Essentialism/ nominalism and absolutism/relativism
Petteri Sulonen
in the 'What does it mean for you to be [_______]?' thread, split into
its own thread for clarity. It's a bit long; I hope you stayed with me.
:-)].
(1) The difference between essentialism and nominalism
The main difference between essentialism and nominalism is in how they
approach the problem of definitions. The essentialist states that
before we can discuss something, we must define our terms; find the
"essential" something in them that makes them what they are. "What is
it that makes a chair a chair? What is the essence of history? What is
a Christian? What is God?" are the kinds of questions an essentialist
would ask.
The nominalist, on the other hand, proceeds from the assumption that
precise and immutable definitions are impossible to find. Instead, s/he
attempts to define concepts by pointing at things and stating whether
they do or do not match the concept under discussion, and leaves open
the possibility of modifying, refining, or clarifying the definitions
if they turn out to be unworkable. "A god is a supernatural entity like
Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or
ghosts," s/he might answer.
Some famous essentialist philosophies are Platonism ("A chair is an
object that actualizes the idea of a chair"), Marxism ("History is
change in relations of production"), Scholasticism, and Objectivism.
Some famous nominalist philosophies are critical rationalism ("A
proposition should be considered true if and only if it is supported by
argument and experience") and, although it's not usually considered a
philosophy, the scientific method. For example, a biologist isn't that
interested in what the essence of a fruit fly is or whether a
particular insect is a fruit fly or some other kind of fly; instead,
she's content if she has an idea of what other kinds of flies the
insect in question is related to and whether she can learn something
interesting from it. Engineering is also famously nominalistic. For
example, very few programmers imagine that what they are doing is the
end-all be-all of programs: they're either improving something that's
already there or if they're desiging something new, they fully expect
it to be refined in the future as well. "But what is it _really_?" is
an essentialist question. "How can we make it work?" is a nominalist
one.
(2) Why nominalism is better than essentialism (wouldn't you say? ;-))
The world is not easily dividable into clear, unambiguous categories.
Where is the line that separates one species from another? How tall
must a person be to be called tall? How much money do you have to have
to be called rich? An essentialist must find such dividers in order to
be able to use the terms species, tall, or rich. A nominalist can just
use them and clarify them if needed; that is, if somebody is confused.
This way we can avoid squabbling about semantics. Richard Feynman tells
when he was invited to a seminar with some philosophers, and was asked
whether an electron is an 'essential object'. The discussion never got
anywhere, because the philosophers started squabbling among themselves
about his counter-question, "Could you clarify what you mean by
'essential object'? Is a brick an essential object?". They couldn't
agree whether a brick is an essential object or not -- and they didn't
even get to the point of considering the _inside_ of a brick.
(3) How can we have a rational discussion without 'defining our
terms'?
Popper proposes the following solution: First, we agree that the
statement 'A proposition should be considered true if and only if it is
supported by argument and experience' should be accepted as the basis
of the discussion. Then we would look at what we're discussing. Suppose
it's "rights". We would look at how we use the term, look at what
'rights' people actualy have in various societies. Then we might ask,
"What good are rights?". We don't need to understand what "rights"
_essentially_ are, as long as we're talking about the same thing.
Eventually we could arrive at a working definition, e.g., "Our rights
are whatever we successfully defend."
(4) How does this tie in with moral relativism and absolutism?
Essentialism is related to absolutism. An essentialist system of ethics
would start by attempting to answer the questions "What is justice?
What are rights?" fully; in other words, to arrive at a definition that
is universal and absolute. The rules derived from this essentialist
definition would naturally also be absolute. You only get blacks and
whites.
Nominalism, on the other hand, leads to relativism. Since the
definitions are subject to change without notice, so are the
conclusions. There is no such thing as "universal, absolute" ethics any
more than there is a "universal, absolute" society or "universal,
absolute" building. There are only various different real ethical
systems, societies, and buildings.
Does this lead to a chaos of "anything goes" or "whatever my culture
says is right?" No, it doesn't. Some societies are more pleasant to
live in than others, much like some buildings are more pleasant to live
in than others. Likewise, some ethical systems are better to live with
than others. Of course, there will always be room for interpretation:
somebody _likes_ wall-to-wall carpeting whereas I can't abide it. This
doesn't mean that wall-to-wall carpeting is bad and plain wooden floors
are good; it just means that we disagree about this. However, I think
most of us can agree that a building that is warm in the winter, cool
in the summer, that keeps the rain, snow, and burglars out makes a
better home than one that isn't and doesn't.
We can approach ethics the same way: by examining what we have and know
about, discussing them, and improving on them.
Whew, I'm running out of steam. If you're still with me, I can go on
more a bit later about policy utilitarianism, the system of ethics that
seems to me to make the most sense.
/Petteri
--
Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
experience. -- Andrew Welch
Adrian
-snip-
>(4) How does this tie in with moral relativism and absolutism?
>
>Essentialism is related to absolutism. An essentialist system of ethics
>would start by attempting to answer the questions "What is justice?
>What are rights?" fully; in other words, to arrive at a definition that
>is universal and absolute. The rules derived from this essentialist
>definition would naturally also be absolute. You only get blacks and
>whites.
>
>Nominalism, on the other hand, leads to relativism. Since the
>definitions are subject to change without notice, so are the
>conclusions. There is no such thing as "universal, absolute" ethics any
>more than there is a "universal, absolute" society or "universal,
>absolute" building. There are only various different real ethical
>systems, societies, and buildings.
>
>
Based on your definitions of "essentialism" and "nominalism", this is
completely false. An essentialist would be quick to conclude that
there is no essential definition of "rights" and so it is a bogus
subject to discuss. At the very least, such a definition has not yet
been established and if we discuss anything, it must be the
definitions (metaethics) or so an essentialist must conclude. And
that is precisely how moral relativists and subjectivists of any
stripe approach the matter. They see no value in discussing ethics
outside of what this or that culture believes or what this or that
person believes. They do not talk about what is in fact true because
they doubt the yultimate veracity of any claim under the assumption
that there are no universal definitions.
A nominalist (as you are defining it), on the other hand, wouldn't be
so bothered by the lack of a clear cut definition of "rights" and
would discuss them anyway. They would have no problem coming to
conclusions that (modulo some more or less indisputable foundational
assumptions) are "correct" and treat these conclusions like any other
"true" statement. I will also point out here that your definition of
"nominalist" is not the common use of the term in philosophical
circles. The Scholastics, for instance, invented nominalism which is
generally used to refer to the view that universals don't exist and
are just names (hence the term) for classes of particulars. This
general view is associated not with Plato and extreme forms of
Idealism (which hold the opposite view, called naive realism, that
universals are all that exist) or with extremely "objectivist"
philosophies. Rather, nominalism is much more associated with
skepticism and empiricism and so the moral relativism that you
(wrongly in my opinion) attribute to your definition of it.
In other words, the requirement of a well established definition is
associated with "nominalism" as it is commonly used by philosophers,
skepticism, empiricism, and a strong focus on science as the primary
(or even only) source of genuine knowledge. The looseness with
definitions (and so the willingness to just add them to the debate
rather than insisting on discussing only them before you can even
start the debate) is associated with realism, objectivism,
rationalism, and a lack of focus on science as the primary source of
genuine knowledge.
Matthias Weiss
Petteri Sulonen wrote:
I liked your exposé. A question to the speaker:
> (2) Why nominalism is better than essentialism (wouldn't you say?
> ;-))
Shouldn't we decide on a case-to-case basis whether finding a precise
definition would be advantageous and clarify the situation? Not all
things happen on a continuum, sometimes things really are black and
white. In an example you brought up, a line could be drawn between
(sexually reproducing) species by saying that a boy and a girl of
different species will never be able to produce fertile offspring.
I don't know if I understand terms like "thing in itself" or "thing as
such". We humans create symbols (a word in our native language, a
pictogram) to refer to certain aspects of reality. It is quite clear
what is meant by the No Smoking sign/symbol. Nominalism might lead to
people claiming that one puff could still be considered No Smoking
because, so they argue, smoking consists of consuming at least an entire
cigarette.
As to your example with the programmer: Of course the programmer knows
what the program "per se" is: a piece of software that performs, without
running into undefined states (crashes) all functions demanded by the
customer. Of course he is also aware that he may or may not be able to
achieve this goal, depending on his skills, the complexity of the
project, and the time he has to test his program. But he will always
know whether he delivers "The Program" as ordered or merely a
compromise. Telling him, "There, there, we don't know how to define good
software anyway!" doesn't serve anyone, <aside> also it seems to be the
Microsoft crede </aside>.
So why shouldn't we define good morals? The trick consists of
observing reality and defining morals in such a way that the definition
reflects reality as best as possible -- it's no different than finding a
definition for "star".
Moral behavior does not increase suffering. (That's why justice is
different from moral.) In real terms, everything that is illegal should
be immoral (because it increases suffering to various extend or has a
high likelihood of doing so). I suffer, at the very least, if I am at a
higher risk of losing my well-being, health, or life than I would be
without the immoral action perpetrated against me. Those things can be
measured objectively: Burning down my house puts me at a higher risk of
losing my health or my life, thus it will be immoral of you to do so.
Suffering from experiencing fear, embarrassment, or other emotional
distress can, of course, not be measured objectively because emotions
can be faked (and higher civil-suit settlements be achieved).
Nontheless, an action that gratuitously causes those emotions must be
considered immoral. The fact that third parties cannot decide whether my
making you ride a glass elevator is an immoral act against you does not
preclude us from defining it -- either you do or you do not experience
mortal fear upon getting higher than the third floor.
Thus the problem is not so much our inability to define things as our
inability to verify whether a given object satisfies the definition. If
something is well-defined, then any given object either does or does not
satisfy the definition. Of course, again the problem propagates as we do
not actually deal with the object as such but with an abstract idea
reflecting certain properties of the object. On the other hand, it is
not always useful or necessary to define things clearly: Is a crate to
be considered furniture because you can turn it around and sit on it?
My response would be: Who cares? Language evolved to be a useful means
of communication -- to help facilitate and structure social
interactions. Language, and therefore definitions, only have to reflect
such aspects of reality that are important, or at least useful, for this
purpose. Sometimes a clear definition is necessary, sometimes it is nice
to have, sometimes it is clumsy and unnecessary. Clearly nominalism
isn't "better" than essentialism, just as a pair of pliers isn't
"better" than a pair of tweezers.
Matthias.
Petteri Sulonen
<adri...@hotmail.com> wrote:
Hm. This doesn't jibe with my experience. I wonder what some of the
resident essentialists have to say about this; at least Don Kresch
seems to have a definition of rights that is not based on observing
existing societies. Don?
> At the very least, such a definition has not yet
> been established and if we discuss anything, it must be the
> definitions (metaethics) or so an essentialist must conclude. And
> that is precisely how moral relativists and subjectivists of any
> stripe approach the matter. They see no value in discussing ethics
> outside of what this or that culture believes or what this or that
> person believes. They do not talk about what is in fact true because
> they doubt the yultimate veracity of any claim under the assumption
> that there are no universal definitions.
Quite.
> A nominalist (as you are defining it), on the other hand, wouldn't be
> so bothered by the lack of a clear cut definition of "rights" and
> would discuss them anyway. They would have no problem coming to
> conclusions that (modulo some more or less indisputable foundational
> assumptions) are "correct" and treat these conclusions like any other
> "true" statement. I will also point out here that your definition of
> "nominalist" is not the common use of the term in philosophical
> circles. The Scholastics, for instance, invented nominalism which is
> generally used to refer to the view that universals don't exist and
> are just names (hence the term) for classes of particulars. This
> general view is associated not with Plato and extreme forms of
> Idealism (which hold the opposite view, called naive realism, that
> universals are all that exist) or with extremely "objectivist"
> philosophies. Rather, nominalism is much more associated with
> skepticism and empiricism and so the moral relativism that you
> (wrongly in my opinion) attribute to your definition of it.
Hm. Popper seems to disagree with you, or I may have misread him.
> In other words, the requirement of a well established definition is
> associated with "nominalism" as it is commonly used by philosophers,
> skepticism, empiricism, and a strong focus on science as the primary
> (or even only) source of genuine knowledge. The looseness with
> definitions (and so the willingness to just add them to the debate
> rather than insisting on discussing only them before you can even
> start the debate) is associated with realism, objectivism,
^^^^^^^^^^^
This, again, does not fit with my experiences of talking with
objectivists.
> rationalism, and a lack of focus on science as the primary source of
> genuine knowledge.
Thanks for the clarifications.
Petteri Sulonen
<matt...@po.cwru.edu> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>
> I liked your exposé. A question to the speaker:
Heh. I'm just waiting to get clobbered by someone who _actually_ knows
something about this...
> > (2) Why nominalism is better than essentialism (wouldn't you say?
> > ;-))
>
> Shouldn't we decide on a case-to-case basis whether finding a precise
> definition would be advantageous and clarify the situation? Not all
> things happen on a continuum, sometimes things really are black and
> white. In an example you brought up, a line could be drawn between
> (sexually reproducing) species by saying that a boy and a girl of
> different species will never be able to produce fertile offspring.
By that definition lions and tigers would the same species, since they
have been capable of producing fertile offspring. This, however, does
not fit with our usual usage of the term. I agree that your proposed
definition would be a good "working definition," but I don't think it
works as a universal one.
> I don't know if I understand terms like "thing in itself" or "thing as
> such". We humans create symbols (a word in our native language, a
> pictogram) to refer to certain aspects of reality. It is quite clear
> what is meant by the No Smoking sign/symbol. Nominalism might lead to
> people claiming that one puff could still be considered No Smoking
> because, so they argue, smoking consists of consuming at least an entire
> cigarette.
Negotiating definitions does not preclude agreement. I think there is a
fairly strong consensus that a single puff does constitute smoking (in
that context). However, if you have taken a single puff from a
cigarette, or do bum a single puff from a friend's cigarette when out
partying, does that make you a smoker? Again, I think the definition of
'smoking' is fluid.
However, there are lots of times it is possible to arrive (eventually)
at fairly precise definitions of terms; physics as a science has
probably the most examples.
> As to your example with the programmer: Of course the programmer knows
> what the program "per se" is: a piece of software that performs, without
> running into undefined states (crashes) all functions demanded by the
> customer.
But that is a functional definition. He does not assume that there is
only one "right" program for the task. He recognizes that there are
lots of ways of doing it, some better, some worse, some just different.
> Of course he is also aware that he may or may not be able to
> achieve this goal, depending on his skills, the complexity of the
> project, and the time he has to test his program. But he will always
> know whether he delivers "The Program" as ordered or merely a
> compromise. Telling him, "There, there, we don't know how to define good
> software anyway!" doesn't serve anyone, <aside> also it seems to be the
> Microsoft crede </aside>.
Heh.
Quite. However, in SW development you actually quite rarely know
exactly what you're developing when you start the project. You could
even say that the act of programming is to provide a mathematically
precise definition of the problem. Iterative SW development addresses
precisely this: it recognizes that the project is a moving target, and
doesn't attempt to define it to death before sitting down and coding.
> So why shouldn't we define good morals? The trick consists of
> observing reality and defining morals in such a way that the definition
> reflects reality as best as possible -- it's no different than finding a
> definition for "star".
Here, I think you're mistaken. Ethics and morality are a function of
society -- Robinson Crusoe can't be moral or immoral until Man Friday
shows up. Here we run into the immense complexities of society and
psychology: preferences, in other words. Some people prefer to live in
a society that provides a strong communitarian web for support at the
expense of privacy. Others prefer the inverse. Moreover, our
preferences are strongly shaped (if not actually determined) by the
society that brings us up. Therefore, I think it's extremely difficult
to arrive at a definition or description of morality that is both
universal and meaningful.
> Moral behavior does not increase suffering. (That's why justice is
> different from moral.)
That depends entirely on context, the operational system of morality,
and point of view. In many cultures a man has the moral imperative to
murder his sister if she has been 'dishonored' (e.g., raped). This kind
of behaviour certainly increases suffering.
> In real terms, everything that is illegal should
> be immoral (because it increases suffering to various extend or has a
> high likelihood of doing so). I suffer, at the very least, if I am at a
> higher risk of losing my well-being, health, or life than I would be
> without the immoral action perpetrated against me. Those things can be
> measured objectively: Burning down my house puts me at a higher risk of
> losing my health or my life, thus it will be immoral of you to do so.
Here you've already leapt way ahead: you're discussing what should or
should not be immoral or illegal _without_ having an operational
definition for what is moral and what is not. Before we get that far,
we should discuss that. Note, again, that I'm talking of a nominalist,
fluid definition, not an essentialist, rigid one.
> Suffering from experiencing fear, embarrassment, or other emotional
> distress can, of course, not be measured objectively because emotions
> can be faked (and higher civil-suit settlements be achieved).
> Nontheless, an action that gratuitously causes those emotions must be
> considered immoral. The fact that third parties cannot decide whether my
> making you ride a glass elevator is an immoral act against you does not
> preclude us from defining it -- either you do or you do not experience
> mortal fear upon getting higher than the third floor.
>
> Thus the problem is not so much our inability to define things as our
> inability to verify whether a given object satisfies the definition. If
Doesn't this boild down to the same thing?
> something is well-defined, then any given object either does or does not
> satisfy the definition. Of course, again the problem propagates as we do
> not actually deal with the object as such but with an abstract idea
> reflecting certain properties of the object. On the other hand, it is
> not always useful or necessary to define things clearly: Is a crate to
> be considered furniture because you can turn it around and sit on it?
>
> My response would be: Who cares? Language evolved to be a useful means
> of communication -- to help facilitate and structure social
> interactions. Language, and therefore definitions, only have to reflect
> such aspects of reality that are important, or at least useful, for this
> purpose. Sometimes a clear definition is necessary, sometimes it is nice
> to have, sometimes it is clumsy and unnecessary.
I agree with you fine up to here. However, nominalist definitions need
not be unclear. It's simply that they cannot and should not be _more
precise_ than what they are describing; what is definable -- and
verifiable. _That_ is a false clarity: making things look clear and
unambiguous when, in fact, they aren't. "Acceleration means the change
of velocity over time" is a very clear and precise statement. It's
useful because the bit of reality it describes is similarily clear and
precise. Concepts dealing with society, people, and morality cannot be
as clear and precise, because the _reality_ isn't as clear and precise.
> Clearly nominalism
> isn't "better" than essentialism, just as a pair of pliers isn't
> "better" than a pair of tweezers.
I still disagree -- but I think you may have misunderstood my
explanation of essentialism. I hope somebody continues to set me
straight -- that way we might all learn something.
Colin Day
>
> By that definition lions and tigers would the same species, since they
> have been capable of producing fertile offspring. This, however, does
> not fit with our usual usage of the term. I agree that your proposed
> definition would be a good "working definition," but I don't think it
> works as a universal one.
>
> > project, and the time he has to test his program. But he will always
> > know whether he delivers "The Program" as ordered or merely a
> > compromise. Telling him, "There, there, we don't know how to define good
> > software anyway!" doesn't serve anyone, <aside> also it seems to be the
> > Microsoft crede </aside>.
>
No, they have a different definition of "good", defining it in terms of
retaining control.
>
> > So why shouldn't we define good morals? The trick consists of
> > observing reality and defining morals in such a way that the definition
> > reflects reality as best as possible -- it's no different than finding a
> > definition for "star".
>
> Here, I think you're mistaken. Ethics and morality are a function of
> society -- Robinson Crusoe can't be moral or immoral until Man Friday
Why? Are you saying that whether Crusoe grows crops or lies about on the
beach has no moral significance?
Colin Day aa #1500
BAAWA-nnabe
Matthias Weiss
Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> Heh. I'm just waiting to get clobbered by someone who _actually_ knows
> something about this...
<shriek!> I thought YOU knew! :)
>> > (2) Why nominalism is better than essentialism (wouldn't you say?
>> > ;-))
>>
> By that definition lions and tigers would the same species, since they
> have been capable of producing fertile offspring. This, however, does
> not fit with our usual usage of the term.
It's how I remember it from my high school biology lessons, and I
wouldn't find it absurd to call lions and tigers races of some big-cat
species. But that was just an example, and I don't want to get on a
tangent with it.
> I agree that your proposed
> definition would be a good "working definition," but I don't think it
> works as a universal one.
I disagree, but be that as it may. I think taxonimists must have a VERY
clear definition of what a species, a family, etc. is...maybe it's just
a matter of looking up the term. After all, things don't have an essence
in themselves. We, as humans, with brains shaped by our evolution,
determine what the essence of a thing should be, and we define terms
accordingly. The more important the aspect of reality is to us, the more
differentiated the language in which we talk about it becomes. Tahitian,
for example, has different terms for the different developmental stages
of the coconut. Inuit languages, on the other hand, differentiate
between snow of different consistency. If we bothered to care about
these things, our western languages might have achieved such a level of
precision as well. I don't think it is valid to ask about the "essence"
of things, because that, too, is subjective, a function of environment
and culture.
> However, there are lots of times it is possible to arrive (eventually)
> at fairly precise definitions of terms; physics as a science has
> probably the most examples.
>
>
>>As to your example with the programmer: Of course the programmer knows
>>what the program "per se" is: a piece of software that performs, without
>>running into undefined states (crashes) all functions demanded by the
>>customer.
>>
>
> But that is a functional definition. He does not assume that there is
> only one "right" program for the task. He recognizes that there are
> lots of ways of doing it, some better, some worse, some just different.
There is not one way to draw a triangle...does that make the definition
of a triangle fuzzy? What we deal with here is "equivalence classes": A
program is anything that consists of meaningful (to the computer) lines
of code. We consider "equivalent" all strings in letters of the
programming language which make the computer perform a certain task, and
call this class of strings "The Program" to be produced. This, I think,
removes all fuzziness in the language, because all concepts involved are
strictly defined.
>>So why shouldn't we define good morals? The trick consists of
>>observing reality and defining morals in such a way that the definition
>>reflects reality as best as possible -- it's no different than finding a
>>definition for "star".
>
> Here, I think you're mistaken. Ethics and morality are a function of
> society -- Robinson Crusoe can't be moral or immoral until Man Friday
> shows up. Here we run into the immense complexities of society and
> psychology: preferences, in other words. Some people prefer to live in
> a society that provides a strong communitarian web for support at the
> expense of privacy. Others prefer the inverse. Moreover, our
> preferences are strongly shaped (if not actually determined) by the
> society that brings us up. Therefore, I think it's extremely difficult
> to arrive at a definition or description of morality that is both
> universal and meaningful.
Hence morality is a function of at least two people. The exactly same
action might be immoral if directed to one person, but neutral with
respect to another.
>>Moral behavior does not increase suffering. (That's why justice is
>>different from moral.)
>
> That depends entirely on context, the operational system of morality,
> and point of view. In many cultures a man has the moral imperative to
> murder his sister if she has been 'dishonored' (e.g., raped). This kind
> of behaviour certainly increases suffering.
What you say is certainly true but does not contradict what I've been
stating: all of language is a function of culture and environment, all
of language is a matter of opinion. (See the above example about
coconuts and snow.)
> Here you've already leapt way ahead: you're discussing what should or
> should not be immoral or illegal _without_ having an operational
> definition for what is moral and what is not.
Hmmmm...that's because there isn't one (I know of)? I, personally, would
define an immoral action as one that increases suffering. But again,
morality has the function of regulating social interaction so as to
create a viable society. Hence, moral behavior depends on the
environment in which the society lives, the threats with which it has to
cope, etc. etc. Moral behavior is to cultures what genetics is to
species: The society with the ultimately best moral standards will be
the one that prevails, because good morals make a society fit for
survival. Just as there are different genetic codes, there are different
categories of moral behavior.
In Polynesian cultures, cultures without written language, there was
always one person who was responsible of memorizing all the tribe's
folklore -- by threat of death. We, with libraries, would consider such
draconic penalties for forgetfulness immoral, but it may well have been
crucial for the survival of these tribes as cultural entities.
> Before we get that far,
> we should discuss that. Note, again, that I'm talking of a nominalist,
> fluid definition, not an essentialist, rigid one.
I don't think "fluid" or "rigid" are good terms here. I think there are different
degrees of generality: First, you define "morality" as a system of behavioral standards
which ensure the coherence of a culture. Then, when looking at different cultures,
you get more specific, because then you can take into account their
environment, etc. When taking into account more special cases, the
definition becomes more "fluid", of course.
> I agree with you fine up to here. However, nominalist definitions need
> not be unclear. It's simply that they cannot and should not be _more
> precise_ than what they are describing; what is definable -- and
> verifiable. _That_ is a false clarity: making things look clear and
> unambiguous when, in fact, they aren't. "Acceleration means the change
> of velocity over time" is a very clear and precise statement. It's
> useful because the bit of reality it describes is similarily clear and
> precise. Concepts dealing with society, people, and morality cannot be
> as clear and precise, because the _reality_ isn't as clear and precise.
Again, as in different categories of snow in the Inuit languages, that may
merely be a flaw of the language. If things *need* to be made clear, usually
the language to do so is being created.
This, of course, is different from fraudulently creating a false
impression of clarity by pretending to know what one is talking about.
The term "god", for example, is utterly without meaning. Those who use
the term do not have the linguistic tools to fill it with meaning. That
doesn't mean it is not possible to do so, but it precludes me from
taking them seriously...
> I still disagree -- but I think you may have misunderstood my
> explanation of essentialism. I hope somebody continues to set me
> straight -- that way we might all learn something.
Hey, I readily admit that I'm arguing from a layman's position here,
applying concepts as they are presented to my personal experience. But I
figure it's more interesting to do that than discussing Pascal's wager
with some troll! :-)
Matthias.
> /Petteri
Colin Day
>
> [For spectators, this is a continuation of my discussion with AndrewC
> in the 'What does it mean for you to be [_______]?' thread, split into
> its own thread for clarity. It's a bit long; I hope you stayed with me.
> :-)].
>
> (1) The difference between essentialism and nominalism
>
> The main difference between essentialism and nominalism is in how they
> approach the problem of definitions. The essentialist states that
> before we can discuss something, we must define our terms; find the
> "essential" something in them that makes them what they are. "What is
> it that makes a chair a chair? What is the essence of history? What is
> a Christian? What is God?" are the kinds of questions an essentialist
> would ask.
>
> The nominalist, on the other hand, proceeds from the assumption that
> precise and immutable definitions are impossible to find. Instead, s/he
> attempts to define concepts by pointing at things and stating whether
> they do or do not match the concept under discussion, and leaves open
> the possibility of modifying, refining, or clarifying the definitions
> if they turn out to be unworkable. "A god is a supernatural entity like
> Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or
> ghosts," s/he might answer.
>
> Some famous essentialist philosophies are Platonism ("A chair is an
> object that actualizes the idea of a chair"), Marxism ("History is
> change in relations of production"), Scholasticism, and Objectivism.
But according to Objectivism, definitions are not immutable.
"All definitions are contextual..." Introduction to Objectivist
Epistemology, page 56, 1979 ed.
Lenin also voiced similar thoughts, see Materialism and
Empirio-Criticism.
But what does it mean for a home to be better?
Adrian
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>In article <3c3594c6...@news-server.nc.rr.com>, Adrian
><adri...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
-snip-
>>
>> Based on your definitions of "essentialism" and "nominalism", this is
>> completely false. An essentialist would be quick to conclude that
>> there is no essential definition of "rights" and so it is a bogus
>> subject to discuss.
>
>Hm. This doesn't jibe with my experience. I wonder what some of the
>resident essentialists have to say about this; at least Don Kresch
>seems to have a definition of rights that is not based on observing
>existing societies. Don?
>
Well, looking to the broader community of philosophers, those that
demand definitions first and are unwiling to include them as part of a
philosophical discussion fit this trend. The demand for definition
comes for science oriented, skeptical, and empirically minded folks.
-snip-
>
>> A nominalist (as you are defining it), on the other hand, wouldn't be
>> so bothered by the lack of a clear cut definition of "rights" and
>> would discuss them anyway. They would have no problem coming to
>> conclusions that (modulo some more or less indisputable foundational
>> assumptions) are "correct" and treat these conclusions like any other
>> "true" statement. I will also point out here that your definition of
>> "nominalist" is not the common use of the term in philosophical
>> circles. The Scholastics, for instance, invented nominalism which is
>> generally used to refer to the view that universals don't exist and
>> are just names (hence the term) for classes of particulars. This
>> general view is associated not with Plato and extreme forms of
>> Idealism (which hold the opposite view, called naive realism, that
>> universals are all that exist) or with extremely "objectivist"
>> philosophies. Rather, nominalism is much more associated with
>> skepticism and empiricism and so the moral relativism that you
>> (wrongly in my opinion) attribute to your definition of it.
>
>Hm. Popper seems to disagree with you, or I may have misread him.
>
I think I see where you are getting your terms from:
"From Plato until today, most philosophers have either been
nominalists or else what I have called essentialists."
-- Poper, _Objective Knowledge_, p.123
What exactly essentialism, entails or not is not a simple question.
It is Popper's idea, so it requires a lengthy discussion to identify
and establish. However, such is not the case for nominalism which is
a common term among philosophers and is generally defined as I have
done so above. Also, it is a simple matter of fact as to what
philosophical world views have been associated with it through history
and what the origin of the idea is.
"English scholastic William of Ockham (d. 1347) takes an alternative
approach called nominalism. Nominalism maintains that abstract objects
do not exist in any real sense, but are simply general words that we
apply to a collection of things."
-- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
As for the relationship of nominalism to other ideas like skepticism
or empiricism and postivism (the philosophical admiration of science),
that is a bit beyond this remark. But, Popper cannot deny the
historical connection. It is again a simple matter of fact. For
instance, were the British Empiricists (e.g. Locke, Berkeley, Hume)
nominalist or essentialist? What is the connection between empiricism
and positivism? And so on...
>> In other words, the requirement of a well established definition is
>> associated with "nominalism" as it is commonly used by philosophers,
>> skepticism, empiricism, and a strong focus on science as the primary
>> (or even only) source of genuine knowledge. The looseness with
>> definitions (and so the willingness to just add them to the debate
>> rather than insisting on discussing only them before you can even
>> start the debate) is associated with realism, objectivism,
> ^^^^^^^^^^^
>
>This, again, does not fit with my experiences of talking with
>objectivists.
>
Incidentally, I am not talking about Objectivists(with capital "o"),
as in the followers of Ayn Rand. I am just saying that those that
tend to hold that philsoophical issues are objective and that are not
skeptics -- doubting the possibility of knowledge with regard to
philosophical issues. Some philosophers have doubted the possibility
of knowledge of some things and others have doubt such a possibility
with other things. Some have doubted such a possibility altogether.
If we look back at recent history and divide philosophers into
followers of Kant or followers of Hume, then we get that out of the
two Hume was
Nominalist,
Empiricist/Positivist,
Skeptical,
Relative
and Kant was
Realist,
Rationalist (though really neither)/Philosophical,
Objective,
Absolute/Universal
That is why I am associating nominalism with what I do.
-snip-
Peter van Velzen
>
> But what does it mean for a home to be better?
>
> Colin Day aa #1500
> BAAWA-nnabe
That is a simple question:
Of course it depends on the context.
1. If you can buy it for the same price as the "worse" home, you will (if
you buy any that is).
2. If you grow up in the "better" home, you will - in the end - have more
offspring.
3. If you live in the "better" home, you live longer.
4. If you live in the "better" home, you write better songs,
(that is your songs get higher on the all-times best list)
(or your songs will sell better, while you are alive)
etcetera, etcetera etcetera
"better" is indeed a very relative term.
But what isn't ?
--
"Think for yourself"
Atheist #1107
Peter van Velzen
Amstelveen
The Netherlands
http://home-2.worldonline.nl/~pbamvv/petervve.htm
Peter van Velzen
<snip (if you want to read it, read the original post)
> (2) Why nominalism is better than essentialism (wouldn't you say? ;-))
If (1) is true (2) is true.
> (3) How can we have a rational discussion without 'defining our
> terms'?
We cannot, but we cannot define our terms exactly.
We only need just enough definition to stay out of communication problems
>
> (4) How does this tie in with moral relativism and absolutism?
>
<snip>understood
> /Petteri
Of course I am a utititarian
That is, I only care for the use of the issue
not for any theoretical perfection.
Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you
with
Never call them an idiot, for there are to possibilities
1. You are lying, (s)he is not an idiot
2. You are right, and they won't understand what you mean by "idiot".
Joshua Lusion I
server.nc.rr.com:
> On Fri, 04 Jan 2002 16:54:29 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
...
>I will also point out here that your definition of
> "nominalist" is not the common use of the term in philosophical
> circles. The Scholastics, for instance, invented nominalism which is
> generally used to refer to the view that universals don't exist and
> are just names (hence the term) for classes of particulars. This
> general view is associated not with Plato and extreme forms of
> Idealism (which hold the opposite view, called naive realism, that
> universals are all that exist) or with extremely "objectivist"
> philosophies. Rather, nominalism is much more associated with
> skepticism and empiricism and so the moral relativism that you
> (wrongly in my opinion) attribute to your definition of it.
I'm confused in your reply; even though Petteri followed up and seemed to
be backing off, your _clarification_ of what nominalism really means as
opposed to Petteri's definition, at least to me, seems to be the same exact
thing!
IOW, from Petterri's original post in this thread:
P>The nominalist, on the other hand, proceeds from the assumption that
P>precise and immutable definitions are impossible to find. Instead, s/he
P>attempts to define concepts by pointing at things and stating whether
P>they do or do not match the concept under discussion, and leaves open
P>the possibility of modifying, refining, or clarifying the definitions
P>if they turn out to be unworkable. "A god is a supernatural entity like
P>Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or
P>ghosts," s/he might answer.
From this, I gather that nominalists don't define things precisely and
allow instances to fit the definition, but rather they vaguely classify
certain instances under the same umbrella. From your definition, I gather
the same exact thing. My experiences with the terms "nominalism" and
"essentialism" stem from clarifications given to me via Objectivists; and
although Objectivists are strange, I'm intrigued about the definitions as
others would lay it out. Hence, my dilemma... I'm not quite sure what
you're objecting to and what Petterri seems to be considering retracting.
Or are you just objecting to the loose categorizations of other schools of
thought as "essentialist" or "nominalist" approaches?
--
>><>>><>>><><>><><><>> | Joshua Lusion I
>><><><>><>>>>><><><>> | Welcome to the world of freethought
>><>>><>>><><>>><><>>> | aa #272
Joshua Lusion I
news:3C360C13...@po.cwru.edu:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>...
[Petteri's:]
>>> > ;-))
>> By that definition lions and tigers would the same species, since they
>> have been capable of producing fertile offspring. This, however, does
>> not fit with our usual usage of the term.
> It's how I remember it from my high school biology lessons, and I
> wouldn't find it absurd to call lions and tigers races of some big-cat
> species. But that was just an example, and I don't want to get on a
> tangent with it.
This definition of species, btw, _isn't_ clear. There are ring species--
for example--geographically scattered species that, locally, can breed, but
if you grab two from far away locations, they can't. In other words,
individuals taken from large distances can only be considered part of the
same species because of the intermediates that make a chain of
interfertility. If you allow theoretical and/or dead species to be
intermediates, that basically makes all sexual life on earth the same
species.
...oh, and that brings up yet another problem with the term "species" as
defined in this way--it _only_ works for sexual species (how would you test
the species border of bacteria, or amoeba? Or what about the lizard for
which there's only the female--that lays fertile eggs?)
And donkeys/horses can interbreed to create mules, but mules can't
interbreed with anything. So are donkeys/horses the same species?
Donkeys/mules?
>> I agree that your proposed
>> definition would be a good "working definition," but I don't think it
>> works as a universal one.
>
>
> I disagree, but be that as it may. I think taxonimists must have a VERY
> clear definition of what a species, a family, etc. is...maybe it's just
> a matter of looking up the term.
They don't... a lot of it is art. This is actually a problem in taxonomy.
Generally speaking, there are quite a few things that clearly can be
categorized as species, but there are also quite a few things that betray
attempted well-defined categories that must get a subjective judgement or a
flip of the coin to decide.
>> However, there are lots of times it is possible to arrive (eventually)
>> at fairly precise definitions of terms; physics as a science has
>> probably the most examples.
And it has a lot of counterexamples. What is the precise definition of
energy? Physics has different types of problems along the same lines, btw,
because they also attempt to forsee a little bit of ontology--eg, is energy
the same exact thing as momentum, rotated in time? As I'm aware of it,
physicists are far from nailing their definitions down exactly, and they're
quite willing to flex a few potential ways.
>> But that is a functional definition. He does not assume that there is
>> only one "right" program for the task. He recognizes that there are
>> lots of ways of doing it, some better, some worse, some just
>> different.
> There is not one way to draw a triangle...does that make the definition
> of a triangle fuzzy?
No, that doesn't, but other things do. For instance, you may want to
consider hand drawn triangles to be triangles in some instances, even
though the lines aren't straight. Also, are all three-sided "figures"
triangles, or only such figures that have spatial representations? (IOW,
can I talk about the smallest possible triangle in pressure/temperature
space where liquid water can exist? Are such things really triangles?)
> What we deal with here is "equivalence classes":
...but we deal with weak equivalence classes. For almost every concept we
have, there are things we don't know where to put. We _could_ arbitrate it
into one category or the other, but this would be an arbitration.
> A program is anything that consists of meaningful (to the computer) lines
> of code.
...and this begs the question: What does it mean for something to
be maningful to the computer? I'm reminded of an entry into the Obfuscated
C programming contest that was a simple game. It didn't compile. But that
wasn't a fault of the program--it was by design. When you tried to compile
it, you got a compiler error. The compiler error was a #error directive,
so it gave you more information--the information was something like, "You
are standing near a door". To get past this, you need to add a flag to the
compiler, eg: cc -Door game.c. This creative obfuscation won a temporary
category that was something along the lines of "Worst abuse of the C
preprocessor".
IOW, this "program" worked by not being able to compile. So, was it
meaningfull to the computer? OTOH, there may be random data in memory
somewhere on my machine that, although it does something totally useless
and may lock up my computer, the machine will actually execute if the PC
ever points there. Is this a program?
> We consider "equivalent" all strings in letters of the
> programming language which make the computer perform a certain task,
> and call this class of strings "The Program" to be produced. This, I
> think, removes all fuzziness in the language, because all concepts
> involved are strictly defined.
Unless you start doing weird things as per above. I guess this "elf" game
could be considered unequivocably to be a program written in C
preprocessor. But it's not clear cut, without another arbitration, whether
or not it can be classified as a "C program" (note: It does actually
compile in C--you just have to have the correct flags).
> Hence morality is a function of at least two people. The exactly same
> action might be immoral if directed to one person, but neutral with
> respect to another.
...or, it could be indeterminate wrt either one or both.
It's my opinion that even most categorizations that we take for granted as
being well defined are in some instances very fuzzy. Specific fields of
math are the only types of counterexamples I can think of.
The purpose of this is more to further demonstrate the advantages of what I
understand to be nominalist stances than to be pedantic, btw.
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>[For spectators, this is a continuation of my discussion with AndrewC
>in the 'What does it mean for you to be [_______]?' thread, split into
>its own thread for clarity. It's a bit long; I hope you stayed with me.
>:-)].
>
>(1) The difference between essentialism and nominalism
>
>The main difference between essentialism and nominalism is in how they
>approach the problem of definitions. The essentialist states that
>before we can discuss something, we must define our terms; find the
>"essential" something in them that makes them what they are. "What is
>it that makes a chair a chair? What is the essence of history? What is
>a Christian? What is God?" are the kinds of questions an essentialist
>would ask.
>
>The nominalist, on the other hand, proceeds from the assumption that
>precise and immutable definitions are impossible to find. Instead, s/he
>attempts to define concepts by pointing at things and stating whether
>they do or do not match the concept under discussion, and leaves open
>the possibility of modifying, refining, or clarifying the definitions
>if they turn out to be unworkable. "A god is a supernatural entity like
>Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or
>ghosts," s/he might answer.
Only when you have an idea of what god people are talking about can
you deal with the topic. They may be talking about zeus who is a
specifically different character than yahweh. If you state it before
hand then it leads to an easier discussion.
If you can find this out before hand it leads to a sane discussion.
>Some famous essentialist philosophies are Platonism ("A chair is an
>object that actualizes the idea of a chair"), Marxism ("History is
>change in relations of production"), Scholasticism, and Objectivism.
>
>Some famous nominalist philosophies are critical rationalism ("A
>proposition should be considered true if and only if it is supported by
>argument and experience") and, although it's not usually considered a
>philosophy, the scientific method. For example, a biologist isn't that
>interested in what the essence of a fruit fly is or whether a
>particular insect is a fruit fly or some other kind of fly; instead,
>she's content if she has an idea of what other kinds of flies the
>insect in question is related to and whether she can learn something
>interesting from it. Engineering is also famously nominalistic. For
>example, very few programmers imagine that what they are doing is the
>end-all be-all of programs: they're either improving something that's
>already there or if they're desiging something new, they fully expect
>it to be refined in the future as well. "But what is it _really_?" is
>an essentialist question. "How can we make it work?" is a nominalist
>one.
A "Program" is a specific concept. It includes all the "programs" ever
writen. From Ada Lovelace's creations to those punch cards that played
piano keys. Depending on what your concept of a "program" is.
Tieing this in with the above, if I were to go talking about programs
and was only referring to say executables written in assembly, and
your concept of programs was everything from punch cards to NeuralNet
Spreadsheets then we may have a conflict. Defining what you mean
before hand can be handy. When talking about instruction sets for
machines it won't create to much of a hassle. But if we go through 15
posts in a deep thread with conflicting definitions of "Rational
Egoism" then, as we have both discovered, it leads to a few more
problems as each of the conflicting elements of our concept of
rational egoism come into play must be individually weeded out.
Of course, a concept of a system of morality and its source is someone
more complicated than a concept of a "program"
The program they are writing is a specific example of that concept or
a "concrete".
>(2) Why nominalism is better than essentialism (wouldn't you say? ;-))
>
>The world is not easily dividable into clear, unambiguous categories.
>Where is the line that separates one species from another? How tall
>must a person be to be called tall? How much money do you have to have
>to be called rich? An essentialist must find such dividers in order to
>be able to use the terms species, tall, or rich. A nominalist can just
>use them and clarify them if needed; that is, if somebody is confused.
>This way we can avoid squabbling about semantics.
Its like that old line "Put 4 economists in a room and ask a question,
you'll get 6 opinions".
Concepts vary from person to person because each person has a
different "background story". Everyone has a different perspective. I
am of above average height, so my definition of tall is generally
someone 4 inches taller than me. My definition of short is generally
someone 4 inches shorter than me. Of course other people may not
consider someone 6'1" as particularly short.
It is for this reason that a predefined (in the context of the
discussion) concept be illicited before the discussion begins. If I
may now bring my analogy back to the discussion, I largely don't see
the line between essentialist and nominalist. It sounds to me as if
you are defining an essentialist as someone who wants a definition and
preconcept of the terms being discusses and a nomilist is someone whom
relies on popular usage to get them through. Of course, my background
sounds like is vastly different from yours (you sound much wider read)
so you would be able to know those differences where I would not be
able to distinguish them.
<snip of an quasiessentialist brick>
>(3) How can we have a rational discussion without 'defining our
>terms'?
>
>Popper proposes the following solution: First, we agree that the
>statement 'A proposition should be considered true if and only if it is
>supported by argument and experience' should be accepted as the basis
>of the discussion. Then we would look at what we're discussing. Suppose
>it's "rights". We would look at how we use the term, look at what
>'rights' people actualy have in various societies. Then we might ask,
>"What good are rights?". We don't need to understand what "rights"
>_essentially_ are, as long as we're talking about the same thing.
>Eventually we could arrive at a working definition, e.g., "Our rights
>are whatever we successfully defend."
An analogy to follow.
Person A defines "rights" as: Our rights are whatever we successfully
defend.
Person B defines "rights" as: A moral principle defining and
sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context.
Now, these two go on discussing rights for a while. Using nominalism
they get their understanding of what eachother means by "rights" from
the US bill of Rights.
Person B thinks Person A means what he does. Because he would, by his
definition of rights, hold everything that is on the bill of rights.
Person A thinks Person B means what he does. Because, as with his
definition the only reason the Bill of Rights is in existence is
because that is what was successfully defended.
They go on arguing and Person B can't think of the reason why Person A
doesn't put great importance on freedom of speech. Even though person
B is thinking of Crapbleckistan which doesn't have it in their bill of
rights. Person A can't think of why Person B defends freedom of speech
so much when he is of the understanding that Person B defines it the
same way he does.
Of course, this is a sketchy example, but is the same problem I have
found myself up against when ever I discuss this sort of thing with
others whom do not share my definitions of rights, morals, politics
etc... Which is why it would be important to know EXACTLY what the
other person means by it.
>(4) How does this tie in with moral relativism and absolutism?
>
>Essentialism is related to absolutism. An essentialist system of ethics
>would start by attempting to answer the questions "What is justice?
>What are rights?" fully; in other words, to arrive at a definition that
>is universal and absolute. The rules derived from this essentialist
>definition would naturally also be absolute. You only get blacks and
>whites.
>
>Nominalism, on the other hand, leads to relativism. Since the
>definitions are subject to change without notice, so are the
>conclusions. There is no such thing as "universal, absolute" ethics any
>more than there is a "universal, absolute" society or "universal,
>absolute" building. There are only various different real ethical
>systems, societies, and buildings.
A building is not absolute?
>Does this lead to a chaos of "anything goes" or "whatever my culture
>says is right?" No, it doesn't. Some societies are more pleasant to
>live in than others, much like some buildings are more pleasant to live
>in than others. Likewise, some ethical systems are better to live with
>than others. Of course, there will always be room for interpretation:
>somebody _likes_ wall-to-wall carpeting whereas I can't abide it. This
>doesn't mean that wall-to-wall carpeting is bad and plain wooden floors
>are good; it just means that we disagree about this. However, I think
>most of us can agree that a building that is warm in the winter, cool
>in the summer, that keeps the rain, snow, and burglars out makes a
>better home than one that isn't and doesn't.
>
>We can approach ethics the same way: by examining what we have and know
>about, discussing them, and improving on them.
By what standard do you deem that life in one society is better than
life in another?
>Whew, I'm running out of steam. If you're still with me, I can go on
>more a bit later about policy utilitarianism, the system of ethics that
>seems to me to make the most sense.
Please do. If you don't mind though, we'll wait until this is done
with. I am most interested in hearing of it though.
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
[snip]
> > Some famous essentialist philosophies are Platonism ("A chair is an
> > object that actualizes the idea of a chair"), Marxism ("History is
> > change in relations of production"), Scholasticism, and Objectivism.
>
>
> But according to Objectivism, definitions are not immutable.
>
> "All definitions are contextual..." Introduction to Objectivist
> Epistemology, page 56, 1979 ed.
>
> Lenin also voiced similar thoughts, see Materialism and
> Empirio-Criticism.
That, again, does not seem to match my experiences with objectivism and
objectivists. Objectivism does claim that it is an ethical philosophy
that is universal and objective; it alone is "right" while others are
"wrong". It then proceeds to state its principles. If it is universal
and objective, how can these principles be mutable?
[snip]
> > Does this lead to a chaos of "anything goes" or "whatever my culture
> > says is right?" No, it doesn't. Some societies are more pleasant to
> > live in than others, much like some buildings are more pleasant to live
> > in than others. Likewise, some ethical systems are better to live with
> > than others. Of course, there will always be room for interpretation:
> > somebody _likes_ wall-to-wall carpeting whereas I can't abide it. This
> > doesn't mean that wall-to-wall carpeting is bad and plain wooden floors
> > are good; it just means that we disagree about this. However, I think
> > most of us can agree that a building that is warm in the winter, cool
> > in the summer, that keeps the rain, snow, and burglars out makes a
> > better home than one that isn't and doesn't.
> >
>
> But what does it mean for a home to be better?
That's largely a matter of preference. However, I think that by
discussing it, we can arrive at a consensus regarding some things that
make a home better -- and act upon it. That's the idea of an open
society.
Petteri Sulonen
<pba...@worldonline.nl> wrote:
> > (1) The difference between essentialism and nominalism
>
> <snip (if you want to read it, read the original post)
>
>
> > (2) Why nominalism is better than essentialism (wouldn't you say? ;-))
>
> If (1) is true (2) is true.
>
> > (3) How can we have a rational discussion without 'defining our
> > terms'?
>
> We cannot, but we cannot define our terms exactly.
> We only need just enough definition to stay out of communication problems
>
> >
> > (4) How does this tie in with moral relativism and absolutism?
> >
> <snip>understood
>
>
> > /Petteri
>
> Of course I am a utititarian
> That is, I only care for the use of the issue
> not for any theoretical perfection.
Same here.
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you
> with
>
> Never call them an idiot, for there are to possibilities
>
> 1. You are lying, (s)he is not an idiot
> 2. You are right, and they won't understand what you mean by "idiot".
I like that.
/Petteri
--
Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
experience. -- Andrew Welch
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
Yep. Of course, this is contingent on my (operational) definition of
morality -- internalized rules of conduct that govern social behaviour.
Somebody who's alone obviously doesn't _have_ social behaviour, ergo,
in that context 'morality' has no meaning.
Would you like to propose another definition for morality? In my
experience the ones that try to incorporate behaviour that has no
impact on others quickly run into problems.
Petteri Sulonen
<matt...@po.cwru.edu> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>
> > Heh. I'm just waiting to get clobbered by someone who _actually_ knows
> > something about this...
>
> <shriek!> I thought YOU knew! :)
>
>
> >> > (2) Why nominalism is better than essentialism (wouldn't you say?
> >> > ;-))
> >>
> > By that definition lions and tigers would the same species, since they
> > have been capable of producing fertile offspring. This, however, does
> > not fit with our usual usage of the term.
>
>
> It's how I remember it from my high school biology lessons, and I
> wouldn't find it absurd to call lions and tigers races of some big-cat
> species. But that was just an example, and I don't want to get on a
> tangent with it.
Quite. I'm just using the counterexample to show that a single, precise
definition like the one you proposed will not fit all contexts. It
certainly makes sense in a lot of contexts, but, for example, it also
makes sense to speak of the Amur tiger and the Bengal tiger as two
species (for example, when considering their chances of survival) even
if by your definition they would be the same species.
> > I agree that your proposed
> > definition would be a good "working definition," but I don't think it
> > works as a universal one.
>
>
> I disagree, but be that as it may. I think taxonimists must have a VERY
> clear definition of what a species, a family, etc. is...maybe it's just
> a matter of looking up the term.
Even if they did, it wouldn't change the fact that in other contexts
their definition might be of very limited usefulness, and using their
definition when it's not suitable only serves to confuse things.
> After all, things don't have an essence
> in themselves. We, as humans, with brains shaped by our evolution,
> determine what the essence of a thing should be, and we define terms
> accordingly. The more important the aspect of reality is to us, the more
> differentiated the language in which we talk about it becomes. Tahitian,
> for example, has different terms for the different developmental stages
> of the coconut. Inuit languages, on the other hand, differentiate
> between snow of different consistency. If we bothered to care about
> these things, our western languages might have achieved such a level of
> precision as well. I don't think it is valid to ask about the "essence"
> of things, because that, too, is subjective, a function of environment
> and culture.
If you're saying that we, as humans, conceptualize and categorize
nature to make sense of it, I entirely agree. However, I think it's
very important to keep in mind that our conceptual model of the world
is a _model_ -- it does not and cannot reflect accurately every aspect
of the world. Therefore the need for fluid definitions.
> > However, there are lots of times it is possible to arrive (eventually)
> > at fairly precise definitions of terms; physics as a science has
> > probably the most examples.
> >
> >
> >>As to your example with the programmer: Of course the programmer knows
> >>what the program "per se" is: a piece of software that performs, without
> >>running into undefined states (crashes) all functions demanded by the
> >>customer.
> >>
> >
> > But that is a functional definition. He does not assume that there is
> > only one "right" program for the task. He recognizes that there are
> > lots of ways of doing it, some better, some worse, some just different.
>
>
> There is not one way to draw a triangle...does that make the definition
> of a triangle fuzzy? What we deal with here is "equivalence classes": A
> program is anything that consists of meaningful (to the computer) lines
> of code. We consider "equivalent" all strings in letters of the
> programming language which make the computer perform a certain task, and
> call this class of strings "The Program" to be produced. This, I think,
> removes all fuzziness in the language, because all concepts involved are
> strictly defined.
A triangle is indeed a very simple concept, and it is possible to
define it unambiguously. However, when you move into more complex
areas, things become a lot fuzzier. Think of games or simulations, for
example.
> >>So why shouldn't we define good morals? The trick consists of
> >>observing reality and defining morals in such a way that the definition
> >>reflects reality as best as possible -- it's no different than finding a
> >>definition for "star".
> >
> > Here, I think you're mistaken. Ethics and morality are a function of
> > society -- Robinson Crusoe can't be moral or immoral until Man Friday
> > shows up. Here we run into the immense complexities of society and
> > psychology: preferences, in other words. Some people prefer to live in
> > a society that provides a strong communitarian web for support at the
> > expense of privacy. Others prefer the inverse. Moreover, our
> > preferences are strongly shaped (if not actually determined) by the
> > society that brings us up. Therefore, I think it's extremely difficult
> > to arrive at a definition or description of morality that is both
> > universal and meaningful.
>
>
> Hence morality is a function of at least two people. The exactly same
> action might be immoral if directed to one person, but neutral with
> respect to another.
Quite.
> >>Moral behavior does not increase suffering. (That's why justice is
> >>different from moral.)
> >
> > That depends entirely on context, the operational system of morality,
> > and point of view. In many cultures a man has the moral imperative to
> > murder his sister if she has been 'dishonored' (e.g., raped). This kind
> > of behaviour certainly increases suffering.
>
>
> What you say is certainly true but does not contradict what I've been
> stating: all of language is a function of culture and environment, all
> of language is a matter of opinion. (See the above example about
> coconuts and snow.)
Indeed it doesn't. Did you think it did?
> > Here you've already leapt way ahead: you're discussing what should or
> > should not be immoral or illegal _without_ having an operational
> > definition for what is moral and what is not.
>
>
> Hmmmm...that's because there isn't one (I know of)? I, personally, would
> define an immoral action as one that increases suffering. But again,
> morality has the function of regulating social interaction so as to
> create a viable society. Hence, moral behavior depends on the
> environment in which the society lives, the threats with which it has to
> cope, etc. etc. Moral behavior is to cultures what genetics is to
> species: The society with the ultimately best moral standards will be
> the one that prevails, because good morals make a society fit for
> survival. Just as there are different genetic codes, there are different
> categories of moral behavior.
Now we're talking: these are definitions we can work with. However, I'd
submit the following terms for discussion:
o Morality: an internalized system of morals that governs social
behaviour.
o Ethics: a conceptualized, stated version of the above. When
ethics are internalized, they become morals.
o "Good" and "bad" systems of ethics: One system of ethics is better
than another if the people within its scope are happier
than in the other.
> In Polynesian cultures, cultures without written language, there was
> always one person who was responsible of memorizing all the tribe's
> folklore -- by threat of death. We, with libraries, would consider such
> draconic penalties for forgetfulness immoral, but it may well have been
> crucial for the survival of these tribes as cultural entities.
Interesting. I wasn't aware of that.
> > Before we get that far,
> > we should discuss that. Note, again, that I'm talking of a nominalist,
> > fluid definition, not an essentialist, rigid one.
>
>
> I don't think "fluid" or "rigid" are good terms here. I think there are
> different
>
> degrees of generality: First, you define "morality" as a system of behavioral
> standards
> which ensure the coherence of a culture. Then, when looking at different
> cultures,
>
> you get more specific, because then you can take into account their
> environment, etc. When taking into account more special cases, the
> definition becomes more "fluid", of course.
Exactly. The fluidity of the definition is contignent on the ambiguity
of the issues under discussion.
> > I agree with you fine up to here. However, nominalist definitions need
> > not be unclear. It's simply that they cannot and should not be _more
> > precise_ than what they are describing; what is definable -- and
> > verifiable. _That_ is a false clarity: making things look clear and
> > unambiguous when, in fact, they aren't. "Acceleration means the change
> > of velocity over time" is a very clear and precise statement. It's
> > useful because the bit of reality it describes is similarily clear and
> > precise. Concepts dealing with society, people, and morality cannot be
> > as clear and precise, because the _reality_ isn't as clear and precise.
>
> Again, as in different categories of snow in the Inuit languages, that may
>
> merely be a flaw of the language. If things *need* to be made clear, usually
>
> the language to do so is being created.
Plus, we can clarify what we mean as we go along. "I'm sorry, I didn't
quite understand what you were saying," "Did you mean...," and "What do
you mean by..." are very useful questions.
>
> This, of course, is different from fraudulently creating a false
> impression of clarity by pretending to know what one is talking about.
> The term "god", for example, is utterly without meaning. Those who use
> the term do not have the linguistic tools to fill it with meaning. That
> doesn't mean it is not possible to do so, but it precludes me from
> taking them seriously...
>
> > I still disagree -- but I think you may have misunderstood my
> > explanation of essentialism. I hope somebody continues to set me
> > straight -- that way we might all learn something.
>
>
> Hey, I readily admit that I'm arguing from a layman's position here,
> applying concepts as they are presented to my personal experience. But I
> figure it's more interesting to do that than discussing Pascal's wager
> with some troll! :-)
Likewise. Don't for one second imagine that I'm somehow "qualified" to
carry on this kind of discussion: I've read a few books, thought about
a number of things, some things make sense to me, others don't. I hope
some "real" philosophers (that is, people who have done much more
reading and thinking about these subjects) join the discussion. :-)
Petteri Sulonen
> On Fri, 04 Jan 2002 16:54:29 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
[snip]
> >The nominalist, on the other hand, proceeds from the assumption that
> >precise and immutable definitions are impossible to find. Instead, s/he
> >attempts to define concepts by pointing at things and stating whether
> >they do or do not match the concept under discussion, and leaves open
> >the possibility of modifying, refining, or clarifying the definitions
> >if they turn out to be unworkable. "A god is a supernatural entity like
> >Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or
> >ghosts," s/he might answer.
>
> Only when you have an idea of what god people are talking about can
> you deal with the topic. They may be talking about zeus who is a
> specifically different character than yahweh. If you state it before
> hand then it leads to an easier discussion.
>
> If you can find this out before hand it leads to a sane discussion.
Exactly. My point is that we should keep in mind that whatever
definition we arrive at is not necessarily valid in other contexts.
Trying to find the "essence" of god-ness tends to lead very quickly to
rather pointless discussions of whether X is or is not a god.
Again, exactly. But _agreeing_ on our terms is not the same as "finding
the essence of X".
> Of course, a concept of a system of morality and its source is someone
> more complicated than a concept of a "program"
Exactly.
> The program they are writing is a specific example of that concept or
> a "concrete".
This, I think, goes somewhat astray again. Another poster recounted the
example of the Obfuscated-C contest entry, which was a program that was
designed not to compile. Is this a concrete of the concept of a
program? Does it matter? The nominalist would say that the _question_
is pointless.
You're misunderstanding me, then. My point is that the essentialist
tends to put the cart before the horse: once he has, to his
satisfaction, found the 'essence' of a concept, he goes to examine
'concretes', comparing them against the 'essence'. When asked to define
a chair, a nominalist could say "A piece of furniture that's designed
for one person to sit on, that's not a bathroom appliance." An
essentialist would answer "An object that actualizes the essence of a
chair". Then the essentialist would wander off looking for the essence
of a chair, where the nominalist would be merrily making one.
Again, exactly. (By the way, I don't see the two definitions as
necessarily in conflict.) However, in such a discussion, I'm perfectly
willing to use the other person's definition, if it makes understanding
easier.
However, here we come to another problem. Some definitions are more
useful than others. For example, if we define "monopoly" as "exclusive
control of the market", and understand "exclusive" as "100%", we'll
find that we'd be very hard-pressed to find a _single_ monopoly
_anywhere_. We've restricted the definition of "monopoly" to
uselessness: it's a concept that doesn't refer to anything that exists.
To take another example, if we define "god" as "something that has a
paramount importance in your life," we end up with gods here, there,
and everywhere -- we've _stretched_ the definition to the point of
meaninglessness. _This_ kind of discussion of terms can be very useful:
is D a useful definition for X? The mistake is to discuss "is X D?" or
"is D X?" That leads to an argument about semantics.
> >(4) How does this tie in with moral relativism and absolutism?
> >
> >Essentialism is related to absolutism. An essentialist system of ethics
> >would start by attempting to answer the questions "What is justice?
> >What are rights?" fully; in other words, to arrive at a definition that
> >is universal and absolute. The rules derived from this essentialist
> >definition would naturally also be absolute. You only get blacks and
> >whites.
> >
> >Nominalism, on the other hand, leads to relativism. Since the
> >definitions are subject to change without notice, so are the
> >conclusions. There is no such thing as "universal, absolute" ethics any
> >more than there is a "universal, absolute" society or "universal,
> >absolute" building. There are only various different real ethical
> >systems, societies, and buildings.
>
> A building is not absolute?
I don't understand the question. What do you mean by "absolute"? I
meant something like "the unique object that perfectly embodies the
concept of building-ness, thereby rendering all other buildings
'false'".
> >Does this lead to a chaos of "anything goes" or "whatever my culture
> >says is right?" No, it doesn't. Some societies are more pleasant to
> >live in than others, much like some buildings are more pleasant to live
> >in than others. Likewise, some ethical systems are better to live with
> >than others. Of course, there will always be room for interpretation:
> >somebody _likes_ wall-to-wall carpeting whereas I can't abide it. This
> >doesn't mean that wall-to-wall carpeting is bad and plain wooden floors
> >are good; it just means that we disagree about this. However, I think
> >most of us can agree that a building that is warm in the winter, cool
> >in the summer, that keeps the rain, snow, and burglars out makes a
> >better home than one that isn't and doesn't.
> >
> >We can approach ethics the same way: by examining what we have and know
> >about, discussing them, and improving on them.
>
> By what standard do you deem that life in one society is better than
> life in another?
That's certainly a tough one. I'd start by asking how _they_ feel about
it. Then I'd ask them what kinds of things they think make for a good
life, and tell them my thoughts about it. Eventually we might agree
about a set of quantifiable indicators of "goodness" of a society.
These could be, for example, crime rate, mortality rate, unwanted
pregnancy rate, rate of poverty, level of education (as measured by
some standardized tests), rate of corruption (already tougher), type
and quantity of restrictions freedom of conscience, speech, and the
press, etc. Once we have a list we've agreed upon, we might compare
societies based on these indicators _and_ the people's indications of
what kinds of things they expect from a "good" society.
> >Whew, I'm running out of steam. If you're still with me, I can go on
> >more a bit later about policy utilitarianism, the system of ethics that
> >seems to me to make the most sense.
>
> Please do. If you don't mind though, we'll wait until this is done
> with. I am most interested in hearing of it though.
OK, let's. Rune can probably explain it better than I, though.
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>In article <lhhd3u8cuetpot9v0...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 04 Jan 2002 16:54:29 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
>> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>[snip]
<snip a bit>
>> The program they are writing is a specific example of that concept or
>> a "concrete".
>
>This, I think, goes somewhat astray again. Another poster recounted the
>example of the Obfuscated-C contest entry, which was a program that was
>designed not to compile. Is this a concrete of the concept of a
>program? Does it matter? The nominalist would say that the _question_
>is pointless.
It depends how you define a Program.
The above is an example of "code". If it doesn't compile and perform
its function then it can hardly be called a program.
well, by your definition I am an essentialist, and I find the question
pointless :)
Why would an essentialist be the only philosopher wandering off to
find concretes of a chair.
What about abstractions? You get three concretes of a chair and you
understand the concept of a chair. Then using abstraction you can look
at many different chairs and following the process of perception and
abstraction you can know that said item is a chair without anyone
having pointed to it and saying "That is also a chair".
Yes, but Peron A is under the assumption that a morality is only
because someone successfully defended it. Person B is under the
assumption that a Right is a sanction of freedom of action in a social
context. Person A would declare that The US bill of rights is just as
good as any other (no better no worse). Person B would think that the
US bill of rights is depending on his value system either good or evil
(depending on if they want a full freedom of action, or they don't
want a full freedom of action).
>However, here we come to another problem. Some definitions are more
>useful than others. For example, if we define "monopoly" as "exclusive
>control of the market", and understand "exclusive" as "100%", we'll
>find that we'd be very hard-pressed to find a _single_ monopoly
>_anywhere_. We've restricted the definition of "monopoly" to
>uselessness: it's a concept that doesn't refer to anything that exists.
>To take another example, if we define "god" as "something that has a
>paramount importance in your life," we end up with gods here, there,
>and everywhere -- we've _stretched_ the definition to the point of
>meaninglessness. _This_ kind of discussion of terms can be very useful:
>is D a useful definition for X? The mistake is to discuss "is X D?" or
>"is D X?" That leads to an argument about semantics.
There is also the case of not finding any concretes for a concept so
loosening its definition so you can fit some concretes in. In the
process making the original concept inhernatly worthless, and having
to create a new one.
As to the latter part, yeah, I agree.
>> >(4) How does this tie in with moral relativism and absolutism?
>> >
>> >Essentialism is related to absolutism. An essentialist system of ethics
>> >would start by attempting to answer the questions "What is justice?
>> >What are rights?" fully; in other words, to arrive at a definition that
>> >is universal and absolute. The rules derived from this essentialist
>> >definition would naturally also be absolute. You only get blacks and
>> >whites.
>> >
>> >Nominalism, on the other hand, leads to relativism. Since the
>> >definitions are subject to change without notice, so are the
>> >conclusions. There is no such thing as "universal, absolute" ethics any
>> >more than there is a "universal, absolute" society or "universal,
>> >absolute" building. There are only various different real ethical
>> >systems, societies, and buildings.
>>
>> A building is not absolute?
>
>I don't understand the question. What do you mean by "absolute"? I
>meant something like "the unique object that perfectly embodies the
>concept of building-ness, thereby rendering all other buildings
>'false'".
The "concept" is never "absolute". It is a vague understanding of
which there are many concretes. To go back to the chair you have many
different ones. I am sitting on a leather swivel chair and sitting
some ways away from me is a kitchen chair. Both are chairs, fitting
the concept of a chair, they are merely different in their concretized
form.
The same can be said of a building. A building itself has a set of
attributes. For example: It must be artificially made, be designed,
and constructed from materials, have a roof, and some structures to
support said roof. Everything that has those attributes can be a
"building".
(warning, attribute list for building not accurate for outside useage
:)
I mean, if a building exists, it exists. How can that not be an
absolute? That is... a truth.
As an example:
What makes a crime rate good or bad?
What makes a mortality rate good or bad?
What makes an unwanted pregnancy rate good or bad?
What makes a povery rate good or bad?
What makes a level of education good or bad?
What make a rate of corruption good or bad?
What makes freedom good or bad?
What makes one persons opinion over another good or bad?
>> >Whew, I'm running out of steam. If you're still with me, I can go on
>> >more a bit later about policy utilitarianism, the system of ethics that
>> >seems to me to make the most sense.
>>
>> Please do. If you don't mind though, we'll wait until this is done
>> with. I am most interested in hearing of it though.
>
>OK, let's. Rune can probably explain it better than I, though.
Rune?
Rune Popper?
Petteri Sulonen
> On Sat, 05 Jan 2002 15:11:14 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>
> >In article <lhhd3u8cuetpot9v0...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
> >
> >> On Fri, 04 Jan 2002 16:54:29 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
> >> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
> >[snip]
>
> <snip a bit>
>
> >> The program they are writing is a specific example of that concept or
> >> a "concrete".
> >
> >This, I think, goes somewhat astray again. Another poster recounted the
> >example of the Obfuscated-C contest entry, which was a program that was
> >designed not to compile. Is this a concrete of the concept of a
> >program? Does it matter? The nominalist would say that the _question_
> >is pointless.
>
> It depends how you define a Program.
>
> The above is an example of "code". If it doesn't compile and perform
> its function then it can hardly be called a program.
Ah, but if it's _designed_ not to compile? See the example elsewhere in
this thread.
> well, by your definition I am an essentialist, and I find the question
> pointless :)
I'd rather say that since you find the question pointless, you're
actually a nominalist who only _thinks_ he's an essentialist.
[snip]
> >You're misunderstanding me, then. My point is that the essentialist
> >tends to put the cart before the horse: once he has, to his
> >satisfaction, found the 'essence' of a concept, he goes to examine
> >'concretes', comparing them against the 'essence'. When asked to define
> >a chair, a nominalist could say "A piece of furniture that's designed
> >for one person to sit on, that's not a bathroom appliance." An
> >essentialist would answer "An object that actualizes the essence of a
> >chair". Then the essentialist would wander off looking for the essence
> >of a chair, where the nominalist would be merrily making one.
>
> Why would an essentialist be the only philosopher wandering off to
> find concretes of a chair.
Read again: the essentialist wouldn't be looking for concretes of a
chair, but the _essence_ of the chair.
> What about abstractions? You get three concretes of a chair and you
> understand the concept of a chair. Then using abstraction you can look
> at many different chairs and following the process of perception and
> abstraction you can know that said item is a chair without anyone
> having pointed to it and saying "That is also a chair".
Abstractions are necessary for any kind of understanding. However, we
have to recognize that they are necessarily imprecise. For example, we
can look at real chairs and eventually arrive at an abstraction, "A
chair is a piece of furniture for one person to sit on". We don't
_need_ to find out what the "essence" of a chair is. If someone takes a
tree stump, carries it into his house, and uses it for a chair, we can
call it a chair. When he chops it up and builds a fire with it, we can
call it fuel. The essentialist mistake is to take the abstraction for
the reality.
[snip]
> >Again, exactly. (By the way, I don't see the two definitions as
> >necessarily in conflict.) However, in such a discussion, I'm perfectly
> >willing to use the other person's definition, if it makes understanding
> >easier.
>
> Yes, but Peron A is under the assumption that a morality is only
> because someone successfully defended it. Person B is under the
> assumption that a Right is a sanction of freedom of action in a social
> context. Person A would declare that The US bill of rights is just as
> good as any other (no better no worse). Person B would think that the
> US bill of rights is depending on his value system either good or evil
> (depending on if they want a full freedom of action, or they don't
> want a full freedom of action).
Quite. However, neither of the definitions you propose make any comment
on the relative merits of different systems of rights. For that, we
need to agree on something else -- namely, criteria to use to _compare_
these systems.
> >However, here we come to another problem. Some definitions are more
> >useful than others. For example, if we define "monopoly" as "exclusive
> >control of the market", and understand "exclusive" as "100%", we'll
> >find that we'd be very hard-pressed to find a _single_ monopoly
> >_anywhere_. We've restricted the definition of "monopoly" to
> >uselessness: it's a concept that doesn't refer to anything that exists.
> >To take another example, if we define "god" as "something that has a
> >paramount importance in your life," we end up with gods here, there,
> >and everywhere -- we've _stretched_ the definition to the point of
> >meaninglessness. _This_ kind of discussion of terms can be very useful:
> >is D a useful definition for X? The mistake is to discuss "is X D?" or
> >"is D X?" That leads to an argument about semantics.
>
> There is also the case of not finding any concretes for a concept so
> loosening its definition so you can fit some concretes in. In the
> process making the original concept inhernatly worthless, and having
> to create a new one.
I'd consider it simply modifying the original concept to make it more
useful. Concepts don't have a life of their own; they're whatever we
agree them to be, no?
> As to the latter part, yeah, I agree.
Ah, coming over to nominalism, then... we'll cure you of your
Objectivism yet... :-}
> >> >(4) How does this tie in with moral relativism and absolutism?
> >> >
> >> >Essentialism is related to absolutism. An essentialist system of ethics
> >> >would start by attempting to answer the questions "What is justice?
> >> >What are rights?" fully; in other words, to arrive at a definition that
> >> >is universal and absolute. The rules derived from this essentialist
> >> >definition would naturally also be absolute. You only get blacks and
> >> >whites.
> >> >
> >> >Nominalism, on the other hand, leads to relativism. Since the
> >> >definitions are subject to change without notice, so are the
> >> >conclusions. There is no such thing as "universal, absolute" ethics any
> >> >more than there is a "universal, absolute" society or "universal,
> >> >absolute" building. There are only various different real ethical
> >> >systems, societies, and buildings.
> >>
> >> A building is not absolute?
> >
> >I don't understand the question. What do you mean by "absolute"? I
> >meant something like "the unique object that perfectly embodies the
> >concept of building-ness, thereby rendering all other buildings
> >'false'".
>
> The "concept" is never "absolute". It is a vague understanding of
> which there are many concretes. To go back to the chair you have many
> different ones. I am sitting on a leather swivel chair and sitting
> some ways away from me is a kitchen chair. Both are chairs, fitting
> the concept of a chair, they are merely different in their concretized
> form.
How about the stump of wood I mentioned earlier? An overturned crate? A
rock of convenient size that I happen to sit on while on a walk in the
woods?
> The same can be said of a building. A building itself has a set of
> attributes. For example: It must be artificially made, be designed,
> and constructed from materials, have a roof, and some structures to
> support said roof. Everything that has those attributes can be a
> "building".
So, you wouldn't consider the Olympic Stadium a building? It doesn't
have a roof. Or how about a beaver's dam and lair? That fits the
criteria, yet isn't usually considered a building.
> (warning, attribute list for building not accurate for outside useage
> :)
You could continue the list to exclude and include things, but what's
the point?
> I mean, if a building exists, it exists. How can that not be an
> absolute? That is... a truth.
Sure. That's not what I was talking about, though.
Intersubjectivity does. We can discuss it and come to something
approaching consensus over it. More to the point, we can later return
to our original evaluations and improve them based on the experiences
we have gained from attempts in the meantime.
> What makes one persons opinion over another good or bad?
Again, "objectively" nothing. Intersubjectivity is the key. If we
accept rational discussion as a way to improve our ideas (that "a
proposition should be considered true only if it is supported by
argument and experience") we can apply this process to any subject,
including "good" or "bad". We don't _need_ an immutable, 'objective'
yardstick to measure good or bad; all we need is to find things that we
_consider_ good or bad. You'd be surprised to find how much common
ground there is between people.
> >> >Whew, I'm running out of steam. If you're still with me, I can go on
> >> >more a bit later about policy utilitarianism, the system of ethics that
> >> >seems to me to make the most sense.
> >>
> >> Please do. If you don't mind though, we'll wait until this is done
> >> with. I am most interested in hearing of it though.
> >
> >OK, let's. Rune can probably explain it better than I, though.
>
> Rune?
> Rune Popper?
:-D Nope, Rune Børsjø, a Norwegian regular to a.a. _Karl_ Popper can do
a good job too; if you have the time, check out his _The Open Society
and its Enemies_.
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C35FEC3...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
> > > Some famous essentialist philosophies are Platonism ("A chair is an
> > > object that actualizes the idea of a chair"), Marxism ("History is
> > > change in relations of production"), Scholasticism, and Objectivism.
> >
> >
> > But according to Objectivism, definitions are not immutable.
> >
> > "All definitions are contextual..." Introduction to Objectivist
> > Epistemology, page 56, 1979 ed.
> >
> > Lenin also voiced similar thoughts, see Materialism and
> > Empirio-Criticism.
>
> That, again, does not seem to match my experiences with objectivism and
> objectivists. Objectivism does claim that it is an ethical philosophy
> that is universal and objective; it alone is "right" while others are
> "wrong". It then proceeds to state its principles. If it is universal
> and objective, how can these principles be mutable?
And who are these objectivists? What basis do they have for their
claims?
Also, you were discussing definitions, not principles.
As for the mutability of the principles, this is more problematic. I'll
start with an astronomical example, the orbits of planets. From Ptolemy
to Kepler to Newton to Einstein, there have been changes in how we
describe those orbits. Is this a mutation of principle?
Yes, objectivism is concerned with ethics, and yes it claims that those
ethics are universal and objective. Is it the Final Thoery of Ethics,
uhh... maybe not. As in physics, one may have to alter theories in the
light of new data, or learn to extend principles to new situations.
>
> [snip]
>
> > > Does this lead to a chaos of "anything goes" or "whatever my culture
> > > says is right?" No, it doesn't. Some societies are more pleasant to
> > > live in than others, much like some buildings are more pleasant to live
> > > in than others. Likewise, some ethical systems are better to live with
> > > than others. Of course, there will always be room for interpretation:
> > > somebody _likes_ wall-to-wall carpeting whereas I can't abide it. This
> > > doesn't mean that wall-to-wall carpeting is bad and plain wooden floors
> > > are good; it just means that we disagree about this. However, I think
> > > most of us can agree that a building that is warm in the winter, cool
> > > in the summer, that keeps the rain, snow, and burglars out makes a
> > > better home than one that isn't and doesn't.
> > >
> >
> > But what does it mean for a home to be better?
>
> That's largely a matter of preference. However, I think that by
> discussing it, we can arrive at a consensus regarding some things that
> make a home better -- and act upon it. That's the idea of an open
> society.
But what if our preferences are wrong, i. e. objectively bad for us?
What if one likes the taste of arsenic? Or its ideological equivalent,
religious fundamentalism?
And by what means would we arrive at a consensus?
>
> /Petteri
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day aa #1500
BAAWA-nnabe
Colin Day
>
> > >
> >
> > But what does it mean for a home to be better?
> >
> > Colin Day aa #1500
> > BAAWA-nnabe
>
> That is a simple question:
> Of course it depends on the context.
>
> 1. If you can buy it for the same price as the "worse" home, you will (if
> you buy any that is).
But how does one know which one is better?
>
> 2. If you grow up in the "better" home, you will - in the end - have more
> offspring.
>
What if you don't want offspring, or that many offspring?
> 3. If you live in the "better" home, you live longer.
>
But you might not know this when you buy the house, or you might not
value living longer (ask Phillip Morris).
> 4. If you live in the "better" home, you write better songs,
> (that is your songs get higher on the all-times best list)
> (or your songs will sell better, while you are alive)
>
> etcetera, etcetera etcetera
>
> "better" is indeed a very relative term.
>
> But what isn't ?
>
> --
> "Think for yourself"
> Atheist #1107
> Peter van Velzen
> Amstelveen
> The Netherlands
> http://home-2.worldonline.nl/~pbamvv/petervve.htm
Colin Day aa #1500
BAAWA-nnabe
Colin Day
But this assumes that people are moral. Is any action based on an
internalized rule of conduct that governs social behavior moral? And
given a choice of rules to internalize, which one(s) should we select?
> Would you like to propose another definition for morality? In my
> experience the ones that try to incorporate behaviour that has no
> impact on others quickly run into problems.
Ethics deals with how we should exercise (and act on) our free will (of
course, if we don't have free will, this isn't going to work).
>
> /Petteri
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day aa #1500
BAAWA-nnabe
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> > In article <3C35FEC3...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> > <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> > [snip]
> >
> > > > Some famous essentialist philosophies are Platonism ("A chair is an
> > > > object that actualizes the idea of a chair"), Marxism ("History is
> > > > change in relations of production"), Scholasticism, and Objectivism.
> > >
> > >
> > > But according to Objectivism, definitions are not immutable.
> > >
> > > "All definitions are contextual..." Introduction to Objectivist
> > > Epistemology, page 56, 1979 ed.
> > >
> > > Lenin also voiced similar thoughts, see Materialism and
> > > Empirio-Criticism.
> >
> > That, again, does not seem to match my experiences with objectivism and
> > objectivists. Objectivism does claim that it is an ethical philosophy
> > that is universal and objective; it alone is "right" while others are
> > "wrong". It then proceeds to state its principles. If it is universal
> > and objective, how can these principles be mutable?
>
> And who are these objectivists?
Don Kresch, to name one. Of course, I may be mistaken in my
understanding of objectivism. Doesn't it claim universal validity?
> What basis do they have for their
> claims?
That's what I've been wondering about as well.
> Also, you were discussing definitions, not principles.
Indeed I was.
> As for the mutability of the principles, this is more problematic. I'll
> start with an astronomical example, the orbits of planets. From Ptolemy
> to Kepler to Newton to Einstein, there have been changes in how we
> describe those orbits. Is this a mutation of principle?
Well, am I mistaken to think that definitions and principles are
somewhat related concepts? The nominalist view being that both should
be judged by their usefulness as aids of conceptualization and
description, rather than by comparing them against some immutable,
universal criterion (e.g., the Qur'an, the dialectical materialist
principle).
> Yes, objectivism is concerned with ethics, and yes it claims that those
> ethics are universal and objective. Is it the Final Thoery of Ethics,
> uhh... maybe not. As in physics, one may have to alter theories in the
> light of new data, or learn to extend principles to new situations.
Exactly. This, IMO, is the main problem with essentialist philosophies.
They take a (more or less valid) proposition as their basis, then
proceed to reason the hell out of it. When observed reality and the
arrived-at conclusions conflict, reality is judged to be in error.
[snip]
> > That's largely a matter of preference. However, I think that by
> > discussing it, we can arrive at a consensus regarding some things that
> > make a home better -- and act upon it. That's the idea of an open
> > society.
>
> But what if our preferences are wrong, i. e. objectively bad for us?
What do you mean by 'objectively bad'? I maintain that 'good' and 'bad'
have meaning only as (inter)subjective terms.
> What if one likes the taste of arsenic?
What if one is suicidal?
> Or its ideological equivalent,
> religious fundamentalism?
>
> And by what means would we arrive at a consensus?
Popper proposes the critical, rational method. He argues that (1) it is
accessible to everyone and (2) has been empirically shown to yield good
results. I see no reason to disagree with him.
In other words, we should start by trying to find some common ground
from which we can proceed in our discussion. If we agree that "a
proposition should be considered true only if it is supported by
argument and experience," the discussion might actually become quite
fruitful.
You'd be surprised at how easy it is to be to find common ground with
most people.
Of course, there are some people you just _cannot_ reason with. If they
leave me alone, I'm content to return the courtesy in kind. If they do
not, I'll fight them. Religious fundamentalists of an extreme variety
fall into this category: I don't care _what_ they believe, but if they
attempt to impose their views of what is right on me or control the way
I live, I will do what I can to stop them.
Colin Day
>
> No, that doesn't, but other things do. For instance, you may want to
> consider hand drawn triangles to be triangles in some instances, even
> though the lines aren't straight. Also, are all three-sided "figures"
> triangles, or only such figures that have spatial representations? (IOW,
> can I talk about the smallest possible triangle in pressure/temperature
> space where liquid water can exist? Are such things really triangles?)
>
But is there such a smallest trinagle at all. You may have a sequence of
nested triangles whose intersection is a point. The problem is in the
ontology, not the definition of triangle.
> > What we deal with here is "equivalence classes":
>
> ...but we deal with weak equivalence classes. For almost every concept we
> have, there are things we don't know where to put. We _could_ arbitrate it
> into one category or the other, but this would be an arbitration.
>
But as Rand herself would say, if there are no complications when we
make higher-order classifications, then there is no problem. If there
are such complications, then we have additional information for
fine-tuning the original definition.
<snip>
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
[snip]
> > > Why? Are you saying that whether Crusoe grows crops or lies about on the
> > > beach has no moral significance?
> >
> > Yep. Of course, this is contingent on my (operational) definition of
> > morality -- internalized rules of conduct that govern social behaviour.
> > Somebody who's alone obviously doesn't _have_ social behaviour, ergo,
> > in that context 'morality' has no meaning.
>
> But this assumes that people are moral.
Well, in my experience all but a very few people _are_ moral. That is
to say, they have internalized some kind of shared system of ethics and
values, they disapprove if someone else violates that system, they feel
shame if _they_ are caught violating it, and they might feel bad about
violating it even if they are _not_ caught.
> Is any action based on an
> internalized rule of conduct that governs social behavior moral?
This sounds a bit tricky: you aren't using two conflicting definitions
of "moral" here, by any chance? That is "moral" in the sense of
"conforming to a system of morality" and "moral" in the sense of
"conforming to _my_ (or, 'some objective') system of morality"?
> And
> given a choice of rules to internalize, which one(s) should we select?
Do we _have_ a choice? The system of morals that we have internalized
is one we've arrived at through our upbringing. I _couldn't_ select,
say, the ethics system proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood even if I
wanted to.
However, I _can_ subject my system of morals to intelligent scrutiny,
discuss it with other people, and maybe arrive at a decision to change
something. In this way, we can _improve_ our existing systems of
morality. I think that it's impossible to "start from scratch" and
design a completely new system of ethics -- because the construction
involves value choices, which are a product of the system we already
have.
> > Would you like to propose another definition for morality? In my
> > experience the ones that try to incorporate behaviour that has no
> > impact on others quickly run into problems.
>
> Ethics deals with how we should exercise (and act on) our free will (of
> course, if we don't have free will, this isn't going to work).
That sounds good too. It doesn't seem to conflict with the definition I
proposed, either.
Colin Day
>
>
> You're misunderstanding me, then. My point is that the essentialist
> tends to put the cart before the horse: once he has, to his
> satisfaction, found the 'essence' of a concept, he goes to examine
> 'concretes', comparing them against the 'essence'. When asked to define
> a chair, a nominalist could say "A piece of furniture that's designed
> for one person to sit on, that's not a bathroom appliance." An
> essentialist would answer "An object that actualizes the essence of a
> chair". Then the essentialist would wander off looking for the essence
> of a chair, where the nominalist would be merrily making one.
>
Then to Rand, and hence Objectivism, definitions are not essentialist.
In fact, for common household objects such as chairs she said that
definitions are largely uunnecessary. Her definitions of "table" and
"furniture" are pretty much like your nominalist definition of "chair".
Cephalus
wrote:
-snip-
>
>Ethics deals with how we should exercise (and act on) our free will (of
>course, if we don't have free will, this isn't going to work).
>
>
No, actually it deals with how we should excercise (and act on) our
will...
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
Then how are they objective?
What about objectivist ethics?
darth_versive
> [For spectators, this is a continuation of my discussion with AndrewC
> in the 'What does it mean for you to be [_______]?' thread, split into
> its own thread for clarity. It's a bit long; I hope you stayed with me.
> :-)].
>
>
> approach the problem of definitions. The essentialist states that
> before we can discuss something, we must define our terms; find the
> "essential" something in them that makes them what they are. "What is
> it that makes a chair a chair? What is the essence of history? What is
> a Christian? What is God?" are the kinds of questions an essentialist
> would ask.
>
> precise and immutable definitions are impossible to find. Instead, s/he
> attempts to define concepts by pointing at things and stating whether
> they do or do not match the concept under discussion, and leaves open
> the possibility of modifying, refining, or clarifying the definitions
> if they turn out to be unworkable. "A god is a supernatural entity like
> Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or
> ghosts," s/he might answer.
>
> object that actualizes the idea of a chair"), Marxism ("History is
> change in relations of production"), Scholasticism, and Objectivism.
>
> proposition should be considered true if and only if it is supported by
> argument and experience") and, although it's not usually considered a
> philosophy, the scientific method. For example, a biologist isn't that
> interested in what the essence of a fruit fly is or whether a
> particular insect is a fruit fly or some other kind of fly; instead,
> she's content if she has an idea of what other kinds of flies the
> insect in question is related to and whether she can learn something
> interesting from it. Engineering is also famously nominalistic. For
> example, very few programmers imagine that what they are doing is the
> end-all be-all of programs: they're either improving something that's
> already there or if they're desiging something new, they fully expect
> it to be refined in the future as well. "But what is it _really_?" is
> an essentialist question. "How can we make it work?" is a nominalist
> one.
>
>
> The world is not easily dividable into clear, unambiguous categories.
> Where is the line that separates one species from another? How tall
> must a person be to be called tall? How much money do you have to have
> to be called rich? An essentialist must find such dividers in order to
> be able to use the terms species, tall, or rich. A nominalist can just
> use them and clarify them if needed; that is, if somebody is confused.
> when he was invited to a seminar with some philosophers, and was asked
> whether an electron is an 'essential object'. The discussion never got
> anywhere, because the philosophers started squabbling among themselves
> about his counter-question, "Could you clarify what you mean by
> 'essential object'? Is a brick an essential object?". They couldn't
> agree whether a brick is an essential object or not -- and they didn't
> even get to the point of considering the _inside_ of a brick.
>
> terms'?
>
> Popper proposes the following solution: First, we agree that the
> statement 'A proposition should be considered true if and only if it is
> supported by argument and experience' should be accepted as the basis
> of the discussion. Then we would look at what we're discussing. Suppose
> it's "rights". We would look at how we use the term, look at what
> 'rights' people actualy have in various societies. Then we might ask,
> "What good are rights?". We don't need to understand what "rights"
> _essentially_ are, as long as we're talking about the same thing.
> Eventually we could arrive at a working definition, e.g., "Our rights
> are whatever we successfully defend."
>
>
> Essentialism is related to absolutism. An essentialist system of ethics
> would start by attempting to answer the questions "What is justice?
> What are rights?" fully; in other words, to arrive at a definition that
> is universal and absolute. The rules derived from this essentialist
> definition would naturally also be absolute. You only get blacks and
> whites.
>
> Nominalism, on the other hand, leads to relativism. Since the
> definitions are subject to change without notice, so are the
> conclusions. There is no such thing as "universal, absolute" ethics any
> more than there is a "universal, absolute" society or "universal,
> absolute" building. There are only various different real ethical
> systems, societies, and buildings.
>
> says is right?" No, it doesn't. Some societies are more pleasant to
> live in than others, much like some buildings are more pleasant to live
> in than others. Likewise, some ethical systems are better to live with
> than others. Of course, there will always be room for interpretation:
> somebody _likes_ wall-to-wall carpeting whereas I can't abide it. This
> doesn't mean that wall-to-wall carpeting is bad and plain wooden floors
> are good; it just means that we disagree about this. However, I think
> most of us can agree that a building that is warm in the winter, cool
> in the summer, that keeps the rain, snow, and burglars out makes a
> better home than one that isn't and doesn't.
>
> about, discussing them, and improving on them.
>
> more a bit later about policy utilitarianism, the system of ethics that
> seems to me to make the most sense.
>
You raise some interesting points here. A similar type of discussion
took place over the last few days in this NG in the thread, "Morality
without God?" between MGodwyn and myself. He took the essentialist
position and I the nominalist. We never achieved much of a "meeting
of the minds," however, never even really agreeing to disagree,
perhaps because he never seemed to understand my position (I suspect
it was because he kept clinging to his own definitions of the terms I
was using in my arguments to support my position--even after I had
explained them at length--so he considered my position to be
"incoherent"). I've often found this kind of "confusion of tongues"
to occur in discussions with essentialists (not all of them, and not
all the time, just often with them).
But, in contrast to what you said above, I don't think that nominalism
(or at least my brand of it, naturalism) necessarily leads to
relativism. As I posted in the aforementioned thread (which led to a
long series of interesting points and counter-points:
-----Start Quote
NATURALISM, RELATIVISM, AND MORAL ABSOLUTES
Whether a belief in naturalism necessarily entails a relativistic
moral framework is open to debate, but it seems clear that if one
maintains that science can only describe and not prescribe a set of
moral values, and then subscribes to a sytematic naturalistic
perspective, then one would reasonably be expected to maintain that no
universal or absolute moral standards can be shown to exist on the
basis of any empirical evidence. Such questions as the merits of
particular value judgments are to be considered beyond the scope of
scientific investigation, in my view. One can still answer them, but
only as personal value judgments--and hopefully they are to be
recognized as such.
If a viewpoint in which one denies that moral absolutes can be proven
scientifically but that one will still--by virtue of one's human
nature--hold to a particular set of moral standards anyway (whether
absolute or otherwise) can be argued to be relativistic, then I think
that an interesting debate is likely to ensue. I doubt whether either
side will easily concede the point. This is especially true, I think,
when one side holds to a naturalistic perspective while at the same
time holding to a particular set of moral values, while the other
holds that any denial of a provable set of absolute moral standards is
tantamount to relativism.
To me, being a relativist means believing that all value judgments or
moral frameworks are equally good or valid, or that we cannot
reasonably take a position that they are not so. While one can
certainly hold this position and be a naturalist, it is not a
necessary consequence of being one, in my view. One can just as
easily believe that this or that value or moral system is inferior or
superior, that there ARE universal standards (based upon legalistic,
humanistic, utilitarian, or some other reasonable criteria), that
there are no standards, just the law of the jungle, or that morality
itself is all an illusion and doesn't even exist, as in some kind of
genetic/biochemical determinist viewpoint. Where naturalism comes
into the picture, in my view, is in the recognition that such
questions are beyond the scope of scientific method to answer, and
that people will have to--as they invariably do--come up with these
answers on their own, using other criteria than scientific ones.
To the objection that such a view justifies the arbitrary choice of
one's values, and that this is a bad thing, I would reply that I think
it's better, as a general rule, to develop one's moral precepts by
whatever means, arbitrary or not, in light of true facts about the
universe, rather than to derive them with precise logic from false
premises. I believe that the facts of history clearly demonstrate the
tragic results that often follow from the latter course of action.
Relativism is taking a particular position on the value of value
judgments. Naturalism involves taking a particular position on the
methodology one should use--or more precisely, should NOT use--when
making value judgments. One can be both a naturalist and a
relativist, but I don't think it's a necessary consequence.
-----End Quote
If you have any comments on this, I'd like to hear them. While it
might be true that certain types of nominalism might lead to
relativism, I don't think that naturalism does, and so this
counter-instance would serve to demonstrate (or to argue) that
nominalism in general does not always have to lead to relativism
(given that naturalism is a form of nominalism, which I maintain it
is).
DV
Joshua Lusion I
news:3C3732B9...@telocity.com:
> Joshua Lusion I wrote:
>> No, that doesn't, but other things do. For instance, you may want to
>> consider hand drawn triangles to be triangles in some instances, even
>> though the lines aren't straight. Also, are all three-sided "figures"
>> triangles, or only such figures that have spatial representations?
>> (IOW, can I talk about the smallest possible triangle in
>> pressure/temperature space where liquid water can exist? Are such
>> things really triangles?)
> But is there such a smallest trinagle at all. You may have a sequence
> of nested triangles whose intersection is a point. The problem is in
> the ontology, not the definition of triangle.
The point was simply that this is not a spatial triangle, so we may not
actually want to think of it as a triangle. However, to answer your
question, my phrasing was purposefull... so long as such phase points do
not span infinite space, and are no collinear (actually, the latter
requires yet another convention to be arbitrated, which I'll discuss
later), there is guaranteed to be a smallest triangle where water can exist
(even if the phase points where water can't exist is not in the shape of a
triangle). I guess my phrasing made it ambiguous, but think of such phase
space as not being a triangle (eg, being bent in, and potentially even cut
of at a tip to have 4 sides... add complications at will)--then I'm simply
talking about the smallest triangle that contains this shape. BTW, also
note that this triangle isn't necessarily unique (consider a regular
hexagon--there are two smallest triangle containing it).
As for the other point here, sometimes it is prudent to consider a
treatment of triangles in such a way that you have "collinear triangles".
Eg, it doesn't mess up projections at all, and if you're projecting a
triangle and it becomes collinear, it may be more helpfull to still think
of it as a triangle.
>> > What we deal with here is "equivalence classes":
>>
>> ...but we deal with weak equivalence classes. For almost every
>> concept we have, there are things we don't know where to put. We
>> _could_ arbitrate it into one category or the other, but this would be
>> an arbitration.
> But as Rand herself would say, if there are no complications when we
> make higher-order classifications, then there is no problem. If there
> are such complications, then we have additional information for
> fine-tuning the original definition.
Two comments here... the complications sometimes can't be resolved by
anything other than arbitration, and quite often this isn't usefull anyway.
Eg, even if you had a color wheel arbitration, an object can reflect
particular intermediate non-primary light at different amounts, and thus
strattle the "blue" and "blue-green" line in different ways than the "same"
color on the color wheel depending on the type of light shining on it--in
such cases, it may be more convenient to toss the idea of color of an
object being constant and redefine color as being dependant both on the
light and light conditions--however, this definition would be useless if
we're considering colors in a jpg picture, where consideration of light
conditions are independant--and likewise, if we abstract out all
considerations and consider "color" in general, we still have a usefull
concept (iow, we can talk about "red" in general), but then we have to
realize that we could have such difficulties later.
And the second comment--as per my other post in this thread, I'm admitting
ignorance of essentialism and nominalism... I can only comment on what I
understand it to be at the moment (which is, in fact, based on other
people's definitions--nevertheless, they seem a bit ambiguous to me, so I
could see that I'm interpreting things wrongly). So if you think I'm
misusing the terms, or slightly misusing them, it'd be more beneficial to
me for you to point out how exactly than to just bring up that I am
misusing them. Even if my understanding isn't refined, however, the prior
post I replied to makes sense at least in terms of "fuzzy categorization"
versus "crisp categorization".
Petteri Sulonen
darth_versive <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote in message
> news:<040120021654297580%Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi>...
[snip]
> But, in contrast to what you said above, I don't think that nominalism
> (or at least my brand of it, naturalism) necessarily leads to
> relativism. As I posted in the aforementioned thread (which led to a
> long series of interesting points and counter-points:
Actually, I agree -- sort of. However, I think that our understandings
of 'relativism' might differ somewhat. For example, I'm an ethical
policy utilitarian. By your definition it is an 'absolutist' form of
ethics, as it does base itself on a principle ("an ethical imperative
should be retained only if it increases happiness and decreases misery
for the maximum number of people"). However, the absolutism is
something of an illusion, as 'happiness' and 'misery' are highly
subjective concepts and at least partly contingent on culture. At best,
we can arrive at some level of consensus regarding what kinds of things
increase happiness and decrease misery. However, it is good enough to
work with: we can use it to improve our ethical systems.
> -----Start Quote
>
> NATURALISM, RELATIVISM, AND MORAL ABSOLUTES
[snip 2 pg]
> To me, being a relativist means believing that all value judgments or
> moral frameworks are equally good or valid, or that we cannot
> reasonably take a position that they are not so.
I beg to differ with this definition. To me, beign a relativist simply
means the disbelief in the existence of moral absolutes (that is, moral
principles that are immutable and valid for everyone and every
situation, and are not trivial or tautological).
> While one can
> certainly hold this position and be a naturalist, it is not a
> necessary consequence of being one, in my view. One can just as
> easily believe that this or that value or moral system is inferior or
> superior, that there ARE universal standards (based upon legalistic,
> humanistic, utilitarian, or some other reasonable criteria), that
> there are no standards, just the law of the jungle, or that morality
> itself is all an illusion and doesn't even exist, as in some kind of
> genetic/biochemical determinist viewpoint. Where naturalism comes
> into the picture, in my view, is in the recognition that such
> questions are beyond the scope of scientific method to answer, and
> that people will have to--as they invariably do--come up with these
> answers on their own, using other criteria than scientific ones.
There is another possibility: that there are standards that are
non-universal without being arbitrary. They are not 'scientific'
because science only describes; they are more like principles of
engineering -- we can base them on what we have learned through
scientific inquiry.
> To the objection that such a view justifies the arbitrary choice of
> one's values, and that this is a bad thing, I would reply that I think
> it's better, as a general rule, to develop one's moral precepts by
> whatever means, arbitrary or not, in light of true facts about the
> universe, rather than to derive them with precise logic from false
> premises. I believe that the facts of history clearly demonstrate the
> tragic results that often follow from the latter course of action.
>
> Relativism is taking a particular position on the value of value
> judgments. Naturalism involves taking a particular position on the
> methodology one should use--or more precisely, should NOT use--when
> making value judgments. One can be both a naturalist and a
> relativist, but I don't think it's a necessary consequence.
[snip]
> If you have any comments on this, I'd like to hear them. While it
> might be true that certain types of nominalism might lead to
> relativism, I don't think that naturalism does, and so this
> counter-instance would serve to demonstrate (or to argue) that
> nominalism in general does not always have to lead to relativism
> (given that naturalism is a form of nominalism, which I maintain it
> is).
As I said above, I think that the absolutism in this case is rather
illusory.
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>In article <q42e3usgfn3pkjmjl...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 05 Jan 2002 15:11:14 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
>> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>>
>> >In article <lhhd3u8cuetpot9v0...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
>> >
>> >> On Fri, 04 Jan 2002 16:54:29 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
>> >> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>> >[snip]
>>
>> <snip a bit>
>>
>> >> The program they are writing is a specific example of that concept or
>> >> a "concrete".
>> >
>> >This, I think, goes somewhat astray again. Another poster recounted the
>> >example of the Obfuscated-C contest entry, which was a program that was
>> >designed not to compile. Is this a concrete of the concept of a
>> >program? Does it matter? The nominalist would say that the _question_
>> >is pointless.
>>
>> It depends how you define a Program.
>>
>> The above is an example of "code". If it doesn't compile and perform
>> its function then it can hardly be called a program.
>
>Ah, but if it's _designed_ not to compile? See the example elsewhere in
>this thread.
Then it is simply code. But I believe this is getting off track.
>> well, by your definition I am an essentialist, and I find the question
>> pointless :)
>
>I'd rather say that since you find the question pointless, you're
>actually a nominalist who only _thinks_ he's an essentialist.
I still fail to see the distinction.
"A god is a supernatural entity like Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not
like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or ghosts," -you give this an example
of a nominalist definition of 'god'
By doing this you are relying on other concepts to provide you with
the working details of your definition. What is supernatural about
zeus, thor, or Yahweh. What specifically distinquishes someone whom
can control thunder from someone whom is omniscient about the deeds of
small children?
>[snip]
>
>> >You're misunderstanding me, then. My point is that the essentialist
>> >tends to put the cart before the horse: once he has, to his
>> >satisfaction, found the 'essence' of a concept, he goes to examine
>> >'concretes', comparing them against the 'essence'. When asked to define
>> >a chair, a nominalist could say "A piece of furniture that's designed
>> >for one person to sit on, that's not a bathroom appliance." An
>> >essentialist would answer "An object that actualizes the essence of a
>> >chair". Then the essentialist would wander off looking for the essence
>> >of a chair, where the nominalist would be merrily making one.
>>
>> Why would an essentialist be the only philosopher wandering off to
>> find concretes of a chair.
>
>Read again: the essentialist wouldn't be looking for concretes of a
>chair, but the _essence_ of the chair.
Define what you mean by the "essence" of something.
To take an example you give elsewhere, a rock is a rock and it doesn't
matter whether you sit down on it or not. A crate is a crate whether
you sit on it or not. A chair is a chair whether you sit on it or not.
A building is a building whether anyone uses it or not.
I am beginning to see the destinction between the two. Is it that an
essentialist believes in an objective reality, and a nominalist does
not. For example: An essentialist would believe a tree falling in the
woods makes a sound because sound is defined as waves/ripples carried
by conduction through a medium (or something like that). Where as a
nominalist would say it doesn't make a sound _because_ no one is there
to hear those ripples.
>> What about abstractions? You get three concretes of a chair and you
>> understand the concept of a chair. Then using abstraction you can look
>> at many different chairs and following the process of perception and
>> abstraction you can know that said item is a chair without anyone
>> having pointed to it and saying "That is also a chair".
>
>Abstractions are necessary for any kind of understanding. However, we
>have to recognize that they are necessarily imprecise. For example, we
>can look at real chairs and eventually arrive at an abstraction, "A
>chair is a piece of furniture for one person to sit on". We don't
>_need_ to find out what the "essence" of a chair is. If someone takes a
>tree stump, carries it into his house, and uses it for a chair, we can
>call it a chair. When he chops it up and builds a fire with it, we can
>call it fuel. The essentialist mistake is to take the abstraction for
>the reality.
>[snip]
Why does an essentialist mistake the abstraction for reality, and not
the nominalist?
If an essentialist says the essence of a chair (for the sake of
argument) is "A piece of furniture for one person to sit on", when the
chair becomes firewood, it no longer a concrete of the
abstraction/concept of that definition of a chair. It fits the
definition of "fuel" pretty well though.
>> >Again, exactly. (By the way, I don't see the two definitions as
>> >necessarily in conflict.) However, in such a discussion, I'm perfectly
>> >willing to use the other person's definition, if it makes understanding
>> >easier.
>>
>> Yes, but Peron A is under the assumption that a morality is only
>> because someone successfully defended it. Person B is under the
>> assumption that a Right is a sanction of freedom of action in a social
>> context. Person A would declare that The US bill of rights is just as
>> good as any other (no better no worse). Person B would think that the
>> US bill of rights is depending on his value system either good or evil
>> (depending on if they want a full freedom of action, or they don't
>> want a full freedom of action).
>
>Quite. However, neither of the definitions you propose make any comment
>on the relative merits of different systems of rights. For that, we
>need to agree on something else -- namely, criteria to use to _compare_
>these systems.
It is implied in the definition.
Person A would find no difference between one bill of rights and
another. Both have come about because they have been "successfully
defended". So no comparison is needed.
Person B would find a world of difference because he sees a right and
wrong bill of rights. Depending on the value he places on freedom he
can point to America's bill of rights and declare it good or bad. He
can point to crapblekistans bill of rights and declare it good or bad
depending on what elements it declares as freedom of action.
>> >However, here we come to another problem. Some definitions are more
>> >useful than others. For example, if we define "monopoly" as "exclusive
>> >control of the market", and understand "exclusive" as "100%", we'll
>> >find that we'd be very hard-pressed to find a _single_ monopoly
>> >_anywhere_. We've restricted the definition of "monopoly" to
>> >uselessness: it's a concept that doesn't refer to anything that exists.
>> >To take another example, if we define "god" as "something that has a
>> >paramount importance in your life," we end up with gods here, there,
>> >and everywhere -- we've _stretched_ the definition to the point of
>> >meaninglessness. _This_ kind of discussion of terms can be very useful:
>> >is D a useful definition for X? The mistake is to discuss "is X D?" or
>> >"is D X?" That leads to an argument about semantics.
>>
>> There is also the case of not finding any concretes for a concept so
>> loosening its definition so you can fit some concretes in. In the
>> process making the original concept inhernatly worthless, and having
>> to create a new one.
>
>I'd consider it simply modifying the original concept to make it more
>useful. Concepts don't have a life of their own; they're whatever we
>agree them to be, no?
Agreed.
>> As to the latter part, yeah, I agree.
>
>Ah, coming over to nominalism, then... we'll cure you of your
>Objectivism yet... :-}
Well then... the one question I failed to ask is "what do you mean by
'useful definition'?"
A stump of wood is a stump of wood, of which there are many different
concretes. An overturned crate is a variety of crate in a specific
state of existence (namely, that of being upside down). A rock of
convenient size is a concrete of the concept "rock". Of which there
are many different types of rock.
>> The same can be said of a building. A building itself has a set of
>> attributes. For example: It must be artificially made, be designed,
>> and constructed from materials, have a roof, and some structures to
>> support said roof. Everything that has those attributes can be a
>> "building".
>
>So, you wouldn't consider the Olympic Stadium a building? It doesn't
>have a roof. Or how about a beaver's dam and lair? That fits the
>criteria, yet isn't usually considered a building.
I haven't though about that yet.
>> (warning, attribute list for building not accurate for outside useage
>> :)
>
>You could continue the list to exclude and include things, but what's
>the point?
Then, merely, roof would not be an attribute used to classify a
building. Or it could belong to a specific class of buildings...
namely "roofless sports stadiums".
>> I mean, if a building exists, it exists. How can that not be an
>> absolute? That is... a truth.
>
>Sure. That's not what I was talking about, though.
I know that now.
Then you are merely drawing back into the old stereotype of moral
relativsm. Doing what everyone else is doing. And thinking (or at
least ending up with) what everyone else is concluding.
I have always wondered why no one ever defaults to rational egoism.
>> What makes one persons opinion over another good or bad?
>
>Again, "objectively" nothing. Intersubjectivity is the key. If we
>accept rational discussion as a way to improve our ideas (that "a
>proposition should be considered true only if it is supported by
>argument and experience") we can apply this process to any subject,
>including "good" or "bad". We don't _need_ an immutable, 'objective'
>yardstick to measure good or bad; all we need is to find things that we
>_consider_ good or bad. You'd be surprised to find how much common
>ground there is between people.
By what standard to you judge your considerations?
>> >> >Whew, I'm running out of steam. If you're still with me, I can go on
>> >> >more a bit later about policy utilitarianism, the system of ethics that
>> >> >seems to me to make the most sense.
>> >>
>> >> Please do. If you don't mind though, we'll wait until this is done
>> >> with. I am most interested in hearing of it though.
>> >
>> >OK, let's. Rune can probably explain it better than I, though.
>>
>> Rune?
>> Rune Popper?
>
>:-D Nope, Rune Børsjø, a Norwegian regular to a.a. _Karl_ Popper can do
>a good job too; if you have the time, check out his _The Open Society
>and its Enemies_.
oh... hehe... yeah, I know of rune :)
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C373636...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> > >
> >
> > >
> > > You're misunderstanding me, then. My point is that the essentialist
> > > tends to put the cart before the horse: once he has, to his
> > > satisfaction, found the 'essence' of a concept, he goes to examine
> > > 'concretes', comparing them against the 'essence'. When asked to define
> > > a chair, a nominalist could say "A piece of furniture that's designed
> > > for one person to sit on, that's not a bathroom appliance." An
> > > essentialist would answer "An object that actualizes the essence of a
> > > chair". Then the essentialist would wander off looking for the essence
> > > of a chair, where the nominalist would be merrily making one.
> > >
> >
> > Then to Rand, and hence Objectivism, definitions are not essentialist.
> > In fact, for common household objects such as chairs she said that
> > definitions are largely uunnecessary. Her definitions of "table" and
> > "furniture" are pretty much like your nominalist definition of "chair".
>
> Then how are they objective?
How are they not objective?
Example (from Rand) table: A man-made object consisting of a flat, level
surface and support(s), intended to support other, smaller objects.
So how would this be nonobjective?
>
> What about objectivist ethics?
>
Rand would claim that ethics arise because humans cannot live by
"instinct", so efficacious action requires some thought (presumably,
nonefficacious action leads to death). Ethical objectivity means that
the demands of human life are independent of our feelings about them.
For example, eating arsenic is bad, no matter how much you might like
the taste.
The harder part comes when we examine the psychological demands of human
life. For Rand, the struggle for human existence is largely
intellectual, so the preservation/growth of our cognition is important.
Again, she argued that human psychology is what it is, and is not
malleable to our whims.
A question: Are you treating objectivity as the same as absoluteness?
For example, the Lorentz effects in special relativity are objective, i.
e., they depend on reference frames, and not observers per se. But those
effects aren't absolute, as they are frame dependent.
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> > In article <3C373636...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> > <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> > > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > You're misunderstanding me, then. My point is that the essentialist
> > > > tends to put the cart before the horse: once he has, to his
> > > > satisfaction, found the 'essence' of a concept, he goes to examine
> > > > 'concretes', comparing them against the 'essence'. When asked to define
> > > > a chair, a nominalist could say "A piece of furniture that's designed
> > > > for one person to sit on, that's not a bathroom appliance." An
> > > > essentialist would answer "An object that actualizes the essence of a
> > > > chair". Then the essentialist would wander off looking for the essence
> > > > of a chair, where the nominalist would be merrily making one.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Then to Rand, and hence Objectivism, definitions are not essentialist.
> > > In fact, for common household objects such as chairs she said that
> > > definitions are largely uunnecessary. Her definitions of "table" and
> > > "furniture" are pretty much like your nominalist definition of "chair".
> >
> > Then how are they objective?
>
> How are they not objective?
>
> Example (from Rand) table: A man-made object consisting of a flat, level
> surface and support(s), intended to support other, smaller objects.
>
> So how would this be nonobjective?
Is an overturned crate a table, if you use it to support smaller
objects? How about a tree-stump you use for a picnic table in the
forest? How about a water table?
> >
> > What about objectivist ethics?
> >
>
> Rand would claim that ethics arise because humans cannot live by
> "instinct", so efficacious action requires some thought (presumably,
> nonefficacious action leads to death). Ethical objectivity means that
> the demands of human life are independent of our feelings about them.
> For example, eating arsenic is bad, no matter how much you might like
> the taste.
>
> The harder part comes when we examine the psychological demands of human
> life. For Rand, the struggle for human existence is largely
> intellectual, so the preservation/growth of our cognition is important.
> Again, she argued that human psychology is what it is, and is not
> malleable to our whims.
>
> A question: Are you treating objectivity as the same as absoluteness?
No, although I consider the concepts related. By 'objective' I
understand 'same for everyone,' 'independent of the observer'. In
ethics, I understand that 'objective' would mean 'universally
applicable, same for everyone'. By 'absolute' I understand 'not
relative,' 'binary rather than graded'. In ethics, this would mean
something like 'unequivocally good (bad), irrespective of the
situation'.
> For example, the Lorentz effects in special relativity are objective, i.
> e., they depend on reference frames, and not observers per se. But those
> effects aren't absolute, as they are frame dependent.
I'm afraid that example goes over my head.
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C3728CF...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> > >
> > > In article <3C35FEC3...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> > > <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> > >
> > > [snip]
> > >
> > > > > Some famous essentialist philosophies are Platonism ("A chair is an
> > > > > object that actualizes the idea of a chair"), Marxism ("History is
> > > > > change in relations of production"), Scholasticism, and Objectivism.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > But according to Objectivism, definitions are not immutable.
> > > >
> > > > "All definitions are contextual..." Introduction to Objectivist
> > > > Epistemology, page 56, 1979 ed.
> > > >
> > > > Lenin also voiced similar thoughts, see Materialism and
> > > > Empirio-Criticism.
> > >
> > > That, again, does not seem to match my experiences with objectivism and
> > > objectivists. Objectivism does claim that it is an ethical philosophy
> > > that is universal and objective; it alone is "right" while others are
> > > "wrong". It then proceeds to state its principles. If it is universal
> > > and objective, how can these principles be mutable?
> >
> > And who are these objectivists?
>
> Don Kresch, to name one. Of course, I may be mistaken in my
> understanding of objectivism. Doesn't it claim universal validity?
>
Yes, it does. I wasn't objecting to that, however, objectivists treat
ethics more abstractly than you do, so universality is easier to
achieve.
> > What basis do they have for their
> > claims?
>
> That's what I've been wondering about as well.
I meant what basis did they have for saying that Rand said such and
such, not what basis they had for saying that the such and such itself
is true.
>
> > Also, you were discussing definitions, not principles.
>
> Indeed I was.
>
> > As for the mutability of the principles, this is more problematic. I'll
> > start with an astronomical example, the orbits of planets. From Ptolemy
> > to Kepler to Newton to Einstein, there have been changes in how we
> > describe those orbits. Is this a mutation of principle?
>
> Well, am I mistaken to think that definitions and principles are
> somewhat related concepts? The nominalist view being that both should
> be judged by their usefulness as aids of conceptualization and
> description, rather than by comparing them against some immutable,
> universal criterion (e.g., the Qur'an, the dialectical materialist
> principle).
>
Again, this is nor far from what Rand herself said, but she had
different standards of usefulness. For example, how do the nominalists
deal with higher-order classification?
> > Yes, objectivism is concerned with ethics, and yes it claims that those
> > ethics are universal and objective. Is it the Final Thoery of Ethics,
> > uhh... maybe not. As in physics, one may have to alter theories in the
> > light of new data, or learn to extend principles to new situations.
>
> Exactly. This, IMO, is the main problem with essentialist philosophies.
> They take a (more or less valid) proposition as their basis, then
> proceed to reason the hell out of it. When observed reality and the
> arrived-at conclusions conflict, reality is judged to be in error.
>
That's not very objective.
> [snip]
>
> > > That's largely a matter of preference. However, I think that by
> > > discussing it, we can arrive at a consensus regarding some things that
> > > make a home better -- and act upon it. That's the idea of an open
> > > society.
> >
> > But what if our preferences are wrong, i. e. objectively bad for us?
>
> What do you mean by 'objectively bad'? I maintain that 'good' and 'bad'
> have meaning only as (inter)subjective terms.
>
But if we could simply act on our subjective preferences, then why would
we need ethics at all? Ah, you say, we have to balance the subjective
preferences of everybody? Why? What if some people want ceaseless
violence?
> > What if one likes the taste of arsenic?
>
> What if one is suicidal?
>
And why is one suicidal? If one is in extreme agony from a disease that
is currently incurable, then suicide might be justified. But there are
easier ways to commit it.
> > Or its ideological equivalent,
> > religious fundamentalism?
> >
> > And by what means would we arrive at a consensus?
>
> Popper proposes the critical, rational method. He argues that (1) it is
> accessible to everyone and (2) has been empirically shown to yield good
> results. I see no reason to disagree with him.
>
What examples does he provide?
> In other words, we should start by trying to find some common ground
> from which we can proceed in our discussion. If we agree that "a
> proposition should be considered true only if it is supported by
> argument and experience," the discussion might actually become quite
> fruitful.
But what argument/experience would count as support for a proposition,
and what would be the degree of support?
>
> You'd be surprised at how easy it is to be to find common ground with
> most people.
>
But it is important common ground? Also, could one reach common ground
by nonrational means (appeal to ethnic solidarity, psychological
manipulation, etc).
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
Ah, but is it a _false_ universality? That's the problem with
essentialist systems: you take a premise which seems reasonable, argue
from it, and end up with something that may or may not be reasonable.
> > > What basis do they have for their
> > > claims?
> >
> > That's what I've been wondering about as well.
>
> I meant what basis did they have for saying that Rand said such and
> such, not what basis they had for saying that the such and such itself
> is true.
>
> >
> > > Also, you were discussing definitions, not principles.
> >
> > Indeed I was.
> >
> > > As for the mutability of the principles, this is more problematic. I'll
> > > start with an astronomical example, the orbits of planets. From Ptolemy
> > > to Kepler to Newton to Einstein, there have been changes in how we
> > > describe those orbits. Is this a mutation of principle?
> >
> > Well, am I mistaken to think that definitions and principles are
> > somewhat related concepts? The nominalist view being that both should
> > be judged by their usefulness as aids of conceptualization and
> > description, rather than by comparing them against some immutable,
> > universal criterion (e.g., the Qur'an, the dialectical materialist
> > principle).
> >
>
> Again, this is nor far from what Rand herself said, but she had
> different standards of usefulness. For example, how do the nominalists
> deal with higher-order classification?
Could you clarify what you mean by higher-order classification? I'm not
sure I understood the question. However, assuming I do understand you
correctly, I'd say that the nominalist would consider conclusions drawn
from higher-order classifications as hypotheses which need to be (a)
falsifiable and (b) pass whatever tests can be devised to falsify them.
The essentialist, OTOH, would consider such falsification unnecessary.
> > > Yes, objectivism is concerned with ethics, and yes it claims that those
> > > ethics are universal and objective. Is it the Final Thoery of Ethics,
> > > uhh... maybe not. As in physics, one may have to alter theories in the
> > > light of new data, or learn to extend principles to new situations.
> >
> > Exactly. This, IMO, is the main problem with essentialist philosophies.
> > They take a (more or less valid) proposition as their basis, then
> > proceed to reason the hell out of it. When observed reality and the
> > arrived-at conclusions conflict, reality is judged to be in error.
> >
> That's not very objective.
Look at Marxism, for example. Marx predicted (1) that capitalism could
never be reformed, only overturned, and (2) that capitalism would
collapse of its own accord, to be replaced by first socialism and the
Communism. He turned out to be wrong on both counts. However, talk to a
true-believer Marxist, and he'll reinterpret reality to match Marx's
prediction.
> > [snip]
> >
> > > > That's largely a matter of preference. However, I think that by
> > > > discussing it, we can arrive at a consensus regarding some things that
> > > > make a home better -- and act upon it. That's the idea of an open
> > > > society.
> > >
> > > But what if our preferences are wrong, i. e. objectively bad for us?
> >
> > What do you mean by 'objectively bad'? I maintain that 'good' and 'bad'
> > have meaning only as (inter)subjective terms.
>
> But if we could simply act on our subjective preferences, then why would
> we need ethics at all? Ah, you say, we have to balance the subjective
> preferences of everybody? Why? What if some people want ceaseless
> violence?
Then those who do not want ceaseless violence should try to (1)
convince them that they are wrong or, failing that (2) arrange to
protect themselves against that violence.
Again, your question seems slightly pointless. The point with the
nominalist method is that we don't live in a vacuum. We already _have_
societies and systems of ethics. Instead of trying to throw them out
and build a new one from scratch, we should do what science and
technology do: study them and attempt to improve them. You'll find that
within such societies, whether local or global in scope, there is a
great deal of intersubjective consensus on a great number of subjects.
Things like "fairness" are fairly universal concepts.
> > > What if one likes the taste of arsenic?
> >
> > What if one is suicidal?
> >
> And why is one suicidal? If one is in extreme agony from a disease that
> is currently incurable, then suicide might be justified. But there are
> easier ways to commit it.
Certainly.
However, I think the problem with the arsenic comparison is that unlike
poisoning, which is diagnosable and observable, ethics depend largely
on value judgements, and value judgements necessarily have a large
subjective component.
> > > Or its ideological equivalent,
> > > religious fundamentalism?
> > >
> > > And by what means would we arrive at a consensus?
> >
> > Popper proposes the critical, rational method. He argues that (1) it is
> > accessible to everyone and (2) has been empirically shown to yield good
> > results. I see no reason to disagree with him.
>
> What examples does he provide?
Science and technology. They're a product of the nominalist method.
> > In other words, we should start by trying to find some common ground
> > from which we can proceed in our discussion. If we agree that "a
> > proposition should be considered true only if it is supported by
> > argument and experience," the discussion might actually become quite
> > fruitful.
>
> But what argument/experience would count as support for a proposition,
> and what would be the degree of support?
By argument he means a reasoned, connected series of statements
advanced to establish the truth of a proposition. By experience he
means something that is repeatable and observable. The degree of
certainty which we should accord to our belief in a proposition should
be conditional on the degree of support we can advance for it.
> > You'd be surprised at how easy it is to be to find common ground with
> > most people.
>
> But it is important common ground? Also, could one reach common ground
> by nonrational means (appeal to ethnic solidarity, psychological
> manipulation, etc).
I think any common ground is important. For example, you could carry a
constructive discussion with an Islamic fundamentalist if he accepts
the following propositions (which most of them do):
(1) The laws in the shari'a can be divided into two groups: those
which deal with worship, and those that deal with society.
(2) The laws in the first group only apply to Muslims, and they
should be followed by them to the letter.
(3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
(_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
(4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
Hey presto, we've established a common epistemology good enough to
discuss how to organize society with a member of a group commonly
considered to be among the most inflexible around today. He doesn't
need to accept my "fundamental" epistemology (that laws are a matter of
social convention and intersubjective agreement) any more than I need
to accept his fundamental epistemology that laws are ordained by God
and written down in the Qur'an and the ha'adith.
For example, we could make the following argument (I didn't make this
one up, I heard an Islamic scholar make it): "The Qur'an says that a
male descendant is entitled to twice the share of a female descendant
in inheritance. The _hikmat_ behind this rule is that, as the Qur'an
also says, the male is responsible for maintaining his sisters and
female cousins at the same standard of living as himself, while the
female has no such obligation. If the male should refuse this
obligation, the _hikmat_ has changed, and he should no longer be
accorded a larger share in the inheritance."
See where I'm going?
/Petteri
If we agree on this, we can go on to discuss the _hikmat_ behi
Petteri Sulonen
> On Sat, 05 Jan 2002 17:23:30 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
[snip]
> I still fail to see the distinction.
>
> "A god is a supernatural entity like Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not
> like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or ghosts," -you give this an example
> of a nominalist definition of 'god'
>
> By doing this you are relying on other concepts to provide you with
> the working details of your definition. What is supernatural about
> zeus, thor, or Yahweh. What specifically distinquishes someone whom
> can control thunder from someone whom is omniscient about the deeds of
> small children?
Who cares?
[snip]
> >Read again: the essentialist wouldn't be looking for concretes of a
> >chair, but the _essence_ of the chair.
>
> Define what you mean by the "essence" of something.
"[That which] specifically distinquishes someone whom
can control thunder from someone whom is omniscient about the deeds of
small children."
> To take an example you give elsewhere, a rock is a rock and it doesn't
> matter whether you sit down on it or not. A crate is a crate whether
> you sit on it or not. A chair is a chair whether you sit on it or not.
> A building is a building whether anyone uses it or not.
>
> I am beginning to see the destinction between the two. Is it that an
> essentialist believes in an objective reality, and a nominalist does
> not. For example: An essentialist would believe a tree falling in the
> woods makes a sound because sound is defined as waves/ripples carried
> by conduction through a medium (or something like that). Where as a
> nominalist would say it doesn't make a sound _because_ no one is there
> to hear those ripples.
You're getting there. However, now you're falling into the post-modern
trap.
Nominalism does not (necessarily) deny the existence of a reality that
is independent of the observer. (I know I don't.) Empiricism and
naturalism are two nominalist philosophies which specifically proceed
from the assumption that there _is_ a single, external reality that we
can learn to understand through studying it. The point is that
nominalism recognizes the problems inherent in the process of observing
and studying: how can we be sure that what we see and what conclusions
we draw in fact are _consistent_ with this external reality? The answer
is again: intersubjectivity. Let's say that I have a hypothesis: if a
person hits his thumb hard with a hammer, he will experience pain. I
can hit my thumb with a hammer, and tell you what I experienced. You
can do the same. Repeat this with a number of people. If they get
similar results, we can reasonably conclude that the hypothesis has a
good chance of accurately reflecting reality. We don't need to figure
out "what pain is" in order to confidently state "hitting your thumb
with a hammer will cause you pain".
[snip]
> Why does an essentialist mistake the abstraction for reality, and not
> the nominalist?
Because the nominalist checks the conclusions he draws from the
abstractions against reality. If a conclusion is not falsifiable, it is
meaningless. If it is falsified, it is incorrect.
> If an essentialist says the essence of a chair (for the sake of
> argument) is "A piece of furniture for one person to sit on", when the
> chair becomes firewood, it no longer a concrete of the
> abstraction/concept of that definition of a chair. It fits the
> definition of "fuel" pretty well though.
Then how can a definition be objective if the same object is one man's
chair and another man's fuel?
[snip]
> >Quite. However, neither of the definitions you propose make any comment
> >on the relative merits of different systems of rights. For that, we
> >need to agree on something else -- namely, criteria to use to _compare_
> >these systems.
>
> It is implied in the definition.
>
> Person A would find no difference between one bill of rights and
> another. Both have come about because they have been "successfully
> defended". So no comparison is needed.
>
> Person B would find a world of difference because he sees a right and
> wrong bill of rights. Depending on the value he places on freedom he
> can point to America's bill of rights and declare it good or bad. He
> can point to crapblekistans bill of rights and declare it good or bad
> depending on what elements it declares as freedom of action.
Quite. But both people can declare until they're blue in the face, and
it won't lead anywhere until they agree on criteria they can use to
compare them. If they can keep in mind that the criteria are
provisional and subject to change should new information or insights
arrive, so much the better.
Note that the criteria I listed were merely proposals: things you can
measure and quantify that could conceivably have a bearing on whether a
society should be considered 'good' or not.
[snip]
> >> There is also the case of not finding any concretes for a concept so
> >> loosening its definition so you can fit some concretes in. In the
> >> process making the original concept inhernatly worthless, and having
> >> to create a new one.
> >
> >I'd consider it simply modifying the original concept to make it more
> >useful. Concepts don't have a life of their own; they're whatever we
> >agree them to be, no?
>
> Agreed.
>
> >> As to the latter part, yeah, I agree.
> >
> >Ah, coming over to nominalism, then... we'll cure you of your
> >Objectivism yet... :-}
>
> Well then... the one question I failed to ask is "what do you mean by
> 'useful definition'?"
One that has explanatory power. One that helps us understand what we're
talking about.
[snip]
> >> The "concept" is never "absolute". It is a vague understanding of
> >> which there are many concretes. To go back to the chair you have many
> >> different ones. I am sitting on a leather swivel chair and sitting
> >> some ways away from me is a kitchen chair. Both are chairs, fitting
> >> the concept of a chair, they are merely different in their concretized
> >> form.
> >
> >How about the stump of wood I mentioned earlier? An overturned crate? A
> >rock of convenient size that I happen to sit on while on a walk in the
> >woods?
>
> A stump of wood is a stump of wood, of which there are many different
> concretes. An overturned crate is a variety of crate in a specific
> state of existence (namely, that of being upside down). A rock of
> convenient size is a concrete of the concept "rock". Of which there
> are many different types of rock.
If I furnish my house with overturned crates (and believe me, I've seen
homes like that), I don't think it makes _sense_ to call these objects
crates in a specific state of existence. To me, it seems to me to make
much more sense to call them chairs, tables, or beds -- whatever
they're being used for. The point is that many (if not most) real-life
objects don't neatly fit one conceptual category. This holds even more
for abstractions such as you find in ethics or philosophy. Depending on
how you look at it, a star can be a source of poetic inspiration, a
white-hot ball of hydrogen nuclei undergoing fusion, the energy source
that keeps a planet's ecosystem running, or a light source. None of
these definitions is "righter" than any other: it all depends on the
context.
> >> The same can be said of a building. A building itself has a set of
> >> attributes. For example: It must be artificially made, be designed,
> >> and constructed from materials, have a roof, and some structures to
> >> support said roof. Everything that has those attributes can be a
> >> "building".
> >
> >So, you wouldn't consider the Olympic Stadium a building? It doesn't
> >have a roof. Or how about a beaver's dam and lair? That fits the
> >criteria, yet isn't usually considered a building.
>
> I haven't though about that yet.
>
> >> (warning, attribute list for building not accurate for outside useage
> >> :)
> >
> >You could continue the list to exclude and include things, but what's
> >the point?
>
> Then, merely, roof would not be an attribute used to classify a
> building. Or it could belong to a specific class of buildings...
> namely "roofless sports stadiums".
Sure you could, but what would be the point? Would it teach us anything
we don't know about buildings? Help us build better ones?
[snip]
> >> As an example:
> >>
> >> What makes a crime rate good or bad?
> >> What makes a mortality rate good or bad?
> >> What makes an unwanted pregnancy rate good or bad?
> >> What makes a povery rate good or bad?
> >> What makes a level of education good or bad?
> >> What make a rate of corruption good or bad?
> >> What makes freedom good or bad?
> >
> >Intersubjectivity does. We can discuss it and come to something
> >approaching consensus over it. More to the point, we can later return
> >to our original evaluations and improve them based on the experiences
> >we have gained from attempts in the meantime.
>
> Then you are merely drawing back into the old stereotype of moral
> relativsm. Doing what everyone else is doing. And thinking (or at
> least ending up with) what everyone else is concluding.
Nope. You missed the bit about discussion and evaluation: that's the
crux of it. We take something we have, we try to understand it, and we
try to make it better.
> I have always wondered why no one ever defaults to rational egoism.
Maybe because it's somewhat alien to the way we _actually_ function, as
opposed to Ms. Rand's ideas of how we _should_ function?
> >> What makes one persons opinion over another good or bad?
> >
> >Again, "objectively" nothing. Intersubjectivity is the key. If we
> >accept rational discussion as a way to improve our ideas (that "a
> >proposition should be considered true only if it is supported by
> >argument and experience") we can apply this process to any subject,
> >including "good" or "bad". We don't _need_ an immutable, 'objective'
> >yardstick to measure good or bad; all we need is to find things that we
> >_consider_ good or bad. You'd be surprised to find how much common
> >ground there is between people.
>
> By what standard to you judge your considerations?
By reason. "A proposition should be considered true only if it is
supported by argument and experience," remember? Similarly, "a rule of
ethics should be retained only if it is supported by argument and
experience". Do you see where I'm going?
[snip]
Petteri Sulonen
<060120021033349061%Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi>, Petteri
Sulonen <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
[snip]
> > Example (from Rand) table: A man-made object consisting of a flat, level
> > surface and support(s), intended to support other, smaller objects.
> >
> > So how would this be nonobjective?
>
> Is an overturned crate a table, if you use it to support smaller
> objects? How about a tree-stump you use for a picnic table in the
> forest? How about a water table?
I was a bit hasty in posting, and ended up a bit unclear. What I mean
is, if two people can reasonably consider the same object to match two
different definitions, I don't think the definitions can be considered
'objective'. One person's crate can reasonably be another person's
chair.
[snip rest]
/Petteri
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>In article <v05f3uguqgaqfmll9...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 05 Jan 2002 17:23:30 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
>> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>[snip]
>
>> I still fail to see the distinction.
>>
>> "A god is a supernatural entity like Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not
>> like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or ghosts," -you give this an example
>> of a nominalist definition of 'god'
>>
>> By doing this you are relying on other concepts to provide you with
>> the working details of your definition. What is supernatural about
>> zeus, thor, or Yahweh. What specifically distinquishes someone whom
>> can control thunder from someone whom is omniscient about the deeds of
>> small children?
>
>Who cares?
>
>[snip]
>
>> >Read again: the essentialist wouldn't be looking for concretes of a
>> >chair, but the _essence_ of the chair.
>>
>> Define what you mean by the "essence" of something.
>
>"[That which] specifically distinquishes someone whom
>can control thunder from someone whom is omniscient about the deeds of
>small children."
k.
>> To take an example you give elsewhere, a rock is a rock and it doesn't
>> matter whether you sit down on it or not. A crate is a crate whether
>> you sit on it or not. A chair is a chair whether you sit on it or not.
>> A building is a building whether anyone uses it or not.
>>
>> I am beginning to see the destinction between the two. Is it that an
>> essentialist believes in an objective reality, and a nominalist does
>> not. For example: An essentialist would believe a tree falling in the
>> woods makes a sound because sound is defined as waves/ripples carried
>> by conduction through a medium (or something like that). Where as a
>> nominalist would say it doesn't make a sound _because_ no one is there
>> to hear those ripples.
>
>You're getting there. However, now you're falling into the post-modern
>trap.
>
>Nominalism does not (necessarily) deny the existence of a reality that
>is independent of the observer. (I know I don't.) Empiricism and
>naturalism are two nominalist philosophies which specifically proceed
>from the assumption that there _is_ a single, external reality that we
>can learn to understand through studying it. The point is that
>nominalism recognizes the problems inherent in the process of observing
>and studying: how can we be sure that what we see and what conclusions
>we draw in fact are _consistent_ with this external reality? The answer
>is again: intersubjectivity.
I would have said logic, reason, and further study. but hey...
<snip>
>> Why does an essentialist mistake the abstraction for reality, and not
>> the nominalist?
>
>Because the nominalist checks the conclusions he draws from the
>abstractions against reality. If a conclusion is not falsifiable, it is
>meaningless. If it is falsified, it is incorrect.
And why does this not apply to the Essentialist?
If an essentialist make a definition. What is to stop them from
altering it later if they discover a mistake in their methodology,
perceptions, process of abstraction, conceptualisation etc...
Ayn Rand herself said many times that human perception is not perfect,
nor is the conceptualisation faculty, but it is what we have. The
person must take the responsibility of not only thinking, but of
correcting any mistakes in that thinking.
I fail to... accept your claim that an "essentialist" makes a decision
(as it appears you are claiming) and once that decision is made it is
irrevocable.
>> If an essentialist says the essence of a chair (for the sake of
>> argument) is "A piece of furniture for one person to sit on", when the
>> chair becomes firewood, it no longer a concrete of the
>> abstraction/concept of that definition of a chair. It fits the
>> definition of "fuel" pretty well though.
>
>Then how can a definition be objective if the same object is one man's
>chair and another man's fuel?
Because in the process of converting the chair into the fuel, it
changes "essence".
It is no longer (by your definition) a peice of furniture one person
sits on. It is "something that is used to produce energy".
<snipped>
A poets description, despite its inspiring verse, does not change the
fact a star is "a mass of incandescent gas, a giant nuclear furnace".
Even if it is used in a number of contexts a crate is a crate, a star
is a star, and a chair is a chair.
>> >> (warning, attribute list for building not accurate for outside useage
>> >> :)
>> >
>> >You could continue the list to exclude and include things, but what's
>> >the point?
>>
>> Then, merely, roof would not be an attribute used to classify a
>> building. Or it could belong to a specific class of buildings...
>> namely "roofless sports stadiums".
>
>Sure you could, but what would be the point? Would it teach us anything
>we don't know about buildings? Help us build better ones?
No. But when you convert the analogy over to philosophy, it is much
more important to have a definition of "relativism" or "egoism".
Furthermore, I think that defining terms properly, like Essentialism,
can help us to "build better ones".
>[snip]
>
>> >> As an example:
>> >>
>> >> What makes a crime rate good or bad?
>> >> What makes a mortality rate good or bad?
>> >> What makes an unwanted pregnancy rate good or bad?
>> >> What makes a povery rate good or bad?
>> >> What makes a level of education good or bad?
>> >> What make a rate of corruption good or bad?
>> >> What makes freedom good or bad?
>> >
>> >Intersubjectivity does. We can discuss it and come to something
>> >approaching consensus over it. More to the point, we can later return
>> >to our original evaluations and improve them based on the experiences
>> >we have gained from attempts in the meantime.
>>
>> Then you are merely drawing back into the old stereotype of moral
>> relativsm. Doing what everyone else is doing. And thinking (or at
>> least ending up with) what everyone else is concluding.
>
>Nope. You missed the bit about discussion and evaluation: that's the
>crux of it. We take something we have, we try to understand it, and we
>try to make it better.
Try to make it better? By what standard?
>> >> What makes one persons opinion over another good or bad?
>> >
>> >Again, "objectively" nothing. Intersubjectivity is the key. If we
>> >accept rational discussion as a way to improve our ideas (that "a
>> >proposition should be considered true only if it is supported by
>> >argument and experience") we can apply this process to any subject,
>> >including "good" or "bad". We don't _need_ an immutable, 'objective'
>> >yardstick to measure good or bad; all we need is to find things that we
>> >_consider_ good or bad. You'd be surprised to find how much common
>> >ground there is between people.
>>
>> By what standard to you judge your considerations?
>
>By reason. "A proposition should be considered true only if it is
>supported by argument and experience," remember? Similarly, "a rule of
>ethics should be retained only if it is supported by argument and
>experience". Do you see where I'm going?
How can you reason if you don't accept objective values? True or false
indicators for things.
For example: Violating the rights of Others is bad... true!
It isn't, well lets define "violating the rights of others" and open
up discussion channels to guage what people consider good or bad about
the subject. Is it good or not. Reason should lead you to the answer.
Petteri Sulonen
[snip]
> >Nominalism does not (necessarily) deny the existence of a reality that
> >is independent of the observer. (I know I don't.) Empiricism and
> >naturalism are two nominalist philosophies which specifically proceed
> >from the assumption that there _is_ a single, external reality that we
> >can learn to understand through studying it. The point is that
> >nominalism recognizes the problems inherent in the process of observing
> >and studying: how can we be sure that what we see and what conclusions
> >we draw in fact are _consistent_ with this external reality? The answer
> >is again: intersubjectivity.
>
> I would have said logic, reason, and further study. but hey...
Without intersubjectivity, how can you discover experimental bias?
>
> <snip>
>
> >> Why does an essentialist mistake the abstraction for reality, and not
> >> the nominalist?
> >
> >Because the nominalist checks the conclusions he draws from the
> >abstractions against reality. If a conclusion is not falsifiable, it is
> >meaningless. If it is falsified, it is incorrect.
>
> And why does this not apply to the Essentialist?
>
> If an essentialist make a definition. What is to stop them from
> altering it later if they discover a mistake in their methodology,
> perceptions, process of abstraction, conceptualisation etc...
>
> Ayn Rand herself said many times that human perception is not perfect,
> nor is the conceptualisation faculty, but it is what we have. The
> person must take the responsibility of not only thinking, but of
> correcting any mistakes in that thinking.
>
> I fail to... accept your claim that an "essentialist" makes a decision
> (as it appears you are claiming) and once that decision is made it is
> irrevocable.
All right, then. Please explain what kind of test you would perform to
falsify Ayn Rand's claim that property rights are fundamental to all
other rights.
> >> If an essentialist says the essence of a chair (for the sake of
> >> argument) is "A piece of furniture for one person to sit on", when the
> >> chair becomes firewood, it no longer a concrete of the
> >> abstraction/concept of that definition of a chair. It fits the
> >> definition of "fuel" pretty well though.
> >
> >Then how can a definition be objective if the same object is one man's
> >chair and another man's fuel?
>
> Because in the process of converting the chair into the fuel, it
> changes "essence".
You mean, like the host becomes the body of Christ and the wine becomes
the blood of Christ in the miracle of the transubstantiation?
> It is no longer (by your definition) a peice of furniture one person
> sits on. It is "something that is used to produce energy".
>
> <snipped>
How do you determine when an object 'changes essence'?
[snip]
> >If I furnish my house with overturned crates (and believe me, I've seen
> >homes like that), I don't think it makes _sense_ to call these objects
> >crates in a specific state of existence. To me, it seems to me to make
> >much more sense to call them chairs, tables, or beds -- whatever
> >they're being used for. The point is that many (if not most) real-life
> >objects don't neatly fit one conceptual category. This holds even more
> >for abstractions such as you find in ethics or philosophy. Depending on
> >how you look at it, a star can be a source of poetic inspiration, a
> >white-hot ball of hydrogen nuclei undergoing fusion, the energy source
> >that keeps a planet's ecosystem running, or a light source. None of
> >these definitions is "righter" than any other: it all depends on the
> >context.
>
> A poets description, despite its inspiring verse, does not change the
> fact a star is "a mass of incandescent gas, a giant nuclear furnace".
> Even if it is used in a number of contexts a crate is a crate, a star
> is a star, and a chair is a chair.
Of course. But none of these is a complete, exhaustive, and universal
description of the object in question. That is the problem with
essentialist definitions: you easily slide into a context where they no
longer apply, and it is very easy not to notice it, thereby ending up
with fallacious conclusions.
> >> >> (warning, attribute list for building not accurate for outside useage
> >> >> :)
> >> >
> >> >You could continue the list to exclude and include things, but what's
> >> >the point?
> >>
> >> Then, merely, roof would not be an attribute used to classify a
> >> building. Or it could belong to a specific class of buildings...
> >> namely "roofless sports stadiums".
> >
> >Sure you could, but what would be the point? Would it teach us anything
> >we don't know about buildings? Help us build better ones?
>
> No. But when you convert the analogy over to philosophy, it is much
> more important to have a definition of "relativism" or "egoism".
>
> Furthermore, I think that defining terms properly, like Essentialism,
> can help us to "build better ones".
What do _you_ mean by "defining terms properly"?
[snip]
> >Nope. You missed the bit about discussion and evaluation: that's the
> >crux of it. We take something we have, we try to understand it, and we
> >try to make it better.
>
> Try to make it better? By what standard?
<sigh>
By the standard of whatever consensus we have arrived at through the
application of reason, i.e., argument and experience.
> >> >> What makes one persons opinion over another good or bad?
> >> >
> >> >Again, "objectively" nothing. Intersubjectivity is the key. If we
> >> >accept rational discussion as a way to improve our ideas (that "a
> >> >proposition should be considered true only if it is supported by
> >> >argument and experience") we can apply this process to any subject,
> >> >including "good" or "bad". We don't _need_ an immutable, 'objective'
> >> >yardstick to measure good or bad; all we need is to find things that we
> >> >_consider_ good or bad. You'd be surprised to find how much common
> >> >ground there is between people.
> >>
> >> By what standard to you judge your considerations?
> >
> >By reason. "A proposition should be considered true only if it is
> >supported by argument and experience," remember? Similarly, "a rule of
> >ethics should be retained only if it is supported by argument and
> >experience". Do you see where I'm going?
>
> How can you reason if you don't accept objective values? True or false
> indicators for things.
You don't need to have an objective measure of tallness to be able to
state that Burt is taller than Anna. You don't need an objective
measure of goodness to state that A is better than B. All you need to
do is come to an agreement about what things are preferable over
others, and look for those things in the application of various ethical
systems. For example, I happen to believe that happiness is desirable,
and therefore when I compare systems of ethics, I consider one that
leads to greater happiness and lesser misery among the larger number of
people better than the other. I think that if we discussed it, we could
find quite a number of things we could use as such yardsticks that we
agreed about.
> For example: Violating the rights of Others is bad... true!
It's also tautological. A 'right' is implicitly something the violation
of which is 'bad'. Like 'murder is always unjustified', where 'murder'
is defined as 'the unjustified killing of another person'.
> It isn't, well lets define "violating the rights of others" and open
> up discussion channels to guage what people consider good or bad about
> the subject. Is it good or not. Reason should lead you to the answer.
If by 'reason' you mean 'argument and experience', I agree.
darth_versive
> In article <8e0e3045.02010...@posting.google.com>,
> darth_versive <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote in message
> > news:<040120021654297580%Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi>...
> [snip]
>
> > But, in contrast to what you said above, I don't think that nominalism
> > (or at least my brand of it, naturalism) necessarily leads to
> > relativism. As I posted in the aforementioned thread (which led to a
> > long series of interesting points and counter-points:
>
> Actually, I agree -- sort of. However, I think that our understandings
> of 'relativism' might differ somewhat. For example, I'm an ethical
> policy utilitarian. By your definition it is an 'absolutist' form of
> ethics, as it does base itself on a principle ("an ethical imperative
> should be retained only if it increases happiness and decreases misery
> for the maximum number of people"). However, the absolutism is
> something of an illusion, as 'happiness' and 'misery' are highly
> subjective concepts and at least partly contingent on culture. At best,
> we can arrive at some level of consensus regarding what kinds of things
> increase happiness and decrease misery. However, it is good enough to
> work with: we can use it to improve our ethical systems.
I don't think we really disagree here. Certainly, "happiness" and
"misery," etc. are highly subjective concepts, and are partly
contingent on culture. The point being made here is that someone
*can* base a set of universal standards on utilitarian principles
("universal" as meaning "considered to be applicable to everyone," not
in the essentialist sense of "a universal," of course), and that
utilitarianism is one possible example of a reasonable criteria that
can be used for such a task.
I myself am not a utilitarian, but I agree that those utilitarians who
hold to it as an ethical imperative that should be binding on everyone
do have a potential problem in holding to what could be a form of
absolutism which is somewhat illusory. But that's a problem that
they'll have to sort out for themselves, I think. I would imagine,
from what you've said so far, that you haven't fallen into this trap.
> > -----Start Quote
> >
> > NATURALISM, RELATIVISM, AND MORAL ABSOLUTES
>
> [snip 2 pg]
>
> > To me, being a relativist means believing that all value judgments or
> > moral frameworks are equally good or valid, or that we cannot
> > reasonably take a position that they are not so.
>
> I beg to differ with this definition. To me, beign a relativist simply
> means the disbelief in the existence of moral absolutes (that is, moral
> principles that are immutable and valid for everyone and every
> situation, and are not trivial or tautological).
The definition being used here is the so-called "detractors
definition," used mainly by those (such as essentialists) who oppose
relativism. The definition you cite is also well-known and
widely-used, but I don't think it would work so well in the context of
this argument. As to which one might be the "true" definition, I
wouldn't want to argue about that at this point. The definition being
used here is one which does reflect actual usage, and which does help
to make the point of the argument.
> > While one can
> > certainly hold this position and be a naturalist, it is not a
> > necessary consequence of being one, in my view. One can just as
> > easily believe that this or that value or moral system is inferior or
> > superior, that there ARE universal standards (based upon legalistic,
> > humanistic, utilitarian, or some other reasonable criteria), that
> > there are no standards, just the law of the jungle, or that morality
> > itself is all an illusion and doesn't even exist, as in some kind of
> > genetic/biochemical determinist viewpoint. Where naturalism comes
> > into the picture, in my view, is in the recognition that such
> > questions are beyond the scope of scientific method to answer, and
> > that people will have to--as they invariably do--come up with these
> > answers on their own, using other criteria than scientific ones.
>
> There is another possibility: that there are standards that are
> non-universal without being arbitrary. They are not 'scientific'
> because science only describes; they are more like principles of
> engineering -- we can base them on what we have learned through
> scientific inquiry.
Yes, the list was not meant to be an exhaustive one, but just a few
examples to make the point. There is a wide variety of other
possibilities that were not cited. And the definition of "arbitrary,"
like that of "happiness" or "misery," can also be highly subjective.
One person's "well-thought-out personal moral standard based upon a
careful reading of history for the sake of gathering empirical data"
might be another person's "arbitrary moral standard."
(And whatever additional examples of standards that you could cite
would add to the strength of the argument by showing that one could
hold to a great number of different moral standards while also being a
systematic naturalist.)
> > To the objection that such a view justifies the arbitrary choice of
> > one's values, and that this is a bad thing, I would reply that I think
> > it's better, as a general rule, to develop one's moral precepts by
> > whatever means, arbitrary or not, in light of true facts about the
> > universe, rather than to derive them with precise logic from false
> > premises. I believe that the facts of history clearly demonstrate the
> > tragic results that often follow from the latter course of action.
> >
> > Relativism is taking a particular position on the value of value
> > judgments. Naturalism involves taking a particular position on the
> > methodology one should use--or more precisely, should NOT use--when
> > making value judgments. One can be both a naturalist and a
> > relativist, but I don't think it's a necessary consequence.
>
> [snip]
>
> > If you have any comments on this, I'd like to hear them. While it
> > might be true that certain types of nominalism might lead to
> > relativism, I don't think that naturalism does, and so this
> > counter-instance would serve to demonstrate (or to argue) that
> > nominalism in general does not always have to lead to relativism
> > (given that naturalism is a form of nominalism, which I maintain it
> > is).
>
> As I said above, I think that the absolutism in this case is rather
> illusory.
>
> /Petteri
Yes, like I said above, I agree with this.
DV
P.S. Did you ever check out that other thread I mentioned ("Morality
without God?")? The general lack of communication involved, given the
level of verbosity, is quite amusing. ;)
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>In article <5gng3ucdii24vhofr...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
>[snip]
>
>> >Nominalism does not (necessarily) deny the existence of a reality that
>> >is independent of the observer. (I know I don't.) Empiricism and
>> >naturalism are two nominalist philosophies which specifically proceed
>> >from the assumption that there _is_ a single, external reality that we
>> >can learn to understand through studying it. The point is that
>> >nominalism recognizes the problems inherent in the process of observing
>> >and studying: how can we be sure that what we see and what conclusions
>> >we draw in fact are _consistent_ with this external reality? The answer
>> >is again: intersubjectivity.
>>
>> I would have said logic, reason, and further study. but hey...
>
>Without intersubjectivity, how can you discover experimental bias?
You discover experimental bias by having peer reviewed journals. By
having your findings verified (or falsified) by other scientists
around the world. Even then the experimental bias isn't detected. In
that case in a few years when new techniques are found you discover
that the old experiment was mistaken and you revise your results.
Just because your experiment was wrong, does not change existence.
A chair is a chair, no matter what you think of it. A light is a
light, even if it ends up that they don't exist in "quanta" and in the
years to come we discover its something else entirely, it doesn't mean
that light itself has up and changed from being a discrete quanta.
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>> >> Why does an essentialist mistake the abstraction for reality, and not
>> >> the nominalist?
>> >
>> >Because the nominalist checks the conclusions he draws from the
>> >abstractions against reality. If a conclusion is not falsifiable, it is
>> >meaningless. If it is falsified, it is incorrect.
>>
>> And why does this not apply to the Essentialist?
>>
>> If an essentialist make a definition. What is to stop them from
>> altering it later if they discover a mistake in their methodology,
>> perceptions, process of abstraction, conceptualisation etc...
>>
>> Ayn Rand herself said many times that human perception is not perfect,
>> nor is the conceptualisation faculty, but it is what we have. The
>> person must take the responsibility of not only thinking, but of
>> correcting any mistakes in that thinking.
>>
>> I fail to... accept your claim that an "essentialist" makes a decision
>> (as it appears you are claiming) and once that decision is made it is
>> irrevocable.
>
>All right, then. Please explain what kind of test you would perform to
>falsify Ayn Rand's claim that property rights are fundamental to all
>other rights.
Why would I? I have seen what not having property rights does to the
rights of human beings. By my knowledge it is correct. If someone
smarter than me can suggest something, I am more than willing to take
a look at it. So far I haven't found any good arguments.
Intersubjectivity sounds like a load of crap to me.
>> >> If an essentialist says the essence of a chair (for the sake of
>> >> argument) is "A piece of furniture for one person to sit on", when the
>> >> chair becomes firewood, it no longer a concrete of the
>> >> abstraction/concept of that definition of a chair. It fits the
>> >> definition of "fuel" pretty well though.
>> >
>> >Then how can a definition be objective if the same object is one man's
>> >chair and another man's fuel?
>>
>> Because in the process of converting the chair into the fuel, it
>> changes "essence".
>
>You mean, like the host becomes the body of Christ and the wine becomes
>the blood of Christ in the miracle of the transubstantiation?
"like" that. But I would not suggest that wine is the blood of christ.
>> It is no longer (by your definition) a peice of furniture one person
>> sits on. It is "something that is used to produce energy".
>>
>> <snipped>
>
>How do you determine when an object 'changes essence'?
When you change your definition of what it is.
A chair on the fireplace being burnt could be called a "burning
chair". It might also be termed fuel. At about that stage you might
want to start calling it "firewood".
>[snip]
>
>> >If I furnish my house with overturned crates (and believe me, I've seen
>> >homes like that), I don't think it makes _sense_ to call these objects
>> >crates in a specific state of existence. To me, it seems to me to make
>> >much more sense to call them chairs, tables, or beds -- whatever
>> >they're being used for. The point is that many (if not most) real-life
>> >objects don't neatly fit one conceptual category. This holds even more
>> >for abstractions such as you find in ethics or philosophy. Depending on
>> >how you look at it, a star can be a source of poetic inspiration, a
>> >white-hot ball of hydrogen nuclei undergoing fusion, the energy source
>> >that keeps a planet's ecosystem running, or a light source. None of
>> >these definitions is "righter" than any other: it all depends on the
>> >context.
>>
>> A poets description, despite its inspiring verse, does not change the
>> fact a star is "a mass of incandescent gas, a giant nuclear furnace".
>> Even if it is used in a number of contexts a crate is a crate, a star
>> is a star, and a chair is a chair.
>
>Of course. But none of these is a complete, exhaustive, and universal
>description of the object in question. That is the problem with
>essentialist definitions: you easily slide into a context where they no
>longer apply, and it is very easy not to notice it, thereby ending up
>with fallacious conclusions.
And why doesn't this apply to the nominalist. When you "slide" into a
context where they no longer apply, don't continue to apply them.
Seems quite simple really doesn't it :)
>> >> >> (warning, attribute list for building not accurate for outside useage
>> >> >> :)
>> >> >
>> >> >You could continue the list to exclude and include things, but what's
>> >> >the point?
>> >>
>> >> Then, merely, roof would not be an attribute used to classify a
>> >> building. Or it could belong to a specific class of buildings...
>> >> namely "roofless sports stadiums".
>> >
>> >Sure you could, but what would be the point? Would it teach us anything
>> >we don't know about buildings? Help us build better ones?
>>
>> No. But when you convert the analogy over to philosophy, it is much
>> more important to have a definition of "relativism" or "egoism".
>>
>> Furthermore, I think that defining terms properly, like Essentialism,
>> can help us to "build better ones".
>
>What do _you_ mean by "defining terms properly"?
Well, when you define essentialism with specific attributes so a
correct understanding of what Essentialism ACTUALLY is, then you can
go about building better ones.
>[snip]
>
>> >Nope. You missed the bit about discussion and evaluation: that's the
>> >crux of it. We take something we have, we try to understand it, and we
>> >try to make it better.
>>
>> Try to make it better? By what standard?
>
><sigh>
>
>By the standard of whatever consensus we have arrived at through the
>application of reason, i.e., argument and experience.
Why is "concensus" a good thing. By what standard?
<snipped last bit>
Colin Day
Think about biological classification, where we sort individuals into
species, species into genera, genera into orders? classes? and so on.
> sure I understood the question. However, assuming I do understand you
> correctly, I'd say that the nominalist would consider conclusions drawn
> from higher-order classifications as hypotheses which need to be (a)
> falsifiable and (b) pass whatever tests can be devised to falsify them.
> The essentialist, OTOH, would consider such falsification unnecessary.
Rand would say that difficulties in higher-order classification can be
taken as justification against the lower-level classification. That is,
if a system of classification is not extensible, and a competing system
is, then the extensibility of the second system makes it preferable to
the first system, other things being the same.
I suspect that some your issues with objectivists may involve
differences over the use of the terms "essentialist" and "nominalist".
>
> > > > Yes, objectivism is concerned with ethics, and yes it claims that those
> > > > ethics are universal and objective. Is it the Final Thoery of Ethics,
> > > > uhh... maybe not. As in physics, one may have to alter theories in the
> > > > light of new data, or learn to extend principles to new situations.
> > >
> > > Exactly. This, IMO, is the main problem with essentialist philosophies.
> > > They take a (more or less valid) proposition as their basis, then
> > > proceed to reason the hell out of it. When observed reality and the
> > > arrived-at conclusions conflict, reality is judged to be in error.
> > >
> > That's not very objective.
>
> Look at Marxism, for example. Marx predicted (1) that capitalism could
> never be reformed, only overturned, and (2) that capitalism would
> collapse of its own accord, to be replaced by first socialism and the
> Communism. He turned out to be wrong on both counts. However, talk to a
> true-believer Marxist, and he'll reinterpret reality to match Marx's
> prediction.
>
No need to reinterpret reality, just wait some more :-).
Yes, many Marxists (and ideologists of other stripes) seem unwilling to
reject theories that deviate wildly from reality. However, this is a
problem of using theories as means of cognition, that we can extend the
depth and breadth of our cognition, while risking the loss of detail.
How much do we hold onto a relatively successful theory that fails to
account for certain details?
> > > [snip]
> > >
> > > > > That's largely a matter of preference. However, I think that by
> > > > > discussing it, we can arrive at a consensus regarding some things that
> > > > > make a home better -- and act upon it. That's the idea of an open
> > > > > society.
> > > >
> > > > But what if our preferences are wrong, i. e. objectively bad for us?
> > >
> > > What do you mean by 'objectively bad'? I maintain that 'good' and 'bad'
> > > have meaning only as (inter)subjective terms.
> >
> > But if we could simply act on our subjective preferences, then why would
> > we need ethics at all? Ah, you say, we have to balance the subjective
> > preferences of everybody? Why? What if some people want ceaseless
> > violence?
>
> Then those who do not want ceaseless violence should try to (1)
> convince them that they are wrong or, failing that (2) arrange to
> protect themselves against that violence.
>
But according to you, (1) is impossible, since all notion of right and
wrong is subjective. Now (2) is better, but you might outnumbered, and
it's more effective in terms of one's own morale to know that the enemy
is wrong, and not merely feel it.
> Again, your question seems slightly pointless. The point with the
> nominalist method is that we don't live in a vacuum. We already _have_
> societies and systems of ethics. Instead of trying to throw them out
> and build a new one from scratch, we should do what science and
> technology do: study them and attempt to improve them.
But what would constitute an improvement? What is the standard by which
you would judge changes?
You'll find that
> within such societies, whether local or global in scope, there is a
> great deal of intersubjective consensus on a great number of subjects.
> Things like "fairness" are fairly universal concepts.
>
But what if the consensus is wrong?
> > > > What if one likes the taste of arsenic?
> > >
> > > What if one is suicidal?
> > >
> > And why is one suicidal? If one is in extreme agony from a disease that
> > is currently incurable, then suicide might be justified. But there are
> > easier ways to commit it.
>
> Certainly.
>
> However, I think the problem with the arsenic comparison is that unlike
> poisoning, which is diagnosable and observable, ethics depend largely
> on value judgements, and value judgements necessarily have a large
> subjective component.
>
Certainly, many of our value judgments include a subjective/emotional
response (certainly my value judgment of Elizabeth Hurley naked in my
bed would :-) ), however, this response is not the justification of the
value.
But should they be Muslims in the first place?
> (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
>
> (4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
> understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
>
And what is reason?
> Hey presto, we've established a common epistemology good enough to
> discuss how to organize society with a member of a group commonly
> considered to be among the most inflexible around today. He doesn't
> need to accept my "fundamental" epistemology (that laws are a matter of
> social convention and intersubjective agreement) any more than I need
> to accept his fundamental epistemology that laws are ordained by God
> and written down in the Qur'an and the ha'adith.
>
> For example, we could make the following argument (I didn't make this
> one up, I heard an Islamic scholar make it): "The Qur'an says that a
> male descendant is entitled to twice the share of a female descendant
> in inheritance. The _hikmat_ behind this rule is that, as the Qur'an
> also says, the male is responsible for maintaining his sisters and
> female cousins at the same standard of living as himself, while the
> female has no such obligation. If the male should refuse this
> obligation, the _hikmat_ has changed, and he should no longer be
> accorded a larger share in the inheritance."
Let me get back on this.
>
> See where I'm going?
>
> /Petteri
>
> If we agree on this, we can go on to discuss the _hikmat_ behi
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day aa #1500
BAAWA-nnabe
Colin Day
>
> > > > Or its ideological equivalent,
> > > > religious fundamentalism?
> > > >
> > > > And by what means would we arrive at a consensus?
> > >
> > > Popper proposes the critical, rational method. He argues that (1) it is
> > > accessible to everyone and (2) has been empirically shown to yield good
> > > results. I see no reason to disagree with him.
> >
> > What examples does he provide?
>
> Science and technology. They're a product of the nominalist method.
>
But scientist achieve consensus not because they view consensus as a
goal, but because they deal with objective facts. How can one achieve
consesnsus about intersubjective tastes?
But wouldn't the reason or basis then be objective?
> (4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
> understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
>
> Hey presto, we've established a common epistemology good enough to
> discuss how to organize society with a member of a group commonly
> considered to be among the most inflexible around today. He doesn't
> need to accept my "fundamental" epistemology (that laws are a matter of
> social convention and intersubjective agreement) any more than I need
> to accept his fundamental epistemology that laws are ordained by God
> and written down in the Qur'an and the ha'adith.
>
> For example, we could make the following argument (I didn't make this
> one up, I heard an Islamic scholar make it): "The Qur'an says that a
> male descendant is entitled to twice the share of a female descendant
> in inheritance. The _hikmat_ behind this rule is that, as the Qur'an
> also says, the male is responsible for maintaining his sisters and
> female cousins at the same standard of living as himself, while the
> female has no such obligation. If the male should refuse this
> obligation, the _hikmat_ has changed, and he should no longer be
> accorded a larger share in the inheritance."
>
But is it proper for women to be economically dependent on men?
> See where I'm going?
>
> /Petteri
>
> If we agree on this, we can go on to discuss the _hikmat_ behi
What's the _hikmat_ for female genital mutilation? Or is FGM not a
_hikmat_?
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C372F98...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> [snip]
>
> > > > Why? Are you saying that whether Crusoe grows crops or lies about on the
> > > > beach has no moral significance?
> > >
> > > Yep. Of course, this is contingent on my (operational) definition of
> > > morality -- internalized rules of conduct that govern social behaviour.
> > > Somebody who's alone obviously doesn't _have_ social behaviour, ergo,
> > > in that context 'morality' has no meaning.
> >
> > But this assumes that people are moral.
>
> Well, in my experience all but a very few people _are_ moral. That is
> to say, they have internalized some kind of shared system of ethics and
> values, they disapprove if someone else violates that system, they feel
> shame if _they_ are caught violating it, and they might feel bad about
> violating it even if they are _not_ caught.
>
> > Is any action based on an
> > internalized rule of conduct that governs social behavior moral?
>
> This sounds a bit tricky: you aren't using two conflicting definitions
> of "moral" here, by any chance? That is "moral" in the sense of
> "conforming to a system of morality" and "moral" in the sense of
> "conforming to _my_ (or, 'some objective') system of morality"?
The former, of course.
>
> > And
> > given a choice of rules to internalize, which one(s) should we select?
>
> Do we _have_ a choice? The system of morals that we have internalized
> is one we've arrived at through our upbringing. I _couldn't_ select,
> say, the ethics system proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood even if I
> wanted to.
>
Why not? True, the ethics in which one is brought up is often difficult
to reject (which is why religion is still here). But many atheists in
this newsgroup were brought up as theists (I was), so it is possible.
And if we don't have a choice, then would a housebroken puppy have
internalized a rule of conduct that governs its social behavior, i. e.,
scratch at the door if I need to poop?
> However, I _can_ subject my system of morals to intelligent scrutiny,
> discuss it with other people, and maybe arrive at a decision to change
> something. In this way, we can _improve_ our existing systems of
But "improve" presupposes some standard. And how does one apply
"intelligent scrutiny" to subjective preferences?
> morality. I think that it's impossible to "start from scratch" and
> design a completely new system of ethics -- because the construction
> involves value choices, which are a product of the system we already
> have.
Psychologically, this would be more difficult in ethics, than say
physics.
However, there have been changes in physics, such as relativity and
quantum mechanics, where physicists rejected views that were largely
internalized.
>
> > > Would you like to propose another definition for morality? In my
> > > experience the ones that try to incorporate behaviour that has no
> > > impact on others quickly run into problems.
> >
> > Ethics deals with how we should exercise (and act on) our free will (of
> > course, if we don't have free will, this isn't going to work).
>
> That sounds good too. It doesn't seem to conflict with the definition I
> proposed, either.
>
Hmm. . . It didn't? Though we might disagree on the extent of our
volition.
Colin Day
My bad. I thought you meant the smallest triangle containing any point
of the liquid water region, but you meant the smallest triangle
containing all of the liquid water region. OK.
> As for the other point here, sometimes it is prudent to consider a
> treatment of triangles in such a way that you have "collinear triangles".
> Eg, it doesn't mess up projections at all, and if you're projecting a
> triangle and it becomes collinear, it may be more helpfull to still think
> of it as a triangle.
Do theorems of projective geometry still hold for such triangles?
>
> >> > What we deal with here is "equivalence classes":
> >>
> >> ...but we deal with weak equivalence classes. For almost every
> >> concept we have, there are things we don't know where to put. We
> >> _could_ arbitrate it into one category or the other, but this would be
> >> an arbitration.
>
> > But as Rand herself would say, if there are no complications when we
> > make higher-order classifications, then there is no problem. If there
> > are such complications, then we have additional information for
> > fine-tuning the original definition.
>
> Two comments here... the complications sometimes can't be resolved by
> anything other than arbitration, and quite often this isn't usefull anyway.
But if there is no other way to resolve the complications, then that's
OK. Epistemology cannot demand the impossible.
> Eg, even if you had a color wheel arbitration, an object can reflect
> particular intermediate non-primary light at different amounts, and thus
> strattle the "blue" and "blue-green" line in different ways than the "same"
> color on the color wheel depending on the type of light shining on it--in
> such cases, it may be more convenient to toss the idea of color of an
> object being constant and redefine color as being dependant both on the
> light and light conditions--however, this definition would be useless if
> we're considering colors in a jpg picture, where consideration of light
> conditions are independant--and likewise, if we abstract out all
> considerations and consider "color" in general, we still have a usefull
> concept (iow, we can talk about "red" in general), but then we have to
> realize that we could have such difficulties later.
>
> And the second comment--as per my other post in this thread, I'm admitting
> ignorance of essentialism and nominalism... I can only comment on what I
> understand it to be at the moment (which is, in fact, based on other
> people's definitions--nevertheless, they seem a bit ambiguous to me, so I
> could see that I'm interpreting things wrongly). So if you think I'm
> misusing the terms, or slightly misusing them, it'd be more beneficial to
> me for you to point out how exactly than to just bring up that I am
> misusing them. Even if my understanding isn't refined, however, the prior
> post I replied to makes sense at least in terms of "fuzzy categorization"
> versus "crisp categorization".
I suspect that Petteri and I are using the terms somewhat differently,
but I'll try to be clear.
Colin Day
Colin Day
By her definition, none of the above. The crate is closest, but was it
designed to support objects in that way? And if it were a table, why
would this invalidate anything? Why couldn't something be both a table
and a crate?
Also, for Rand, what we define are not words but concepts, so the use of
the word "table" as in "water table" and "sewing table" is an
equivocation, but not an equiconception.
>
> > >
> > > What about objectivist ethics?
> > >
> >
> > Rand would claim that ethics arise because humans cannot live by
> > "instinct", so efficacious action requires some thought (presumably,
> > nonefficacious action leads to death). Ethical objectivity means that
> > the demands of human life are independent of our feelings about them.
> > For example, eating arsenic is bad, no matter how much you might like
> > the taste.
> >
> > The harder part comes when we examine the psychological demands of human
> > life. For Rand, the struggle for human existence is largely
> > intellectual, so the preservation/growth of our cognition is important.
> > Again, she argued that human psychology is what it is, and is not
> > malleable to our whims.
> >
> > A question: Are you treating objectivity as the same as absoluteness?
>
> No, although I consider the concepts related. By 'objective' I
> understand 'same for everyone,' 'independent of the observer'. In
But is "independent of observer" the same as "same for everyone"?
> ethics, I understand that 'objective' would mean 'universally
> applicable, same for everyone'. By 'absolute' I understand 'not
> relative,' 'binary rather than graded'. In ethics, this would mean
> something like 'unequivocally good (bad), irrespective of the
> situation'.
>
> > For example, the Lorentz effects in special relativity are objective, i.
> > e., they depend on reference frames, and not observers per se. But those
> > effects aren't absolute, as they are frame dependent.
>
> I'm afraid that example goes over my head.
According to special relativity, if you move fast relative to an object,
the object will appear to contract along the direction of your motion.
Now this effect could be detected photographically, so it's objective.
Colin Day
Colin Day
>
> In article
> <060120021033349061%Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi>, Petteri
> Sulonen <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
> [snip]
>
> > > Example (from Rand) table: A man-made object consisting of a flat, level
> > > surface and support(s), intended to support other, smaller objects.
> > >
> > > So how would this be nonobjective?
> >
> > Is an overturned crate a table, if you use it to support smaller
> > objects? How about a tree-stump you use for a picnic table in the
> > forest? How about a water table?
>
> I was a bit hasty in posting, and ended up a bit unclear. What I mean
> is, if two people can reasonably consider the same object to match two
> different definitions, I don't think the definitions can be considered
> 'objective'. One person's crate can reasonably be another person's
> chair.
>
But what if *one* person considers the object to fit two different
definitions? What if everyone considers that the object satisifies both
definitions?
Colin Day
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
[sense]
> > > Is any action based on an
> > > internalized rule of conduct that governs social behavior moral?
> >
> > This sounds a bit tricky: you aren't using two conflicting definitions
> > of "moral" here, by any chance? That is "moral" in the sense of
> > "conforming to a system of morality" and "moral" in the sense of
> > "conforming to _my_ (or, 'some objective') system of morality"?
>
> The former, of course.
Well, in that case, certainly, don't you think? In my understanding
it's even tautological.
> >
> > > And
> > > given a choice of rules to internalize, which one(s) should we select?
> >
> > Do we _have_ a choice? The system of morals that we have internalized
> > is one we've arrived at through our upbringing. I _couldn't_ select,
> > say, the ethics system proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood even if I
> > wanted to.
>
> Why not? True, the ethics in which one is brought up is often difficult
> to reject (which is why religion is still here). But many atheists in
> this newsgroup were brought up as theists (I was), so it is possible.
I'm sorry, I may have been unclear. I think that we are incapable of
rejecting one system of morality and adopting another one wholesale.
However, what we _can_ do is modify our system of morality based on
ethical reasoning. In my view, we have a strong moral imperative to
_do_ so.
I think that many of the ex-theists in alt.atheism and elsewhere have
changed their _epistemology_ much more than their system of morality.
Christians teach their children "do not steal". So would I. They teach
"do not kill". So would I. They teach, "do not cheat". So would I. The
main difference is in the way a Christian would answer the inevitable
"Why?".
> And if we don't have a choice, then would a housebroken puppy have
> internalized a rule of conduct that governs its social behavior, i. e.,
> scratch at the door if I need to poop?
I'm sorry, could you rephrase that? I don't understand.
> > However, I _can_ subject my system of morals to intelligent scrutiny,
> > discuss it with other people, and maybe arrive at a decision to change
> > something. In this way, we can _improve_ our existing systems of
>
> But "improve" presupposes some standard. And how does one apply
> "intelligent scrutiny" to subjective preferences?
Through intersubjective dialogue. For example, I can say "It makes
sense to me to use the following statement as a yardstick to compare
ethical systems: 'An ethical imperative should be retained only if it
increases happiness and decreases misery for the maximum number of
people.' What do you think?" Even if we can't agree _that_ deeply, we
can discuss individual imperatives, explaining _why_ we feel they
should be retained. If we can find _some_ common ground in the
epistemological basis, we can go places.
> > morality. I think that it's impossible to "start from scratch" and
> > design a completely new system of ethics -- because the construction
> > involves value choices, which are a product of the system we already
> > have.
>
> Psychologically, this would be more difficult in ethics, than say
> physics.
> However, there have been changes in physics, such as relativity and
> quantum mechanics, where physicists rejected views that were largely
> internalized.
I'm wasn't talking about individual imperatives, but entire systems.
Individual imperatives can certainly be learned or un-learned (e.g.,
someone who loses his religion can un-learn the 'missionary imperative'
or someone who gets converted can learn it). It helps if we have good
reasons to learn or un-learn said imperative. It helps more if we
understand our 'ethical epistemology'.
> > > > Would you like to propose another definition for morality? In my
> > > > experience the ones that try to incorporate behaviour that has no
> > > > impact on others quickly run into problems.
> > >
> > > Ethics deals with how we should exercise (and act on) our free will (of
> > > course, if we don't have free will, this isn't going to work).
> >
> > That sounds good too. It doesn't seem to conflict with the definition I
> > proposed, either.
>
> Hmm. . . It didn't? Though we might disagree on the extent of our
> volition.
Not that I can see. I think it looks at the subject from a different
angle. Where do you think they conflict (if anywhere)?
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
[snip]
> > > Again, this is nor far from what Rand herself said, but she had
> > > different standards of usefulness. For example, how do the nominalists
> > > deal with higher-order classification?
> >
> > Could you clarify what you mean by higher-order classification? I'm not
>
> Think about biological classification, where we sort individuals into
> species, species into genera, genera into orders? classes? and so on.
Biologists _are_ nominalists. I think you just answered your question.
:-)
> > sure I understood the question. However, assuming I do understand you
> > correctly, I'd say that the nominalist would consider conclusions drawn
> > from higher-order classifications as hypotheses which need to be (a)
> > falsifiable and (b) pass whatever tests can be devised to falsify them.
> > The essentialist, OTOH, would consider such falsification unnecessary.
>
> Rand would say that difficulties in higher-order classification can be
> taken as justification against the lower-level classification. That is,
> if a system of classification is not extensible, and a competing system
> is, then the extensibility of the second system makes it preferable to
> the first system, other things being the same.
>
> I suspect that some your issues with objectivists may involve
> differences over the use of the terms "essentialist" and "nominalist".
It's possible.
Could you provide a concrete example? I have a feeling that
extensibility might be desirable, but to the nominalist, explanatory
power is what counts.
For example, if I classify something as a vertebrate based on, say,
morphological criteria, I can make a prediction that I will find
certain things if I look at the genes. If I classify something by, say,
color, I can't know what to expect when I look at its other attributes.
> > > > > Yes, objectivism is concerned with ethics, and yes it claims that
> > > > > those
> > > > > ethics are universal and objective. Is it the Final Thoery of Ethics,
> > > > > uhh... maybe not. As in physics, one may have to alter theories in the
> > > > > light of new data, or learn to extend principles to new situations.
> > > >
> > > > Exactly. This, IMO, is the main problem with essentialist philosophies.
> > > > They take a (more or less valid) proposition as their basis, then
> > > > proceed to reason the hell out of it. When observed reality and the
> > > > arrived-at conclusions conflict, reality is judged to be in error.
> > > >
> > > That's not very objective.
> >
> > Look at Marxism, for example. Marx predicted (1) that capitalism could
> > never be reformed, only overturned, and (2) that capitalism would
> > collapse of its own accord, to be replaced by first socialism and the
> > Communism. He turned out to be wrong on both counts. However, talk to a
> > true-believer Marxist, and he'll reinterpret reality to match Marx's
> > prediction.
>
> No need to reinterpret reality, just wait some more :-).
Oh yes there is. Marx specifically stated that capitalism (as he
described it) cannot be reformed, only overturned. Capitalism as he
described it no longer exists, but it hasn't been overturned and it has
been reformed. He was wrong. Waiting more doesn't change this fact. If
our modern system does collapse and is replaced by socialism, Marx
would still have been wrong: the system he predicted would collapse,
didn't, and the system that did wasn't the one he predicted (and
probably didn't collapse for the reasons he predicted).
> Yes, many Marxists (and ideologists of other stripes) seem unwilling to
> reject theories that deviate wildly from reality. However, this is a
> problem of using theories as means of cognition, that we can extend the
> depth and breadth of our cognition, while risking the loss of detail.
And this is where intersubjectivity, experience, and argument come in.
> How much do we hold onto a relatively successful theory that fails to
> account for certain details?
Until a better theory is devised, that is, one that explains more of
the phenomena while conflicting with fewer, I don't see any reason to
reject it.
[snip]
> > Then those who do not want ceaseless violence should try to (1)
> > convince them that they are wrong or, failing that (2) arrange to
> > protect themselves against that violence.
>
> But according to you, (1) is impossible, since all notion of right and
> wrong is subjective.
Not subjective. Intersubjective, and a subject that is possible to
scrutinize rationally. Unless you _actually_ like pain, insecurity, and
death, I can make a very good argument that ceaseless violence is a bad
policy. Fortunately for us, such people are few.
> Now (2) is better, but you might outnumbered, and
> it's more effective in terms of one's own morale to know that the enemy
> is wrong, and not merely feel it.
Well, if it makes you feel any better, I both feel and have an
intellectual certainty that my basis for ethics is a good one. However,
I'm willing to reject it if you can convince me that another one is
even better. :-)
> > Again, your question seems slightly pointless. The point with the
> > nominalist method is that we don't live in a vacuum. We already _have_
> > societies and systems of ethics. Instead of trying to throw them out
> > and build a new one from scratch, we should do what science and
> > technology do: study them and attempt to improve them.
>
> But what would constitute an improvement? What is the standard by which
> you would judge changes?
AndrewC already asked this one. I'd start by listing quantifiable
things which I think were indicative of a 'good' society, asking people
within these societies whether or not they think they're good
indicators, and eventually arrive at some kind of consensus about them.
Then I'd look at these quantities and compare societies. These
quantities could be stuff like incarceration rate, literacy rate,
distribution of income, poverty rate, abortion rate, suicide rate, and
so on.
> You'll find that
> > within such societies, whether local or global in scope, there is a
> > great deal of intersubjective consensus on a great number of subjects.
> > Things like "fairness" are fairly universal concepts.
>
> But what if the consensus is wrong?
By what standard?
> > > > > What if one likes the taste of arsenic?
> > > >
> > > > What if one is suicidal?
> > > >
> > > And why is one suicidal? If one is in extreme agony from a disease that
> > > is currently incurable, then suicide might be justified. But there are
> > > easier ways to commit it.
> >
> > Certainly.
> >
> > However, I think the problem with the arsenic comparison is that unlike
> > poisoning, which is diagnosable and observable, ethics depend largely
> > on value judgements, and value judgements necessarily have a large
> > subjective component.
>
> Certainly, many of our value judgments include a subjective/emotional
> response (certainly my value judgment of Elizabeth Hurley naked in my
> bed would :-) ), however, this response is not the justification of the
> value.
No. However, through discussion, we can arrive at more general
standards we can use to devise systems of ethics. For example, we can
examine our 'moral sense' in certain situations and try think _why_ we
feel action A is 'right' and action B 'wrong'. Then we can discuss it.
[snip]
> > I think any common ground is important. For example, you could carry a
> > constructive discussion with an Islamic fundamentalist if he accepts
> > the following propositions (which most of them do):
> >
> > (1) The laws in the shari'a can be divided into two groups: those
> > which deal with worship, and those that deal with society.
> >
> > (2) The laws in the first group only apply to Muslims, and they
> > should be followed by them to the letter.
>
> But should they be Muslims in the first place?
That's a moot point, since I doubt you'll be able to deconvert them.
> > (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> > (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
> >
> > (4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
> > understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
>
> And what is reason?
Actually, the Muslim understands by 'reason' very much the same thing
as the Westerner does. Remember, they studied Plato and Aristotle when
we were dying of horrible diseases or mouthing Latin phrases we
couldn't understand.
> > Hey presto, we've established a common epistemology good enough to
> > discuss how to organize society with a member of a group commonly
> > considered to be among the most inflexible around today. He doesn't
> > need to accept my "fundamental" epistemology (that laws are a matter of
> > social convention and intersubjective agreement) any more than I need
> > to accept his fundamental epistemology that laws are ordained by God
> > and written down in the Qur'an and the ha'adith.
> >
> > For example, we could make the following argument (I didn't make this
> > one up, I heard an Islamic scholar make it): "The Qur'an says that a
> > male descendant is entitled to twice the share of a female descendant
> > in inheritance. The _hikmat_ behind this rule is that, as the Qur'an
> > also says, the male is responsible for maintaining his sisters and
> > female cousins at the same standard of living as himself, while the
> > female has no such obligation. If the male should refuse this
> > obligation, the _hikmat_ has changed, and he should no longer be
> > accorded a larger share in the inheritance."
>
> Let me get back on this.
I'll be looking forward to it.
[sigsnip]
/Petteri
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>
>
> >
> > > > > Or its ideological equivalent,
> > > > > religious fundamentalism?
> > > > >
> > > > > And by what means would we arrive at a consensus?
> > > >
> > > > Popper proposes the critical, rational method. He argues that (1) it is
> > > > accessible to everyone and (2) has been empirically shown to yield good
> > > > results. I see no reason to disagree with him.
> > >
> > > What examples does he provide?
> >
> > Science and technology. They're a product of the nominalist method.
>
> But scientist achieve consensus not because they view consensus as a
> goal, but because they deal with objective facts. How can one achieve
> consesnsus about intersubjective tastes?
Ah, but the question is, _how_ do they arrive at this consensus?
Granted, their position is easier than that of the 'ethicist' or
'social engineer', because nature behaves more predictably than people.
However, I think their method -- devising experiments, discussing them
to find flaws, repeating them, formulating hypotheses based on them,
testing the hypotheses with yet more experiment, observation, and
discussion, and devising theories based on the tested hypotheses can
also be used for society. The only difference is that the margin of
uncertainty is far bigger.
[snip]
> > I think any common ground is important. For example, you could carry a
> > constructive discussion with an Islamic fundamentalist if he accepts
> > the following propositions (which most of them do):
> >
> > (1) The laws in the shari'a can be divided into two groups: those
> > which deal with worship, and those that deal with society.
> >
> > (2) The laws in the first group only apply to Muslims, and they
> > should be followed by them to the letter.
> >
> > (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> > (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
>
> But wouldn't the reason or basis then be objective?
Actually, no: it depends on circumstances.
> > (4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
> > understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
> >
> > Hey presto, we've established a common epistemology good enough to
> > discuss how to organize society with a member of a group commonly
> > considered to be among the most inflexible around today. He doesn't
> > need to accept my "fundamental" epistemology (that laws are a matter of
> > social convention and intersubjective agreement) any more than I need
> > to accept his fundamental epistemology that laws are ordained by God
> > and written down in the Qur'an and the ha'adith.
> >
> > For example, we could make the following argument (I didn't make this
> > one up, I heard an Islamic scholar make it): "The Qur'an says that a
> > male descendant is entitled to twice the share of a female descendant
> > in inheritance. The _hikmat_ behind this rule is that, as the Qur'an
> > also says, the male is responsible for maintaining his sisters and
> > female cousins at the same standard of living as himself, while the
> > female has no such obligation. If the male should refuse this
> > obligation, the _hikmat_ has changed, and he should no longer be
> > accorded a larger share in the inheritance."
>
> But is it proper for women to be economically dependent on men?
Trick question. If you asked, is it proper to _force_ women to be
economically dependent on men, I'd certainly have said 'no'. However,
what you did ask sounds a lot like "is it proper for a woman to be
economicaly dependent on men _even if she chooses to_?" This, IMO, is a
good deal more problematic. I can't see that we can place an
_obligation_ on a person to be economically independent, if another
person volunteers to provide for him/her.
(The Muslim scholar above would probably have pointed out that the
woman actually had the _better_ deal, since she did get one half the
inheritance with (usually) much less than half the economic
obligations: she would have both security, since her brothers and male
cousins are obligated to look to her needs, and freedom, since she has
her half-share to dispose of as she wished.)
> > See where I'm going?
> >
> > /Petteri
> >
> > If we agree on this, we can go on to discuss the _hikmat_ behi
>
> What's the _hikmat_ for female genital mutilation? Or is FGM not a
> _hikmat_?
FGM is neither in the Qur'an nor the ha'adith. It's a pre-Islamic
custom that has persisted to these days, like the so-called 'murders of
honor' and similar barbarities. Many Muslim scholars condemn it.
(Personally, I think it's a scandal that _all_ Muslim scholars don't
condemn it: they should know better!)
I don't think a discussion on Islamic jurisprudence is very relevant
here, by the way: I merely used it as an example to demonstrate how it
is possible to establish enough of a common epistemological basis for a
meaningful dialogue with someone whose _fundamental_ epistemology you
entirely disagree with.
(As an aside, going from the little I _do_ know about the subject, I
think that it is perfectly possible to reconcile Islamic law with an
open society. I'll even venture a prediction: it will first happen in
Iran. This, of course, doesn't mean that I would agree with every
single law of that country. I can't think of _any_ country that matches
_that_ criterion!)
/Petteri
Petteri Sulonen
> On Sun, 06 Jan 2002 17:39:40 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>
> >In article <5gng3ucdii24vhofr...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
> >[snip]
> >
> >> >Nominalism does not (necessarily) deny the existence of a reality that
> >> >is independent of the observer. (I know I don't.) Empiricism and
> >> >naturalism are two nominalist philosophies which specifically proceed
> >> >from the assumption that there _is_ a single, external reality that we
> >> >can learn to understand through studying it. The point is that
> >> >nominalism recognizes the problems inherent in the process of observing
> >> >and studying: how can we be sure that what we see and what conclusions
> >> >we draw in fact are _consistent_ with this external reality? The answer
> >> >is again: intersubjectivity.
> >>
> >> I would have said logic, reason, and further study. but hey...
> >
> >Without intersubjectivity, how can you discover experimental bias?
>
> You discover experimental bias by having peer reviewed journals. By
> having your findings verified (or falsified) by other scientists
> around the world.
Which is (you guessed it), intersubjectivity.
> Even then the experimental bias isn't detected. In
> that case in a few years when new techniques are found you discover
> that the old experiment was mistaken and you revise your results.
> Just because your experiment was wrong, does not change existence.
Indeed.
> A chair is a chair, no matter what you think of it. A light is a
> light, even if it ends up that they don't exist in "quanta" and in the
> years to come we discover its something else entirely, it doesn't mean
> that light itself has up and changed from being a discrete quanta.
You're still putting the cart before the horse. 'Chair' is a
definition. The object is what it is. We can (and do) change our
_definition_ of what it is according to circumstances and our increase
in knowledge.
[snip]
> >All right, then. Please explain what kind of test you would perform to
> >falsify Ayn Rand's claim that property rights are fundamental to all
> >other rights.
>
> Why would I? I have seen what not having property rights does to the
> rights of human beings.
If you can't devise a test that would falsify the statement, you're in
effect stating that _nothing_ will change your mind about it. In other
words, you're accepting it on faith.
Since I pay 70% taxes (direct and indirect), by your definition my
property rights are severely limited. What has that done to my rights?
> By my knowledge it is correct. If someone
> smarter than me can suggest something, I am more than willing to take
> a look at it. So far I haven't found any good arguments.
Well, going by what you state above, there isn't any argument you would
accept. Again, what test would you devise that could falsify Rand's
statement on property rights as fundamental?
> Intersubjectivity sounds like a load of crap to me.
You know what? You just threw the entire scientific method out of the
window.
> >> >> If an essentialist says the essence of a chair (for the sake of
> >> >> argument) is "A piece of furniture for one person to sit on", when the
> >> >> chair becomes firewood, it no longer a concrete of the
> >> >> abstraction/concept of that definition of a chair. It fits the
> >> >> definition of "fuel" pretty well though.
> >> >
> >> >Then how can a definition be objective if the same object is one man's
> >> >chair and another man's fuel?
> >>
> >> Because in the process of converting the chair into the fuel, it
> >> changes "essence".
> >
> >You mean, like the host becomes the body of Christ and the wine becomes
> >the blood of Christ in the miracle of the transubstantiation?
>
> "like" that. But I would not suggest that wine is the blood of christ.
I thought so. :-)
The RCC Cathechism says something like, "In the miracle of
transubstantiation, the host and the wine _become_ the body and blood
of Christ in their essence. Nothing is left of the host and the wine,
except their substance..." Makes perfect sense in an essentialist
framework: a string of non-falsifiable statements that you are asked to
accept on faith.
> >> It is no longer (by your definition) a peice of furniture one person
> >> sits on. It is "something that is used to produce energy".
> >>
> >> <snipped>
> >
> >How do you determine when an object 'changes essence'?
>
> When you change your definition of what it is.
>
> A chair on the fireplace being burnt could be called a "burning
> chair". It might also be termed fuel. At about that stage you might
> want to start calling it "firewood".
But that's not essentialism at all! That's nominalism! You're changing
your definition _based on its usefulness_! Bravo!
Ah, but how can you _tell_ when they no longer apply? The nominalist
would say "when a conclusion drawn from the definitions fails the
falsification test". The essentialist _has_ no such test. Wherefrom we
get all these beautiful chains of reasoning that lead to absurdities.
> >> >> >> (warning, attribute list for building not accurate for outside useage
> >> >> >> :)
> >> >> >
> >> >> >You could continue the list to exclude and include things, but what's
> >> >> >the point?
> >> >>
> >> >> Then, merely, roof would not be an attribute used to classify a
> >> >> building. Or it could belong to a specific class of buildings...
> >> >> namely "roofless sports stadiums".
> >> >
> >> >Sure you could, but what would be the point? Would it teach us anything
> >> >we don't know about buildings? Help us build better ones?
> >>
> >> No. But when you convert the analogy over to philosophy, it is much
> >> more important to have a definition of "relativism" or "egoism".
> >>
> >> Furthermore, I think that defining terms properly, like Essentialism,
> >> can help us to "build better ones".
> >
> >What do _you_ mean by "defining terms properly"?
>
> Well, when you define essentialism with specific attributes so a
> correct understanding of what Essentialism ACTUALLY is, then you can
> go about building better ones.
Correct by what standard?
> >[snip]
> >
> >> >Nope. You missed the bit about discussion and evaluation: that's the
> >> >crux of it. We take something we have, we try to understand it, and we
> >> >try to make it better.
> >>
> >> Try to make it better? By what standard?
> >
> ><sigh>
> >
> >By the standard of whatever consensus we have arrived at through the
> >application of reason, i.e., argument and experience.
>
> Why is "concensus" a good thing. By what standard?
Ask the scientist who reads Nature. If many reasonable people agree
about something, isn't it more likely to be correct?
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
[snip]
> > > > Then how are they objective?
> > >
> > > How are they not objective?
> > >
> > > Example (from Rand) table: A man-made object consisting of a flat, level
> > > surface and support(s), intended to support other, smaller objects.
> > >
> > > So how would this be nonobjective?
> >
> > Is an overturned crate a table, if you use it to support smaller
> > objects? How about a tree-stump you use for a picnic table in the
> > forest? How about a water table?
>
> By her definition, none of the above. The crate is closest, but was it
> designed to support objects in that way? And if it were a table, why
> would this invalidate anything? Why couldn't something be both a table
> and a crate?
Exactly. However, if two people can reasonably consider the same object
to be two different things, why would you call the definitions
'objective'?
> Also, for Rand, what we define are not words but concepts, so the use of
> the word "table" as in "water table" and "sewing table" is an
> equivocation, but not an equiconception.
OK.
[snip]
> > > A question: Are you treating objectivity as the same as absoluteness?
> >
> > No, although I consider the concepts related. By 'objective' I
> > understand 'same for everyone,' 'independent of the observer'. In
>
> But is "independent of observer" the same as "same for everyone"?
I don't know. Is it?
> > ethics, I understand that 'objective' would mean 'universally
> > applicable, same for everyone'. By 'absolute' I understand 'not
> > relative,' 'binary rather than graded'. In ethics, this would mean
> > something like 'unequivocally good (bad), irrespective of the
> > situation'.
> >
> > > For example, the Lorentz effects in special relativity are objective, i.
> > > e., they depend on reference frames, and not observers per se. But those
> > > effects aren't absolute, as they are frame dependent.
> >
> > I'm afraid that example goes over my head.
>
> According to special relativity, if you move fast relative to an object,
> the object will appear to contract along the direction of your motion.
> Now this effect could be detected photographically, so it's objective.
OK. I think that there you use a slightly different definition of
'objective' than what would be applicable in, say, social philosophy or
ethics: you have a precise definition of 'observer' and 'point of
view'. For an observer inside the object there would appear to be no
contraction, whereas for an outside observer there would be. I don't
think this example is very relevant. After all, we're not looking for
the 'essence' of 'objective'. Are we?
/Petteri
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
Well, in that case I think there's even less reason to consider any of
the definitions 'objective'. Words mean whatever we decide they mean,
no? In my world-view, the only thing that is 'objective' is reality.
Our perceptions of reality are always subjective. If we want to arrive
at a more precise understanding of reality, the best we can do is
compare our experiences, and assume that where they are congruent they
are more likely to reflect reality accurately. This, of course,
includes using telescopes, electron microscopes, the electron
diffraction effect measurement, and whatnot.
Adrian
<spamyy2b...@iclinux.com.remove.the.spam> wrote:
>adri...@hotmail.com (Adrian) wrote in news:3c3594c6.9274846@news-
>server.nc.rr.com:
>
>> On Fri, 04 Jan 2002 16:54:29 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
>> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>...
>
>>I will also point out here that your definition of
>> "nominalist" is not the common use of the term in philosophical
>> circles. The Scholastics, for instance, invented nominalism which is
>> generally used to refer to the view that universals don't exist and
>> are just names (hence the term) for classes of particulars. This
>> general view is associated not with Plato and extreme forms of
>> Idealism (which hold the opposite view, called naive realism, that
>> universals are all that exist) or with extremely "objectivist"
>> philosophies. Rather, nominalism is much more associated with
>> skepticism and empiricism and so the moral relativism that you
>> (wrongly in my opinion) attribute to your definition of it.
>
>I'm confused in your reply; even though Petteri followed up and seemed to
>be backing off, your _clarification_ of what nominalism really means as
>opposed to Petteri's definition, at least to me, seems to be the same exact
>thing!
>
>IOW, from Petterri's original post in this thread:
>P>The nominalist, on the other hand, proceeds from the assumption that
>P>precise and immutable definitions are impossible to find. Instead, s/he
>P>attempts to define concepts by pointing at things and stating whether
>P>they do or do not match the concept under discussion, and leaves open
>P>the possibility of modifying, refining, or clarifying the definitions
>P>if they turn out to be unworkable. "A god is a supernatural entity like
>P>Zeus, Thor, and Yahweh, but not like Santa Claus, leprechauns, or
>P>ghosts," s/he might answer.
>
>From this, I gather that nominalists don't define things precisely and
>allow instances to fit the definition, but rather they vaguely classify
>certain instances under the same umbrella. From your definition, I gather
>the same exact thing. My experiences with the terms "nominalism" and
>"essentialism" stem from clarifications given to me via Objectivists; and
>although Objectivists are strange, I'm intrigued about the definitions as
>others would lay it out. Hence, my dilemma... I'm not quite sure what
>you're objecting to and what Petterri seems to be considering retracting.
>
>Or are you just objecting to the loose categorizations of other schools of
>thought as "essentialist" or "nominalist" approaches?
>
Well, this whole thing is evidently midthread. I am interested in
jumping in so I don't know what the real context of everything being
said is. (It appeared as its own thread on my reader even though it
is apparently midstream.)
With that said, then, if you want to know what nominalism is according
to the generally accepted history of ideas, it refers to a position
concerning the status of universals. Originally, Plato had taken an
extreme realist position on the matter deciding that universals are
what is truly real. Ockham took the opposite view that universals are
not real at all. Abelard was a conceptualist which is somewhere
inbetween the two. All of this really has little to do with tolerance
for lack of definitions.
But, going back to the main criticism I have about the issue of
tolerating a lack of definitions, I say that the ones that *don't*
tolerate a lack of well established and unequivocal definitions are
the ones that tend to fall in the camp of positivist/skeptic/moral
relativist. The ones that can debate the definitions along with
everythig else are the ones that are antipostivist/objective/moral
objectivist (not Objectivist, but objectivist). So, most philosophers
are okay with this handicap, but the more positivistic ones (i.e.
those that admire science) and scientists tend to look on such a thing
as more like Voodoo than any kind of objective pursuit of knowledge.
That is where the skepticism comes in. Because of the lack of
definitions those that require them see the whole discussion as
illegitimate and so doubt the possibility of any meaningful pursuit of
knowledge taking place. Generally, this sort sticks to math and
science and sees the latter as where real knowledge takes place (hence
the empiricism).
The broad alternative is to not admire science so much and return to
philosophy as a source of knowledge. In this case, it is usually
difficult to be an empiricist since most of philosophy is performed
independently of any experiments. And so, you tend to hold the view
that there is significant knowledge to be had in pure a priori
reasoning. Indeed, it would be hard to turn to philosophy as a source
of knowledge with the existence of science and not hold these views or
nonempiricism and moral statements being objectively true or false.
Don't get me wrong, though, I am not saying that it isn't possible to
mix and match -- just describing the general trend.
In either case, I put those demanding widely agreed to definitions and
nominalists (those that believe universals don't exist) in the same
camp with moral relativists. I put those that hold the definitions to
be as negotiable/debatable as anything else together with rationalists
and moral objectivists.
Adrian
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>In article <3c3594c6...@news-server.nc.rr.com>, Adrian
><adri...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
-snip-
>>
>> Based on your definitions of "essentialism" and "nominalism", this is
>> completely false. An essentialist would be quick to conclude that
>> there is no essential definition of "rights" and so it is a bogus
>> subject to discuss.
>
>Hm. This doesn't jibe with my experience. I wonder what some of the
>resident essentialists have to say about this; at least Don Kresch
>seems to have a definition of rights that is not based on observing
>existing societies. Don?
>
Well, looking to the broader community of philosophers, those that
demand definitions first and are unwiling to include them as part of a
philosophical discussion fit this trend. The demand for definition
comes for science oriented, skeptical, and empirically minded folks.
-snip-
>
>> A nominalist (as you are defining it), on the other hand, wouldn't be
>> so bothered by the lack of a clear cut definition of "rights" and
>> would discuss them anyway. They would have no problem coming to
>> conclusions that (modulo some more or less indisputable foundational
>> assumptions) are "correct" and treat these conclusions like any other
>> "true" statement. I will also point out here that your definition of
>> "nominalist" is not the common use of the term in philosophical
>> circles. The Scholastics, for instance, invented nominalism which is
>> generally used to refer to the view that universals don't exist and
>> are just names (hence the term) for classes of particulars. This
>> general view is associated not with Plato and extreme forms of
>> Idealism (which hold the opposite view, called naive realism, that
>> universals are all that exist) or with extremely "objectivist"
>> philosophies. Rather, nominalism is much more associated with
>> skepticism and empiricism and so the moral relativism that you
>> (wrongly in my opinion) attribute to your definition of it.
>
>Hm. Popper seems to disagree with you, or I may have misread him.
>
I think I see where you are getting your terms from:
"From Plato until today, most philosophers have either been
nominalists or else what I have called essentialists."
-- Poper, _Objective Knowledge_, p.123
What exactly essentialism, entails or not is not a simple question.
It is Popper's idea, so it requires a lengthy discussion to identify
and establish. However, such is not the case for nominalism which is
a common term among philosophers and is generally defined as I have
done so above. Also, it is a simple matter of fact as to what
philosophical world views have been associated with it through history
and what the origin of the idea is.
"English scholastic William of Ockham (d. 1347) takes an alternative
approach called nominalism. Nominalism maintains that abstract objects
do not exist in any real sense, but are simply general words that we
apply to a collection of things."
-- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
As for the relationship of nominalism to other ideas like skepticism
or empiricism and postivism (the philosophical admiration of science),
that is a bit beyond this remark. But, Popper cannot deny the
historical connection. It is again a simple matter of fact. For
instance, were the British Empiricists (e.g. Locke, Berkeley, Hume)
nominalist or essentialist? What is the connection between empiricism
and positivism? And so on...
>> In other words, the requirement of a well established definition is
>> associated with "nominalism" as it is commonly used by philosophers,
>> skepticism, empiricism, and a strong focus on science as the primary
>> (or even only) source of genuine knowledge. The looseness with
>> definitions (and so the willingness to just add them to the debate
>> rather than insisting on discussing only them before you can even
>> start the debate) is associated with realism, objectivism,
> ^^^^^^^^^^^
>
>This, again, does not fit with my experiences of talking with
>objectivists.
>
Incidentally, I am not talking about Objectivists(with capital "o"),
as in the followers of Ayn Rand. I am just saying that those that
tend to hold that philsoophical issues are objective and that are not
skeptics -- doubting the possibility of knowledge with regard to
philosophical issues. Some philosophers have doubted the possibility
of knowledge of some things and others have doubt such a possibility
with other things. Some have doubted such a possibility altogether.
If we look back at recent history and divide philosophers into
followers of Kant or followers of Hume, then we get that out of the
two Hume was
Nominalist,
Empiricist/Positivist,
Skeptical,
Relative
and Kant was
Realist,
Rationalist (though really neither)/Philosophical,
Objective,
Absolute/Universal
That is why I am associating nominalism with what I do.
-snip-
Adrian
<spamyy2b...@iclinux.com.remove.the.spam> wrote:
>adri...@hotmail.com (Adrian) wrote in news:3c3594c6.9274846@news-
>server.nc.rr.com:
>
>> On Fri, 04 Jan 2002 16:54:29 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
>> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>...
>
>>I will also point out here that your definition of
>> "nominalist" is not the common use of the term in philosophical
>> circles. The Scholastics, for instance, invented nominalism which is
>> generally used to refer to the view that universals don't exist and
>> are just names (hence the term) for classes of particulars. This
>> general view is associated not with Plato and extreme forms of
>> Idealism (which hold the opposite view, called naive realism, that
>> universals are all that exist) or with extremely "objectivist"
>> philosophies. Rather, nominalism is much more associated with
>> skepticism and empiricism and so the moral relativism that you
>> (wrongly in my opinion) attribute to your definition of it.
>
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>In article <obsh3uk8u48bhvn17...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
>
>> On Sun, 06 Jan 2002 17:39:40 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
>> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
>>
>> >In article <5gng3ucdii24vhofr...@4ax.com>, AndrewC wrote:
>> >[snip]
>> >
<snip>
>> >> >> If an essentialist says the essence of a chair (for the sake of
>> >> >> argument) is "A piece of furniture for one person to sit on", when the
>> >> >> chair becomes firewood, it no longer a concrete of the
>> >> >> abstraction/concept of that definition of a chair. It fits the
>> >> >> definition of "fuel" pretty well though.
>> >> >
>> >> >Then how can a definition be objective if the same object is one man's
>> >> >chair and another man's fuel?
>> >>
>> >> Because in the process of converting the chair into the fuel, it
>> >> changes "essence".
>> >
>> >You mean, like the host becomes the body of Christ and the wine becomes
>> >the blood of Christ in the miracle of the transubstantiation?
>>
>> "like" that. But I would not suggest that wine is the blood of christ.
>
>I thought so. :-)
>
>The RCC Cathechism says something like, "In the miracle of
>transubstantiation, the host and the wine _become_ the body and blood
>of Christ in their essence. Nothing is left of the host and the wine,
>except their substance..." Makes perfect sense in an essentialist
>framework: a string of non-falsifiable statements that you are asked to
>accept on faith.
Okay. I am not longer responding to you .
<snip>
Colin Day
But you have yet to say why an object's falling under more than one term
makes the definitions of those terms nonobjective.
>
> /Petteri
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C3925E1...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> [snip]
>
> > > > > Then how are they objective?
> > > >
> > > > How are they not objective?
> > > >
> > > > Example (from Rand) table: A man-made object consisting of a flat, level
> > > > surface and support(s), intended to support other, smaller objects.
> > > >
> > > > So how would this be nonobjective?
> > >
> > > Is an overturned crate a table, if you use it to support smaller
> > > objects? How about a tree-stump you use for a picnic table in the
> > > forest? How about a water table?
> >
> > By her definition, none of the above. The crate is closest, but was it
> > designed to support objects in that way? And if it were a table, why
> > would this invalidate anything? Why couldn't something be both a table
> > and a crate?
>
> Exactly. However, if two people can reasonably consider the same object
> to be two different things, why would you call the definitions
> 'objective'?
But the object isn't two different things, it's just one thing that is
subsumed under two different concepts. Why can't teo different concepts
share common members?
Not inside and outside, but at relative rest and relative motion.
Also, I am reading you as saying that if any part of value judgments is
arbitrary, than such judgments are nonobjective. I would take the
opposite view, that if any part of a value judgment can be objective,
then ethical objectivity is possible.
>
> /Petteri
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C3905A9...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> [snip]
>
> > > > Again, this is nor far from what Rand herself said, but she had
> > > > different standards of usefulness. For example, how do the nominalists
> > > > deal with higher-order classification?
> > >
> > > Could you clarify what you mean by higher-order classification? I'm not
> >
> > Think about biological classification, where we sort individuals into
> > species, species into genera, genera into orders? classes? and so on.
>
> Biologists _are_ nominalists. I think you just answered your question.
> :-)
Then again, Rand would not be an essentialist by that use of the term.
>
> > > sure I understood the question. However, assuming I do understand you
> > > correctly, I'd say that the nominalist would consider conclusions drawn
> > > from higher-order classifications as hypotheses which need to be (a)
> > > falsifiable and (b) pass whatever tests can be devised to falsify them.
> > > The essentialist, OTOH, would consider such falsification unnecessary.
> >
> > Rand would say that difficulties in higher-order classification can be
> > taken as justification against the lower-level classification. That is,
> > if a system of classification is not extensible, and a competing system
> > is, then the extensibility of the second system makes it preferable to
> > the first system, other things being the same.
> >
> > I suspect that some your issues with objectivists may involve
> > differences over the use of the terms "essentialist" and "nominalist".
>
> It's possible.
>
> Could you provide a concrete example? I have a feeling that
> extensibility might be desirable, but to the nominalist, explanatory
> power is what counts.
>
> For example, if I classify something as a vertebrate based on, say,
> morphological criteria, I can make a prediction that I will find
> certain things if I look at the genes. If I classify something by, say,
> color, I can't know what to expect when I look at its other attributes.
>
Then Rand would say that "vertebrate" is a better means of classifying
organism than by color. Part of Rand's objection to what she termed
nominalism was that nominalists would view the two criteria (vertebrate,
color) as equally arbitrary. I suspect that you might not accept her use
of the term "nominalism".
And how has capitalism been reformed? Naive me, I thought that most
people still got paychecks from employers.
(Not trying to defend Marx so much as playing Devil's Advocate).
>
> > Yes, many Marxists (and ideologists of other stripes) seem unwilling to
> > reject theories that deviate wildly from reality. However, this is a
> > problem of using theories as means of cognition, that we can extend the
> > depth and breadth of our cognition, while risking the loss of detail.
>
> And this is where intersubjectivity, experience, and argument come in.
>
> > How much do we hold onto a relatively successful theory that fails to
> > account for certain details?
>
> Until a better theory is devised, that is, one that explains more of
> the phenomena while conflicting with fewer, I don't see any reason to
> reject it.
> [snip]
>
> > > Then those who do not want ceaseless violence should try to (1)
> > > convince them that they are wrong or, failing that (2) arrange to
> > > protect themselves against that violence.
> >
> > But according to you, (1) is impossible, since all notion of right and
> > wrong is subjective.
>
> Not subjective. Intersubjective, and a subject that is possible to
> scrutinize rationally. Unless you _actually_ like pain, insecurity, and
> death, I can make a very good argument that ceaseless violence is a bad
> policy. Fortunately for us, such people are few.
>
But some them of them had some success in the previous century. Besides,
they might like other people's pain, insecurity, and death.
> > Now (2) is better, but you might outnumbered, and
> > it's more effective in terms of one's own morale to know that the enemy
> > is wrong, and not merely feel it.
>
> Well, if it makes you feel any better, I both feel and have an
> intellectual certainty that my basis for ethics is a good one. However,
> I'm willing to reject it if you can convince me that another one is
> even better. :-)
>
> > > Again, your question seems slightly pointless. The point with the
> > > nominalist method is that we don't live in a vacuum. We already _have_
> > > societies and systems of ethics. Instead of trying to throw them out
> > > and build a new one from scratch, we should do what science and
> > > technology do: study them and attempt to improve them.
> >
> > But what would constitute an improvement? What is the standard by which
> > you would judge changes?
>
> AndrewC already asked this one. I'd start by listing quantifiable
> things which I think were indicative of a 'good' society, asking people
> within these societies whether or not they think they're good
> indicators, and eventually arrive at some kind of consensus about them.
> Then I'd look at these quantities and compare societies. These
> quantities could be stuff like incarceration rate, literacy rate,
> distribution of income, poverty rate, abortion rate, suicide rate, and
> so on.
>
I might agree that a lower incarceration rate is better than a higher
one, but again, why? The same for the other criteria.
> > You'll find that
> > > within such societies, whether local or global in scope, there is a
> > > great deal of intersubjective consensus on a great number of subjects.
> > > Things like "fairness" are fairly universal concepts.
> >
> > But what if the consensus is wrong?
>
> By what standard?
Failure to identify reality, and if there is no "reality" of such
issues, then why should we have any ethics at all?
> > > However, I think the problem with the arsenic comparison is that unlike
> > > poisoning, which is diagnosable and observable, ethics depend largely
> > > on value judgements, and value judgements necessarily have a large
> > > subjective component.
> >
> > Certainly, many of our value judgments include a subjective/emotional
> > response (certainly my value judgment of Elizabeth Hurley naked in my
> > bed would :-) ), however, this response is not the justification of the
> > value.
>
> No. However, through discussion, we can arrive at more general
> standards we can use to devise systems of ethics. For example, we can
> examine our 'moral sense' in certain situations and try think _why_ we
> feel action A is 'right' and action B 'wrong'. Then we can discuss it.
> [snip]
>
But if there cannot be an objective basis for such a feeling, then what
would this discussion accomplish?
> > > I think any common ground is important. For example, you could carry a
> > > constructive discussion with an Islamic fundamentalist if he accepts
> > > the following propositions (which most of them do):
> > >
> > > (1) The laws in the shari'a can be divided into two groups: those
> > > which deal with worship, and those that deal with society.
> > >
> > > (2) The laws in the first group only apply to Muslims, and they
> > > should be followed by them to the letter.
> >
> > But should they be Muslims in the first place?
>
> That's a moot point, since I doubt you'll be able to deconvert them.
>
But even if I can't convert them, it does not moot the point. Those
Muslims could choose, so it an ethical matter.
> > > (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> > > (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
> > >
> > > (4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
> > > understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
> >
> > And what is reason?
>
> Actually, the Muslim understands by 'reason' very much the same thing
> as the Westerner does. Remember, they studied Plato and Aristotle when
> we were dying of horrible diseases or mouthing Latin phrases we
> couldn't understand.
>
I suspect they're not the same Muslims, as I suspect that Avicenna and
Averroes would not crash airplanes into skyscrapers.
But I was asking about *your* use the term "reason".
> > > Hey presto, we've established a common epistemology good enough to
> > > discuss how to organize society with a member of a group commonly
> > > considered to be among the most inflexible around today. He doesn't
> > > need to accept my "fundamental" epistemology (that laws are a matter of
> > > social convention and intersubjective agreement) any more than I need
> > > to accept his fundamental epistemology that laws are ordained by God
> > > and written down in the Qur'an and the ha'adith.
> > >
> > > For example, we could make the following argument (I didn't make this
> > > one up, I heard an Islamic scholar make it): "The Qur'an says that a
> > > male descendant is entitled to twice the share of a female descendant
> > > in inheritance. The _hikmat_ behind this rule is that, as the Qur'an
> > > also says, the male is responsible for maintaining his sisters and
> > > female cousins at the same standard of living as himself, while the
> > > female has no such obligation. If the male should refuse this
> > > obligation, the _hikmat_ has changed, and he should no longer be
> > > accorded a larger share in the inheritance."
> >
> > Let me get back on this.
>
> I'll be looking forward to it.
>
> [sigsnip]
>
> /Petteri
Colin Day
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C391553...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> >
> > >
> > > > > > Or its ideological equivalent,
> > > > > > religious fundamentalism?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > And by what means would we arrive at a consensus?
> > > > >
> > > > > Popper proposes the critical, rational method. He argues that (1) it is
> > > > > accessible to everyone and (2) has been empirically shown to yield good
> > > > > results. I see no reason to disagree with him.
> > > >
> > > > What examples does he provide?
> > >
> > > Science and technology. They're a product of the nominalist method.
> >
> > But scientist achieve consensus not because they view consensus as a
> > goal, but because they deal with objective facts. How can one achieve
> > consesnsus about intersubjective tastes?
>
> Ah, but the question is, _how_ do they arrive at this consensus?
No, the question is: how do they cognize reality? Once you do that,
achieving a consensus is pretty easy (at least in the hard sciences).
> Granted, their position is easier than that of the 'ethicist' or
> 'social engineer', because nature behaves more predictably than people.
> However, I think their method -- devising experiments, discussing them
> to find flaws, repeating them, formulating hypotheses based on them,
> testing the hypotheses with yet more experiment, observation, and
> discussion, and devising theories based on the tested hypotheses can
> also be used for society. The only difference is that the margin of
> uncertainty is far bigger.
I agree that sociologists could proceed in this way, but how would one
derive ethics from observations of behavior?
> [snip]
>
> > > I think any common ground is important. For example, you could carry a
> > > constructive discussion with an Islamic fundamentalist if he accepts
> > > the following propositions (which most of them do):
> > >
> > > (1) The laws in the shari'a can be divided into two groups: those
> > > which deal with worship, and those that deal with society.
> > >
> > > (2) The laws in the first group only apply to Muslims, and they
> > > should be followed by them to the letter.
> > >
> > > (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> > > (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
> >
> > But wouldn't the reason or basis then be objective?
>
> Actually, no: it depends on circumstances.
>
Then is it a reason in the first place?
Rand once wrote to one of her acquaintances who was getting a divorce.
Rand told her that even if she got enough alimony to live on, that she
should get a job. Not because she needed the money, but because she
needed something to do with mind. For Rand, a productive career (or some
other extended, serious pursuit) was good for one's psychology, because
it helped in integrating one's goals and actions over one's life.
> (The Muslim scholar above would probably have pointed out that the
> woman actually had the _better_ deal, since she did get one half the
> inheritance with (usually) much less than half the economic
> obligations: she would have both security, since her brothers and male
> cousins are obligated to look to her needs, and freedom, since she has
> her half-share to dispose of as she wished.)
>
> > > See where I'm going?
> > >
> > > /Petteri
> > >
> > > If we agree on this, we can go on to discuss the _hikmat_ behi
> >
> > What's the _hikmat_ for female genital mutilation? Or is FGM not a
> > _hikmat_?
>
> FGM is neither in the Qur'an nor the ha'adith. It's a pre-Islamic
> custom that has persisted to these days, like the so-called 'murders of
> honor' and similar barbarities. Many Muslim scholars condemn it.
> (Personally, I think it's a scandal that _all_ Muslim scholars don't
> condemn it: they should know better!)
Perhaps giving the potential victims of FGM fully loaded AK-47's would
have more of an effect :-).
>
> I don't think a discussion on Islamic jurisprudence is very relevant
> here, by the way: I merely used it as an example to demonstrate how it
> is possible to establish enough of a common epistemological basis for a
> meaningful dialogue with someone whose _fundamental_ epistemology you
> entirely disagree with.
>
A meaningful dialogue, perhaps (meaningful in the sense that all sides
know each other's positions). But a dialog that achieves agreement?
Colin Day
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C391C6D...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> [sense]
>
> > > > Is any action based on an
> > > > internalized rule of conduct that governs social behavior moral?
> > >
> > > This sounds a bit tricky: you aren't using two conflicting definitions
> > > of "moral" here, by any chance? That is "moral" in the sense of
> > > "conforming to a system of morality" and "moral" in the sense of
> > > "conforming to _my_ (or, 'some objective') system of morality"?
> >
> > The former, of course.
>
> Well, in that case, certainly, don't you think? In my understanding
> it's even tautological.
Boo!! Rand would agree with you. Of course people act on some (usually
implicit) morality. I was thinking about somewhere between your two
choices, i. e. people who have an explicit morality, whether it was
correct or incorrect.
>
> > >
> > > > And
> > > > given a choice of rules to internalize, which one(s) should we select?
> > >
> > > Do we _have_ a choice? The system of morals that we have internalized
> > > is one we've arrived at through our upbringing. I _couldn't_ select,
> > > say, the ethics system proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood even if I
> > > wanted to.
> >
> > Why not? True, the ethics in which one is brought up is often difficult
> > to reject (which is why religion is still here). But many atheists in
> > this newsgroup were brought up as theists (I was), so it is possible.
>
> I'm sorry, I may have been unclear. I think that we are incapable of
> rejecting one system of morality and adopting another one wholesale.
> However, what we _can_ do is modify our system of morality based on
> ethical reasoning. In my view, we have a strong moral imperative to
> _do_ so.
>
> I think that many of the ex-theists in alt.atheism and elsewhere have
> changed their _epistemology_ much more than their system of morality.
> Christians teach their children "do not steal". So would I. They teach
> "do not kill". So would I. They teach, "do not cheat". So would I. The
> main difference is in the way a Christian would answer the inevitable
> "Why?".
But then the differences among most moralities is so small that there
wouldn't be much to change?
>
> > And if we don't have a choice, then would a housebroken puppy have
> > internalized a rule of conduct that governs its social behavior, i. e.,
> > scratch at the door if I need to poop?
>
> I'm sorry, could you rephrase that? I don't understand.
You said that ethics dealt with internalized rules that govern social
behavior (why the word "social"?). But even certain non-human animals
have such rules, especially those that lives in large groups.
>
> > > However, I _can_ subject my system of morals to intelligent scrutiny,
> > > discuss it with other people, and maybe arrive at a decision to change
> > > something. In this way, we can _improve_ our existing systems of
> >
> > But "improve" presupposes some standard. And how does one apply
> > "intelligent scrutiny" to subjective preferences?
>
> Through intersubjective dialogue. For example, I can say "It makes
> sense to me to use the following statement as a yardstick to compare
But is this sense just a subjective preference? If so, what makes it
sensible? And if not , then isn't that sense objective?
> ethical systems: 'An ethical imperative should be retained only if it
> increases happiness and decreases misery for the maximum number of
> people.'
Even if one could measure happiness/misery well enough to implement
this, why would people be obligated to act in such a way?
What do you think?" Even if we can't agree _that_ deeply, we
> can discuss individual imperatives, explaining _why_ we feel they
> should be retained. If we can find _some_ common ground in the
> epistemological basis, we can go places.
>
But the justification for particular imperatives may depend on other
imperatives. And again, what is an epistemological basis for a
subjective value judgment. The mere use of epistemology presupposes that
some objectivity is possible.
The desert island example: you say that ethics doesn't make sense in
that context, whereas I would say that one could exercise volition in
such a condition so that ethics does apply.
> /Petteri
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day
Joshua Lusion I
>> As for the other point here, sometimes it is prudent to consider a
>> treatment of triangles in such a way that you have "collinear
>> triangles". Eg, it doesn't mess up projections at all, and if you're
>> projecting a triangle and it becomes collinear, it may be more
>> helpfull to still think of it as a triangle.
>
> Do theorems of projective geometry still hold for such triangles?
Yes, so long as your theorems allow for such triangles :). Where your
theorems differ, you can simply amend the "classical" concept of triangles
and talk about "noncolinear triangles". But in standard treatments of
geometry, you call such things "a point on a line segment" (or occasionally
"a line segment", depending on how it projects).
Example: The triangular inequality states that in a triangle ABC, AB+BC is
greater than AC. If you allow "collinear triangles", you have to ammend
this and say that it is AB+BC<=AC.
Perhaps a more interesting way to approach this is to just temporarily
consider yourself ignorant of a particular treatment of such triangles. In
such a case, perhaps you're programming a 3-D graphics engine, and you want
to create a class representing the 2-D projected coordinates of triangles.
You know, because of the limitations of computers, and the precise angles
things will wind up as occasionally, that there are going to be 3-D
projections that are collinear. You don't want your 3-D engine to crash
beforehand. And you want your engine to be fast and generic.
One approach, then, to begin programming such an engine, would be to just
start out and call all projections of triangles "triangles". Then you ask
yourself later what the border cases are for such projections, and what the
consequences are, exactly. Do you ever have to divide by 0? Will you get
overflows? Do you have to treat collinear triangles as special cases?
This isn't a great example because at least we can immediately see that the
only different case wrt the projections is that you can have a collinear
triangle. There may be more complex examples where you don't know exactly
what the consequences are of just bending concept X and borrowing it to fit
the space Y is. It may be that you find the special cases later on, and
that you have to explore a little bit before you can define exactly what
you mean by an X, but you could still have some idea of what you want X to
mean in such cases.
I think inexact areas like morality are like this more often--we tend to
have more of an idea of what being moral is supposed to be like than we do
a definition of being moral, and we actually tend to argue, debate, and
work out definitions that fit what our idea of being moral is.
Occasionally we may even come up with what we think are great definitions,
then someone would present this hypothetical situation to us that makes
something seem atrocious that we would define as moral. In such cases, we
have some vague idea of what we're talking about, but we're not quite sure
what a good definition would be.
Programming in general (on small levels) might be a better example. When
you're coding, sometimes it's better to just sit down with a vague idea of
what you want to do, and some vague ideas of what classes represent. Then
you imagine how the classes may interact, possibly ignoring minor details
and such, and then you begin programming the overall design. As you
program, you realize more things about your classes, and it may occur to
you that if you allow this class to also represent this type of thing, it
would be more elegant--and if you let this class only represent this
particular flavor, it would work better because you could come up with
other flavors and structure them this way, etc. In other words, you sit
down and play around with things with just an idea of what the classes do,
and work on exact definitions later as you go.
--
>><>>><>>><><>><><><>> | Joshua Lusion I
>><><><>><>>>>><><><>> | Welcome to the world of freethought
>><>>><>>><><>>><><>>> | aa #272
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> > In article <3C3905A9...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> > <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> > [snip]
> >
> > > > > Again, this is nor far from what Rand herself said, but she had
> > > > > different standards of usefulness. For example, how do the nominalists
> > > > > deal with higher-order classification?
> > > >
> > > > Could you clarify what you mean by higher-order classification? I'm not
> > >
> > > Think about biological classification, where we sort individuals into
> > > species, species into genera, genera into orders? classes? and so on.
> >
> > Biologists _are_ nominalists. I think you just answered your question.
> > :-)
>
> Then again, Rand would not be an essentialist by that use of the term.
Come to think of it, you'd probably be hard pressed to find anyone who
used _only_ essentialist thinking. Plato, I think, comes the closest.
However, the idea behind nominalism is to use the same criteria --
falsifiability, intersubjectivity, argument, experience -- on _all_ of
the thinking. You can't be 'somewhat nominalist' any more than you can
be 'slightly pregnant'. [Note: context is very important here; a person
can be, say, a devout Catholic and believer in the transubstantiation,
and thereby an essentialist, yet write a paper on physics where the
arguments are thoroughly nominalist. His religious beliefs should in no
way lessen the value of his paper on physics. If he used St. Augustine
to justify his conclusions in the paper, however, it would be another
story.]
Well, it's certainly not what I mean by nominalism. If you like, we can
call my version pnominalism. If we go on that tack, this conversation
will become awfully hard to follow, though...
(1) Marx predicted that wealth would be concentrated in ever fewer
hands, while the number of proletarians living at the subsistence level
would grow ever larger.
(2) When you look at England, Germany, France, or even the United
States today, you'll find that income differentials are drastically
smaller and the average proletarian's (i.e., wage-earner's) standard of
living is drastically higher.
(3) There has been no catastrophic collapse of capitalism in the
meantime.
Ergo, capitalism has been reformed to cure most of the immediate ills
Marx listed in e.g. the Communist manifesto.
I know, you could trot out the Leninist attempt at making Marx's
predictions conform to reality, or the later Maoist ones, but I think
they don't stand up very well either.
> > > Yes, many Marxists (and ideologists of other stripes) seem unwilling to
> > > reject theories that deviate wildly from reality. However, this is a
> > > problem of using theories as means of cognition, that we can extend the
> > > depth and breadth of our cognition, while risking the loss of detail.
> >
> > And this is where intersubjectivity, experience, and argument come in.
> >
>
>
>
> > > How much do we hold onto a relatively successful theory that fails to
> > > account for certain details?
> >
> > Until a better theory is devised, that is, one that explains more of
> > the phenomena while conflicting with fewer, I don't see any reason to
> > reject it.
> > [snip]
> >
> > > > Then those who do not want ceaseless violence should try to (1)
> > > > convince them that they are wrong or, failing that (2) arrange to
> > > > protect themselves against that violence.
> > >
> > > But according to you, (1) is impossible, since all notion of right and
> > > wrong is subjective.
> >
> > Not subjective. Intersubjective, and a subject that is possible to
> > scrutinize rationally. Unless you _actually_ like pain, insecurity, and
> > death, I can make a very good argument that ceaseless violence is a bad
> > policy. Fortunately for us, such people are few.
>
> But some them of them had some success in the previous century. Besides,
> they might like other people's pain, insecurity, and death.
>
We, however, have the benefit of experience. It's by no means
impossible that a democracy could disestablish itself in favor of a
totalitarian, aggressive regime. However, most democracies have proved
remarkably stable for the past 50 years or so. I think that if we
ensure that discontent can be addressed within the system rather than
out of it, we can maintain the system in the future as well.
Note also that last century's nasties didn't gain power by promising
pain, insecurity and death. They promised a bright future to a public
that felt massively aggrieved. If we can defuse such griefs before they
reach boiling point, I think we'll do OK.
> > > Now (2) is better, but you might outnumbered, and
> > > it's more effective in terms of one's own morale to know that the enemy
> > > is wrong, and not merely feel it.
> >
> > Well, if it makes you feel any better, I both feel and have an
> > intellectual certainty that my basis for ethics is a good one. However,
> > I'm willing to reject it if you can convince me that another one is
> > even better. :-)
> >
> > > > Again, your question seems slightly pointless. The point with the
> > > > nominalist method is that we don't live in a vacuum. We already _have_
> > > > societies and systems of ethics. Instead of trying to throw them out
> > > > and build a new one from scratch, we should do what science and
> > > > technology do: study them and attempt to improve them.
> > >
> > > But what would constitute an improvement? What is the standard by which
> > > you would judge changes?
> >
> > AndrewC already asked this one. I'd start by listing quantifiable
> > things which I think were indicative of a 'good' society, asking people
> > within these societies whether or not they think they're good
> > indicators, and eventually arrive at some kind of consensus about them.
> > Then I'd look at these quantities and compare societies. These
> > quantities could be stuff like incarceration rate, literacy rate,
> > distribution of income, poverty rate, abortion rate, suicide rate, and
> > so on.
> >
> I might agree that a lower incarceration rate is better than a higher
> one, but again, why? The same for the other criteria.
There is no 'why,' only agreement and observation. If you like, we
could poll people in different societies, asking how happy they feel
and why. We could factor this into our model.
Ah, sorry: I jumped the gun. My presupposition is that happiness is
good and misery is bad. Do you disagree? If you do, I'm afraid I'm out
of answers: I really can't get more 'objective' than that.
> > > You'll find that
> > > > within such societies, whether local or global in scope, there is a
> > > > great deal of intersubjective consensus on a great number of subjects.
> > > > Things like "fairness" are fairly universal concepts.
> > >
> > > But what if the consensus is wrong?
> >
> > By what standard?
>
> Failure to identify reality, and if there is no "reality" of such
> issues, then why should we have any ethics at all?
Ethics deals with interpersonal relations. What reality is there to
them besides people's experiences?
> > > > However, I think the problem with the arsenic comparison is that unlike
> > > > poisoning, which is diagnosable and observable, ethics depend largely
> > > > on value judgements, and value judgements necessarily have a large
> > > > subjective component.
> > >
> > > Certainly, many of our value judgments include a subjective/emotional
> > > response (certainly my value judgment of Elizabeth Hurley naked in my
> > > bed would :-) ), however, this response is not the justification of the
> > > value.
> >
> > No. However, through discussion, we can arrive at more general
> > standards we can use to devise systems of ethics. For example, we can
> > examine our 'moral sense' in certain situations and try think _why_ we
> > feel action A is 'right' and action B 'wrong'. Then we can discuss it.
> > [snip]
>
> But if there cannot be an objective basis for such a feeling, then what
> would this discussion accomplish?
At the least, it might help us negotiate a deal where we don't fly
airplanes at each other's buildings, shoot or starve each other's
children to death by gun and economic embargo, suicide-bomb each
others' teenagers to shreds, or bomb and bulldoze each other's houses
to rubble. Don't you think that would be worth something?
> > > > I think any common ground is important. For example, you could carry a
> > > > constructive discussion with an Islamic fundamentalist if he accepts
> > > > the following propositions (which most of them do):
> > > >
> > > > (1) The laws in the shari'a can be divided into two groups: those
> > > > which deal with worship, and those that deal with society.
> > > >
> > > > (2) The laws in the first group only apply to Muslims, and they
> > > > should be followed by them to the letter.
> > >
> > > But should they be Muslims in the first place?
> >
> > That's a moot point, since I doubt you'll be able to deconvert them.
>
> But even if I can't convert them, it does not moot the point. Those
> Muslims could choose, so it an ethical matter.
In _theory_ they could choose. In practice, there's not much of a
choice. If you insisted on deconversion as a precondition to dialogue,
you wouldn't get very far at all. If you were satisfied with some
common ground, you might be able to agree about any number of points of
practical importance -- and just might in a small way affect the world
in a direction where the Muslim might have _more_ of a choice in that
respect. If you insist on 'all or nothing', you'll most likely end up
with nothing.
> > > > (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> > > > (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
> > > >
> > > > (4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
> > > > understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
> > >
> > > And what is reason?
> >
> > Actually, the Muslim understands by 'reason' very much the same thing
> > as the Westerner does. Remember, they studied Plato and Aristotle when
> > we were dying of horrible diseases or mouthing Latin phrases we
> > couldn't understand.
> >
>
> I suspect they're not the same Muslims, as I suspect that Avicenna and
> Averroes would not crash airplanes into skyscrapers.
Funny. I was just thinking of the two Ibns. :-)
> But I was asking about *your* use the term "reason".
Care for a sloppy nominalist answer? "Reason" is what we've been
applying in this conversation all along. :-)
[snip]
/Petteri
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
[snip]
> > > But scientist achieve consensus not because they view consensus as a
> > > goal, but because they deal with objective facts. How can one achieve
> > > consesnsus about intersubjective tastes?
> >
> > Ah, but the question is, _how_ do they arrive at this consensus?
>
> No, the question is: how do they cognize reality? Once you do that,
> achieving a consensus is pretty easy (at least in the hard sciences).
I think that's the wrong question. Say an astronomer sits alone at his
radio telescope, gets all kinds of results, and forms a theory based on
them. What degree of validity would you give this theory, if he never
referred to anyone else's work and never showed it to anyone else? An
essential <g> part of the scientific process is making your work fit
into the 'big picture' -- which is arrived at precisely through
intersubjective discussion, 'comparing notes' if you will; even if not
every experiment is diligently repeated at laboratories all around the
world. We don't need to know that much about how we cognize reality to
do that -- although, of course, such knowledge helps.
> > Granted, their position is easier than that of the 'ethicist' or
> > 'social engineer', because nature behaves more predictably than people.
> > However, I think their method -- devising experiments, discussing them
> > to find flaws, repeating them, formulating hypotheses based on them,
> > testing the hypotheses with yet more experiment, observation, and
> > discussion, and devising theories based on the tested hypotheses can
> > also be used for society. The only difference is that the margin of
> > uncertainty is far bigger.
>
> I agree that sociologists could proceed in this way, but how would one
> derive ethics from observations of behavior?
<g> Isn't this kind of thing precisely what Rand claims to have
accomplished? Well, maybe not quite...
I think it would be an iterative process. I'd use 'happiness' as
reported by the 'experimental subjects' (that is, you and I) as the
fundamental quantity. I'd use other quantities which I would have
correlated with 'happiness'. I'd compare existing ethical systems to
find the relative levels of 'happiness' they produce. Then I'd
formulate a hypothesis: modify imperative I of system S in way W, and
the total happiness in system W will increase. Then I'd make the
experiment. Based on the results, I would devise further hypotheses and
make further experiences. [This, of course, is a gross
oversimplification, but you get the picture.]
As a matter of fact, I think this is more or less how we actually
proceed, only we do it in the dark, without realizing it. I think it
would be good if ethical imperatives were subjected to this kind of
open scrutiny. Progress might be faster, with less boo-boos on the way.
> > [snip]
> >
> > > > I think any common ground is important. For example, you could carry a
> > > > constructive discussion with an Islamic fundamentalist if he accepts
> > > > the following propositions (which most of them do):
> > > >
> > > > (1) The laws in the shari'a can be divided into two groups: those
> > > > which deal with worship, and those that deal with society.
> > > >
> > > > (2) The laws in the first group only apply to Muslims, and they
> > > > should be followed by them to the letter.
> > > >
> > > > (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> > > > (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
> > >
> > > But wouldn't the reason or basis then be objective?
> >
> > Actually, no: it depends on circumstances.
> >
> Then is it a reason in the first place?
I think 'wisdom' is more accurate, actually.
And no doubt it is, for many if not most people. However, I've no doubt
that many people can find fulfilment in other pursuits -- such as
running a household and raising a family. And I'm not saying that such
a person needs to be a woman.
> > (The Muslim scholar above would probably have pointed out that the
> > woman actually had the _better_ deal, since she did get one half the
> > inheritance with (usually) much less than half the economic
> > obligations: she would have both security, since her brothers and male
> > cousins are obligated to look to her needs, and freedom, since she has
> > her half-share to dispose of as she wished.)
> >
> > > > See where I'm going?
> > > >
> > > > /Petteri
> > > >
> > > > If we agree on this, we can go on to discuss the _hikmat_ behi
> > >
> > > What's the _hikmat_ for female genital mutilation? Or is FGM not a
> > > _hikmat_?
> >
> > FGM is neither in the Qur'an nor the ha'adith. It's a pre-Islamic
> > custom that has persisted to these days, like the so-called 'murders of
> > honor' and similar barbarities. Many Muslim scholars condemn it.
> > (Personally, I think it's a scandal that _all_ Muslim scholars don't
> > condemn it: they should know better!)
>
> Perhaps giving the potential victims of FGM fully loaded AK-47's would
> have more of an effect :-).
The only problem is that they themselves accept the necessity of FGM.
It's either that, or become social outcasts. Most prefer to be
mutilated than pariahs. We need to modify the system of ethics within
the society to weaken, then remove that particular imperative.
> > I don't think a discussion on Islamic jurisprudence is very relevant
> > here, by the way: I merely used it as an example to demonstrate how it
> > is possible to establish enough of a common epistemological basis for a
> > meaningful dialogue with someone whose _fundamental_ epistemology you
> > entirely disagree with.
>
> A meaningful dialogue, perhaps (meaningful in the sense that all sides
> know each other's positions). But a dialog that achieves agreement?
Not complete agreement, in the real world. From the POV of the Muslim,
you and I are as good as identical in our epistemological assumptions.
Do you think _we_ can achieve complete agreement? However, agreement
about any number of specific issues, why not?
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
[snip]
It depends on what you mean by 'objective', I guess. I understand
'objective' to be roughly 'the same for everyone'. To take your physics
example, an effect is objective if it can be observed by any observer
performing the experiment. If the definitions are not the same for
everyone, I don't think it's fair to call them 'objective'. Do you have
a more useful definition of 'objective'?
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
If they do that, why call the definitions 'objective'?
I stand corrected.
> Also, I am reading you as saying that if any part of value judgments is
> arbitrary, than such judgments are nonobjective. I would take the
> opposite view, that if any part of a value judgment can be objective,
> then ethical objectivity is possible.
Hm... not quite. Actually I maintain that the very concept of
'objective' is meaningless when applied to ethics, because ethics deal
with inter_subjective_ relations, and subjective experiences thereof.
Intersubjectivity is the best way out of this dilemma that I can see.
Colin Day
> >
> > Then again, Rand would not be an essentialist by that use of the term.
>
> Come to think of it, you'd probably be hard pressed to find anyone who
> used _only_ essentialist thinking. Plato, I think, comes the closest.
>
> However, the idea behind nominalism is to use the same criteria --
> falsifiability, intersubjectivity, argument, experience -- on _all_ of
> the thinking. You can't be 'somewhat nominalist' any more than you can
> be 'slightly pregnant'. [Note: context is very important here; a person
> can be, say, a devout Catholic and believer in the transubstantiation,
> and thereby an essentialist, yet write a paper on physics where the
> arguments are thoroughly nominalist. His religious beliefs should in no
> way lessen the value of his paper on physics. If he used St. Augustine
> to justify his conclusions in the paper, however, it would be another
> story.]
How would one falsify a nominalist definition?
>
<snip>
> > > >
> > Then Rand would say that "vertebrate" is a better means of classifying
> > organism than by color. Part of Rand's objection to what she termed
> > nominalism was that nominalists would view the two criteria (vertebrate,
> > color) as equally arbitrary. I suspect that you might not accept her use
> > of the term "nominalism".
>
> Well, it's certainly not what I mean by nominalism. If you like, we can
> call my version pnominalism. If we go on that tack, this conversation
> will become awfully hard to follow, though...
>
Hmm. . . What about the entry for "nominalism" in Blackwell's A
Companion to Metaphysics. I'll use it here, but feel free to cite your
own reference.
I gather from that entry that nominalism would not admit of first-order
classifications as being objects, so there would be no higher-order
classification.
<snip>
> > >
> > > Oh yes there is. Marx specifically stated that capitalism (as he
> > > described it) cannot be reformed, only overturned. Capitalism as he
> > > described it no longer exists, but it hasn't been overturned and it has
> > > been reformed. He was wrong. Waiting more doesn't change this fact. If
> > > our modern system does collapse and is replaced by socialism, Marx
> > > would still have been wrong: the system he predicted would collapse,
> > > didn't, and the system that did wasn't the one he predicted (and
> > > probably didn't collapse for the reasons he predicted).
> >
> > And how has capitalism been reformed? Naive me, I thought that most
> > people still got paychecks from employers.
> >
> > (Not trying to defend Marx so much as playing Devil's Advocate).
>
> (1) Marx predicted that wealth would be concentrated in ever fewer
> hands, while the number of proletarians living at the subsistence level
> would grow ever larger.
>
He predicted that the distribution of income would be more unequal, but
not that the proletariat's absolute incomes would diminish.
> (2) When you look at England, Germany, France, or even the United
> States today, you'll find that income differentials are drastically
> smaller and the average proletarian's (i.e., wage-earner's) standard of
> living is drastically higher.
>
Does Kenneth Lay know this?
> (3) There has been no catastrophic collapse of capitalism in the
> meantime.
>
But you can only say: not yet.
> Ergo, capitalism has been reformed to cure most of the immediate ills
> Marx listed in e.g. the Communist manifesto.
>
I was thinking more of Das Kapital. OK, I know that forcing anyone to
read all three volumes is (or should be) against the Geneva Convention.
> I know, you could trot out the Leninist attempt at making Marx's
> predictions conform to reality, or the later Maoist ones, but I think
> they don't stand up very well either.
>
Quite the opposite. A strict Marxist might criticize both of the for
trying to effect a revolution without having the proper economic basis.
> >
> > But some them of them had some success in the previous century. Besides,
> > they might like other people's pain, insecurity, and death.
> >
> We, however, have the benefit of experience. It's by no means
> impossible that a democracy could disestablish itself in favor of a
> totalitarian, aggressive regime. However, most democracies have proved
> remarkably stable for the past 50 years or so. I think that if we
> ensure that discontent can be addressed within the system rather than
> out of it, we can maintain the system in the future as well.
>
> Note also that last century's nasties didn't gain power by promising
> pain, insecurity and death. They promised a bright future to a public
> that felt massively aggrieved. If we can defuse such griefs before they
> reach boiling point, I think we'll do OK.
>
> > >
> > I might agree that a lower incarceration rate is better than a higher
> > one, but again, why? The same for the other criteria.
>
> There is no 'why,' only agreement and observation. If you like, we
> could poll people in different societies, asking how happy they feel
> and why. We could factor this into our model.
But suppose a certain policy would make many people happier and others
sadder. How do we quantify the degree of happiness/sadness? We could
also try to figure out what might make (most) people happier and sadder.
>
> Ah, sorry: I jumped the gun. My presupposition is that happiness is
> good and misery is bad. Do you disagree? If you do, I'm afraid I'm out
> of answers: I really can't get more 'objective' than that.
>
Is it better to be a happy fool than a miserable genius? Of course one
could qualify your question by saying all other things being equal.
> > > > You'll find that
> > > > > within such societies, whether local or global in scope, there is a
> > > > > great deal of intersubjective consensus on a great number of subjects.
> > > > > Things like "fairness" are fairly universal concepts.
> > > >
> > > > But what if the consensus is wrong?
> > >
> > > By what standard?
> >
> > Failure to identify reality, and if there is no "reality" of such
> > issues, then why should we have any ethics at all?
>
> Ethics deals with interpersonal relations. What reality is there to
> them besides people's experiences?
>
But again, I never agreed that ethics dealt only with interpersonal
relations. Besides, there are objective aspects of interpersonal
relations. If I cut your arm off, even using anesthesia so there is no
pain, I have still objectively harmed you. I'm assuming that it was a
healthy arm, that you weren't handcuffed to a bomb, etc. . .
> > > No. However, through discussion, we can arrive at more general
> > > standards we can use to devise systems of ethics. For example, we can
> > > examine our 'moral sense' in certain situations and try think _why_ we
> > > feel action A is 'right' and action B 'wrong'. Then we can discuss it.
> > > [snip]
> >
> > But if there cannot be an objective basis for such a feeling, then what
> > would this discussion accomplish?
>
> At the least, it might help us negotiate a deal where we don't fly
> airplanes at each other's buildings, shoot or starve each other's
> children to death by gun and economic embargo, suicide-bomb each
> others' teenagers to shreds, or bomb and bulldoze each other's houses
> to rubble. Don't you think that would be worth something?
>
Yes, but only because refraining from indiscriminant slaughter is
objectively valuable to me. Hey, I can't trade with dead people.
> > > That's a moot point, since I doubt you'll be able to deconvert them.
> >
> > But even if I can't convert them, it does not moot the point. Those
> > Muslims could choose, so it an ethical matter.
>
> In _theory_ they could choose. In practice, there's not much of a
> choice. If you insisted on deconversion as a precondition to dialogue,
I wouldn't do that.
> you wouldn't get very far at all. If you were satisfied with some
> common ground, you might be able to agree about any number of points of
> practical importance -- and just might in a small way affect the world
> in a direction where the Muslim might have _more_ of a choice in that
> respect. If you insist on 'all or nothing', you'll most likely end up
> with nothing.
>
I wouldn't insist from a view of policy.
> > > > > (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> > > > > (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
> > > > >
> > > > > (4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
> > > > > understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
> > > >
> > > > And what is reason?
> > >
> > > Actually, the Muslim understands by 'reason' very much the same thing
> > > as the Westerner does. Remember, they studied Plato and Aristotle when
> > > we were dying of horrible diseases or mouthing Latin phrases we
> > > couldn't understand.
> > >
> >
> > I suspect they're not the same Muslims, as I suspect that Avicenna and
> > Averroes would not crash airplanes into skyscrapers.
>
> Funny. I was just thinking of the two Ibns. :-)
>
> > But I was asking about *your* use the term "reason".
>
> Care for a sloppy nominalist answer? "Reason" is what we've been
> applying in this conversation all along. :-)
OK for now, but I might be back.
Hope I didn't snip too much, but these posts are getting long
Colin Day
Colin Day
achieve
> > > > consesnsus about intersubjective tastes?
> > >
> > > Ah, but the question is, _how_ do they arrive at this consensus?
> >
> > No, the question is: how do they cognize reality? Once you do that,
> > achieving a consensus is pretty easy (at least in the hard sciences).
>
> I think that's the wrong question. Say an astronomer sits alone at his
> radio telescope, gets all kinds of results, and forms a theory based on
> them. What degree of validity would you give this theory, if he never
Some
> referred to anyone else's work and never showed it to anyone else? An
> essential <g> part of the scientific process is making your work fit
> into the 'big picture' -- which is arrived at precisely through
> intersubjective discussion, 'comparing notes' if you will; even if not
> every experiment is diligently repeated at laboratories all around the
> world. We don't need to know that much about how we cognize reality to
> do that -- although, of course, such knowledge helps.
>
An astronomer might accept another's result not because he has
replicated it but because he believes that had he made the same
observation he would have seen the same thing. This is a matter of trust
in the scientific community, and why the fakers get flamed.
> > derive ethics from observations of behavior?
>
> <g> Isn't this kind of thing precisely what Rand claims to have
> accomplished? Well, maybe not quite...
>
Oh no, she does of course use historical examples, but these are more by
way of illustration than of proof. Her derivations in ethics depend more
on her claims about human nature and reality.
> I think it would be an iterative process. I'd use 'happiness' as
> reported by the 'experimental subjects' (that is, you and I) as the
> fundamental quantity. I'd use other quantities which I would have
> correlated with 'happiness'. I'd compare existing ethical systems to
> find the relative levels of 'happiness' they produce. Then I'd
> formulate a hypothesis: modify imperative I of system S in way W, and
> the total happiness in system W will increase. Then I'd make the
> experiment. Based on the results, I would devise further hypotheses and
> make further experiences. [This, of course, is a gross
> oversimplification, but you get the picture.]
>
But if you can't measure happiness, then how can you know what is
correlated with it? Also, do people know how happy they are? Or merely
how contented?
> As a matter of fact, I think this is more or less how we actually
> proceed, only we do it in the dark, without realizing it. I think it
> would be good if ethical imperatives were subjected to this kind of
> open scrutiny. Progress might be faster, with less boo-boos on the way.
>
> > > [snip]
> > >
> > > > But wouldn't the reason or basis then be objective?
> > >
> > > Actually, no: it depends on circumstances.
> > >
> > Then is it a reason in the first place?
>
> I think 'wisdom' is more accurate, actually.
>
OK
> > > > > obligation, the _hikmat_ has changed, and he should no longer be
> > > > > accorded a larger share in the inheritance."
> > > >
> > > > But is it proper for women to be economically dependent on men?
> > >
> > > Trick question. If you asked, is it proper to _force_ women to be
> > > economically dependent on men, I'd certainly have said 'no'. However,
> > > what you did ask sounds a lot like "is it proper for a woman to be
> > > economicaly dependent on men _even if she chooses to_?" This, IMO, is a
> > > good deal more problematic. I can't see that we can place an
> > > _obligation_ on a person to be economically independent, if another
> > > person volunteers to provide for him/her.
> >
> > Rand once wrote to one of her acquaintances who was getting a divorce.
> > Rand told her that even if she got enough alimony to live on, that she
> > should get a job. Not because she needed the money, but because she
> > needed something to do with mind. For Rand, a productive career (or some
> > other extended, serious pursuit) was good for one's psychology, because
> > it helped in integrating one's goals and actions over one's life.
>
> And no doubt it is, for many if not most people. However, I've no doubt
> that many people can find fulfilment in other pursuits -- such as
> running a household and raising a family. And I'm not saying that such
> a person needs to be a woman.
>
But can one raise a family one's whole life? And how much is there to
running a household? Gee, didn't some women suffer during the fifties
because they were stuck at home?
of
> > > honor' and similar barbarities. Many Muslim scholars condemn it.
> > > (Personally, I think it's a scandal that _all_ Muslim scholars don't
> > > condemn it: they should know better!)
> >
> > Perhaps giving the potential victims of FGM fully loaded AK-47's would
> > have more of an effect :-).
>
> The only problem is that they themselves accept the necessity of FGM.
> It's either that, or become social outcasts. Most prefer to be
> mutilated than pariahs. We need to modify the system of ethics within
> the society to weaken, then remove that particular imperative.
>
Or remove the fear of being a pariah.
> > > I don't think a discussion on Islamic jurisprudence is very relevant
> > > here, by the way: I merely used it as an example to demonstrate how it
> > > is possible to establish enough of a common epistemological basis for a
> > > meaningful dialogue with someone whose _fundamental_ epistemology you
> > > entirely disagree with.
> >
> > A meaningful dialogue, perhaps (meaningful in the sense that all sides
> > know each other's positions). But a dialog that achieves agreement?
>
> Not complete agreement, in the real world. From the POV of the Muslim,
> you and I are as good as identical in our epistemological assumptions.
> Do you think _we_ can achieve complete agreement? However, agreement
> about any number of specific issues, why not?
>
OK, whatever.
Colin Day
Colin Day
But you aren't defining the object, you're defining the words. Maybe
most people would agree that the object is both a table and a crate. It
may be that everyone can apply the definition of "table" to the object
and agree that it is a table. Ditto for "crate".
Also, I may been unclear. In saying that objective means independent of
observer, I did mean to imply that the observers would agree, just that
the facts would be the same.
>
> /Petteri
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day
Colin Day
> > > Exactly. However, if two people can reasonably consider the same object
> > > to be two different things, why would you call the definitions
> > > 'objective'?
> >
> > But the object isn't two different things, it's just one thing that is
> > subsumed under two different concepts. Why can't teo different concepts
> > share common members?
>
> If they do that, why call the definitions 'objective'?
>
Because what makes something a table, and what makes it a crate, are not
subject to our moods? Also, we might use a table as something other than
a table, but it's still a table.
> > > ethics: you have a precise definition of 'observer' and 'point of
> > > view'. For an observer inside the object there would appear to be no
> > > contraction, whereas for an outside observer there would be. I don't
> > > think this example is very relevant. After all, we're not looking for
> > > the 'essence' of 'objective'. Are we?
> >
> > Not inside and outside, but at relative rest and relative motion.
>
> I stand corrected.
>
> > Also, I am reading you as saying that if any part of value judgments is
> > arbitrary, than such judgments are nonobjective. I would take the
> > opposite view, that if any part of a value judgment can be objective,
> > then ethical objectivity is possible.
>
> Hm... not quite. Actually I maintain that the very concept of
> 'objective' is meaningless when applied to ethics, because ethics deal
> with inter_subjective_ relations, and subjective experiences thereof.
> Intersubjectivity is the best way out of this dilemma that I can see.
>
No. Even if we restrict ethics to interpersonal relations, that doesn't
make ethics nonobjective.
Which would you prefer: That someone chops off your arm, but uses enough
anesthesia so that you don't feel pain, or that someone simulates the
pain that you would experience if your arm were chopped off, but not
actually chop off your arm?
> /Petteri
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>
> > >
> > > Then again, Rand would not be an essentialist by that use of the term.
> >
> > Come to think of it, you'd probably be hard pressed to find anyone who
> > used _only_ essentialist thinking. Plato, I think, comes the closest.
> >
> > However, the idea behind nominalism is to use the same criteria --
> > falsifiability, intersubjectivity, argument, experience -- on _all_ of
> > the thinking. You can't be 'somewhat nominalist' any more than you can
> > be 'slightly pregnant'. [Note: context is very important here; a person
> > can be, say, a devout Catholic and believer in the transubstantiation,
> > and thereby an essentialist, yet write a paper on physics where the
> > arguments are thoroughly nominalist. His religious beliefs should in no
> > way lessen the value of his paper on physics. If he used St. Augustine
> > to justify his conclusions in the paper, however, it would be another
> > story.]
>
> How would one falsify a nominalist definition?
You wouldn't. Definitions aren't 'true' or 'false'; they're merely more
or less useful. You would falsify _statements_.
However, there is an analogous process. For example, suppose I made the
definition:
slave : individual who does not have full control over the fruit of is
produce
Now, since taxpayers don't have full control over the fruit of their
produce, we would have to conclude that all taxpayers are slaves.
By this definition, lots of people whom we normally don't consider
slaves would be considered slaves, and there would be no distinction
between those individuals who are considered property of other people
and the other 'slaves'. For example, discussing the problem of slavery
in the modern world becomes impossible, if we use this definition.
We could observe that the above definition of 'slave' is not a very
useful one, does not very well describe the individuals we usually call
slaves, and does not enable us to draw very many useful conclusions
about the real world. Therefore, we would conclude that we should look
for a more useful definition of 'slave'.
> > > Then Rand would say that "vertebrate" is a better means of classifying
> > > organism than by color. Part of Rand's objection to what she termed
> > > nominalism was that nominalists would view the two criteria (vertebrate,
> > > color) as equally arbitrary. I suspect that you might not accept her use
> > > of the term "nominalism".
> >
> > Well, it's certainly not what I mean by nominalism. If you like, we can
> > call my version pnominalism. If we go on that tack, this conversation
> > will become awfully hard to follow, though...
> >
>
> Hmm. . . What about the entry for "nominalism" in Blackwell's A
> Companion to Metaphysics. I'll use it here, but feel free to cite your
> own reference.
>
> I gather from that entry that nominalism would not admit of first-order
> classifications as being objects, so there would be no higher-order
> classification.
Hm. I'm not quite sure what he means there. Are _any_ definitions
'objects'? What does he mean by 'object'?
> > > > Oh yes there is. Marx specifically stated that capitalism (as he
> > > > described it) cannot be reformed, only overturned. Capitalism as he
> > > > described it no longer exists, but it hasn't been overturned and it has
> > > > been reformed. He was wrong. Waiting more doesn't change this fact. If
> > > > our modern system does collapse and is replaced by socialism, Marx
> > > > would still have been wrong: the system he predicted would collapse,
> > > > didn't, and the system that did wasn't the one he predicted (and
> > > > probably didn't collapse for the reasons he predicted).
> > >
> > > And how has capitalism been reformed? Naive me, I thought that most
> > > people still got paychecks from employers.
> > >
> > > (Not trying to defend Marx so much as playing Devil's Advocate).
> >
> > (1) Marx predicted that wealth would be concentrated in ever fewer
> > hands, while the number of proletarians living at the subsistence level
> > would grow ever larger.
>
> He predicted that the distribution of income would be more unequal, but
> not that the proletariat's absolute incomes would diminish.
Quite, as he argued that the proletariat will always return to
subsistence-level income, although upswings in the trade cycle when
there is a deficit of labor may temporarily raise their income.
He definitely predicted that over the long term the absolute income of
the proletariat would not _rise_. This has happened. Ergo, his
prediction was wrong.
> > (2) When you look at England, Germany, France, or even the United
> > States today, you'll find that income differentials are drastically
> > smaller and the average proletarian's (i.e., wage-earner's) standard of
> > living is drastically higher.
>
> Does Kenneth Lay know this?
Who's Kenneth Lay?
> > (3) There has been no catastrophic collapse of capitalism in the
> > meantime.
>
> But you can only say: not yet.
Actually, no. Today's economic structure in the developed world is
_very_ different from the 19th century. The system he so brilliantly
described is no more.
> > Ergo, capitalism has been reformed to cure most of the immediate ills
> > Marx listed in e.g. the Communist manifesto.
>
> I was thinking more of Das Kapital. OK, I know that forcing anyone to
> read all three volumes is (or should be) against the Geneva Convention.
Have you read it? I've only read bits and pieces. :-)
> > I know, you could trot out the Leninist attempt at making Marx's
> > predictions conform to reality, or the later Maoist ones, but I think
> > they don't stand up very well either.
>
> Quite the opposite. A strict Marxist might criticize both of the for
> trying to effect a revolution without having the proper economic basis.
Hehe, I always did find the arguments among Marxists wryly amusing.
Especially their arguments about who is *really* a Marxist. :-)
> > > But some them of them had some success in the previous century. Besides,
> > > they might like other people's pain, insecurity, and death.
> > >
> > We, however, have the benefit of experience. It's by no means
> > impossible that a democracy could disestablish itself in favor of a
> > totalitarian, aggressive regime. However, most democracies have proved
> > remarkably stable for the past 50 years or so. I think that if we
> > ensure that discontent can be addressed within the system rather than
> > out of it, we can maintain the system in the future as well.
> >
> > Note also that last century's nasties didn't gain power by promising
> > pain, insecurity and death. They promised a bright future to a public
> > that felt massively aggrieved. If we can defuse such griefs before they
> > reach boiling point, I think we'll do OK.
>
> > > I might agree that a lower incarceration rate is better than a higher
> > > one, but again, why? The same for the other criteria.
> >
> > There is no 'why,' only agreement and observation. If you like, we
> > could poll people in different societies, asking how happy they feel
> > and why. We could factor this into our model.
>
> But suppose a certain policy would make many people happier and others
> sadder. How do we quantify the degree of happiness/sadness? We could
> also try to figure out what might make (most) people happier and sadder.
I think we should be _very_ careful of any policy that makes _any_
people more miserable. Sometimes it can't be avoided, but if, after due
consideration, a policy change would increase total happiness by 3
units and increase misery by only 1 unit, I think we should at least
consider it.
> > Ah, sorry: I jumped the gun. My presupposition is that happiness is
> > good and misery is bad. Do you disagree? If you do, I'm afraid I'm out
> > of answers: I really can't get more 'objective' than that.
>
> Is it better to be a happy fool than a miserable genius?
I don't know. What do you think?
> Of course one
> could qualify your question by saying all other things being equal.
Quite.
> > > > > You'll find that
> > > > > > within such societies, whether local or global in scope, there is a
> > > > > > great deal of intersubjective consensus on a great number of
> > > > > > subjects.
> > > > > > Things like "fairness" are fairly universal concepts.
> > > > >
> > > > > But what if the consensus is wrong?
> > > >
> > > > By what standard?
> > >
> > > Failure to identify reality, and if there is no "reality" of such
> > > issues, then why should we have any ethics at all?
> >
> > Ethics deals with interpersonal relations. What reality is there to
> > them besides people's experiences?
>
> But again, I never agreed that ethics dealt only with interpersonal
> relations. Besides, there are objective aspects of interpersonal
> relations. If I cut your arm off, even using anesthesia so there is no
> pain, I have still objectively harmed you. I'm assuming that it was a
> healthy arm, that you weren't handcuffed to a bomb, etc. . .
'Misery' is a broader category than 'pain'. If you cut of my arm by
_any_ means, I assure you you would be causing me a great deal of
misery!
What do you mean by 'objective aspects of interpersonal relations'?
I'd say that there are some observations concerning interpersonal
relations that enough people agree about as to be considered universal.
For example, that physically harming another person against that
person's will causes that person misery. However, I still wouldn't
consider it 'objective' -- it's merely something about which we have a
very deep and broad consensus, and should therefore certainly consider
when formulating our ethical policies.
However, in my book it's still intersubjectivity that allows us to come
to the conclusion. "Self-evident" things are merely things we all (or
all but an insignificantly small number of people) agree about.
> > > > No. However, through discussion, we can arrive at more general
> > > > standards we can use to devise systems of ethics. For example, we can
> > > > examine our 'moral sense' in certain situations and try think _why_ we
> > > > feel action A is 'right' and action B 'wrong'. Then we can discuss it.
> > > > [snip]
> > >
> > > But if there cannot be an objective basis for such a feeling, then what
> > > would this discussion accomplish?
> >
> > At the least, it might help us negotiate a deal where we don't fly
> > airplanes at each other's buildings, shoot or starve each other's
> > children to death by gun and economic embargo, suicide-bomb each
> > others' teenagers to shreds, or bomb and bulldoze each other's houses
> > to rubble. Don't you think that would be worth something?
>
> Yes, but only because refraining from indiscriminant slaughter is
> objectively valuable to me. Hey, I can't trade with dead people.
In a context like that, _why_ you agree with me would be of secondary
importance to me.
> > > > That's a moot point, since I doubt you'll be able to deconvert them.
> > >
> > > But even if I can't convert them, it does not moot the point. Those
> > > Muslims could choose, so it an ethical matter.
> >
> > In _theory_ they could choose. In practice, there's not much of a
> > choice. If you insisted on deconversion as a precondition to dialogue,
>
> I wouldn't do that.
>
> > you wouldn't get very far at all. If you were satisfied with some
> > common ground, you might be able to agree about any number of points of
> > practical importance -- and just might in a small way affect the world
> > in a direction where the Muslim might have _more_ of a choice in that
> > respect. If you insist on 'all or nothing', you'll most likely end up
> > with nothing.
>
> I wouldn't insist from a view of policy.
Well, then -- *we've* found enough common ground to be on the same side
in the negotiating team. Isn't that something, too?
> > > > > > (3) Each of the laws in the second group has a reason and a basis
> > > > > > (_hikmat_ or 'wisdom'), and cannot be taken in isolation.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (4) As circumstances change, the laws need to be interpreted and
> > > > > > understood according to reason. (This is known as _ijtihad_.)
> > > > >
> > > > > And what is reason?
> > > >
> > > > Actually, the Muslim understands by 'reason' very much the same thing
> > > > as the Westerner does. Remember, they studied Plato and Aristotle when
> > > > we were dying of horrible diseases or mouthing Latin phrases we
> > > > couldn't understand.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I suspect they're not the same Muslims, as I suspect that Avicenna and
> > > Averroes would not crash airplanes into skyscrapers.
> >
> > Funny. I was just thinking of the two Ibns. :-)
> >
> > > But I was asking about *your* use the term "reason".
> >
> > Care for a sloppy nominalist answer? "Reason" is what we've been
> > applying in this conversation all along. :-)
>
> OK for now, but I might be back.
>
> Hope I didn't snip too much, but these posts are getting long
Hehe, tell me about it. I've enjoyed this conversation a lot, btw.
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>
> achieve
> > > > > consesnsus about intersubjective tastes?
> > > >
> > > > Ah, but the question is, _how_ do they arrive at this consensus?
> > >
> > > No, the question is: how do they cognize reality? Once you do that,
> > > achieving a consensus is pretty easy (at least in the hard sciences).
> >
> > I think that's the wrong question. Say an astronomer sits alone at his
> > radio telescope, gets all kinds of results, and forms a theory based on
> > them. What degree of validity would you give this theory, if he never
>
> Some
>
> > referred to anyone else's work and never showed it to anyone else? An
> > essential <g> part of the scientific process is making your work fit
> > into the 'big picture' -- which is arrived at precisely through
> > intersubjective discussion, 'comparing notes' if you will; even if not
> > every experiment is diligently repeated at laboratories all around the
> > world. We don't need to know that much about how we cognize reality to
> > do that -- although, of course, such knowledge helps.
> >
>
> An astronomer might accept another's result not because he has
> replicated it but because he believes that had he made the same
> observation he would have seen the same thing. This is a matter of trust
> in the scientific community, and why the fakers get flamed.
Quite true. However, in the end, what keeps science 'honest' is the
fact that it's a collective undertaking. 'They' might not check your
results now or this year, but eventually somebody's going to use them,
make his own observations, find that they don't fit, and check yours --
and be really mad if he finds out you've been screwing around with
them.
> > > derive ethics from observations of behavior?
> >
> > <g> Isn't this kind of thing precisely what Rand claims to have
> > accomplished? Well, maybe not quite...
>
> Oh no, she does of course use historical examples, but these are more by
> way of illustration than of proof. Her derivations in ethics depend more
> on her claims about human nature and reality.
Yep, but doesn't she claim to base those claims on _observation_ of
human nature and reality?
> > I think it would be an iterative process. I'd use 'happiness' as
> > reported by the 'experimental subjects' (that is, you and I) as the
> > fundamental quantity. I'd use other quantities which I would have
> > correlated with 'happiness'. I'd compare existing ethical systems to
> > find the relative levels of 'happiness' they produce. Then I'd
> > formulate a hypothesis: modify imperative I of system S in way W, and
> > the total happiness in system W will increase. Then I'd make the
> > experiment. Based on the results, I would devise further hypotheses and
> > make further experiences. [This, of course, is a gross
> > oversimplification, but you get the picture.]
>
> But if you can't measure happiness, then how can you know what is
> correlated with it? Also, do people know how happy they are? Or merely
> how contented?
Iteratively.
For example, you could start with the following two assumptions (do
they sound reasonable to you?):
(1) People usually know when they're happy.
(2) People usually can tell fairly accurately whether a person they
know is happy.
Then you would ask them whether they are happy and whether people they
know are happy. You would see how well their self-assessment and the
assessment of others would fit. Then you would look at their
circumstances, ethics, and society. Then you'd look for common patterns
in the circumstances, ethics, and society and their self-stated or
peer-observed happiness. *Then* you'd look for these patterns in
another set of people, and see how good predictors of 'happiness' they
make. You'd refine your patterns based on your new results, improve
your questionnaires, and go for a new round. And so on.
What's the difference between 'happy' and 'contented' btw?
I'm sure they did. That's why it shouldn't be forced on them. However,
I can't see any reason to _deny_ that choice to anyone either -- man
_or_ woman.
> of
> > > > honor' and similar barbarities. Many Muslim scholars condemn it.
> > > > (Personally, I think it's a scandal that _all_ Muslim scholars don't
> > > > condemn it: they should know better!)
> > >
> > > Perhaps giving the potential victims of FGM fully loaded AK-47's would
> > > have more of an effect :-).
> >
> > The only problem is that they themselves accept the necessity of FGM.
> > It's either that, or become social outcasts. Most prefer to be
> > mutilated than pariahs. We need to modify the system of ethics within
> > the society to weaken, then remove that particular imperative.
>
> Or remove the fear of being a pariah.
You'd also have to remove the fear of physical assault and rape, hunger
and deprivation (the families would no longer support them and there
are as yet very few jobs available to them) etc. It's one hell of a big
job that can't be done overnight. I'd start with trying to weaken that
particular imperative, and work on from there.
> > > > I don't think a discussion on Islamic jurisprudence is very relevant
> > > > here, by the way: I merely used it as an example to demonstrate how it
> > > > is possible to establish enough of a common epistemological basis for a
> > > > meaningful dialogue with someone whose _fundamental_ epistemology you
> > > > entirely disagree with.
> > >
> > > A meaningful dialogue, perhaps (meaningful in the sense that all sides
> > > know each other's positions). But a dialog that achieves agreement?
> >
> > Not complete agreement, in the real world. From the POV of the Muslim,
> > you and I are as good as identical in our epistemological assumptions.
> > Do you think _we_ can achieve complete agreement? However, agreement
> > about any number of specific issues, why not?
>
> OK, whatever.
I hope I didn't offend you in any way.
Petteri Sulonen
I apologize if I offended you. My intention was at most to poke gentle
fun, and also to show one actual application of essentialist thinking.
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
[snip]
> > It depends on what you mean by 'objective', I guess. I understand
> > 'objective' to be roughly 'the same for everyone'. To take your physics
> > example, an effect is objective if it can be observed by any observer
> > performing the experiment. If the definitions are not the same for
> > everyone, I don't think it's fair to call them 'objective'. Do you have
> > a more useful definition of 'objective'?
>
> But you aren't defining the object, you're defining the words.
I'm afraid that's all I can do. Reality just is what it is. We make
sense of it through classifying the things within it with a conceptual
framework. However I define my concepts doesn't really change anything
in reality. Concepts and definitions are descriptive. Even 'object' is
nothing but a concept and a definition: in some cases it makes sense to
define something as a single object, in others, as a collection of
objects. I could usefully define a human being as an object, or as a
myriad of objects. Is a foetus an object?
> Maybe
> most people would agree that the object is both a table and a crate. It
> may be that everyone can apply the definition of "table" to the object
> and agree that it is a table. Ditto for "crate".
>
> Also, I may been unclear. In saying that objective means independent of
> observer, I did mean to imply that the observers would agree, just that
> the facts would be the same.
Exactly. Reality doesn't change, only our conceptual model of it does.
Since conceptual models are always simplifications and to a degree
arbitrary, I don't think it makes sense to call them 'objective'.
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>
>
> > > > Exactly. However, if two people can reasonably consider the same object
> > > > to be two different things, why would you call the definitions
> > > > 'objective'?
> > >
> > > But the object isn't two different things, it's just one thing that is
> > > subsumed under two different concepts. Why can't teo different concepts
> > > share common members?
> >
> > If they do that, why call the definitions 'objective'?
>
> Because what makes something a table, and what makes it a crate, are not
> subject to our moods? Also, we might use a table as something other than
> a table, but it's still a table.
See, we have our epistemological priorities in a different order. For
you, the definition is more important. For me, the definition is only
important inasmuch as it is useful.
Incidentally, are you interested in languages? I'm constantly struck by
the conceptual differences between different languages. It really
brings home to me the arbitrariness of definitions.
> > > > ethics: you have a precise definition of 'observer' and 'point of
> > > > view'. For an observer inside the object there would appear to be no
> > > > contraction, whereas for an outside observer there would be. I don't
> > > > think this example is very relevant. After all, we're not looking for
> > > > the 'essence' of 'objective'. Are we?
> > >
> > > Not inside and outside, but at relative rest and relative motion.
> >
> > I stand corrected.
> >
> > > Also, I am reading you as saying that if any part of value judgments is
> > > arbitrary, than such judgments are nonobjective. I would take the
> > > opposite view, that if any part of a value judgment can be objective,
> > > then ethical objectivity is possible.
> >
> > Hm... not quite. Actually I maintain that the very concept of
> > 'objective' is meaningless when applied to ethics, because ethics deal
> > with inter_subjective_ relations, and subjective experiences thereof.
> > Intersubjectivity is the best way out of this dilemma that I can see.
>
> No. Even if we restrict ethics to interpersonal relations, that doesn't
> make ethics nonobjective.
>
> Which would you prefer: That someone chops off your arm, but uses enough
> anesthesia so that you don't feel pain, or that someone simulates the
> pain that you would experience if your arm were chopped off, but not
> actually chop off your arm?
By 'misery' I don't mean 'pain'. I would much rather experience
momentary pain than continued misery. I addressed this in more depth in
another post; check it out for details.
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
You did not offend me.
Your intention may have been as you stated. All you ended up with was
a dishonest and underhanded example of the "fallacy of equivocation".
Petteri Sulonen
What was I equivocating about? I fear you may have misunderstood me.
But in any case I think it might be high time to drop this discussion.
I seem to detect some hostility in the air, and I don't see anything to
be gained from that.
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C3B9E1C...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> >
> > > > > Exactly. However, if two people can reasonably consider the same object
> > > > > to be two different things, why would you call the definitions
> > > > > 'objective'?
> > > >
> > > > But the object isn't two different things, it's just one thing that is
> > > > subsumed under two different concepts. Why can't teo different concepts
> > > > share common members?
> > >
> > > If they do that, why call the definitions 'objective'?
> >
> > Because what makes something a table, and what makes it a crate, are not
> > subject to our moods? Also, we might use a table as something other than
> > a table, but it's still a table.
>
> See, we have our epistemological priorities in a different order. For
> you, the definition is more important. For me, the definition is only
> important inasmuch as it is useful.
And what not useful in allowing an object to fall under two different
terms?
>
> Incidentally, are you interested in languages? I'm constantly struck by
> the conceptual differences between different languages. It really
> brings home to me the arbitrariness of definitions.
>
Somewhat, but I don't know how much I'll be able to post, as classes
have started again.
<snip>
Colin Day
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C3B9C93...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
> > > It depends on what you mean by 'objective', I guess. I understand
> > > 'objective' to be roughly 'the same for everyone'. To take your physics
> > > example, an effect is objective if it can be observed by any observer
> > > performing the experiment. If the definitions are not the same for
> > > everyone, I don't think it's fair to call them 'objective'. Do you have
> > > a more useful definition of 'objective'?
> >
> > But you aren't defining the object, you're defining the words.
>
> I'm afraid that's all I can do. Reality just is what it is. We make
> sense of it through classifying the things within it with a conceptual
> framework. However I define my concepts doesn't really change anything
> in reality. Concepts and definitions are descriptive. Even 'object' is
> nothing but a concept and a definition: in some cases it makes sense to
> define something as a single object, in others, as a collection of
> objects. I could usefully define a human being as an object, or as a
> myriad of objects. Is a foetus an object?
Yes, just not one possessing rights.
>
> > Maybe
> > most people would agree that the object is both a table and a crate. It
> > may be that everyone can apply the definition of "table" to the object
> > and agree that it is a table. Ditto for "crate".
> >
> > Also, I may been unclear. In saying that objective means independent of
> > observer, I did mean to imply that the observers would agree, just that
> > the facts would be the same.
>
> Exactly. Reality doesn't change, only our conceptual model of it does.
> Since conceptual models are always simplifications and to a degree
> arbitrary, I don't think it makes sense to call them 'objective'.
>
But as long as they are to a degree nonarbitrary, then they can (or
fail) to be objective. Objectivity deals with the nonarbitrary part, if
such there be.
Colin Day
Colin Day
But then, what is it about the observations that could do this? What if
one were already honest?
<did she observe behavior>
But to her, human nature is largely psychological, so I don't know how
much of it she observed (or am I construing "observe" too narrowly?). I
took you to mean deriving ethics from behavior in the sense of accepting
such behavior as ethical, and then making the ethics fit.
> > > I think it would be an iterative process. I'd use 'happiness' as
> > > reported by the 'experimental subjects' (that is, you and I) as the
> > > fundamental quantity. I'd use other quantities which I would have
> > > correlated with 'happiness'. I'd compare existing ethical systems to
> > > find the relative levels of 'happiness' they produce. Then I'd
> > > formulate a hypothesis: modify imperative I of system S in way W, and
> > > the total happiness in system W will increase. Then I'd make the
> > > experiment. Based on the results, I would devise further hypotheses and
> > > make further experiences. [This, of course, is a gross
> > > oversimplification, but you get the picture.]
> >
> > But if you can't measure happiness, then how can you know what is
> > correlated with it? Also, do people know how happy they are? Or merely
> > how contented?
>
> Iteratively.
>
> For example, you could start with the following two assumptions (do
> they sound reasonable to you?):
>
> (1) People usually know when they're happy.
replace "happy" with "content"
>
> (2) People usually can tell fairly accurately whether a person they
> know is happy.
>
See above
> Then you would ask them whether they are happy and whether people they
> know are happy. You would see how well their self-assessment and the
> assessment of others would fit. Then you would look at their
> circumstances, ethics, and society. Then you'd look for common patterns
> in the circumstances, ethics, and society and their self-stated or
> peer-observed happiness. *Then* you'd look for these patterns in
> another set of people, and see how good predictors of 'happiness' they
> make. You'd refine your patterns based on your new results, improve
> your questionnaires, and go for a new round. And so on.
>
> What's the difference between 'happy' and 'contented' btw?
>
When one is contented, one is not aware of any reason to be unhappy,
even if there is a reason. Note how dictators try to keep people
content, and try to content themselves by exercising power.
> > > running a household and raising a family. And I'm not saying that such
> > > a person needs to be a woman.
> >
> > But can one raise a family one's whole life? And how much is there to
> > running a household? Gee, didn't some women suffer during the fifties
> > because they were stuck at home?
>
> I'm sure they did. That's why it shouldn't be forced on them. However,
> I can't see any reason to _deny_ that choice to anyone either -- man
> _or_ woman.
> > of
> > > > > honor' and similar barbarities. Many Muslim scholars condemn it.
> > > > > (Personally, I think it's a scandal that _all_ Muslim scholars don't
> > > > > condemn it: they should know better!)
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps giving the potential victims of FGM fully loaded AK-47's would
> > > > have more of an effect :-).
> > >
> > > The only problem is that they themselves accept the necessity of FGM.
> > > It's either that, or become social outcasts. Most prefer to be
> > > mutilated than pariahs. We need to modify the system of ethics within
> > > the society to weaken, then remove that particular imperative.
> >
> > Or remove the fear of being a pariah.
>
> You'd also have to remove the fear of physical assault and rape,
The AK-47 might help, although a semiautomatic pistol would probably be
better for personal defense.
hunger
> and deprivation (the families would no longer support them and there
> are as yet very few jobs available to them) etc. It's one hell of a big
> job that can't be done overnight. I'd start with trying to weaken that
> particular imperative, and work on from there.
>
> > > you and I are as good as identical in our epistemological assumptions.
> > > Do you think _we_ can achieve complete agreement? However, agreement
> > > about any number of specific issues, why not?
> >
> > OK, whatever.
>
> I hope I didn't offend you in any way.
>
Oh, don't worry about that. I was just getting tired. I have to stop
posting while experience subjective states of hunger :-).
> /Petteri
>
> --
> Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level then beat you with
> experience. -- Andrew Welch
Colin Day
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
Erm... chair changes to fuel when it is being used as firewood and
being burned. That is the same as wine turning into the blood of
christ during a christian cerimony of whatever. Wine turning into the
blood of christ is rediculous, therefore a chair being burned labeled
as fuel is rediculous, therefore essentialism is rediculous.
Sounds alike a pretty text book case of fallacy of equivocation if
ever I saw one. A pretty shabby one at that.
And stop "detecting some hostility in the air", if you think their is
hostiliy and you don't want to continue, don't continue.
Colin Day
Although in democratic countries, voters have some control (at least in
theory) over taxation.
>
> By this definition, lots of people whom we normally don't consider
> slaves would be considered slaves, and there would be no distinction
> between those individuals who are considered property of other people
> and the other 'slaves'. For example, discussing the problem of slavery
> in the modern world becomes impossible, if we use this definition.
>
> We could observe that the above definition of 'slave' is not a very
> useful one, does not very well describe the individuals we usually call
> slaves, and does not enable us to draw very many useful conclusions
> about the real world. Therefore, we would conclude that we should look
> for a more useful definition of 'slave'.
>
But useful by what standard? Such a definition of "slave" might have
been useful to antebellum Southerners.
> > > > Then Rand would say that "vertebrate" is a better means of classifying
> > > > organism than by color. Part of Rand's objection to what she termed
> > > > nominalism was that nominalists would view the two criteria (vertebrate,
> > > > color) as equally arbitrary. I suspect that you might not accept her use
> > > > of the term "nominalism".
> > >
> > > Well, it's certainly not what I mean by nominalism. If you like, we can
> > > call my version pnominalism. If we go on that tack, this conversation
> > > will become awfully hard to follow, though...
> > >
> >
> > Hmm. . . What about the entry for "nominalism" in Blackwell's A
> > Companion to Metaphysics. I'll use it here, but feel free to cite your
> > own reference.
> >
> > I gather from that entry that nominalism would not admit of first-order
> > classifications as being objects, so there would be no higher-order
> > classification.
>
> Hm. I'm not quite sure what he means there. Are _any_ definitions
> 'objects'? What does he mean by 'object'?
>
No, not the definitions, but the classification resulting therefrom.
> > > > > Oh yes there is. Marx specifically stated that capitalism (as he
> > > > > described it) cannot be reformed, only overturned. Capitalism as he
> > > > > described it no longer exists, but it hasn't been overturned and it has
> > > > > been reformed. He was wrong. Waiting more doesn't change this fact. If
> > > > > our modern system does collapse and is replaced by socialism, Marx
> > > > > would still have been wrong: the system he predicted would collapse,
> > > > > didn't, and the system that did wasn't the one he predicted (and
> > > > > probably didn't collapse for the reasons he predicted).
> > > >
> > > > And how has capitalism been reformed? Naive me, I thought that most
> > > > people still got paychecks from employers.
> > > >
> > > > (Not trying to defend Marx so much as playing Devil's Advocate).
> > >
> > > (1) Marx predicted that wealth would be concentrated in ever fewer
> > > hands, while the number of proletarians living at the subsistence level
> > > would grow ever larger.
> >
> > He predicted that the distribution of income would be more unequal, but
> > not that the proletariat's absolute incomes would diminish.
>
> Quite, as he argued that the proletariat will always return to
> subsistence-level income, although upswings in the trade cycle when
> there is a deficit of labor may temporarily raise their income.
>
Not subsistence, for he allowed that there would be cultural components
of wages as well. Most people could be expected to have cars, computers,
and so on, but not enough to be financially independent.
> He definitely predicted that over the long term the absolute income of
> the proletariat would not _rise_. This has happened. Ergo, his
> prediction was wrong.
>
Capital, or Manifesto?
> > > (2) When you look at England, Germany, France, or even the United
> > > States today, you'll find that income differentials are drastically
> > > smaller and the average proletarian's (i.e., wage-earner's) standard of
> > > living is drastically higher.
> >
> > Does Kenneth Lay know this?
>
> Who's Kenneth Lay?
>
Former(?) Chairman of Enron. The employees were encouraged to put most
of their investments in Enron, and then forbidden to sell when the
market slid. Not pretty.
From what I've read, the ratio of high-income incomes to low-income
incomes has increased, at least in the US.
> > > (3) There has been no catastrophic collapse of capitalism in the
> > > meantime.
> >
> > But you can only say: not yet.
>
> Actually, no. Today's economic structure in the developed world is
> _very_ different from the 19th century. The system he so brilliantly
> described is no more.
>
Give him more credit than that. True, we know more about macroeconomic
stabilization than we did in 1929, so such a collapse is less likely to
happen by government error. But is it still impossible.
But you have a point. According to Marx, capitalist economies should
have increased instability over time, and we haven't seen it.
> > > Ergo, capitalism has been reformed to cure most of the immediate ills
> > > Marx listed in e.g. the Communist manifesto.
> >
> > I was thinking more of Das Kapital. OK, I know that forcing anyone to
> > read all three volumes is (or should be) against the Geneva Convention.
>
> Have you read it? I've only read bits and pieces. :-)
>
I've parsed it, and understood some of it.
> > > I know, you could trot out the Leninist attempt at making Marx's
> > > predictions conform to reality, or the later Maoist ones, but I think
> > > they don't stand up very well either.
> >
> > Quite the opposite. A strict Marxist might criticize both of the for
> > trying to effect a revolution without having the proper economic basis.
>
> Hehe, I always did find the arguments among Marxists wryly amusing.
> Especially their arguments about who is *really* a Marxist. :-)
>
I'm surprised that they oppose globalization. Globalization would lead
to equalization of wages, which would reduce opportunities for profit.
Ooops. And would you repay that misery with compound interest?
> What do you mean by 'objective aspects of interpersonal relations'?
>
> I'd say that there are some observations concerning interpersonal
> relations that enough people agree about as to be considered universal.
> For example, that physically harming another person against that
> person's will causes that person misery. However, I still wouldn't
> consider it 'objective' -- it's merely something about which we have a
> very deep and broad consensus, and should therefore certainly consider
> when formulating our ethical policies.
>
I would say that the loss of your arm is objective, and that the
negative evaluation of that loss is also objectively justifiable.
Colin Day
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
The fact that all of them are observing the same reality, which appears
to exhibit some regularities of behaviour.
> What if
> one were already honest?
One could be honestly mistaken. Happens all the time. Without the
collective undertaking, there would be no way to detect certain kinds
systematic experimental error.
> <did she observe behavior>
>
> But to her, human nature is largely psychological, so I don't know how
> much of it she observed (or am I construing "observe" too narrowly?). I
> took you to mean deriving ethics from behavior in the sense of accepting
> such behavior as ethical, and then making the ethics fit.
It goes both ways. I think one problem with many 'essentialist' systems
of ethics is that they tend to ignore how people _actually_ behave. If
people never cheated, Communism would certainly be as close to perfect
as far as ethical systems went. People do, so it fails
catastrophically. It's tricky, this one: a system of ethics has to take
into account how people behave while simultaneously moderating it.
Precisely because it's a two-way process I think an iterative approach
works best: take what we have, and tweak it to make it better.
> > > > I think it would be an iterative process. I'd use 'happiness' as
> > > > reported by the 'experimental subjects' (that is, you and I) as the
> > > > fundamental quantity. I'd use other quantities which I would have
> > > > correlated with 'happiness'. I'd compare existing ethical systems to
> > > > find the relative levels of 'happiness' they produce. Then I'd
> > > > formulate a hypothesis: modify imperative I of system S in way W, and
> > > > the total happiness in system W will increase. Then I'd make the
> > > > experiment. Based on the results, I would devise further hypotheses and
> > > > make further experiences. [This, of course, is a gross
> > > > oversimplification, but you get the picture.]
> > >
> > > But if you can't measure happiness, then how can you know what is
> > > correlated with it? Also, do people know how happy they are? Or merely
> > > how contented?
> >
> > Iteratively.
> >
> > For example, you could start with the following two assumptions (do
> > they sound reasonable to you?):
> >
> > (1) People usually know when they're happy.
>
> replace "happy" with "content"
Even given your explanation below, I fail to see the distinction. How
can _you_ tell if someone (yourself) is happy or merely content? If you
can't, aren't the two functional equivalents?
> > (2) People usually can tell fairly accurately whether a person they
> > know is happy.
>
> See above
>
> > Then you would ask them whether they are happy and whether people they
> > know are happy. You would see how well their self-assessment and the
> > assessment of others would fit. Then you would look at their
> > circumstances, ethics, and society. Then you'd look for common patterns
> > in the circumstances, ethics, and society and their self-stated or
> > peer-observed happiness. *Then* you'd look for these patterns in
> > another set of people, and see how good predictors of 'happiness' they
> > make. You'd refine your patterns based on your new results, improve
> > your questionnaires, and go for a new round. And so on.
> >
> > What's the difference between 'happy' and 'contented' btw?
>
> When one is contented, one is not aware of any reason to be unhappy,
> even if there is a reason. Note how dictators try to keep people
> content, and try to content themselves by exercising power.
See above. :-)
> > > > running a household and raising a family. And I'm not saying that such
> > > > a person needs to be a woman.
> > >
> > > But can one raise a family one's whole life? And how much is there to
> > > running a household? Gee, didn't some women suffer during the fifties
> > > because they were stuck at home?
> >
> > I'm sure they did. That's why it shouldn't be forced on them. However,
> > I can't see any reason to _deny_ that choice to anyone either -- man
> > _or_ woman.
> > > of
> > > > > > honor' and similar barbarities. Many Muslim scholars condemn it.
> > > > > > (Personally, I think it's a scandal that _all_ Muslim scholars don't
> > > > > > condemn it: they should know better!)
> > > > >
> > > > > Perhaps giving the potential victims of FGM fully loaded AK-47's would
> > > > > have more of an effect :-).
> > > >
> > > > The only problem is that they themselves accept the necessity of FGM.
> > > > It's either that, or become social outcasts. Most prefer to be
> > > > mutilated than pariahs. We need to modify the system of ethics within
> > > > the society to weaken, then remove that particular imperative.
> > >
> > > Or remove the fear of being a pariah.
> >
> > You'd also have to remove the fear of physical assault and rape,
>
> The AK-47 might help, although a semiautomatic pistol would probably be
> better for personal defense.
Are you serious? What do you think a 12-year-old Somali would do with a
firearm? Remember it's her _family_ that is doing it to her!
> hunger
> > and deprivation (the families would no longer support them and there
> > are as yet very few jobs available to them) etc. It's one hell of a big
> > job that can't be done overnight. I'd start with trying to weaken that
> > particular imperative, and work on from there.
> >
> > > > you and I are as good as identical in our epistemological assumptions.
> > > > Do you think _we_ can achieve complete agreement? However, agreement
> > > > about any number of specific issues, why not?
> > >
> > > OK, whatever.
> >
> > I hope I didn't offend you in any way.
>
> Oh, don't worry about that. I was just getting tired. I have to stop
> posting while experience subjective states of hunger :-).
Heh.
Petteri Sulonen
> On Thu, 10 Jan 2002 18:52:20 +0200, Petteri Sulonen
> <Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
[snip]
> >>
> >> Your intention may have been as you stated. All you ended up with was
> >> a dishonest and underhanded example of the "fallacy of equivocation".
> >
> >What was I equivocating about? I fear you may have misunderstood me.
> >
> >But in any case I think it might be high time to drop this discussion.
> >I seem to detect some hostility in the air, and I don't see anything to
> >be gained from that.
>
> Erm... chair changes to fuel when it is being used as firewood and
> being burned. That is the same as wine turning into the blood of
> christ during a christian cerimony of whatever. Wine turning into the
> blood of christ is rediculous, therefore a chair being burned labeled
> as fuel is rediculous, therefore essentialism is rediculous.
>
> Sounds alike a pretty text book case of fallacy of equivocation if
> ever I saw one. A pretty shabby one at that.
Actually, I didn't intend that as a serious argument, although I can
see how you could read it as such. I just thought the analogy amusing.
Statement withdrawn with apologies.
However, you're not being a very _good_ essentialist. For the
essentialist, the essence is the fundamental, objects are secondary. An
object "changing its essence" is a true miracle, as it is presented in
the Cathechism. Your facile 'changing of essence' is the functional
equivalent of what I'm doing -- changing the definition. Your
understanding of 'essence' is almost equivalent to mine of
'definition'. I think you're a bit confused.
> And stop "detecting some hostility in the air", if you think their is
> hostiliy and you don't want to continue, don't continue.
Hm. Personally, I find it impolite if someone just runs out from a
thread without saying anything.
But this discussion does seem to have outlived its usefulness. Bye for
now, and see you in another thread, I hope!
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> > In article <3C3B9C93...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> > <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> >
> > [snip]
> >
> > > > It depends on what you mean by 'objective', I guess. I understand
> > > > 'objective' to be roughly 'the same for everyone'. To take your physics
> > > > example, an effect is objective if it can be observed by any observer
> > > > performing the experiment. If the definitions are not the same for
> > > > everyone, I don't think it's fair to call them 'objective'. Do you have
> > > > a more useful definition of 'objective'?
> > >
> > > But you aren't defining the object, you're defining the words.
> >
> > I'm afraid that's all I can do. Reality just is what it is. We make
> > sense of it through classifying the things within it with a conceptual
> > framework. However I define my concepts doesn't really change anything
> > in reality. Concepts and definitions are descriptive. Even 'object' is
> > nothing but a concept and a definition: in some cases it makes sense to
> > define something as a single object, in others, as a collection of
> > objects. I could usefully define a human being as an object, or as a
> > myriad of objects. Is a foetus an object?
>
> Yes, just not one possessing rights.
Um... you lost me here. Do 'objects' have 'rights'?
Is a cell an object? Is a human an object? Is a hand an object? Is a
family an object? Is a species an object? I'd say yes and no to all of
these. They're concepts that match certain parts of reality,
delimitable to a greater or lesser degree of precision. 'Object' itself
is a conceptual model. Reality is a continuum; we impose categories on
it to understand it. Since the categories are simplifications, we have
to watch for situations where they no longer apply.
> > > Maybe
> > > most people would agree that the object is both a table and a crate. It
> > > may be that everyone can apply the definition of "table" to the object
> > > and agree that it is a table. Ditto for "crate".
> > >
> > > Also, I may been unclear. In saying that objective means independent of
> > > observer, I did mean to imply that the observers would agree, just that
> > > the facts would be the same.
> >
> > Exactly. Reality doesn't change, only our conceptual model of it does.
> > Since conceptual models are always simplifications and to a degree
> > arbitrary, I don't think it makes sense to call them 'objective'.
>
> But as long as they are to a degree nonarbitrary, then they can (or
> fail) to be objective. Objectivity deals with the nonarbitrary part, if
> such there be.
In my experience, especially society and psychology that deals with
high degrees of abstraction, you're very hard pressed to find
nonarbitrary things that aren't trivial. If you restrict your study to
them, or choose to ignore the arbitrariness, I think you risk going off
into the woods.
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
[snip]
> > > > If they do that, why call the definitions 'objective'?
> > >
> > > Because what makes something a table, and what makes it a crate, are not
> > > subject to our moods? Also, we might use a table as something other than
> > > a table, but it's still a table.
> >
> > See, we have our epistemological priorities in a different order. For
> > you, the definition is more important. For me, the definition is only
> > important inasmuch as it is useful.
>
> And what not useful in allowing an object to fall under two different
> terms?
The point is precisely that it _is_ useful -- and not _just_ two. The
point is that we should leave definitions open, to be modified and
reconsidered as contexts and situations change. What's the use of
nailing them down?
> > Incidentally, are you interested in languages? I'm constantly struck by
> > the conceptual differences between different languages. It really
> > brings home to me the arbitrariness of definitions.
>
> Somewhat, but I don't know how much I'll be able to post, as classes
> have started again.
OK. If you like, we could wrap this up: I've enjoyed the exchange of
ideas greatly.
AndrewC
<Petteri...@seittipaja.spambuster.fi> wrote:
Who ever said I was a professional philosopher?
You accused me of being an "essentialist". I am merely trying to
understand what you are accusing me of being.
>> And stop "detecting some hostility in the air", if you think their is
>> hostiliy and you don't want to continue, don't continue.
>
>Hm. Personally, I find it impolite if someone just runs out from a
>thread without saying anything.
>
>But this discussion does seem to have outlived its usefulness. Bye for
>now, and see you in another thread, I hope!
later.
Colin Day
> > > > in the scientific community, and why the fakers get flamed.
> > >
> > > Quite true. However, in the end, what keeps science 'honest' is the
> > > fact that it's a collective undertaking. 'They' might not check your
> > > results now or this year, but eventually somebody's going to use them,
> > > make his own observations, find that they don't fit, and check yours --
> > > and be really mad if he finds out you've been screwing around with
> > > them.
> > >
> >
> > But then, what is it about the observations that could do this?
>
> The fact that all of them are observing the same reality, which appears
> to exhibit some regularities of behaviour.
>
But wwouldn't this make it objective, if the reality is the same
independent of observer?
> > What if
> > one were already honest?
>
> One could be honestly mistaken. Happens all the time. Without the
> collective undertaking, there would be no way to detect certain kinds
> systematic experimental error.
>
But without deviations from intersubjectivity, there would be no way to
detect certain kinds of culturally induced errors.
> > <did she observe behavior>
> >
> > But to her, human nature is largely psychological, so I don't know how
> > much of it she observed (or am I construing "observe" too narrowly?). I
> > took you to mean deriving ethics from behavior in the sense of accepting
> > such behavior as ethical, and then making the ethics fit.
>
> It goes both ways. I think one problem with many 'essentialist' systems
> of ethics is that they tend to ignore how people _actually_ behave. If
> people never cheated, Communism would certainly be as close to perfect
> as far as ethical systems went. People do, so it fails
> catastrophically. It's tricky, this one: a system of ethics has to take
> into account how people behave while simultaneously moderating it.
> Precisely because it's a two-way process I think an iterative approach
> works best: take what we have, and tweak it to make it better.
One's interactions with people should take into account their behavior
(if you come running at me with a gun, then I will seek cover). But what
I seek in ethics is a way to make myself virtuous, I have little control
over the morality of others.
> > >
> > > Iteratively.
> > >
> > > For example, you could start with the following two assumptions (do
> > > they sound reasonable to you?):
> > >
> > > (1) People usually know when they're happy.
> >
> > replace "happy" with "content"
>
> Even given your explanation below, I fail to see the distinction. How
> can _you_ tell if someone (yourself) is happy or merely content? If you
> can't, aren't the two functional equivalents?
>
One can tell, if one analyzes oneself enough. But do most people do
this?
> > > (2) People usually can tell fairly accurately whether a person they
> > > know is happy.
> >
> > See above
> >
> > > Then you would ask them whether they are happy and whether people they
> > > know are happy. You would see how well their self-assessment and the
> > > assessment of others would fit. Then you would look at their
> > > circumstances, ethics, and society. Then you'd look for common patterns
> > > in the circumstances, ethics, and society and their self-stated or
> > > peer-observed happiness. *Then* you'd look for these patterns in
> > > another set of people, and see how good predictors of 'happiness' they
> > > make. You'd refine your patterns based on your new results, improve
> > > your questionnaires, and go for a new round. And so on.
> > >
> > > What's the difference between 'happy' and 'contented' btw?
> >
> > When one is contented, one is not aware of any reason to be unhappy,
> > even if there is a reason. Note how dictators try to keep people
> > content, and try to content themselves by exercising power.
>
> See above. :-)
>
See above :-).
> > > > > the society to weaken, then remove that particular imperative.
> > > >
> > > > Or remove the fear of being a pariah.
> > >
> > > You'd also have to remove the fear of physical assault and rape,
> >
> > The AK-47 might help, although a semiautomatic pistol would probably be
> > better for personal defense.
>
> Are you serious? What do you think a 12-year-old Somali would do with a
> firearm? Remember it's her _family_ that is doing it to her!
>
I don't know, but if I had a 12-year-old daughter, and she were
brandishing an AK-47, I would stay out of her way. I guess I'm being
somewhat facetious.
Colin Day
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C3E3ECB...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> > >
> > > In article <3C3B9C93...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> > > <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > [snip]
> > >
> > > > > It depends on what you mean by 'objective', I guess. I understand
> > > > > 'objective' to be roughly 'the same for everyone'. To take your physics
> > > > > example, an effect is objective if it can be observed by any observer
> > > > > performing the experiment. If the definitions are not the same for
> > > > > everyone, I don't think it's fair to call them 'objective'. Do you have
> > > > > a more useful definition of 'objective'?
> > > >
> > > > But you aren't defining the object, you're defining the words.
> > >
> > > I'm afraid that's all I can do. Reality just is what it is. We make
> > > sense of it through classifying the things within it with a conceptual
> > > framework. However I define my concepts doesn't really change anything
> > > in reality. Concepts and definitions are descriptive. Even 'object' is
> > > nothing but a concept and a definition: in some cases it makes sense to
> > > define something as a single object, in others, as a collection of
> > > objects. I could usefully define a human being as an object, or as a
> > > myriad of objects. Is a foetus an object?
> >
> > Yes, just not one possessing rights.
>
> Um... you lost me here. Do 'objects' have 'rights'?
I only wanted to say that fetuses didn't
>
> Is a cell an object? Is a human an object? Is a hand an object? Is a
> family an object? Is a species an object? I'd say yes and no to all of
> these. They're concepts that match certain parts of reality,
Is a human a concept? Is a cell?
> delimitable to a greater or lesser degree of precision. 'Object' itself
> is a conceptual model. Reality is a continuum; we impose categories on
> it to understand it. Since the categories are simplifications, we have
> to watch for situations where they no longer apply.
>
I didn't expect the bleedin' Spanish Inquisition. I just wanted to avoid
any possible anti-abortion connotations.
> > > > Maybe
> > > > most people would agree that the object is both a table and a crate. It
> > > > may be that everyone can apply the definition of "table" to the object
> > > > and agree that it is a table. Ditto for "crate".
> > > >
> > > > Also, I may been unclear. In saying that objective means independent of
> > > > observer, I did mean to imply that the observers would agree, just that
> > > > the facts would be the same.
> > >
> > > Exactly. Reality doesn't change, only our conceptual model of it does.
> > > Since conceptual models are always simplifications and to a degree
> > > arbitrary, I don't think it makes sense to call them 'objective'.
> >
> > But as long as they are to a degree nonarbitrary, then they can (or
> > fail) to be objective. Objectivity deals with the nonarbitrary part, if
> > such there be.
>
> In my experience, especially society and psychology that deals with
> high degrees of abstraction, you're very hard pressed to find
> nonarbitrary things that aren't trivial. If you restrict your study to
> them, or choose to ignore the arbitrariness, I think you risk going off
> into the woods.
>
But is that inherent in those studies, or merely a result of current
theories?
Colin Day
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C3E3D3D...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
> > > > > If they do that, why call the definitions 'objective'?
> > > >
> > > > Because what makes something a table, and what makes it a crate, are not
> > > > subject to our moods? Also, we might use a table as something other than
> > > > a table, but it's still a table.
> > >
> > > See, we have our epistemological priorities in a different order. For
> > > you, the definition is more important. For me, the definition is only
> > > important inasmuch as it is useful.
> >
> > And what not useful in allowing an object to fall under two different
> > terms?
>
> The point is precisely that it _is_ useful -- and not _just_ two. The
> point is that we should leave definitions open, to be modified and
> reconsidered as contexts and situations change. What's the use of
> nailing them down?
>
By why should objectivity presuppose being nailed down?
> > > Incidentally, are you interested in languages? I'm constantly struck by
> > > the conceptual differences between different languages. It really
> > > brings home to me the arbitrariness of definitions.
> >
> > Somewhat, but I don't know how much I'll be able to post, as classes
> > have started again.
>
> OK. If you like, we could wrap this up: I've enjoyed the exchange of
> ideas greatly.
Thanks, I'll try to get some replies in.
Colin Day
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
>
>
> > > > > in the scientific community, and why the fakers get flamed.
> > > >
> > > > Quite true. However, in the end, what keeps science 'honest' is the
> > > > fact that it's a collective undertaking. 'They' might not check your
> > > > results now or this year, but eventually somebody's going to use them,
> > > > make his own observations, find that they don't fit, and check yours --
> > > > and be really mad if he finds out you've been screwing around with
> > > > them.
> > > >
> > >
> > > But then, what is it about the observations that could do this?
> >
> > The fact that all of them are observing the same reality, which appears
> > to exhibit some regularities of behaviour.
>
> But wwouldn't this make it objective, if the reality is the same
> independent of observer?
Strictly, no -- because our perceptions != reality. They are merely
derived indirectly _from_ reality. We need intersubjectivity precisely
to help resolve the 'experimental error' caused by our very perceptive
apparatus. Our senses, brains, conceptual methods, and so on.
> > > What if
> > > one were already honest?
> >
> > One could be honestly mistaken. Happens all the time. Without the
> > collective undertaking, there would be no way to detect certain kinds
> > systematic experimental error.
>
> But without deviations from intersubjectivity, there would be no way to
> detect certain kinds of culturally induced errors.
That's why the broader the pool of people engaged in the discussion,
the better for the discussion.
Also, I'm afraid we just might have to come to terms with the idea that
we may _never_ resolve all of the problems associated with our way of
observing and conceptualizing the universe. If we ever meet an
intelligent, alien species, it'll be fascinating to see what insights
we'll gain from discourse with _them_.
> > > <did she observe behavior>
> > >
> > > But to her, human nature is largely psychological, so I don't know how
> > > much of it she observed (or am I construing "observe" too narrowly?). I
> > > took you to mean deriving ethics from behavior in the sense of accepting
> > > such behavior as ethical, and then making the ethics fit.
> >
> > It goes both ways. I think one problem with many 'essentialist' systems
> > of ethics is that they tend to ignore how people _actually_ behave. If
> > people never cheated, Communism would certainly be as close to perfect
> > as far as ethical systems went. People do, so it fails
> > catastrophically. It's tricky, this one: a system of ethics has to take
> > into account how people behave while simultaneously moderating it.
> > Precisely because it's a two-way process I think an iterative approach
> > works best: take what we have, and tweak it to make it better.
>
> One's interactions with people should take into account their behavior
> (if you come running at me with a gun, then I will seek cover). But what
> I seek in ethics is a way to make myself virtuous, I have little control
> over the morality of others.
Don't we all? I don't think in _practice_ you and I function very
differently. I feel virtuous if I feel I'm acting in a way that
increases happiness and decreases misery.
> > > > Iteratively.
> > > >
> > > > For example, you could start with the following two assumptions (do
> > > > they sound reasonable to you?):
> > > >
> > > > (1) People usually know when they're happy.
> > >
> > > replace "happy" with "content"
> >
> > Even given your explanation below, I fail to see the distinction. How
> > can _you_ tell if someone (yourself) is happy or merely content? If you
> > can't, aren't the two functional equivalents?
>
> One can tell, if one analyzes oneself enough. But do most people do
> this?
(1) How can one tell? (2) How can one tell one's not fooling oneself?
We're _really_ good at that!
> > > > (2) People usually can tell fairly accurately whether a person they
> > > > know is happy.
> > >
> > > See above
> > >
> > > > Then you would ask them whether they are happy and whether people they
> > > > know are happy. You would see how well their self-assessment and the
> > > > assessment of others would fit. Then you would look at their
> > > > circumstances, ethics, and society. Then you'd look for common patterns
> > > > in the circumstances, ethics, and society and their self-stated or
> > > > peer-observed happiness. *Then* you'd look for these patterns in
> > > > another set of people, and see how good predictors of 'happiness' they
> > > > make. You'd refine your patterns based on your new results, improve
> > > > your questionnaires, and go for a new round. And so on.
> > > >
> > > > What's the difference between 'happy' and 'contented' btw?
> > >
> > > When one is contented, one is not aware of any reason to be unhappy,
> > > even if there is a reason. Note how dictators try to keep people
> > > content, and try to content themselves by exercising power.
> >
> > See above. :-)
>
> See above :-).
I think we have a bit of a sticking-point here. Could you outline a
functional distinction between 'happiness' and 'contentment'? That is,
a way an observer (whether of himself or others) could reliably tell
whether he or the other is 'happy' or 'contented'?
> > > > > > the society to weaken, then remove that particular imperative.
> > > > >
> > > > > Or remove the fear of being a pariah.
> > > >
> > > > You'd also have to remove the fear of physical assault and rape,
> > >
> > > The AK-47 might help, although a semiautomatic pistol would probably be
> > > better for personal defense.
> >
> > Are you serious? What do you think a 12-year-old Somali would do with a
> > firearm? Remember it's her _family_ that is doing it to her!
>
> I don't know, but if I had a 12-year-old daughter, and she were
> brandishing an AK-47, I would stay out of her way. I guess I'm being
> somewhat facetious.
Yes, I think you are. :-) And, to be more facetious, in Somalia her dad
is likely to have a 4WD Toyota equipped with a machine gun... I don't
think an arms race is the solution to this particular social problem.
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> > In article <3C3E3D3D...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> > <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
> >
> > [snip]
> >
> > > > > > If they do that, why call the definitions 'objective'?
> > > > >
> > > > > Because what makes something a table, and what makes it a crate, are
> > > > > not
> > > > > subject to our moods? Also, we might use a table as something other
> > > > > than
> > > > > a table, but it's still a table.
> > > >
> > > > See, we have our epistemological priorities in a different order. For
> > > > you, the definition is more important. For me, the definition is only
> > > > important inasmuch as it is useful.
> > >
> > > And what not useful in allowing an object to fall under two different
> > > terms?
> >
> > The point is precisely that it _is_ useful -- and not _just_ two. The
> > point is that we should leave definitions open, to be modified and
> > reconsidered as contexts and situations change. What's the use of
> > nailing them down?
>
> By why should objectivity presuppose being nailed down?
If the definitions aren't nailed down, then how are they primary?
> > > > Incidentally, are you interested in languages? I'm constantly struck by
> > > > the conceptual differences between different languages. It really
> > > > brings home to me the arbitrariness of definitions.
> > >
> > > Somewhat, but I don't know how much I'll be able to post, as classes
> > > have started again.
> >
> > OK. If you like, we could wrap this up: I've enjoyed the exchange of
> > ideas greatly.
>
> Thanks, I'll try to get some replies in.
I'll be looking forward to them.
Colin Day
> > > The point is precisely that it _is_ useful -- and not _just_ two. The
> > > point is that we should leave definitions open, to be modified and
> > > reconsidered as contexts and situations change. What's the use of
> > > nailing them down?
> >
> > By why should objectivity presuppose being nailed down?
>
> If the definitions aren't nailed down, then how are they primary?
>
Primary? Could you be more specific?
Colin Day
Petteri Sulonen
<coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
I was referring to the relationship between reality and definitions. If
definitions are subject to change without notice, what sense does it
make to have them take primacy over whatever object happens to be
defined in a given time or given context? That is, why worry about what
a crate _really_ is if it is being used as a chair, or, to take a more
abstract example, what rights _really_ are?
Of course, abstractions are useful: we can make one and then compare
things we imagine it is an abstraction of against it to see if it fits
and what we can learn about it.
However, it's very easy to get into a pointless discussion about
whether a crate is _really_ a crate even if it is used as a chair, or
whether a right is _really_ a right, even if it isn't successfully
defended, or whether taxation is _really_ slavery, even if people who
consider themselves and each other free pay taxes. _This_ is what I
mean by "primacy of definitions". I think it's pointless, frustrating,
and hinders rather than helps communication. From my POV, it's just
squabbling about semantics. If it is useful to define taxation as
slavery in a given context, fine. If it isn't useful in another
context, then we'll use some other definition. Do you get my drift?
Colin Day
> > > The fact that all of them are observing the same reality, which appears
> > > to exhibit some regularities of behaviour.
> >
> > But wwouldn't this make it objective, if the reality is the same
> > independent of observer?
>
> Strictly, no -- because our perceptions != reality. They are merely
> derived indirectly _from_ reality. We need intersubjectivity precisely
> to help resolve the 'experimental error' caused by our very perceptive
> apparatus. Our senses, brains, conceptual methods, and so on.
>
Our perceptions are caused by reality, by derived from it? Is the
formations of brain states from retinal images a derivation? And while
our conceptual methods can be erroneous, how can our brain/senses be
erroneous?
> > > > What if
> > > > one were already honest?
> > >
> > > One could be honestly mistaken. Happens all the time. Without the
> > > collective undertaking, there would be no way to detect certain kinds
> > > systematic experimental error.
> >
> > But without deviations from intersubjectivity, there would be no way to
> > detect certain kinds of culturally induced errors.
>
> That's why the broader the pool of people engaged in the discussion,
> the better for the discussion.
>
But what if one of the culturally induced errors is a prohibition
against making claims that might offend any culture? Then the broader
the pool of cultures, the more prohibitions.
> Also, I'm afraid we just might have to come to terms with the idea that
> we may _never_ resolve all of the problems associated with our way of
> observing and conceptualizing the universe. If we ever meet an
> intelligent, alien species, it'll be fascinating to see what insights
> we'll gain from discourse with _them_.
>
That might be interesting.
But you are conflating two issues, the differences themselves with how
we could be aware of them.
> > > > > (2) People usually can tell fairly accurately whether a person they
> > > > > know is happy.
> > > >
> > > > See above
> > > >
> > > > > Then you would ask them whether they are happy and whether people they
> > > > > know are happy. You would see how well their self-assessment and the
> > > > > assessment of others would fit. Then you would look at their
> > > > > circumstances, ethics, and society. Then you'd look for common patterns
> > > > > in the circumstances, ethics, and society and their self-stated or
> > > > > peer-observed happiness. *Then* you'd look for these patterns in
> > > > > another set of people, and see how good predictors of 'happiness' they
> > > > > make. You'd refine your patterns based on your new results, improve
> > > > > your questionnaires, and go for a new round. And so on.
> > > > >
> > > > > What's the difference between 'happy' and 'contented' btw?
> > > >
> > > > When one is contented, one is not aware of any reason to be unhappy,
> > > > even if there is a reason. Note how dictators try to keep people
> > > > content, and try to content themselves by exercising power.
> > >
> > > See above. :-)
> >
> > See above :-).
>
> I think we have a bit of a sticking-point here. Could you outline a
> functional distinction between 'happiness' and 'contentment'? That is,
> a way an observer (whether of himself or others) could reliably tell
> whether he or the other is 'happy' or 'contented'?
>
Why must all differences be "functional"? Are you claiming that
functionality is objective epistemological goal?
> > > > > > > the society to weaken, then remove that particular imperative.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Or remove the fear of being a pariah.
> > > > >
> > > > > You'd also have to remove the fear of physical assault and rape,
> > > >
> > > > The AK-47 might help, although a semiautomatic pistol would probably be
> > > > better for personal defense.
> > >
> > > Are you serious? What do you think a 12-year-old Somali would do with a
> > > firearm? Remember it's her _family_ that is doing it to her!
> >
> > I don't know, but if I had a 12-year-old daughter, and she were
> > brandishing an AK-47, I would stay out of her way. I guess I'm being
> > somewhat facetious.
>
> Yes, I think you are. :-) And, to be more facetious, in Somalia her dad
> is likely to have a 4WD Toyota equipped with a machine gun... I don't
> think an arms race is the solution to this particular social problem.
>
Ah, yes, I remember P J O'Rourke mentioning something like that.
Colin Day
Colin Day
>
> In article <3C404145...@telocity.com>, Colin Day
> <coli...@telocity.com> wrote:
>
> > Petteri Sulonen wrote:
> >
> >
> > > > > The point is precisely that it _is_ useful -- and not _just_ two. The
> > > > > point is that we should leave definitions open, to be modified and
> > > > > reconsidered as contexts and situations change. What's the use of
> > > > > nailing them down?
> > > >
> > > > By why should objectivity presuppose being nailed down?
> > >
> > > If the definitions aren't nailed down, then how are they primary?
> > >
> >
> > Primary? Could you be more specific?
>
> I was referring to the relationship between reality and definitions. If
> definitions are subject to change without notice, what sense does it
> make to have them take primacy over whatever object happens to be
> defined in a given time or given context? That is, why worry about what
> a crate _really_ is if it is being used as a chair, or, to take a more
> abstract example, what rights _really_ are?
Because if one uses a crate as a chair and a chair as a crate, you may
want to swap. Besides, it isn't the object that is defined, but the
term.
>
> Of course, abstractions are useful: we can make one and then compare
> things we imagine it is an abstraction of against it to see if it fits
> and what we can learn about it.
>
> However, it's very easy to get into a pointless discussion about
> whether a crate is _really_ a crate even if it is used as a chair, or
But it still has the structure of a crate, so why wouldn't it be a
crate?
> whether a right is _really_ a right, even if it isn't successfully
Yes. Why wouldn't it be? Would a robbery be less moral if the
perpetrator were never caught?
> defended, or whether taxation is _really_ slavery, even if people who
I don't think that slavery is the best comparison (theft would be
closer), but even then, solving problems of taxation will require good
definitions, among other things.
> consider themselves and each other free pay taxes. _This_ is what I
> mean by "primacy of definitions". I think it's pointless, frustrating,
> and hinders rather than helps communication. From my POV, it's just
> squabbling about semantics. If it is useful to define taxation as
But how one "chops up" reality is not just semantics. For example think
about defining "art", as in fine art. The term is now taken to include
fecally enhanced crucifixes, bizarre compositions of steel, random
sounds. The problem is not just a waste of tax dollars (at least in the
US), but also a degradation of aesthetics.
> slavery in a given context, fine. If it isn't useful in another
> context, then we'll use some other definition. Do you get my drift?
>
But useful by what standard? It may be useful for corporations to define
taxation as slavery, not because it would be correct, but because it
would reduce their taxes.
Colin Day