On Ethical Relativism
Jeffrey D Koperski
had widely varying ethic views is well documented. This fact
is often cited as conclusive evidence for a naive ethical
relativism, something along the lines of "there is no real
right and wrong; morality is just a matter of what you've
been brought up to believe." And hence, one can believe
whatever he wants since there is no danger of being wrong.
The first part of my thesis (which is surely not
original) is that this attitude is a kind of modern
indoctrination brought about by (1) an admirable desire to be
tolerant, (2) the sociological fact cited above, and (3) some
faulty logic. Indoctrination always has an evil side, no
matter what the doctrine, if it entails the ready acceptance
of the dogma at hand coupled with a cultural pressure not to
ask difficult questions. In the past, there has been
sometimes widespread indoctrination of this sort in western
society of Christian theology and ethics. In recent times
around the world, Marxism has been the doctrine of choice.
This indoctrination need not always be aggressive, however.
Consider the usually unquestioned value of democracy in
democratic states. Perhaps it is the best political system
available, but we inevitably forget _why_ this is the case
when we stop asking _whether_ it is the case.
The question here is whether conflicting ethical beliefs
entail (or are by themselves even evidence for) relativism.
The answer is no. Note carefully, I am not arguing that all
forms of ethical relativism are false. I am simply pointing
out that the mere existence of conflicting ethical systems
does not support that view.
Why not? To illustrate the problem, consider the
astronomical beliefs of the world population around 1700.
Most scientists at the time believed there were six planets,
although some believed there were seven due to Pythagorean
assumptions about the heavens. Nor had everyone accepted the
heliocentric model of the solar system by this time. In
other cultures a variety of views about celestial bodies were
available that were in no way "scientific." Anyone positing
nine planets would have held a true belief, but a completely
unwarranted one. In the year 1700, did the existence of
these conflicting astronomical views provide any evidence for
"solar relativism?" Of course not. This is because we
recognize the difference between astronomical facts and the
evidence we have for them, between the way the world is and
what we believe about it. In short, we can be wrong. We
would not say that the belief in six planets was true-for-
them, rather the scientists of the time had well justified
beliefs that were in fact false. Truth and falsehood, unlike
justification, does not change over time.
Likewise, there may very well be moral facts, although I
don't wish to argue for them here. Their existence is the
philosophical claim of ethical realism, not to be confused
with slogans advocating "moral absolutes." In any discourse
in which there are facts, one can be right or wrong and have
strong or weak justification for his beliefs. Science is
often taken as the paradigm of a fact-stating discourse,
which is not the same as a truth-stating discourse (a fact-
stating discourse is one in which the statements made are
_capable_ of being true or false). The ethical realist has
no difficulty with the conflicting moral systems the social
scientist has uncovered. His explanation is that some of
those beliefs are wrong. In exactly the same way, not all of
the beliefs about the solar system in 1700 could be correct
since they were inconsistent. From our point of view, none
of their views were true (disallowing for the moment the
controversial notion of "approximate truth," whatever that
may be).
Note that at the time scientists had no way of knowing
which of the conflicting solar models was correct; they could
only discuss the various degrees of justification for each
(cf. our situation today with respect to cosmology).
Likewise, we are not in a position to know which ethical
system is correct, only that they cannot all be true if there
are ethical facts and that some are clearly better than
others. This lack says something about our own limitations
at best, not whether or not there is one, perhaps as yet
undeveloped, comprehensive and true ethical system.
The difference we all feel between putative moral and
scientific facts is due to different epistemological
constraints--our access to the facts. If there are ethical
facts, they are not discoverable by telescopes. This
difference may very well lead into a critique of ethical
realism, but that is not the point here, which is very
narrow: differences in belief, no matter how widespread, are
not by themselves evidence for relativism. Once again, there
may be no moral facts. But given the widespread _agreement_
on clear cases of moral goodness (helping an injured child)
and evil (the holocaust), it appears prima facie that there
are moral facts. In short, a more substantial argument is
required either way.
One more observation. Disagreement is the order of the
day in economics, psychology, political science, cognitive
science, linguistics, etc., yet no one would take this as
evidence that these fields are somehow suspect and that there
is no fact of the matter regarding their studies. The
ethical realist asks us to treat moral theory with equal
respect.
A bonus for the theist: an exactly analogous argument
can be used to defend against the oft cited "many religions"
criticism. It is not dogmatism to say that one of many
religions is the right one if those religions conflict,
although it may be dogmatic to say _my_ religion is the right
one. To claim that one of them is right (I gloss over the
commonality among religions here) is merely to say there are
theological facts. There may not be, but the mere existence
of conflicting religions does not count against the claim.
Jeffrey Koperski
Teaching Associate
Department of Philosophy
Ohio State University
Kendall Auel
[stuff deleted]
|> The question here is whether conflicting ethical beliefs
|> entail (or are by themselves even evidence for) relativism.
|> The answer is no. Note carefully, I am not arguing that all
|> forms of ethical relativism are false. I am simply pointing
|> out that the mere existence of conflicting ethical systems
|> does not support that view.
[more stuff deleted]
|> Jeffrey Koperski
|> Teaching Associate
|> Department of Philosophy
|> Ohio State University
|>
|> koper...@osu.edu
|>
I found your article very interesting. It made me wonder if there
might not be two types of ethical relativism: 1) absolute relativism,
and 2) contextual relativism. Absolute relativism would state that
all ethical beliefs are relative; there is no absolute right or wrong
(it is relativism that is absolute). Contextual relativism, on the
other hand, states that there is an absolute right and wrong, but that
it must be determined by taking into consideration the social context.
For example, a merchant prices his wares far above their value. In
some societies, this is expected. Haggling is part of the ritual of
buying things. In another social context, this type of pricing would
be considered unfair and unethical. The ethical practice is "selling
merchandise at a fair price". The relative ethics involves how the
merchandise is initially priced.
I think in this example it would be a mistake to say that one behavior
is ethical and another isn't, in some absolute ethical framework. While
this is not a proof of ethical relativism, it seems to imply that some
form of contextual relativism is needed.
--
Kendall Auel -- Mentor Graphics Corporation
kendal...@mentorg.com (503) 685-7000 x2853
[ The fact that I have no standard disclaimer in my ]
[ signature should in no way be construed to mean ]
[ that I am not disclaiming anything (or should that ]
[ be that I am claiming anything?). I'm not. ]
From: ka...@rainbow.mentorg.com (Kendall Auel)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: On Ethical Relativism
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 1993 23:17:32 GMT
References: <21s1tt$1...@news.mantis.co.uk>
Distribution: world
Organization: Mentor Graphics Corporation
In article <21s1tt$1...@news.mantis.co.uk>, jkop...@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Jeffrey D Koperski) writes:
[stuff deleted]
|> The question here is whether conflicting ethical beliefs
|> entail (or are by themselves even evidence for) relativism.
|> The answer is no. Note carefully, I am not arguing that all
|> forms of ethical relativism are false. I am simply pointing
|> out that the mere existence of conflicting ethical systems
|> does not support that view.
[more stuff deleted]
|> Jeffrey Koperski
|> Teaching Associate
|> Department of Philosophy
|> Ohio State University
|>
|> koper...@osu.edu
|>
I found your article very interesting. It made me wonder if there
might not be two types of ethical relativism: 1) absolute relativism,
and 2) contextual relativism. Absolute relativism would state that
all ethical beliefs are relative; there is no absolute right or wrong
(it is relativism that is absolute). Contextual relativism, on the
other hand, states that there is an absolute right and wrong, but that
it must be determined by taking into consideration the social context.
For example, a merchant prices his wares far above their value. In
some societies, this is expected. Haggling is part of the ritual of
buying things. In another social context, this type of pricing would
be considered unfair and unethical. The ethical practice is "selling
merchandise at a fair price". The relative ethics involves how the
merchandise is initially priced.
I think in this example it would be a mistake to say that one behavior
is ethical and another isn't, in some absolute ethical framework. While
this is not a proof of ethical relativism, it seems to imply that some
form of contextual relativism is needed.
--
Kendall Auel -- Mentor Graphics Corporation
kendal...@mentorg.com (503) 685-7000 x2853
[ The fact that I have no standard disclaimer in my ]
[ signature should in no way be construed to mean ]
[ that I am not disclaiming anything (or should that ]
[ be that I am claiming anything?). I'm not. ]
Shaad M. Ahmad
a particularly interesting critique of ethical relativism in article
<21s1tt$1...@news.mantis.co.uk>.
> The first part of my thesis (which is surely not
>original) is that this attitude is a kind of modern
>indoctrination brought about by (1) an admirable desire to be
>tolerant, (2) the sociological fact cited above [that different
>ethical systems do exist], and (3) some faulty logic.
Jeff, you still have to prove this part of your thesis. In your
article you have shown (or rather, suggested) that indoctrination
has occurred in the past, particularly with reference to Christian
theology and Marxism; you have proposed (not proved, and we shall
get back to this fairly soon) that ethical relativism (referred to
as ER henceforth for reasons of brevity) might well be an invalid
concept; but nowhere have you demonstrated that folk jump on the ER
bandwagon simply because they notice the prevalence of different
ethical systems. While I do not deny that such may well be the case
for some ethical relativists, making that into a generalization
applicable to all is rather close to stereotyping them all as "faulty
logicians".
To get back to the second part of your thesis, you use the
different amounts of information known about the solar system at
different points in history as an analogy for different ethical
systems. This analogy, as you yourself admit, would hold true if and
only if there exist universal non-contradictory moral facts (ana-
logous to the existence of, say, Mercury, Venus and Mars) with the
emphasis being on (1) universal and (2) non-contradictory.
> . . . But given the widespread _agreement_
>on clear cases of moral goodness (helping an injured child)
>and evil (the holocaust), it appears prima facie that there
>are moral facts. In short, a more substantial argument is
>required either way.
And, while your examples do argue in favour of moral facts, they
do not address the question of whether such facts are necessarily
universal and non-contradictory (unlike the existence of Jupiter, a
fact to which both these conditions apply). After all, a large number
of the Nazis certainly did not look upon the holocaust as evil; and
even now, in certain societies with limited resources, it is the unin-
jured child who is helped (whom these resources are channelled towards)
at the expense of the injured one. We should remain particularly wary
of confusing generally held and socially acceptable opinions with uni-
versal and non-contradictory moral facts.
To conclude, until and unless you can prove the existence of
universal and non-contradictory moral facts that apply to any and
all possible happenstances, ethical relativism remains a valid and
tenable approach.
Regards.
sh...@leland.stanford.edu - Shaad -
the deviant biologist
"It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle if it is
lightly greased."
-- Kehlog Albran, "The Profit"