Einstein in FAQ
Torkel Franzen
The final comment isn't accurate:
>[Furthermore, in this case Einstein was wrong to condemn quantum theory.
>If anything, the quote shows how even a great scientist like Einstein can
>be wrong when he ignores science in favour of his own religious views.]
Einstein didn't "condemn" quantum theory: he thought it was incomplete.
Also, the remark about Einstein ignoring science in favor of his own
religious views in his comment about God not playing dice is ridiculous.
What science did Einstein ignore, and in favor of which religious views?
Bob Daniel
Thanks..
William B. Knight
To the Ground
> The final comment isn't accurate:
> >[Furthermore, in this case Einstein was wrong to condemn quantum theory.
> >If anything, the quote shows how even a great scientist like Einstein can
> >be wrong when he ignores science in favour of his own religious views.]
>
> Einstein didn't "condemn" quantum theory: he thought it was incomplete.
He thought the 'random' things weren't random; that 'God does not play dice'.
He believed that some additional factors would be discovered which would
explain away the randomness. This is known as the hidden variable hypothesis,
and is wrong. So Einstein was wrong.
> Also, the remark about Einstein ignoring science in favor of his own
> religious views in his comment about God not playing dice is ridiculous.
> What science did Einstein ignore, and in favor of which religious views?
His comment about God not playing dice indicated that he refused to believe
in the randomness of quantum effects because it did not fit his religious
viewpoint. He preferred to believe in some hidden variable, in spite of
the fact that there was no evidence of any such thing. He was therefore
ignoring science (not scientific facts, but science in general and the
scientific method) in favour of his own religious views. There was no
scientific evidence to support his beliefs about quantum theory, but
he chose to believe them anyway.
Perhaps "condemn" is too strong a word, though. Suggested alternatives?
"dismiss"? "disbelieve"?
mathew
--
Another would-be Mac owner put off by Apple's monopolistic practices.
Torkel Franzen
writes:
>So Einstein was wrong.
I didn't say anything about Einstein not being wrong. The current scientific
standing of Einstein's views on quantum theory is not at issue. I rejected
your claim that Einstein "condemned" quantum theory.
>His comment about God not playing dice indicated that he refused to believe
>in the randomness of quantum effects because it did not fit his religious
>viewpoint.
Now which religious viewpoint was that? Really, this comment is every
bit as silly and unfounded as the claim that such quotations show that
Einstein believed in the Christian God. I see no point in countering the
claims of atheist-bashers with equally absurd counter-claims. It is
painfully obvious that your remarks about Einstein's "ignoring the
scientific method" and "dismissing" quantum theory are based on no
knowledge whatsoever of Einstein's scientific work but are an instance of
just the kind of mechanical and uninformed response that is so often condemned
in this group when theists resort to it.
Dave Davis
mat...@mantis.co.uk writes, in reply to Torkel Franzen's question,
>His comment about God not playing dice indicated that he refused to believe
>in the randomness of quantum effects because it did not fit his religious
>viewpoint. He preferred to believe in some hidden variable, in spite of
>the fact that there was no evidence of any such thing. He was therefore
>ignoring science (not scientific facts, but science in general and the
>scientific method) in favour of his own religious views.
This still doesn't explain what we are to think Einstein's religious
views to be. The poster seems to think that they are obvious from the
fact that E. used the word 'God' (or, perhaps, 'Herr Gott' :-) )
If so, this is mistaken. E.'s statements about God are fairly clear,
and non-conventional. His concept of 'God' was more like that of
Spinoza; to conventional ears, this can't be distinguished from the
terms 'universe' 'cosmos' or 'Nature'. Leaving this unclear is unfair
to folks who haven't read any of his writings on the subject (a good
collection is Ideas_and_Opinions). From my understanding of what I've
read, it would not be unfair to call E. an atheist. That is, I
understand him not to have affirmed the existence of 'the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob' (or any others).
If mathew@mantis has some point to make about deriving a criticism of
E. from a nexus of his science and his (putative) religion, he really
will have to use a citation, and tell the rest of us to what he refers
to as E.'s "own religious views."
Dave Davis
These are my opinions and activities alone.
da...@westford.ccur.com *or* {harvard,uunet,petsd}!masscomp!daved
Random QOTD:
Let the fire be your friend
And the sea rock you gently
Let the moon light your way
'Til the wind sets you free
Anon.
Bill Mayne
>He believed that some additional factors would be discovered which would
>explain away the randomness. This is known as the hidden variable hypothesis,
>and is wrong. So Einstein was wrong.
>
>in the randomness of quantum effects because it did not fit his religious
>viewpoint. He preferred to believe in some hidden variable, in spite of
>the fact that there was no evidence of any such thing. He was therefore
>ignoring science (not scientific facts, but science in general and the
>scientific method) in favour of his own religious views. There was no
>scientific evidence to support his beliefs about quantum theory, but
>he chose to believe them anyway.
Einstein's belief in physical determinism wasn't just a religious
view, in spite of the quaint way he chose to express it. It had been
the accepted view in physical sciences at least since Newton and
probably long before that. It still guides scientific thinking
in most areas, even when an underlying non-determinism at the
partical level is admitted it is usually ignored.
Also keep in mind that Einstein died in 1955 and did most of his
scientific work and commenting on quantum theory much earlier,
when the theory was new and the modern evidence against hidden
variables wasn't so strong. The search for hidden variables to
explain apparent randomness was consistent with scientific methods.
When we encounter a phenomenon which seems to defy existing theory
we first try to reconcile it with established theory before
accepting the necessity of a new theory.
Einstein was apparently wrong about hidden variables determinism,
but taken in the context of his time and considering how revolutionary
quantum theory was this was a reasonable position. He was not so
dogmatically religious or stubbornly unscientific as you judge him
to have been. He did not believe in a personal god and his comment
about God playing dice was just a way of expressing his belief in
order in the universe. A belief in some kind of comprehensible
order in the universe is still a hallmark of science.
Bill Mayne
Graham Matthews
>Einstein was apparently wrong about hidden variables determinism,
>but taken in the context of his time and considering how revolutionary
>quantum theory was this was a reasonable position. He was not so
>dogmatically religious or stubbornly unscientific as you judge him
>to have been. He did not believe in a personal god and his comment
>about God playing dice was just a way of expressing his belief in
>order in the universe. A belief in some kind of comprehensible
>order in the universe is still a hallmark of science.
This is one thing I always have trouble with in scientific thinking and
especially when playing quantum mechanics, namely how can apparent
determinism at the macro level arise from non-determinism at the
micro level? I know all the theory about stastical measures (ie: we know
that X % of the Y's will do so-and-so, but we do not know which individual
y in Y will be in that X%), but have never really found it all that
convincing for some reason.
Has anyone got a really good example of determinism arising at the
macro level from non-determinism at the micro level? Can someone
answer the question that if particles obey the laws of quantum
mechanics (which allows acausal events), and I am a collection of
particles, how is it then that the collection of particles (namely me)
acts causally, and yet my components (the particles) do not?
Cheers
graham
--
Graham Matthews Freedom is the freedom to say that 2+2=4.
Pure Math, Uni.Sydney, Oz If that is granted all else follows.
gra...@maths.su.oz.au
To the Ground
> mat...@mantis.co.uk writes, in reply to Torkel Franzen's question,
> >His comment about God not playing dice indicated that he refused to believe
> >in the randomness of quantum effects because it did not fit his religious
> >viewpoint.
> This still doesn't explain what we are to think Einstein's religious
> views to be. The poster seems to think that they are obvious from the
> fact that E. used the word 'God' (or, perhaps, 'Herr Gott' :-) )
No, I think they're obvious from the FAQ file itself, which says:
A better quote showing what Einstein thought about God is the following:
"I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of
what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of
human beings."
> If so, this is mistaken. E.'s statements about God are fairly clear,
> and non-conventional. His concept of 'God' was more like that of
> Spinoza; to conventional ears, this can't be distinguished from the
> terms 'universe' 'cosmos' or 'Nature'. [...]
Spot the person who didn't read the FAQ file before responding to criticism
of it.
> If mathew@mantis has some point to make about deriving a criticism of
> E. from a nexus of his science and his (putative) religion, he really
> will have to use a citation, and tell the rest of us to what he refers
> to as E.'s "own religious views."
In one brief paragraph of an FAQ file? I mean, yes, it might be nice to
go into elaborate detail about exactly what Einstein believed and his exact
reasoning behind his statements about QM, but let's get this thing into
perspective... We're after an approximate one-paragraph summary of things.
If you can do better than what's in the FAQ file at the moment, please go
ahead.
mathew
--
Another would-be Mac owner put off by Apple's monopolistic practices.
"We don't care what other people think" -- response from a member of the
Apple Developer Council
To the Ground
> In article <wXykaB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (To the Ground)
> writes:
> >So Einstein was wrong.
>
> I didn't say anything about Einstein not being wrong. The current scientif
> your claim that Einstein "condemned" quantum theory.
And I responded to that in the bit of my message which you carefully deleted.
> >His comment about God not playing dice indicated that he refused to believ
> >in the randomness of quantum effects because it did not fit his religious
> >viewpoint.
>
> Now which religious viewpoint was that?
That he "believe[d] in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly
harmony of what exists" (his words). His religious viewpoint that God
was associated with order and harmony in the universe was the reason
why he couldn't accept the randomness inherent in QM.
If you have an alternative non-religious (scientific) explanation
as to why he rejected QM, perhaps from one of his biographies or his scientific
writings, then please do quote it for us.
> It is painfully obvious that your remarks about Einstein's "ignoring the
> scientific method" and "dismissing" quantum theory are based on no
> knowledge whatsoever of Einstein's scientific work
It is painfully obvious that you don't know who you're talking to.
mathew
[ Oh, if only I had a killfile... ]
Bob Daniel
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Newcomb's Paradox:
One day Omega, a superbeing from outer space, landed on the earth. Omega had
advanced equipment for studying human brains. He could predict with great
accuracy how any person would choose between two alternatives. Omega tested
many people by using two large boxes. Box A was transparent and always held
$1000. Box B was opaque. Either it was empty or it held 1,000,000.00!! Omega
told each subject: you have two choices. One is to take both boxes and keep
their contents. But if I expect you to do this, I have left B empty. You get
only $1000. You other choice is to take only box B. If I expected you to
do this, I have put a million dollars in B. You get it all...
Which option do YOU take???
(This is a litmus test for a big philosophical issue. Do you know what it
is?)
(I apologize if this was posted before)
Tony Lezard
> Has anyone got a really good example of determinism arising at the
> macro level from non-determinism at the micro level? Can someone
> answer the question that if particles obey the laws of quantum
> mechanics (which allows acausal events), and I am a collection of
> particles, how is it then that the collection of particles (namely me)
> acts causally, and yet my components (the particles) do not?
Erm, well basically, as the scale increases, things remain
nondeterministic but the probability that things do what they appear
to tends towards 1 very quickly. As an example, at the quantum scale,
photons have amplitudes to travel faster or slower than the measured
speed of light. But when the photon travels a longer distance the
amplitudes cancel out and you are left (almost certainly) with a
photon travelling at the speed of light. Probability amplitudes can
cancel out like this whereas real probabilities don't.
No-one really knows what reality actually "is" down at the quantum
level, indeed assigning some tangible meaning to the idea of things
like "complex probability amplitudes" may not even be possible.
Physicists just do the sums and get the experimentally observed
results and rarely think about what it all means. Pondering the
nature of reality is more a philosopher's job.
--
Tony Lezard IS to...@mantis.co.uk OR tony%mantis...@uknet.ac.uk
OR EVEN ar...@phx.cam.ac.uk if all else fails. Great! Kept my .sig down to two
lines!
Graham Matthews
>> Has anyone got a really good example of determinism arising at the
>> macro level from non-determinism at the micro level? Can someone
>> answer the question that if particles obey the laws of quantum
>> mechanics (which allows acausal events), and I am a collection of
>> particles, how is it then that the collection of particles (namely me)
>> acts causally, and yet my components (the particles) do not?
Tony Lezard replies:
>Erm, well basically, as the scale increases, things remain
>nondeterministic but the probability that things do what they appear
>to tends towards 1 very quickly.
Yes this was the only solution I could come up with myself, namely
that everything is in fact non-deterministic to some degree. I must
admist however that I find this answer somewhat lacking although I
cannot say why exactly.
>Physicists just do the sums and get the experimentally observed
>results and rarely think about what it all means. Pondering the
>nature of reality is more a philosopher's job.
I would contend that pondering the meaning of the results should
also be part of a physicists work!
Trent Tobler
> From bob Sat Oct 26 15:05 CDT 1991
> Content-Type: binary
> Content-Length: 849
>
> Newcomb's Paradox:
>
> One day Omega, a superbeing from outer space, landed on the earth. Omega had
> advanced equipment for studying human brains. He could predict with great
> accuracy how any person would choose between two alternatives. Omega tested
> many people by using two large boxes. Box A was transparent and always held
> $1000. Box B was opaque. Either it was empty or it held 1,000,000.00!! Omega
> told each subject: you have two choices. One is to take both boxes and keep
> their contents. But if I expect you to do this, I have left B empty. You get
> only $1000. You other choice is to take only box B. If I expected you to
> do this, I have put a million dollars in B. You get it all...
>
> Which option do YOU take???
Depending on how well I know the Omega can guess will determine which box
I choose. If the Omega can predict with 100% accuracy, I will always take
box B. If however, he is right only half the time, I will take both boxes.
Or, I will just foul up his prediction, get some radioactive material, and
take box A, or both A or B depending on if I detect any alpha radiation within
a certain time period. :)
>
> (This is a litmus test for a big philosophical issue. Do you know what it
> is?)
Yes, it is challenging free will (absolute sense). It questions the notion
that we can make a decision without any previous or external biases.
> (I apologize if this was posted before)
Yes, it has.
--
Trent Tobler - tto...@csulx.weber.edu
Torkel Franzen
writes:
>It is painfully obvious that you don't know who you're talking to.
From this particular exchange, I am sorry to say, you come across as
somebody who substitutes self-important bluster for argument. You inform
us that
>[Einstein's] religious viewpoint that God
>was associated with order and harmony in the universe was the reason
>why he couldn't accept the randomness inherent in QM.
You make no attempt whatever to substantiate this pronouncement. Apparently
you regard your fantasies, based on quoted snippets, as having a peculiar
authority.
Those who lack your implicit faith in these fantasies can
turn to the scientific biography of Einstein by Abraham Pais ("Subtle
is the Lord...") for a more informed account of Einstein's view of
quantum mechanics. I'll quote a few passages.
During the last twenty-five years of his life, Einstein
maintained that quantum mechanics was incomplete. He no
longer believed that quantum mechanics was wrong, but
did believe that the common view of the physics community
was wrong in ascribing to the postulates of quantum
mechanics a degree of finality that he held to be naive
and unjustified.
....
In contrast to the view that the concept of phenomenon
[as defined by Bohr] *irrevocably* includes the specifics
of the experimental conditions of observation, Einstein
held that one should seek for a deeper-lying theoretical
framework which permits the description of phenomena
independently of these conditions. After 1933 it was his
almost solitary position that quantum mechanics is
logically consistent but that it is an incomplete
manifestation of an underlying theory in which an
objectively real description is possible.
....
In the Spencer lecture, Einstein mentioned the success not
only of classical mechanics but also of the statistical
interpretation of quantum theory. "This conception is
logically unexceptionable and has led to important
successes." But, he added, "I still believe in the
possibility of giving a model of reality which shall
represent events themselves and not merely the probability
of their occurrence."
From this lecture as well as from discussions with him on
the foundations of quantum physics, I have gained the
following impression. Einstein tended to compare the
successes of classical mechanics with those of quantum
mechanics. In his view both were on a par, being
successful but incomplete. For more than a decade,
Einstein had pondered the single question of how to
extend the invariance under uniform translation to
general motions. His resulting theory, general relativity,
had led to only small deviations from Newton's theory.
(Instances where these deviations were large were
discussed only much later.) He was likewise prepared
for the survival of the practical successes of
quantum mechanics, with perhaps only small modifications.
He was also prepared to undertake his own search for
objective reality, fearless of how long it would take.
It is quite plausible that the very success of his
highest achievment, general relativity, was an added
spur to Einstein's apartness.
To the Ground
> Newcomb's Paradox:
>
> One day Omega, a superbeing from outer space, landed on the earth. Omega had
> advanced equipment for studying human brains. He could predict with great
> accuracy how any person would choose between two alternatives. Omega tested
> many people by using two large boxes. Box A was transparent and always held
> $1000. Box B was opaque. Either it was empty or it held 1,000,000.00!! Omega
> told each subject: you have two choices. One is to take both boxes and keep
> their contents. But if I expect you to do this, I have left B empty. You ge
> do this, I have put a million dollars in B. You get it all...
>
> Which option do YOU take???
As I see it, the choices are:
amount probability
1) $1000 p (Take boxes A and B)
$1,001,000 1-p
2) $0 1-p (Take box B only)
$1,000,000 p
Where p expresses the probability that Omega's prediction of my behaviour
is correct.
So we can give an expected gain for the two strategies:
1) Gain = 1000 * p + 1001000 * (1-p) = 1001000 - 1000000 * p
2) Gain = 1000000 * p
So for gain from strategy 1 to be better,
1001000 - 1000000 * p > 1000000 * p
=> 2000000 * p < 1001000
=> p < 1001000 / 2000000 or p < 1/2 approximately.
So if I know that Omega can "predict with great accuracy" (p >> 1/2), then
my best bet is to take box B only. If I don't know that, I'll go for box
A and B.
I must be missing something, as I can't see why this is a paradox.
> (This is a litmus test for a big philosophical issue. Do you know what it
> is?)
I have a horrible feeling I'm going to find out.
mathew
Crunchy Frog
>r...@genco.bungi.com (Bob Daniel) writes:
>> Newcomb's Paradox:
>>
>> One day Omega, a superbeing from outer space, landed on the earth. Omega had
>> advanced equipment for studying human brains. He could predict with great
>> accuracy how any person would choose between two alternatives. Omega tested
>> many people by using two large boxes. Box A was transparent and always held
>> $1000. Box B was opaque. Either it was empty or it held 1,000,000.00!! Omega
>> told each subject: you have two choices. One is to take both boxes and keep
>> their contents. But if I expect you to do this, I have left B empty. You ge
>> only $1000. You other choice is to take only box B. If I expected you to
>> do this, I have put a million dollars in B. You get it all...
>>
>> Which option do YOU take???
>
>As I see it, the choices are:
...... some probability deleted ......
>So for gain from strategy 1 to be better,
>
>1001000 - 1000000 * p > 1000000 * p
>
>=> 2000000 * p < 1001000
>
>=> p < 1001000 / 2000000 or p < 1/2 approximately.
>
>So if I know that Omega can "predict with great accuracy" (p >> 1/2), then
>my best bet is to take box B only. If I don't know that, I'll go for box
>A and B.
>
>I must be missing something, as I can't see why this is a paradox.
Here is the difficulty. Suppose you know that p = .99 (this isn't necessary
for the demonstration, I am just supposing). Omega puts the boxes in front
of you and says "Choose hoser" (or whatever). You might think
"Omega is almost certain to be able to predict what I will choose, therefore,
by the above analysis it must be to my advantage to take only box B,
becase he knew that and will make it worth my while" (convoluted syntax but
you get the point).
There is another point of view (one which I hold):
"Screw the cost/benefit analysis. Either box B has the bucks in it or it
doesn't. Whatever choice I make now will not change what is in box B,
it can't. Clearly, therefore, I should take both boxes, that way I get
1000 dollars *plus* whatever is in Box B."
Ken Arromdee
>my best bet is to take box B only. If I don't know that, I'll go for box
>A and B.
>I must be missing something, as I can't see why this is a paradox.
>> (This is a litmus test for a big philosophical issue. Do you know what it
>> is?)
>I have a horrible feeling I'm going to find out.
To really get to the heart of the issue, rephrase the question so that instead
of "Omega predicts with great accuracy", Omega always predicts accurately.
The problem is that 1) you should take box B for the reason you give above,
but 2) you should take both boxes under the reasoning "the boxes are already
filled and what I do now cannot affect the boxes' contents, so I should take
both boxes since this will always give me more than taking just one box."
Theoretically, believers in free will will reason 2) and believers in
determinism will reason 1).
I think the problem with 2) is "choose". One objection might be that being
asked to "choose" between the boxes is inconsistent with 100% predictability.
But I think there's a more fundamental problem: You are not really being
asked to "choose" between the boxes, but to _figure_out_ whether taking one
or both provides more money. Even if there is free will, your "decision" to
"choose" between the boxes is no more a "choice" than if you were given a
math problem, told you would get $1M if your answer matched the correct one
sealed in an envelope, and asked to "choose" between a group of possible
answers. If the right answer to the math problem is 42, the envelope contains
42, and if it's 43, the envelope contains 43--but that doesn't mean that your
choice can "affect" whether or not there is a 42 or a 43 in the envelope.
Given this, 2) is wrong as follows: what you do cannot "affect" the boxes'
contents in a causal sense, but since what you do is constrained by rules of
logic, the contents of the boxes do depend on your action in a similar way to
how the contents of the 42/43 envelopes do.
--
"Halvah? What kind of fish is that?" --grocer, to my grandfather, many
years ago....
Kenneth Arromdee (UUCP: ....!jhunix!arromdee; BITNET: arromdee@jhuvm;
INTERNET: arro...@cs.jhu.edu)
house ron
>Tony Lezard replies:
>>Erm, well basically, as the scale increases, things remain
>>nondeterministic but the probability that things do what they appear
>>to tends towards 1 very quickly.
>Yes this was the only solution I could come up with myself, namely
>that everything is in fact non-deterministic to some degree. I must
>admist however that I find this answer somewhat lacking although I
>cannot say why exactly.
This way of looking at it seems to ignore the recent insights of chaos
theory. _Bulk_ matter behaves statistically, but very small changes in
initial conditions results in very divergent results. It seems to me that
if microscopic phenomena are indeterminate, then even macroscopic
effects will not be deterministic.
--
Regards,
Ron House. (s64...@zeus.usq.edu.au)
(By post: Info Tech, U.C.S.Q. Toowoomba. Australia. 4350)
Graham Matthews
>>>Erm, well basically, as the scale increases, things remain
>>>nondeterministic but the probability that things do what they appear
>>>to tends towards 1 very quickly.
Me:
>>Yes this was the only solution I could come up with myself, namely
>>that everything is in fact non-deterministic to some degree. I must
>>admist however that I find this answer somewhat lacking although I
>>cannot say why exactly.
Ron House:
>This way of looking at it seems to ignore the recent insights of chaos
>theory. _Bulk_ matter behaves statistically, but very small changes in
>initial conditions results in very divergent results. It seems to me that
>if microscopic phenomena are indeterminate, then even macroscopic
>effects will not be deterministic.
Not necessarily Ron. Not all systems are initial condition sensitive!
Actually thinking a little harder I am not sure chaos theory has anything
to do with non-determinism.
Bill Mayne
>
>>Tony Lezard wrote:
>>>Erm, well basically, as the scale increases, things remain
>>>nondeterministic but the probability that things do what they appear
>>>to tends towards 1 very quickly.
>
>theory. _Bulk_ matter behaves statistically, but very small changes in
>initial conditions results in very divergent results. It seems to me that
>if microscopic phenomena are indeterminate, then even macroscopic
>effects will not be deterministic.
Chaos theory has relatively little to do with this, as it is based on
determinism, not quantam-like uncertainly at the microscopic level.
The small changes in initial conditions are just too small to observe
in some cases, which makes things like weather unpredictable or at least
much less predictable than we might like past a fairly short time
frame. This is independent of any actual nondeterminism.
Even in chaos theory, it takes some time or number of iterations before
the small changes in initial conditions result in very divergent results.
It could be that the probabilities of macroscopic events is so high that
divergence happens too slowly to be observed, or to be distinguished
from deterministic chaos. This is just my opinion as a lay person.
Expert comments welcome.
Bill Mayne
Trent Tobler
> gra...@maths.su.oz.au (Graham Matthews) writes:
>
> >Tony Lezard replies:
> >>Erm, well basically, as the scale increases, things remain
> >>nondeterministic but the probability that things do what they appear
> >>to tends towards 1 very quickly.
>
> >Yes this was the only solution I could come up with myself, namely
> >that everything is in fact non-deterministic to some degree. I must
> >admist however that I find this answer somewhat lacking although I
> >cannot say why exactly.
>
> This way of looking at it seems to ignore the recent insights of chaos
> theory. _Bulk_ matter behaves statistically, but very small changes in
> initial conditions results in very divergent results. It seems to me that
> if microscopic phenomena are indeterminate, then even macroscopic
> effects will not be deterministic.
>
scale that things become deterministic, but rather they become close
to deterministic (ie, probability becomes vanishingly small in the
non-expected case) Chaos theory also plays a part. In chaos theory, it
says that points that are near each other *AND ALSO NEAR AN UNSTABLE
ATTRACTER* will result in very divergent results. It also says that
points near each other and near a stable attractor will result in
convergant results. So, it is only when we can determine that space
is full of unstable attracters (like the Baker's transform, for instance)
that we can say that initial conditions will give divergent results. On
the other hand, if the universe has more 'area' of stable attractors (gravity
wells, etc.), then initial conditions will not make a lot of difference,
hence things become pseudo-deterministic (meaning they will still depend
on probabilities, but most cases can be ignored because the probability
involved is so small)
jbr...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com
> In article <Rw9VaB...@mantis.co.uk> mat...@mantis.co.uk (To the Ground) writes:
>>So if I know that Omega can "predict with great accuracy" (p >> 1/2), then
>>my best bet is to take box B only. If I don't know that, I'll go for box
>>A and B.
>>I must be missing something, as I can't see why this is a paradox.
>>> (This is a litmus test for a big philosophical issue. Do you know what it
>>> is?)
>>I have a horrible feeling I'm going to find out.
>
> To really get to the heart of the issue, rephrase the question so that instead
> of "Omega predicts with great accuracy", Omega always predicts accurately.
> The problem is that 1) you should take box B for the reason you give above,
> but 2) you should take both boxes under the reasoning "the boxes are already
> filled and what I do now cannot affect the boxes' contents, so I should take
> both boxes since this will always give me more than taking just one box."
>
> Theoretically, believers in free will will reason 2) and believers in
> determinism will reason 1).
Actually, believers in free will (like me) will reason 1) and believers in
determinism will reason 2).
Free Will argument: The Being has put something in box B because he knows
that I will choose box B, therefore I choose box B.
Determinism argument: What I choose makes no difference, the boxes' contents
are the way they are, so I choose both boxes.
>
> I think the problem with 2) is "choose". One objection might be that being
> asked to "choose" between the boxes is inconsistent with 100% predictability.
> But I think there's a more fundamental problem: You are not really being
> asked to "choose" between the boxes, but to _figure_out_ whether taking one
> or both provides more money. Even if there is free will, your "decision" to
> "choose" between the boxes is no more a "choice" than if you were given a
> math problem, told you would get $1M if your answer matched the correct one
> sealed in an envelope, and asked to "choose" between a group of possible
> answers. If the right answer to the math problem is 42, the envelope contains
> 42, and if it's 43, the envelope contains 43--but that doesn't mean that your
> choice can "affect" whether or not there is a 42 or a 43 in the envelope.
It depends on how highly you regard the Being's ability to predict your choice,
and on how trustworthy that you think he is. The real choice for you is one
of assessing the character and ability of the Being.
>
> Given this, 2) is wrong as follows: what you do cannot "affect" the boxes'
> contents in a causal sense, but since what you do is constrained by rules of
> logic, the contents of the boxes do depend on your action in a similar way to
> how the contents of the 42/43 envelopes do.
Given such a Being that can prepare the boxes based on your choice, your choice
*is* the causal factor in determining what is in the boxes.
> --
>
> Kenneth Arromdee (UUCP: ....!jhunix!arromdee; BITNET: arromdee@jhuvm;
> INTERNET: arro...@cs.jhu.edu)
Regards,
Jim B.
M Holmes
>gra...@maths.su.oz.au (Graham Matthews) writes:
[re: determinism...]
>This way of looking at it seems to ignore the recent insights of chaos
>theory. _Bulk_ matter behaves statistically, but very small changes in
>initial conditions results in very divergent results. It seems to me that
>if microscopic phenomena are indeterminate, then even macroscopic
>effects will not be deterministic.
Chaos Theory says that complex systems will have highly divergent
results based upon very small divergence in initial conditions. It does
not say that the system is in principle unpredictable, only that you
need very accurate measurements in order to do the predicting.
house ron
>Tony Lezard :
>>>>Erm, well basically, as the scale increases, things remain
>>>>nondeterministic but the probability that things do what they appear
>>>>to tends towards 1 very quickly.
>Me:
>>>Yes this was the only solution I could come up with myself, namely
>>>that everything is in fact non-deterministic to some degree. I must
>>>admist however that I find this answer somewhat lacking although I
>>>cannot say why exactly.
>Ron House:
>>This way of looking at it seems to ignore the recent insights of chaos
>>theory. _Bulk_ matter behaves statistically, but very small changes in
>>initial conditions results in very divergent results. It seems to me that
>>if microscopic phenomena are indeterminate, then even macroscopic
>>effects will not be deterministic.
>Not necessarily Ron. Not all systems are initial condition sensitive!
>Actually thinking a little harder I am not sure chaos theory has anything
>to do with non-determinism.
For the universe as a whole to be nondeterministic, it is merely
necessary that at least one macroscopic phenomenon be so. For example,
such things as weather simulations soon lead to grossly divergent
results due to extremely minute changes in initial conditions. If the
existence of a blizzard in London in ten years time depends on the exact
air pressure in my office today, and that is slightly uncertain, then
basically everything becomes uncertain, as the effects of the presence
or absence of a blizzard will certainly influence human behaviour.
Trent Tobler
Hi James!
jbr...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com writes:
>
> Free Will argument: The Being has put something in box B because he knows
> that I will choose box B, therefore I choose box B.
I disagree. This is weak free will (as opposed to strong free will). Weak
free will is considered deterministic. Strong free will, a choice independant
of any cause including the prediction of the being, would say that the being
could not predict my choice. Weak free will, simply that of being presented
with two or more options and picking one based on cause/learning/intelligence,
would mean that the Being could determine, is a deterministic point of view.
>
> Determinism argument: What I choose makes no difference, the boxes' contents
> are the way they are, so I choose both boxes.
This again, is slightly incorrect. IF the world is deterministic, and this
being had a way to predict the future with a great accuracy, he would be
able to predict that I would 'choose' both boxes (weak free will) and
would not have placed the $1M in box B. However, if I choose only box B,
the being would also have been able to determine (<-note root word in
deterministic) that this would have been my choice and placed the $1M in
the box.
> It depends on how highly you regard the Being's ability to predict your choice,
> and on how trustworthy that you think he is. The real choice for you is one
> of assessing the character and ability of the Being.
This is true. He would first have to be accurate, and also honest ("No, I
knew you would only choose box B, and I didn't want to lose any money" :)
> Given such a Being that can prepare the boxes based on your choice, your choice
> *is* the causal factor in determining what is in the boxes.
Unless your choice is an effect from the causes (state of the universe) that
the being used to predict what to place in the boxes. In this case (the
deterministic case) the 'choice' is an effect of the previous state, and not
really a 'cause' of the contents of the box in a traditional sense (although
in this case, causality could be reversed)
I still think I would prefer fowling (you know, throw a duck in it :) up the
beings prediction and use the outcome of some quantum affect that had a 50%
probability to decide what to choose (the hypothetical flipping of the coin).
Steven J. Edwards
> jbr...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com writes:
>
> I still think I would prefer fowling (you know, throw a duck in it :) up the
> beings prediction and use the outcome of some quantum affect that had a 50%
> probability to decide what to choose (the hypothetical flipping of the coin).
In the version of Newcomb's Paradox from Martin Gardner, there
is an additional condition that deals with chance selection. If the
Great Ooga Booga predicts that the human will use a randomizer, It
makes both boxes empty!
There is really no paradox involved. The "free will" payoff
matrix (take both boxes) is false because it is predicated on the
contridiction that suffciently accurate prediction and free will can
co-exist in the same universe.
I would take box B and very likely get the million dollars.
On the other hand, Gardner published the responses of a number of
prominent individuals, and several would take both boxes and so risk
receiving only a thousand bucks. Isacc Asimov wrote that he thought
that picking both boxes was the required choice of an atheist (which
he is [I'm not]), as the alternative would be equivalent to admission
of an omniscent being. He also stated that if such a person was lucky
enough to get the million dollars as well, the value of disproving the
existence of an omniscent predictor outweighed the value of the cash.
[The above opinions expressed are my own; not necessarily held by others.]
== Steven J. Edwards Bull HN Information Systems Inc. ==
== (508) 294-3484 300 Concord Road MS 820A ==
== s...@xylos.ma30.bull.com Billerica, MA 01821 USA ==
"That Government which Governs the Least, Governs Best." -- Thomas Jefferson
house ron
>s64...@zeus.usq.EDU.AU (house ron) writes:
>>gra...@maths.su.oz.au (Graham Matthews) writes:
>[re: determinism...]
You misunderstand my point. In such a divergent system, the future
behaviour is inherently unstable with regard to the initial conditions.
But according to QM there is a lower limit below which we _cannot_
make a measurement, because the physical system simply does not
possess these particular measurable attributes to any greater precision.
This means that there is a minscule, but real, uncertainty in such things
as the air pressure, temperature, etc. The future divergence will come
from this _real_ indeterminacy in the initial conditions.
Alex Bunker
Well No, actually reality is a bit more subtle than that. when a
dynamical system is chaotic then the accuracy to which you have measured
the initial conditions lengthens the time over which you can predict events
but no matter how accurately you make the measurements eventually the
time over which you can predict the events will run out because it is
impossible to measure anyting to infinite accuracy. So while reality is
still deterministic it is no longer predictable.
ALEX BUNKER
jbr...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com
> Hi James!
Hi Trent!
>
> jbr...@sleepy.bmd.trw.com writes:
>>
>> Free Will argument: The Being has put something in box B because he knows
>> that I will choose box B, therefore I choose box B.
>
> I disagree. This is weak free will (as opposed to strong free will). Weak
> free will is considered deterministic. Strong free will, a choice independant
> of any cause including the prediction of the being, would say that the being
> could not predict my choice. Weak free will, simply that of being presented
> with two or more options and picking one based on cause/learning/intelligence,
> would mean that the Being could determine, is a deterministic point of view.
OK, I accept your classification of my position as "weak" free will. In fact,
as we have discussed before, (weak) free will and (weak) determinism are simply
two sides of the same coin. Free Will _____ Determinism: the conjunctive that
goes in the blank is "and" and not "exclusive or". More on this after your
next comment.
>
>>
>> Determinism argument: What I choose makes no difference, the boxes' contents
>> are the way they are, so I choose both boxes.
>
> This again, is slightly incorrect. IF the world is deterministic, and this
> being had a way to predict the future with a great accuracy, he would be
> able to predict that I would 'choose' both boxes (weak free will) and
> would not have placed the $1M in box B. However, if I choose only box B,
> the being would also have been able to determine (<-note root word in
> deterministic) that this would have been my choice and placed the $1M in
> the box.
So therefore an omniscient being predicts your choice regardless of you have
free will or your choices are determined. Now is the time to clarify the
two types of free will you mentioned and the two types of determinism that
I mentioned.
Working definitions in regard to omniscience:
Determinism: 1. (Strong) Persons have no freedom of action, for the being
has determined (chosen for them) what they will do. All their decisions
are forced decisions. Strong Determinism precludes free will of any
type.
2. (Weak) Persons have freedom of action, for the being only determines
(identifies) what their decisions will be. No decisions are forced.
Weak Determinism does not preclude weak free will.
Free Will: 1. (Strong) Persons have freedom of action, and their decisions
cannot be known in advance. This type of free will (absolute
autonomy of action) does preclude determinism of any type. This is
the type of free will that the anti-omniscience debaters always
assumed was Free Will back during the Free Will vs. Omniscience
discussions last summer.
2. (Weak) Persons have freedom of action, and their decisions can
be known or identified in advance by a sufficiently shrewd being or
an omniscient one. This type of free will is compatible with weak
determinism described above.
As I stated last summer, and will rephrase here in light of the above working
definitions, weak free will and weak determinism (allowing for omniscience)
are not contradictory. Only the strong types preclude the other. This may
be the solution to the semantics dilemma I ran afoul of when this was debated
last. Thanks, Trent, for pointing out the strong/weak distinction; I think
that this may clear up some of the misunderstanding.
>
>> It depends on how highly you regard the Being's ability to predict your choice,
>> and on how trustworthy that you think he is. The real choice for you is one
>> of assessing the character and ability of the Being.
>
> This is true. He would first have to be accurate, and also honest ("No, I
> knew you would only choose box B, and I didn't want to lose any money" :)
>
>> Given such a Being that can prepare the boxes based on your choice, your choice
>> *is* the causal factor in determining what is in the boxes.
>
> Unless your choice is an effect from the causes (state of the universe) that
> the being used to predict what to place in the boxes. In this case (the
> deterministic case) the 'choice' is an effect of the previous state, and not
> really a 'cause' of the contents of the box in a traditional sense (although
> in this case, causality could be reversed)
And for the case of omniscience, I submit that the causality IS reversed.
Remember, omniscience is not simply "looking ahead" or "predicting the future",
it is looking back at the event before the event takes place. The event (or
decision in this case) is the cause, and the being's prior action is dependent
on that decision/cause. The paradox is resolved in the *nature* of the being
itself, in the essence of what omniscience is. The being does not choose what
to put in the box until he experiences your decision. Then he puts the prize
there according to the rules so that you get only what the rules allow for.
>
> I still think I would prefer fowling (you know, throw a duck in it :) up the
> beings prediction and use the outcome of some quantum affect that had a 50%
> probability to decide what to choose (the hypothetical flipping of the coin).
>
> --
> Trent Tobler - tto...@csulx.weber.edu
Many tried to assert last summer that strong free will is essentially the
same as randomness, like the QM example you give. The idea was that the
person would choose as arbitrarily as possible to preclude any possibility
of an omniscient prediction. But the problem with this is that human
decisions are rarely, if ever, arbitrary on anything, especially if the
choice really matters. If I choose a Coke over a Pepsi, it's because I
really wanted a Coke. If I choose to buy a car, it's the best fit to
a set of criteria I've established beforehand. Human decisions are hardly
ever random. Close friends can usually predict with near exacting accuracy
what a person will do in a given situation. They are not contraining
(forcing) the person's choice, they are merely identifying (determining)
what that person's *free* choice will be under the circumstances. An
omnipotent, omniscient God can certainly determine all of our choices in
like manner without forcing our decisions in any way. Therefore, whether
(as a theist) one believes in strong determinism or free will with weak
determinism, omniscience on the part of God does not present a problem.
Only if you believe in a strong (random/arbitrary) type of free will is
the idea of God and omniscience necessarily precluded.
Regards,
Jim B.