William Lane Craig, Objective Morality, and Naturalism
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
As of late I have been reading William Lane Craig's position on
meta-ethics. He states here,
"...if God exists, then the objectivity of moral values, moral duties,
and moral accountability is secured, but that in the absence of God,
that is, if God does not exist, then morality is just a human
convention, that is to say, morality is wholly subjective and
non-binding. We might act in precisely the same ways that we do in fact
act, but in the absence of God, such actions would no longer count as
good (or evil), since if God does not exist, objective moral values do
not exist. Thus, we cannot truly be good without God. On the other
hand, if we do believe that moral values and duties are objective, that
provides moral grounds for believing in God." -- 'The Indispensability
of Theological Meta-ethical Foundations for Morality.' Foundations 5
(1997): 9-12. (available online here:
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html)
For Craig, objective morality does not exist apart from the existence
of God. Is this the case? Is his argument deductively valid and/or
sound? I am not too thrilled by his usage of Michael Ruse here; Ruse is
not an ethicist. However, Craig has a point here that I would like to
consider:
"Thus, if naturalism is true, it becomes impossible to condemn war,
oppression, or crime as evil. Nor can one praise brotherhood, equality,
or love as good. It does not matter what values you choose--for there
is no right and wrong; good and evil do not exist." (available online
here: http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html)
That is, God is the truth-maker of moral claims. I am less interested
in his argument for God, per se. Rather, what concerns me is his
insistent belief that naturalism fails to churn up objective morality.
I'm interested in a naturalist response, as I personally, to some small
degree, think Craig has a point here.
Best wishes,
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
Denis Loubet
<derrick_a...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1166565831.3...@t46g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Does he explain the purpose of morals? If the purpose of morals is not the
means by which people can live together in peace and harmony, then what is
it?
If morals ARE rules by which people can live together in peace and harmony,
then naturalistic morality would be those objective behaviors that support
peace and harmony. Is there any culture where random acts of murder support
the peace and harmony of the culture? No? Then there's an objective behavior
that we can call immoral. Is there an example of a culture where assisting
the poor does not objectively support the peace and harmony of the culture?
No? Then we can make a claim that assisting the poor is objectively moral.
--
Denis Loubet
dlo...@io.com
http//www.io.com/~dloubet
quibbler
derrick_a...@yahoo.com says...
> Hello all...
>
> As of late I have been reading William Lane Craig's position on
> meta-ethics. He states here,
>
> "...if God exists, then the objectivity of moral values, moral duties,
> and moral accountability is secured, but that in the absence of God,
> that is, if God does not exist, then morality is just a human
> convention,
Irrelevant because, even if god articulated "objective" laws (whatever
that means, since it's only from his subjective perspective), then it
would still need to be interpreted by humans. Thus, it would still be
highly subjective to the extent that any humans are involved.
> that is to say, morality is wholly subjective and
> non-binding.
What "ought to be" is never binding upon what actually is. Craig needs
to go back to philophy 101 and get a fucking education.
> We might act in precisely the same ways that we do in fact
> act, but in the absence of God, such actions would no longer count as
> good (or evil), since if God does not exist, objective moral values do
> not exist.
But all he's done is assert that it can't be objective without god. It's
not clear why humans can't discover objective and optimal procedures for
living that are logically true, irrespective of whether god declares it
or not. In fact, it's not clear how god declaring it could make it so.
It must be so independent of whether god declares it, or even if it
exists. In any event, when we speak of morality, we only speak of an
approximation of those behaviors which are optimal by some value
criteria. It's not clear that anyone truly knows what is meant by
morality in an absolute sense.
> Thus, we cannot truly be good without God.
Incorrect. God has nothing to do with it, nor is the word "Thus"
justified, since you have not made an argument or reached any sort of
conclusion.
> For Craig, objective morality does not exist apart from the existence
> of God. Is this the case?
Nope. Firstly, you'll notice that Craig fails to distinguish between
humans arbitrarily making up rules, versus discovering facts about the
way the world works.
> Is his argument deductively valid and/or
> sound?
It's a bit premature to ask about whether all the premises can be true,
given that Craig hasn't even clearly articulated all his premises.
>I am not too thrilled by his usage of Michael Ruse here; Ruse is
> not an ethicist. However, Craig has a point here that I would like to
> consider:
>
> "Thus, if naturalism is true, it becomes impossible to condemn war,
> oppression, or crime as evil.
Not so. It can still be analyzed according to a variety of standards of
conduct which is all that we ever do with respect to ethics. According
to many axiological standards, conducts like war and oppression would
conflict with those value systems. In fact naturalism provides a firm
grounding for our value systems, because it can be based upon
evolutionary traits which promote survival.
> Nor can one praise brotherhood, equality,
> or love as good. It does not matter what values you choose--for there
> is no right and wrong; good and evil do not exist." (available online
> here: http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html)
>
> That is, God is the truth-maker of moral claims. I am less interested
> in his argument for God, per se. Rather, what concerns me is his
> insistent belief that naturalism fails to churn up objective morality.
It's not naturalism, but rather determinism which might create some
difficulties for traditional versions of morality. However, there are
still interpretations by which we can describe moral outcomes. We are
talking about ideal outcomes, even if those outcomes cannot, in
principle, be achieved.
> I'm interested in a naturalist response, as I personally, to some small
> degree, think Craig has a point here.
Only if his point is that he is a clueless moron.
--
Quibbler (quibbler247atyahoo.com)
"It is fashionable to wax apocalyptic about the
threat to humanity posed by the AIDS virus, 'mad cow'
disease, and many others, but I think a case can be
made that faith is one of the world's great evils,
comparable to the smallpox virus but harder to
eradicate." -- Richard Dawkins
Al Klein
>For Craig, objective morality does not exist apart from the existence
>of God. Is this the case?
If God can think, and he decides on what's moral, morality is
subjective by definition. If people can decide to accept some parts
of the Bible and not others, morality is subjective by definition.
>However, Craig has a point here that I would like to
>consider:
>"Thus, if naturalism is true, it becomes impossible to condemn war,
>oppression, or crime as evil. Nor can one praise brotherhood, equality,
>or love as good. It does not matter what values you choose--for there
>is no right and wrong; good and evil do not exist." (available online
>here: http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html)
>That is, God is the truth-maker of moral claims. I am less interested
>in his argument for God, per se. Rather, what concerns me is his
>insistent belief that naturalism fails to churn up objective morality.
>I'm interested in a naturalist response, as I personally, to some small
>degree, think Craig has a point here.
Those without gills can't understand how those with gills can exist
without breathing.
--
rukbat at optonline dot net
"A stupid man's report of what a clever man says is never accurate because he
unconsciously translates what he hears into something he can understand."
-- Bertrand Russell.
(random sig, produced by SigChanger)
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
Quibbler wrote:
"Irrelevant because, even if god articulated "objective" laws
(whatever
that means, since it's only from his subjective perspective), then it
would still need to be interpreted by humans. Thus, it would still be
highly subjective to the extent that any humans are involved. "
I'm not sure about the claim you are making here. Are you saying that
if morals depended upon God they would lack some interpretative
understanding? Whether or not we can articulate moral claims is beside
Craig's point. His argument is an ontological claim, not an
epistemological one.
"But all he's done is assert that it can't be objective without god.
It's
not clear why humans can't discover objective and optimal procedures
for
living that are logically true, irrespective of whether god declares it
or not. In fact, it's not clear how god declaring it could make it so.
It must be so independent of whether god declares it, or even if it
exists. In any event, when we speak of morality, we only speak of an
approximation of those behaviors which are optimal by some value
criteria. It's not clear that anyone truly knows what is meant by
morality in an absolute sense. "
Craig does in fact state that we can discover optimal procedures (i.e.
morals) for human prosperity. What is problematic for Craig is that
morals without God are merely human arbitrations. And if morals are
arbitrary then they lack truth-ness or, as I put it, ontological glue.
Let me put the situation this way. What makes the statement, 'boiling
babies is wrong', true? Craig would respond that the statement in
itself contains no truth-value. However, God's eternal nature makes
the above assertion true, you see? I'm not saying this is a good
argument, but this is how Craig sees the picture.
"Nope. Firstly, you'll notice that Craig fails to distinguish
between
humans arbitrarily making up rules, versus discovering facts about the
way the world works."
Craig would argue that there is a difference between an arbitrary moral
claim and a truthful moral claim. The latter in Craig's view would be
truth-dependent upon God. Apart from God, moral claims have no
truth-value and are thus human projections. This is evident from his
usage of Michael Ruse's socio-biology.
"In fact naturalism provides a firm
grounding for our value systems, because it can be based upon
evolutionary traits which promote survival."
I'm interested in seeing you develop this into some kind of an
argument rather than a naked claim. Care to elaborate?
Let me say this about Craig. What he is actually claiming is that moral
objectivity does exist. That is, moral claims do have truth-aptness.
The linchpin for Craig is that moral claims have a *divine*
truth-maker. Without such a divine truth-maker, claims such as,'
boiling babies is wrong' would be arbitrary.
best wishes,
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
raven1
>Hello all...
>
>As of late I have been reading William Lane Craig's position on
>meta-ethics. He states here,
>
>"...if God exists, then the objectivity of moral values, moral duties,
>and moral accountability is secured, but that in the absence of God,
>that is, if God does not exist, then morality is just a human
>convention, that is to say, morality is wholly subjective and
>non-binding.
Bollocks. Look at the question from another angle: if certain actions
are moral or immoral just because "God says so", then morality *is*
inherently subjective; if God says that certain acts are moral or
immoral because they are inherently so, then God is unnecessary for
morality. Either way, the whole idea collapses.
--
"O Sybilli, si ergo
Fortibus es in ero
O Nobili! Themis trux
Sivat sinem? Causen Dux"
quibbler
derrick_a...@yahoo.com says...
> Hello all....
>
> Quibbler wrote:
>
> "Irrelevant because, even if god articulated "objective" laws
> (whatever
> that means, since it's only from his subjective perspective), then it
> would still need to be interpreted by humans. Thus, it would still be
> highly subjective to the extent that any humans are involved. "
>
>
> I'm not sure about the claim you are making here. Are you saying that
> if morals depended upon God they would lack some interpretative
> understanding?
I'm not sure what was unclear about my original claim, but your confusion
on the issue sort of underscores my point. People have to get the memo
from god, attempt to understand what it means, which will almost
certainly involve subjective judgments, by the same argument craig uses
to condemn human made systems of morality. In short, it's not clear that
people will be able to agree on what is meant by god's allegedly
objective moral laws, especially if they are only true because god
subjectively generates them. OTOH, the natural world can provide an
objective grounding for both value system and sets of behavior conducive
to survival, which all humans may agree about. Those could form the
basis of an objective moral system is described by humans from the
natural world but not merely subjectively generated.
> Whether or not we can articulate moral claims is beside
> Craig's point. His argument is an ontological claim, not an
> epistemological one.
He makes lots of claims, some of which are existence ones. My point is
that whether he's obsessing on ontology or not, there would be no
practical significance to his result unless we could also objectively
understand god's alleged moral law, which it is not clear humans could
do. Now, as to his ontological claim (and it is merely that, not any
kind of serious argument) it's not clear at all why objective standards
could not exist apart from god. In particular, and I think Denis echoed
what I wanted to say, the natural features of the universe can provide an
objective and empirically investigatable grounding for a value or moral
system. Of course, that's not the same as the so called naturalistic
fallacy of saying that we can determine what ought to be merely from what
is. The values in the system might be contingent upon accidents of the
way the world happens to be, versus how it could be in other possible
worlds.
>
> Craig does in fact state that we can discover optimal procedures (i.e.
> morals) for human prosperity. What is problematic for Craig is that
> morals without God are merely human arbitrations.
It's problematic because it is an undischarged assumption in craig's
thinking which ignores any other possibilities. It is a false dichotomy
to say that morality must either be an arbitrary human creation of an
(arbitrary) creation of god. There may well be facts about the world
that constrain our moral codes, especially if we see morality as "how
best to live".
> And if morals are
> arbitrary then they lack truth-ness or, as I put it, ontological glue.
Not necessarily. They might be right by accident, even if arbitrary.
However, more seriously, they might be derived logically or based upon
both reasoning and empirical facts about the way the world works. As but
one example, without the empirical data that hitting someone with a
hammer hurts, there would be nothing logically objectionable about
swinging a hammer in and of itself.
> Let me put the situation this way. What makes the statement, 'boiling
> babies is wrong', true? Craig would respond that the statement in
> itself contains no truth-value.
And I would respond that empirical data along with logical reasoning
about the data reveal that there are more optimal procedures to produce
goals which people tend to agree upon are effective ways to live. I
would point out that, in Craig's bible, there is all kinds of baby
killing which is said to be good, so it's doubtful that he could really
say there is not truth value in the statement and stay consistent with
his religious precommitments.
> However, God's eternal nature makes
> the above assertion true,
How? By magic? Because he says it's true? What about his nature "makes
it true". If gawd's "nature" makes it true, why can't the nature of the
universe make it equally true without any recourse to god?
> you see?
Yeah, clear as mud. Thanks.
> I'm not saying this is a good
> argument,
I'm saying that it's an exceptionally ridiculous argument.
> but this is how Craig sees the picture.
I'm glad to know how he sees the world from the perspective of having his
head up his own ass.
>
>
> "Nope. Firstly, you'll notice that Craig fails to distinguish
> between
> humans arbitrarily making up rules, versus discovering facts about the
> way the world works."
>
> Craig would argue that there is a difference between an arbitrary moral
> claim and a truthful moral claim.
Would he now. Well, as I've already pointed out, he is wrong to say that
any human standard is necessarily arbitrary. I mean, granted, religious
people have come up with just about every crazy behavior possible.
However, in general, human cultures do not just make up all moral
procedures arbitrarily, as any serious student of culture would know.
Instead, they formulate theoretical moral codes that correspond to things
that work in the natural world.
> The latter in Craig's view would be
> truth-dependent upon God.
Is it not possible for you to see that it is a complete non sequitur to
attempt to link something irrelevant like god's existence with "truth"?
Logical truth would exist whether there was a god or not and don't give
me any of that presuppositional bullshit, either.
> Apart from God, moral claims have no
> truth-value and are thus human projections.
Again, it isn't an argument, but just a bare assertion. To be fair,
there are some concealed premises here. One is that there is truth.
Another is that it had to come from somewhere. The third is that if it
didn't come from humans then, by process of false dichotomy deduction, it
must have come from god. That appears to be the argument, though often
times it's not even spelled out in terms that explicit.
> This is evident from his
> usage of Michael Ruse's socio-biology.
It's not evident at all. Sociobiology tries to discover, through
empirical and scientific means, some of the facts of the world which can
influence the question of which behaviors are "moral", so-called. BTW,
when I say that, I only mean that morality must be defined in some sense
and once we have that definition, the standards are not necessarily
subjective.
>
> "In fact naturalism provides a firm
> grounding for our value systems, because it can be based upon
> evolutionary traits which promote survival."
>
> I'm interested in seeing you develop this into some kind of an
> argument rather than a naked claim. Care to elaborate?
It is not a claim, but a fact. Naturalism is a set of observable facts
about the world and we evolved to adapt to the natural world. Therefore,
according to fairly basic principles of socio-biology, which you claimed
that Craig considered, those things which are evolutionarily successful
in promoting survival, such as procedures which enhance group cohesion,
will become things that are valued. In socio-biological terms, these
traits can be selected for and therefore get reflected instinctually in
the thinking of future generations.
>
> Let me say this about Craig. What he is actually claiming is that moral
> objectivity does exist. That is, moral claims do have truth-aptness.
That's no small thing to be claiming and he does it with essentially no
argument, other than vaguely claiming that it can't come from arbitrary
human standards, and thus, by faulty process of elimination, must come
from the magic pixie.
> The linchpin for Craig is that moral claims have a *divine*
> truth-maker.
Truth doesn't need to be made. It merely is.
> Without such a divine truth-maker, claims such as,'
> boiling babies is wrong' would be arbitrary.
Not true. It is an objective fact that it does harm to the babies.
There may be other subjective contexts, such as the old testament bible,
which approves of it anyway, via some canard appealing to god's will.
It's true that humans have a hard time reasonably justifying any given
moral question, but that would be true whether there was a god or not.
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
Many of the posters here have posited that humans can be moral without
God. Granted. However, this is not the force of Craig's argument nor
is it an objection to his claims. Craig agrees that humans *can*, and
have been, moral without God. What is of importance to Craig is the
moral objectivity of moral claims. What makes 'boiling babies is
wrong' true? There must be some factor-x that makes this so beyond
human agreement. Thus far, I have not seen adequate responses to
Craig's claims. For instance,
raven1 wrote:
>
> Bollocks. Look at the question from another angle: if certain actions
> are moral or immoral just because "God says so", then morality *is*
> inherently subjective...
I want to first deal with your conditional. Playing Craig's advocate
here, how would morals be subjective? Do you mean arbitrary? The heart
of Craig's argument, the aspect that I agree with, is that morals (i.e.
the good) stems from God's perfect essence. God does not *choose* what
is good, rather the good is essentially apart of the divine essence,
like abstracta. I made this point a few months ago in a post.
You state,
> if God says that certain acts are moral or
> immoral because they are inherently so, then God is unnecessary for
> morality. Either way, the whole idea collapses.
Craig's argument avoids Euthyphro's dilemma by positing that morals
stem from God's divine essence. I stated this above. Further, moral
claim, 'x is wrong' is true for Craig. However, if 'x is wrong' is
true, it needs a truth-maker. God, being *essentially* perfect and
good, makes the assertion 'x is wrong' true. The move here is not an
arbitrary one; nay - it is an essential one. To paraphrase William
Alston, the good is part and parcel of the moral nature of God Himself,
which is expressed necessarily in His moral commands, which become for
us our moral duties (see William Alston, "What Euthyphro Should Have
Said," in William Alston, Divine Nature and Human Language (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989)). Keep in mind that Craig does
NOT say that we cannot be moral without God. That is not his argument.
I'm interested in a naturalist account morality. The most serious
challenge to Craig's argument is moral realism. However, I feel moral
realism fails on several accounts (e.g. moral disagreement;
truth-aptness). Can objective morals be derived from naturalism? I'm
inclined to think in the negative. Responses?
Best wishes,
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
Michael Gray
- Refer: <1166640197.3...@73g2000cwn.googlegroups.com>
>I feel there is a large misunderstanding of Dr. Craig's argument.
>Many of the posters here have posited that humans can be moral without
>God. Granted. However, this is not the force of Craig's argument nor
>is it an objection to his claims. Craig agrees that humans *can*, and
>have been, moral without God. What is of importance to Craig is the
>moral objectivity of moral claims. What makes 'boiling babies is
>wrong' true?
But boiling babies is NOT a universal moral at all.
Your descent into post-modern hyperbole to protect a string of illogic
is not unexpected, though.
--
quibbler
derrick_a...@yahoo.com says...
> I feel there is a large misunderstanding of Dr. Craig's argument.
> Many of the posters here have posited that humans can be moral without
> God.
But not if god doesn't exist, according to Craig, since morality would,
for no apparent reason, be impossible. He has made no serious argument
to support such a ridiculous point of view. He believes that god could
be an easy route to establishing moral truths, essentially by fiat.
However, he makes no credible argument that human discovered standards
should be any more arbitrary than those from god.
> Granted. However, this is not the force of Craig's argument
That's because there is no force to his "argument".
> nor
> is it an objection to his claims. Craig agrees that humans *can*, and
> have been, moral without God. What is of importance to Craig is the
> moral objectivity of moral claims. What makes 'boiling babies is
> wrong' true?
It ain't god, that's for fucking certain.
> There must be some factor-x that makes this so beyond
> human agreement.
It's not being human agreement when your bible endorses killing babies.
> Thus far, I have not seen adequate responses to
> Craig's claims. For instance,
Well, for one thing, Craig's use of the term "objective" is ridiculous.
To begin with, his own arbitrary standards or nature may be as subjective
to him as any human standard. Objective, among other things, means
something that reasonable observers can agree upon and certainly, by this
standard there has never been anything even close to "objective" coming
from religion. Rather, we see science is the place were objective
standard are used.
>
> raven1 wrote:
> >
> > Bollocks. Look at the question from another angle: if certain actions
> > are moral or immoral just because "God says so", then morality *is*
> > inherently subjective...
>
> I want to first deal with your conditional. Playing Craig's advocate
> here, how would morals be subjective? Do you mean arbitrary? The heart
> of Craig's argument, the aspect that I agree with, is that morals (i.e.
> the good) stems from God's perfect essence.
We could just as easily invoke the universe's "perfect essence". If we
don't have to prove that there is any such thing , then we can play the
same game as the theologians all day long.
> God does not *choose* what
> is good, rather the good is essentially apart of the divine essence,
> like abstracta.
Yeah and similarly, if there are moral facts, perhaps they arise from the
facts of the way that the natural world is.
> I made this point a few months ago in a post.
It wasn't any better back then either.
>
> You state,
>
> > if God says that certain acts are moral or
> > immoral because they are inherently so, then God is unnecessary for
> > morality. Either way, the whole idea collapses.
>
> Craig's argument avoids Euthyphro's dilemma by positing that morals
> stem from God's divine essence.
Only if, among other things, we know that his essence is not, in some
sens arbitrary. Furthermore, if there is this essence which gives rise
to morality, it's not clear why such a quality could not exist apart from
their being a god. It's not even clear why morality has to be absolutely
perfect. It might be very limited and unprovable beyond a certain point,
but still true morally. Thus, "boiling babies is wrong" might be
something we can conclude, even without perfect moral systems.
> I stated this above. Further, moral
> claim, 'x is wrong' is true for Craig. However, if 'x is wrong' is
> true, it needs a truth-maker.
Why is that? Can you really "make" something true, as though before some
given time 2+2 would not have been 4?
> God, being *essentially* perfect and
> good, makes the assertion 'x is wrong' true. The move here is not an
> arbitrary one; nay - it is an essential one. To paraphrase William
> Alston, the good is part and parcel of the moral nature of God Himself,
Do you ever get tired of begging the question, or is that all your
theology can do?
> which is expressed necessarily in His moral commands, which become for
> us our moral duties (see William Alston, "What Euthyphro Should Have
> Said," in William Alston, Divine Nature and Human Language (Ithaca,
> N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989)). Keep in mind that Craig does
> NOT say that we cannot be moral without God. That is not his argument.
Only because he doesn't have one and thus nobody cares when he said that
they could be moral but that it would somehow be arbitrary. I've already
demonstrated that logic and naturalism can be non-subjective sources to
derive morality. Please address that.
>
> I'm interested in a naturalist account morality. The most serious
> challenge to Craig's argument is moral realism. However, I feel moral
> realism fails on several accounts (e.g. moral disagreement;
That fact that people disagree doesn't mean that moral facts are somehow
"unreal".
> truth-aptness). Can objective morals be derived from naturalism? I'm
> inclined to think in the negative. Responses?
Yeah, why do you claim that considering that you merely hocus pocus your
own deus ex machina of god's "perfect essence" as your own source of
morality. Why can't we merely claim that the natural world is the
source, using precisely as little evidence and argument as you do?
>
> Best wishes,
I wish for a pony. Please pass the word on to Santa Christ.
Neil Kelsey
Except assisting the poor seems to piss off a lot of conservatives.
quibbler
>
> As of late I have been reading William Lane Craig's position on
> meta-ethics. He states here,
>
> "...if God exists, then the objectivity of moral values, moral duties,
> and moral accountability is secured,
That's a complete non sequitur. It's funny how half-assed theological (I
pronounce it "the-illogical") twerps like Craig take so much for granted
that actually stands in need of demonstration. It's not clear that craig
even understands that values underlie morality, rather than being a part
of it. Even if god did have some "perfect essence", whatever the fuck
that means, this would be no guarantee that any objective moral system
would exist. Neither is it clear that any duties or accountabilities or
morality whatsoever would necessarily obtain.
> but that in the absence of God,
But in the absence of God, Lame Craig is too lazy to consider how
morality could arise and therefore it's "impossible". Note, of course,
that Craig was actually also too lazy to say how it would arise if there
were a god, but he can't let that stop him, can he.
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
quibbler wrote:
> That's a complete non sequitur. It's funny how half-assed theological (I
> pronounce it "the-illogical") twerps like Craig take so much for granted
> that actually stands in need of demonstration. It's not clear that craig
> even understands that values underlie morality, rather than being a part
> of it. Even if god did have some "perfect essence", whatever the fuck
> that means, this would be no guarantee that any objective moral system
> would exist. Neither is it clear that any duties or accountabilities or
> morality whatsoever would necessarily obtain.
>
I'm busy at the moment. However, whence I return home I will deal with
some of the errors in your reasoning against Craig.
Best Wishes
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
quibbler
derrick_a...@yahoo.com says...
I can't wait. In the mean time I will pre-emptively chug some pepto and
more thoroughly examine some of the theology references you provided.
> Best Wishes
I'm still waiting for that pony. Jebus said all I have to do is pray for
it.
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
Hello all...
As promised, I will unpack my objections to quibblers ad hoc responses
in hope that he (she?) has understood the nature of this thread.
Quibbler states:
"But not if god doesn't exist, according to Craig, since morality
would,
for no apparent reason, be impossible. He has made no serious argument
to support such a ridiculous point of view. He believes that god could
be an easy route to establishing moral truths, essentially by fiat.
However, he makes no credible argument that human discovered standards
should be any more arbitrary than those from god."
You set up a strawman objection. Firstly, Craig does not say that
morality is impossible without God. On the contrary, what he says is
that morals seem *unlikely, odd, or even queer* without God as an
explanation. Think of it this way, if God does NOT exist, then we have
good reason to believe that morals are arbitrary. So your
"impossibility" charge is of your own fantasy, not one Craig
invokes.
Secondly, Craig does not say God is the easy way out. Au contraire,
rather he says that God is the *best explanation* for moral
objectivity. Unless one can render a naturalistic account of moral
objectivity that would explain all the data, then God is certainly
warranted. This is not my argument.
Thirdly, Craig does not say that morality is objectively arbitrary -
or merely arbitrary if they are made "true" by God. God does not
choose between moral x and moral y, rather the good is essential to
God's nature. For God to do otherwise would be for God to transcend
His nature. That's impossible. If you had a robust understanding of
what "essence" means you wouldn't throw in cheap gigabyte eaters
as objections. Once again you prop up another man of straw and then
knock it down.
Moving on...
Quibbler states:
"It's not being human agreement when your bible endorses killing
babies."
Would that be addressed to me or Craig? It's not entirely clear who
you are throwing this ad hominem at. Care to explain?
Quibbler states:
"Well, for one thing, Craig's use of the term "objective" is
ridiculous.
To begin with, his own arbitrary standards or nature may be as
subjective
to him as any human standard. Objective, among other things, means
something that reasonable observers can agree upon and certainly, by
this
standard there has never been anything even close to "objective" coming
from religion. Rather, we see science is the place were objective
standard are used."
This paragraph is unclear. What do you mean "his own arbitrary
standards or nature may be as subjective to him as any human
standard"? I feel we're going in circles in regards to God's
nature. You just don't seem willing to accept the argument for what
it is. That is not to say that you should agree with it; nonetheless,
you continue to confuse divine "essence" with divine volition.
Anyhow, your statement that "objective, among other things, means
something that reasonable observers can agree upon and certainly..."
is confusing and problematic; in fact, it is down right ridiculous in
the light of your statement that, "Rather, we see science is the
place were [sic] objective standard are used." Take cosmology, for
instance. Many a cosmologist lack positive evidence of an early
inflationary era in the history of the universe. However, those very
cosmologists continue to argue that such an inflationary era actually
existed. Now are they "subjective" scientists because they base
their conclusions non-objectively? Of course not, it would be absurd to
consider them subjectivists. If reasonability and agreement are all it
takes for a conclusion to be objective, then I would insist that many
conclusions (contradictory even) are objective, and that's nonsense.
Perhaps you have something else in mind. If so, my confusion stems from
your confusing passage.
I previously stated:
"I want to first deal with your conditional. Playing Craig's advocate
here, how would morals be subjective? Do you mean arbitrary? The heart
of Craig's argument, the aspect that I agree with, is that morals
(i.e.
the good) stems from God's perfect essence."
To which quibbler responded:
"We could just as easily invoke the universe's 'perfect essence'. If
we
don't have to prove that there is any such thing , then we can play the
same game as the theologians all day long."
Such a maneuver would be an ad hoc response. Unless you're willing to
argue for a naturalistic account of "perfect essence", then your
response is no good - never mind that you would thus commit yourself
to some form of intrinsic value.
Quibbler states:
"Yeah and similarly, if there are moral facts, perhaps they arise from
the
facts of the way that the natural world is."
Perhaps. However, I would like to see an argument - in the technical
sense - for this position, enough with the inflated statements.
Quibbler states:
"Only if, among other things, we know that his essence is not, in some
sens arbitrary..."
How is an essence arbitrary? If you are a realist, then an object x is
essentially what it is. It does not choose to be what it is, it simply
is. The number 7 as a prime number is essentially 7. There's nothing
arbitrary about it. This is realism (or more specifically Platonic
realism). The alternative would be nominalism. However, recourse to
nominalism wouldn't help you since that would run a 180 degree
counter-punch to your universal "perfect essence". Game over.
Quibbler states:
".Furthermore, if there is this essence which gives rise
to morality, it's not clear why such a quality could not exist apart
from
their being a god. It's not even clear why morality has to be
absolutely
perfect. It might be very limited and unprovable beyond a certain
point,
but still true morally. Thus, "boiling babies is wrong" might be
something we can conclude, even without perfect moral systems."
I don't see how this applies (or objects) to Craig's points. Thus
again we travel down red herring lane.
Quibbler states:
"Why is that? Can you really "make" something true, as though before
some
given time 2+2 would not have been 4?"
Read above about essences and "names" (nominalism).
I stated previously:
"God, being *essentially* perfect and
> good, makes the assertion 'x is wrong' true. The move here is not an
> arbitrary one; nay - it is an essential one. To paraphrase William
> Alston, the good is part and parcel of the moral nature of God Himself,"
Quibbler states in response:
"Do you ever get tired of begging the question, or is that all your
theology can do?"
Do you ever get tired of throwing ad hoc responses, or is that all your
atheology can do?
Quibbler states:
"Only because he doesn't have one and thus nobody cares when he said
that
they could be moral but that it would somehow be arbitrary. I've
already
demonstrated that logic and naturalism can be non-subjective sources to
derive morality. Please address that."
No argument, no refutation, nothing - just mindless ranting.
Fatigued?
Quibbler states:
"Yeah, why do you claim that considering that you merely hocus pocus
your
own deus ex machina of god's "perfect essence" as your own source of
morality. Why can't we merely claim that the natural world is the
source, using precisely as little evidence and argument as you do?"
Much of the same: rant, ad hoc, and ad hominem.
Quibbler states:
"That's a complete non sequitur. It's funny how half-assed theological
(I
pronounce it "the-illogical") twerps like Craig take so much for
granted
that actually stands in need of demonstration. It's not clear that
craig
even understands that values underlie morality, rather than being a
part
of it. Even if god did have some "perfect essence", whatever the fuck
that means, this would be no guarantee that any objective moral system
would exist. Neither is it clear that any duties or accountabilities
or
morality whatsoever would necessarily obtain."
I agree, the argument contains a missing premise. However, again you
develop no argument to your credit. All you do is pound your fist on
the table and exclaim, "Foul!"
You say, "Even if god did have some 'perfect essence', whatever
the fuck that means, this would be no guarantee that any objective
moral system would exist." Now wait a minute. Previously you said
that it would be more fruitful to suggest that the universe contains a
"perfect essence". In this passage, "perfect essence" is now
vague or unclear. So if a divine "perfect essence" is unclear then
what about a natural "perfect essence"? Or perhaps we should say:
*whatever the fuck that means...* right? Further, if there is no
guarantee that a divine "perfect essence" can substantiate
objective morality then what makes you so confident that a natural
perfect essence would?
Anyhow, you haven't shown me why Craig should drop his argument.
Best wishes,
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
raven1
>I feel there is a large misunderstanding of Dr. Craig's argument.
>Many of the posters here have posited that humans can be moral without
>God. Granted. However, this is not the force of Craig's argument nor
>is it an objection to his claims. Craig agrees that humans *can*, and
>have been, moral without God. What is of importance to Craig is the
>moral objectivity of moral claims. What makes 'boiling babies is
>wrong' true? There must be some factor-x that makes this so beyond
>human agreement.
Craig might wish this, but that does not make it so.
>. Thus far, I have not seen adequate responses to
>Craig's claims. For instance,
>
>raven1 wrote:
>>
>> Bollocks. Look at the question from another angle: if certain actions
>> are moral or immoral just because "God says so", then morality *is*
>> inherently subjective...
>
>I want to first deal with your conditional. Playing Craig's advocate
>here, how would morals be subjective? Do you mean arbitrary?
Indeed, and at the heart of it is the fact that "God says so" is just
as arbitrary as any other moral system that is not derived by humans
from objectively observable reality.
>The heart
>of Craig's argument, the aspect that I agree with, is that morals (i.e.
>the good) stems from God's perfect essence.
This is meaningless jargon.
> God does not *choose* what
>is good, rather the good is essentially apart of the divine essence,
>like abstracta. I made this point a few months ago in a post.
And again, more meaningless jargon. Like Anselm's ontological argument
for God, Craig is trying to define something into existence, but in
the end, it's just Special Pleading, among other logical problems,
such as question begging, circular reasoning, undemonstrated premises,
and non sequitur conclusions.
>
>You state,
>
>> if God says that certain acts are moral or
>> immoral because they are inherently so, then God is unnecessary for
>> morality. Either way, the whole idea collapses.
>
>Craig's argument avoids Euthyphro's dilemma by positing that morals
>stem from God's divine essence. I stated this above.
And which, as I pointed out, is just as arbitrary a source as any
other.
> Further, moral
>claim, 'x is wrong' is true for Craig. However, if 'x is wrong' is
>true, it needs a truth-maker.
Non Sequitur.
> God, being *essentially* perfect and
>good,
More meaningless jargon lifted from Anselm.
>makes the assertion 'x is wrong' true. The move here is not an
>arbitrary one; nay - it is an essential one.
It's ontological nonsense; again, like Anselm, Craig is trying to
define something into existence, and tripping all over himself into
gigantic and obvious logical fallacies.
quibbler
derrick_a...@yahoo.com says...
>
> Hello all...
>
> As promised, I will unpack my objections to quibblers ad hoc responses
> in hope that he (she?) has understood the nature of this thread.
>
> Quibbler states:
> "But not if god doesn't exist, according to Craig, since morality
> would,
> for no apparent reason, be impossible. He has made no serious argument
>
> to support such a ridiculous point of view. He believes that god could
>
> be an easy route to establishing moral truths, essentially by fiat.
> However, he makes no credible argument that human discovered standards
> should be any more arbitrary than those from god."
>
> You set up a strawman objection. Firstly, Craig does not say that
> morality is impossible without God.
He IS saying that objective morality would be impossible without god. He
admits that we might follow the same exact conduct which god would have
commanded, had he existed, but seems to think that conduct would be
arbitrary or somehow unjustified in an objective sense without god. This
is a non sequitur on his part. If there is a justification for moral
conduct then one possibility is that it has nothing to do with god or his
essence. There is no reason to dismiss this possibility and thus no
reason to say that we could not have objective morality if god didn't
exist.
> On the contrary, what he says is
> that morals seem *unlikely, odd, or even queer* without God
Perhaps to a fool like Craig they would. However, they don't seem odd at
all when a person uses one's brain for even a second. Morals tend to be
highly useful for survival and societal cohesion, irrespective of any
god.
> as an
> explanation.
You've given no justification for why they would be "unlikely, odd, ..."
We have to behave somehow and it's only natural that we will reflect on
those behaviors and ask if there are general categories of behavior which
are more optimal than others for achieving survival and other valued
results, individually and collectively.
> Think of it this way, if God does NOT exist, then we have
> good reason to believe that morals are arbitrary.
What good reason? That Craig is too dumb to think of how else they god
here. That seems to be the only "good reason" floating around and while
it is convincing that Craig really is too dumb to think of any other way
for them to get here, that is hardly a proof that there really is no
other way.
> So your
> "impossibility" charge is of your own fantasy
So Craig isn't saying that morals could be objective without god
existing? That's curious considering that you quoted him as saying, "if
God does not exist, then morality is just a human convention, that is to
say, morality is wholly subjective and non-binding." That is saying that
it's impossible for human morality to be objective.
>, not one Craig
> invokes.
Yes, in fact is does, precisely as I quoted it.
>
> Secondly, Craig does not say God is the easy way out.
He's too stupid to draw that conclusion, but his argument suggests it.
> Au contraire,
> rather
A bit redundant.
> he says that God is the *best explanation* for moral
> objectivity.
No, as the quote above showed, he says the only possibility is that it's
a human convention that is subjective. This is flat wrong and shows the
kind of sloppy thinking that passes for scholarship from Craig. There
can be other bases, including nature and logic which need not be
subjective, arbitrary, or non-binding.
> Unless one can render a naturalistic account of moral
> objectivity
But Craig already rules this out. People are working on such an account
and frankly have made more progress that some theologians I could
mention.
> that would explain all the data, then God is certainly
> warranted.
No, he is one easy, cop-out, magical explanation for where ethics came
from, just as magic can be invoked to explain where anything one doesn't
understand "came from".
>This is not my argument.
Good, because it's a shitty one Craig seems to be advancing.
>
> Thirdly, Craig does not say that morality is objectively arbitrary -
> or merely arbitrary if they are made "true" by God. God does not
> choose between moral x and moral y,
I didn't say that he had to do it by choice. I completely understand the
assertions about his nature dictating some particular facts about how
things might have to be. Of course, it's not particularly convincing and
just as easy to counter-propose that it's the nature of the universe from
which ethical truths spring without any recourse to god.
> rather the good is essential to
> God's nature. For God to do otherwise would be for God to transcend
> His nature.
Saying that god has a good nature begs the question of where goodness
comes from because it presumes that he already has the thing of which we
were trying to explain the origin. What things about god's "little miss
perfect essence" make him good and why could these things apply to
something that was non-sentient or non-anthropomorphic?
> That's impossible.
Yes, logically, if we accept the definition, which we don't. So what.
> If you had a robust understanding of
> what "essence" means
I do.
> you wouldn't throw in cheap gigabyte eaters
> as objections.
You conflated some of my responses with similar ones that others gave
from the traditional Euthyphro camp. I was not saying the same thing.
> Once again you prop up another man of straw and then
> knock it down.
Nope, read more carefully.
>
> Moving on...
>
> Quibbler states:
> "It's not being human agreement when your bible endorses killing
> babies."
>
> Would that be addressed to me or Craig? It's not entirely clear who
> you are throwing this ad hominem at. Care to explain?
Craig endorses Christianity and its holy books as it's likely you do.
The bible does endorse the killing of babies in a variety of places.
There's nothing ad hominem about that.
>
> Quibbler states:
> "Well, for one thing, Craig's use of the term "objective" is
> ridiculous.
> To begin with, his own arbitrary standards or nature may be as
> subjective
> to him as any human standard. Objective, among other things, means
> something that reasonable observers can agree upon and certainly, by
> this
> standard there has never been anything even close to "objective" coming
>
> from religion. Rather, we see science is the place were objective
> standard are used."
>
> This paragraph is unclear. What do you mean "his own arbitrary
> standards or nature may be as subjective to him as any human
> standard"? I feel we're going in circles in regards to God's
> nature. You just don't seem willing to accept the argument for what
> it is.
No, I'm not confusing them. I'm accepting that both of them may be
involved. For the same of argument I will accept that his nature could
specify facts about how morality has to be. At the same time, this will
have to be consistent with his volition. But it's not clear that his
nature is binding on how all morality must be. And it would still be
subjective in the sense that no other person may be able to experience or
verify god's perfect nature in order to say that it is correct or
perfect. Objectivity requires that it be possible, at least in
principle, to corroborate the findings of another and if there are no
other perfect beings, then this wouldn't be possible.
> That is not to say that you should agree with it; nonetheless,
> you continue to confuse divine "essence" with divine volition.
No, you continue to joust at windmills that are not in fact there.
>
> Anyhow, your statement that "objective, among other things, means
> something that reasonable observers can agree upon and certainly..."
That's just a nod to the fact that no other reasonable observers may be
able to corroborate god's standards of goodness.
> is confusing and problematic; in fact, it is down right ridiculous in
> the light of your statement that, "Rather, we see science is the
> place were [sic] objective standard are used." Take cosmology, for
> instance. Many a cosmologist lack positive evidence of an early
> inflationary era in the history of the universe. However, those very
> cosmologists continue to argue that such an inflationary era actually
> existed. Now are they "subjective" scientists because they base
> their conclusions non-objectively?
It is objectively based upon models which others can analyze
mathematically and logically. Try again.
> Of course not, it would be absurd
I agree that your objection was absurd for the reason that I noted above.
Glad we can both agree on something.
> to
> consider them subjectivists.
Your ridiculous example has nothing to do with the reason that god's
ethical standards might not be objective.
> If reasonability and agreement are all it
> takes for a conclusion to be objective, then I would insist that many
> conclusions (contradictory even) are objective, and that's nonsense.
It's objective that the conclusions say what they say, even if those
conclusions end up containing contradictions. You're the one who seems
to be generating nonsensical examples that have little or nothing to do
with the actual point at hand.
> Perhaps you have something else in mind.
Yep, as explained above.
>If so, my confusion stems from
> your confusing passage.
>
> I previously stated:
> "I want to first deal with your conditional. Playing Craig's advocate
> here, how would morals be subjective? Do you mean arbitrary? The heart
>
> of Craig's argument, the aspect that I agree with, is that morals
> (i.e.
> the good) stems from God's perfect essence."
>
> To which quibbler responded:
> "We could just as easily invoke the universe's 'perfect essence'. If
> we
> don't have to prove that there is any such thing , then we can play the
>
> same game as the theologians all day long."
>
> Such a maneuver would be an ad hoc response.
As opposed to your ad hoc response of attributing it to god's perfect
essence.
> Unless you're willing to
> argue for a naturalistic account of "perfect essence",
Why should I when you don't seriously argue for a perfect essence on the
part of god either. I will if you will. Deal?
> then your
> response is no good
Ditto for your own. Thanks for discrediting it with the same brush you
wish to use on my argument.
> - never mind that you would thus commit yourself
> to some form of intrinsic value.
As though that would be a problem? Do you think god is necessary for
such a thing?
>
>
> Quibbler states:
> "Yeah and similarly, if there are moral facts, perhaps they arise from
> the
> facts of the way that the natural world is."
>
> Perhaps. However, I would like to see an argument - in the technical
> sense - for this position, enough with the inflated statements.
I've presented outlines of one which are at least as detailed as any
you've presented about god.
>
>
> Quibbler states:
> "Only if, among other things, we know that his essence is not, in some
> sens arbitrary..."
>
> How is an essence arbitrary? If you are a realist, then an object x is
> essentially what it is.
Yeah, but it could have been something else and had a different essence.
You're engaging in circularity by saying that an essence has to be the
way it is because that's what something is. It's the essence that
determined what it was and so the essence, in principle, could have been
different.
> It does not choose to be what it is,
It doesn't have to choose. When I say that it is arbitrary whether a
child is a boy or a girl, the reality is that there are physical and
material constraints. But in principle, the child could have turned out
either way, so it is, in essence, arbitrary as to which way it ends up.
And no choosing by the object in question was needed for it to be
arbitrary.
>it simply
> is. The number 7 as a prime number is essentially 7.
You're defining it ahead of time and then assigning the essence that
corresponds to that definition. But if we just talk about "a number"
abstractly then it might or might not be prime, even, odd, etc. That's
the since in which such traits would be arbitrary.
>There's nothing
> arbitrary about it. This is realism
There is nothing unreal about something just because we can talk about a
particular trait being arbitrarily assigned. Once some traits are
specified other may be forced to logically follow as parts of analytic
definition. But we may still have degrees of freedom to assign other
traits to a given object, especially if we consider other possible
worlds.
> (or more specifically Platonic
> realism).
Really, it seemed more like idealism.
> The alternative would be nominalism. However, recourse to
> nominalism wouldn't help you since that would run a 180 degree
> counter-punch to your universal "perfect essence".
Oh, my "perfect essence". Yeah, like I was the one who brought that up.
I've suggested that we don't even require a "perfect essence" in order
for some moral properties to be objective. We only need to show that one
thing could be morally objective without recourse to god to prove Craig
wrong.
> Game over.
Whatever you say.
>
> Quibbler states:
> ".Furthermore, if there is this essence which gives rise
> to morality, it's not clear why such a quality could not exist apart
> from
> their being a god. It's not even clear why morality has to be
> absolutely
> perfect. It might be very limited and unprovable beyond a certain
> point,
> but still true morally. Thus, "boiling babies is wrong" might be
> something we can conclude, even without perfect moral systems."
>
> I don't see how this applies (or objects) to Craig's points.
The fact that you don't see it doesn't necessarily say much. Craig is
holding forth that only the existence of god can admit an objective
morality, per the quotes that you started with. I'm merely pointing out
that these essences he is talking about could potentially exist apart
from any deity.
> Thus
> again we travel down red herring lane.
You must be used to that from reading Craig's "arguments" by now.
>
> Quibbler states:
> "Why is that? Can you really "make" something true, as though before
> some
> given time 2+2 would not have been 4?"
>
> Read above about essences and "names" (nominalism).
If it is merely the essence of 2, plus and 2 again to equal four then
nothing was needed to "make" it so. A "truthmaker" is this superfluous.
>
> I stated previously:
> "God, being *essentially* perfect and
> > good, makes the assertion 'x is wrong' true. The move here is not an
> > arbitrary one; nay - it is an essential one. To paraphrase William
> > Alston, the good is part and parcel of the moral nature of God Himself,"
>
> Quibbler states in response:
> "Do you ever get tired of begging the question, or is that all your
> theology can do?"
>
> Do you ever get tired of throwing ad hoc responses, or is that all your
> atheology can do?
I'll probably get tired about the same time you do.
>
> Quibbler states:
> "Only because he doesn't have one and thus nobody cares when he said
> that
> they could be moral but that it would somehow be arbitrary. I've
> already
> demonstrated that logic and naturalism can be non-subjective sources to
>
> derive morality. Please address that."
>
> No argument, no refutation, nothing - just mindless ranting.
That's a good description of what I've been seeing from Craig and you.
Where is Craig's demonstration that the only alternative to morality
coming from god would be for it to be an arbitrary human creation? Why
couldn't it have sources external to humans, such as the natural world,
or a basis in logic itself? Why do you still avoid these issues?
> Fatigued?
No, I'm used to the run-around from theists.
>
>
> Quibbler states:
> "Yeah, why do you claim that considering that you merely hocus pocus
> your
> own deus ex machina of god's "perfect essence" as your own source of
> morality. Why can't we merely claim that the natural world is the
> source, using precisely as little evidence and argument as you do?"
>
> Much of the same: rant, ad hoc, and ad hominem.
You need to look up each of those terms, because you're failing to use
any of them correctly.
>
> Quibbler states:
> "That's a complete non sequitur. It's funny how half-assed theological
> (I
> pronounce it "the-illogical") twerps like Craig take so much for
> granted
> that actually stands in need of demonstration. It's not clear that
> craig
> even understands that values underlie morality, rather than being a
> part
> of it. Even if god did have some "perfect essence", whatever the fuck
> that means, this would be no guarantee that any objective moral system
> would exist. Neither is it clear that any duties or accountabilities
> or
> morality whatsoever would necessarily obtain."
>
> I agree, the argument contains a missing premise. However, again you
> develop no argument to your credit. All you do is pound your fist on
> the table and exclaim, "Foul!"
So, IOWs, you're saying that I'm acting like you and Craig ;)
>
> You say, "Even if god did have some 'perfect essence', whatever
> the fuck that means, this would be no guarantee that any objective
> moral system would exist." Now wait a minute. Previously you said
> that it would be more fruitful to suggest that the universe contains a
> "perfect essence". In this passage, "perfect essence" is now
> vague or unclear. So if a divine "perfect essence" is unclear then
> what about a natural "perfect essence"?
Now don't get your knickers in a twist, Abdul. I floated that as one
*possibility*. You do understand what possibilities are, don't you? I'm
now merely pointing out that the one *possibility* I proposed to mirror
Craig, may not, in reality be the actual explanation, because it too may
suffer from defects. I only proposed such a defective possibility
because it mirrored the move that Craig was trying to make.
> Or perhaps we should say:
> *whatever the fuck that means...* right?
I see it's too late. Your knickers are already somewhat twisted.
> Further, if there is no
> guarantee that a divine "perfect essence" can substantiate
> objective morality then what makes you so confident that a natural
> perfect essence would?
I didn't say I was confident. I allowed it as a possibility which was a
counterproposal to Craig's own. I didn't say it was guaranteed to be
absolutely correct any more than Craig's original proposal was
guaranteed.
>
> Anyhow, you haven't shown me why Craig should drop his argument.
You haven't shown me that he makes an actual argument and as to dropping
it, if he's not embarrassed by it, then he should certainly circulate it
widely. We need something to laugh at. Craig's reputation can pretty
much only sink lower at this point, not that it was ever that high to
begin with.
>
> Best wishes,
I sure better get that pony, or I'm going to have to have a little talk
with you and Jebus.
DarkAngel
>
> "...if God exists, then the objectivity of moral values, moral duties,
> and moral accountability is secured
This is a non sequitur. The existence of God does not secure such
objectivity. If morality comes from divine pronouncement, it is still
subjective. Good and evil in this case is only what, in the opinion of
God, is good or evil. One may then ask why human beings should follow
the moral opinions of an alien being over their own. As Max Stirner
puts it: "The divine is God's concern; the human, Man's. My concern is
neither the divine nor the human, not the true, good, just, free, etc.,
but solely what is mine, and it is not a general one, but is - Unique,
as I am Unique." (The Ego and Its Own)
If, OTOH, morality exists objectively and independant of God, then
God's existence is irrelevant to the existence of objective morality.
The choice is between moral relativism or accepting that objective
morality is independant of God, and thus possible even in a godless
world.
quibbler
drkan...@hotmail.com says...
> derrick_a...@yahoo.com wrote:
> >
> > "...if God exists, then the objectivity of moral values, moral duties,
> > and moral accountability is secured
>
> This is a non sequitur. The existence of God does not secure such
> objectivity. If morality comes from divine pronouncement,
Derrick insists that it's not divine pronouncements, but merely the
perfect nature of god that somehow causes morals to be the way they are.
Of course, to use derrick's new favorite word, this is entirely ad hoc
and doesn't explain anything, but rather begs the question of what was
supposed to be explained. He's essentially saying that morality exists
because it exists, albeit as part of god. But why not just assume that
morality exists without introducing the extra baggage of god along with
it? At this point, derrick can only sputter about realism and the like.
> it is still
> subjective. Good and evil in this case is only what, in the opinion of
> God, is good or evil.
Even if it was not god's opinion, but merely the way that he way, it
would still not necessarily be "objective", since it's not clear that
anyone else could examine or verify god's nature, assuming for the moment
that such things are even in the realm of possibility. Furthermore, even
if goodness were part of god's nature, that wouldn't explain why that was
binding on anything else to be good. As usual, theology turns out to
merely be a philosophy for simpletons who can't handle the real questions
raised by disciplines like ethics.
derrick_a...@yahoo.com
Quibbler states:
"That's a good description of what I've been seeing from Craig and
you.
Where is Craig's demonstration that the only alternative to morality
coming from god would be for it to be an arbitrary human creation? Why
couldn't it have sources external to humans, such as the natural world,
or a basis in logic itself? Why do you still avoid these issues?"
Again, you misread what Craig says. He said that God is the best
explanation for moral objectivity. The only serious alternative I can
think of is moral realism. However, Craig might complain that moral
realism must explain Mackie's error theory, and thus is not the *best
explanation* for moral objectivity. I personally do not think Craig is
off the hook. Nonetheless, a moral realist must explain how moral
properties. I believe such an explanation is a stringent one. Hence, a
"morality constituted in nature" is not as easy and explainable as
you might assume.
Quibbler states:
"Why
couldn't it have sources external to humans, such as the natural world,
or a basis in logic itself? Why do you still avoid these issues?"
The first horn of your exhaustive disjunction is moral realism,
explained above. Though, I'm interested, how can you derive moral
objectivity from logic? Logic deals with inference. I think you mean
reason rather than logic, which raises more questions than it actually
answers. Thus, I did not avoid your issues.
I stated:
> You say, "Even if god did have some 'perfect essence', whatever
> the fuck that means, this would be no guarantee that any objective
> moral system would exist." Now wait a minute. Previously you said
> that it would be more fruitful to suggest that the universe contains a
> "perfect essence". In this passage, "perfect essence" is now
> vague or unclear. So if a divine "perfect essence" is unclear then
> what about a natural "perfect essence"?
Quibbler responded:
"Now don't get your knickers in a twist, Abdul. I floated that as
one
*possibility*. You do understand what possibilities are, don't you?
I'm
now merely pointing out that the one *possibility* I proposed to mirror
Craig, may not, in reality be the actual explanation, because it too
may
suffer from defects. I only proposed such a defective possibility
because it mirrored the move that Craig was trying to make."
I'm not interested in mere possibilities. Craig does not rule out
that he has possible alternatives to his position. What interests him
are "best explanations". Take moral realism once again. Craig will
charge that moral realism is not the best possible explanation for
moral objectivity because (i) Mackie's error theory, (ii) moral
disagreement, and (iii) moral property-supervention (my word). Thus,
moral realism does not solve the issue it sets out to solve. So
invoking mere possibilities is not enough. If your possibility is not
a real threat to Craig, then why invoke it at all?
By the way, you are aware that a natural perfect essence is problematic
via the problem of evil. If nature is essentially good, then natural
objects are essentially good. However, natural evil would all but
refute such a position.
I'll leave the last word for you.
Best wishes,
Derrick Abdul-Hakim
DarkAngel
derrick_a...@yahoo.com a écrit :
> He said that God is the best explanation for moral objectivity.
A morality that flows from God is subjective to God's will. The
believer is by necessity a moral relativist.
---
No Gods. No Masters.