wam.umd.edu) wrote:
[ cut ]
: That's fine. You don't have to act on your beliefs. If you don't
: have any purpose, maybe you don't need one. But the existence of value
: (purpose) ties up a lot of loose ends that naturalism doesn't answer.
Then what is the purpose of god ? Surely she, he or it also needs
purpose in order to exist and act 'significantly'.
(If god can exist without it, then why can't we ? )
I don't think the purported existence of value ties up loose ends, it
simply shifts the claimed loose ends to some metaphysical and
unfalsifiable realm.
Regards,
--
P A U L P A U L P A U L P A U L P A U L
C A R T E R C A R T E R C A R T E R C A R T E R C A R T E R
3d signature 3d signature 3d signature 3d signature 3d signature
Focus lines: | |
Schall und Rauch
Keywords:
Since Matthew Alexander Colvin is not answering most of the refutations -
yes, nothing less - of his argument and he is even grossly misunderstanding
the few he picks on, I wonder if there is a point to extending the
discussion anymore.
How about compiling the best counter-arguments brought up so far - and
demand that he answers each and every point in it to everybody's satisfaction
before any new theme is brought up?
As a side note, he admits the weakness of the theistic version. Unfortunately,
he does not see that it is a refutation. He still has got to answer why the
circularity of theism can be considered an answer to the questions of Value.
(Capitalization intended, in order to separate his terms from those of the
Naturalist.) The only thing he acheives is to assert that there *is* an
objective existence and that it is found in god. *Why* this is so, he cannot
answer without resorting to non-answers, respectively, fallacies.
Further, it is not clear what has been gained by the assertion of Value.
After all, the question if the right set of Values can be found by man,
and even more interesting, if the method that unveils the right set of
Values can be agreed on, is still open. A concept of *Value* that lies
cannot be determined is utterly pointless. ven worse, it allows to
arbitrarily define certain Ethics as the right one - and connect them to
the superiority of a god. I do not understand how this can be presented
as a positive result.
By the way, anyone disagreeing that he has arrived in preaching mode
eventually?
gary charbonneau
>I demonstrated that in a naturalist system, nothing is valuable. Then
>Gary Charbonneau popped up and, after every time I stated that "nothing is
>valuable", he said "unless man gives it value."
>
>> Your post sounds very much like you're trying to figure out
>> why you should pay $.49 for a can of soup at the grocery
>> store unless the soup has an "inherent" value of $.49, set by God --
>> and if it _does_ have an inherent value, you should buy the soup
>> for that price, whether you like soup or not.
>>
>> You seem to be confused about what is meant by "value."
>
>
>I'm not confused at all, Gary. You are. You seem to have confused
>naturalism with existentialism. Naturalism doesn't give man the ability
>to assign value. He has to adopt another worldview in order to do so --
>and existentialism has its problems too.
My understanding of the meaning of the terms "naturalism" and "existentialism"
is that the two terms are by no means mutually exclusive. Are you defining
them in such a way that they are? Could I trouble you to trot out a couple
of brief definitions (you may have done so somewhere upthread, but I don't
recall).
--
Gary Charbonneau
char...@ucs.indiana.edu
"It is well that war is so terrible, else we would grow too fond of it."
- R.E. Lee
gary charbonneau
>I'm still waiting for the naturalists to
>disprove Hume's contention that their worldview doesn't provide "ought"
>from "is."
Well, I'm a naturalist (I think -- I will await your definition and see
whether you have defined naturalism in such a way that I can't agree
with it). I feel under no obligation to disprove Hume's contention,
because I believe he is basically correct. However, I understand
your position to be that we "ought" to obey God because God "is".
It looks like you are making the same mistake that Hume warned against.
gary charbonneau
> But why? You give no reason why nature should have such a
>preference. Sure, it's just the way things are, but this is all rather
>mysterious (a lot of naturalist explanations of the past are). The reason
>that *I* see is that God made it that way. Nature derives its purpose
>from Him.
Deriving "oughts" ("Nature's purposes") from "is's" (God's existence
and actions) again, are we? Tsk, tsk....
One of my values is a strong preference for diet Barq's root beer.
Did I get that from God? What if one of my
values were molesting young children? Would I owe that to God
too? Just asking....
Matthew Alexander Colvin
Of course I don't refuse to eat before I figure out why I'm
hungry. We can't go through life wasting time with the philosophy of
every action! You obtuse stinker -- I'm not suggesting that naturalists
ought to commit suicide. I'm asking them to _explain_why_they_don't_.
They have a reason -- that life is valuable. But I don't see where they
derive that reason from.
Matt Colvin
Matthew Alexander Colvin
(George Heintzelman) writes:
> > You make an absurd assumption: that organisms started off as two
> >distinct groups -- ones with a survival bent and ones without it.
> Not necessarily. We observe that organisms exist with survival
> bent. We hypothesize that if organisms existed without one, they would
> be selected against (seeing no a priori reason they could not exist),
> hence explaining our failure to observe them.
OH-HO!! So, you maintain that organisms just came about complete
with this survival tendency? And where did they get it from?
> >Ridiculous. You're just snatching *purpose* out of the air again: you
> >now have to explain why organisms would start surviving for no reason.
> 'Random' (by which I mean, more or less, chaotic) chance, to
> start, but the ones that DID, would survive to reproduce.
> No teleology there.
Really? Answer my question above -- where did we get this
survival bent? It just came about randomly? So there were creatures
without it first? And how the hell did they survive? Absurd. Or there
were no creatures without it? So it DIDN'T come about randomly? How then
did it come about? God? Nice dodge of teleology -- it just hit you in
the forehead.
> I'm thinking of giving up, guys. This one's unconvinceable
> (granted, unconvinceable in an entirely different way than Michael
> Courtney, Bill Conner, and Booby, but still...).
Yep. Just as I expected. You'd like to brush me off as another
preacher. That's a lot easier than justifying your beliefs, isn't it?
Matt Colvin
KRESSJA
>Now John Kress goes in full-bore with assertions like:
>
>In article 20JAN199...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu, kre...@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>>Nihilism is not the ansence of local purposes; nihilism is the awareness
>>of the falseness and arbitrariness of all purposes. One cannot live by
>>a lie, once one has grasped it as a lie. I do not wish to see the
>>human race reduced to something whose purpose is "getting on," i.e.
>>simple continuation.
>John is committing a variation of what Flew calls the "no true
>Scotsman" argument, and others here have called the "no real Christian"
>argument: a "local purpose" is not a real Purpose, and Purpose is in
>fact defined in such a way that only a non-naturalist explanation can
>qualify as a true Purpose. This is a thoroughly pernicious variation of
>the religious notion that all virtue flows from god and people cannot
>be virtuous in and of themselves.
Actually, John is committing the fallacy of equivocation, but not
intentionally so. I do not mean to say that local purposes aren't "real;"
I meant, in fact, to say the opposite in my first sentence, and admit that
they are very much to the point. I think in fact that it is because such
local thing are so extremely meaningful that we are troubled about and
ask about the meaning of the whole.
Nihilism denies meaning to the whole.
>As homo sapiens evolved and began to investigate and reason about the
>world, there was much which was inexplicable. One function of religion
>was to institutionalise this sense of the unknown, and to create the
>myth that the core meaning of the world was a mystery which could be
>approached only through the mediation of the religious institutions.
>Thus arose the notion that true meaning was necessarily mysterious and
>transcended "mere" physical explanation.
>The "lie" was (and is) this myth. The purposes and goals of people
>which were systematically devalued by this myth are not lies, and they
>never were. A practical, humanistic, materialist, naturalist purpose of
>working for the well-being and happiness of one's family, friends,
>community, and so forth is not a "lie" simply because John Kress believes
>it to be.
Such meanings are also not physicalist, and never were. Explain friendship
in physical terms.
-Kressja
"ever eager to enlighten and clarify"
______________________________________________________________________________
| | |
| John Kress | "God is a gross answer, an indelicacy against us thinkers-- |
| | at bottom merely a gross prohibition for us: you shall not |
| | think!" |
| | -Nietzsche, Ecce Homo |
|______________|_______________________________________________________________|
KRESSJA
>
>John: you're all tied up in a giant use/mention mess.
>
>Take our favourite fountain. Superficial sense data is of an object - something
>that has physical existence (I can stick my hand into the water and feel it)
>and extent. Closer examination reveals that the perceived object is composed
>of drops of water, is not solid, etc. etc.
>
>I decide to call this "thing" a fountain. (Actually, I'm tasught that
>that's what other English-speakers call it.) There is now in my brain
>a pattern which associates the word "fountain" with various other
>elements: the memory of observed fountains, (probably) processed in
>various ways to assist in rapid recognition; my knowledge concerning
>fountains (water jets, droplets, relationships to geysers, etc.).
>
>When asked what the meaning of the word "fountain" is, we naturally
>refer to the physical phenemenon which we label as such. This is not
>due to some "privileged" status of physical meaning: it is a function of
>our language and the practical way in which we employ it.When asked
>the meaning of "42", we refer to the concept and (usually) leave implicit
>the relationship between the concept and the physical reality
>of, say, 42 fountains.
I disagree. This seems to me an epistemological falsification of events:
one *does not* encounter sense data; it is precisely "sense data" that do
not exist! One encounters a fountain, with respect to which one possible
response is to abstract from the meaningfulness thereof, and treat it as
a mere brute object of the senses--even here, there are no mere "sense
data"; even here, the object still is meaningful exactly as such an
abstract outcome of a highly specialized project.
My problems is that you want to say that the highly specialized and abstract
way of looking at it, it the *right* way to do so (because that's all it
is in itself) whereas everything else, such as its meaningfulness, is added
on by human doing. There are no "fountains" strictly speaking; there are
only "abstractions" of matter in motion in certain patterns. But this is
a lie! There is nowhere in human experience to be encountered "matter," or
"motion;" rather, we encounter things, which first show themselves to us
as material, or in motion. And these things are more to us than
physicalist abstractions; you cannot but live in a world of meaningful things,
yet you insist that they are just figments produced by you brain? Strange.
>> Why should it be that physical extantness is the superlative standard of
>> being whereby everything else is to be measured?
>But it isn't. You seem to be saying that a naturalist goes around
>ranking everything, and that physical entities outrank conceptual
>ones. But a conceptual entity DOES have a physical reality: the
>reality of the pattern in my brain. It's as if you suggested that
>a naturalist would rank a grain of sand above a planet, since a
>planet is "merely" a very complex arrangements of grains of sand and
>similar stuff.
You've just demonstrated my point; you've reduced conceptual entities to
physical ones, presumably to demonstrate that they have as much value as
(other) physical entities. In all cases, physical extantness is taken to
be the criterion for being. Thus, all being are to regarded only in the
light of their physical components; the rest is just window dressing
(or useful abstractions).
>OK, this imputation to naturalism is clearly (IMHO) wrong-headed, but
>let's explore why it arose. I think that there are a couple of elements
>here, which I'll just hint at for now. First, mutual communication
>about sense-data is more reliable than communication about conceptual
>entities. It can be directly checked, and relies less on cultural or
>personal assumptions, prejudices, etc. Secondly, it is probable that
>language first evolved as a way of communicating about physical
>elements of the environment, and that this has been preserved in some
>way in our structures of thought and language. Paradoxically, naturalism
>affords us the opportunity to examine the nature of such phenomena -
>maybe this is why you seem to view it as a Pandora's box....
I deny sense data exist at all, but as for your geneaology, I think that
it is probably true that man first takes his bearings from the things
with which he concerns himself in the world, and hence is slanted in
a physical orientation. It isn't an historical accident that man
thinks in this way, but that says nothing about its truth.
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
# OH-HO!! So, you maintain that organisms just came about complete
#with this survival tendency? And where did they get it from?
Why not educate yourself? Pop over to talk.origins and grab a copy of
the abiogenesis and evolution FAQ's. Deaddog's reported some really
interesting new work which fills in some of the replicator questions.
And watch it with the teleological assumptions, or you'll get eaten
alive....
[cross-posted to talk.origins - it's finally time for Matthew to
meet the team.]
Geoff
--
Geoff Arnold, PC-NFS architect, Sun Select. (geoff....@East.Sun.COM)
## It seems to me that this yearning for "real significance" is ##
## nothing more than the corpse of Nietzsche's dead god draped over ##
## your shoulders and weighing you down. (Hans Dykstra on a.a) ##
George Heintzelman
>In article <2hsff0$2...@senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> geo...@ATHENA.MIT.EDU
>(George Heintzelman) writes:
>
>> > You make an absurd assumption: that organisms started off as two
>> >distinct groups -- ones with a survival bent and ones without it.
>> Not necessarily. We observe that organisms exist with survival
>> bent. We hypothesize that if organisms existed without one, they would
>> be selected against (seeing no a priori reason they could not exist),
>> hence explaining our failure to observe them.
>
> OH-HO!! So, you maintain that organisms just came about complete
>with this survival tendency? And where did they get it from?
>> >Ridiculous. You're just snatching *purpose* out of the air again: you
>> >now have to explain why organisms would start surviving for no reason.
>> 'Random' (by which I mean, more or less, chaotic) chance, to
>> start, but the ones that DID, would survive to reproduce.
>> No teleology there.
>
> Really? Answer my question above -- where did we get this
>survival bent? It just came about randomly? So there were creatures
>without it first? And how the hell did they survive? Absurd.
First of all, this is a false dichotomy, one which I
admittedly am somewhat responsible for propagating. Let's think about
evolutionary theory for a moment (which you repeatedly show your
ignorance of, even to a relative layman like me).
In the primordial soup, there are lots of molecules and chains
formed, through, yes, random chance (chaotic, that is, behaving
ultimately in a determinisitc fashion. I won't repeat this caveat
again...). Some of these chains have the ability, because of the way
chemistry and physics works, to replicate. They tend to make more of
themselves. They stick around, while the other chains, that couldn't
do this, don't.
That's the beginning. Through random chance, there emerge, on
occasion, things that are BETTER at making more of themselves. They
tend to survive and reproduce better than the ones they're competing
with. So we go up into simple single-celled and multicellular
organisms, which are BETTER at reproducing themselves and propagating
their lines and competing for scarce resources than others. Yay.
So these organisms evolved with a 'drive' to reproduce built
right in, because they had to reproduce from the very start in order
to continue, and if they lost it somehow, the line died out. In the
simple one-celled case, I don't think there is anything thinking about
it, that has any perception of it, it just does it because that's the
way it works. The amoeba splits when it gets fed enough, because
that's how it has evolved to self-propagate.
Multicellular organisms are in this regard no different. They
have evolved from these smaller cells, and they too, must reproduce
and survive or their line becomes extinct. So they develop an aversion
to self-destructive behaviors -- those organisms that DIDN'T have
aversions to particular behaviors, either genetically or (when you
start talking about more 'socialized' animals) memetically, tend to
die without reproducing. We see it as a drive to survive.
Was that clear enough? Your misunderstanding seems to be in
emphasizing the either-or, one-step dicotomy that you want to imbue it
with. It doesn't all happen at once, and its not 'I MUST MUST MUST
survive' versus 'Oh, a Mack truck. Gee, whippee... <thud>'. Gradations
and development are what evolution is all about.
>Or there
>were no creatures without it? So it DIDN'T come about randomly? How then
>did it come about? God? Nice dodge of teleology -- it just hit you in
>the forehead.
Try again. It DID come about randomly. I just thought you were
a bright enough person with enough understanding of evolution to
understand what I was saying without having to go through the
step-by-step outline that I just did.
Go read Dawkins. Really. From what I understand from people
who really know evolution, he's not perfect, but he's pretty damn good
at explaining to the layman.
>> I'm thinking of giving up, guys. This one's unconvinceable
>> (granted, unconvinceable in an entirely different way than Michael
>> Courtney, Bill Conner, and Booby, but still...).
>
> Yep. Just as I expected. You'd like to brush me off as another
>preacher. That's a lot easier than justifying your beliefs, isn't it?
Well, when things have been repeatedly explained to you and
you persistently don't get it, one starts to suspect that there may be
an element of wilful misunderstanding here.
Oh well, so I'm foolish enough to respond anyway.
George Heintzelman
geo...@mit.edu
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
#Such meanings are also not physicalist, and never were.
I disagree vehemently. See below.
#Explain friendship in physical terms.
Hmmm................. where would you like me to begin?! Do you insist
on restricting the discussion to humans, or can we consider analogous
mechanisms in other primates? Or do you want me to first come up with a
physicalist model for consciousness and then fit friendship into that?
How long do I have? How long do YOU have?! ;-)
In one sense, we've already covered this here in the various references
to the evolution of and survival value of societies. Within the societal
groupings, there are many opportunities for short- and longer-term
partnerships. Effective communication between partners naturally enhances
the efficiency of these partnerships, and so it is advantageous to
develop social frameworks which give individuals the opportunity to get
to know each other. (Note: shorthand, no teleological implications!)
All of this is easily explicable in physicalist (evolutionary,
gene/meme-based) terms. The patterns of behaviour, as well as our
introspective view of these patterns within ourselves, are simply
patterns of matter - genetic, neurological, and so forth. Where's the
problem? Consciousness, behaviours, emotions, etc. are simply
epiphenomena of the brain which is constructed according to the genetic
blueprint and programmed by memetic impressions and experience. Where's
the need for any "non-physicalist" elements in the description?
[Please consider my .sig quote from Hans Dykstra carefully in
formulating your response.]
KRESSJA
> Depending on what you mean by fountain, I think I disagree with this.
>Consider that if you remove the water from a waterfall, you don't have a
>waterfall- you have a cliff.
No, you have a certain volume of water, which in no way affects the
waterfall, so long as other waters continue to run through it. To
destroy the waterfall, it would be necessary to re-route the stream
that feeds it. And such is possible; you *can* destroy waterfalls.
I state clearly that things can have physical components and *nonetheless*
not be physical things. (In fact, this seems to me to be the case with
just about everything; everything of which we know has some connection
to body.)
My arguement is that body or relation to body is not the defining
attribute of all being. It is *not* incorrect to speak of the water
and the cliff as making up the waterfall (they jointly constitute
the material cause, in Aristotle's sense of it); it is however, not
true to say that in explicating the waterfall thusly, we have grasped
it in its being in an exhaustive way. We have addressed it correctly,
but there remains more to be said; we have not, in fact, grasped it
essentially.
What I resist is the attempt to so reduce it. Some might say that
"there are only the water and the cliff, and no more." You say, "there
is the water and the cliff, and the very real, physically based
abstraction of the pattern of the water and cliff." This is, in my
view, a variant of the same thing; in each case, the waterfall is
apprehended according to material components, and the nature of it
that appears immaterial is consigned to a magical process of brain
abstraction, of which there is no adequate account, but only the
faith that such an account will be forthcoming.
>>> You seem to have accepted the following argument, critiqued in _The_Mind's
>>>_I_:
>>> "Some facts are not about the properties, circumstances, and relations of
>>>physical objects.
>>> Therefore some facts are about the properties, circumstances, and relations
>>>of nonphysical objects."
>>
>>The error in the above argument as I see it is that physical objects,
>>and physical extantness, are taken to be definitive with respect to
>>being, such that the other things are assumed, since they are, to be
>>somekind of non-physical-but-nevertheless-extant objects. The logic
>>goes:
>>
>>1. These things are.
>>2. To be is to be an extant object.
>>3. They are not physically extant objects.
>>4. Therefore, they must be non-physical, yet extant objects.
>>
>>The difference is how the faulty reasoning is attacked. We seem to agree
>>on premise one, that these things are (or do you agree?). The point at
>>which we part ways is at premise two. As I understand it, Ray, you and
>>Geoff accept premise two, whereas I do not. You wish to deny that
>>there are non-physical, extant objects
> Yes; I think the very term 'object' is ill-used here. Is the triangle I
>drew above an 'object'? Is a hole an object? (Consider that, in
>semiconductor physics, it is often (hell, nearly always) the case that
>one does not just speak of electrons moving- one speaks of 'holes' moving
>in the opposite direction as well. "...the valence band hole is actually an
>entity on an equal footing with the conduction band electron." (_Semicond.
>Fundamentals_, Robert Pierret, p. 26).)
> Something can be real and have a physical effect even if it is not physical,
>but that does not mean that it is an 'object'.
By 'extant object' I mean a unity which is in some way present to
apprehension in an immediate fashion. A non-physical extant object would
be the soul. I assert that you do not accept the existence of such
objects, as I do not. Right?
>>You speak of the mind's being damaged whenever the brain is, and take this
>>as evidence that the mind is an abstraction from the brain; this is
>>good evidence that the mind is not something which *is* without the
>>brain, but it provides no _prima facie_ justification for treating the
>>mind solely in terms of the brain. *That* requires the ontological
>>presupposition of the primacy of physical extantness.
> I don't treat the Mona Lisa as a collection of dried pigmented fluids on
>a cloth backing, either. But it is not incorrect to describe it as such.
>(Indeed, I find great joy in knowing that such a beautiful thing can be
>given form in such "mundane" things. (But if they can do so, can they be
>truly understood as 'mundane'? :-> ))
No it is not incorrect to do so; but it is only partially true, insofar
as more remains to be said, and indeed, what is essential remains to
be said.
>[river and "Farmer's Axe" deleted]
>>The truth of the river or the axe is not to be found in an examination,
>>however careful, of the water or the wood.
>
> But it is not incorrect to describe them as such. You are confusing the
>possibility of multiple descriptions with the necessity of conflicting
>descriptions. They can serve different purposes and still all be true.
I admit that it is not incorrect to do so. I agree wholeheartedly.
I also agree that multiple descriptions can all present the truth
about things. In fact, what you say here sounds very reasonable to
me.
Wherein, then, lies our disagreement?
What I resist: I resist the attempt to instantiate the physicalist reduction
in knowing (which is correct) as the whole truth of the matter; I resist
further the attempt to admit that the physicalist presentation of a
thing is lacking, but to supplement it by still other physicalist
reductions, usually involving the brain.
I suspect that the latter is what you do; if that's not so, please tell me,
because otherwise I can't see that we would disagree on this point. (An
example of this is your recurrent war against the 'mind' in favor of the
brain, which seems overhasty to me; I think that "there do not exist
non-physical extant objects" does not necessarily imply "there exist only
physical extant objects".)
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
#it is probably true that man first takes his bearings from the things
#with which he concerns himself in the world, and hence is slanted in
#a physical orientation. It isn't an historical accident that man
#thinks in this way, but that says nothing about its truth.
"What is truth?" (gee, that has a familiar ring to it).
Remember Bob Beauchaine's nice .sig about how nice it is to be the possessor
of a large brain? This large brain is all that you and I have to work
with on this stuff, and our study of this and other brains has never
revealed any way of getting stuff into it except for our senses and
chemicals in our bloodstream. (Obviously "stuff" gets into it when it's
constructed, but that's a matter of genetics and embryology.)
Two questions, John?
(1) Does the "no sense data" mysticism (for such it clearly is) apply to
cockcroaches as well as humans?
(2) If a visual stimulus causes a clear and repeatable pattern of
activity in a brain, as measured by a PET scan or similar,
what is it that you assert is taking place to the physical
structures that make up the brain?
KRESSJA
understanding evolutionary theory, committing the "no true Scotsman"
fallacy, attacking science, advocating ignorance, and carrying the
weighty corpse of God on my shoulders. And this is HOW MANY days old?
Three? *sigh*
At any rate, I want to give a summative answer to everyone, as best I can;
let me say that I've given up reading the part of this thread involving
Mr. Colvin, because we're not after the same thing, and I don't have
so much time. He's arguing something different than I am, anyway.
A collection of answers to points variously raised by Ray Ingles,
Niall McAuley and Hans M Dykstra:
Teleology: as a process, I am not prepared to endorse or deny teleology
just yet. My position is that final causes are not the province of science,
and should have no place in good science; my position is also that
science is *not* coextensive with human knowing, and that "outside the
province of science" *does not* mean not worth knowing/irrational/impossible
to ever know.
Ultimate meaning: What is the purpose of life? I don't know. I don't even
know if this is a good question; I see no way in which it might be
answered or even addressed. Still, the fact of local, temporal meaning
does give rise to a tendency to ask such questions; perhaps a reflection
on the whole will provide a basis upon which to address such questions.
To attack science is to advocate ignorance: this is true only if science
is coextensive with knowledge, which I deny. Rather, "scientism," the
belief in the efficacy of *only* science as a reliable and useful way
of knowing, is itself (I argue) a kind of systematic blindness, and hence
a kind of ignorance. This is exactly what I wish to attack, since I
view scientism and naturalism as equivalent. I oppose ignorance, even
when it takes the form of the idolitry of scientific knowledge.
Is naturalism reductive? If naturalism has any meaning, then it is a
form of reductivism. If "nature" is simply another name for
"everything," then the concept of nature is without specific content,
and hence naturalism has no meaning. On the other hand, if (as I take it)
naturalism refers to a certain region of being, nature, which it wishes
to make definitive for the interpretation of the whole, then it is
reductive (no minds, only brains, unless mind by considered as abstract
manifestation of the brain's functioning, etc.)
Is the naturalistic reduction violent? I say that it is, insofar as it
cuts off beings from their proper ontological regions by trying to
define them in terms of their physical objectivness. This is what
naturalism maintains *ought* to be done.
Who is a naturalist? There have been some equivocations here; I do not
consider anyone who says that the naturalistic reduction is useful, but
is not the only way to deal with things to be a naturalist. Of course
it's useful; it's what science is all about. Such determinations are
correct ways of categorizing things; but they are incomplete, and hence
not yet true. "Naturalism" is the view that all things may be addressed
and understood *only* and *completely* by such a reduction. No route
to addressing the mind or the soul which ignores brain physiology is
to be accepted as accurate knowing.
What about abstractions/concepts? The argument is often made that I am
referring not to things, but to "ideas," "abstractions," or "concepts,"
in our brains (but not minds?); I insist that someone who thinks of
himself as a naturalist cease talking about such things, unless he can
provide a fully naturalistic account of them. I do not accept hope of
advances in brain physiology as sufficient; hope is a fine thing, but
its also begging the question to assure me that "there will soon be"
a naturalistic account of such things. Until then, you must convince
me that things such as fountains and waterfalls should be thought of
as concepts. I do not, after all, live in the concept of Nashville;
I live in the *city* of Nashville.
Geoff and his kleptomaniacal child: Geoff posed the question of why
ethics should not be taught/explained by reference to social behavior;
why should he tell his child not to steal? Because such prohibitions
have been agreed on by society, and are biologically grounded. He seemed
to want to simultaneouly accept the relativity of mores in society and
postulate some form of biological standard? I am confused, Geoff, at
what exactly you were getting at. Let me pose some questions: what, if
anything, about Nazi genocide is "biologically" wrong? Almost all human
societies have relegate women to a subordinate position--were they
wrong to do so? Why or why not, if there was broad consensus? Would we
be justified in re-instituting discriminatory strictures if a majority
felt it a good idea? Have I missed your point? Was I negligent in doing
so, or did my memes make me do it? Is your response to this pre-programmed?
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu
>
> Of course I don't refuse to eat before I figure out why I'm
>hungry. We can't go through life wasting time with the philosophy of
>every action! You obtuse stinker -- I'm not suggesting that naturalists
>ought to commit suicide. I'm asking them to _explain_why_they_don't_.
>They have a reason -- that life is valuable. But I don't see where they
>derive that reason from.
>
>Matt Colvin
>
You are asking why people do not want to commit suicide?
(Obtuse stinker?! :) Matt, you've got style!)
It's hard to believe how kind memebers of this group are to you!
They really say that "life is valuable!" That just goes to show
how many people are willing to play along with you. It really amazes
me how much compassion some members of a.a. really have!
As you say: "We can't go through life wasting time with the philosophy of
every action!" Now what that means is that most people are far to busy
_living_, that is, studying, skiing, making love, eating pizza, or what have
you, to deal with such dry philosophy as you want to foist off onto them here.
So when people say that life is valuable, they mean generally speaking that
living has value to them,and, of course, that is where value comes from, from
people. Things have value because people value them.
So the short and proper answer to the question as to why a person does not
commit suicide is "Because I do not want to!"
If you are confused by that answer, you really should try to get out more and
get away from the computer keyboard!
sincerely,
arn
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu
Geoff Arnold @ Sun BOS - R.H. coast near the top
#understanding evolutionary theory, committing the "no true Scotsman"
#fallacy, attacking science, advocating ignorance, and carrying the
#weighty corpse of God on my shoulders. And this is HOW MANY days old?
#Three? *sigh*
It's a humdinger of a thread, isn't it? nyone who thinks that atheism
is a monolithic ideology or believe system should be quickly disabusing
themselves of that notion.
Here's what I see as the kernel of the matter. As an atheist, I fully
understand how and why a theist reaches outside the material, natural
universe for causes, purposes, reasons, and ultimate truth. A deity
which didn't provide these things would scarcely pass muster these days.
(Eat your heart out, Odin!).
As a materialist, naturalist atheist I find the universe as
comprehensible and consistent as I can reasonably expect it to be. The
conceptual and physical tools which we employ to make sense of the
universe as we experience it seem to work. The critical breakthrough
seems to me to have been the replacement of codified, dogmatic
knowledge by provisional, tentative, incremental, scientific knowledge.
Over the long term, science adapts and assimilates what works. Here is
the first sense in which I suggest that naturalism is correct: that any
method of looking at the world that works will inevitably be
assimilated into our scientific world-view, enriching that world-view
without in any way diminishing that which is incorporated.
It seems that the principle area of disagreement in this thread concerns
the relationship between the individual and the external world. My
(materialist) position is that my mind is an epiphenomenon of my
physical brain ("minds are what brains do"), and that every aspect of my
perceiving, reasoning, remembering, imagining, and so forth is solely
the product of neurological and chemical processes within my brain. My
justification for this position is twofold. First, I am unaware of any
alternative model which has better explanatory power and which would be
testable in any way. Second, there is an inductive argument that more
complex brains have evolved from simpler brains without any obviously
fundamental changes which are not explicable in evolutionary terms. I am
naturally sceptical of any species-chauvinistic thinking: I see no
evidence that we are any more than one more life-form on one more small
planet in one more galaxy...
Now taking this viewpoint in now way commits me to a single,
reductionist way of thinking about the world. In particular, when John
writes:
#... My position is that final causes are not the province of science,
#and should have no place in good science; my position is also that
#science is *not* coextensive with human knowing, and that "outside the
#province of science" *does not* mean not worth knowing/irrational/impossible
#to ever know.
and
#... "Naturalism" is the view that all things may be addressed
#and understood *only* and *completely* by such a reduction. No route
#to addressing the mind or the soul which ignores brain physiology is
#to be accepted as accurate knowing.
he is either erecting a strawman or misunderstanding what naturalism
really is. Naturalism does not claim that things that are outside the
province of science are not worth knowing, or that science is
coextensive with human knowing. What it *does* claim is that these
things - ideas, beliefs, art, emotion, truth, beauty, and so forth - are
natural products of a natural world, particularly the natural grey lumps
which sit inside out skulls - and that there is no need to invoke
supernatural causes and explanations of these things.
I'm not sure where this absolutist "Only and completely" and "accurate
knowing" come from. Since science is in the business of incremental,
provisional, and tentative "knowing", the absoluteness is particularly
inappropriate. Furthermore the imputation that naturalism would commit
one to total reductionism for all worthwhile knowledge is absurd: it
would reduce the number of true naturalists to a handful of (probably
deranged) individuals. This should have been a clue that this
characterisation of naturalism was probably misplaced...
#Is naturalism reductive? If naturalism has any meaning, then it is a
#form of reductivism. If "nature" is simply another name for
#"everything," then the concept of nature is without specific content,
#and hence naturalism has no meaning. On the other hand, if (as I take it)
#naturalism refers to a certain region of being, nature, which it wishes
#to make definitive for the interpretation of the whole, then it is
#reductive (no minds, only brains, unless mind by considered as abstract
#manifestation of the brain's functioning, etc.)
Naturalism is in principle reductive, in this way: it argues that all
elements of the universe are in principle (if not in practice)
explicable in terms of the components of the universe. If it were not
for various supernaturalist world-views, the term "naturalism" would
indeed be empty and irelevant. An analogy: if it were not for the
existence of theists, we would not need the word or concept "atheism",
but in a world in which people regularly ascribe purpose and majesty to
their imaginary friends, we find it useful to be able to characterise the
alternative viewpoint.
#Is the naturalistic reduction violent? I say that it is, insofar as it
#cuts off beings from their proper ontological regions by trying to
#define them in terms of their physical objectivness. This is what
#naturalism maintains *ought* to be done.
As long as "proper ontological regions" (wozzat?!) isn't meant to refer
to the supernatural, this is false. Naturalism doesn't say anything
*ought*; it says things *are*. From whence do you derive this "ought"
from an "is"? ;-)
#What about abstractions/concepts? The argument is often made that I am
#referring not to things, but to "ideas," "abstractions," or "concepts,"
#in our brains (but not minds?); I insist that someone who thinks of
#himself as a naturalist cease talking about such things, unless he can
#provide a fully naturalistic account of them.
You can insist all you want, but I see no reason to do what you suggest.
There's that absolutist streak, John ("fully naturalistic"). I suppose
that you would equally prohibit geneticists, geologists, and so forth
from using various models at different levels in their hierarchy of
understanding until they can fill in every step from quark to Shakespeare?
I think not....
[I'll leave the klepto kid to another posting. It's not directly related
to this.]
James J. Lippard
>Quoth pto...@next16pg2.wam.umd.edu (Matthew Alexander Colvin) (in <2hufh1$c...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>):
># OH-HO!! So, you maintain that organisms just came about complete
>#with this survival tendency? And where did they get it from?
>
>Why not educate yourself? Pop over to talk.origins and grab a copy of
>the abiogenesis and evolution FAQ's. Deaddog's reported some really
>interesting new work which fills in some of the replicator questions.
Hey, I wanna know about the subject. Who claims there's something
mysterious about naturalistic epistemology? (Probably not an
epistemologist, since they misspelled "epistemology.")
Jim Lippard Lip...@CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU
Dept. of Philosophy Lip...@ARIZVMS.BITNET
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu
>
>It seems that the principle area of disagreement in this thread concerns
>the relationship between the individual and the external world. My
>(materialist) position is that my mind is an epiphenomenon of my
>physical brain ("minds are what brains do"), and that every aspect of my
>perceiving, reasoning, remembering, imagining, and so forth is solely
>the product of neurological and chemical processes within my brain. My
>justification for this position is twofold. First, I am unaware of any
>alternative model which has better explanatory power and which would be
>testable in any way. Second, there is an inductive argument that more
>complex brains have evolved from simpler brains without any obviously
>fundamental changes which are not explicable in evolutionary terms. I am
>naturally sceptical of any species-chauvinistic thinking: I see no
>evidence that we are any more than one more life-form on one more small
>planet in one more galaxy...
>
It is only with the very greatest trepidation that I jump into the middle of
this thread, with even greater anxiety because I have not read all of the
postings. But here goes nothing anyway....
The one thing that I find impossibly difficult in wrestling with a naturalist
view of the world is, not necessarily to figure out how in detail nature
creates consciousness, but rather to imagine how an explanation of _subjective_
experience can be accounted for in objective terms.
You see what I am getting at Geoff? There is one area and one area only where
we know "das Ding an sich" for sure, that is our own subjectivity. But how can
one account for that subjectivity in material terms? You see other
subjectivities only from the outside. You an create Eliza software, or more
sophisticated programs, you can manage perhaps to fool people in a Turing test
with an AI, but could you ever be sure that you had really created a
subjectivity like your own?
It seems to me that the very tools, the very language that we have developed
for dealing with the physical world are quite unsuitable for dealing with the
issue of subjectivity. It is after all _subjectivity_ that _creates_ the world
of objective experience. (No - I do not mean literally that you create your own
reality! I mean that subjectivity has invented the notion of objectivity!)
Do you all (John, I'm talking to you too!) see what I am getting at here?
sincerely,
arn
les...@tigger.stcloud.msus.edu