Platonic Philosophy
Darwin
Hello everyone!! First let me say two things: 1) I am not a
Platonist. 2) I am not a theist (of course). 3) My knowledge of
philosophy is minimal, although I am minoring in it and will only
learn more as time passes.
I would like to discuss Plato’s theory of forms, and this post assumes
the reader has at least a minimal understanding of the theory. My
goal is to attract criticism of the theory, or arguments in defense of
the criticisms I levy against it.
As you all know, Plato argued that our world, the mutable,
ever-changing, Heraclitean world of constant flux, is but a shadow of
true reality. The true reality is a unified, unchanging, non-spatial,
non-physical and non-temporal world, and stands in direct relation to
the sensory world that we perceive. The sensory world supposedly
partakes of this world of forms, but this gives rise to several
problems. First, how does the sensory world partake of the world of
forms? If there is a form for Beauty, and I see a beautiful woman,
would I say she has partaken of part of the form Beauty? If I say
this, then every beautiful woman I see would be partaking of part of
the form Beauty, therefore it would be broken into several pieces and
dispersed amongst the women. This cannot be because, as I mentioned
earlier, the world of forms is supposed to be a unity. If we say that
each woman has partaken of the form Beauty as a whole, then it follows
that the form would be separated from itself.
Plato sought to account for this problem by saying that the objects in
the sensory world were simply made in the image of their forms, and
did not necessarily partake of it. This also gives rise to problems.
If it is said that a particular horse is made in the image of the form
‘horse,’ then it follows that not only is the particular horse like
the form of horse, but the form is like the particular horse. Now
consider this: If I say I am like another human, then it follows that
that human is like me. If I am like him, and he is like me, then
there must be some common trait we share, which we will call humanity.
Likewise, the form horse and a particular horse have "horseness" in
common. However, we must also say that the particular horse and
horseness have something in common, which could be called
"horseness2." Horseness and horseness2 also have something in common,
called horseness3, and so on ad infinitum. Most people consider this
to be absurd, because it would no longer make any sense to say the
horse is like anything.
However, cannot the same thing be said of humans? If the reader and I
share a common trait called humanity, then it follows that I am like
humanity. This means that humanity and I share a trait, which would
be humanity2, and so forth ad infinitum. Perhaps a way to escape this
paradox is to say that ‘humanity’ is merely a collection of
individuals that share a particular trait that makes them human. The
ability to empathize is such a trait, and it would make no sense to
say that I have something in common with empathy; only that empathy is
something I have in common with other humans. However, this escape
route cannot be applied to rescue Plato’s problem; or perhaps one
could argue that it does apply. If so, what individual trait does a
particular horse have in common with the form horse, if not the
general horseness?
This has brought another thought to mind. If God created us in his
image, then we are like him and he is like us. Therefore there must
be some trait we have in common, which can be called spirituality.
However, we must also have something in common with spirituality, such
as spirituality2, and so forth ad infinitum. Either we have this
ridiculous paradox, or God does not exist and we all evolved
particular traits that we share. The latter explanation is simpler.
Plato also argued that human knowledge can be divided into four
different categories. 1) Imagining 2) Belief 3) Thinking 4)
Intelligence. Intelligence involves knowledge of "the Good," which
can only be obtained through some kind of intellectual osmosis one
receives from following about a wise man who has gained knowledge of
"the Good." The only way such knowledge can be obtained is by
discourse with this wise man, so the obvious problem is where the
first wise man came from. Does anyone know if Plato answered this
question?
Any comments and criticisms will be greatly appreciated.
Thanks,
Darwin
Peter Kirby
> [snip]
> Likewise, the form horse and a particular horse have "horseness" in
> common. However, we must also say that the particular horse and
> horseness have something in common, which could be called
> "horseness2." Horseness and horseness2 also have something in common,
> called horseness3, and so on ad infinitum. Most people consider this
> to be absurd, because it would no longer make any sense to say the
> horse is like anything.
I'm not sure that I understand the problem; which, of course, does not mean
that I agree with Plato. The form horse equivalent to the neologism
"horseness." "Horseness" should be thought of as some quality or set of
qualities that is present in all horses. Thus, the set of qualities that is
common to "horseness" and any particular horse is identical to the set of
qualities in "horseness."
[snip]
>
> Plato also argued that human knowledge can be divided into four
> different categories. 1) Imagining 2) Belief 3) Thinking 4)
> Intelligence. Intelligence involves knowledge of "the Good," which
> can only be obtained through some kind of intellectual osmosis one
> receives from following about a wise man who has gained knowledge of
> "the Good." The only way such knowledge can be obtained is by
> discourse with this wise man, so the obvious problem is where the
> first wise man came from. Does anyone know if Plato answered this
> question?
Plato advocated the doctrine of reincarnation and prenatal knowledge. Plato
could have held the view that the universe is eternal, including the cycle of
death and rebirth, as most reincarnationists do.
Although I don't remember him addressing this question specifically, he does
refer to an Artificer or Craftsman in some of his writings. The following is
from The Republic, Book X:
"Now take any class of many particulars if you please; for instance, if you
like, there are many beds and tables."
"By all means."
"These have forms, I suppose, underlying them - two in fact: one of the bed,
one of the table."
"Yes."
"Well, we usually say that the craftsman, in making either of these articles
of furniture, keeps his eye upon the ideas, and so makes the beds or tables
which we use accordingly, and so with other things. For I suppose no
craftsman makes the form itself; how could he?"
"He could not."
"Now please consider how you define this Craftsman."
"What one?"
"The one who makes everything that separate handicraftsmen make."
"What a wonderful, clever man you speak of!"
"Wait a minute - you will say that more than ever directly. This same
handicraftsman can make not only furniture, but he makes all that grows in
the earth and fashions all living creatures, all these including himself,
and, besides, earth and heaven and gods, and all that is in heaven above and
in Hades under the earth - he fashions all!"
"There's a marvel! A real wizard!"
"Don't you believe me? Just inform me - do you deny flatly that there could
be such a Craftsman? Or do you think that in one way there could be, and in
another way there could not be, a maker of all these things. Don't you see
that there is a way in which you could make all these things yourself?"
"And what way, if you please?"
"An easy way, craftsman-made everywhere and quickly too; most quickly, I
think, if you just pick up a mirror and carry it everywhere..."
Plato goes on to develop his theory that an artist makes an imitation of a
particular object, just as a craftsman makes an imitation of the form, which
was created by a divine Artificer.
--
Peter Kirby <ki...@earthlink.net>
XTIANITY list owner, alt.atheism atheist #16
Home page: http://home.earthlink.net/~kirby/ (updated 8/27/98)
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <363ffc61...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>
>Hello everyone!! First let me say two things: 1) I am not a
>Platonist. 2) I am not a theist (of course)
I am both.
Technically, I am a Christian Neoplatonist. That will slant my definitions
somewhat.
>
>I would like to discuss Plato’s theory of forms, and this post assumes
>the reader has at least a minimal understanding of the theory. My
>goal is to attract criticism of the theory, or arguments in defense of
>the criticisms I levy against it.
>
I will be defending. :-)
<snip of forms and image intro.>
First, how does the sensory world partake of the world of
>forms? If there is a form for Beauty, and I see a beautiful woman,
>would I say she has partaken of part of the form Beauty? If I say
>this, then every beautiful woman I see would be partaking of part of
>the form Beauty, therefore it would be broken into several pieces and
>dispersed amongst the women. This cannot be because, as I mentioned
>earlier, the world of forms is supposed to be a unity. If we say that
>each woman has partaken of the form Beauty as a whole, then it follows
>that the form would be separated from itself.
>
Have you ever been in a house of mirrors funhouse?
There were all of those reflections looking back at you, each was similar to
you, but none were you. You remained you, despite the existence of
reflections. Pictures, movie video, all the same. They represent part of
you, images of you, but they are not you, nor do they take away from the
you.
The form of Beauty is 'shadowed' in the image of the beautiful woman. The
woman reflects an aspect of Beauty, she partakes of the true Beauty.
Does that help a little?
>Plato sought to account for this problem by saying that the objects in
>the sensory world were simply made in the image of their forms, and
>did not necessarily partake of it. This also gives rise to problems.
>If it is said that a particular horse is made in the image of the form
>‘horse,’ then it follows that not only is the particular horse like
>the form of horse, but the form is like the particular horse.
That is close to correct, in so much as a shadow is "like" the you, and the
you is "like" the shadow.
Now
>consider this: If I say I am like another human, then it follows that
>that human is like me.
Are any two pictures of you, taken at different times identical to one
another?
What of two shadows of you, one cast by the mid-morning sun, the other cast
by a low watt inside bulb?
If I am like him, and he is like me, then
>there must be some common trait we share, which we will call humanity.
More or less.
>Likewise, the form horse and a particular horse have "horseness" in
>common. However, we must also say that the particular horse and
>horseness have something in common, which could be called
>"horseness2." Horseness and horseness2 also have something in common,
>called horseness3, and so on ad infinitum.
Nope. Horseness is the alikeness. Each horseness is the representation at
which the image of the horse is like the form of the Horse. Horseness is a
comparison, not a form separate from the Horse.
>However, cannot the same thing be said of humans? If the reader and I
>share a common trait called humanity, then it follows that I am like
>humanity. This means that humanity and I share a trait, which would
>be humanity2, and so forth ad infinitum.
Again, no. Each humanity is the similarity to the Form Human. Humanity is
not the image of a Form, humanity is the relationship of a human and the
Human.
>say that I have something in common with empathy; only that empathy is
>something I have in common with other humans. However, this escape
Empathy is an interesting choice here. I perceive empathy to be the
"partaking" of the Form. I can know what it is like to be another in as much
as I partake of the Form, and that other human partakes of the Form. Does
empathy have a Form of which it is an image? Yes. (In steps Theism.) God
experiences the Form of empathy, of which we experience the image.
>route cannot be applied to rescue Plato’s problem; or perhaps one
>could argue that it does apply. If so, what individual trait does a
>particular horse have in common with the form horse, if not the
>general horseness?
>
Horseness is the relationship, not an existence in itself.
>This has brought another thought to mind. If God created us in his
>image, then we are like him and he is like us.
BTW, that doctrine is the foundation of Christian Neoplatonism.
Therefore there must
>be some trait we have in common, which can be called spirituality.
>However, we must also have something in common with spirituality, such
>as spirituality2, and so forth ad infinitum.
Spirituality, as you use it here, is the relationship of the image, (man) to
the Form (God).
<snip of 4 types of knowledge>
Intelligence involves knowledge of "the Good," which
>can only be obtained through some kind of intellectual osmosis one
>receives from following about a wise man who has gained knowledge of
>"the Good." The only way such knowledge can be obtained is by
>discourse with this wise man, so the obvious problem is where the
>first wise man came from. Does anyone know if Plato answered this
>question?
>
Plato claimed the first wise man came into existence by a "random" position,
where the first wise man just happened to be closer to the Form than usual.
Platonic and Neoplatonics agree that knowledge can be known in the spirit,
and need not be transmitted person to person.
>Any comments and criticisms will be greatly appreciated.
>
>Thanks,
>
>Darwin
>
Did I help? Or confuse?
I would be interested in continuing this discussion, if such is desirable by
you. The above questions barely touch the surface of the implications of
Platonism, so we have plenty left to discuss, even if you don't challenge
anything I said! And I'm sure you have a critique of my statements.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Peter Kirby wrote in message <36410E...@earthlink.net>...
>Plato goes on to develop his theory that an artist makes an imitation of a
>particular object, just as a craftsman makes an imitation of the form,
which
>was created by a divine Artificer.
>
>--
The modern expression of this theory was articulated by J.R.R. Tolkien as
the act of sub-creation.
I agree whole-heartedly.
kestrel_mp
Darwin
>Technically, I am a Christian Neoplatonist. That will slant my definitions
>somewhat.
You are just the person for whom I was looking. ;)
<snip>
> First, how does the sensory world partake of the world of
>>forms? If there is a form for Beauty, and I see a beautiful woman,
>>would I say she has partaken of part of the form Beauty? If I say
>>this, then every beautiful woman I see would be partaking of part of
>>the form Beauty, therefore it would be broken into several pieces and
>>dispersed amongst the women. This cannot be because, as I mentioned
>>earlier, the world of forms is supposed to be a unity. If we say that
>>each woman has partaken of the form Beauty as a whole, then it follows
>>that the form would be separated from itself.
>>
>
>Have you ever been in a house of mirrors funhouse?
>
>There were all of those reflections looking back at you, each was similar to
>you, but none were you. You remained you, despite the existence of
>reflections. Pictures, movie video, all the same. They represent part of
>you, images of you, but they are not you, nor do they take away from the
>you.
>
>The form of Beauty is 'shadowed' in the image of the beautiful woman. The
>woman reflects an aspect of Beauty, she partakes of the true Beauty.
>
>Does that help a little?
I was with you up until you said "she partakes of the true Beauty." I
can understand, to a certain extent, you saying that the objects of
the sensory world are poor reflections of the true form, but how do
they partake?
Here is another question that I think needs to be addressed: The
'world of forms' is Parmenidean, which means it is immutable and
unmoving. However, if you and I were in that 'house of mirrors' you
spoke of, and you saw my reflection move, would you not infer that I
had also moved? Plato argued that the images and reflections in this
world are related to the actual objects they reflect, just as the
actual objects we see are related to their forms. If I see the
shadows of a horse, and I see the shadows move, then I conclude the
horse is moving. What, then, after observing the horse move, is going
to stop me from inferring that the form 'horse' also moves?
<snip the comments I have no problem with>
> Intelligence involves knowledge of "the Good," which
>>can only be obtained through some kind of intellectual osmosis one
>>receives from following about a wise man who has gained knowledge of
>>"the Good." The only way such knowledge can be obtained is by
>>discourse with this wise man, so the obvious problem is where the
>>first wise man came from. Does anyone know if Plato answered this
>>question?
>>
>
>Plato claimed the first wise man came into existence by a "random" position,
>where the first wise man just happened to be closer to the Form than usual.
>Platonic and Neoplatonics agree that knowledge can be known in the spirit,
>and need not be transmitted person to person.
Can you explain to me how modern neo-Platonism differs from Platonism?
Also, if something is non-spatial, non-temporal, and non-physical,
what exactly is it? And how can it have an 'image' at all?
Do you believe such trivial objects as hair, mud, fingernails, etc.,
have forms? If yes, does that not seem ludicrous? If no, why not?
Thanks,
Darwin
Spiffy
> Kestrel_MP
[snippage]
> >Have you ever been in a house of mirrors funhouse?
> >There were all of those reflections looking back at you, each was similar to
> >you, but none were you. You remained you, despite the existence of
> >reflections. Pictures, movie video, all the same. They represent part of
> >you, images of you, but they are not you, nor do they take away from the
> >you.
> >The form of Beauty is 'shadowed' in the image of the beautiful woman. The
> >woman reflects an aspect of Beauty, she partakes of the true Beauty.
> >Does that help a little?
> can understand, to a certain extent, you saying that the objects of
> the sensory world are poor reflections of the true form, but how do
> they partake?
> Here is another question that I think needs to be addressed: The
> 'world of forms' is Parmenidean, which means it is immutable and
> unmoving. However, if you and I were in that 'house of mirrors' you
> spoke of, and you saw my reflection move, would you not infer that I
> had also moved? Plato argued that the images and reflections in this
> world are related to the actual objects they reflect, just as the
> actual objects we see are related to their forms. If I see the
> shadows of a horse, and I see the shadows move, then I conclude the
> horse is moving. What, then, after observing the horse move, is going
> to stop me from inferring that the form 'horse' also moves?
Good point! Something else to think of is how evolution would place
itself in Plato's theory.
Human beings are noticably taller than they were durring times as recent
as a century ago, as shown by articles of clothing, Civil War tents,
etc. We do not deny that they are the same species as we are, but they
are noticably different from us. Did the forms change to accomidate
this?
As you may guess, I don't subscribe to platonic thought either. This is
in part because as someone studying to be an art teacher I have some
serious problems with Plato's views on art and the value of original
objects vs. copies.
--------=Fare thee well, be loved, and be whole=--------
Aaron "Spiffy" Smith -- delete "NOSPAM" to reply
Links: http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/Towers/3299/
Anime Images: http://members.tripod.com/~Spiffykun2/
---------------=LONG LIVE THE MACINTOSH=----------------
Spiffy
>
> >Plato goes on to develop his theory that an artist makes an imitation of a
> >particular object, just as a craftsman makes an imitation of the form,
> which
> >was created by a divine Artificer.
But then do you see art as having no value other than (to paraphrase
Plato) to honor great men and worship gods? Or does art that dos
neither of these have some kind of worth?
What about artworks that are not copies of something in this world, like
modern art or OPart?
I'm curious as to the opinions that are out there about this.
--
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <364154e9...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>>Technically, I am a Christian Neoplatonist. That will slant my definitions
>>somewhat.
>
>
><snip>
>
Glad I can be of service.
<snip of form/image relationship stuff>
>>Does that help a little?
>
>I was with you up until you said "she partakes of the true Beauty." I
>can understand, to a certain extent, you saying that the objects of
>the sensory world are poor reflections of the true form, but how do
>they partake?
>
Partake is me slipping into philosophic language. Sorry. Reflect is the
better word.
>Here is another question that I think needs to be addressed: The
>'world of forms' is Parmenidean, which means it is immutable and
>unmoving. However, if you and I were in that 'house of mirrors' you
>spoke of, and you saw my reflection move, would you not infer that I
>had also moved? Plato argued that the images and reflections in this
>world are related to the actual objects they reflect, just as the
>actual objects we see are related to their forms. If I see the
>shadows of a horse, and I see the shadows move, then I conclude the
>horse is moving. What, then, after observing the horse move, is going
>to stop me from inferring that the form 'horse' also moves?
>
If you stand still outside throughout the day, does your shadow move? Yes,
as the sun seems to move across the sky, your shadow changes its position in
relationship to you. The shadow has moved, while you stay in the same place.
><snip the comments I have no problem with>
>
>> Intelligence involves knowledge of "the Good," which
>>>can only be obtained through some kind of intellectual osmosis one
>>>receives from following about a wise man who has gained knowledge of
>>>"the Good." The only way such knowledge can be obtained is by
>>>discourse with this wise man, so the obvious problem is where the
>>>first wise man came from. Does anyone know if Plato answered this
>>>question?
>>>
>>
>>Plato claimed the first wise man came into existence by a "random"
position,
>>where the first wise man just happened to be closer to the Form than
usual.
>>Platonic and Neoplatonics agree that knowledge can be known in the spirit,
>>and need not be transmitted person to person.
>
>Can you explain to me how modern neo-Platonism differs from Platonism?
>
Neoplatonics tend to believe that Forms are not necessarily immutable.
Christian Neoplatonics believe that everything is 'shadowed' out of Heaven.
>Also, if something is non-spatial, non-temporal, and non-physical,
>what exactly is it? And how can it have an 'image' at all?
>
I don't believe that Forms are non-physical! In fact, Platonists/Neos
consider the Form to be the physical, while this world is a 'shadow' of true
physicalness!
Another way to approach this is to think of an author writing a novel. In
the novel there will be characters, each of which is based on the author's
experience with other people (and himself!). There will be animals, objects
and landscapes, all of which are based on the author's experience. In the
novel these plot devices and characters interact, in some ways they reflect
the 'image' of the world the author holds. Sometimes the plot will move in
such a way that something happens (a character dies) that is unrelated to
the world. I.e. the person(s) upon whom the character was based need not
have died at all!
(From a Christian perspective, one would say God was the author. What He
used for inspiration, I don't know!)
>Do you believe such trivial objects as hair, mud, fingernails, etc.,
>have forms? If yes, does that not seem ludicrous? If no, why not?
>
I would say that hair, fingernails, etc. represent something that is a part
of human (or animal) Forms. Mud would be a relational Form of earthy stuff
and watery stuff. Thats Neoplatonic, I have no idea what Plato would have
said.
Do subscribe to any of Plato's philosophy? (Political, artistic, etc.)
Have you read any of the more recent Neoplatonics?
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Spiffy wrote in message <3641EC...@geocities.com>...
>Darwin wrote:
>> Kestrel_MP
<snip of image/forms relationship>
>
>Good point! Something else to think of is how evolution would place
>itself in Plato's theory.
>
>Human beings are noticably taller than they were durring times as recent
>as a century ago, as shown by articles of clothing, Civil War tents,
>etc. We do not deny that they are the same species as we are, but they
>are noticably different from us. Did the forms change to accomidate
>this?
>
No! We are just taller images of the same Form! (Think of your shadow as the
sun goes down, it gets taller!)
>As you may guess, I don't subscribe to platonic thought either. This is
>in part because as someone studying to be an art teacher I have some
>serious problems with Plato's views on art and the value of original
>objects vs. copies.
>
Its possible to agree with some Platonism without accepting Plato en toto. I
suspect, for instance, that you would find merit in Platonic political
thought.
kestrel_mp
Budikka
might be nice to illuminate the issue.
Aristotle was a student of Plato.
Plato was a student of Socrates
Socrates was a student of Diotima
Diotima was a woman.
Budikka
psych...@xpoint.at
great autopsy on Plato.
HRG.
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
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Darwin
>Not a lot of people know who taught who back in ancient Greece. I thought it
>might be nice to illuminate the issue.
You could've added:
>Alexander the Great was a student of Aristotle.
>Aristotle was a student of Plato.
>Plato was a student of Socrates
>Socrates was a student of Diotima
>
>Diotima was a woman.
Really? I've never heard of Diotima. From where did you gain this
information?
Darwin
Darwin
<kestr...@hotmail.com<removetag>> wrote:
>
>Darwin wrote in message <364154e9...@news.mindspring.com>...
>>
>>>Technically, I am a Christian Neoplatonist. That will slant my definitions
>>>somewhat.
>>
>>You are just the person for whom I was looking. ;)
>>
>><snip>
>>
>
>Glad I can be of service.
>
><snip of form/image relationship stuff>
>
>>>Does that help a little?
>>
>>I was with you up until you said "she partakes of the true Beauty." I
>>can understand, to a certain extent, you saying that the objects of
>>the sensory world are poor reflections of the true form, but how do
>>they partake?
>>
>
>Partake is me slipping into philosophic language. Sorry. Reflect is the
>better word.
This is the thought police, sir, and we do not allow philosphic
language in here. You will have to find a way to discuss Platonism
without resoring go such language. :-)
Seriously, it appears we have established that the sensory world is a
reflection of, but does not partake of, the world of forms. Correct?
>
>>Here is another question that I think needs to be addressed: The
>>'world of forms' is Parmenidean, which means it is immutable and
>>unmoving. However, if you and I were in that 'house of mirrors' you
>>spoke of, and you saw my reflection move, would you not infer that I
>>had also moved? Plato argued that the images and reflections in this
>>world are related to the actual objects they reflect, just as the
>>actual objects we see are related to their forms. If I see the
>>shadows of a horse, and I see the shadows move, then I conclude the
>>horse is moving. What, then, after observing the horse move, is going
>>to stop me from inferring that the form 'horse' also moves?
>>
>
>If you stand still outside throughout the day, does your shadow move? Yes,
>as the sun seems to move across the sky, your shadow changes its position in
>relationship to you. The shadow has moved, while you stay in the same place.
I do not really find this convincing, because it is not really
consistent with the analogy you are using. Certainly if I stand
outside all day, my shadow will change shapes, but I do not expect my
shadow to take a stroll, or dash off while I remain unmoved. This
seems to be what you are claiming though.
<snip>
>>Can you explain to me how modern neo-Platonism differs from Platonism?
>>
>
>Neoplatonics tend to believe that Forms are not necessarily immutable.
>Christian Neoplatonics believe that everything is 'shadowed' out of Heaven.
If the first statement about Neoplatonism is true, then I don't really
see any point in positing Platonism to begin with, because Plato
introduced it for the purpose of, among other things, solving the
problem of change.
>
>
>>Also, if something is non-spatial, non-temporal, and non-physical,
>>what exactly is it? And how can it have an 'image' at all?
>>
>
>I don't believe that Forms are non-physical! In fact, Platonists/Neos
>consider the Form to be the physical, while this world is a 'shadow' of true
>physicalness!
You only denied the non-physical aspect of forms, do you likewise deny
that they are non-temporal and non-spatial?
>
<snip the book/author analogy>
>
>(From a Christian perspective, one would say God was the author. What He
>used for inspiration, I don't know!)
Glad do see you openly admit ignorance as to where such inspiration
could come from, such honesty is necessary for philosophic discussion.
I'm an atheist (naturalist, whatever), but we'll save the God question
for later. My question to you is this: why do you feel that
Neoplatonism is necessary? What do you think of Aristotle's reworking
of the theory, by which he confined the forms to the sensory world?
>
>>Do you believe such trivial objects as hair, mud, fingernails, etc.,
>>have forms? If yes, does that not seem ludicrous? If no, why not?
>
>I would say that hair, fingernails, etc. represent something that is a part
>of human (or animal) Forms. Mud would be a relational Form of earthy stuff
>and watery stuff. Thats Neoplatonic, I have no idea what Plato would have
>said.
I think Plato eventually said he didn't like thinking of such specific
things, in fact his actual words make me laugh everytime I read them:
"Then, when I have reached that point, I am driven to retreat, for
fear of tumbling into a bottomless pit of nonsense." lol...it has had
the ususal effect on me.
I think he eventually ended up denying that mud and other such trivial
things were real (i.e. they didn't have forms), but were only a
"likely story."
>
>Do subscribe to any of Plato's philosophy? (Political, artistic, etc.)
>Have you read any of the more recent Neoplatonics?
Well, I am not informed enough at this point to form an opinion on his
political and artistic philosophy. Basically what I have thus far
covered in my reading is his epistemology and metaphysics, and some of
the criticisms of his ideas. I have also studied the historical
framework that led him to feel such a theory was necessary, hence I
understand why he posited what he did.
I will say that his major goal was to develop a political theory, but
first he had to prove knowledge was possible. It seems to me, then,
that if his epistemology is underminded, then his metaphysics and
politics must go tumbling down with it. For example, if there is no
form for "Morality," then one would expect evidence for moral
relativism. Well, since most cultures have different standards of
morality, and they can't all be right, it appears that such evidence
abounds. If there is a form for "Morality," then why isn't there more
agreement among the many different cultures? Why haven't more people
found it? After all, you did say that association with a wiseman was
not necessary for such knowledge.
Later,
Darwin
maff91
wrote:
>On 6 Nov 1998 03:05:14 GMT, bud...@aol.com (Budikka) wrote:
>
>>Not a lot of people know who taught who back in ancient Greece. I thought it
>>might be nice to illuminate the issue.
>
>You could've added:
>
>>Alexander the Great was a student of Aristotle.
http://dir.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/History/Ancient_History/Greece/People/Alexander_the_Great/
http://dir.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/Philosophy/Philosophers/Aristotle__384_322_BC_/
>>Aristotle was a student of Plato.
http://dir.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/Philosophy/Philosophers/Plato/
>>Plato was a student of Socrates
http://dir.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/Philosophy/Philosophers/Socrates__470_399_B_C__/
>>Socrates was a student of Diotima
>>
>>Diotima was a woman.
>
>Really? I've never heard of Diotima. From where did you gain this
>information?
http://www.trincoll.edu/academics/departments/phil/philo/phils/diotima.html
>
>Darwin
*****************************************************
"Science is the true theology" -- Thomas Paine
(as quoted in Emerson: The Mind on Fire page 153)
"The Age of Paine" by Jon Katz
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.05/paine.html
*****************************************************
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <3643723e...@news.mindspring.com>...
>On Fri, 06 Nov 1998 01:56:01 GMT, "Kestrel_MP"
><kestr...@hotmail.com<removetag>> wrote:
>
>>
>>Darwin wrote in message <364154e9...@news.mindspring.com>...
>>Partake is me slipping into philosophic language. Sorry. Reflect is the
>>better word.
>
>This is the thought police, sir, and we do not allow philosphic
>language in here. You will have to find a way to discuss Platonism
>without resoring go such language. :-)
>
LOL!
Sometimes its difficult to discuss this stuff, because you get so used to
not explaining it (most people really don't know, and don't care to know
anything about Plato.) that you know what you think, but in explaining you
end up going in circles.
:-)
>Seriously, it appears we have established that the sensory world is a
>reflection of, but does not partake of, the world of forms. Correct?
>
OK. But you understand that "reflect" is a model, and not the exact process,
right?
>>
<snip of why things move>
>>
>>If you stand still outside throughout the day, does your shadow move? Yes,
>>as the sun seems to move across the sky, your shadow changes its position
in
>>relationship to you. The shadow has moved, while you stay in the same
place.
>
>I do not really find this convincing, because it is not really
>consistent with the analogy you are using. Certainly if I stand
>outside all day, my shadow will change shapes, but I do not expect my
>shadow to take a stroll, or dash off while I remain unmoved. This
>seems to be what you are claiming though.
>
The analogy isn't perfect.
As a Neoplatonist, I have no problem with saying the Form could've moved in
some way to. But more to the point, If I take a picture of myself, and the
picture is later digitally altered, am I changed in anyway?
I don't think that Image and Form are inextricably bound, which is what you
seem to be positing.
><snip>
>
>>>Can you explain to me how modern neo-Platonism differs from Platonism?
>>>
>>
>>Neoplatonics tend to believe that Forms are not necessarily immutable.
>>Christian Neoplatonics believe that everything is 'shadowed' out of
Heaven.
>
>If the first statement about Neoplatonism is true, then I don't really
>see any point in positing Platonism to begin with, because Plato
>introduced it for the purpose of, among other things, solving the
>problem of change.
Really!! I didn't know the origin of Platonism myself. I guess I need to do
some more serious reading of the guy. Below you say it was tied to his
political thought, which makes sense, but I've spent more time reading more
modern people than Plato himself. (You know, modern, like Plotinus :-) )
My reasons for Neoplatonism are different from Plato himself.
>>
>>
>>>Also, if something is non-spatial, non-temporal, and non-physical,
>>>what exactly is it? And how can it have an 'image' at all?
>>>
>>
>>I don't believe that Forms are non-physical! In fact, Platonists/Neos
>>consider the Form to be the physical, while this world is a 'shadow' of
true
>>physicalness!
>
>You only denied the non-physical aspect of forms, do you likewise deny
>that they are non-temporal and non-spatial?
>>
Temporality and spatiality are our words for something that the Forms
experience more perfectly. Which is to say, yes, something like time moves
for the Forms, but it is perfect time, something like spatial reality
exists, but it is perfect spatial reality, just as the Forms are the perfect
physical. I don't buy into immutability. Why would the Forms be immutable?
We, the images, are not!
>
>>(From a Christian perspective, one would say God was the author. What He
>>used for inspiration, I don't know!)
>
>Glad do see you openly admit ignorance as to where such inspiration
>could come from, such honesty is necessary for philosophic discussion.
>
Hey, there's a lot of things I'll admit ignorance about!
Like: how do long distance carriers decide what to charge for a minute of
service?
Neoplatonism seems downright simplistic juxtaposed with questions such as
that!
>
>I'm an atheist (naturalist, whatever), but we'll save the God question
>for later. My question to you is this: why do you feel that
>Neoplatonism is necessary?
My reasons for Neoplatonism are tied to my belief in God. To discuss the
one, I must discuss the other.
What do you think of Aristotle's reworking
>of the theory, by which he confined the forms to the sensory world?
>>
I think that for most instances of action and practical thought, Aristotle's
world view is vastly easier to handle, explain, and even live with. For
instance, when I type on this keyboard, I am not wondering what my Form is
doing, and whether or not it also has a Form Keyboard to type on!
Neoplatonism is only necessary when travelling into the esoteric, yet fun,
worlds of epistemology, ethics, theology and metaphysics.
In other words, I think Aristotle was right. And so was Plato. Depends on
the subject matter.
<snip of mud and hair - i.e. the shampoo story>
>>Do subscribe to any of Plato's philosophy? (Political, artistic, etc.)
>>Have you read any of the more recent Neoplatonics?
>
>Well, I am not informed enough at this point to form an opinion on his
>political and artistic philosophy. Basically what I have thus far
>covered in my reading is his epistemology and metaphysics, and some of
>the criticisms of his ideas. I have also studied the historical
>framework that led him to feel such a theory was necessary, hence I
>understand why he posited what he did.
>
Can you recommend some of the critiques of Plato? I would be interested in
exploring the Old Greek a little more. I know the idea of Neoplatonism, but
not the history behind the theories development.
>I will say that his major goal was to develop a political theory, but
>first he had to prove knowledge was possible. It seems to me, then,
>that if his epistemology is underminded, then his metaphysics and
>politics must go tumbling down with it.
Not necessarily. I think Platonic Republicanism can make sense, even if the
Forms concepts are meaningless. A lot of Romantics have agreed with Plato's
ethics, politics and aestetics without really touching on his Forms
ideology.
For example, if there is no
>form for "Morality," then one would expect evidence for moral
>relativism. Well, since most cultures have different standards of
>morality, and they can't all be right, it appears that such evidence
>abounds. If there is a form for "Morality," then why isn't there more
>agreement among the many different cultures? Why haven't more people
>found it?
Couldn't it be argued that enough of a Form of morality can be seen in each
culture to validate the idea of a higher Form of Morality? I know its not
necessary to say that, but consider, every culture has some concept of
murder, sexual misconduct, and stealing, so we could say that part of the
Form forbids certain types of killing, certain types of sex, and theft? I
know their are other reasons for each of these things, but it also fits into
Platonic Morality as well, right?
After all, you did say that association with a wiseman was
>not necessary for such knowledge.
>
Agreed. But I will add that it helps to have some kind of wiseman to assist
in the transmission of knowledge.
>Later,
>
>Darwin
kestrel_mp
Darwin
<snip>
>>I do not really find this convincing, because it is not really
>>consistent with the analogy you are using. Certainly if I stand
>>outside all day, my shadow will change shapes, but I do not expect my
>>shadow to take a stroll, or dash off while I remain unmoved. This
>>seems to be what you are claiming though.
>>
>
>The analogy isn't perfect.
>
>As a Neoplatonist, I have no problem with saying the Form could've moved in
>some way to. But more to the point, If I take a picture of myself, and the
>picture is later digitally altered, am I changed in anyway?
No, but that analogy implies that the 'form' acted on its image.
>
>I don't think that Image and Form are inextricably bound, which is what you
>seem to be positing.
>
I was only attempting to expose the shadow analogy as flawed. Also,
an image a shadow casts is a relationship between items in this world,
but I'm not sure it is appropriate to posit a similar relationship
between the world of forms and our world.
<snip>
>>If the first statement about Neoplatonism is true, then I don't really
>>see any point in positing Platonism to begin with, because Plato
>>introduced it for the purpose of, among other things, solving the
>>problem of change.
>
>
>Really!! I didn't know the origin of Platonism myself. I guess I need to do
>some more serious reading of the guy. Below you say it was tied to his
>political thought, which makes sense, but I've spent more time reading more
>modern people than Plato himself. (You know, modern, like Plotinus :-) )
Yes, Plato was upset about the death of Socrates, and he wished to
posit a political system in which such injustices could not occur.
However, in order to offer the basis for an ideal political system, he
had to first prove that knowledge was possible (the Sophists had
challenged this notion), and that there were discoverable standards
for ethics and truth.
>My reasons for Neoplatonism are different from Plato himself.
You heretic!! :)
>>>>Also, if something is non-spatial, non-temporal, and non-physical,
>>>>what exactly is it? And how can it have an 'image' at all?
>>>>
>>>
>>>I don't believe that Forms are non-physical! In fact, Platonists/Neos
>>>consider the Form to be the physical, while this world is a 'shadow' of
>true
>>>physicalness!
Very different from Plato indeed. Here is a question for you: can
any action taken here in the sensory world change or alter a 'form'?
This is going somewhere, trust me.
>>
>>You only denied the non-physical aspect of forms, do you likewise deny
>>that they are non-temporal and non-spatial?
>>>
>
>Temporality and spatiality are our words for something that the Forms
>experience more perfectly. Which is to say, yes, something like time moves
>for the Forms, but it is perfect time, something like spatial reality
>exists, but it is perfect spatial reality, just as the Forms are the perfect
>physical. I don't buy into immutability. Why would the Forms be immutable?
>We, the images, are not!
Plato posited immutable forms to account for the problem of change.
Take an acorn, for instance. If an acorn turns into a tree, can we
reasonable call the tree an acorn? Of course not, but where did the
acorn go? The acorn could not have become nothing, because there is
no nothing.
Perhaps a better example is you. When you look at yourself in a
picture taken ten years previously, you are looking at yourself. But
you have also changed, so it is not really you. So it is you and not
you at the same time. This is one of the reasons Plato introduced an
immutable, 'other' world. There is a consensus among modern
philosophers that Plato failed to solve the problem, but that
Aristotle did.
<snip>
>>I'm an atheist (naturalist, whatever), but we'll save the God question
>>for later. My question to you is this: why do you feel that
>>Neoplatonism is necessary?
>
>My reasons for Neoplatonism are tied to my belief in God. To discuss the
>one, I must discuss the other.
Okay, why do you believe in God?
>
> What do you think of Aristotle's reworking
>>of the theory, by which he confined the forms to the sensory world?
>>>
>
>I think that for most instances of action and practical thought, Aristotle's
>world view is vastly easier to handle, explain, and even live with. For
>instance, when I type on this keyboard, I am not wondering what my Form is
>doing, and whether or not it also has a Form Keyboard to type on!
lol...
>
>Neoplatonism is only necessary when travelling into the esoteric, yet fun,
>worlds of epistemology, ethics, theology and metaphysics.
Aristotelianism also provides a basis for those realms.
>
>In other words, I think Aristotle was right. And so was Plato. Depends on
>the subject matter.
I would like to elaborate on this later, right now I am still studying
Aristotle. The impression I have gotten so far is that one cannot
accept *both* of them.
>Can you recommend some of the critiques of Plato? I would be interested in
>exploring the Old Greek a little more. I know the idea of Neoplatonism, but
>not the history behind the theories development.
Sure, go check out "A History of Western Philosophy: The Classical
Mind, Second Edition" by W.T. Jones. It's the first volume of a five
volume series. For a quicker read, you might want to try "The Greek
Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle" by W. K. C. Guthrie. I would
recommend the former.
> For example, if there is no
>>form for "Morality," then one would expect evidence for moral
>>relativism. Well, since most cultures have different standards of
>>morality, and they can't all be right, it appears that such evidence
>>abounds. If there is a form for "Morality," then why isn't there more
>>agreement among the many different cultures? Why haven't more people
>>found it?
>
>Couldn't it be argued that enough of a Form of morality can be seen in each
>culture to validate the idea of a higher Form of Morality? I know its not
>necessary to say that, but consider, every culture has some concept of
>murder, sexual misconduct, and stealing, so we could say that part of the
>Form forbids certain types of killing, certain types of sex, and theft? I
>know their are other reasons for each of these things, but it also fits into
>Platonic Morality as well, right?
We could say that, or we could say that morality is simply invented
for societal reasons. Killing and theft certainly have detrimental
effects on society, but "certain types of sex"? What are you talking
about? I am not homosexual, but the Greeks thought homosexualty to be
honorable. If there was "part of a form" that forbid homosexuality,
does it seem likely that people would reach the *opposite* conclusion?
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <3647eb81...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
><snip>
>
>>>I do not really find this convincing, because it is not really
>>>consistent with the analogy you are using. Certainly if I stand
>>>outside all day, my shadow will change shapes, but I do not expect my
>>>shadow to take a stroll, or dash off while I remain unmoved. This
>>>seems to be what you are claiming though.
>>>
>>
>>The analogy isn't perfect.
>>
>>As a Neoplatonist, I have no problem with saying the Form could've moved
in
>>some way to. But more to the point, If I take a picture of myself, and the
>>picture is later digitally altered, am I changed in anyway?
>
>No, but that analogy implies that the 'form' acted on its image.
No. I am stating that the image can be acted upon seperately from the Form.
But then I'm not sure I have a problem with the Form acting upon the image,
either. So whichever way, it doesn't bother me. Plato, of course, would be
horrified at the thought of Forms acting...but thats why I'm Neo-.
>>
>>I don't think that Image and Form are inextricably bound, which is what
you
>>seem to be positing.
>>
>I was only attempting to expose the shadow analogy as flawed. Also,
>an image a shadow casts is a relationship between items in this world,
>but I'm not sure it is appropriate to posit a similar relationship
>between the world of forms and our world.
>
Interesting. What would be the negative consequence of Form/image
interaction? I can think of a problem or two, but I'm interested in your
critique.
><snip>
>
>>>If the first statement about Neoplatonism is true, then I don't really
>>>see any point in positing Platonism to begin with, because Plato
>>>introduced it for the purpose of, among other things, solving the
>>>problem of change.
>>
>>
>>Really!! I didn't know the origin of Platonism myself. I guess I need to
do
>>some more serious reading of the guy. Below you say it was tied to his
>>political thought, which makes sense, but I've spent more time reading
more
>>modern people than Plato himself. (You know, modern, like Plotinus :-) )
>
>Yes, Plato was upset about the death of Socrates, and he wished to
>posit a political system in which such injustices could not occur.
>However, in order to offer the basis for an ideal political system, he
>had to first prove that knowledge was possible (the Sophists had
>challenged this notion), and that there were discoverable standards
>for ethics and truth.
>
>>My reasons for Neoplatonism are different from Plato himself.
>
>You heretic!! :)
>
Ah, yes, the joys of dissention...
>>>>>Also, if something is non-spatial, non-temporal, and non-physical,
>>>>>what exactly is it? And how can it have an 'image' at all?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>I don't believe that Forms are non-physical! In fact, Platonists/Neos
>>>>consider the Form to be the physical, while this world is a 'shadow' of
>>true
>>>>physicalness!
>
>Very different from Plato indeed. Here is a question for you: can
>any action taken here in the sensory world change or alter a 'form'?
>This is going somewhere, trust me.
Hmmm....tough one. Plato would have said "no, images cannot alter Forms".
(He would have been a tad more elegant about it, but you get the point.). In
fact, I'm fairly sure that the classical Neos would say "no" too. I have a
feeling that the Cambridge guys might have said "yes" for their own
metaphysical reasons, and so I'll be trendy and go with the young guys.
Sure, in some (as yet unpostulated) manner, the image can indeed react with
the Form in such a way as to give rise to change in the Form.
I am sure there are nasty consequences of this, but I also have a couple of
philosophical benefits in mind. So this might play out very well.
Ever wanted to participate in the creation of new system of philosophy? We
seem pretty close here.
(unless you can shoot holes in the above, or unless John Scotus or Henry
More already said all of this).
>>>
>>>You only denied the non-physical aspect of forms, do you likewise deny
>>>that they are non-temporal and non-spatial?
>>>>
>>
>>Temporality and spatiality are our words for something that the Forms
>>experience more perfectly. Which is to say, yes, something like time moves
>>for the Forms, but it is perfect time, something like spatial reality
>>exists, but it is perfect spatial reality, just as the Forms are the
perfect
>>physical. I don't buy into immutability. Why would the Forms be immutable?
>>We, the images, are not!
>
>Plato posited immutable forms to account for the problem of change.
>Take an acorn, for instance. If an acorn turns into a tree, can we
>reasonable call the tree an acorn? Of course not, but where did the
>acorn go? The acorn could not have become nothing, because there is
>no nothing.
>
I have no problem with saying the acorn was the tree, just a different
reflection of the same Form.
>Perhaps a better example is you. When you look at yourself in a
>picture taken ten years previously, you are looking at yourself. But
>you have also changed, so it is not really you. So it is you and not
>you at the same time. This is one of the reasons Plato introduced an
>immutable, 'other' world. There is a consensus among modern
>philosophers that Plato failed to solve the problem, but that
>Aristotle did.
>
Again, different reflections of the same thing.
><snip>
>
>>>I'm an atheist (naturalist, whatever), but we'll save the God question
>>>for later. My question to you is this: why do you feel that
>>>Neoplatonism is necessary?
>>
>>My reasons for Neoplatonism are tied to my belief in God. To discuss the
>>one, I must discuss the other.
>
>Okay, why do you believe in God?
Wow. What a question! To be answered in a future post. (Hopefully tomorrow)
>>
>> What do you think of Aristotle's reworking
>>>of the theory, by which he confined the forms to the sensory world?
>>>>
>>
>>I think that for most instances of action and practical thought,
Aristotle's
>>world view is vastly easier to handle, explain, and even live with. For
>>instance, when I type on this keyboard, I am not wondering what my Form is
>>doing, and whether or not it also has a Form Keyboard to type on!
>
>lol...
>>
>>Neoplatonism is only necessary when travelling into the esoteric, yet fun,
>>worlds of epistemology, ethics, theology and metaphysics.
>
>Aristotelianism also provides a basis for those realms.
I think Aristotelianism breaks down rather badly in metaphysics, and comes
completely apart in theology. But you're right to say that both epistemology
and ethics can be dealt with in an Aristotelian manner.
>>
>>In other words, I think Aristotle was right. And so was Plato. Depends on
>>the subject matter.
>
>I would like to elaborate on this later, right now I am still studying
>Aristotle. The impression I have gotten so far is that one cannot
>accept *both* of them.
>
And why not? (I believe Plato to be ultimately correct, but that Aristotle
postulates an effective, workable method of working within Plato's universe)
>>Can you recommend some of the critiques of Plato? I would be interested in
>>exploring the Old Greek a little more. I know the idea of Neoplatonism,
but
>>not the history behind the theories development.
>
>Sure, go check out "A History of Western Philosophy: The Classical
>Mind, Second Edition" by W.T. Jones. It's the first volume of a five
>volume series. For a quicker read, you might want to try "The Greek
>Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle" by W. K. C. Guthrie. I would
>recommend the former.
>
Jones is good, but dense. Give me a day or two with him.
>> For example, if there is no
>>>form for "Morality," then one would expect evidence for moral
>>>relativism. Well, since most cultures have different standards of
>>>morality, and they can't all be right, it appears that such evidence
>>>abounds. If there is a form for "Morality," then why isn't there more
>>>agreement among the many different cultures? Why haven't more people
>>>found it?
>>
>>Couldn't it be argued that enough of a Form of morality can be seen in
each
>>culture to validate the idea of a higher Form of Morality? I know its not
>>necessary to say that, but consider, every culture has some concept of
>>murder, sexual misconduct, and stealing, so we could say that part of the
>>Form forbids certain types of killing, certain types of sex, and theft? I
>>know their are other reasons for each of these things, but it also fits
into
>>Platonic Morality as well, right?
>
>We could say that, or we could say that morality is simply invented
>for societal reasons. Killing and theft certainly have detrimental
>effects on society, but "certain types of sex"? What are you talking
>about? I am not homosexual, but the Greeks thought homosexualty to be
>honorable. If there was "part of a form" that forbid homosexuality,
>does it seem likely that people would reach the *opposite* conclusion?
>
>
I was thinking incest when I said that, not homosexuality. But I do not
believe every culture would completely reflect the entire Form. So that if
the Form said:
Wrong: To kill for pleasure, to kill for profit, to kill for revenge, to
kill for hate
It would not follow that no society would allow blood-debt killing. Society
might say:
Wrong: To kill for pleasure, to kill for profit, to kill for hate
OK: To kill for revenge.
After all, the images are imperfect reflections of the Form.
And I do realize that common morality can be almost completely explained via
Aristotelian methods, undercutting the necessity for a Platonic Form.
However, the Forms theory also fits the facts.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <3647eb81...@news.mindspring.com>...
>>My reasons for Neoplatonism are tied to my belief in God. To discuss the
>>one, I must discuss the other.
>
>Okay, why do you believe in God?
Why do I believe in God:
(BTW, this is the simplistic response; also the following are not arguments
to convince you, but only my reasons, with the connection to Neoplatonism.)
1) Personal Experience
I have had faith centered experiences which point to the existence of God.
In my life, I have seen things which seem to fit in with the idea of God's
benevolence in my life.
Neoplatonic component: Obvious romantic comment. My experience placed
above logic and reason.
2) Testimony of Believers
Others internally consistent relation of events that indicate the existence
of a benevolent God.
Neoplatonic component: Experiential romanticism.
3) First Cause
Somebody made all of this! Otherwise, where did the universe come from?
Neoplatonic component: Actually this one goes to Aristotle. :-)
4) Teleology
Everything works to well to be random development. A Creator must have been
responsible.
Neoplatonic component: A Creator who we imitate, shaping this world in
the image of the Forms.
5) Supernatural Phenomenon
I find the evidence of supernatural phenomenon to be convincing.
Neoplatonic component: Supernatural activities are the action of the
Forms upon the world of the images. For instance, if spirits are the Form of
the image of a human, then a ghost is the Form acting upon the sensory
world.
6) Morality
I believe that morality has a universal component. That is, I believe there
is an absolute morality.
N.C.: God is the Form of our morality.
7) Personal Eschatology
I believe people continue after death.
N.C.: Spirits are the eternal Forms of which we are the image.
8) Knowledge
I believe there is an ultimate truth which can be known.
N.C.: Obvious. Forms are the basis of a priori knowledge, if there
exists an ultimate truth, it should be discoverable via a priori methods.
All of this adds up to a belief in:
A) Spirits
B) Ultimate Truth
C) An Uncaused Cause
D) Experiential Contact with a Deity
E) A Designer whom we imitate.
God.
I see further impacts of each of the above points. If you my connections at
any point seem circular, ask and I will try and explain better. I may be
taking certain assumptions for granted.
kestrel_mp
Darwin
<kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
>Darwin wrote in message <3647eb81...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>>>My reasons for Neoplatonism are tied to my belief in God. To discuss the
>>>one, I must discuss the other.
>>
>>Okay, why do you believe in God?
>
>
>Why do I believe in God:
Just for the record, would you say 'God' is an assumption of your
Platonism, or the ultimate conclusion?
>
>(BTW, this is the simplistic response; also the following are not arguments
>to convince you, but only my reasons, with the connection to Neoplatonism.)
Okay, I still plan to criticize them.
>
>1) Personal Experience
>
>I have had faith centered experiences which point to the existence of God.
>In my life, I have seen things which seem to fit in with the idea of God's
>benevolence in my life.
> Neoplatonic component: Obvious romantic comment. My experience placed
>above logic and reason.
Irrelevant to me, having not experienced any such things (and I was a
Christian for about 15 years). I also apply Hume's maxim when I hear
stories of supernatural phenomena.
>
>2) Testimony of Believers
>
>Others internally consistent relation of events that indicate the existence
>of a benevolent God.
> Neoplatonic component: Experiential romanticism.
I realize you aren't making an argument here, but if you were it would
be circular. Hume's maxim is likewise applicable.
>
>3) First Cause
>
>Somebody made all of this! Otherwise, where did the universe come from?
> Neoplatonic component: Actually this one goes to Aristotle. :-)
Simply because you are an animal that has evolved a mind which is
capable of taking pre-existent matter and manipulating it, it does
*not* follow that the ultimate cause of everything is also a mind of
some sort. Also, evolution is enough to account for life and
complexity. See Hume.
Logically, matter does not have to have a beginning. Neither does
motion, so Aristotle's argument about the "Unmoved Mover" was faulty.
Modern physics has demonstrated that gas molecules can begin to move
for no reason, provided energy is conserved. In principle, this
movement can continue indefinitely.
>
>4) Teleology
>
>Everything works to well to be random development. A Creator must have been
>responsible.
> Neoplatonic component: A Creator who we imitate, shaping this world in
>the image of the Forms.
This confuses evolution with a 'random' process. Cumulative selection
is essentially nonrandom. Dawkins had a lot to say on this point in
"The Blind Watchmaker."
>
>5) Supernatural Phenomenon
>
>I find the evidence of supernatural phenomenon to be convincing.
> Neoplatonic component: Supernatural activities are the action of the
>Forms upon the world of the images. For instance, if spirits are the Form of
>the image of a human, then a ghost is the Form acting upon the sensory
>world.
To the best of my knowledge, such "evidence" has been sought and even
tested, but has never been found or in any way conclusive. I would
like to see a comprehensive listing of such 'evidence,' as well as a
citing of the sources from which the information was derived.
>
>6) Morality
>
>I believe that morality has a universal component. That is, I believe there
>is an absolute morality.
> N.C.: God is the Form of our morality.
As I mentioned in an earlier posting, morality is clearly relative.
Any "universality" can be chalked up to social convention. There have
even been cultures that condoned the butchery of children,
homosexuality, and yes, even incest (Victorian England comes to mind).
>
>7) Personal Eschatology
>
>I believe people continue after death.
> N.C.: Spirits are the eternal Forms of which we are the image.
This has been tested on more than one occassion. Upon request, I will
further elaborate (I'm lazy right now).
>
>8) Knowledge
>
>I believe there is an ultimate truth which can be known.
> N.C.: Obvious. Forms are the basis of a priori knowledge, if there
>exists an ultimate truth, it should be discoverable via a priori methods.
Ultimate truth? Please clarify.
Darwin
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <364ca1aa...@news.mindspring.com>...
>On Fri, 13 Nov 1998 02:46:19 GMT, "Kestrel_MP"
>
>>
>>Darwin wrote in message <3647eb81...@news.mindspring.com>...
>>
>>>>My reasons for Neoplatonism are tied to my belief in God. To discuss the
>>>>one, I must discuss the other.
>>>
>>>Okay, why do you believe in God?
>>
>>
>
>Just for the record, would you say 'God' is an assumption of your
>Platonism, or the ultimate conclusion?
>>
My Platonism is a consequence of my belief in God.
And God is the ultimate conclusion of my Neoplatonic philosophy.
They sustain each other, as would be expected of coherent world-view.
>>(BTW, this is the simplistic response; also the following are not
arguments
>>to convince you, but only my reasons, with the connection to
Neoplatonism.)
>
>Okay, I still plan to criticize them.
I never doubted you would!
>>
>>1) Personal Experience
>>
>>I have had faith centered experiences which point to the existence of God.
>>In my life, I have seen things which seem to fit in with the idea of God's
>>benevolence in my life.
>> Neoplatonic component: Obvious romantic comment. My experience placed
>>above logic and reason.
>
>Irrelevant to me, having not experienced any such things (and I was a
>Christian for about 15 years). I also apply Hume's maxim when I hear
>stories of supernatural phenomena.
Yes, but its part of my own romantic experience.
>>
>>2) Testimony of Believers
>>
>>Others internally consistent relation of events that indicate the
existence
>>of a benevolent God.
>> Neoplatonic component: Experiential romanticism.
>
>I realize you aren't making an argument here, but if you were it would
>be circular. Hume's maxim is likewise applicable.
Not sure why this is circular. Please elaborate.
>>
>>3) First Cause
>>
>>Somebody made all of this! Otherwise, where did the universe come from?
>> Neoplatonic component: Actually this one goes to Aristotle. :-)
>
>Simply because you are an animal that has evolved a mind which is
>capable of taking pre-existent matter and manipulating it, it does
>*not* follow that the ultimate cause of everything is also a mind of
>some sort. Also, evolution is enough to account for life and
>complexity. See Hume.
>
I do not deny evolution.
>Logically, matter does not have to have a beginning. Neither does
>motion, so Aristotle's argument about the "Unmoved Mover" was faulty.
>Modern physics has demonstrated that gas molecules can begin to move
>for no reason, provided energy is conserved. In principle, this
>movement can continue indefinitely.
Personally, I cannot imagine a cyclic state universe without a cause. Even
in the gas molecule example you give, their is an energy shift component, a
cause. More appropriate would be quantum random particle generation theory.
However, I am betting that even random particle generation has a hitherto
undiscovered cause. Everything in this reality has a cause, therefore, I
posit an external cause not operating under this reality's strictures.
>>
>>4) Teleology
>>
>>Everything works to well to be random development. A Creator must have
been
>>responsible.
>> Neoplatonic component: A Creator who we imitate, shaping this world in
>>the image of the Forms.
>
>This confuses evolution with a 'random' process. Cumulative selection
>is essentially nonrandom. Dawkins had a lot to say on this point in
>"The Blind Watchmaker."
I meant random as in "unguided". I believe a guide was necessary.
>>
>>5) Supernatural Phenomenon
>>
>>I find the evidence of supernatural phenomenon to be convincing.
>> Neoplatonic component: Supernatural activities are the action of the
>>Forms upon the world of the images. For instance, if spirits are the Form
of
>>the image of a human, then a ghost is the Form acting upon the sensory
>>world.
>
>To the best of my knowledge, such "evidence" has been sought and even
>tested, but has never been found or in any way conclusive. I would
>like to see a comprehensive listing of such 'evidence,' as well as a
>citing of the sources from which the information was derived.
You mean the evidence was sought and tested using Aristotelian methods of
empirical investigation!
Of course, romantic evidence does not claim to conform to empirical
investigation.
>>
>>6) Morality
>>
>>I believe that morality has a universal component. That is, I believe
there
>>is an absolute morality.
>> N.C.: God is the Form of our morality.
>
>As I mentioned in an earlier posting, morality is clearly relative.
>Any "universality" can be chalked up to social convention. There have
>even been cultures that condoned the butchery of children,
>homosexuality, and yes, even incest (Victorian England comes to mind).
>
Morality need be consistent en toto. If murder is a crime in a majority of
societies, and incest is a crime in a majority of societies, then murder and
incest are examples of the components of the Moral Form. I do not believe
that any society need accept all of the Form of Morality, each society
partakes in its own way. (I know, I used the word partake.)
>>
>>7) Personal Eschatology
>>
>>I believe people continue after death.
>> N.C.: Spirits are the eternal Forms of which we are the image.
>
>This has been tested on more than one occassion. Upon request, I will
>further elaborate (I'm lazy right now).
It has? Please elaborate.
>>
>>8) Knowledge
>>
>>I believe there is an ultimate truth which can be known.
>> N.C.: Obvious. Forms are the basis of a priori knowledge, if there
>>exists an ultimate truth, it should be discoverable via a priori methods.
>
>Ultimate truth? Please clarify.
>
Tried to slip that one in. Ultimate truth=God.
kestrel_mp
Darwin
>>>>Okay, why do you believe in God?
>>>
>>>
>>>Why do I believe in God:
>>
>>Just for the record, would you say 'God' is an assumption of your
>>Platonism, or the ultimate conclusion?
>>>
>
>My Platonism is a consequence of my belief in God.
>And God is the ultimate conclusion of my Neoplatonic philosophy.
>They sustain each other, as would be expected of coherent world-view.
In other words...if one falls, the other falls.
<snip personal experience>
>Yes, but its part of my own romantic experience.
Many people have claimed to experience many things. For instance, do
you believe those who claim to have been abducted by aliens?
>
>>>
>>>2) Testimony of Believers
>>>
>>>Others internally consistent relation of events that indicate the
>existence
>>>of a benevolent God.
>>> Neoplatonic component: Experiential romanticism.
Same alien with big head, big eyes, human like body. Experiments
usually involve some kind of sexual molestation. Pretty consistent
testimonies, are they not?
>>
>>I realize you aren't making an argument here, but if you were it would
>>be circular. Hume's maxim is likewise applicable.
>
>
>Not sure why this is circular. Please elaborate.
To experience God he must first exist to be experienced. To convince
a skeptic, evidence must be provided that does *not* assume the
conclusion.
>I do not deny evolution.
Good, at a later date I plan to post a thread called "Why Evolution
Disproves God." Watch for it, it will probably be about a week from
now though (I have finals coming up).
>
>>Logically, matter does not have to have a beginning. Neither does
>>motion, so Aristotle's argument about the "Unmoved Mover" was faulty.
>>Modern physics has demonstrated that gas molecules can begin to move
>>for no reason, provided energy is conserved. In principle, this
>>movement can continue indefinitely.
>
>Personally, I cannot imagine a cyclic state universe without a cause. Even
>in the gas molecule example you give, their is an energy shift component, a
>cause. More appropriate would be quantum random particle generation theory.
>However, I am betting that even random particle generation has a hitherto
>undiscovered cause. Everything in this reality has a cause, therefore, I
>posit an external cause not operating under this reality's strictures.
Saying you cannot imagine something is not an argument against it, but
is merely an affirmation of incredulity. I do not have enough
knowledge of the quantum theory you spoke of, so I will withold
judgement on that issue.
You appear to be assuming that an infinite regression of causes is
impossible, and it is not. Many theologians have claimed this to be
absurd, but never explained why they thought such. Just as we have an
infinite set of integers, we could likewise have an infinite
regression of causes. To say the whole series of integers must have a
"Captain Integer" would be ridiculous, so it is not necessary that the
whole series of causes have an "ultimate cause."
>>This confuses evolution with a 'random' process. Cumulative selection
>>is essentially nonrandom. Dawkins had a lot to say on this point in
>>"The Blind Watchmaker."
>
>I meant random as in "unguided". I believe a guide was necessary.
Natural selection was that guide, that's the beauty of it!!
>>>
>>>5) Supernatural Phenomenon
>>>
>>>I find the evidence of supernatural phenomenon to be convincing.
>>> Neoplatonic component: Supernatural activities are the action of the
>>>Forms upon the world of the images. For instance, if spirits are the Form
>of
>>>the image of a human, then a ghost is the Form acting upon the sensory
>>>world.
>>
>>To the best of my knowledge, such "evidence" has been sought and even
>>tested, but has never been found or in any way conclusive. I would
>>like to see a comprehensive listing of such 'evidence,' as well as a
>>citing of the sources from which the information was derived.
>
>
>You mean the evidence was sought and tested using Aristotelian methods of
>empirical investigation!
>Of course, romantic evidence does not claim to conform to empirical
>investigation.
Okay, explain to me what you mean by "romantic evidence." To me,
modern scientific methodology is the *best* means by which we can
possibly gain knowledge. Nobody will doubt its efficacy, that's for
sure.
<snip>
>>>7) Personal Eschatology
>>>
>>>I believe people continue after death.
>>> N.C.: Spirits are the eternal Forms of which we are the image.
>>
>>This has been tested on more than one occassion. Upon request, I will
>>further elaborate (I'm lazy right now).
>
>
>It has? Please elaborate.
This will also appear in an upcoming thread "Scientific Methodology
and God," or something along those lines.
Darwin
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <364f386f...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>>>>>Okay, why do you believe in God?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Why do I believe in God:
>>>
>>>Just for the record, would you say 'God' is an assumption of your
>>>Platonism, or the ultimate conclusion?
>>>>
>>
>>My Platonism is a consequence of my belief in God.
>>And God is the ultimate conclusion of my Neoplatonic philosophy.
>>They sustain each other, as would be expected of coherent world-view.
>
>In other words...if one falls, the other falls.
>
Interesting way of putting it.
><snip personal experience>
>
>>Yes, but its part of my own romantic experience.
>
>Many people have claimed to experience many things. For instance, do
>you believe those who claim to have been abducted by aliens?
I believe abduction stories have some basis in reality. What they are
evidence for is still in doubt. I would think that alien abductions would be
more believable to you than religious visions our miraculous happenings.
After all, science has never claimed that aliens cannot exist!
>>
>>>>
>>>>2) Testimony of Believers
>>>>
>>>>Others internally consistent relation of events that indicate the
>>existence
>>>>of a benevolent God.
>>>> Neoplatonic component: Experiential romanticism.
>
>Same alien with big head, big eyes, human like body. Experiments
>usually involve some kind of sexual molestation. Pretty consistent
>testimonies, are they not?
Yes. Consistent enough that I have to give credence to their experience.
Again, I'm not sure what they've experienced, but I for one have no problem
even accepting that they have been abducted!
>>>
>>>I realize you aren't making an argument here, but if you were it would
>>>be circular. Hume's maxim is likewise applicable.
>>
>>
>>Not sure why this is circular. Please elaborate.
>
>To experience God he must first exist to be experienced. To convince
>a skeptic, evidence must be provided that does *not* assume the
>conclusion.
>
I'm not sure this a legit fallacy here. Think about it, to experience an
emotion, did it have to exist before you experienced it? If not, was it
created by your experience? Did it last? Have substance? Is it comparable to
emotions felt by other people? If so, why?
But, if the emotion did exist before you experienced it....then there must
be a Form of that emotion.
And if there are Forms of emotions....
>>I do not deny evolution.
>
>Good, at a later date I plan to post a thread called "Why Evolution
>Disproves God." Watch for it, it will probably be about a week from
>now though (I have finals coming up).
I would be interested in seeing this, as I see no way in which scientific
theories of evolution could possible disprove God.
>>Personally, I cannot imagine a cyclic state universe without a cause. Even
>>in the gas molecule example you give, their is an energy shift component,
a
>>cause. More appropriate would be quantum random particle generation
theory.
>>However, I am betting that even random particle generation has a hitherto
>>undiscovered cause. Everything in this reality has a cause, therefore, I
>>posit an external cause not operating under this reality's strictures.
>
>Saying you cannot imagine something is not an argument against it, but
>is merely an affirmation of incredulity. I do not have enough
>knowledge of the quantum theory you spoke of, so I will withold
>judgement on that issue.
>
I find it more plausible to accept an external mover, than continuous
regression.
>You appear to be assuming that an infinite regression of causes is
>impossible, and it is not. Many theologians have claimed this to be
>absurd, but never explained why they thought such. Just as we have an
>infinite set of integers, we could likewise have an infinite
>regression of causes. To say the whole series of integers must have a
>"Captain Integer" would be ridiculous, so it is not necessary that the
>whole series of causes have an "ultimate cause."
>
Integers are a human construct, and interestingly enough, we created their
infiniteness! However, the ultimate question is: In a universe where all
known things have a cause, can we reasonably assume that there exists no
cause? Or is it rational to postulate an external cause?
>>>This confuses evolution with a 'random' process. Cumulative selection
>>>is essentially nonrandom. Dawkins had a lot to say on this point in
>>>"The Blind Watchmaker."
>>
>>I meant random as in "unguided". I believe a guide was necessary.
>
>Natural selection was that guide, that's the beauty of it!!
Still, natural selection is not a guide, only a method of guiding.
>>>To the best of my knowledge, such "evidence" has been sought and even
>>>tested, but has never been found or in any way conclusive. I would
>>>like to see a comprehensive listing of such 'evidence,' as well as a
>>>citing of the sources from which the information was derived.
>>
>>
>>You mean the evidence was sought and tested using Aristotelian methods of
>>empirical investigation!
>>Of course, romantic evidence does not claim to conform to empirical
>>investigation.
>
>Okay, explain to me what you mean by "romantic evidence."
Impressionism, experiential, a priori logic.
To me,
>modern scientific methodology is the *best* means by which we can
>possibly gain knowledge. Nobody will doubt its efficacy, that's for
>sure.
>
Best only in our current "reality". Empiricism cannot even prove the
existence of reality, hence the solipsist position (which I am not).
><snip>
>
>>>>7) Personal Eschatology
>>>>
>>>>I believe people continue after death.
>>>> N.C.: Spirits are the eternal Forms of which we are the image.
>>>
>>>This has been tested on more than one occassion. Upon request, I will
>>>further elaborate (I'm lazy right now).
>>
>>
>>It has? Please elaborate.
>
>This will also appear in an upcoming thread "Scientific Methodology
>and God," or something along those lines.
>
I would also be interested in this. CC: me a copy if you don't mind.
kestrel_mp
BTW, so far this has been the most civil, informative thread I've been in
with an atheist. If only everyone could get along this way....
Darwin
<snip>
>>
>>Many people have claimed to experience many things. For instance, do
>>you believe those who claim to have been abducted by aliens?
>
>
>I believe abduction stories have some basis in reality. What they are
>evidence for is still in doubt. I would think that alien abductions would be
>more believable to you than religious visions our miraculous happenings.
>After all, science has never claimed that aliens cannot exist!
Perhaps a little more believable, but only because I have no problem
believing that aliens may exist. As far as I know, there could be
several alien civilizations that have evolved and been destroyed
during the vast duration of our universe, and there may be several out
there now. But then again, there may not be; we could be all alone.
However, I do not believe that they have been visiting the earth and
abducting women.
>>>>>
>>>>>2) Testimony of Believers
>>>>>
>>>>>Others internally consistent relation of events that indicate the
>>>existence
>>>>>of a benevolent God.
>>>>> Neoplatonic component: Experiential romanticism.
>>
>>Same alien with big head, big eyes, human like body. Experiments
>>usually involve some kind of sexual molestation. Pretty consistent
>>testimonies, are they not?
>
>
>Yes. Consistent enough that I have to give credence to their experience.
>Again, I'm not sure what they've experienced, but I for one have no problem
>even accepting that they have been abducted!
When Michael Shermer (historian and editor of Skeptic magazine) was
cross-country cycling, he was moving at a break-neck rate and getting
very little food and sleep. At one point he recalled having
hallucinated, and he was looking down on himself from above, similar
to people's out of body experiences. At one point he could no longer
go on, and his friends made him get in the mobile home. At this point
he began hallucinating again, and he believed he was being kidnapped
by aliens. I think similar explanations can be found for all the
other experiences of this nature.
You will also recall that there have often been people who have
claimed to have experienced "near death," out of body occurrences.
There is usually the same light at the end of the tunnel, and a robed
figure that they refer to as either God or a loved one. Well,
psychologists have managed to replicate these same hallucinations with
opium and other drugs.
Again allow me to cite Hume's maxim: One should only believe in
miracles if the *alternative* explanation is even more miraculous. I
have found this to be an excellent epistemological attitude to take.
There are other interesting theories to explain these occurences that
are certainly less miraculous than adhering to what you adhere to. I
would recommend you pick up Shermer's "Why People Believe Weird
Things" or Sagan's "The Demon Haunted World."
Native Americans thought that the Europeans were gods, and they
believed that white people had special healing powers. Believe it or
not, sick Indians would actually get better in the presence of white
people, and when the whites left the village, those same Indians would
relapse and some even died. Does it follow that Europeans are gods?
I think a similar phenomena can account for these so-called "faith
healers," and that is not counting downwright deception.
>>To experience God he must first exist to be experienced. To convince
>>a skeptic, evidence must be provided that does *not* assume the
>>conclusion.
>>
>
>I'm not sure this a legit fallacy here. Think about it, to experience an
>emotion, did it have to exist before you experienced it?
>
>>>I do not deny evolution.
>>
>>Good, at a later date I plan to post a thread called "Why Evolution
>>Disproves God." Watch for it, it will probably be about a week from
>>now though (I have finals coming up).
>
>
>I would be interested in seeing this, as I see no way in which scientific
>theories of evolution could possible disprove God.
Maybe 'disprove' was a bit extreme, but the evidence is overwhelming.
Stay tuned.
>I find it more plausible to accept an external mover, than continuous
>regression.
Why?
>>You appear to be assuming that an infinite regression of causes is
>>impossible, and it is not. Many theologians have claimed this to be
>>absurd, but never explained why they thought such. Just as we have an
>>infinite set of integers, we could likewise have an infinite
>>regression of causes. To say the whole series of integers must have a
>>"Captain Integer" would be ridiculous, so it is not necessary that the
>>whole series of causes have an "ultimate cause."
>>
>
>Integers are a human construct, and interestingly enough, we created their
>infiniteness! However, the ultimate question is: In a universe where all
>known things have a cause, can we reasonably assume that there exists no
>cause? Or is it rational to postulate an external cause?
I think you are in a tight spot here. While it cannot be proven that
every effect must have a cause, it is generally considered to be a
priori knowledge. It is impossible to conceive of an effect without a
cause, so I see no problem with assuming an infinite regression. I
think nothing is gained, or added to the store of human wisdom, by
positing an "external" cause. Such an argument is entirely
speculative.
Are you willing to accept the logical possibility of an infinite
regression? If so, then the first cause cannot be considered a proof
of God. If no, why not? I think you may be having an aesthetic
reaction, most people find the concept rather ugly.
>
>>>>This confuses evolution with a 'random' process. Cumulative selection
>>>>is essentially nonrandom. Dawkins had a lot to say on this point in
>>>>"The Blind Watchmaker."
>>>
>>>I meant random as in "unguided". I believe a guide was necessary.
>>
>>Natural selection was that guide, that's the beauty of it!!
>
>
>Still, natural selection is not a guide, only a method of guiding.
The Design argument is worthless. I think you will agree that certain
laws and concepts that are applicable in some areas of the universe
are not in others, hence the necessity of paradigm shifts. Einstein
demonstrated this truism quite clearly. Now then, as far as we *know*
the mind is something that came about after billions of years of
evolution, and is no more than one more principle of the universe.
How can one possibly posit a "mind" as the ultimate cause and guide of
everything in the universe?
What is so good about natural selection is that it offers an
explanation for biological complexity, and it does so in completely
naturalistic terms. The idea of God is merely a superfluous
postulate, and I see nothing gained by it.
> To me,
>>modern scientific methodology is the *best* means by which we can
>>possibly gain knowledge. Nobody will doubt its efficacy, that's for
>>sure.
>>
>Best only in our current "reality". Empiricism cannot even prove the
>existence of reality, hence the solipsist position (which I am not).
I think the success of science lends credence to it and its
presuppositions. One of those presuppositions is the existence of a
reality, and that the reality is as it appears to be.
What has religion done for us?
Also, if reality did not exist, it would not be possible for people to
share common experiences, as we clearly do. Physicists in Japan have
the same physics that we do, but such cannot be said of religion.
It looks like we are back to the argument you about "internal
consistency," but everyone has a different god, a different religion,
a different prophet, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>>I believe people continue after death.
>>>>> N.C.: Spirits are the eternal Forms of which we are the image.
>>>>
>>>>This has been tested on more than one occassion. Upon request, I will
>>>>further elaborate (I'm lazy right now).
>>>
>>>
>>>It has? Please elaborate.
>>
>>This will also appear in an upcoming thread "Scientific Methodology
>>and God," or something along those lines.
>>
>
>I would also be interested in this. CC: me a copy if you don't mind.
Sure, no problem.
>
>
>kestrel_mp
>
>BTW, so far this has been the most civil, informative thread I've been in
>with an atheist. If only everyone could get along this way....
Yeah, watch out for Stix. :) I try not to take this stuff too
seriously, although I recognize the question to be a serious one.
People deal with things differently, I suppose. Believe it or not, I
have been called arrogant, close-minded, and militant for expressing
my atheist views (and my tone is never different than the one you have
encountered). I write articles for my collegiate newspaper,
and...well...I have had some very interesting e-mails, to say the
least.
Darwin
Fred Stone
There's another explanation for the alien abduction thing: most of the
"testimony" is from folks who were hypnotised, and the consistency is basically
from improper technique on the part of the operator, not the subject. Same with
the "recovered memory" cases of a few years ago. Simply an extreme case of
"leading the witness."
--
Fred
aa # 1369
EAC Microbiologist - Saccharomyces division
Darwin
>There's another explanation for the alien abduction thing: most of the
>"testimony" is from folks who were hypnotised, and the consistency is basically
>from improper technique on the part of the operator, not the subject. Same with
>the "recovered memory" cases of a few years ago. Simply an extreme case of
>"leading the witness."
Exactly, that's one I had forgotten about. There are always more
rational, naturalistic explanations for such phenomena.
Some of those hypnotists are really bad about that, and have even been
known to create false memories of child abuse and other horrid things.
Darwin
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <36511b2...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
This could get lengthy. You were warned.
><snip>
>>>
>>>Many people have claimed to experience many things. For instance, do
>>>you believe those who claim to have been abducted by aliens?
>>
>>
>>I believe abduction stories have some basis in reality. What they are
>>evidence for is still in doubt. I would think that alien abductions would
be
>>more believable to you than religious visions our miraculous happenings.
>>After all, science has never claimed that aliens cannot exist!
>
>Perhaps a little more believable, but only because I have no problem
>believing that aliens may exist. As far as I know, there could be
>several alien civilizations that have evolved and been destroyed
>during the vast duration of our universe, and there may be several out
>there now. But then again, there may not be; we could be all alone.
>However, I do not believe that they have been visiting the earth and
>abducting women.
So you admit the possibility of alien races, you admit multiple witnesses to
supposed abductions, yet you conclude that there is no evidence for alien
encounters. Why is that? It would seem that you have decided that there are
not any alien abductions, and thus dismiss evidence which is clearly
relevant.
Isn't that what atheists accuse theists of?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>2) Testimony of Believers
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Others internally consistent relation of events that indicate the
>>>>existence
>>>>>>of a benevolent God.
>>>>>> Neoplatonic component: Experiential romanticism.
>>>
>>>Same alien with big head, big eyes, human like body. Experiments
>>>usually involve some kind of sexual molestation. Pretty consistent
>>>testimonies, are they not?
>>
>>
>>Yes. Consistent enough that I have to give credence to their experience.
>>Again, I'm not sure what they've experienced, but I for one have no
problem
>>even accepting that they have been abducted!
>
<snip of impressionistic account of non-abduction>]
[applause for the use of impressionistic evidence]
>
>You will also recall that there have often been people who have
>claimed to have experienced "near death," out of body occurrences.
>There is usually the same light at the end of the tunnel, and a robed
>figure that they refer to as either God or a loved one. Well,
>psychologists have managed to replicate these same hallucinations with
>opium and other drugs.
>
Computers can simulate aircraft flight, does that mean there are no
aircraft?
>Again allow me to cite Hume's maxim: One should only believe in
>miracles if the *alternative* explanation is even more miraculous. I
>have found this to be an excellent epistemological attitude to take.
>
So, since one believes interplanetary flight is impossible, one can dismiss
the moon walks as the much more likely fabrication of the government.
Doesn't this line of reasoning lead us into some difficult spots?
<snip of psychosomatic reference>
>>>>I do not deny evolution.
>>>
>>>Good, at a later date I plan to post a thread called "Why Evolution
>>>Disproves God." Watch for it, it will probably be about a week from
>>>now though (I have finals coming up).
>>
>>
>>I would be interested in seeing this, as I see no way in which scientific
>>theories of evolution could possible disprove God.
>
>Maybe 'disprove' was a bit extreme, but the evidence is overwhelming.
>Stay tuned.
>
I think disprove is too strong a word, but then I haven't seen your evidence
yet.
It would have to be very interesting stuff to disprove God.
>>I find it more plausible to accept an external mover, than continuous
>>regression.
>
>Why?
>
At some point, reasonably, the matter had to come from somewhere.
>>>You appear to be assuming that an infinite regression of causes is
>>>impossible, and it is not. Many theologians have claimed this to be
>>>absurd, but never explained why they thought such. Just as we have an
>>>infinite set of integers, we could likewise have an infinite
>>>regression of causes. To say the whole series of integers must have a
>>>"Captain Integer" would be ridiculous, so it is not necessary that the
>>>whole series of causes have an "ultimate cause."
>>>
>>
>>Integers are a human construct, and interestingly enough, we created their
>>infiniteness! However, the ultimate question is: In a universe where all
>>known things have a cause, can we reasonably assume that there exists no
>>cause? Or is it rational to postulate an external cause?
>
>I think you are in a tight spot here. While it cannot be proven that
>every effect must have a cause, it is generally considered to be a
>priori knowledge. It is impossible to conceive of an effect without a
>cause, so I see no problem with assuming an infinite regression. I
>think nothing is gained, or added to the store of human wisdom, by
>positing an "external" cause. Such an argument is entirely
>speculative.
>
>Are you willing to accept the logical possibility of an infinite
>regression? If so, then the first cause cannot be considered a proof
>of God. If no, why not? I think you may be having an aesthetic
>reaction, most people find the concept rather ugly.
I do not see how infinite regression is possible. Stuff had to come from
somewhere. This is one of the keys of the Platonic argument, something a
priori must exist for everything else to exist.
>>
>>>>>This confuses evolution with a 'random' process. Cumulative selection
>>>>>is essentially nonrandom. Dawkins had a lot to say on this point in
>>>>>"The Blind Watchmaker."
>>>>
>>>>I meant random as in "unguided". I believe a guide was necessary.
>>>
>>>Natural selection was that guide, that's the beauty of it!!
>>
>>
>>Still, natural selection is not a guide, only a method of guiding.
>
>The Design argument is worthless. I think you will agree that certain
>laws and concepts that are applicable in some areas of the universe
>are not in others, hence the necessity of paradigm shifts. Einstein
>demonstrated this truism quite clearly.
No, he did not. He demonstrated a way in which the accepted theories did not
work, and then expanded the accepted theories. Eventually science will
demonstrate a way in which Einstein and Newton can be reconciled. (Or else
replace both!)
Now then, as far as we *know*
>the mind is something that came about after billions of years of
>evolution, and is no more than one more principle of the universe.
>How can one possibly posit a "mind" as the ultimate cause and guide of
>everything in the universe?
>
You mean the brain is something that came about over billions of years of
evolution. The "mind" required no evolution that we know of. The mind can
only be known via Platonic inquiry, and we find that the mind is an
expression of the interaction of Form and Image. Evolution brought Image to
the point where interaction with the mind was both practical and desirable.
>What is so good about natural selection is that it offers an
>explanation for biological complexity, and it does so in completely
>naturalistic terms. The idea of God is merely a superfluous
>postulate, and I see nothing gained by it.
>
Even if nothing were gained, it may still be true. (Obviously, I do see a
benefit of God!)
>> To me,
>>>modern scientific methodology is the *best* means by which we can
>>>possibly gain knowledge. Nobody will doubt its efficacy, that's for
>>>sure.
>>>
>>Best only in our current "reality". Empiricism cannot even prove the
>>existence of reality, hence the solipsist position (which I am not).
>
>I think the success of science lends credence to it and its
>presuppositions. One of those presuppositions is the existence of a
>reality, and that the reality is as it appears to be.
>
But the existence of this sensory reality can only be proven by circular
methods. (I see it therefore its there).
If this reality could be proven to be an illusion, then all of science would
be demonstrated as merely the complex rules of an elaborate VR game.
>What has religion done for us?
>
We disagree about the benefits of religion, and I think debating that point
would prove unfruitful.
>Also, if reality did not exist, it would not be possible for people to
>share common experiences, as we clearly do. Physicists in Japan have
>the same physics that we do, but such cannot be said of religion.
>
No, thats not true. If those guys in Japan are in the same VR sim we're in,
then it would be consistent for them to experience the world in the same
manner we do. In fact, as Descartes said, the only thing we can know is that
we exist. Everything else is supposed, contingent existence.
<snip of boring non-argumentative stuff.>
>>BTW, so far this has been the most civil, informative thread I've been in
>>with an atheist. If only everyone could get along this way....
>
>Yeah, watch out for Stix. :)
I've had the dubious pleasure.
I try not to take this stuff too
>seriously, although I recognize the question to be a serious one.
I have to remember that occasionally.
>People deal with things differently, I suppose. Believe it or not, I
>have been called arrogant, close-minded, and militant for expressing
>my atheist views (and my tone is never different than the one you have
>encountered). I write articles for my collegiate newspaper,
>and...well...I have had some very interesting e-mails, to say the
>least.
>
I am often described as a close-minded, militant theist. The word fundie is
used quite a bit. Maff once called me a twit (is that bad? I never could
tell.)
I guess part of it is the expectations. If I expect that you will be an
unreasonable atheist, then I never will be able to talk to you. Of course,
some people are unreasonable...
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <3651ddb1...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>>There's another explanation for the alien abduction thing: most of the
>>"testimony" is from folks who were hypnotised, and the consistency is
basically
>>from improper technique on the part of the operator, not the subject. Same
with
>>the "recovered memory" cases of a few years ago. Simply an extreme case of
>>"leading the witness."
>
>Exactly, that's one I had forgotten about. There are always more
>rational, naturalistic explanations for such phenomena.
>
Ah, but this has a nice romantic explanation too! You see, at the point of
hypnosis and the subsequent "brain-washing", the washers Form interferes
with the interaction of the washees Form and image.
>Some of those hypnotists are really bad about that, and have even been
>known to create false memories of child abuse and other horrid things.
>
And sometimes there is child abuse. You reveal the fallaciousness of your
own reasoning. Thank you!
kestrel_mp
Darwin
<kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
We know children are abused, it is not necessarily an outrageous
claim. Evidence should be proportional to the probability of the
thing testified to. As far as the alien abduction stuff goes, I think
you will admit the evidence is inconclusive. I think you would also
admit that a psychological explanation is more rational.
Hume's maxim.
Darwin
Darwin
<kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>This could get lengthy. You were warned.
>>Perhaps a little more believable, but only because I have no problem
>>believing that aliens may exist. As far as I know, there could be
>>several alien civilizations that have evolved and been destroyed
>>during the vast duration of our universe, and there may be several out
>>there now. But then again, there may not be; we could be all alone.
>>However, I do not believe that they have been visiting the earth and
>>abducting women.
>
>So you admit the possibility of alien races, you admit multiple witnesses to
>supposed abductions, yet you conclude that there is no evidence for alien
>encounters. Why is that? It would seem that you have decided that there are
>not any alien abductions, and thus dismiss evidence which is clearly
>relevant.
The only evidence you have is personal testimony, often from dubious
sources. I have already addressed the 'evidence,' by saying that
these are either hallucinating, deluding themselves, or simply
deceiving people.
'Dollo's Law' informs us of the extreme improbability of evolution
taking the same course, either forward or backward. This is all the
more applicable when the environment is so entirely different. What,
then, are the odds of life evolving on some other planet with two
eyes, two legs and two arms, and very humanoid features?
>
>Isn't that what atheists accuse theists of?
We accuse theists mainly of conjectures and gullibility.
>>You will also recall that there have often been people who have
>>claimed to have experienced "near death," out of body occurrences.
>>There is usually the same light at the end of the tunnel, and a robed
>>figure that they refer to as either God or a loved one. Well,
>>psychologists have managed to replicate these same hallucinations with
>>opium and other drugs.
>>
>
>Computers can simulate aircraft flight, does that mean there are no
>aircraft.
Very good analogy. Computers are programmed by humans to simulate
such things, and aircraft is certainly a human invention. God is
likewise a human invention, and certainly does exist in the mind of
the believer. That is why, when under surgery and oxygen to the brain
is cut off or decreased substantially, hallucinations will occur.
Likewise with the opium, starvation, etc. Native Americans would
starve themselves for days and then claim to have visited the "spirit
world," which usually consisted of animals of some sort. That is a
reflection of the culture in which they lived, just as the "light at
the end of the tunnel" and "God" reflects our culture.
Are you prepared to give credence to the experiences of Indians? What
about those who claim to have experienced Allah, a god very different
than the one you worship.
>
>>Again allow me to cite Hume's maxim: One should only believe in
>>miracles if the *alternative* explanation is even more miraculous. I
>>have found this to be an excellent epistemological attitude to take.
>>
>
>So, since one believes interplanetary flight is impossible, one can dismiss
>the moon walks as the much more likely fabrication of the government.
>Doesn't this line of reasoning lead us into some difficult spots?
Not really, in fact I would find it more miraculous to believe in the
government conspiracy. Again, there is the question of evidence.
>
>>Maybe 'disprove' was a bit extreme, but the evidence is overwhelming.
>>Stay tuned.
>>
>
>I think disprove is too strong a word, but then I haven't seen your evidence
>yet.
>
>It would have to be very interesting stuff to disprove God.
The burden of proof is actually on you. Must I also disprove fairies?
By the way, many people believe in fairies, and I am sure there are
some who will claim to have experienced them.
>
>>>I find it more plausible to accept an external mover, than continuous
>>>regression.
>>
>>Why?
>>
>
>At some point, reasonably, the matter had to come from somewhere.
Well, I don't see why.
>
<snip>
>>I think you are in a tight spot here. While it cannot be proven that
>>every effect must have a cause, it is generally considered to be a
>>priori knowledge. It is impossible to conceive of an effect without a
>>cause, so I see no problem with assuming an infinite regression. I
>>think nothing is gained, or added to the store of human wisdom, by
>>positing an "external" cause. Such an argument is entirely
>>speculative.
>>
>>Are you willing to accept the logical possibility of an infinite
>>regression? If so, then the first cause cannot be considered a proof
>>of God. If no, why not? I think you may be having an aesthetic
>>reaction, most people find the concept rather ugly.
>
>
>I do not see how infinite regression is possible. Stuff had to come from
>somewhere. This is one of the keys of the Platonic argument, something a
>priori must exist for everything else to exist.
I do not see how this is 'a priori.' I see no difficulty believing
that matter has always been, and perhaps always will be.
>
>>The Design argument is worthless. I think you will agree that certain
>>laws and concepts that are applicable in some areas of the universe
>>are not in others, hence the necessity of paradigm shifts. Einstein
>>demonstrated this truism quite clearly.
>
>No, he did not. He demonstrated a way in which the accepted theories did not
>work, and then expanded the accepted theories. Eventually science will
>demonstrate a way in which Einstein and Newton can be reconciled. (Or else
>replace both!)
That may or may not be true, but do you deny that paradigm shifts are
ever needed?
>
> Now then, as far as we *know*
>>the mind is something that came about after billions of years of
>>evolution, and is no more than one more principle of the universe.
>>How can one possibly posit a "mind" as the ultimate cause and guide of
>>everything in the universe?
>>
>
>You mean the brain is something that came about over billions of years of
>evolution. The "mind" required no evolution that we know of. The mind can
>only be known via Platonic inquiry, and we find that the mind is an
>expression of the interaction of Form and Image. Evolution brought Image to
>the point where interaction with the mind was both practical and desirable.
The mind is inextricable from the brain, and we may come to a better
understanding of it as science progresses.
>
>>What is so good about natural selection is that it offers an
>>explanation for biological complexity, and it does so in completely
>>naturalistic terms. The idea of God is merely a superfluous
>>postulate, and I see nothing gained by it.
>>
>
>Even if nothing were gained, it may still be true. (Obviously, I do see a
>benefit of God!)
God might exist, but then again he might not. Since we are talking
about "God," could you define for me what you mean when you say that
word?
Darwin
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <36533b59...@news.mindspring.com>...
>The only evidence you have is personal testimony, often from dubious
>sources. I have already addressed the 'evidence,' by saying that
>these are either hallucinating, deluding themselves, or simply
>deceiving people.
>
I believe their testimony is consistent enough to, and such experiences
happen diffusely enough, that conjecture about non-normal causation is
valid. I do not claim that alien races exist, only that 1) Most probably
their are non-human sentient life-forms 2)Something seems to have happened
to some people
3) 1) and 2) may or may not be related. Who knows, maybe all of the alien
abductions are a big government plot ala the X-files.
>'Dollo's Law' informs us of the extreme improbability of evolution
>taking the same course, either forward or backward. This is all the
>more applicable when the environment is so entirely different. What,
>then, are the odds of life evolving on some other planet with two
>eyes, two legs and two arms, and very humanoid features?
I am unfamiliar with Dollo's Law. Can you provide a reference where I might
examine the argument?
>>Computers can simulate aircraft flight, does that mean there are no
>>aircraft.
>
>Very good analogy. Computers are programmed by humans to simulate
>such things, and aircraft is certainly a human invention.
Computers could simulate the flight of a bird if thats what the programmer
wanted. (Or any of a billion other things for that matter) Which man had
nothing to with creating.
God is
>likewise a human invention,
To an extent the concept of God may be a human construct, that does not mean
God is not real.
(History is also a human construct, in that the past is never fully
recoverable, but we have no problem admitting that something happened in the
past, which we are fallibly studying.)
and certainly does exist in the mind of
>the believer. That is why, when under surgery and oxygen to the brain
>is cut off or decreased substantially, hallucinations will occur.
>Likewise with the opium, starvation, etc. Native Americans would
>starve themselves for days and then claim to have visited the "spirit
>world," which usually consisted of animals of some sort. That is a
>reflection of the culture in which they lived, just as the "light at
>the end of the tunnel" and "God" reflects our culture.
>
>Are you prepared to give credence to the experiences of Indians? What
>about those who claim to have experienced Allah, a god very different
>than the one you worship.
Why would I deny Native American, Indian or Islamic experiences? All lend
credence to my belief in Spirit Forms, and God. While I would interpret
their experience differently, I have no problem at all saying that they
experienced something of the Numinous.
>The burden of proof is actually on you. Must I also disprove fairies?
>By the way, many people believe in fairies, and I am sure there are
>some who will claim to have experienced them.
I am not trying to prove God to you. Belief in God is ultimately a faith
(romantic) matter, and Aristotelian evidence is neither useful nor
particularly valid.
>>
>>>>I find it more plausible to accept an external mover, than continuous
>>>>regression.
>>>
>>>Why?
>>>
>>
>>At some point, reasonably, the matter had to come from somewhere.
>
>Well, I don't see why.
At this point: I guess I don't know why. It doesn't make sense to me (and a
lot of other people) for eternal regression to be true.
>>I do not see how infinite regression is possible. Stuff had to come from
>>somewhere. This is one of the keys of the Platonic argument, something a
>>priori must exist for everything else to exist.
>
>I do not see how this is 'a priori.' I see no difficulty believing
>that matter has always been, and perhaps always will be.
I am arguing that in this reality set that we know, all things have a cause,
all matter/energy has a source, and nothing comes out of nothing. Your claim
of eternal regression is not even scientifically valid, so by what basis do
you make it? Is it a faith matter?
>That may or may not be true, but do you deny that paradigm shifts are
>ever needed?
Of course not! The need for paradigm shifts is an intricate part of the
fallibility of human knowledge, not a difference in the "laws of physics".
>>You mean the brain is something that came about over billions of years of
>>evolution. The "mind" required no evolution that we know of. The mind can
>>only be known via Platonic inquiry, and we find that the mind is an
>>expression of the interaction of Form and Image. Evolution brought Image
to
>>the point where interaction with the mind was both practical and
desirable.
>
>The mind is inextricable from the brain, and we may come to a better
>understanding of it as science progresses.
Platonically, the mind is antecedent to the brain. While I am sure that
science will be able to demonstrate the workings of the brain in ever
increasing complexity, they do not demonstrate the necessity of the abscence
of a soul/mind/Form. Nor can they demonstrate the actual absence of the
soul/mind/Form, as the Form is knowable via experential and impressionistic
(i.e. romantic) means only. Empirical methods cannot penetrate into the
world of the Forms.
The differences in our assumptions shows clearly at this point, wouldn't you
say? In fact, the mind/brain controversy is one of the key dynamics in the
Plato-Aristotle debate.
>God might exist, but then again he might not. Since we are talking
>about "God," could you define for me what you mean when you say that
>word?
Matters for another post. Maybe tomorrow.
Just as an aside, what do you mean when you say "God"?
kestrel_mp
Darwin
<kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
>Darwin wrote in message <36533b59...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>>The only evidence you have is personal testimony, often from dubious
>>sources. I have already addressed the 'evidence,' by saying that
>>these are either hallucinating, deluding themselves, or simply
>>deceiving people.
>>
>
>I believe their testimony is consistent enough to, and such experiences
>happen diffusely enough, that conjecture about non-normal causation is
>valid. I do not claim that alien races exist, only that 1) Most probably
>their are non-human sentient life-forms 2)Something seems to have happened
>to some people
>3) 1) and 2) may or may not be related. Who knows, maybe all of the alien
>abductions are a big government plot ala the X-files.
Ha, not with our media being the way it is. Seriously though, it
seems logical to me to assume that 1 and 2 are not related. During
the medieval ages people claimed to have been molested or cursed by
witches, or to have been visited by angles; now its aliens. It seems
to be a reflection of our culture more than anything else. I think we
can both agree that nobody knows whether or not aliens exist, right?
>
>>'Dollo's Law' informs us of the extreme improbability of evolution
>>taking the same course, either forward or backward. This is all the
>>more applicable when the environment is so entirely different. What,
>>then, are the odds of life evolving on some other planet with two
>>eyes, two legs and two arms, and very humanoid features?
>
>
>I am unfamiliar with Dollo's Law. Can you provide a reference where I might
>examine the argument?
Sure, an excellent argument is made in Dawkins' book "The Blind
Watchmaker," I think it was in the chapter titled "Making Tracks
Through Animal Space." He illustrates the vast improbability quite
excellently with a computer program analogy. Incidentally, he also
argues that in spite of the improbability, similar courses have been
taken several times in convergent evolution. Bats use highly
sophisticated echolocating to navigate, and so do dolphins and other
toothed whales. Weak electric eels use 'electrolocation' to navigate
the waters, the idea being that if a particular 'design' is good
enough to evolve once, then it can evolve again under similar
circumstances. I doubt any alien environments will be anything at all
like ours, but I could be wrong. However, if life forms evolved then
they would probably be unable to come to earth. Just look at all the
difficulties we have encountered while considering the possibility of
establising colonies on Mars!!
>
>>>Computers can simulate aircraft flight, does that mean there are no
>>>aircraft.
>>
>>Very good analogy. Computers are programmed by humans to simulate
>>such things, and aircraft is certainly a human invention.
>
>Computers could simulate the flight of a bird if thats what the programmer
>wanted. (Or any of a billion other things for that matter) Which man had
>nothing to with creating.
I think examing the mind in terms of a computer programmed by the
culture in which it lives could be fruitful. Didn't Daniel Dennett do
something like that?
>
> God is
>>likewise a human invention,
>
>To an extent the concept of God may be a human construct, that does not mean
>God is not real.
>(History is also a human construct, in that the past is never fully
>recoverable, but we have no problem admitting that something happened in the
>past, which we are fallibly studying.)
I think 'God' is nothing but a human construct, a testament to
mankind's imagination. Kind of like fairies...
<snip>
>>The burden of proof is actually on you. Must I also disprove fairies?
>>By the way, many people believe in fairies, and I am sure there are
>>some who will claim to have experienced them.
>
>I am not trying to prove God to you. Belief in God is ultimately a faith
>(romantic) matter, and Aristotelian evidence is neither useful nor
>particularly valid.
If that's the way you want to look at it, sounds like a cop-out to me.
>
>>>
>>>>>I find it more plausible to accept an external mover, than continuous
>>>>>regression.
>>>>
>>>>Why?
>>>>
>>>
>>>At some point, reasonably, the matter had to come from somewhere.
>>
>>Well, I don't see why.
>
>
>At this point: I guess I don't know why. It doesn't make sense to me (and a
>lot of other people) for eternal regression to be true.
I think the 'lot of other people' would probably, if questioned, not
be able to explain why they think that either. If you can't explain
why it doesn't make sense to you, then it seems reasonable that their
is probably no reason; or at least that you don't really understand
such things. Don't get me wrong, I don't understand either...nobody
does, if you get down to it. I only pointed out that an 'infinite
regression' is possible to illustrate that a 'First Cause' is not
necessary, therefore the First Cause argument cannot be considered a
proof of God.
>
>>>I do not see how infinite regression is possible. Stuff had to come from
>>>somewhere. This is one of the keys of the Platonic argument, something a
>>>priori must exist for everything else to exist.
>>
>>I do not see how this is 'a priori.' I see no difficulty believing
>>that matter has always been, and perhaps always will be.
>
>
>I am arguing that in this reality set that we know, all things have a cause,
>all matter/energy has a source, and nothing comes out of nothing. Your claim
>of eternal regression is not even scientifically valid, so by what basis do
>you make it? Is it a faith matter?
Everything you said seems to validate an eternal regression. If
everyting has a cause, something that precedes it, then *everything*
has a cause, ad infinitum.
If you want to say that an "external" force created and set everything
in motion, and therefore that our principles and a priori knowledge
does not apply to this 'force,' then I can just say that our
principles do not apply to anything before the big bang. Matter
could've been popping into existence all the time, and moving itself
or what not, or adhering to some radically different laws. This is a
lot of wild speculation, but so is the idea of 'God.'
Science has nothing to do with my naturalistic philosophy, although
the modern scientific method is what I consider the source of my
epistemology. I don't really think it is a matter of faith, either.
You see, we know matter exists. Assuming it is eternal is therefore
more reasonable than positing 'another realm' for which there is no
evidence. When you do that, you have reached the realm of faith.
Your question tacitly assumes that faith is a bad thing, and with that
I agree.
<snip>
>>The mind is inextricable from the brain, and we may come to a better
>>understanding of it as science progresses.
>
>
>Platonically, the mind is antecedent to the brain. While I am sure that
>science will be able to demonstrate the workings of the brain in ever
>increasing complexity, they do not demonstrate the necessity of the abscence
>of a soul/mind/Form. Nor can they demonstrate the actual absence of the
>soul/mind/Form, as the Form is knowable via experential and impressionistic
>(i.e. romantic) means only. Empirical methods cannot penetrate into the
>world of the Forms.
If the mind is something separate from the brain, then why is it that
protein build-up in the *brain* can destroy memory (i.e. Alzheimers)?
Scientists have poked and prodded the brains of humans and caused them
to recovery memories long since forgotten, and it was a physical
organism which they were poking. This seems to indicate that the mind
and brain are the same thing, or at least inextricable.
>
>The differences in our assumptions shows clearly at this point, wouldn't you
>say? In fact, the mind/brain controversy is one of the key dynamics in the
>Plato-Aristotle debate.
Yes, radically different. It has been said that everyone is born
either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, the latter being the more
down-to-earth, empirical types, the former being more idealistic and
'other-worldly.'
>
>
>>God might exist, but then again he might not. Since we are talking
>>about "God," could you define for me what you mean when you say that
>>word?
>
>
>Matters for another post. Maybe tomorrow.
>
>Just as an aside, what do you mean when you say "God"?
>
I don't know, I find it a meaningless concept. You are the believer,
you tell me!! :)
Darwin
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <3655f392...@news.mindspring.com>...
>On Thu, 19 Nov 1998 02:15:49 GMT, "Kestrel_MP"
><kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
Sorry this response has taken so long.
>>
>>Darwin wrote in message <36533b59...@news.mindspring.com>...
>>
>>>The only evidence you have is personal testimony, often from dubious
>>>sources. I have already addressed the 'evidence,' by saying that
>>>these are either hallucinating, deluding themselves, or simply
>>>deceiving people.
>>>
>>
>>I believe their testimony is consistent enough to, and such experiences
>>happen diffusely enough, that conjecture about non-normal causation is
>>valid. I do not claim that alien races exist, only that 1) Most probably
>>their are non-human sentient life-forms 2)Something seems to have happened
>>to some people
>>3) 1) and 2) may or may not be related. Who knows, maybe all of the alien
>>abductions are a big government plot ala the X-files.
>
>Ha, not with our media being the way it is. Seriously though, it
>seems logical to me to assume that 1 and 2 are not related. During
>the medieval ages people claimed to have been molested or cursed by
>witches, or to have been visited by angles; now its aliens. It seems
>to be a reflection of our culture more than anything else.
And it could be cultural manifestations of the same type of event.
Personally, I lean towards the spirit explanation myself.
I think we
>can both agree that nobody knows whether or not aliens exist, right?
Sure. But I have no problem saying they might!
>Sure, an excellent argument is made in Dawkins' book "The Blind
>Watchmaker," I think it was in the chapter titled "Making Tracks
>Through Animal Space." He illustrates the vast improbability quite
>excellently with a computer program analogy. Incidentally, he also
>argues that in spite of the improbability, similar courses have been
>taken several times in convergent evolution. Bats use highly
>sophisticated echolocating to navigate, and so do dolphins and other
>toothed whales. Weak electric eels use 'electrolocation' to navigate
>the waters, the idea being that if a particular 'design' is good
>enough to evolve once, then it can evolve again under similar
>circumstances. I doubt any alien environments will be anything at all
>like ours, but I could be wrong.
1) If we assume that earth is a suitable life environment then life would
reasonably develop on other earth like worlds.
2) Remember, I believe that God makes special interactions, if He does so,
then life forms would possibly be similar.
However, if life forms evolved then
>they would probably be unable to come to earth. Just look at all the
>difficulties we have encountered while considering the possibility of
>establising colonies on Mars!!
Bad argument. Think how much trouble it took for poor Chris Columbus to get
to the New World. Then look at a Concord.
>I think examing the mind in terms of a computer programmed by the
>culture in which it lives could be fruitful. Didn't Daniel Dennett do
>something like that?
That would be interesting.
>>>The burden of proof is actually on you. Must I also disprove fairies?
>>>By the way, many people believe in fairies, and I am sure there are
>>>some who will claim to have experienced them.
>>
>
>>I am not trying to prove God to you. Belief in God is ultimately a faith
>>(romantic) matter, and Aristotelian evidence is neither useful nor
>>particularly valid.
>
>If that's the way you want to look at it, sounds like a cop-out to me.
Why so? From my (Neoplatonic) perspective, your denial of God seems silly.
<snip of infinite regression stuff which we both agree that we don't
understand>
>If you want to say that an "external" force created and set everything
>in motion, and therefore that our principles and a priori knowledge
>does not apply to this 'force,' then I can just say that our
>principles do not apply to anything before the big bang.
Yes, you could. And once you said such a statement, you would be making a
faith statement. Are you making such a faith statement?
>You see, we know matter exists.
No, actually we don't. Solipsism again.
Assuming it is eternal is therefore
>more reasonable than positing 'another realm' for which there is no
>evidence. When you do that, you have reached the realm of faith.
I have no problem with faith.
>>>The mind is inextricable from the brain, and we may come to a better
>>>understanding of it as science progresses.
>>
>>
>>Platonically, the mind is antecedent to the brain. While I am sure that
>>science will be able to demonstrate the workings of the brain in ever
>>increasing complexity, they do not demonstrate the necessity of the
abscence
>>of a soul/mind/Form. Nor can they demonstrate the actual absence of the
>>soul/mind/Form, as the Form is knowable via experential and
impressionistic
>>(i.e. romantic) means only. Empirical methods cannot penetrate into the
>>world of the Forms.
>
>If the mind is something separate from the brain, then why is it that
>protein build-up in the *brain* can destroy memory (i.e. Alzheimers)?
>Scientists have poked and prodded the brains of humans and caused them
>to recovery memories long since forgotten, and it was a physical
>organism which they were poking. This seems to indicate that the mind
>and brain are the same thing, or at least inextricable.
Radio-controlled cars can be manipulated by the direct application of
electricity to the on-board control system. Does that invalidate the
controller?
>>
>>The differences in our assumptions shows clearly at this point, wouldn't
you
>>say? In fact, the mind/brain controversy is one of the key dynamics in the
>>Plato-Aristotle debate.
>
>Yes, radically different. It has been said that everyone is born
>either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, the latter being the more
>down-to-earth, empirical types, the former being more idealistic and
>'other-worldly.'
I think everyone falls more or less into one of those two categories.
Problems arise when the two try to override each other.
>>Just as an aside, what do you mean when you say "God"?
>>
>I don't know, I find it a meaningless concept. You are the believer,
>you tell me!! :)
>
Ah...but you have something in mind!
Just as you have something in mind when you talk about purple unicorns.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <3655f392...@news.mindspring.com>...
>>>God might exist, but then again he might not. Since we are talking
>>>about "God," could you define for me what you mean when you say that
>>>word?
>>
>>
>>Matters for another post. Maybe tomorrow.
>>
>>Just as an aside, what do you mean when you say "God"?
>>
>I don't know, I find it a meaningless concept. You are the believer,
>you tell me!! :)
>
>Darwin
Here goes:
1) God is the eternal being from which all else proceeds.
2) Within the mind of God their exists all things which we can term good.
3) The act of Creation is the bringing into existence, ex nihilio, those
things which exist in the mind of God.
4) Forms, i.e. spirits, are the direct Creation of God, made closest in His
image.
5) Images, i.e. physical reality, are the secondary creation of God, based
on the Form antecedents.
Attributes of God:
1) Eternal - exists outside of our reality reference.
2) Omnipotent - Capable of all things logically possible in this reality
reference.
3) Omniscience - Knowing all things that actually exist in this reality
reference.
4) Good - As He made everything, He also got to make the rules. However, His
nature is Good.
5) Personal - For whatever reason, He wants to have a relationship with each
and every one of us.
Ways to know God:
1) Special Revelation - The Bible
2) Direct Revelation - God speaking to a person via dreams, visions, etc.
3) General Revelation - Discovering things about the artist from His
Creation
4) Universal Revelation - Common longing for God
Nature of God:
1) External to this reality set.
2) Capable of interacting with this reality set.
3) Ultimate Form of all things.
Specific Things we know about God:
1) Trinity - Father, Son, Holy Ghost
2) Love
3) Forgiving, to the point of personally participating in our forgiveness by
suffering.
Does that help?
kestrel_mp
Darwin
>Sorry this response has taken so long.
Ditto, I've been out of town.
>>Ha, not with our media being the way it is. Seriously though, it
>>seems logical to me to assume that 1 and 2 are not related. During
>>the medieval ages people claimed to have been molested or cursed by
>>witches, or to have been visited by angles; now its aliens. It seems
>>to be a reflection of our culture more than anything else.
>
>And it could be cultural manifestations of the same type of event.
>Personally, I lean towards the spirit explanation myself.
I think the naturalistic explanation is more reasonable. Suppose you
are sitting at home and the doorbell rings, but when you open the door
there is nobody there. Sure, you can conjure up fairies, ghosts,
forms and spirits, and you could probably even formulate some pretty
clever arguments against a skeptic. However, suppose the next day
your neighbor stopped by and confessed that he had rang yesterday, but
then had to leave quickly due to an unforeseeable calamity. You could
maintain that he and the ghosts rang simultaneously, or just that he
rang. Which is it?
People just have overactive imaginations, they tend to see what they
want to. If a satellite comes blazing through our atmosphere, people
claim it is a UFO or (like Billy Graham) a demon of some sort.
>
>
> I think we
>>can both agree that nobody knows whether or not aliens exist, right?
>
>Sure. But I have no problem saying they might!
Nor do I.
>1) If we assume that earth is a suitable life environment then life would
>reasonably develop on other earth like worlds.
Possibly, but keep in mind how improbable the first self-replicating
molecule actually was, then remember how probable it is for
*intelligent* life to evolve. There could be planets full of
wonderful creatures, but none more intelligent than a frog.
>2) Remember, I believe that God makes special interactions, if He does so,
>then life forms would possibly be similar.
Ah...the Divine, Tinkering Finger.
>
>
> However, if life forms evolved then
>>they would probably be unable to come to earth. Just look at all the
>>difficulties we have encountered while considering the possibility of
>>establising colonies on Mars!!
>
>
>Bad argument. Think how much trouble it took for poor Chris Columbus to get
>to the New World. Then look at a Concord.
Yes, but the atmosphere in the New World was not radically different
than the atmosphere in the Old World.
>
<snip>
>
>>>I am not trying to prove God to you. Belief in God is ultimately a faith
>>>(romantic) matter, and Aristotelian evidence is neither useful nor
>>>particularly valid.
>>
>>If that's the way you want to look at it, sounds like a cop-out to me.
>
>Why so? From my (Neoplatonic) perspective, your denial of God seems silly.
Silly? hmm...too bad you don't have any evidence. You make it sound
as if evidence abounds, but frankly there is none (in spite of the
efforts of theologians for century after century, no convincing
arguments have been forthcoming).
It is belief in a God that's silly, just as belief in fairies is
silly.
>
>
><snip of infinite regression stuff which we both agree that we don't
>understand>
I don't understand a lot of things, including relativity and quantum
mechanics. I think an infinite regression is plausible, but who
knows?
>
>>If you want to say that an "external" force created and set everything
>>in motion, and therefore that our principles and a priori knowledge
>>does not apply to this 'force,' then I can just say that our
>>principles do not apply to anything before the big bang.
>
>Yes, you could. And once you said such a statement, you would be making a
>faith statement. Are you making such a faith statement?
No, when people ask me where matter came from, or how everyting got
its beginning, I usually just say "I don't know." I was just
demonstrating how easy it was to postulate wildly. What I said does
make sense though, seeing that before the big bang would be a paradigm
with which we are not familiar.
>
>>You see, we know matter exists.
>
>No, actually we don't. Solipsism again.
Sure we do. Go drive yourself into a brick wall, and you will come to
agree with me.
>
>Assuming it is eternal is therefore
>>more reasonable than positing 'another realm' for which there is no
>>evidence. When you do that, you have reached the realm of faith.
>
>I have no problem with faith.
Faith is a joke because it can be used to justify anything, no matter
how ludicrous.
>
>>If the mind is something separate from the brain, then why is it that
>>protein build-up in the *brain* can destroy memory (i.e. Alzheimers)?
>>Scientists have poked and prodded the brains of humans and caused them
>>to recovery memories long since forgotten, and it was a physical
>>organism which they were poking. This seems to indicate that the mind
>>and brain are the same thing, or at least inextricable.
>
>Radio-controlled cars can be manipulated by the direct application of
>electricity to the on-board control system. Does that invalidate the
>controller?
Interesting analogy. To make this fit my argument, you would have to
assume the car is the equivalent of the human body, and the controller
the brain/mind. If you broke the controller in half and its ability
to influence the car was not affected, I would be impressed.
>
<snip Aristotle/Plato dichotomy>
>>>Just as an aside, what do you mean when you say "God"?
>>>
>>I don't know, I find it a meaningless concept. You are the believer,
>>you tell me!! :)
>>
>Ah...but you have something in mind!
>Just as you have something in mind when you talk about purple unicorns.
Not really, with purple unicorns I have some reference point. I can
understand what they might be like by identifying what they have in
common with horses.
Darwin
Darwin
>Here goes:
>
>1) Hud is the eternal being from which all else proceeds.
How do you know?
>2) Within the mind of Hud their exists all things which we can term good.
How do you know?
>3) The act of Creation is the bringing into existence, ex nihilio, those
>things which exist in the mind of Hud.
Evidence please?
>4) Forms, i.e. spirits, are the direct Creation of Hud, made closest in His
>image.
Ah, I see.
>5) Images, i.e. physical reality, are the secondary creation of Hud, based
>on the Form antecedents.
None of the above is a definition.
>
>
>Attributes of God:
Attributes of Hud:
>
>1) Eternal - exists outside of our reality reference.
>2) Omnipotent - Capable of all things logically possible in this reality
>reference.
>3) Omniscience - Knowing all things that actually exist in this reality
>reference.
>4) Good - As He made everything, He also got to make the rules. However, His
>nature is Good.
>5) Personal - For whatever reason, He wants to have a relationship with each
>and every one of us.
Number one moves Hud out of reach of all rational inquiry. Two and
three list attributes Hud shares with humans, but not what makes Hud
Hud. Four gives rise to the problem of evil. Five is flattering, and
typical of our species.
>Ways to know God:
>
>1) Special Revelation - The Bible
Circular Reasoning.
>2) Direct Revelation - God speaking to a person via dreams, visions, etc.
Primitive way of explaining dreams, I prefer modern psychology.
>3) General Revelation - Discovering things about the artist from His
>Creation
As Hume illustrated, this is an invald inference.
>4) Universal Revelation - Common longing for God
Desire for something does not mean that it exists.
Darwin
Don Antropos
>
>>>I am not trying to prove God to you. Belief in God is ultimately a faith
>>>(romantic) matter, and Aristotelian evidence is neither useful nor
>>>particularly valid.
>>
>>If that's the way you want to look at it, sounds like a cop-out to me.
>
>Why so? From my (Neoplatonic) perspective, your denial of God seems silly.
That seems to be logical, but I'm not sure if I do understand what you
mean. Can you explain to me what your (Neoplatonic) perspective
actually holds? And how would you go about it if you would like to
explain 'faith' to somebody who only holds empirical data to be
trustworthy?
-------------------
Rev. Antropos Esq., Freethinker
Ath.no. #1001 (digitally yours)
"Keep questioning, avoid believing."
The alt.atheism related website:
http://www.signature.nl/alt.atheism/
-------------------
Don Antropos
>
>Darwin wrote in message <3655f392...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>>>>God might exist, but then again he might not. Since we are talking
>>>>about "God," could you define for me what you mean when you say that
>>>>word?
>>>
>>>
>>>Matters for another post. Maybe tomorrow.
>>>
>>>Just as an aside, what do you mean when you say "God"?
>>>
>>I don't know, I find it a meaningless concept. You are the believer,
>>you tell me!! :)
>>
>>Darwin
>
>Here goes:
>
>1) God is the eternal being from which all else proceeds.
>2) Within the mind of God their exists all things which we can term good.
>3) The act of Creation is the bringing into existence, ex nihilio, those
>things which exist in the mind of God.
>4) Forms, i.e. spirits, are the direct Creation of God, made closest in His
>image.
>5) Images, i.e. physical reality, are the secondary creation of God, based
>on the Form antecedents.
>
>
>Attributes of God:
>
>1) Eternal - exists outside of our reality reference.
>2) Omnipotent - Capable of all things logically possible in this reality
>reference.
>3) Omniscience - Knowing all things that actually exist in this reality
>reference.
>4) Good - As He made everything, He also got to make the rules. However, His
>nature is Good.
>5) Personal - For whatever reason, He wants to have a relationship with each
>and every one of us.
>
>Ways to know God:
>
>1) Special Revelation - The Bible
>2) Direct Revelation - God speaking to a person via dreams, visions, etc.
>3) General Revelation - Discovering things about the artist from His
>Creation
>4) Universal Revelation - Common longing for God
>
>Nature of God:
>
>1) External to this reality set.
>2) Capable of interacting with this reality set.
>3) Ultimate Form of all things.
>
>Specific Things we know about God:
>
>1) Trinity - Father, Son, Holy Ghost
>2) Love
>3) Forgiving, to the point of personally participating in our forgiveness by
>suffering.
>
>
>Does that help?
>
It makes your believes very clear to me, thanks. But I really would
like to discuss this 'ways to know god'-stuff. The central word here
is 'revelation'. What is that and how can it be achieved? Is
revelation something which we perceive with our senses, or with our
minds or are there yet other ways to perceive something. And is it
possible to verify any revelation? I mean, suppose somebody came up to
you and said: it has been revealed to me that you need to give me all
your money. Eleven out of nine you wouldn't believe him, or would you?
On what grounds can you judge (or we for that matter) which revelation
is true and which is not? In other words: is there a way to repeat a
revelation and if so, how can that be done? This would be interesting
to know, for it would give us humans a means to find out which parts
of the bible are truthful and which parts are only conjured up by past
frauds.
Do you agree that these questions are important and if not, why not?
Kestrel_MP
Don Antropos wrote in message <36676d73...@news.cistron.nl>...
>"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
>>
>>>>I am not trying to prove God to you. Belief in God is ultimately a faith
>>>>(romantic) matter, and Aristotelian evidence is neither useful nor
>>>>particularly valid.
>>>
>>>If that's the way you want to look at it, sounds like a cop-out to me.
>>
>>Why so? From my (Neoplatonic) perspective, your denial of God seems silly.
>
>mean. Can you explain to me what your (Neoplatonic) perspective
>actually holds? And how would you go about it if you would like to
>explain 'faith' to somebody who only holds empirical data to be
>trustworthy?
>
Neoplatonic romanticisim is the rejection of the proposition that knowledge
and existence are primarily matters of empirical deduction. A romantic
believes that love is real, not just a biochemical reaction. A romantic
believes in spirits. A romantic sees the everyday world as a shadowy
extension of a greater world just beyond the reaches of our sentience.
Ultimately it is a matter of faith. I cannot prove that romantic views of
the world are superior to realist views, nor can a realist prove their views
to be superior to those of a romantic.
This is the central debate that theists and non-theists hit upon
occasionally. Non-theists refuse to realize that Neoplatonic world-views are
equally valid to Aristotelian world-views. In all fairness, many Platonics
make the same error, and assume that if you lack 'faith' in the spiritual
that you are foolish.
I would like to postulate that romanticism and realism both have value, and
that a dialogue between die-hard romantics (such as myself) and die-hard
realists could be both profitable and interesting.
Much of this has to do with presuppositions and starting points. Our
assumptions control the language of the debate, unless we recognize the
problem of language before hand, and make allowances for it.
Faith is not contradictory to empirical evidence, but it does go beyond
empirical evidence.
BTW, romanticism claims to be internally logically consistent, and is not a
matter of what I made it up, so that proves it.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Don Antropos wrote in message <36686ea4...@news.cistron.nl>...
>It makes your believes very clear to me, thanks. But I really would
>like to discuss this 'ways to know god'-stuff. The central word here
>is 'revelation'. What is that and how can it be achieved? Is
>revelation something which we perceive with our senses, or with our
>minds or are there yet other ways to perceive something. And is it
>possible to verify any revelation?
Revelation should be logically and internally consistent. Revelation should
not violate a priori applications of itself.
I mean, suppose somebody came up to
>you and said: it has been revealed to me that you need to give me all
>your money. Eleven out of nine you wouldn't believe him, or would you?
Who revealed it to him?
Why?
The questions are valid, and should be comparable to prior revelatory
experiences.
>On what grounds can you judge (or we for that matter) which revelation
>is true and which is not?
Internal consistency. A priori consistency. At some point a faith step
towards certain authoritativeness is necessary. (That is: I accept the Bible
as revelation, the Bible is then a tool for comparison of other revelations.
Conversely, I see the Bible confirmed by all other manners of revelation
[personal, experential, general, universal])
In other words: is there a way to repeat a
>revelation and if so, how can that be done?
Individually revelation could be discredited. As a whole, and taken as
logical consistency, revelation should be a valid method of knowledge
gathering.
This would be interesting
>to know, for it would give us humans a means to find out which parts
>of the bible are truthful and which parts are only conjured up by past
>frauds.
>Do you agree that these questions are important and if not, why not?
>
The questions are both interesting and valid. However, they do demonstrate a
marked bend towards Aristotelianism.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <365d1358...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>>Sorry this response has taken so long.
>
>Ditto, I've been out of town.
>
And yet again...
>>And it could be cultural manifestations of the same type of event.
>>Personally, I lean towards the spirit explanation myself.
>
>I think the naturalistic explanation is more reasonable. Suppose you
>are sitting at home and the doorbell rings, but when you open the door
>there is nobody there. Sure, you can conjure up fairies, ghosts,
>forms and spirits, and you could probably even formulate some pretty
>clever arguments against a skeptic. However, suppose the next day
>your neighbor stopped by and confessed that he had rang yesterday, but
>then had to leave quickly due to an unforeseeable calamity. You could
>maintain that he and the ghosts rang simultaneously, or just that he
>rang. Which is it?
>
The neighbor ringing today does not mean its the same neighbor ringing
tomorrow. I agree that in general circumstances the more 'realistic'
explanation is appealing. However, I refuse to rule out the possibility of
the supernatural.
>People just have overactive imaginations, they tend to see what they
>want to. If a satellite comes blazing through our atmosphere, people
>claim it is a UFO or (like Billy Graham) a demon of some sort.
And if a Space ship from Alpha Draconis a whizzed by, the science folk would
insist it must have been a stealth bomber.
>>
>>
>> I think we
>>>can both agree that nobody knows whether or not aliens exist, right?
>>
>>Sure. But I have no problem saying they might!
>
>Nor do I.
>
You seem to have a problem with the possibility of alien visitations.
>> However, if life forms evolved then
>>>they would probably be unable to come to earth. Just look at all the
>>>difficulties we have encountered while considering the possibility of
>>>establising colonies on Mars!!
>>
>>
>>Bad argument. Think how much trouble it took for poor Chris Columbus to
get
>>to the New World. Then look at a Concord.
>
>Yes, but the atmosphere in the New World was not radically different
>than the atmosphere in the Old World.
But the agricultural situation was radically different! And it took time to
adapt. Now, however, we can drop into a secluded part of Brazil, slash and
burn, fertilize, plant and sow with only limited difficulty.
>Silly? hmm...too bad you don't have any evidence.
I have no empirical evidence. I have already offered romantic evidence.
>It is belief in a God that's silly, just as belief in fairies is
>silly.
Why are fairies silly?
>
>>>You see, we know matter exists.
>>
>>No, actually we don't. Solipsism again.
>
>Sure we do. Go drive yourself into a brick wall, and you will come to
>agree with me.
Not being a solipsist I have no need of the demonstration. However, back to
my VR analogy. In a computer game the system often stops me from moving
through walls, why is that? Are the walls really there?
>>I have no problem with faith.
>
>Faith is a joke because it can be used to justify anything, no matter
>how ludicrous.
No. Faith must be logically and internally consistent. Faith cannot justify
anything.
>Interesting analogy. To make this fit my argument, you would have to
>assume the car is the equivalent of the human body, and the controller
>the brain/mind. If you broke the controller in half and its ability
>to influence the car was not affected, I would be impressed.
>>
If you broke the controller, the car would be uninfluencable by you. Would
you have ceased to exist? Or would you merely unable to communicate with the
car? For that matter, if the car itself were smashed into itty-bitty pieces,
would you no longer exist?
>>>Just as an aside, what do you mean when you say "God"?
>>>>
>>>I don't know, I find it a meaningless concept. You are the believer,
>>>you tell me!! :)
>>>
>>Ah...but you have something in mind!
>>Just as you have something in mind when you talk about purple unicorns.
>
>Not really, with purple unicorns I have some reference point. I can
>understand what they might be like by identifying what they have in
>common with horses.
You're dodging here. Its a simple question: What do you mean when you say
the word God?
kestrel_mp
Darwin
>>I think the naturalistic explanation is more reasonable. Suppose you
>>are sitting at home and the doorbell rings, but when you open the door
>>there is nobody there. Sure, you can conjure up fairies, ghosts,
>>forms and spirits, and you could probably even formulate some pretty
>>clever arguments against a skeptic. However, suppose the next day
>>your neighbor stopped by and confessed that he had rang yesterday, but
>>then had to leave quickly due to an unforeseeable calamity. You could
>>maintain that he and the ghosts rang simultaneously, or just that he
>>rang. Which is it?
>>
>
>tomorrow. I agree that in general circumstances the more 'realistic'
>explanation is appealing. However, I refuse to rule out the possibility of
>the supernatural.
It is appealing because it is more reasonable, right?
>
>>People just have overactive imaginations, they tend to see what they
>>want to. If a satellite comes blazing through our atmosphere, people
>>claim it is a UFO or (like Billy Graham) a demon of some sort.
>
>
>And if a Space ship from Alpha Draconis a whizzed by, the science folk would
>insist it must have been a stealth bomber.
The 'science folk'? I think this is a misunderstanding of scientific
methodology. Scientists want to be disproved, that is how science
advances. As Popper put it, the goal of science ought to be "to err
err err, but less less less." If we had indisputable evidence of the
said spacecraft, we would be delighted!!!
>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think we
>>>>can both agree that nobody knows whether or not aliens exist, right?
>>>
>>>Sure. But I have no problem saying they might!
>>
>>Nor do I.
>>
>
>You seem to have a problem with the possibility of alien visitations.
Yes I do, and with good reason.
>>Silly? hmm...too bad you don't have any evidence.
>
>I have no empirical evidence. I have already offered romantic evidence.
Empirical evidence is the only sound epistemology.
>
>>It is belief in a God that's silly, just as belief in fairies is
>>silly.
>
>Why are fairies silly?
The same reason God is. Don't tell me you believe in fairies too?
>>
>>>>You see, we know matter exists.
>>>
>>>No, actually we don't. Solipsism again.
>>
>>Sure we do. Go drive yourself into a brick wall, and you will come to
>>agree with me.
>
>Not being a solipsist I have no need of the demonstration. However, back to
>my VR analogy. In a computer game the system often stops me from moving
>through walls, why is that? Are the walls really there?
That interesting, I plan to research "solipsism." More on that later.
>
>>>I have no problem with faith.
>>
>>Faith is a joke because it can be used to justify anything, no matter
>>how ludicrous.
>
>
>No. Faith must be logically and internally consistent. Faith cannot justify
>anything.
Sure it can. Why must faith be logically and internally consistent?
If there is a system of belief that really is logically and internally
consistent, it would be reasonable to believe it. If something is
reasonable to believe, it does not require faith.
Why, then, do your beliefs require faith?
Suppose I told you there was a giant elephant in my house, and that I
wished to show him to you. Suppose further that upon arrival to my
house, I pointed to the center of my room and said "there he is." You
look and see nothing.
I explain this by saying he is invisible. You then move about the
room, feeling for this large beast. After not feeling it, what do you
think? You would think I am lying, would you not?
What if I justified this by saying that the elephant was also
immaterial? Would you not begin to wonder why I believed there was an
elephant there to begin with?
I could easily say I have faith in this elephant, and that one day
this elephant will 'reveal' himself to you. Don't hold your breath.
>
>
>>Interesting analogy. To make this fit my argument, you would have to
>>assume the car is the equivalent of the human body, and the controller
>>the brain/mind. If you broke the controller in half and its ability
>>to influence the car was not affected, I would be impressed.
>>>
>
>If you broke the controller, the car would be uninfluencable by you. Would
>you have ceased to exist? Or would you merely unable to communicate with the
>car? For that matter, if the car itself were smashed into itty-bitty pieces,
>would you no longer exist?
In your analogy, we know there are three entities at work: the car,
the controller, the human. With the 'soul debate' we have three
entities: the body, brain, and mind. The mind and body rely on the
shape and health of the brain.
On what grounds do you go past the body, mind and brain? Is there any
empirical evidence, or any sound arguments for doing so?
>
>
>
>You're dodging here. Its a simple question: What do you mean when you say
>the word God?
It's a simple answer: I find it meaningless. You could substitute the
letters G O D with any other three letters and it would mean the same
to me.
Darwin
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <3662d8a7...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
<snip>
>The 'science folk'? I think this is a misunderstanding of scientific
>methodology. Scientists want to be disproved, that is how science
>advances. As Popper put it, the goal of science ought to be "to err
>err err, but less less less." If we had indisputable evidence of the
>said spacecraft, we would be delighted!!!
I was referencing the group of devout skeptics, not the scientific community
altogethor. I was vague.
>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think we
>>>>>can both agree that nobody knows whether or not aliens exist, right?
>>>>
>>>>Sure. But I have no problem saying they might!
>>>
>>>Nor do I.
>>>
>>
>>You seem to have a problem with the possibility of alien visitations.
>
>Yes I do, and with good reason.
>
Interesting.
>>>Silly? hmm...too bad you don't have any evidence.
>>
>>I have no empirical evidence. I have already offered romantic evidence.
>
>Empirical evidence is the only sound epistemology.
Whoah!
Hang on, this discussion began as an exploration of Platonic epistemology
and the consequences of a romantic world view! Now you want to claim that
Platonism is useless?
>>
>>>It is belief in a God that's silly, just as belief in fairies is
>>>silly.
>>
>>Why are fairies silly?
>
>The same reason God is. Don't tell me you believe in fairies too?
No, that doesn't explain anything. You mean fairies are silly because you
haven't seen any, just as you've never seen God. You claim that reality is
only relevent at the point of your experiencing of it. While that is in some
ways valid, I maintain that other realities might exist which you are never
fortunate enough to experience. I personally go looking for those
experiences. I think you'd close your eyes if a fairy came up and bit you.
>>>
>>>>>You see, we know matter exists.
>>>>
>>>>No, actually we don't. Solipsism again.
>>>
>>>Sure we do. Go drive yourself into a brick wall, and you will come to
>>>agree with me.
>>
>>Not being a solipsist I have no need of the demonstration. However, back
to
>>my VR analogy. In a computer game the system often stops me from moving
>>through walls, why is that? Are the walls really there?
>
>That interesting, I plan to research "solipsism." More on that later.
Please do. Solipsism is the most open attack on materialism there is. I
accept what has been termed modified solipsism, "shadow world" theory, ala
C.S. Lewis.
>>
>>>>I have no problem with faith.
>>>
>>>Faith is a joke because it can be used to justify anything, no matter
>>>how ludicrous.
>>
>>
>>No. Faith must be logically and internally consistent. Faith cannot
justify
>>anything.
>
>Sure it can. Why must faith be logically and internally consistent?
>If there is a system of belief that really is logically and internally
>consistent, it would be reasonable to believe it.
My belief system is logically and internally consistent. Will you profess
your conversion now?
If something is
>reasonable to believe, it does not require faith.
>
Everyone has certain amounts of faith. You have faith that quantum physics
will continue to operate in a reasonable manner, and that gravity won't just
shut itself off one day. Importantly, you also have faith that matter
exists.
>Why, then, do your beliefs require faith?
>
>Suppose I told you there was a giant elephant in my house, and that I
>wished to show him to you. Suppose further that upon arrival to my
>house, I pointed to the center of my room and said "there he is." You
>look and see nothing.
>
>I explain this by saying he is invisible. You then move about the
>room, feeling for this large beast. After not feeling it, what do you
>think? You would think I am lying, would you not?
>
>What if I justified this by saying that the elephant was also
>immaterial? Would you not begin to wonder why I believed there was an
>elephant there to begin with?
>
>I could easily say I have faith in this elephant, and that one day
>this elephant will 'reveal' himself to you. Don't hold your breath.
I would ask several questions:
1) Why do you believe in this elephant?
2) Why does it have characteristics different from other elephants?
3) Has anyone else seen this elephant?
4) Do you have indirect evidence? (Do you have big foot prints in your
bathroom?)
I do wonder why you feel it ok to redefine faith, however. As a practitioner
of faith it would seem that my definition--faith as internally consistent
system of thought--would be more reasonable to accept than the definition
you provide.
>In your analogy, we know there are three entities at work: the car,
>the controller, the human. With the 'soul debate' we have three
>entities: the body, brain, and mind. The mind and body rely on the
>shape and health of the brain.
>
No, you just made a jump. In our analogy, you, the person holding the
controller cannot be effected by the damaging of the controller.
>On what grounds do you go past the body, mind and brain? Is there any
>empirical evidence, or any sound arguments for doing so?
I don't. I claim that mind is separate from body and brain. Empirical
evidence is useless, as the matter of the mind is not empirically knowable.
kestrel_mp
Darwin
>Darwin wrote in message <3662d8a7...@news.mindspring.com>...
>>
>
><snip>
>
>>The 'science folk'? I think this is a misunderstanding of scientific
>>methodology. Scientists want to be disproved, that is how science
>>advances. As Popper put it, the goal of science ought to be "to err
>>err err, but less less less." If we had indisputable evidence of the
>>said spacecraft, we would be delighted!!!
>
>I was referencing the group of devout skeptics, not the scientific community
>altogethor. I was vague.
You seem to have a habit of being vague. I'm a skeptic, but I'm not
so sure about how 'devout' I am.
<snip alien stuff>
>>Empirical evidence is the only sound epistemology.
>
>
>Whoah!
>
>
>Hang on, this discussion began as an exploration of Platonic epistemology
>and the consequences of a romantic world view! Now you want to claim that
>Platonism is useless?
Honestly, I have always thought Platonism was useless. If you can't
know that forms exist, how can you expect forms to be the foundation
of knowing? Perhaps that is being too harsh. If you can't come up
with *any* evidence of forms, then why should anyone believe they
exist? Part of Plato's argument was that objects such as 'triangles'
were objects of thought, hence there must be a form of 'triangle,'
else we would have no point of reference by which we could judge
triangularity. Aristotle pointed out that this was confusing
intellectual analysis with ontological status.
Certainly three feet equals a yard, and this is true no matter where
you are in the universe; but it does not follow that a 'yard' form
must exist. As you pointed out about integers, such measurements are
strictly human conventions.
>
>No, that doesn't explain anything. You mean fairies are silly because you
>haven't seen any, just as you've never seen God. You claim that reality is
>only relevent at the point of your experiencing of it. While that is in some
>ways valid, I maintain that other realities might exist which you are never
>fortunate enough to experience. I personally go looking for those
>experiences. I think you'd close your eyes if a fairy came up and bit you.
Fairies are silly because there is no evidence they exist, nor is
there any way to logically justify their existence. The same goes for
'God.'
>>That interesting, I plan to research "solipsism." More on that later.
>
>Please do. Solipsism is the most open attack on materialism there is. I
>accept what has been termed modified solipsism, "shadow world" theory, ala
>C.S. Lewis.
What I have found so far does not look good for the solipsist
position:
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/solipsis.htm
>>>>>I have no problem with faith.
>>>>
>>>>Faith is a joke because it can be used to justify anything, no matter
>>>>how ludicrous.
>>>
>>>
>>>No. Faith must be logically and internally consistent. Faith cannot
>justify
>>>anything.
>>
>>Sure it can. Why must faith be logically and internally consistent?
>>If there is a system of belief that really is logically and internally
>>consistent, it would be reasonable to believe it.
>
>My belief system is logically and internally consistent. Will you profess
>your conversion now?
Not if the assumptions are irrational. 'Internally consistent'
arguments can be used to justify belief in fairies too, but it is the
belief in fairies/forms that we must analyze for logical credibility.
Anytime you go outside of space and time and start positing
superfluous nonsense such as forms and gods, you have gone beyond the
realm of that which is reasonable. Agree?
>
>Everyone has certain amounts of faith. You have faith that quantum physics
>will continue to operate in a reasonable manner, and that gravity won't just
>shut itself off one day. Importantly, you also have faith that matter
>exists.
Again, I think the existence of matter is self-evident, but I am not
finished researching solipsism.
I do not have faith in science, either. Your argument here is
actually quite silly. You have equated that for which there is no good
reason to believe (god and forms), with that for which there is no
good reason not to believe. For example, if I travel up a hill and I
cannot see other side, I naturally assume the street continues on the
other side of the hill. I do not stop my truck and run to the top of
hill to make sure the road doesn't drop off into some abyss.
I have no good reason to believe gravity will 'shut itself off,' just
as I have no good reason to believe the road ends, or that god exists.
>>
>>Suppose I told you there was a giant elephant in my house, and that I
>>wished to show him to you. Suppose further that upon arrival to my
>>house, I pointed to the center of my room and said "there he is." You
>>look and see nothing.
>>
>>I explain this by saying he is invisible. You then move about the
>>room, feeling for this large beast. After not feeling it, what do you
>>think? You would think I am lying, would you not?
>>
>>What if I justified this by saying that the elephant was also
>>immaterial? Would you not begin to wonder why I believed there was an
>>elephant there to begin with?
>>
>>I could easily say I have faith in this elephant, and that one day
>>this elephant will 'reveal' himself to you. Don't hold your breath.
>
>I would ask several questions:
>
>1) Why do you believe in this elephant?
>2) Why does it have characteristics different from other elephants?
>3) Has anyone else seen this elephant?
>4) Do you have indirect evidence? (Do you have big foot prints in your
>bathroom?)
1) It has revealed itself to me.
2) It possesses those characteristics by its very nature, it is the
ideal elephant. It also created the universe, by the way.
3) I have several friends who it has revealed itself to.
4) I think I have about as much 'indirect' evidence as you do of
'God.'
I recall you saying something once about how conjectures were allowed
in your epistemology. That is curious. Why so? Conjectures, by
their very nature, are unsatisfactory.
>
>
>I do wonder why you feel it ok to redefine faith, however. As a practitioner
>of faith it would seem that my definition--faith as internally consistent
>system of thought--would be more reasonable to accept than the definition
>you provide.
I have no problem with that definition, as long as you add 'for which
there is no evidence to support the presuppositions of.'
>
Darwin
Don Antropos
>
>Don Antropos wrote in message <36686ea4...@news.cistron.nl>...
>
>>It makes your believes very clear to me, thanks. But I really would
>>like to discuss this 'ways to know god'-stuff. The central word here
>>is 'revelation'. What is that and how can it be achieved? Is
>>revelation something which we perceive with our senses, or with our
>>minds or are there yet other ways to perceive something. And is it
>>possible to verify any revelation?
>
>Revelation should be logically and internally consistent. Revelation should
>not violate a priori applications of itself.
Okay, I understand that. But how about external consistency and a
posteriori experience? What if it is in contradiction with the stuff
that we experience in everyday life?
>
>
> I mean, suppose somebody came up to
>>you and said: it has been revealed to me that you need to give me all
>>your money. Eleven out of nine you wouldn't believe him, or would you?
>
>Who revealed it to him?
>Why?
>The questions are valid, and should be comparable to prior revelatory
>experiences.
Experiences by whom? The person in question? Other persons as well?
>
>>On what grounds can you judge (or we for that matter) which revelation
>>is true and which is not?
>
>Internal consistency. A priori consistency.
I'm also interested in the consequences to a posteriori knowledge we
have.
> At some point a faith step
>towards certain authoritativeness is necessary. (That is: I accept the Bible
>as revelation, the Bible is then a tool for comparison of other revelations.
>Conversely, I see the Bible confirmed by all other manners of revelation
>[personal, experential, general, universal])
But then again, how can you decide which authority puts in more weight
in the balance? There have been many revelations and many different
ones at that. This is a matter I'm just not able to solve.
>
> In other words: is there a way to repeat a
>>revelation and if so, how can that be done?
>
>Individually revelation could be discredited. As a whole, and taken as
>logical consistency, revelation should be a valid method of knowledge
>gathering.
This logical consistency is more deductive then inductive, right? But
revelation is something from which we should be able to deduce things.
Isn't it then a kind of induction after all? And if so, what would be
the main difference between empirical evidence and revelational
knowledge?
>
> This would be interesting
>>to know, for it would give us humans a means to find out which parts
>>of the bible are truthful and which parts are only conjured up by past
>>frauds.
>>Do you agree that these questions are important and if not, why not?
>>
>
>
>The questions are both interesting and valid. However, they do demonstrate a
>marked bend towards Aristotelianism.
>
Yes, I don't try to hide that fact. However, I'm also very interested
in how and what determines my point of view and what the difference
would be with other points of view. For instance, how do you and I
know if we are right? What kind of criterium do we use? And what's the
difference between our criteria?
Don Antropos
>
>Don Antropos wrote in message <36676d73...@news.cistron.nl>...
>>"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>>>I am not trying to prove God to you. Belief in God is ultimately a faith
>>>>>(romantic) matter, and Aristotelian evidence is neither useful nor
>>>>>particularly valid.
>>>>
>>>>If that's the way you want to look at it, sounds like a cop-out to me.
>>>
>>>Why so? From my (Neoplatonic) perspective, your denial of God seems silly.
>>
>>That seems to be logical, but I'm not sure if I do understand what you
>>mean. Can you explain to me what your (Neoplatonic) perspective
>>actually holds? And how would you go about it if you would like to
>>explain 'faith' to somebody who only holds empirical data to be
>>trustworthy?
>>
>
>
>
>Neoplatonic romanticisim is the rejection of the proposition that knowledge
>and existence are primarily matters of empirical deduction. A romantic
>believes that love is real, not just a biochemical reaction. A romantic
>believes in spirits. A romantic sees the everyday world as a shadowy
>extension of a greater world just beyond the reaches of our sentience.
>Ultimately it is a matter of faith. I cannot prove that romantic views of
>the world are superior to realist views, nor can a realist prove their views
>to be superior to those of a romantic.
>
>This is the central debate that theists and non-theists hit upon
>occasionally. Non-theists refuse to realize that Neoplatonic world-views are
>equally valid to Aristotelian world-views. In all fairness, many Platonics
>make the same error, and assume that if you lack 'faith' in the spiritual
>that you are foolish.
>
>I would like to postulate that romanticism and realism both have value, and
>that a dialogue between die-hard romantics (such as myself) and die-hard
>realists could be both profitable and interesting.
And how could that dialog take place if they are both using (as it
seems) a completely different frame of truth?
>
>Much of this has to do with presuppositions and starting points. Our
>assumptions control the language of the debate, unless we recognize the
>problem of language before hand, and make allowances for it.
That is very interesting, really. I mean, how can people talk with
each other if their starting point and presuppositions are so
different?
>
>Faith is not contradictory to empirical evidence, but it does go beyond
>empirical evidence.
In what way? Isn't faith founded on experience? How does a child learn
to have faith? Part of it is hear-say, being told by adults, but for
another part it must be experience as well. Or do you have a different
idea about this?
>
>BTW, romanticism claims to be internally logically consistent, and is not a
>matter of what I made it up, so that proves it.
I know and as long as you keep within the boundaries of a set of
presuppositions it will remain consistent. It's the same with
empiricism. Once you leave the frame it makes no more sense, at least
not with the 'old' values. However, how to prove one's framework to be
valid to someone 'outside'? How can we find a common language to even
be able to discuss validity of opinions and believes?
Kestrel_MP
Don Antropos wrote in message <366c2de6...@news.cistron.nl>...
>>Revelation should be logically and internally consistent. Revelation
should
>>not violate a priori applications of itself.
>
>Okay, I understand that. But how about external consistency and a
>posteriori experience? What if it is in contradiction with the stuff
>that we experience in everyday life?
>
At this point in the conversation I am unwilling to concede your point here,
why should a priori be subject to a posteriori? Why should empiricism have
value at all?
This is the whole problem, the central crux of the issue.
I can reasonably refuse any and every proposition made by a materialist on
the grounds that matter might not exist. Just as empiricists reject all of
my arguments on the basis of the unprovability of my assertions.
At this point we are deadlocked.
>>
>>
>> I mean, suppose somebody came up to
>>>you and said: it has been revealed to me that you need to give me all
>>>your money. Eleven out of nine you wouldn't believe him, or would you?
>>
>>Who revealed it to him?
>>Why?
>>The questions are valid, and should be comparable to prior revelatory
>>experiences.
>
>Experiences by whom? The person in question? Other persons as well?
To others, myself.
>
>>
>>>On what grounds can you judge (or we for that matter) which revelation
>>>is true and which is not?
>>
>>Internal consistency. A priori consistency.
>
>I'm also interested in the consequences to a posteriori knowledge we
>have.
Until a posteriori can be proven without recourse to itself, then I see no
reason to measure faith matters by empirical standards.
>
>> At some point a faith step
>>towards certain authoritativeness is necessary. (That is: I accept the
Bible
>>as revelation, the Bible is then a tool for comparison of other
revelations.
>>Conversely, I see the Bible confirmed by all other manners of revelation
>>[personal, experential, general, universal])
>
>But then again, how can you decide which authority puts in more weight
>in the balance? There have been many revelations and many different
>ones at that. This is a matter I'm just not able to solve.
There are ways, and I believe that they involve the a priori consistency of
various revelations. Tentatively, I will at this point acknowledge that one
of my criteria for the evaluation of faith systems is there consequential
results on the empirical world. (That is, a system advocating love is
intrinsically better than a system advocating hate. Correspondingly, the
love system would be more a priori correct, because it can reasonably
deduced that a perfect being, ie. God, would be a being consistent with
love. Platonically, God and love can be equated at the supra-formal level.)
>>
>> In other words: is there a way to repeat a
>>>revelation and if so, how can that be done?
>>
>>Individually revelation could be discredited. As a whole, and taken as
>>logical consistency, revelation should be a valid method of knowledge
>>gathering.
>
>This logical consistency is more deductive then inductive, right? But
>revelation is something from which we should be able to deduce things.
>Isn't it then a kind of induction after all? And if so, what would be
>the main difference between empirical evidence and revelational
>knowledge?
In my system, revelation and empirical evidence hold equal value in rational
considerations. Certain areas more pertain to faith, others to empiricism. I
believe that one can be sufficiently intelligent so as to understand the
necessity of different modes of inquiry for different disciplines.
>
>>
>> This would be interesting
>>>to know, for it would give us humans a means to find out which parts
>>>of the bible are truthful and which parts are only conjured up by past
>>>frauds.
>>>Do you agree that these questions are important and if not, why not?
>>>
>>
>>
>>The questions are both interesting and valid. However, they do demonstrate
a
>>marked bend towards Aristotelianism.
>>
>
>Yes, I don't try to hide that fact. However, I'm also very interested
>in how and what determines my point of view and what the difference
>would be with other points of view. For instance, how do you and I
>know if we are right?
Thats a very good question. How can we? I am willing to engage in a debate
to determine this, if, and only if, both empiricism and romanticism can be
given absolutely equal weight in the consideration.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Don Antropos wrote in message <366b2c6a...@news.cistron.nl>...
>>I would like to postulate that romanticism and realism both have value,
and
>>that a dialogue between die-hard romantics (such as myself) and die-hard
>>realists could be both profitable and interesting.
>
>And how could that dialog take place if they are both using (as it
>seems) a completely different frame of truth?
>
What if we agreed to give equal credence to both systems of epistemology?
>>
>>Much of this has to do with presuppositions and starting points. Our
>>assumptions control the language of the debate, unless we recognize the
>>problem of language before hand, and make allowances for it.
>
>That is very interesting, really. I mean, how can people talk with
>each other if their starting point and presuppositions are so
>different?
They have to find a common ground. I am willing to look for such a refrence
frame.
(Would post-modernism be such a reference point?)
>
>>
>>Faith is not contradictory to empirical evidence, but it does go beyond
>>empirical evidence.
>
>In what way? Isn't faith founded on experience? How does a child learn
>to have faith? Part of it is hear-say, being told by adults, but for
>another part it must be experience as well. Or do you have a different
>idea about this?
Again, this is a direct question about methods of gaining knowledge. Why do
some people accept faith? Why do others demand empirical evidence? Why do
some people become solipsists?
>
>>
>>BTW, romanticism claims to be internally logically consistent, and is not
a
>>matter of what I made it up, so that proves it.
>
>I know and as long as you keep within the boundaries of a set of
>presuppositions it will remain consistent. It's the same with
>empiricism. Once you leave the frame it makes no more sense, at least
>not with the 'old' values.
I agree. Many atheists and theists have a problem understanding that.
However, how to prove one's framework to be
>valid to someone 'outside'? How can we find a common language to even
>be able to discuss validity of opinions and believes?
>
I think its worth trying.
Post-modernist discourse would seem to offer at least a tentative way to
approach the subject.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
>
>>I would like to postulate that romanticism and realism both have value,
and
>>that a dialogue between die-hard romantics (such as myself) and die-hard
>>realists could be both profitable and interesting.
>
>And how could that dialog take place if they are both using (as it
>seems) a completely different frame of truth?
>
I would like to make an attempt at such a dialogue.
<snip of excellent questions which will only make sense if a common ground
can be found>
Would you consider post-modernist methodologies as a possible bridge of the
romantic/rationalist gap?
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <3665d2f...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>>I was referencing the group of devout skeptics, not the scientific
community
>>altogethor. I was vague.
>
>You seem to have a habit of being vague. I'm a skeptic, but I'm not
>so sure about how 'devout' I am.
>
lol. Yes, occasionally I do avoid commiting to details...and yes, you seem
to be a devout skeptic.
>
>>>Empirical evidence is the only sound epistemology.
>>
>>
>>Whoah!
>>
>>
>>Hang on, this discussion began as an exploration of Platonic epistemology
>>and the consequences of a romantic world view! Now you want to claim that
>>Platonism is useless?
>
>Honestly, I have always thought Platonism was useless. If you can't
>know that forms exist, how can you expect forms to be the foundation
>of knowing? Perhaps that is being too harsh. If you can't come up
>with *any* evidence of forms, then why should anyone believe they
>exist?
Forms are a consequence of the epistemology. If you accept romanticism, then
forms do make sense.
Part of Plato's argument was that objects such as 'triangles'
>were objects of thought, hence there must be a form of 'triangle,'
>else we would have no point of reference by which we could judge
>triangularity. Aristotle pointed out that this was confusing
>intellectual analysis with ontological status.
>
And I respond that ontology can be a valid method of gaining knowledge.
>Certainly three feet equals a yard, and this is true no matter where
>you are in the universe; but it does not follow that a 'yard' form
>must exist. As you pointed out about integers, such measurements are
>strictly human conventions.
Yet triangles exist, whether we name them or not.
>Fairies are silly because there is no evidence they exist, nor is
>there any way to logically justify their existence. The same goes for
>'God.'
>
No empirical evidence. I will short-hand that as e.e. from now on to point
out the circularity of your arguments.
>>>That interesting, I plan to research "solipsism." More on that later.
>>
>>Please do. Solipsism is the most open attack on materialism there is. I
>>accept what has been termed modified solipsism, "shadow world" theory, ala
>>C.S. Lewis.
>
>What I have found so far does not look good for the solipsist
>position:
>
>http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/solipsis.htm
>
This site does a good job describing the basic school of solipsist thought.
However, it only addresses the condition of the lack of existence of an
inter-entity environment for the exchange of dialogue. I agree. The purist
claim for the lack of knowing the existence of the other is untenable. I can
continue to maintain however that only the other and the self may be know.
Empiricism is the illusion of an elaborate VR simulation, and unless you can
provide evidence otherwise, your arguments against romanticism are no more
valid than romantic attacks on empiricism.
Also, I am not a solipsist, but a 'shadow-worldian'.
>>My belief system is logically and internally consistent. Will you profess
>>your conversion now?
>
>Not if the assumptions are irrational. 'Internally consistent'
>arguments can be used to justify belief in fairies too, but it is the
>belief in fairies/forms that we must analyze for logical credibility.
>
Thats right. And if someone offers evidence for fairies, I will be happy to
believe.
>
>Anytime you go outside of space and time and start positing
>superfluous nonsense such as forms and gods, you have gone beyond the
>realm of that which is reasonable. Agree?
No. I don't agree.
What the heck is space and time? And do you acknowledge that I can go
outside of it at all?
>>
>>Everyone has certain amounts of faith. You have faith that quantum physics
>>will continue to operate in a reasonable manner, and that gravity won't
just
>>shut itself off one day. Importantly, you also have faith that matter
>>exists.
>
>Again, I think the existence of matter is self-evident, but I am not
>finished researching solipsism.
>
>I do not have faith in science, either. Your argument here is
>actually quite silly.
Why so?
You have equated that for which there is no good
>reason to believe (god and forms), with that for which there is no
>good reason not to believe. For example, if I travel up a hill and I
>cannot see other side, I naturally assume the street continues on the
>other side of the hill. I do not stop my truck and run to the top of
>hill to make sure the road doesn't drop off into some abyss.
>
Thats faith. There's even a term for that type of faith. Some philosopher or
another refered to it as a 'blik'.
>>I would ask several questions:
>>
>>1) Why do you believe in this elephant?
>>2) Why does it have characteristics different from other elephants?
>>3) Has anyone else seen this elephant?
>>4) Do you have indirect evidence? (Do you have big foot prints in your
>>bathroom?)
>
>1) It has revealed itself to me.
In what manner has it done so?
>2) It possesses those characteristics by its very nature, it is the
>ideal elephant. It also created the universe, by the way.
It is the ideal elephant? Interesting. What characteristics differentiate it
from 'fallen' elephants. Is it a spirit? Does it exist outside of the
space-time continuum of this reality?
>3) I have several friends who it has revealed itself to.
In what manner has it revealed itself to your friends? Is that revelation
consistent with its revelation to you?
Does the existence of the elephant function in a categorically beneficial
way if criteria of a priori analysis are applied?
Does the elephant claim a necessity for its existence? Is it contingent? If
so, on what?
>4) I think I have about as much 'indirect' evidence as you do of
>'God.'
>
Thats a dodge. Does the elephant leave things which could be construed as
evidence?
>I recall you saying something once about how conjectures were allowed
>in your epistemology. That is curious. Why so? Conjectures, by
>their very nature, are unsatisfactory.
Why are they unsatisfactory?
>>
>>
>>I do wonder why you feel it ok to redefine faith, however. As a
practitioner
>>of faith it would seem that my definition--faith as internally consistent
>>system of thought--would be more reasonable to accept than the definition
>>you provide.
>
>I have no problem with that definition, as long as you add 'for which
>there is no evidence to support the presuppositions of.'
e.e.
Your arguments are getting circular, which is normal. Unless we can find a
common method of expression, further dialogue on these lines may not be
beneficial. Reference my dialogue with Mr. Antropos in this and the
'philosophical' thread.
Even if this line of discussion is no longer valid (that is if we fail to
come to terms with our language and presupposition differences), I am
willing to continue consideration of the consequences of romantic thought.
We have not yet dealt with the economic, social, political, scientific, and
cultural ramifications of romantic belief systems.
That we have reached an epistemological empasse is understandable. However,
I would be willing to set aside epistemological differences if you wish to
consider outgrowth and consequences.
kestrel_mp
uri...@earthlink.net
trouble. What is this distinction you are trying to make? What do you mean by
romanticism? Not something rational? I guess it depends on what your doing.
If what you are trying to do is determine what is true, them it would appear
to me that you should be rational, ie., use something like the scientific
method. Would this be considered realism? If by romanticism you mean
something like an emphasis on emotion, feelings, etc, rather than cold hard
rationality, then I think we can safely banish it from the disconvery of
truth. However, it may find uses in other areas.
In article <Mjoa2.4633$Jl.17...@news3.mia>,
"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
> Don Antropos wrote in message <366b2c6a...@news.cistron.nl>...
> >"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
> >
>
> >>I would like to postulate that romanticism and realism both have value,
> and
> >>that a dialogue between die-hard romantics (such as myself) and die-hard
> >>realists could be both profitable and interesting.
> >
> >And how could that dialog take place if they are both using (as it
> >seems) a completely different frame of truth?
> >
>
> I would like to make an attempt at such a dialogue.
>
> <snip of excellent questions which will only make sense if a common ground
> can be found>
>
> Would you consider post-modernist methodologies as a possible bridge of the
> romantic/rationalist gap?
>
> kestrel_mp
>
>
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
Kestrel_MP
uri...@earthlink.net wrote in message <74dlvc$3lc$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
>I think both you and whoever you are having this dialogue with are in
>trouble. What is this distinction you are trying to make? What do you mean
by
>romanticism? Not something rational? I guess it depends on what your doing.
>If what you are trying to do is determine what is true, them it would
appear
>to me that you should be rational, ie., use something like the scientific
>method. Would this be considered realism? If by romanticism you mean
>something like an emphasis on emotion, feelings, etc, rather than cold hard
>rationality, then I think we can safely banish it from the disconvery of
>truth. However, it may find uses in other areas.
>
Romanticism is the school of thought most usually associated with Platonic
philosophy. Although emotions and feelings are considered valid under
romantic discourse, revelation and a priori knowledge are the basis of the
romantic context. Romantics reject the empirical world-view, preferring to
espouse a system of thought that gives precedent to life, meaning, and
spirituality. There are epistemological, cosmological, environmental,
political, moral, social, and personal ramifications of Romantic thought,
and Romanticists differ on the resolution to a variety of issues.
For a sample of Romantics throughout history consider:
Plato
Plotinus
Philo
Pseudo-Dionynichius
Justin Martyr
Origen of Alexandria
Clement of Alexandria
Augustine
John Scotus Irigena
William Occam
Peter Abelard
Benedict of Nersia
John Calvin
Descartes
Pascal
Henry More
Berkeley
Rousseau
Montesquieu
Kant
Hegel
Marx
Emerson
Thoureau
Nathaniel Hawthorne
William James
Rudolf Otto
G.K. Chesterton
George MacDonald
C.S. Lewis
J.R.R. Tolkien
Charles Williams
And this only a partial list! You will notice that included are
philosophers, scientists, economists, political thinkers, artists, and
theologians. You will also note that their systems of thought do not always
coincide, and at times are down-right contrary! Romanticism is a school of
thought as old as empiricism, has a rich history, and deserves to be treated
as a legitimate method of thought and inquiry.
kestrel_mp
Darwin
You mention that Romanticism makes use of a priori knowledge. Can you
give me an example of what Romanticism knows to be an a priori truth?
Darwin
uri...@earthlink.net
broad. As you say, many of the thinkers you list have contrary ways of
thinking about things not to mention the differences in historical context.
The term "a- priori" did not really emerge until the time of Kant, and thus
it seems weird to apply it to Plato. Kant also was not anti-empirical, if you
mean by that someone who wants to limit our knowledge to what can be
observed. Now Kant certainly wasn't a skeptic like Hume-but his Critique of
Pure Reason can really be viewed as an attempt to pave a theoretical
foundation for Newtonion physics, and remember, Kant was also one hell of an
astronomer. Kant would certianly not say that we can't engage in scientific
discovery through use of "empirical" evidence, in fact he would say that is
how it should be done. Basically, to provide the list of people you have
here and slap the label "romanticism" on them is just not terribly
illuminating. So when I think of romanticism I can say well something that is
common to all these people? Hegel wrote about entities that Occam would never
have begun to admit into his metaphysics. I really think you would be much
better off to debate specific solutions to specific problems, rather than use
the prepackaged labels that have been given to us to make things easy.
In article <d_Ca2.4972$Jl.21...@news3.mia>,
"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
Evan Oesterling
>
> Thats right. And if someone offers evidence for fairies, I will be happy to
> believe.
>
Just out of curiosity, what is your opinion on the Cottingsley (sp?)
photographs?
Evan Oesterling r...@srv.net
Kestrel_MP
Evan Oesterling wrote in message <3670B814...@srvnet.com>...
>Kestrel_MP com wrote:
>>
>
>> Thats right. And if someone offers evidence for fairies, I will be happy
to
>> believe.
>>
>
>photographs?
>
>Evan Oesterling r...@srv.net
I am not sure what the Cottingsley photographs are. Could you please
explain?
kestrel_mp
maff91
<kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
>Evan Oesterling wrote in message <3670B814...@srvnet.com>...
>>Kestrel_MP com wrote:
>>>
>>
>>> Thats right. And if someone offers evidence for fairies, I will be happy
>to
>>> believe.
>>>
>>
>>Just out of curiosity, what is your opinion on the Cottingsley (sp?)
>>photographs?
>>
>>Evan Oesterling r...@srv.net
>
>
>
>I am not sure what the Cottingsley photographs are. Could you please
>explain?
Try
http://www.ndirect.co.uk/~fair/Phenomena/PictureFile/picturefile.htm
>
>kestrel_mp
>
Scientific creationism: a religious dogma combining massive
ignorance with incredible arrogance.
Creationist: (1) One who follows creationism. (2) A moron. (3) A
person incapable of doing math. (4) A liar. (5) A very gullible
true believer.
Creacionismo scientífico: un dogma religioso que combina masiva
ignorancia con increible arrogancia.
Creacionista: (1) Una persona adepta al creacionismo. (2) Una
perosona con el mínimo nivel de inteligencia que aún le permite
hacer labores simples (3) Una persona que ni la grama sabe cortar.
(4) Un mentiroso o repartidor de mentiras (5) Una pesona que cree
fácilmente que lo que le cuentan es verdad.
Kestrel_MP
maff91 wrote in message <3674a567...@newnews.dial.pipex.com>...
>On Fri, 11 Dec 1998 14:37:14 GMT, "Kestrel_MP"
><kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
>>
happy
>>to
>>>> believe.
>>>>
>>>
>>>photographs?
>>>
>>>Evan Oesterling r...@srv.net
>>
>>
>>
>>I am not sure what the Cottingsley photographs are. Could you please
>>explain?
>
>Try
>http://www.ndirect.co.uk/~fair/Phenomena/PictureFile/picturefile.htm
>
Thank you for the link, maff.
The site claims the photos are a hoax, which is reasonable, however, the
hoax seems to have been admitted, with the disclaimer that pictures
represented real events. That is, the picture takers claimed to have based
their photography on actual events, thus providing us with two 'believers'
in the reality of fairies. I have no intrinsic objection to the existence of
such beings, though I have yet to see one.
That said, I will withhold my most auspicious judgement until I can gain
more info.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
uri...@earthlink.net wrote in message <74fimi$jai$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
>Well, let me put it this way: to debate romanticism vs realism is simply
too
>broad.
Probably.
As you say, many of the thinkers you list have contrary ways of
>thinking about things not to mention the differences in historical context.
>The term "a- priori" did not really emerge until the time of Kant, and thus
>it seems weird to apply it to Plato.
No, Plato seems to have used what we term a priori reasoning.
Kant also was not anti-empirical, if you
>mean by that someone who wants to limit our knowledge to what can be
>observed. Now Kant certainly wasn't a skeptic like Hume-but his Critique of
>Pure Reason can really be viewed as an attempt to pave a theoretical
>foundation for Newtonion physics, and remember, Kant was also one hell of
an
>astronomer. Kant would certianly not say that we can't engage in scientific
>discovery through use of "empirical" evidence, in fact he would say that is
>how it should be done.
As I said, my list included representatives of many divergent viewpoints. I
was thinking about categorical imperatives when I included Kant. I know that
he did not reject empiricism wholesale. He did accept non-empirical methods
of reasoning, however.
Basically, to provide the list of people you have
>here and slap the label "romanticism" on them is just not terribly
>illuminating. So when I think of romanticism I can say well something that
is
>common to all these people? Hegel wrote about entities that Occam would
never
>have begun to admit into his metaphysics.
As you have said, the term is broad. Yet we say that Einstein and Ptolmey
were both scientists, and we admit they both made contributions to the field
of scientific knowledge, while having vastly different world-views.
I really think you would be much
>better off to debate specific solutions to specific problems, rather than
use
>the prepackaged labels that have been given to us to make things easy.
>
Dang. You want us to do it the hard way!
But I stand by my position that modern romanticism is the synthesis of
reasoning common to all of the individuals I listed. Some were more
'romantic' than others. The list was a device to demonstrate the long
tradition of non-realist thought, and the fact that not everyone agrees on
approaches to truth, and that one can disagree and still be a semi-rational
individual.
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
Darwin wrote in message <366b4a11...@news.mindspring.com>...
>
>
>You mention that Romanticism makes use of a priori knowledge. Can you
>give me an example of what Romanticism knows to be an a priori truth?
>
>Darwin
Love is good.
kestrel_mp
uri...@earthlink.net
come up with a list similar to the one you provided if we would see any of
the same names appear. I guess I just think of romanticism as being a 19th
century artistic movement rather than a systematic philosophy or "theory of
truth." I like what you say about different approaches to truth. However,
what constitutes a different approach to truth? For example, two scientists
can violently disagree on some question yet still share the same theory of
truth, that is, the correspondence of a theory with empirical evidence (is
this not the basic defintion of truth? ). I think it interesting that you do
not include even one of the people that first come to my mind when i think of
romanticism, like Wordsworth, Coleridge, Wagner, etc, none of whom were
interested in truth ( at least in the scientific sense ). When I think of
truth, or a theory thereof, I think in terms of the scientific method, which
is something I believe most, if not all, "philosophers" share. Then again, we
are really dealing with categories that can be narrowed or broadened to any
extent desired. Well, its good to see that we are basically in agreement that
the debate between romanticism and realism is too broad. I believe in keeping
things in there historical context. If you want to talk about Plato, lets
talk about him with a view towards what was going on around his time. For
example, it would seem weird to say that Aristotle was an idiot because his
logic could not account for definite descriptions, a theory that was only
formulated in the 20th century. To apply a 19th century way of thinking ie.,
romanticism, to ancient or modern period thinkers is, I think, an error.
Again, as to different ways to truth, sure. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Focoult
(don't know if the spelling is right here) are all figures in the western
tradition who wanted to attack the "scientific method" way to truth. You
claim that a belief in the validity of a-prior knowledge is a characteristic
of romanticism. I would contend, however, that there are also realists who
would agree. As Hume showed, if you want to be a strict empiricist, then we
really can't know anything except vacuous logical truths, and I'm sure the
realists wouldn't say that we can't know anything. Anyway, that's all I have
for now.
In article <dfmc2.648$xx1.2...@news3.mia>,
"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
Kestrel_MP
uri...@earthlink.net wrote in message <74teng$eiv$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
>Good to see your response. I'm wondering if we asked the realist folks to
to
>come up with a list similar to the one you provided if we would see any of
>the same names appear.
Possibly. It would be an interesting exercise. Any realists up to it?
I guess I just think of romanticism as being a 19th
>century artistic movement rather than a systematic philosophy or "theory of
>truth."
I am not sure of the history of the use of the term romantic. However, I
believe that it predates the 19th century artistic movement.
I like what you say about different approaches to truth. However,
>what constitutes a different approach to truth? For example, two scientists
>can violently disagree on some question yet still share the same theory of
>truth, that is, the correspondence of a theory with empirical evidence (is
>this not the basic defintion of truth? ).
No. I reject empiricism.
I think it interesting that you do
>not include even one of the people that first come to my mind when i think
of
> romanticism, like Wordsworth, Coleridge, Wagner, etc, none of whom were
>interested in truth ( at least in the scientific sense ).
I did not include them for that very reason, they were not interested in the
application of philosophy to the discovery of knowledge. They applied a
philosophic system of knowledge to various artistic expressions.
Did they do this consciously? Or was it representative of the culture of
their time? That would be an interesting question to see answered. I am
guessing that Wagner was aware of the philosophical implications, I am
unsure of Wordsworth and Coleridge.
When I think of
>truth, or a theory thereof, I think in terms of the scientific method,
which
>is something I believe most, if not all, "philosophers" share.
Not hardly. What do you mean by scientific method?
Then again, we
>are really dealing with categories that can be narrowed or broadened to any
>extent desired. Well, its good to see that we are basically in agreement
that
>the debate between romanticism and realism is too broad.
In some ways. I maintain that a current romantic synthesis is possible, and
it is for that synthesis that I argue. Plato, Occam, etc. serve as prior
arguers from whom I synthesize my own belief system. The closest in terms of
total current synthesis would be C.S. Lewis, and provisionally, I am willing
to accept his romanticism as indicitive of my own, for the purposes of
allowing a close definition. Lewis was most closely influenced by the
Cambridge Platonics (More), but he also was influenced by classical writers.
I believe in keeping
>things in there historical context.
No problem as far as that goes. But there is a difference in arguing about
the historical positions of a philosopher, and discussing the modern
synthesis in that philosopher's tradition.
<snip of context argument>
>Again, as to different ways to truth, sure. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Focoult
>(don't know if the spelling is right here) are all figures in the western
>tradition who wanted to attack the "scientific method" way to truth. You
>claim that a belief in the validity of a-prior knowledge is a
characteristic
>of romanticism. I would contend, however, that there are also realists who
>would agree.
Realists that reject empirical methods? By definition that is contradictory.
As Hume showed, if you want to be a strict empiricist, then we
>really can't know anything except vacuous logical truths, and I'm sure the
>realists wouldn't say that we can't know anything. Anyway, that's all I
have
>for now.
I'm not sure about that. This seems to be engaging in a Lockean empiricism
vs. Humian empiricism situation, rather than empiricism vs. romanticism.
kestrel_mp
uri...@earthlink.net
don't reject them outright? Would you say that when astronomers infer the
existence of black holes from the observable affects around them that they
are going about things in the wrong way?-or when anthropologists look at the
fossil record to determine the origins of human beings? Do you think that the
assertions made in these sciences, as well as the others, could be just as
well supported by purely a priori arguments? As I said before, to be a strict
empiricist, like Hume, is to be a skeptic, someone who thinks that we can't
really know anything at all, not even that there is an "objective" world
apart from our own perceptions-and I tend to doubt that all realists would be
in this camp. In fact I've heard Plato called a realist due to his belief
that the forms have a real existence apart from our representations of them.
I think of the scientific method as a theory of truth which says that the
theory, should in some sense, be able to explain what we actually observe ( I
don't find this to be all that controversial). Now that's not to say that
there may be important a priori considerations operating in the background.
Going back to Kant again, we can look at the transcendental method which
basically makes the assumption that we have some kind of empirical knowledge
and then asks, how is this possible? In order for us to even have the concept
of an object, for example, there must be some kind of a priori synthesis of
representations in the mind, allowing us to infer the law of causality. There
may be realists who follow in this tradition.
So when you say your not an empiricist, do you mean to say that you don't
believe that there are any valid forms of empirical knowledge?-if so, then I
would certainly disagree. However, if your saying that we can't be strict
empiricists, then I would agree. I would consider myself to be an empiricist
in the tradition of Kant described above.
I will take a look at romanticism in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and see
what it says (not that the EOP is an unquestioned authority though). It could
be that your meshing notions common to the traditional conception of
Romanticism into some kind of theory of knowledge purely your own. Look
forward to your response.
In article <1kHc2.596$57.7...@news2.mia>,
"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
> uri...@earthlink.net wrote in message <74teng$eiv$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
> >Good to see your response. I'm wondering if we asked the realist folks to
> to
> >come up with a list similar to the one you provided if we would see any of
> >the same names appear.
>
> Possibly. It would be an interesting exercise. Any realists up to it?
>
> I guess I just think of romanticism as being a 19th
> >century artistic movement rather than a systematic philosophy or "theory of
> >truth."
>
> I am not sure of the history of the use of the term romantic. However, I
> believe that it predates the 19th century artistic movement.
>
> I like what you say about different approaches to truth. However,
> >what constitutes a different approach to truth? For example, two scientists
> >can violently disagree on some question yet still share the same theory of
> >truth, that is, the correspondence of a theory with empirical evidence (is
> >this not the basic defintion of truth? ).
>
> No. I reject empiricism.
>
> I think it interesting that you do
> >not include even one of the people that first come to my mind when i think
> of
> > romanticism, like Wordsworth, Coleridge, Wagner, etc, none of whom were
> >interested in truth ( at least in the scientific sense ).
>
> I did not include them for that very reason, they were not interested in the
> application of philosophy to the discovery of knowledge. They applied a
> philosophic system of knowledge to various artistic expressions.
>
> Did they do this consciously? Or was it representative of the culture of
> their time? That would be an interesting question to see answered. I am
> guessing that Wagner was aware of the philosophical implications, I am
> unsure of Wordsworth and Coleridge.
>
> When I think of
> >truth, or a theory thereof, I think in terms of the scientific method,
> which
> >is something I believe most, if not all, "philosophers" share.
>
> Not hardly. What do you mean by scientific method?
>
> Then again, we
> >are really dealing with categories that can be narrowed or broadened to any
> >extent desired. Well, its good to see that we are basically in agreement
> that
> >the debate between romanticism and realism is too broad.
>
> In some ways. I maintain that a current romantic synthesis is possible, and
> it is for that synthesis that I argue. Plato, Occam, etc. serve as prior
> arguers from whom I synthesize my own belief system. The closest in terms of
> total current synthesis would be C.S. Lewis, and provisionally, I am willing
> to accept his romanticism as indicitive of my own, for the purposes of
> allowing a close definition. Lewis was most closely influenced by the
> Cambridge Platonics (More), but he also was influenced by classical writers.
>
> I believe in keeping
> >things in there historical context.
>
> No problem as far as that goes. But there is a difference in arguing about
> the historical positions of a philosopher, and discussing the modern
> synthesis in that philosopher's tradition.
>
> <snip of context argument>
>
> >Again, as to different ways to truth, sure. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Focoult
> >(don't know if the spelling is right here) are all figures in the western
> >tradition who wanted to attack the "scientific method" way to truth. You
> >claim that a belief in the validity of a-prior knowledge is a
> characteristic
> >of romanticism. I would contend, however, that there are also realists who
> >would agree.
>
> Realists that reject empirical methods? By definition that is contradictory.
>
> As Hume showed, if you want to be a strict empiricist, then we
> >really can't know anything except vacuous logical truths, and I'm sure the
> >realists wouldn't say that we can't know anything. Anyway, that's all I
> have
> >for now.
>
> I'm not sure about that. This seems to be engaging in a Lockean empiricism
> vs. Humian empiricism situation, rather than empiricism vs. romanticism.
>
Stix
following to alt.atheism:
>Darwin wrote:
>>You mention that Romanticism makes use of a priori knowledge. Can you
>>give me an example of what Romanticism knows to be an a priori truth?
>Love is good.
Hah! Demonstrably false.
Example: a woman married to a wife-beater who sincerely loves the guy
and rationalizes the abuse she suffers as being her fault. In such
cases, love is obviously *not* good as it is a detriment to the person
expressing and/or feeling the emotion of love.
One counter example showing that the blanket statement 'love is good' is
not always true is enough to debunk your vapid claim to the statement's
value or verity: ie., the statement 'love is good' it is not always
true, therefore it is not a 'truth' -- 'a priori' or otherwise.
Quod erat demonstrandum.
<lowers flag to half-mast>
<bugle begins playing the soldier's farewell>
So dies the absurd notion that the truth can be known 'a priori', and
once again, empirical observation triumphs over idealistic drivel.
Heh -- so much for your transcendentalist/phenomenalist idealism; which
is, of course, the very same ridiculous fairy tale crap that you've
tried to dress up by calling it 'romanticism' -- but a pig in a silk hat
is still just a pig.
(now waiting for kestrel to vainly try to squirm his way out of it by
redefining 'love' -- or some other you-beaut rhetorical wriggle)
Stix
*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
"Mysticism is a disease of the mind."
*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
Joe Zawadowski
(Stix) wrote:
> "Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> posted the
> following to alt.atheism:
>
> >Darwin wrote:
>
> >>You mention that Romanticism makes use of a priori knowledge. Can you
> >>give me an example of what Romanticism knows to be an a priori truth?
>
> >Love is good.
>
> Hah! Demonstrably false.
>
> Example: a woman married to a wife-beater who sincerely loves the guy
> and rationalizes the abuse she suffers as being her fault. In such
> cases, love is obviously *not* good as it is a detriment to the person
> expressing and/or feeling the emotion of love.
>
> One counter example showing that the blanket statement 'love is good' is
> not always true is enough to debunk your vapid claim to the statement's
> value or verity: ie., the statement 'love is good' it is not always
> true, therefore it is not a 'truth' -- 'a priori' or otherwise.
>
> Quod erat demonstrandum.
>
> <lowers flag to half-mast>
>
> <bugle begins playing the soldier's farewell>
>
> So dies the absurd notion that the truth can be known 'a priori', and
> once again, empirical observation triumphs over idealistic drivel.
>
> Heh -- so much for your transcendentalist/phenomenalist idealism; which
> is, of course, the very same ridiculous fairy tale crap that you've
> tried to dress up by calling it 'romanticism' -- but a pig in a silk hat
> is still just a pig. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Hey Stix! Do you figure "romanticism" would consider this as an 'a priori"
truth???? ;-).
> (now waiting for kestrel to vainly try to squirm his way out of it by
> redefining 'love' -- or some other you-beaut rhetorical wriggle)
>
>
> Stix
> *~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
> "Mysticism is a disease of the mind."
> *~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
--
"Freedom begins between the ears."
"I'd rather kill a man then a snake. Not because I Iove snakes or hate men. It is a question, rather, of proportion."
Edward Abbey, author of "The Monkey Wrench Gang"
Kestrel_MP
Stix wrote in message <36756ebd...@news.ozemail.com.au>...
>"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> posted the
>following to alt.atheism:
>
>>Darwin wrote:
>
>>>You mention that Romanticism makes use of a priori knowledge. Can you
>>>give me an example of what Romanticism knows to be an a priori truth?
>
>>Love is good.
>
>Hah! Demonstrably false.
>
>Example: a woman married to a wife-beater who sincerely loves the guy
>and rationalizes the abuse she suffers as being her fault. In such
>cases, love is obviously *not* good as it is a detriment to the person
>expressing and/or feeling the emotion of love.
>
The love was not at fault.
>One counter example showing that the blanket statement 'love is good' is
>not always true is enough to debunk your vapid claim to the statement's
>value or verity: ie., the statement 'love is good' it is not always
>true, therefore it is not a 'truth' -- 'a priori' or otherwise.
>
Love is always good. The application of love may not always have
demonstrably beneficient results. However, that is working within a limited
model of current reality. Perhaps the results of love are always good at the
level of the Form.
>Heh -- so much for your transcendentalist/phenomenalist idealism; which
>is, of course, the very same ridiculous fairy tale crap that you've
>tried to dress up by calling it 'romanticism' -- but a pig in a silk hat
>is still just a pig.
>
I am not precisely a transcendentalist nor a phenomenalist; however, I admit
some similarity of belief.
>(now waiting for kestrel to vainly try to squirm his way out of it by
>redefining 'love' -- or some other you-beaut rhetorical wriggle)
>
No. Although I would posit that there do exist different types of love.
Maybe I should rephrase the statement as "agape is good."
kestrel_mp
Kestrel_MP
uri...@earthlink.net wrote in message <7505j3$hsr$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
>Hmm.......where to start? Lets talk about "empirical methods." Surely, you
>don't reject them outright?
Only for the purposes of the current argument.
Would you say that when astronomers infer the
>existence of black holes from the observable affects around them that they
>are going about things in the wrong way?-or when anthropologists look at
the
>fossil record to determine the origins of human beings? Do you think that
the
>assertions made in these sciences, as well as the others, could be just as
>well supported by purely a priori arguments?
Nope. But I assert that there exist realms where empiricism is useless, and
where romantic methodologies are the only valid ways to inquire.
As I said before, to be a strict
>empiricist, like Hume, is to be a skeptic, someone who thinks that we can't
>really know anything at all, not even that there is an "objective" world
>apart from our own perceptions-and I tend to doubt that all realists would
be
>in this camp. In fact I've heard Plato called a realist due to his belief
>that the forms have a real existence apart from our representations of
them.
>
Redefining of words. Hume was playing in context with Berkeley, so that
statement is in response to the Berkeleyian assertion of idealistic
empiricism, rather than traditional empiricism.
>I think of the scientific method as a theory of truth which says that the
>theory, should in some sense, be able to explain what we actually observe
I
>don't find this to be all that controversial). Now that's not to say that
>there may be important a priori considerations operating in the background.
>Going back to Kant again, we can look at the transcendental method which
>basically makes the assumption that we have some kind of empirical
knowledge
>and then asks, how is this possible? In order for us to even have the
concept
>of an object, for example, there must be some kind of a priori synthesis of
>representations in the mind, allowing us to infer the law of causality.
There
>may be realists who follow in this tradition.
>
Possibly. I doubt it.
>So when you say your not an empiricist, do you mean to say that you don't
>believe that there are any valid forms of empirical knowledge?-if so, then
I
>would certainly disagree. However, if your saying that we can't be strict
>empiricists, then I would agree. I would consider myself to be an
empiricist
>in the tradition of Kant described above.
>
I am saying that empiricism has limitations.
>I will take a look at romanticism in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and see
>what it says (not that the EOP is an unquestioned authority though). It
could
>be that your meshing notions common to the traditional conception of
>Romanticism into some kind of theory of knowledge purely your own. Look
>forward to your response.
>
Almost definitely. I am not attempting to defend historical romanticism, but
my own contemporary romanticism, which has been molded by my readings of the
historical romantics.
kestrel_mp
uri...@earthlink.net
interesting. For example, the statement "for all x, if x is a duck, then x is
a duck" is true completely a-priori. That is, this statement is true
regardless of whether or not there is, or ever was, any such thing as a duck.
The thing is though this statment doesn't really tell us anything
interesting. When you talk about romanticism being an a-priori kind of
knowledge is this the kind of thing your thinking about? It may very well be
the case that empirical methods have their limitations, but so too, I would
think, do purely a-priori methods. When I think of "knowledge", I think of
scientific knowledge, which, as I take it means the correspondece of the
thing to the object(of scientific enquiry). What would you give as an example
of a realm of knowledge where empirical methods are not valid whatsoever?
Assuming I was somewhat of a logical positivist, I could think of the realms
of perhaps logic and mathematics as being purely formal a-priori types of
knowledge. Give me an example. Later.
In article <AEBd2.2619$ME4.6...@news3.mia>,
"Kestrel_MP" <kestrel_mp@hotmail.<tag>com<removetag>> wrote:
>
> uri...@earthlink.net wrote in message <7505j3$hsr$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
> >Hmm.......where to start? Lets talk about "empirical methods." Surely, you
> >don't reject them outright?
>
> Only for the purposes of the current argument.
>
> Would you say that when astronomers infer the
> >existence of black holes from the observable affects around them that they
> >are going about things in the wrong way?-or when anthropologists look at
> the
> >fossil record to determine the origins of human beings? Do you think that
> the
> >assertions made in these sciences, as well as the others, could be just as
> >well supported by purely a priori arguments?
>
> Nope. But I assert that there exist realms where empiricism is useless, and
> where romantic methodologies are the only valid ways to inquire.
>
> As I said before, to be a strict
> >empiricist, like Hume, is to be a skeptic, someone who thinks that we can't
> >really know anything at all, not even that there is an "objective" world
> >apart from our own perceptions-and I tend to doubt that all realists would
> be
> >in this camp. In fact I've heard Plato called a realist due to his belief
> >that the forms have a real existence apart from our representations of
> them.
> >
>
> Redefining of words. Hume was playing in context with Berkeley, so that
> statement is in response to the Berkeleyian assertion of idealistic
> empiricism, rather than traditional empiricism.
>
> >I think of the scientific method as a theory of truth which says that the
> >theory, should in some sense, be able to explain what we actually observe
> I
> >don't find this to be all that controversial). Now that's not to say that
> >there may be important a priori considerations operating in the background.
> >Going back to Kant again, we can look at the transcendental method which
> >basically makes the assumption that we have some kind of empirical
> knowledge
> >and then asks, how is this possible? In order for us to even have the
> concept
> >of an object, for example, there must be some kind of a priori synthesis of
> >representations in the mind, allowing us to infer the law of causality.
> There
> >may be realists who follow in this tradition.
> >
>
> Possibly. I doubt it.
>
> >So when you say your not an empiricist, do you mean to say that you don't
> >believe that there are any valid forms of empirical knowledge?-if so, then
> I
> >would certainly disagree. However, if your saying that we can't be strict
> >empiricists, then I would agree. I would consider myself to be an
> empiricist
> >in the tradition of Kant described above.
> >
>
> I am saying that empiricism has limitations.
>
> >I will take a look at romanticism in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and see
> >what it says (not that the EOP is an unquestioned authority though). It
> could
> >be that your meshing notions common to the traditional conception of
> >Romanticism into some kind of theory of knowledge purely your own. Look
> >forward to your response.
> >
>
> Almost definitely. I am not attempting to defend historical romanticism, but
> my own contemporary romanticism, which has been molded by my readings of the
> historical romantics.
>