Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could
have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't
conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it
did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a
biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective
experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a
coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we
did, which isn't plausible.
Pardon?
"Which means that wheter it did or didn't"
did or didn't what?
If a cameraman goes out with soldiers to make pictures of the war,
the behaviour of the soldiers during intense combat can be explained
without references to the camera.
Thus - according to you it - would be a coincidence if the camera
would have recorded what actually happened?
Funny way of reasoning:)
In "consciousness explained" Dennet actually describes conciousness as
the narative our brain stores of what has happened. So comparing it
whith the camera is not a silly thing to do. Of course unlike the
camera our consiousness does not consist of raw data, but is also
build up from conclusions our mind has been making during or after the
facts that are described happened. This is very usefull for our
actions during the events (supposing someone is aiming to kill you
provedes a better guidline for soldiers) that merely concluding that
certain sounds present themselves to our ears), but somewhat spoiling
our memory as far as reliability is concerned. (someone might be
playing a tape of bullets flying around instead of really shooting).
If you have any real problems with materialism,
you may present them to me,
I know of no problems so far,
and am willing the learn wether one is serious enough to ponder about.
Peter van Velzen
Atheist and materialist
June 2007
Amstelveen
The Netherlands
Peter van Velzen
concious materialist
June 2007
Amstelveen
The Netherlands
Your analogy was poor. The soldiers behaviour isn't affected by
whether unknown to them the cameraman was filming. So if they were
talking about the cameraman filming, it would only be a coincidence
that there was a cameraman filming.
You couldn't be talking about anything you experience, and about your
subjective experiences, because you actually had subjective
experiences was the point. It would only be a coincidence that you had
the subjective experiences that you were discussing. It would also
have to be a deception that your behaviour was influenced by anything
you subjectively experienced, so on top of it being a coincidence, it
wouldn't even fit with our actual experience.
Looks to me like the pro log for an argument along the lines, "If "A",
and "B", then "Z", with a large dose of argument from incredulity,
thrown in.
If you can't understand it, I suggest that you spend some more time
thinking about it.
Whether they do or don't is supposed to mean anything?
Whether they do or don't is supposed to validate or invalidate the
assertions?
>
> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could
> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't
> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it
> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a
> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective
> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a
> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we
> did, which isn't plausible.
You apparently don't know the difference between machines and humans.
Scientists do, as do atheists, - even if they are at a loss to
(scientifically) explain it.
OK ... so now I understand that you can create a strawman, and erroneous,
assertion.
What erroneous assertion was there? Is it just that you can't face up
to the fact that you believed an implausible story, or that you still
really don't comprehend what was said?
I think I see the error in this.
The flaw in it is that nature in itself is far from orderly. Any
"mechanism" that complex (and it doesn't have to be as complex as living
beings) has to account for chaos.
We all use computers. And we all know that sometimes they "behave"
rather erratic, if not to call it outright esoteric. Any sufficiently
complex thing has chaos build in.
It might be that "consciousness" is applied chaos among the huge number
of brain cells.
Also overlooked in the above statement is the benefit of consciousness.
And that benefit actually NEEDS chaos to deal with unknown situations.
Actually, this sounds rather like an "evolutionary way of thinking" that
is build in.
Tokay
--
Weinberg's Second Law:
If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote
programs, then the first woodpecker that came along would
destroy civilization.
Chaos has only to do with a systems sensitivity to differences in
initial starting conditions, though with no cause within the physical
world (quantum randomness)a systems behaviour could be claimed to be
unpredicable if sensitive to quantum effects. Though many systems such
as cars etc, aren't really that sensitive to quantum effects.
Either way, it doesn't affect the point made. If you had all knowledge
regarding the way any mechanism worked, its behaviour could be
explained (retrospectively if necessary) with the assumption that it
had no subjective experiences. If we were to be regarded as biological
mechanisms, you couldn't be talking about any subjective experiences
you had because you actually had them. It would have to be a
coincidence.
I understand the gist of it, but the conclusion does not follow from
the premises, sentence three is gobbledygook, and sentence four is an
argument from personal incredulity (which would scan much better with
"implied" substituted for "claimed"). Try again.
--
"O Sybilli, si ergo
Fortibus es in ero
O Nobili! Themis trux
Sivat sinem? Causen Dux"
I suggest you spend some time rephrasing it. As I stated elsewhere in
the thread, the conclusion does not follow from the premises, the
third sentence is word salad, and the fourth is an argument from
personal incredulity.
Anyway, need to pop out now, when I get back, I'll take a look at
whether any of you have manage to understand, and accept despite your
egos, that you had been deceived into believing an implausible account
of what you were experiencing. Also by the way, it was prophesised
that the 'intelligent' would be deceived, and turn reality upside
down, and claim that we were simply physical mechanisms, and low and
behold, that is exactly what the materialists did.
http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Isaiah%2029&version=31
vs 14-16
(building a world based around selfishness also wasn't a wise thing to
do, on many levels, just look at the human inflicted death toll of the
20th centuary)
Some might be tempted at this point to distract from what is being
said. Though that would just be a pathetic attempt to live in denial
avoiding reason. Best if you just faced up to reality, and reason,
instead of running from it, while claiming you were in any way
intelligent.
The conclusion does follow from the premises. Where do you think it
doesn't, and what part of sentance three are you having problems in
comprehending?
Also sentance four is correct that it would have to be a coincidence,
though if you wished to think of it as plausible that there was such a
coincidence, and to stake your soul on it, then obviously that is your
choice. You won't be experiencing the physical world forever though,
and soon enough you'll regret your illogical choice.
I'm already talking to you on this same thread, why don't you just
continue the conversation there, instead of avoiding it, and joining
in converstations with others on this same thread. It seems to me you
are running, while trying to make it look like you did give a
response.
It simply doesn't. How do you think that it does?
Let's reduce it to an actual syllogism for illustration purposes:
P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking
consciousness"
Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise?
P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as
you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or not
a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is
unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that
consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it.
C: Sentence three is word salad, but the next sentence gives the idea
that you're implying that because of P1 and P2, that there must be
some kind of "Ghost In The Machine", which simply doesn't follow.
>and what part of sentance three are you having problems in
>comprehending?
What the Hell you were trying to say in English. The words all mean
something, but their combination is nonsensical.
Already done.
> It seems to me you
>are running, while trying to make it look like you did give a
>response.
It seems to me that *you* didn't respond to any of the above. It also
seems bizarre to me that you're implying that my following you around
in the thread constitutes "running", but then you seem to have your
own private definition for just about everything.
If having subjective experiences did affect behaviour (your objection
to P2), then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into
account (P1)?
You were just repeating something you had already posted, when I had
responded to the point.
>I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the
>following:
>
>Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could
>have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't
>conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it
>did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour.
Could you give a reference to a current materialistic philosopher
/scientist, or currently advocated philosophy of science that actually
has this problem, or are you just beating a straw horse? ;-)
>...Therefore if we were simply a
>biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective
>experiences because of their existance.
Perhaps there are a few newbies to atheism who think materialism is
the cat's meow, and your criticism will get them to look into it a
little more deeply. Good for you. They should realize that no such
metaphysical commitment is necessary. Letting go of theism also
includes letting go of an unneeded commitment to *any* metaphysical
ontology. We can pick and choose whichever ontology is convenient. Who
needs to explain their appreciation of pizza or their love of their
partner at the atomic level?
We are what we are. If a concept of consciousness is useful in
explanations, there is no more reason to exclude it than there is
reason to exclude magnetism (which materialism excludes.) The only
explanatory level the theist declines to use is the theistic level.
> It would have to be a
>coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we
>did, which isn't plausible.
One could in principle, seek to describe a vacation in Italy by
describing the movements of the atoms involved, or by how we went
about gaining 15 pounds, ;-), or by describing what we experienced in
comparison with our (conscious) expectations. If there is an atheist
so committed to materialism that he declines to look at his trip in
any but the first of these ways, he's a pretty strange character, and
deserves your questioning.
It applies to any conception where there is only the physical, and we
follow the known laws of physics. Did you manage to understand it, if
so, are you suggesting just abandoning reason, in favour of your bias?
I don't think you are interested in a serious discussion. Bye.
You can run and live in denial if you like, but you won't be
experiencing the physical forever, and you'll regret letting your ego
stand in the way of you seeing the truth.
Noticing you have gone a bit quite, has it dawned on you that it did
follow, and that you were deceived in what you were led to believe, or
do you think it is simply a question of you requiring more time before
the answer will come to you?
Would an atheist scientist or philosopher care to try to help raven1
out here, or can you see where you too were deceived?
No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the explanation of its behavior
would necessarily include that consciousness.
> Which means that whether it
> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour.
Which is nonsense. The explanation of its behavior would necessarily include
the operation of its consciousness if it was conscious.
> Therefore if we were simply a
> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective
> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a
> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we
> did, which isn't plausible.
Well, since you obviously don't understand what you wrote, it's not
surprising that you've reached incorrect conclusions.
--
Denis Loubet
dlo...@io.com
http://www.io.com/~dloubet
http://www.ashenempires.com
Why would I be required to assume any mechanism that simply followed
the laws of physics was conscious, why couldn't I explain it simply in
terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with the
assumption that it wasn't?
Well one of us is making a stupid choice. Your abandonment of reason,
indicates it is you.
What is "the atheist page"? do you mean alt.atheism?
> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could
> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't
> conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it
> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a
> biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective
> experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a
> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we
> did, which isn't plausible.
No, I cannot understand what you wrote. Perhaps you could rewrite it
in an inteligible way?
Jim
Other people have understood it. Perhaps you could point out the
sentance that you are having a problem comprehending.
You seem to be implying that there are mechanisms which do not follow
the laws of physics.
You also seem to be implying that we are not a "simple" biological
mechanism.
You also seem to be implying that consciousness cannot be the product
of a mechanism following the laws of physics.
Have I understood you correctly so far?
Jim
You certainly haven't fully.
Can you understand that there would be no need to assume any mechanism
that simply followed the laws of physics was conscious in order to
explain its behaviour, as its behaviour could be explained terms of
the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with the
assumption that it wasn't?
That's not what I asked, though! I just wanted to know if I have
understood those things correctly. Have I?
>
> Can you understand that there would be no need to assume any mechanism
> that simply followed the laws of physics was conscious in order to
> explain its behaviour, as its behaviour could be explained terms of
> the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with the
> assumption that it wasn't?
Yes.
Jim
I'll take you through it sentance by sentance. I'm not covering my
understanding yet, but will do so once you have understood that
materialism is implausible, but maybe insist that it must be true, as
there is no other explanation.
Do you also understand then that whether the mechanism did have
subjective experiences or not, it couldn't affect its behaviour, as
otherwise its behaviour couldn't be explained without taking into
account whether it did or it didn't have subjective experiences?
that one went right over my head.....
> Do you also understand then that whether the mechanism did have
> subjective experiences or not, it couldn't affect its behaviour, as
> otherwise its behaviour couldn't be explained without taking into
> account whether it did or it didn't have subjective experiences?
You seem to be ignoring the possiblity that the subjective experiences
are a process of a mechanism that merely follows the laws of
physics.
Why can't subjective experience be a mechanical process?
Jim
It depend on how well you explain it
> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could
> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't
> conscious (had no subjective experiences).
There's you first mistake, assuming that consciousness if outside the laws
of physics.
Secondly you assume that the laws of physics controlls reality .. that is
not the cse .. the "laws" of physics attempt to model and explain reality.
That something happens which is outside the scope of those model and
explanations does not make that something impossible, nor does it invalidate
the "laws"
So the rest of your arguments and conclusions can be ignored, as they are
based upon faulty premises.
Explained .. possibly .. but not predicted.
> with the assumption that it had no subjective experiences.
You have presented no valid grounds for that assumption. If subjective
experiences are part of the initial conditions, then you need to take them
into account.
Its nothing todo with egos ..
Your sentence...
"Therefore if we were simply a biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking
about our subjective experiences because of their existance."
... makes no sense .. or at best needs clarification.
1) what is the "their" you a meaning in "their existance" .. biological
mechanism, talking, experiences?
2) are you saying that "they" exists or that they don't exist .. and how
does that stop us talking about subjective experiences?
3) how does "their existence" being the cause of us not being able to talk
require us being simple biological mechanisms.
Please.. try to be more clear.
So P1 is incorrect, and you argument collapses
What deception is it you are talking about .. your post was not coherent
enough to be deceptive.
Are you saying the egos don't exist anyway?
You're assuming the 'laws' of physics are complete.
I haven't ignored that possibility at all. I was just asking whether
you understood that whether the mechanism did have subjective
experiences or not, it couldn't affect its behaviour, as otherwise its
behaviour couldn't be explained without taking into account whether it
did or it didn't have subjective experiences. You seemed to have
avoided answering whether you understood that or not.
How so? (by the way, since there is only me responding, I will only
respond to you in this section, rather than having seperate
converstations with you throughout this single thread)
I have answered you elsewhere, and perhaps you can explain there how
the physical world we experience is not governed by rules.
You evidently seem to think that soldiers bother to talk to the
cameraman when bullets are flying. I do not think that is the case.
But any analogy is poor.
Let's suppose there is no cameramen but only a hidden camera inside a
helmet, of which even the soldier wearing the helmet is oblivious.
The effect of the camera would be minimal,
yet the story it's picture would tell would not be false.
Why could I not be talking about my experiences
Why can't a camera work?
You give me no serious reason for this impromptu statement.
Again if ourt consience (as Dennett suggest) is only a narrative
that doesn't mean it is totally coincidental if the narrative is
somewhat correct.
Experiences lead to actions - even by robots -
if these actions are that monitored
than the narrative made by the monitor too is a result of those
experiences.
Futrhermore materialsm doesn't mean consious experciences do not
influence our decissions. In my example the camera would not influence
the decissions of the soldiers, but if the rewind and look at the
pictures, they may find some information about the position of the
enemy and plan their future actions accordingly.
Likewise a robot may learn from it's experciences by using a
background program that is modifying the foreground program to work
more efficiently, by analizing the data collected by a monitoring
unit.
Of course at present it may be more efficient to have the analyzing
done by a human, as humans are already equipped with the hardware and
software to do that job.
In my viwed You haven't said anything that makes "materialism"
implausible.
(actually I am wondering what you are saying if anything at all)
There is a lot though that makes dualism implausible.
especially Ockham's razor knife.
Peter van Velzen
Atheist and Materialist
June 2007
Amstelveen
The Netherlands
The camera in the helmet is analogous to having subjective experiences
right? Do you understand that if the soldiers were talking about
having a camera in their helmet (which doesn't affect their
behaviour), then it would only be a coincidence that there was a
camera in their helmet?
Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of
physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism
following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the
mechanism had no subjective experiences?
I disagree with your assertion. A mechanism that has subjective
experience as part of it's process could have it's behavior change as
a result of the subjective experiences.
Jim
A backhanded insult from the get go. If we understand it then we're
OK, but if we can't understand it then, well, the implied "we're dumb"
is built right in. Talk about poisoning the well.
> Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could
> have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't
> conscious (had no subjective experiences).
Plenty of mechanisms like this: gravity, quantum mechanics, the strong
nuclear force, the weak nuclear force. Or did you have something else
in mind? Were you thinking of the human body? Plenty of non-subjective
experience/non-conscious actions within the human body like blood
flow, brain chemicals interacting, stomach digestion, breathing, pupil
dilation, & etc. Or did you have something else in mind?
Why not actually come out and say what you mean rather than say "any
mechanism?" What mechanism are you talking about? Be specific.
>Which means that whether it
> did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour.
Assertion that subjective experiences (or lack thereof) affect the
laws of physics. Could you provide a specific example of this? Or are
we talking about the general "any mechanism?"
>Therefore if we were simply a
> biological mechanism,
Good start.
>we couldn't be talking about our subjective
> experiences because of their existance.
Bad landing. Nope. Word salad, as previously mentioned. But we are
biological mechanisms. And we do talk to each other about our
subjective experiences. So your position is wrong. Straight from the
beginning.
>It would have to be a
> coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we
> did, which isn't plausible.
Followed up by more crap. "I don't believe it could happen so it
couldn't happen" - is that the gist of it? But it does, so you're
delusional.
In the end, nothing specific. "Any mechanism ..." Assertions and more
assertions. You're attempting to tie philosophy with science. And
badly at that.
Try again.
/BC
As I said, any mechanism that followed the laws of physics, so yes we
are talking about the general.
Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the laws of physics
could have its behaviour explained with in terms of the physical
mechanism following the laws of physics, with the assumption that it
had no subjective experiences?
You have already agreed to the following (from the bit of our
conversation you snipped which directed preceeded the conversation you
left above):
I had said:
---------------
Do you also understand then that whether the mechanism did have
subjective experiences or not, it couldn't affect its behaviour, as
otherwise its behaviour couldn't be explained without taking into
account whether it did or it didn't have subjective experiences?
---------------
To which you replied:
---------------
Yes.
---------------
Did you wish to change your reply, or explain how the behaviour could
be explained without taking into account the existance of the
subjective experiences, if they did affect the behaviour?
Sorry my mistake there, the quotes should have been:
I had said:
---------------
Can you understand that there would be no need to assume any mechanism
that simply followed the laws of physics was conscious in order to
explain its behaviour, as its behaviour could be explained terms of
the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with the
assumption that it wasn't?
>
> Sorry my mistake there, the quotes should have been:
>
> I had said:
> ---------------
> Can you understand that there would be no need to assume any mechanism
> that simply followed the laws of physics was conscious in order to
> explain its behaviour, as its behaviour could be explained terms of
> the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with the
> assumption that it wasn't?
> ---------------
>
> To which you replied:
> ---------------
> Yes.
> ---------------
>
> Did you wish to change your reply, or explain how the behaviour could
> be explained without taking into account the existance of the
> subjective experiences, if they did affect the behaviour?
Looks like I did not really understand that the first time I read
it....I should have answered "no".
Jim
(I've hit my posting limit, so have had to change names)
Ok, so explain why I couldn't simply explain its behaviour in terms of
Since consciousness is a part of how the mechanism operates, it
probably would be part of the explanation of how the mechanism
operates. Even though consciousness itself is a mechanical process.
Jim
The first paragraph I understand
what I do not understand what connection that would have towards
the plausibility of materialism.
However the second paragraph is known to be untrue.
People do not only have subjective experiences but they act on them.
There are people who think they have been abcucted by aliens and act
accordingly.
There are people who think they have heard the voice of God and act
accordingly.
There is ample evidence to suggest that some of these subjective
experiences are objectively false.(as some maintain that god declares
Islam to be the only true religion while others declare God says it is
not)
The fact that spirits do not exist does not mean people do not act
upon their delusions.
If we disagree on this then apperantly one of us is delusional and
acts accordingly.
That doesn't mean there is anything else than brains that acting
differently.
(I can't say better or worse, for if one of us is wrong about this
particular subject, it may well be that the other is decidingly
thinking better about all other subjects)
Think about it
and let me know
Peter van Velzen
It would have to be an experience of a mechanical process surely.
So the mechanism would not follow the laws of physics as it would be
expected to if it didn't have subjective experiences?
By the way, did you change your answer to know because you thought it
was implausible that our subjective experiences did not influence our
behaviour?
What you say is known, is simply your belief. What you are glossing
over is that your belief is implausible.
You state that you believe the following to be untrue:
------------
Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of
physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism
following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the
mechanism had no subjective experiences?
------------
Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics
couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the
known laws of physics?
Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to
do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective
experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its
behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known
laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the
physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it
didn't have any subjective experiences.
The mechanism would follow the laws of physics. The explanation of
it's function would be incomplete if it did not include all of the
processes involved.
> By the way, did you change your answer to know because you thought it
> was implausible that our subjective experiences did not influence our
> behaviour?
Yes.
However, you seem to be somehow implying that our subjective
experiences are not physical?
Jim
So the process/part of the mechanism that is responsible for our
subjective experiences, would follow the laws of physics as expected?
Who said you had to?
> why couldn't I explain it simply in
> terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics with the
> assumption that it wasn't?
If you fully describe the behavior of the mechanism in terms of a physical
mechanism following the laws of physics, then you are describing all the
events that contribute to that behavior. If the mechanism is conscious, the
consciousness will be included in the description of events in terms of
physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness **is**
physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness is just our
word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical mechanisms following the
laws of physics.
--
Denis Loubet
dlo...@io.com
http://www.io.com/~dloubet
http://www.ashenempires.com
Sure, why not? or are you aware of some type of magical "thinking
stuff" that does not? keep in mind that the problem of duality has
never been overcome that I'm aware of.
Jim
While I you can believe that the mechanism is responsible for our
subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why I *couldn't*
explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical
mechanism following the laws of physics, with the assumption that
there were no subjective experiences, or could I?
So why couldn't I explain the behaviour of the process/part of the
mechanism you believe responsible for our subjective experiences
simply in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of
physics, with the assumption that it wasn't experienced?
That depends on how the mechanism operates. If there is feedback
which alters the operation depending on the specific subjective
experience, then your explanation would not be complete or accurate.
Jim
What difference does feedback make, why couldn't it be taken into
account? Also this isn't about any limits of our attainable knowledge
practically about the mechanism, but just in principle.
So why in principle couldn't the behaviour of the physical mechanism
be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of
Sorry I hadn't fully read your reply, and didn't notice that what the
subjective experience was like would influence the behaviour.
Presumably then you are suggesting that there would be a difference in
behaviour if the universe had been such that the process/portion of
the mechanism responsible for the experience had caused a subjective
experience of fluctuations in the colour green, the brightness of
which was dependent on the number of neurons firing. If so, then the
mechanism wouldn't be following the laws of physics as expected, as
they don't reference or change according to what any subjective
experience may be like.
Can I have Caesar dressing with that word salad?
If you can't understand it, why don't you point out which bit you are
having trouble comprehending?
Do I understand you correctly, in that you are abandoning the
conception that our experience can be explained in terms of a physical
mechanism following the laws of physics as expected as implausible?
I am not sure that human actions can be easily explained without the
assumption of subjective experiences. Of course one can refer to what
happens in our brains synapsis and disregard anything in the real or
imagined world that this synaps event deals with but that is certainly
not easy and actually evading the question whether the subjective
experience has any importance.
Fact is that subjective experiences do influence our behavior even if
both the experience and the behaviour contain nothing more than
someone saying "I experience X".
That does not mean that someone who says to have been abducted by
aliens was abducted by aliens, but it does mean that this person acts
differently than some who does not claim so.
Fact is also that these subjecive experiences as such have little
influence during the experience they are describing.
The clue to Dennetts vision towards consciousness is that he does not
imply that the subjective experience is anything more than that:
Saying what we think has happened..
Of course someone claiming to have been abducted by aliens may also
react differently towards a plain flying over in the nightsky.
If consiousness/subjective experience is narrative and contained in
our memory it always is about the past, while as everything it can
only influence the future.
It does however (totally!) determine the way we view the past.
Still puzzled as how this has any reference towards materialism.
In case anyone misunderstands:
Mine are the following views:
1. Subjective experience has no influence on the real experience it it
desrcibing
(unless the experience takes enough time for nr.2 to have effect)
2. Subjective experience has a lot of influence on future behaviour.
3. Subjective experience is practically the only source for the way we
view our past.
3. Subjective experience need not always to be conscious even though
consciousness is little more than the subjective experience we
momentarily
remember. (I do not want to get flamed by psychologists)
Peter van Velzen
Atheist and materialist
Sleep on it, and I'll check the board again tommorrow.
You appear to be assuming, without evidence, that it is impossible to
have self-awareness in a mechanistic organism.
You just avoided answering the questions as to why
------------
Do you understand that any mechanism that followed the known laws of
physics could be explained simply in terms of the physical mechanism
following the known laws of physics with the assumption that the
mechanism had no subjective experiences?
------------
As I asked:
----------------
Could you explain why a mechanism following the known laws of physics
couldn't be explained in terms of the physical mechanism following the
known laws of physics?
Or is it that you think there is a reason that you would be unable to
do so with the assumption that the mechanism had no subjective
experiences? If so, please explain why I couldn't explain its
behaviour in in terms of the physical mechanism following the known
laws of physics (which don't reference any subjective experiences the
physical might or might not be having), with the assumption that it
didn't have any subjective experiences.
----------------
You could avoid being taken through the reasoning of why materialism
is implausible, and then state that you see no reason why it should be
regarded as such, but why would you?
(I'm off for tonight, I'll check the board tommorrow for your response)
You haven't understood what I am saying, follow the converstation with
J Forbes, and maybe that will help you. I'll check the board tommorrow
if you are still having problems, and take you through it.
The operative word you use is "could." Yes, sure. "Any mechanism"
"could" operate without subjective experience. But that doesn't mean
that all do. Since there are subjective experiences (fact) and we are
present in a material world (fact), then your implication that we
shouldn't have subjective experiences is obviously crap.
This whole statement of yours is simply as logical as "if a chicken
and a half can lay an egg and a half in a day and a half, then a cat
is like a sidewalk because neither can play the piano."
I asked for a specific example. You didn't give it. Why not? I asked
several other questions. I provided several examples. No response on
any of those. Only that you want a general comment about "any
mechanism" following the laws of physics.
Me: 2
You: 0
Try again.
/BC
or without that assumption. . .
in order to decide the importance of subjective experience
one would have to know the influence of those experiences on the
behaviour of the subject.
Many people have experienced you opening post as "word salad",
and act accordingly:)
but don't respond here, I have my own place in the thread where I have
refrained from such expressions:)
You are quite impressed with yourself. I see no reason for that.
>On 3 Jun, 17:20, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote:
>> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 08:53:43 -0700, someone2
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>> >On 3 Jun, 16:49, raven1 <quoththera...@nevermore.com> wrote:
>> >> On Sun, 03 Jun 2007 05:50:33 -0700, someone2
>>
>> >> <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>> >> >I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand the
>> >> >following:
>>
>> >> >Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could
>> >> >have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't
>> >> >conscious (had no subjective experiences). Which means that whether it
>> >> >did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour. Therefore if we were simply a
>> >> >biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our subjective
>> >> >experiences because of their existance. It would have to be a
>> >> >coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour claimed we
>> >> >did, which isn't plausible.
>>
>> >> I understand the gist of it, but the conclusion does not follow from
>> >> the premises, sentence three is gobbledygook, and sentence four is an
>> >> argument from personal incredulity (which would scan much better with
>> >> "implied" substituted for "claimed"). Try again.
>>
>> >The conclusion does follow from the premises. Where do you think it
>> >doesn't,
>>
>> It simply doesn't. How do you think that it does?
>>
>> Let's reduce it to an actual syllogism for illustration purposes:
>>
>> P1: "A mechanism can have its behavior explained without invoking
>> consciousness"
>>
>> Okay so far? Am I fairly encapsulating your first premise?
>>
>> P2: (on which you're already de-railing, since it is a subset of P1as
>> you phrased it, but doesn't logically follow from it) "Whether or not
>> a mechanism is conscious has no effect on its behavior". This is
>> unsupported, to say the least; you haven't demonstrated that
>> consciousness has no effect on behavior, just assumed it.
>>
>> C: Sentence three is word salad, but the next sentence gives the idea
>> that you're implying that because of P1 and P2, that there must be
>> some kind of "Ghost In The Machine", which simply doesn't follow.
>>
>> >and what part of sentance three are you having problems in
>> >comprehending?
>>
>> What the Hell you were trying to say in English. The words all mean
>> something, but their combination is nonsensical.
>
>If having subjective experiences did affect behaviour (your objection
>to P2),
My objection is that you have neither demonstrated that consciousness
has no affect on behavior, nor pointed out why this would be an issue
in the first place, other than your own personal incredulity.
> then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into
>account (P1)?
As you haven't demonstrated P1 either, the ball is in your court, but
again, it does not follow from either premise that some kind of
immaterial agent is necessary for consciousness.
--
"O Sybilli, si ergo
Fortibus es in ero
O Nobili! Themis trux
Sivat sinem? Causen Dux"
>On 3 Jun, 18:03, someone2 <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>> > to P2), then how could behaviour be explained without taking it into
>> > account (P1)?
>>
>> Noticing you have gone a bit quite, has it dawned on you that it did
>> follow, and that you were deceived in what you were led to believe, or
>> do you think it is simply a question of you requiring more time before
>> the answer will come to you?
>>
>
>Would an atheist scientist or philosopher care to try to help raven1
>out here, or can you see where you too were deceived?
Has it occurred to you that some of us have a life outside of Usenet?
Where did you see me agree with either premise?
I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in
terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with the
assumption that there were no subjective experiences, and I defy you to
point out where I did.
What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour of the mechanism simply
in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with the
assumption that there were no subjective experiences, you would, of
necessity, include in that explanation the physical events that constitute
consciousness if they occurred.
Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid describing those physical
events that constitute consciousness, and affect behavior, and leave your
explanation incomplete. You are free to do that.
You are funny, your inability to comprehend what you are being told
doesn't score you points!
It was a simple question, and it was general about any mechanism
following the laws of physics as they are known to us (i.e. don't
directly reference subjective experiences). You can mention a specific
mechanism if you like, it will still fall under the general rule.
You say you understand that any mechanism that followed the laws of
physics as they are known to us, could be explained with the
assumption that there were no subjective experiences. Do you also
understand then that even if the mechanism was responsible for
subjective experiences, that the experiences couldn't influence the
behaviour, which would simply be determined by the mechanism?
well why don't you continue the conversation there, are you stuck?
I'm not impressed with myself. Did you manage to follow the
conversation, or was there anything you didn't comprehend?
Oh no! Not 'someone' again. This is about his fourth
pass and his M.O. is always the same.
Start with a convoluted premise that includes assumption
of the conclusion.
Use lots of equivocation to bury the assumption of
the conclusion.
When someone weeds through the equivocations make
up a new convoluted, equivocal premise and do it
all over again.
Of course it is all quite reasonable to him. It's OK
to assume the conclusion because he just *knows*
consciousness is not physical. And its not equivocation,
he is just trying to find the right explanation.
--
rb
I demonstrated it given P1, which is why you are unable to say why if
P1 were true then P2 wouldn't be, even though you eroneously claimed
P2 didn't follow. So will you admit you were wrong, and that P2 does
follow P1, or will you avoid facing it?
You are free to say why you would object to P1, or perhaps the
original wording you based P1 on:
-------
Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of physics, could
have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it wasn't
conscious (had no subjective experiences).
-------
I'd be interested to hear why I *couldn't* simply explain the
behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the physical mechanism
following the laws of physics (which don't reference subjective
experiences), with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective
experiences.
I wouldn't worry as of yet about your inability to understand the
ramifications, just try to concentrate on understanding the point at
hand, then we can go onto the ramifications after you comprehend some
simple truths.
So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism could be explained
with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective experiences.
Can you follow that this being the case, whether it did or didn't have
any subjective experiences couldn't influence the behaviour, for if it
did, its behaviour could not be explained without taking into account
whether it did or didn't have any subjective experiences?
So were you able to follow the reasoning? If so, did you have any
objections?
Is "driving a car" a behavior?
Is a chemically sedated person (as on an operating
table) conscious?
Yes to both.
So did you manage to understand that the behaviour of any mechanism
stictly following the laws of physics could be explained with the
assumption that it has no subjective experiences?
Well I'm going to bed now, but have a think about it. If your answer
was "yes" then do you understand that it means that any subjective
experiences the mechanism might be thought to be responsible for,
could not in themselves influence behaviour, for if they were an
influence, the behaviour could not be explained without taking them
into account.
If the answer was "no", then why couldn't I explain the behaviour in
terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics (which
don't reference subjective experiences) with the assumption that there
were no subjective experiences.
You're not funny, your inability to comprehend logic doesn't score you
any points. Your failure to answer any of my questions also doesn't
score you any points. Even your failure to respond to your "poisoning
the well" with your first comment of "I was wondering how many on the
atheist page can understand the following" doesn't score you any
points.
> It was a simple question,
Which I answered. Yes, any mechanism "could" occur with no subjective
experience but not all. Which "any mechanism" are you interested in
discussing?
>and it was general about any mechanism
> following the laws of physics as they are known to us (i.e. don't
> directly reference subjective experiences).
Which "any mechanism" do you mean?
>You can mention a specific
> mechanism if you like, it will still fall under the general rule.
So, "if a chicken and a half can lay an egg and a half in a day and a
half, then a cat is like a sidewalk because neither can play the
piano." That seems as an appropriate a "general rule" as yours. Give
me any specific mechanism.
Are you even remotely familiar with logic or the laws of physics? What
experience (subjective or otherwise) do you have with any sort of
education in physics? Is there even a "general rule" of physics that
you could tell me about that "any mechanism" would fall under?
Are you aware of how many types of physics there are? Optics, Nuclear
Theory, Atomic Theory, String Theory, Classical Mechanics, Statistical
Mechanics, General Relativity, Special Relativity, Quantum Mechanics,
Electrodyamics, and more. Which "general rule" covers all of these so
that "any mechanism" would be covered by your statement above?
Can't come up with even ONE example?
> You say you understand that any mechanism that followed the laws of
> physics as they are known to us, could be explained with the
> assumption that there were no subjective experiences.
Yes, again, the operative word is "could." Yes, "any mechanism"
"could" be explained with no subjective experience. But not all.
Do you have any examples that you'd care to share?
Which "any mechanism?"
Why can't you answer that simple question?
>Do you also
> understand then that even if the mechanism was responsible for
> subjective experiences, that the experiences couldn't influence the
> behaviour, which would simply be determined by the mechanism?
You're jumping ahead of yourself. Simply stating that "any mechanism"
"could" be explained with no subjective experience does not mean that
all can be explained with no subjective experience.
In the set of "any mechanisms" are at least three types: those that
can be explained with no subjective experience and those that cannot
as well as those that can be explained with both subjective experience
and without subjective experience. There may be more types. I don't
know. Since you refuse to actually give an example, why should I
continue along with this "influence the behavior" issue?
Which "any mechanism" do you mean?
You've reduced your statement to something totally meaningless. "Any
mechanism" is too general to make any sort of sense in any reasonable
manner. That's like stating "something happened somewhere" without
going into any specifics of "something" or "somewhere."
What specific "any mechanism" are you talking about? Give an example.
Why can't you answer my questions?
Oh, and yes, I can score. Why? Because your logic is very, very
faulty. And you ignore my questions. And you know pretty much nothing
about physics.
Me: 3
You: -15
Try again.
/BC
Your premises are incorrect in that they assume consciousness is not a
physical process, and that the 'laws' of nature are actually correct and
complete.
I said nothing of the sort.
Good thing there is chemistry.
Good thing having it's behavior explained with an *assumption* does not
mean the assumption was valid.
Good thing most of those sentences you probably parroted don't have any real
relation to each other.
We know with absolute certainty that in any situation to date if we
stimulate, injure, or remove certain parts of the brain the results are a
change in consciousness.
If, as you imply consciousness is not a function of biology, why does it
change?
Can it only exist in certain areas?
If yes, if the person has those parts removed are they no longer human?
<snip>
> So, "if a chicken and a half can lay an egg and a half in a day and a
> half, then a cat is like a sidewalk because neither can play the
> piano."
You've captured the essence of 'someone's logic right there.
--
rb #2187
<snip>
>
> I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply
> in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with the
> assumption that there were no subjective experiences, and I defy you to
> point out where I did.
I don't think what you actually say matters to 'someone'.
--
rb