Oronoco and the Ontological Argument
Dave Holloway
in "a few lines" by presenting Hartshorne's ontological argument.
Hartshorne, writing in 1941 and afterward, is one of the more recent
defenders of the ontological argument; another recent defender was Alvin
Plantinga, writing in 1972 and 1983. Here I shall refute both of their
arguments.
For Hartshorne I will look at his more recent, more sophisticated
argument, stated in his book "The Logic of Perfection:"
(1) If God exists, then he necessarily exists.
(2) Either God necessarily exists or he doesn't necessarily exist.
(3) If God does not necessarily exist, then necessarily he does not
necessarily exist.
(4) Either God necessarily exists or necessarily God does not necessarily
exist. (from 2 & 3)
(5) If necessarily God doesn't necessarily exist, then God necessarily
does not exist. (from 1 by modus tollens)
(6) Either God necessarily exists or he necessarily does not exist (from 4 & 5)
(7) It is not necessarily the case that God does not exist (it is possible
that he does).
(8) Therefore, God necessarily exists. (from 6 & 7)
(9) If God necessarily exists, then god exists.
(10) Therefore, God exists. (from 8 & 9)
Whew! It is arguments like these that make one agree with Bertrand
Russell, who called all such arguments merely cases of "bad grammar." (He
was also swayed by the ontological argument in his youth, albeit briefly.)
Here is the argument again, only this time in symbolic form where g is the
proposition that God exists and N means that it is necessarily true
that...
(1) g --> Ng
(2) Ng v ~Ng
(3) ~Ng --> N~Ng
(4) Ng v N~Ng
(5) N~Ng --> N~g
(6) Ng v N~g
(7) ~N~g
(8) Ng
(9) Ng --> g
(10) g
I don't know if that helps matters, but there's the argument. Let's start
by taking the seventh premise: that God does not necessarily not exist. In
order to support this premise, it must already be established that God's
existence is at least possible, being logically coherent. But Hartshorne
does not show this in his works, nor does he attempt to counter the
various atheological arguments which maintain that the concept of God is
logically incoherent. He must do both of those things if the premise is to
be justified, but does he? He does not; rather he takes (7) to be an
"intuitive principle." This doesn't help him; science and philosophy has
shown nothing if not that reality is often counter-intuitive. He does
recommend using one or more of the theistic proofs that already exist to
support (7). But this begs the question, since theistic proofs that
already exist PRESUPPOSE that the concept of God is coherent; they cannot
demonstrate it. Therefore, (7) is unjustified. The argument fails on this
basis alone.
Now, let's take the first premise: that if God exists God necessarily
exists. This premise is derived from St. Anselm's principle that
perfection cannot exist contingently. However, there is no reason to
suppose that, if a perfect being exists, its existence is logically
necessary. The idea that whether or not a statement is logically necessary
should be determined by the existence or nonexistence of something is
contrary to our idea of logical necessity. As Purtill argued, if by
"logically necessary statement" we mean a theorem of a logical system, or
a tautology, or an analytic statement, then it is obvious that the
existence or nonexistence of something is irrelevant to the question of
whether or not a statement is a theorem, a tautology or is analytic. Even
if the theist claims that our idea of logical necessity is wider than any
of these notions, it seems unlikely that any plausible account of logical
necessity would allow it to be dependent on existence. Therefore, (1) is
likewise unjustified.
Also, this argument, like all ontological arguments, can be used to prove
the existence of ANYTHING. One common example is a perfect island; replace
the word "God" in the above argument with the word "Perfect Island," and
it is effectively unchanged. Hartshorne anticipates this objection and
tries to counter it by saying that it is incoherent to suppose that an
island can be perfect, since in order to be perfect it would have to be a
noncontingent being, whereas an island is by its very nature contingent.
But it would be a simple matter to introduce the concept of a "super
island" that, if it existed at all, would exist necessarily rather than
contingently. Hartshorne makes the assertion that a contingent being has
ten properties, among which are being causally dependent for its existence
on something else and being good for some legitimate purpose only. He
seems to argue that an island must by its very nature have these
properties, and thus could not be noncontingent. But again, it is a simple
matter to introduce the concept of an island that lacks some or all of
those properties -- an island, for instance, that is not causally
dependent on anything else. Such an island would be a miracle, and would
violate many laws of nature as we know them, but it is not conceptually
impossible. So there is no reason to think that a necessarily existing
Perfect Island is incoherent, and such a concept can be used to parody
Hartshorne's argument. Other such parodies are possible.
That takes care of Hartshorne's argument. Now let's look at Plantinga's
version of the ontological argument:
(1) There is a possible world where maximal greatness is exemplified.
(1a) Therefore, there is some possible world in which there is a being
that is maximally great.
(2) A being that is maximally great is necessarily, by definition,
maximally excellent in every possible world.
(3) A being that is maximally excellent in every possible world is
necessarily, by definition, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect in
every possible world.
(4) Therefore, there is in our world -- and in every world -- a being that
is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.
Plantinga is quick to point out that this argument does not establish
God's existence conclusively -- premise (1) can be rationally denied,
since it is not rationally established -- but he claims that it is not
contrary to reason, and the argument is therefore rationally acceptable.
First of all, is it the case that (1) is not contrary to reason? It is
indeed contrary to reason if omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection
constitute an incoherent set of properties, as many atheological arguments
demonstrate. Any defense of this argument must therefore include a
demonstration of the unsoundness of such atheological arguments, and
Plantinga does not do this. Also, Plantinga justifies the rationality of
(1) by comparing it to Leibniz's Law:
(LL) For any objects x and y and property P: If x = y, then x has P if and
only if y has P.
Plantinga maintains that although we have no proof of LL we are justified
in accepting it. Similarly, he maintains that although we have no proof of
(1) we are justified in accepting it. However, LL is a free English
translation of a theorem of the first-order predicate calculus with
identity ((x = y) --> (Px <--> Py)), whereas (1) is not a translation of
any standard logic. Disputes over LL are metalinguistic, and not over the
truth value of LL, which is not the case for (1). Therefore, the analogy
between LL and (1) is weak at best.
This is a problem which Hartshorne's argument, in its use of Anselm's
principle, suffers from; indeed, it is a problem common to all modal
ontological arguments. Since it introduces ontologically comitting
vocabulary solely within the scope of modal operators (necessary,
possible, etc.), nontheists are under no obligation to accept any premises
which incur ontological commitment to the existence of a god or gods.
These premises depend on disputed, controversial assumptions about the
nature of logical space -- theists have quite different assumptions about
logical space than do nontheists. Therefore, until these disputes are
resolved there is no reason to accept premises which incur ontological
commitment to theism.
Also, Plantinga's argument can be parodied in the same way that
Hartshorne's argument can. It can show the existence of perfect islands,
leprechauns, ghosts, faries, anything. Let us define the property of being
a perfect leprechaun as entailing the property of being a little green
creature with a pot o' gold in every possible world. Then:
(1') There is one possible world where the property of being a perfect
leprechaun is exemplified.
(1a') Therefore there is one possible world where there is a perfect leprechaun.
(2') A being that is a perfect leprechaun is necessarily, by definition, a
leprechaun in every possible world.
(3') A being that is a leprechaun in every possible world is necessarily,
by definition, a little green creature with a pot o' gold in every
possible world.
(4') Therefore, there is a little green creature with a pot o' gold in our
world and in every world.
Since premise (1') is no more contrary to reason than premise (1), one
must assume that the conclusion (4') is rationally acceptable.
Given the problems with the ontological arguments outlined above, it is
little wonder that Arthur Schopenhauer once wrote, "Considered by daylight
. . . and without prejudice, this famous Ontological Proof is really a
charming joke." Yet some well-known philosophers with reputations as
excellent thinkers have taken it quite seriously. It is difficult to
understand why.
Dave
Selected Sources:
Hartshorne, Charles. "The Logic of Perfection," 1962
Holloway, Dave. "The Ballad of Saint Anselm: Ontological Arguments in
Christian Apologetics," 1997
Martin, Michael. "Atheism: A Philosophical Justification," 1990
Oppy, Graham. "Ontological Arguments," 1996
Plantinga, Alvin. "God, Freedom and Evil," 1983
Plantigna, Alvin. "The Nature of Necessity," 1972
Purtill, R.L. "Hartshorne's Modal Proof," 1966
Rowe, William. "Modal Versions of the Ontological Argument," 1987
Schopenhauer, Arthur. "The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason."
--
From the warped mind of Dave Holloway, alt.atheism Quotemeister, #1184
Director of Defense and Sabotage (DDS), EAC Mars Division
Elf Sternberg
dcho...@cord.edu (Dave Holloway) writes:
>Given the problems with the ontological arguments outlined above, it is
>little wonder that Arthur Schopenhauer once wrote, "Considered by daylight
>. . . and without prejudice, this famous Ontological Proof is really a
>charming joke." Yet some well-known philosophers with reputations as
>excellent thinkers have taken it quite seriously. It is difficult to
>understand why.
In the hopes of avoiding Usenet Nod Syndrome (in which people
just nod their heads, say "yep, that makes sense," and go on their
way, thus perpetuating the accurate impression that most responses to
articles are argumentative while making the writers feel
underappreciated), and in the hopes of also avoiding Mark Twain's
famous dictum, "Your friends love you in private; your enemies hate
you in public," I would just like to than Dave for writing this
treasure of an analysis of the Ontological Argument. It's people like
Dave (who also serves in the demandingly trivial role as Quotemeister)
who keep this newsgroup alive and interesting.
Elf
--
Elf M. Sternberg, rational romantic mystic cynical idealist
MST3K - Help save the saving grace of television.
A.A 1493 http://www.halcyon.com/elf/
Dave Holloway
> In article <dchollow-301...@10.99.1.175>
> dcho...@cord.edu (Dave Holloway) writes:
>
> >Given the problems with the ontological arguments outlined above, it is
> >little wonder that Arthur Schopenhauer once wrote, "Considered by daylight
> >. . . and without prejudice, this famous Ontological Proof is really a
> >charming joke." Yet some well-known philosophers with reputations as
> >excellent thinkers have taken it quite seriously. It is difficult to
> >understand why.
>
> In the hopes of avoiding Usenet Nod Syndrome (in which people
> just nod their heads, say "yep, that makes sense," and go on their
> way, thus perpetuating the accurate impression that most responses to
> articles are argumentative while making the writers feel
> underappreciated), and in the hopes of also avoiding Mark Twain's
> famous dictum, "Your friends love you in private; your enemies hate
> you in public," I would just like to than Dave for writing this
> treasure of an analysis of the Ontological Argument. It's people like
> Dave (who also serves in the demandingly trivial role as Quotemeister)
> who keep this newsgroup alive and interesting.
Demandingly trivial? Hardly! I haven't enjoyed myself so much in years! :o)
Dave
--
From the warped mind of Dave Holloway, Quotemeister, #1184
Paul King
dcho...@cord.edu (Dave Holloway) wrote:
Not a criticism ut I think there is a simpler way to show that Hartshorne's
argument is flawed.
>For Hartshorne I will look at his more recent, more sophisticated
>argument, stated in his book "The Logic of Perfection:"
>
>(1) If God exists, then he necessarily exists.
>(2) Either God necessarily exists or he doesn't necessarily exist.
>(3) If God does not necessarily exist, then necessarily he does not
>necessarily exist.
>(4) Either God necessarily exists or necessarily God does not necessarily
>exist. (from 2 & 3)
>(5) If necessarily God doesn't necessarily exist, then God necessarily
>does not exist. (from 1 by modus tollens)
>(6) Either God necessarily exists or he necessarily does not exist (from 4 & 5)
>(7) It is not necessarily the case that God does not exist (it is possible
>that he does).
>(8) Therefore, God necessarily exists. (from 6 & 7)
>(9) If God necessarily exists, then god exists.
>(10) Therefore, God exists. (from 8 & 9)
>
(7) can be reversed
(7') It is not necessarily the case that God exists (it is possible that he
does not)
(8') Therefore God necessarily does not exist (6 & 7')
(9') If God necessarily does not exist then God does not exist.
(10') Therefore God does not exist (from 8' & 9')
To refute (7') it would have to be shown that God necessarily existed which
would render Hartshorne's argument redundant.
I have a couple of comments on Plantinga's too.
>(1) There is a possible world where maximal greatness is exemplified.
>(1a) Therefore, there is some possible world in which there is a being
>that is maximally great.
>(2) A being that is maximally great is necessarily, by definition,
>maximally excellent in every possible world.
>(3) A being that is maximally excellent in every possible world is
>necessarily, by definition, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect in
>every possible world.
>(4) Therefore, there is in our world -- and in every world -- a being that
>is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.
>
>Plantinga is quick to point out that this argument does not establish
>God's existence conclusively -- premise (1) can be rationally denied,
>since it is not rationally established -- but he claims that it is not
>contrary to reason, and the argument is therefore rationally acceptable.
I disagree. Since maximal greatness cannot be exemplified within a single
world there are good reasons to be suspicious of 1. Further we can apply
the same trick of reversing the argument.
(1') There is a possible world where maximal greatness is not exemplified.
Or better
(1'') There is a possible world where maximal excellence is not exemplified
If either (1') or (1'') is true then Plantinga's (1) is false. Plantinga
therefore needs to argue that both are false - but even disproving (1'')
would require proving that a God existed in our universe.
Thus both arguemnts are useless because to support their premises requires
an alternative argument for the very point that they are trying to prove.
Mark Richardson
King) wrote:
<Snip simple strightforward trashing of God-existence proofs>
Nicely done Paul.
Yet more examples of "IF God exists THEN God exists".
What complete wankers.
Mark.
------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Richardson
m.rich...@utas.edu.au
____________________________________________________________
Dave Holloway
King) wrote:
>In article <dchollow-301...@10.99.1.175>,
>dcho...@cord.edu (Dave Holloway) wrote:
>
>Not a criticism ut I think there is a simpler way to show that Hartshorne's
>argument is flawed.
>
>>For Hartshorne I will look at his more recent, more sophisticated
>>argument, stated in his book "The Logic of Perfection:"
>>
>>(1) If God exists, then he necessarily exists.
>>(2) Either God necessarily exists or he doesn't necessarily exist.
>>(3) If God does not necessarily exist, then necessarily he does not
>>necessarily exist.
>>(4) Either God necessarily exists or necessarily God does not necessarily
>>exist. (from 2 & 3)
>>(5) If necessarily God doesn't necessarily exist, then God necessarily
>>does not exist. (from 1 by modus tollens)
>>(6) Either God necessarily exists or he necessarily does not exist (from 4 & 5)
>>(7) It is not necessarily the case that God does not exist (it is possible
>>that he does).
>>(8) Therefore, God necessarily exists. (from 6 & 7)
>>(9) If God necessarily exists, then god exists.
>>(10) Therefore, God exists. (from 8 & 9)
>>
>
>(7) can be reversed
>
>(7') It is not necessarily the case that God exists (it is possible that he
>does not)
>(8') Therefore God necessarily does not exist (6 & 7')
>(9') If God necessarily does not exist then God does not exist.
>(10') Therefore God does not exist (from 8' & 9')
>
>To refute (7') it would have to be shown that God necessarily existed which
>would render Hartshorne's argument redundant.
I checked the logic on that a couple times, and I can't see anything
wrong with it. Symbolized, the argument would look like this:
(1) g --> Ng
(2) Ng v ~Ng
(3) ~Ng --> N~Ng
(4) Ng v N~Ng
(5) N~Ng --> N~g
(6) Ng v N~g
(7') ~Ng
(8') N~g
(9') N~g --> ~g
(10') ~g
>I have a couple of comments on Plantinga's too.
>
>>(1) There is a possible world where maximal greatness is exemplified.
>>(1a) Therefore, there is some possible world in which there is a being
>>that is maximally great.
>>(2) A being that is maximally great is necessarily, by definition,
>>maximally excellent in every possible world.
>>(3) A being that is maximally excellent in every possible world is
>>necessarily, by definition, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect in
>>every possible world.
>>(4) Therefore, there is in our world -- and in every world -- a being that
>>is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.
>>
>>Plantinga is quick to point out that this argument does not establish
>>God's existence conclusively -- premise (1) can be rationally denied,
>>since it is not rationally established -- but he claims that it is not
>>contrary to reason, and the argument is therefore rationally acceptable.
>
>I disagree. Since maximal greatness cannot be exemplified within a single
>world there are good reasons to be suspicious of 1. Further we can apply
>the same trick of reversing the argument.
>
>(1') There is a possible world where maximal greatness is not exemplified.
>Or better
>(1'') There is a possible world where maximal excellence is not exemplified
>
>If either (1') or (1'') is true then Plantinga's (1) is false. Plantinga
>therefore needs to argue that both are false - but even disproving (1'')
>would require proving that a God existed in our universe.
Let's see . . . If there is a possible world in which maximal
greatness is exemplified, then there is necessarily a maximally great
being in every possible world, according to Plantinga's argument. But
there is not necessarily a maximally great being in every possible
world (God's nonexistence is possible). Therefore, there is no
possible world in which maximal greatness is exemplified.
This also seems to work. There is no reason to not accept the minor
premise of this argument over premise (1) of Plantinga's without
independent evidence, which would make Plantinga's argument redundant.
Thanks for pointing these things out.
Dave
--
From the warped mind of Dave Holloway:
Quotemeister
Alt.atheist #1184
Director of Defense and Sabotage (DDS), EAC Mars Division
Disgruntled Merkin
Thinking (non-)Theistically: http://welcome.to/thinking