Motorcade Route
robc...@netscape.com
Main) at the last minute? I'm wondering why they took the Houston/Elm
route when it violated Secret Service regulations.
r2bz...@sbcglobal.net
***The route was never changed. Going straight down main Street and
onto the Stemmons freeway, the only entrance was from Elm Street, thus
a one block zig, zag was required.
***Ron Judge
Barb Junkkarinen
Probably against several regulations to hump the limo up over curbs
too. <g> Elm St was the route to the Stemmons on ramp.
Barb :-)
>
cdddraftsman
I'm guessing , but I heard or read , to get to the Trade Mart you'd have
to get on the Stemmons Frwy. . To make it to the Frwy. from Main you'd
have to go over a 6" high conc. medium divider to get to the onramp . The
Houston / Elm route was the only practical way to go . Anyone else ? Was I
close ? .................tl
Anthony Marsh
Not exactly against regulations. It could be done. They could place
devices for the vehicles to drive up onto the median and down. But
remember that the limo had a low clearance and such devices would not
work well for the press buses.
I believe it was considered and rejected.
> Barb :-)
>
Anthony Marsh
That was not the only possible route. They considered and rejected going
down Main to Industrial Boulevard.
> ***Ron Judge
>
>
Anthony Marsh
The route was not changed. Other routes were considered and rejected.
It was the best compromise.
David Von Pein
THE MOTORCADE ROUTE -- WAS IT CHANGED AT THE LAST MINUTE?:
www.google.com/group/alt.conspiracy.jfk/msg/fbacd51dfe2f074c
yeuhd
> I'm wondering why they took the Houston/Elm
> route when it violated Secret Service regulations.
The route was not changed.
What "Secret Service regulations" did it violate?
Russ Burr
I don't believe they ever planned on using Main. There is a narrow but
high curb the motorcade would have to go over to get on to Stemmons where
the Trade Mart was. They would have needed a ramp to cross it; not too
Presidential or dignified if you ask me. And to my knowledge they never
changed the motorcade's route once they choose the Trade Mart as opposed
to the Women's Building. Connnally wanted it at the Trade Mart.
Russ
eric_r_carlson
to jump the curb. Look at google maps satellite version of dealey plaza
to see this:
http://i48.photobucket.com/albums/f218/e_ray/DP.jpg
doug.w...@gmail.com
If the motorcade had traveled down Main St. through DP, after going under
the triple underpass, it could have turned right onto Industrial Blvd.
which would have taken the motorcade to the Trade Mart (located at
Stemmons & Industrial Blvd.). Understandably, this would have been a
longer & less aesthetic route than Stemmons Frwy.. Perhaps for those
reasons it was not chosen.
doug.w...@gmail.com
Not sure the divider curb shows up on Google Earth but there is a
divider to prevent traffic from leaving Main, crossing over Elm &
entering the Stemmons on ramp. Traffic along Elm has the option to
enter the ramp onto Stemmons or continue on to the West.
yeuhd
Looking at a 2007 aerial photo of the Triple Underpass isn't the same
as looking at a 1963 ground photo of the same. Mel McIntire's photo of
the motorcade as it left Dealey Plaza onto the Stemmons Freeway shows
that the freeway entrance was not accessible from Main Street without
jumping over a curb:
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/tilson1.jpg
yeuhd
Freeway entrance ramp was not accessible from Main Street:
Martin Shackelford
published in the newspapers on Tuesday, and had been planned well.before
that.
I've never seen any "Secret Service regulations" from that period which
support your claim--though I realize it is also a very old claim.
Martin
<robc...@netscape.com> wrote in message
news:1191727849.3...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
tomnln
Main to Houston to Elm Leads to the Stemmons Freeway.
Straight down Main Leads to Industrial Blvd.
They BOTH INTERSECT at the Trade Mart.
"Anthony Marsh" <anthon...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:_6Kdnay7a-i0rJTa...@comcast.com...
tomnln
Main to Houston to Elm Leads to the Stemmons Freeway.
Straight down Main Leads to Industrial Blvd.
They BOTH INTERSECT at the Trade Mart.
"cdddraftsman" <cdddra...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1191777714.4...@k79g2000hse.googlegroups.com...
Martin Shackelford
after Tuesday.
Martin
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1191799530.2...@r29g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
eric_r_carlson
I asked Judge John Tunheim this question (he worked on one of the
official investigations) and he said they were going to jump the
curb. Then I looked at a areal and realized there was no curb. But
this photo seems to belie that (in 1963):
I think Judge John Tunheim would have known the truth...
Russ Burr
> ALL motorcades through Dallas went either Down or, Up Main Street.
>
> SEE CE 1358K (attached)
So, they took Elm instead. What's your point?
>
>
>
>
> <robc...@netscape.com> wrote in message
> news:1191727849.3...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
>> Does anyone know who had the original route changed (straight down
>> Main) at the last minute? I'm wondering why they took the Houston/Elm
>> route when it violated Secret Service regulations.
>>
>>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
eric_r_carlson
from Vince Palamara:
--------------START QUOTES-------------------
"When I asked Jerry [Behn] what the HSCA
asked of him in Executive Session [not the staff
interviews just released], Behn told me he was
asked two things: they wanted to know
about the Florida trip (manned by ASAIC Boring)
and why the route was changed for Dallas.
Behn told me "I know it was changed, but why...I've forgotten
completely- I don't know".
-------------END QUOTES-------------------
tomnln
the Grassy Knoll.
I'm NOT surprised you didn't know that.
"Russ Burr" <rdc...@netscape.net> wrote in message
news:470a...@mcadams.posc.mu.edu...
eric_r_carlson
----QUOTE ON----
MOTORCADE ROUTE -- The route of the presidential parade violated Secret
Service protocol by involving turns of 90 and 120 degrees. During
interviews with this correspondent, the route was strongly criticized by
former DNC advance man Underwood and former uniformed Secret Service agent
Norris. In addition, Jerry Behn, the # 1 agent in JFK's detail, told me
that the Dallas route was changed from another, as yet unknown route -- a
fact he offered, under oath and in executive session, to the House Select
Committee on Assassinations. That testimony remains, as of the date of
this publication, unpublished. Former agents Lawson and Kinney confirmed
to me that alternate routes (two, according to Kinney) were available.
Vincent M. Palamara
http://www.jfklancer.com/LNE/limo.html
eric_r_carlson
http://calitreview.com/2007/04/03/who-killed-jfk-an-interview-with-lamar-waldron/
QUESTION:
Oswald had been looking for work in Dallas in October of '63 and found
the job at the School Book Depository through a friend of his wife's. He
started work there October 16th. It doesn't sound like an active plot to
kill the President is in place at that time (Kennedy's motorcade route had
not yet been planned) and it also wouldn't give much time for anyone to
set him up as a patsy - creating a bogus snipers nest, etc.
ANSWER:
That's a common misconception. JFK's long-rumored Dallas visit had
finally been announced on Sept. 26-right before Oswald tried to go to Cuba
via Mexico City. It was well known by Jack Ruby and others in Dallas that
any major motorcade would go through Dealy Plaza along Main Street. It's
not generally known, but 11-22-63 wasn't the first time JFK had been
through Dealy Plaza in a motorcade-JFK had been there in 1960, during the
campaign. (Of course, Oswald was in Russia at that time, but Ruby and the
Marcello associates he worked for were in Dallas then.)The mob bosses
who'd been carefully planning to kill JFK had plenty of time make sure
Oswald got a job near the motorcade route. In fact, Oswald applied for
several jobs near and along the motorcade route.
It's important to note that around the same time Oswald moved to a new
city (Dallas, from New Orleans) and got a new job, so did the ex- Marine
arrested at the time of the 11/2/63 Chicago attempt against JFK and the
young man linked to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee who was investigated
by authorities after the 11/18/63 Tampa attempt to assassinate JFK.
tomnln
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1191872772....@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...
eric_r_carlson
> Can you prove him Wrong?
No, I'm asking if anyone can...
Anthony Marsh
Palamara is ridiculous. Previous motorcades always made turns of 90
degrees. You have to have some in order to change streets along a route.
There was no rule against making a turn of 120 degrees.
Other routes were considered and rejected. The existing route was a
compromise.
Anthony Marsh
If your guess is that it is theoretically possible to get onto Stemmons
without jumping a curb, then you are correct. All you have to do is make
a U-turn where it says no U-turns, block off Elm Street and go up Elm
Street the wrong way and make another U-turn onto Stemmons. Somehow I
don't think the SS liked all those U-turns at very slow speeds.
Anthony Marsh
> Who Killed JFK? - An Interview With Lamar Waldron
> http://calitreview.com/2007/04/03/who-killed-jfk-an-interview-with-lamar-waldron/
>
> QUESTION:
> Oswald had been looking for work in Dallas in October of '63 and found
> the job at the School Book Depository through a friend of his wife's. He
> started work there October 16th. It doesn't sound like an active plot to
> kill the President is in place at that time (Kennedy's motorcade route had
> not yet been planned) and it also wouldn't give much time for anyone to
> set him up as a patsy - creating a bogus snipers nest, etc.
>
> ANSWER:
> That's a common misconception. JFK's long-rumored Dallas visit had
> finally been announced on Sept. 26-right before Oswald tried to go to Cuba
> via Mexico City. It was well known by Jack Ruby and others in Dallas that
> any major motorcade would go through Dealy Plaza along Main Street. It's
> not generally known, but 11-22-63 wasn't the first time JFK had been
> through Dealy Plaza in a motorcade-JFK had been there in 1960, during the
> campaign. (Of course, Oswald was in Russia at that time, but Ruby and the
> Marcello associates he worked for were in Dallas then.)The mob bosses
> who'd been carefully planning to kill JFK had plenty of time make sure
> Oswald got a job near the motorcade route. In fact, Oswald applied for
> several jobs near and along the motorcade route.
Duh! The motorcade route was chosen to go through the heart of downtown,
where most of the businesses were.
Anthony Marsh
> Main Street would have been a Much More Further/Faster Difficult Shot
> from the Grassy Knoll.
>
> I'm NOT surprised you didn't know that.
>
That NOT difficult.
eric_r_carlson
QUOTE ON-----
THE MAIN STREET-HOUSTON-ELM TURN
62. Advance Agent Lawson informed committee investigators that he had
nothing to do with the selection of the Main-Houston-Elm turn before
November 14, since only Main Street, not Dealey Plaza, had been selected
for the motorcade at that time. He did not specify the exact date on which
the turn was selected nor did he identify the person selecting the
turn.(195) Sorrels stated that he and Lawson did drive the entire route
together, but did not specify when this occurred. (196)
Anthony Marsh
> Is Vince correct?
>
No. We've gone over this hundreds of times.
Anthony Marsh
Nonsense. Never rely on eyewitness statements.
Anthony Marsh
> WRONG Again Marsh;
> Main to Houston to Elm Leads to the Stemmons Freeway.
>
> Straight down Main Leads to Industrial Blvd.
>
> They BOTH INTERSECT at the Trade Mart.
>
What are you mumbling about? I said they considered Industrial Blvd. and
rejected it. There were many possible routes.
Anthony Marsh
Not quite accurate. It is theoretically possible, but not practical.
Anthony Marsh
No, not quite that difficult. And one photo from a restricted angle does
not prove what you claim. It was theoretically possible to get back to
Stemmons without jumping the curb.
eric_r_carlson
officers in the motorcade: "On the night before his assignment [November
21, 1963], Bellah reviewed the planned route with his captain. The route
was not the original one that was to go straight through Dealey Plaza, but
a revised route. The original plan would have skirted the Texas Book
Depository building by a block, but the altered plan turned to pass
directly in front of the building."74 [Emphasis added.] In a follow-up
letter to the author,75 Bellah wrote: "My Capt. P. W. Law-rence came by my
house in Dallas, it was getting late in the P.M. [November 21, 1963], he
wanted me to go with him to the Triple Underpass and show me the new route
for the escort. The new [route] was Main Street, cross Houston St. at the
Triple Underpass, go forward under the Underpass (railroad)[,] turn right,
cross Elm St. to the entrance to the Expressway, and stop traffic at that
loca-tion for the President's escort. As you know this route was changed
[to] Main St. to Houston St., right on Houston St. to Elm St.[,] then left
on Elm to the service road that approaches the Freeway. There was never an
answer as to why the sudden change. Maybe things would have been
different."
-Vince Palamara
eric_r_carlson
> Palamara is ridiculous. Previous motorcades always made turns of 90
> degrees. You have to have some in order to change streets along a route.
> There was no rule against making a turn of 120 degrees.
> Other routes were considered and rejected. The existing route was a
> compromise.
"DNC advanceman Marty Underwood told Harrison Livingstone: "There were so
many things that fell through in Dallas. Any advance man who had any sense
at all would never have taken him down that route." When Livingstone
com-mented that the route was changed, Underwood added: "Yeah, I know. You
don't take a guy down a route like that."79 [Emphasis added.] Both
Underwood and Uniformed Officer John Norris harshly criticized the route
to the current author, as well; in fact, Norris had previously told author
Bill Sloan: "Allowing those turns went against every protective principle
normally employed by the Secret Service ... and you have to wonder why it
happened. The motorcade route made absolutely no sense from a security
standpoint. The president had been driving past block after block after
block of sidewalks packed with onlook-ers. Why would those in charge have
violated so many of our established pre-cautionary measures just to get
him closer to a few dozen more?"80"
-Vince Palamara
eric_r_carlson
principal agents involved in the planning and selection of the route the
President was to take on November 22, 1963.52 While the Warren Commission
claimed that the fateful route of November 22, 1963 was "selected by Agent
Lawson", Lawson told the HSCA that he could not identify the person who
selected the turn!53 Confusingly, Lawson also told the HSCA on January 31,
1978: "He did not ac-company Dallas Agent Forrest Sorrels on the tour of
the route which they each say they made together on November 14, 1963."
[?] To compound matters, Agent Sorrels told the Warren Commission that it
was he who picked the dogleg turn involving Elm Street.54 (From the HSCA's
March 15, 1978 interview with Sorrels, we learn a startling detail:
"Sorrels recalled that when driving the mo-torcade route, prior to the
actual motorcade, they turned from Main Street to Houston Street and SA
Lawson was startled to see the building facing them. He asked Sorrels what
building it was and Sorrels told him it was the Texas School Book
Depository" ... yet the route included the turn facing the warehouse on
November 22, 1963.)"
-Vince Palamara
tomnln
Thoroughly.
One of his books in available On-Line.
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1191910528.7...@22g2000hsm.googlegroups.com...
tomnln
"Anthony Marsh" <anthon...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:X_adnSuK57f7DZba...@comcast.com...
Anthony Marsh
> Marsh Rescues the WCR Lies AGAIN.
>
What's wrong with you? It is not the WCR.
Anthony Marsh
> Vince Palamara seems to have interviewed Secret Service agents quite
> Thoroughly.
>
So what. Do not rely on eyewitnesses. I knew one of the top SS agents
and most of Palamara's stuff is nonsense.
Anthony Marsh
> "Two agents-Lawson and Dallas SAIC Sorrels-were, on the surface, the
> principal agents involved in the planning and selection of the route the
> President was to take on November 22, 1963.52 While the Warren Commission
> claimed that the fateful route of November 22, 1963 was "selected by Agent
> Lawson", Lawson told the HSCA that he could not identify the person who
Nonsense. It was Sorrels job and he drove the route with the DPD.
> selected the turn!53 Confusingly, Lawson also told the HSCA on January 31,
> 1978: "He did not ac-company Dallas Agent Forrest Sorrels on the tour of
> the route which they each say they made together on November 14, 1963."
> [?] To compound matters, Agent Sorrels told the Warren Commission that it
> was he who picked the dogleg turn involving Elm Street.54 (From the HSCA's
> March 15, 1978 interview with Sorrels, we learn a startling detail:
> "Sorrels recalled that when driving the mo-torcade route, prior to the
> actual motorcade, they turned from Main Street to Houston Street and SA
> Lawson was startled to see the building facing them. He asked Sorrels what
> building it was and Sorrels told him it was the Texas School Book
> Depository" ... yet the route included the turn facing the warehouse on
> November 22, 1963.)"
>
So what? They went past dozens of tall buildings on Main Street.
It's like the mock shock of someone waking up and seeing that the Sun is
already out.
> -Vince Palamara
>
>
Anthony Marsh
> Anthony Marsh <anthony_ma...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>> Palamara is ridiculous. Previous motorcades always made turns of 90
>> degrees. You have to have some in order to change streets along a route.
>> There was no rule against making a turn of 120 degrees.
>> Other routes were considered and rejected. The existing route was a
>> compromise.
>
> "DNC advanceman Marty Underwood told Harrison Livingstone: "There were so
> many things that fell through in Dallas. Any advance man who had any sense
> at all would never have taken him down that route." When Livingstone
More nonsense. It was not Underwood's job to select a motorcade route,
only sites. The SS decides the motorcade route.
> com-mented that the route was changed, Underwood added: "Yeah, I know. You
> don't take a guy down a route like that."79 [Emphasis added.] Both
> Underwood and Uniformed Officer John Norris harshly criticized the route
Jeez, a lot of people criticized the route. So what?
> to the current author, as well; in fact, Norris had previously told author
> Bill Sloan: "Allowing those turns went against every protective principle
> normally employed by the Secret Service ... and you have to wonder why it
> happened. The motorcade route made absolutely no sense from a security
Norris doesn't know what he is talking about every previous President
and Kennedy had routes which turned corners. No one went in a perfectly
straight line. Look at the published motorcade route, for God's sake.
> standpoint. The president had been driving past block after block after
> block of sidewalks packed with onlook-ers. Why would those in charge have
> violated so many of our established pre-cautionary measures just to get
> him closer to a few dozen more?"80"
>
Those precautionary measures are only in the mind of a crackpot like
Fletcher Prouty.
> -Vince Palamara
>
>
>
Anthony Marsh
> "DPD Sergeant Samuel Q. Bellah, one of the three advance motorcycle
> officers in the motorcade: "On the night before his assignment [November
> 21, 1963], Bellah reviewed the planned route with his captain. The route
> was not the original one that was to go straight through Dealey Plaza, but
> a revised route. The original plan would have skirted the Texas Book
> Depository building by a block, but the altered plan turned to pass
That is nonsense. The actual route was published in the newspaper the
DAY before, including the infamous turn.
> directly in front of the building."74 [Emphasis added.] In a follow-up
> letter to the author,75 Bellah wrote: "My Capt. P. W. Law-rence came by my
> house in Dallas, it was getting late in the P.M. [November 21, 1963], he
> wanted me to go with him to the Triple Underpass and show me the new route
> for the escort. The new [route] was Main Street, cross Houston St. at the
> Triple Underpass, go forward under the Underpass (railroad)[,] turn right,
> cross Elm St. to the entrance to the Expressway, and stop traffic at that
> loca-tion for the President's escort. As you know this route was changed
No, that was never the route.
> [to] Main St. to Houston St., right on Houston St. to Elm St.[,] then left
> on Elm to the service road that approaches the Freeway. There was never an
> answer as to why the sudden change. Maybe things would have been
> different."
>
The route was not changed. Other routes were rejected. If you can't
understand that distinction then you should not be discussing this.
> -Vince Palamara
>
>
Anthony Marsh
505
POLITICS AND PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION:
THE MOTORCADE
Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session
March 1979
(505)
CONTENTS
Paragraph
Summary.........................................................(1)
I. The origins of the plan for President Kennedy
to visit Texas............................................(10)
II. The process of the selection of dates for
the trip and the planning of the itinerary................(16)
III. The Texas Christian University appearance.................(22)
IV. The political controversy surrounding the
selection of a speech site for the President's
appearance in Dallas......................................(30)
V. The role of the Secret Service in the resolution of
the selection of the speech site and the
motorcade route...........................................(36)
VI. The publication in Dallas newspapers of the motorcade
route.................................................... (52)
VII. The residual role of the Secret Service in motorcade planing:
(a) The Main Street-Houston-Elm turn.....................(60)
(b) The Protective Research Section......................(64)
(c) Physical protection along the motorcade route........(80)
(506)
507
SUMMARY
(1) It has been suggested that the selection of a motorcade route
that
resulted in the passage of President John F. Kennedy's open limousine at low
speed immediately below the Texas School Book Depository Building in Dallas,
Tex., and in the closest possible proximity in Dealey Plaza to the
grassy knoll,
was probably no mere coincidence; that the use of a motorcade and the
selection
of its route was more likely controlled by the conspiracy that planned the
President's death; and that the Secret Service, since it had
responsibility for
protecting the President, may have been more than simply a negligent
bystander
in the decisionmaking process.(1) The list of suggested conspirators who
allegedly arranged this aspect of the assassination ranges from the Secret
Service itself, to right-wing businessmen, and even includes the Governor of
Texas, John B. Connally (2)--the Governor, perhaps, being an innocent dupe,
since it is unlikely (in the extreme) that he would have wittingly
arranged to
have shots fired the limousine in which he and his wife were also to ride.
(2) The results of the committee's investigation of these
allegations
are described in this start report. In summary, the evidence indicates that
political considerations dictated that there would be a motorcade, and
what its
route would be, and that the Secret Service's protective
responsibilities were
subordinated to those political considerations. The committee found no
evidence
of conspiracy in the processes that led to the use of the motorcade or the
selection of its route.
(3) The political considerations that apparently led to those two
fortuitously critical decisions were traditional Democratic Party
politics and,
as such, were characterized by a struggle between liberal and
conservative wings
of the party: between the conservative wing of the party in Texas led by
Gov.
John B. Connally, and liberal elements, including Texas Senator Ralph
Yarborough, but primarily, of course, centering around the President
himself. In
the end, ironically, it was the tension and compromise between the two views
that produced the fatal motorcade route. If either side had been able to
dictate
its desires without compromise, the assassination might never have occurred.
(4) On one hand, Governor Connally, who was asked by the President to
arrange the trip as a means of broadening and strengthening his support
among
conservatives in Texas, selected the Dallas Trade Mart, a new and attractive
convention hall on the Stemmons Freeway, for the luncheon site. It had the
attribute of appealing to the conservative business element, but the
drawback of
limiting the number of guests that could be accommodated.
(5) The President, on the other hand, believed that his
availability the
people by motorcade was a major factor in his successful campaign for the
Presidency,(3) and since his schedule in Dallas did involve a major public
speech before a large audience, but included
(507)
508
only a "limited" speaking engagement before a "select group" at the
Trade Mart,
the President felt even more strongly that a motorcade should be used to
broaden
his exposure. (4) Both Governor Connally and Frank Erwin, executive
secretary of
the Texas State Democratic Committee, objected to the staging of a downtown
motorcade.(5) Connally opposed the motorcade because the strain placed on
Kennedy of "exuding enthusiasm" would have been excessive: especially in
view of
his tight schedule, and because he considered it a possibility that an
embarrassing picket or sign might be held up before the" President
during the
motorcade.(6) Erwin objected to a downtown motorcade because it exposed the
President unnecessarily to the possibility of an embarrassing incident
provoked
by the right-wing element: in Dallas.(7) Supporters of right-wing extremist
leader Gen. Edwin: Walker were feared, (8) since Lyndon Johnson and Adlai
Stevenson, in 1960 and 1963, respectively, had been publicly assaulted by
radical conservatives in Texas. (9) The memory of these occurrences was
still
vivid, and many Connally associates were still concerned that the image of
Dallas would be tarnished by an incident in which the President would be
publicly embarrassed.(10) Erwin was so concerned about this aspect of
the trip
that when he first heard that the President had been harmed, his first
thought
was that a right-wing extremist had been responsible.(11) In the end,
President
Kennedy's wishes prevailed, and there was a motorcade.(12) Its route was a
simple by-product of the decision to hold the luncheon at the Trade
Mart. (13)
(6) Two luncheon sites had initially been considered:the Women's
Building
at the fair grounds which was located in the central southern part of the
city,(14) and the Dallas Trade Mart, which was located on Stemmons
Freeway to
the west and north of Dealey Plaza. (15)
(7) The Secret Service initially preferred the Women's Building for
security reasons,(16) and the Kennedy staff preferred it for political
reasons. (17) If the Women's Building had been selected, the Presidential
motorcade would have entered Dealey Plaza on Main Street west of Dealey
Plaza
and traveled eastward on Main Street, traversing the Plaza briefly, at high
speed,(18) without taking any turns in or around the Plaza. (19) Such a
west-to-east route through Dealey Plaza on Main Street would have
decreased the
probability of the occurrence of the assassination for two reasons.
First, the
Presidential limousine would have presented a more difficult target at
which to
shoot because it would have been moving more quickly and would have been
positioned one block farther away (to the south) from the assassins'
locations
than it was when the assassination occurred on Elm Street.(20) Second,
the
President,, who rides in the right rear of the limousine in accord with
military protocol, would have been positioned so that Mrs. Kennedy would
have
been seated between him and any gunfire emanating from the Texas State Book
Depository (TSBD) and the grassy knoll.(21)
(8) Nevertheless, in this case the President deferred to the
Governor:
the Women's Building was rejected. and the Trade Mart was selected. (22) The
result, then, was the deployment of the motorcade westward through downtown
Dallas and, in turn, the inclusion of the turn, northward from Main
Street onto
Houston Street and then
509
westward from Houston onto Elm Street, which placed the limousine
directly in
front of the line of fire.
(9) The Secret Service was in fact, a bystander in the process; its
protective functions were subordinated to political considerations. The
committee found no evidence indicating that a conspiracy affected either the
President's decision to incorporate a motorcade into the Dallas
itinerary, or
the Governor's decision to insist on a Presidential appearance at the
Trade Mart
or the Secret Service's acquiescence in those controlling decisions.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE PLAN FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO VISIT TEXAS
(10) Governor John B. Connally of Texas indicated that the idea
of a
Presidential visit to Texas arose first in the spring of 1962, during
the Texas
gubernatorial campaign. (23) Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson approached
Connally with the information that the President wished to come to Texas
for the
purpose of fundraising.(24) Connelly was not interested at that time in
attempting to coordinate such a trip for various reasons. First, he was
in the
midst of a campaign for Governor, was running against an incumbent. and his
initial showing in voter polls had been poor.(25) Second, he became
involved in
a statewide campaign for the general election after winning the primary
and he
had doubts about the capacity of his organization both to do justice to a
Presidential visit and simultaneously to run an effective campaign. (26)
Nevertheless, since Connally won the gubernatorial election and apart
from Vice
President Johnson, was the Texan who was closest to the administration,
the
Vice President continued to remind him about the President's interest. (27)
Connally continued to hesitate to commit himself to a specific time for the
Presidential visit. As Governor, he had to prepare a legislative program
for his
first session with the Texas State Legislature, which was scheduled to
convene
on January 20, 1963. That session was to last 120 days. Nevertheless,
upon its
completion, Connelly became willing to undertake the organization of a
Presidential visit. (28)
(11) It was his understanding from the beginning that the
President wanted
to raise money.(29) It also became apparent that the President wished to
shore
up his sagging popularity in a State that he considered, with
Massachusetts, to
be one of the two primary political objectives for the Presidential
campaign of
1964.(30) In 1960. Kennedy had carried Texas by the small margin of 46,000
votes, despite Johnson, a Texan was his running mate. (31)The President's
legislative program had net fared well in the first year of his
Presidency, and
the President was concerned about the 1964 election. For these reasons,
a visit
to Texas had assumed great importance. (32)
(12) Connally believed that, for specific reasons, the President
wished
to come to Texas under Connally's auspices rather than under the auspices of
Vice President Johnson or on his own. Since a Governor of a State is the
titular
head of his party and sets the political tone of his State, neither
Kennedy or
Johnson would have considered it politically advisable to visit a State
without
the political support of the Governor. (33) And in Connally's opinion,
Kennedy
had another, more narrowly focused reason for wanting to come to Texas.
Connally
had
510
developed a base of support among the moderates and conservative in the
Texas
Democratic Party.(34) The President hoped to obtain political benefit by
associating with Connally, the leader of the moderate and conservative
interests
whose support Kennedy needed in Texas. (35) The liberal wing of the
party still
supported Kennedy; but the moderates and conservatives thought of
Kennedy as
anti-business. (36) The President mentioned this to Connally and said
that it
disturbed him because he had no intention of dismantling the free enterprise
system. (37) Kennedy wanted to talk with and, he hoped, to appeal to the
people
who had not supported him in the Presidental campaign of 1960. (38)
(13) The first important meeting between the President and the
Governor
took place in El Paso, Tex., in June. 1963.(39) Kennedy suggested August
27 as a
possible date for the visit because that was the Vice President's
birthday. The
Governor objected since inclement Texas weather at that time of year
resulted in
the absence of many Texans from the State for vacations. (40) Apart from the
President's suggestion that four or five fundraising dinners be held in the
major Texas cities, no final decision was reached regarding the date for the
trip or the itinerary. (41) Nevertheless, the decision to make the
trip was
considered final as of this time. (42)
(14) From June to early October 1963, the Governor and the Vice
President intermittently discussed the objectives and format of the
trip. (43)
Johnson advised Connally that the President felt that four or five
fundraising
dinners would constitute an acceptable program. The Governor expressed the
opinion that it would be a mistake so to organize the visit, Johnson
responded
by saying that that was what the President wanted and Connally had
better have
"a real good reason" for objecting. (44)
(15) In early October the President and Governor Cormally met in
the
Oval Office. Connally told Kennedy that a Presidential visit consisting
of four
or five consecutive fundraising dinners would be considered by Texans as a
financial rape of the State. (45) On the basis of Connally's discussions
of the
matter with political leaders in the State, the Governor's recommended
course of
action was that the President meet with moderate and conservative
business and
political leaders who had not supported him in 1960 and that he attempt to
convert them in nonpolitical settings. The President agreed. (46)
II. THE PROCESS OF THE SELECTION OF DATES FOR THE TRIP AND THE
PLANNING OF THE ITINERARY
(16) The specific dates of the trip had been resolved prior to this
October meeting. Presidential advance man Jerry Bruno stated that
although he
was given formal notice of the Texas trip on October 21 by Presidential
Appointments Secretary Kenneth O'Donnell,(47) he believed the President and
O'Donnell had developed long range plans prior to the 11 State
conservation tour
in late September.(48) No dates for Texas were mentioned at that time,
but the
September 26, 1963. issue of the Dallas Morning News printed an article
stating
that on November 21 and 22, 1963, the President would visit several Texas
cities.
511
(17) Connally made it clear to the President that it would be
Kennedy
who would pick the dates of the trip. (50) Although in testimony Connally
stated he had no specific recollection of having in, own prior to
October that
November 21 and 22 were the selected dates for the Texas visit, he did
acknowledge that he must have known. (51)
(18) Governor Connally was careful to emphasize that the purpose
of the
Presidential visit was not to resolve differences within the Democratic
Party of
the State of Texas. (52) Appointments Secretary O'Donnell had advanced
this view
in his testimony before the Warren Commission. According to O'Donnell: There
were great controversies existing. There was a party problem in Texas
that the
President and Vice President felt he could be helpful, as both sides of the
controversy were supporting President Kennedy, and they felt he could be a
bridge between these two groups, and this would be helpful in the
election of
1964. I think that is the major reason for the trip. (53)
As Governor Connally stated:
. . . this (the complaints that Texas liberals were not
being
permitted to participate in the planning of the trip or to obtain
tickets to the various trip functions) raised the question that has
since been
discussed in great length that the President came to Texas to resolve the
differences in the Democratic Party in Texas. Nothing could be further
from the
truth. The two individuals who were most involved in the split in the
Party were
Senator Ralph Yarborough and Vice President Johnson, and both of them
were in
Washington, D.C. This is where the trouble was.
The trouble arose basically over Federal patronage and Federal
appointees and Vice President Johnson was trying to get every Federal
appointee
he could get, and so was Senator Yarborough...
And indeed if the President was interested in resolving that
difficulty, he had Vice President Johnson right across the street in the Old
Executive Office Building, he had Senator Yarborough right here on the
Hill,
and he could have gotten them together in 10 minutes. But that wasn't the
purpose of his trip to Texas at all, it had nothing to do with it.
The Governor stated that Texas was basically a one-party State where
political differences had divided liberal from conservative elements for
many
decades and where, throughout the Governor's political career recurrent
conflict
between the two forces was considered a normal state of affairs. The
Govenor,
recalling an incident during which fist fights broke out within the Texas
delegation on the floor of the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago in
1940,
stated that the President was too astute a politician to attempt to
resolve the
differences in the Democratic Party in the State of Texas.(55)
(19) The Governor stated that an early consensus was achieved about
concluding the trip with a major fundraising dinner in Austin, an event that
would have allowed the Texas Legislature a chance to meet the President.
(56)
The Governor understood at this point that
512
the visit would involve a single day. (57) To make the most of time
available,
the Governor suggested to the President that he visit San Antonio,
Houston, Fort
Worth, Dallas and Austin all day.(58) This itinerary is confirmed by Bruno,
Kennedy's advance man, who met with Walter Jenkins, described as "Vice
President
Johnson's right-hand man," on October 24. Bruno's notes record that he and
Jenkins discussed "....the proposed stops for the trip were San Antonio,
Houston
overnight, Fort Worth. Texas Christian University, and a fundraising
dinner in
Austin."(59) Although the luncheon in Dallas was omitted from Bruno's
original
note, Dallas was always included.(60)
(20) The passage quoted above, because of its reference to an
overnight
stop, indicates that the l-day tour planned by Governor nelly was
modified to
include a testimonial dinner for Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston on the
evening of November 21, 1963. (61) Congressman Thomas chairman of the
Appropriations Committee was considered one of the most powerful members
of the
House. He enjoyed the support of both conservatives and liberals in his
Houston
Congressional District.(63) As a result of his terminal illness, and in
appreciation of his distinguished career in public service, a
testimonial dinner
was being given for him. This occasion, along with the President's close
relationship with Thomas, resulted in a Presidential decision to extend
the span
of his visit, adding the afternoon and evening of November 21 to the
1-day trip
already planned for the 22nd.(64) The San Antonio visit to inspect the new
Aerospace Medical Center at Brooks Air Force Base was rescheduled for
Thursday.
(65) Originally, the President had planned to remain overnight in
Houston, then
fly to Fort Worth on the following morning in order to receive an honorary
degree from Texas Christian University, and then fly to Dallas for a midday
luncheon.(66) site for the luncheon had been selected as of Bruno's
arrival in
Texas on October 28. (67) As late as October 30, Bruno visited Houston to
finalize plans for the President's appearance at the Thomas dinner and to
examine the accommodations for Kennedy and his party at the Rice Hotel.
(68) The
overnight stop at Houston was changed to overnight stop at Fort Worth when
Kennedy accepted an invitation to the Houston dinner. (69) In the
meantime, TCU
had decided not to award the President an honorary degree. (70) That
change was
made on November 1.(71) A breakfast with the Fort Worth Chamber of
Commerce was
substituted on November 1 for the canceled honorary degree ceremony. (72)
(21) Since the Governor personally emphasized the scheduling of a
luncheon
in Dallas.(73) and because that suggestion dovetailed conveniently with the
President's insistence on the staging of a motorcade through downtown
Dallas,(74) the final sequence of cities to be visited was established
without
opposition from any person when the overnight stop was changed from
Houston to
Fort Worth.(75). It was then decided that on November 21 Kennedy would
dedicate
the Aerospace Medical Center at Brooks AFB in San Antonio.(76) This would
precede the President's appearance at the Albert Thomas testimonial
dinner,(77)
the event around which the Texas trip was built. (78) In Fort Worth, a
prebreakfast speech in
513
front of the Texas Hotel(79) and Kennedy's breakfast appearance before the
Chamber of Commerce filled the time gap caused by the cancellation of the
ceremony at TCU. (80) The Dallas luncheon and the fundraising dinner at the
Governor's mansion in Austin completed the schedule for the day. (81) It
was the
Governor's opinion that Austin was the best city in the State for a major
fundraising affair because it was the Texas capital. (82)
III. TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY APPEARANCE
(22) In his testimony before the committee, Governor Connally did
not
specify whose idea it was to have the President appear at Texas Christian
University.(83) Advance man Jerry Bruno first learned of the TCU
appearance when
Connally associate Walter Jenkins mentioned it in their first meeting on
October
24.(84) The itinerary presented to Bruno by Jenkins represented Connally's
preferences. (85) Jenkins told Bruno that Connally had proposed the
trip, and
from this Bruno inferred that Connally had proposed the itinerary. (86)
(23) Nevertheless, Bruno's interpretation does not establish the
fact
that the honorary degree was Connally's idea originally, because Jenkins
did not
assert this, and Bruno's notes of the meeting do not record any specific
information on the point. (87)
(24) The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees of TCU
held on
November 1, 1963, did not mention this question. Those minutes record
only that,
"Concerning a special item presented by Chancellor E. Sadler on the
recommendation of the University Council", the University would "tender its
facilities to the Governor of Texas and the City of Fort Worth . . . for the
purpose of extending a warm invitation to the President of the United
States to
speak on the TCU campus during his visit to Texas in November. Motion
passed."
(88) This language permits the inference that it was Chancellor Sadler's
idea to
invite the President, but no specific identification of the original
proponents
of the TCU appearance is made.
(25) A resolution of the question is offered by TCU trustee Sam P.
Woodson, Jr., who was present at the November 1, 1963, trustees'
meeting. (89)
Although he was not able to produce any documentation to support his
recollection, Woodson recalled that in late October 1963, the Governor
contacted
Chancellor Sadler and proposed that the President be awarded an honorary
degree.
Woodson's understanding at the time was either that the President "wanted an
excuse to come down to Texas" or that the Governor "in some sense wanted to
provide the President with such an excuse."(90) He recalled also that the
chancellor thought it was appropriate and decided to introduce the
matter to the
board. (91)
(26) Woodson's explanation of the reasons for the board's
decision not
to confer the degree is as follows:
(27) University procedure required that candidates for honorary
degrees
be nominated from within the university and be evaluated by both the faculty
senate and the student senate, this provided opportunities for approval or
disapproval individual cases.(92) In Kennedy's case, because of the
belief that
the Governor was trying to
514
manipulate the board at the expense of democratic university
procedures,(93) it
was decided that normal procedures should be maintained because they
protected
the university from awarding degrees to recipients who had not been
scrutinized
by all concerned interests.(94)
(28) On the other hand, some Board members felt that it would be
disrespectful to the Office of the President to turn the President down.
In such
a unique case as this, no precedent that would be harmful to the
university's
procedures would be established.(95) Woodson himself voted in favor of
the award
on these grounds and believed that the trustees would have approved the
award if
there had been time for the proposal to go "through channels". (96)
(29) Bruno stated that no consideration of an alternative program
at TCU
was given by the Presidential staff. The embarrassment to the President,
were it
to become known that he had been turned down for an honorary degree,
eliminated
the possibility of an appearance at TCU for some other purpose. (97) It is
ironic that if the honorary degree ceremony at TCU had been held, especially
with a subsequent reception of some kind, logistical complications might
have
delayed the President's arrival in Dallas and thereby interfered with the
scheduled occurrence of the mid-day motorcade. If such a delay had
occurred, the
opportunity might have been lost for an assassin to take advantage of
certain
conditions that promoted Kennedy's assassination. Such conditions
included the
physical absence of many employees from their places of employment (such
as the
TSBD) during the midday lunch hour, and the presence of large crowds on the
streets immediately after the shooting.* (98)
IV. THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE SELECTION OF A
SPEECH SITE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S APPEARANCE IN DALLAS
(30) The decision to send the motorcade in an eastward or westward
direction along Main Street was dependent upon the prior selection of
site for
the President's luncheon speech. (103)
(31) In Dallas, Governor Connally arranged (104) for the
cosponsorship
of the luncheon by several prominent civic organizations: the Dallas
Citizens'
Council, the Dallas Assembly, and the Graduate Research Center of the
Southwest.(105) Connally indicated that such groups were chosen because they
could give the occasion a nonpolitical flavor.
(32) Connally's understanding of the political function of the
trip--to
permit the President an opportunity to meet with the constituency in
Texas whose
support would be indispensable during the 1964 Presi-
------------------------------
* An interesting subsidiary issue regarding itinerary planning and
motorcade route selection is whether Oswald, when he took the job at the
Depository on Oct. 15, 1963, knew President Kennedy planned to visit
Dallas and
that his motorcade would pass through Dealey Plaza. (99) It is, of course,
possible that Oswald could have anticipated well before Oct. 16 that Dallas
would be included in the Texas itinerary. The Sept. 26 issue of the Dallas
Morning News printed an article stating that the President would visit major
cities of the state on Nov. 21 and 22.(100) And it could be inferred
that the
Presidential motorcade would pass through Dealey Plaza. This is because
Dealey
Plaza was part of the traditional parade route through Dallas.(101) However,
knowledge of an eastward versus westward direction would not have been
possible
before Oct. 16, since the route was not finalized until Nov. 15. (102)
515
dential campaign, the moderate and conservative business and financial
interests--led him to conceive of the Dallas visit in limited terms.
The President would arrive in Dallas, proceed directly to the
Trade Mart,
the city's prime commercial center, deliver a speech to the leadership of
Dallas' business community, and leave the city. (106A) Frank Erwin, the
executive secretary of the Texas State Democratic Committee, believed that
Connally's introduction might well convince that leadership that the
President
was "OK" and "could be trusted" with the Presidency. (107) For Connally, the
Trade Mart was the appropriate setting for the Presidential speech.
Architecturally it had the style and flair of the Kennedys themselves. The
building was new, convenient to reach from the Stemmons Expressway, and
generally impressive. (108)
(33) Frank Erwin, who assisted Connally through the process of
planning
the Presidential visit, commented on Connally's relationship with big
business and financial interests in Texas. In Erwin's opinion there was no
possibility that the conservative, affluent supporters of Connally would
have
wanted to mix at a public occasion of any kind with the various elements
in the
liberal wing of the party. (109) Erwin stated his belief that even such
high-ranking persons as the liberal Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas
and the
president of the AFL-CIO were not welcome at social and political functions
sponsored by Connelly's conservative supporters.(110) The appearance of
such
liberals would have led to a walkout by the conservative Connally
associates.
Hence, the State democratic committee, of which Erwin was Executive
Secretary,
insisted that the luncheon be held at the Trade Mart. (111)
(34) The Kennedy staff, on the other hand, preferred the Women's
Building,
which they saw as providing a better forum for contact with liberal
elements in
the party. Politically, the large size of the Women's Building would have
allowed 4,000 people to be admitted and would therefore have benefited
Kennedy
by permitting his liberal constituents to participate in the luncheon.
(112) In
their view, that location, in conjunction with a motorcade, would have
enhanced
their ability to reach the poor, the middle class, labor, and ethnic
minorities.
(113)
(35) The route necessitated by the Kennedy staff's preference for
the
Women's Building would have led eastward along Main Street toward the fair
grounds, which lay to the southeast of the Main Street business
district. (114)
The motorcade's access to the western end of Main Street on the western
side of
Dealey Plaza would have been provided by a cloverleaf exit that led into the
Plaza from the expressway, just west of the Dealey Plaza triple
overpass. (115)
After passing through the overpass, the motorcade would then have
continued, at
what Bruno stated was the President's customarily high rate of speed to
or 50
miles per hour--into Main Street within Dealey Plaza. (116) The distance
on Main
Street from the bottom of the triple overpass to the point where crowds
would be
gathered (at the Houston Street intersection) would have been crossed at
that
speed. Deceleration of the motorcade would have commenced when the
crowds were
reached. (117)
516
V. THE ROLE OF THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE
SELECTION OF THE SPEECH SITE AND THE MOTORCADE ROUTE
(36) On November 4, 1963, Gerald Behn, special agent in charge
(hereafter
SAIC) of the White House detail of the Secret Service, telephoned Forrest
Sorrels, the SAIC of the Dallas field office, stating that the President
would
probably be visiting Dallas "about November 21" and that two buildings
had been
suggested for a luncheon site. (118) One was the Trade Mart, which
according to
Behn's Information had about 60 entrances and 6 catwalks suspended above the
floor area where the luncheon was planned. The second was the Women's
Building
at the fair grounds, whose structure and appearance Behn did not,
according to
Sorrels, describe in equally complete detail.(119)
(37) On that same day, Sorrels made a survey of both locations and
reported back to Behn by telephone. He stated that he and Special Agent
(Hereafter SA) Bob Steuart of the Dallas office had visited the Trade
Mart and
the Women's Building. Sorrels reported that the Women's Building was
preferable
from the standpoint of security because the building had only two
entrances at
either end, each of which was large enough to permit only one car to pass
through. (120) Nevertheless, Sorrels told Behn that the Women's Building
"was
not satisfactory for that [Presidential] type of function" because of
its low
ceilings, exposed air-conditioning, and highly visible steel suspension
supports. As for the Trade Mart, Sorrels told Behn that because of the many
entrances and exits in the Trade Mart, there would be a problem of acquiring
sufficient manpower to cover all areas securely. (121)
(38) Sorrels did not say that the Trade Mart would be impossible to
secure because he felt that the necessary precautions could be
undertaken. (122)
(39) Prior to November 5, Bruno had returned from Dallas with
photographs
of the Trade Mart's interior to show Behn. These photographs revealed,
in full
detail, the catwalks suspended above the floor. (123) Bruno was
concerned about
the catwalks because of an incident involving Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson. (124)
Other members of the President's political staff were also well aware that,
while visiting Dallas during October 1963, Stevenson had been insulted
and spat
upon by right-wing extremist hecklers. (125) Bruno was concerned that
someone
could use the catwalks as a vantage point from which to embarrass the
President.
(126)
(40) After Behn met with Bruno and Ken O'Donnell, Behn announced on
November 5 that he favored the Women's Building. (127) According to
Bruno, Behn
was in charge of trip security. Therefore, Behn had instructed O'Donnell
that
the Women's Building was his selection. Bruno stated that O'Donnell
personally
confirmed this version of the course of events. (128) Behn, in his testimony
before the committee, stated that O'Donnell held the power to make the
ultimate
decision, that Behn himself lacked such power, and that O'Donnell simply
informed Belin that the Trade Mart was the final selection and ordered
him to
secure it.(129) Regardless of where ultimate power resided, a consensus was
reached between Behn and O'Donnell. Because of the catwalks and many
entrances,
Behn announced to Bruno
517
in Washington, D.C., on November 5 his decision favoring the Women's
Building.
(13O) It was Bruno's impression at this time that the report from the Dallas
field office was neutral, since the local office was capable of securing
either
place. (131)
(41) For Bruno, the input of the Dallas field office was of
secondary
import. It has been his impression from working with Belin that he was the
Secret Service official who had power, as SAIC of the White House detail, to
make final decisions in matters of security. (132) The basis for this
assertion
by Bruno was that Bruno had personnally accompanied and observed Behn
during the
advance work for the entirety of the President's 11-State conservation
tour that
had begun on September 24, 1963. He and Behn had looked at every stop on
that
tour.* (133)
(42) In accordance with standard operating procedure in the Secret
Service, a special agent from the White House Detail went to Dallas to
advance the trip and arrange for the President's security once the
speech site
and motorcade route were selected. (134) In this case, the White House
Detail
advance agent was Winston G. Lawson. (135) Lawson testified before the
Warren
Commission that he arrived in Dallas on November 12, and that on the
morning of
November 13 he visited the Trade Mart with Dallas SAIC Forrest Sorrels,
Dallas
SA Robert Steuart, and with Jack Puterbaugh, an advance man serving the
Democratic National Committee and the White House. (136) Lawson gave Behn a
positive report on the Trade Mart because of factors that Sorrels did not
mention: (1) the Mart's internal security system, which barred entry to
everyone
but lessees of commercial space and their customers; (2) the absence of a
kitchen at the Women's Building: and (3) the obstruction of proper TV
coverage
by the Women's Building interior. (137) Lawson agreed with Sorrels that
the
interior decor at the Women's Building was unseemly for a President.(138)
(43) The Warren Commission obtained no testimony or other
information
from Behn or Bruno about the controversy over speech site selection that was
initially resolved, according to Bruno, by the selection of the Women's
Building. (139) Hence, the Warren Commission evaluated Lawson's and Sorrels'
testimony without reference to Bruno's perspective. Bruno's perception
as of the
period between November 6 and 12 was that:
We got word that the local Secret Service agents there had
looked
at the site [Trade Mart] and this is coming from Governor Connally, and
they saw
no reasons not to go there. (140)
(44) Apparently, by "local agents," Bruno was referring to
Sorrels and
the special agents under his supervision in the Dallas field office. Bruno
stated that the local agents in Dallas had decided to withdraw
--------------------------------------
*In his 1978 deposition (p. 35), Bruno stated that Behn
disclosed to
Brumo that Behn, implicity having ultimate power to decide where to send the
Presidential motorcade, chose the Women's Building, and in the Nov. 6, 1963,
entry in Bruno's typewritten notes (p. 8), Bruno indicated that the decision
favoring the Women's Building was reached on Nov. 5. In contradiction of his
1978 deposition, however, the entry of November 6, 1963 clearly stated that
O'Donnell held and exercised the power to make the final decision and
accordingly gave orders to Bruno and Behn to implement the decision. See
references at footnotes 130, 133.
518
their earlier objections to the Trade Mart, and instead recommended it.
If any
local agent did in fact make such recommendations despite Behn's prior
decision
on November 6 favoring the Women's Building, this would have presented a
clear
case of a subordinate agent contradicting the SAIC of the White House
detail.
(141) Bruno insisted that this in fact took place:
Jerry [Behn] got word that the local agents claim that they could
secure it [the Trade Mart] and we were going to have to go with that. (142)
(45) Apart from Bruno's assertion, the committee found no record
of any such communication from any local agent. Sorrels was not asked by the
Warren Commission whether he made any recommendations to Behn, or had any
contact with Belin about speech site security, after November 4; nor did
Sorrels
inform the Committee that any such contact between himself and Behn took
place.
Hence, it is largely speculative as to whether Sorrels or any Dallas
agent had
any impact subsequent to Behn's November 6 selection of the Women's
Building.
(144) Further, Lawson could not recall for the Warren Commission whether his
oral report of November 13 was made to Behn or to one of his assistants.
(145)
Lawson had "no idea" whether Belin had made any recommendations. (146)
Lawson
was not sure how much weight his opinion carried in such situations. All
he knew
was that the decision about the motorcade was made in Washington, and
that, he
assumed that it was made by the White House. (147) His statement to the
committee added to his Warren Commission testimony only the information
that the
selection of the speech site and motorcade route involved Behn and
O'Donnell "at
very least." (148)
(46) Bruno's explanation of how the matter was finally resolved is
found in his journal in the entries of November 14 and 15, 1963:
November 14-- The feud became so bitter that I went to the
White House to ask Bill Moyers, then Deputy Director of the
Peace Corps, and close to both Connally and Johnson, if he
would try to settle the dispute for the good of the President
and his party. On this day, Kenney O'Donnell decided that
there was no other way but to go to the mart.
November 15--The White House announced that the Trade
Mart had been approved. I met with O'Donnell and Moyers
who said that Connally was unbearable and on the verge of
cancelling the trip. They decided they had to let the Governor
have his way. (149)
(47) If Bruno's assertions are true, the role of the Secret
Service is
clear: Although security considerations were taken into account, in the end
political considerations prevailed. The determinative factor was the
desire of
President Kennedy and Mr. O'Donnell not to place the President in the
untenable
position of appearing unable to lead the party in solving party disputes
and of
appearing weak in the South.(150)
(48) Moyers' recollection about these matters was less than
clear. He
could not recall whether it was ever questionable that a motorcade
519
could occur in Dallas. (151) He could not recall whether there had been a
debate about the selection of the speech site.(152) He could recall no
discussion with Governor Connally about the site for the president's
luncheon,(153) but instead said his discussions involved -"who was
participating and the necessity of cooperation." (154) In fact, he could not
remember whether he had even visited Dallas. (155)
(49) Moyers did confirm one aspect of Bruno's November 14-15
entries,
however. He stated that the Presidential staff would overrule the Secret
Service-when "overriding political considerations were paramount."(156)
O'Donnell would listen to the Secret Service, but not always accept their
suggestions. (157) None of the President's political advisers "ever let [the
Secret Service] have the last word" 'because the advisers' interest in the
President's political welfare out-weighed security factors.(158) Moyers
characterized the reaction of the Secret Service when being overruled as
that of
"good soldiers," that "loyal to their obligation, but they accepted the fact
that the President of the United States is also the chief political
figure of
our society."(159) This seems consistent with Bruno's statement that,
when faced
with the political dilemma of how to react to Connally's insistence on
the Trade
Mart, the President and O'Donnell made a decision based on political
concerns.
(160) The Secret Service was powerless to that point, much less to
intervene.
(50) In his testimony before the committee, Governor Cormally
recalled
that the issue of having a motorcade was not resolved until the week of the
assassination, ss Bruno had stated.(161) But with respect to the problem of
choosing a speech site, Connally stated that he was largely ignorant of any
controversy. (162) Connally's version of the decisionmaking process was that
whenever such problems could not be resolved on the staff level, he
would "just
make a decision we are going to do thus and so," or sometimes "call
somebody at
the House and get it worked out." (163) With respect to the
interrelationship
between the speech site and the motorcade route, Connally did
acknowledge that
"if the Women's Building had been chosen, the motorcade could have gone
another route and probably would have."(164)
(51) Bruno indicated that Moyers was asked to visit Texas on
behalf of
the President to settle the conflict over the speech site and motorcade
route. (165) Moyers indicated that both O'Donell and Kennedy asked him
to smooth
over the differences between different Democratic Party factions. (166)
Moyers
at first objected on the grounds that as Department Director of the
Peace Corps,
his presence in Texas would involve that agency in partisan politics. The
President overrode Moyers' objection by saying that Moyers, a Texan
with close
personal and professional ties to Vice President Johnson and good
professional
relations with Connally, should go to Texas and permit the President
worry about
the Peace Corps. (167)
VI. THE PUBLICATION IN DALLAS NEWSPAPERS OF THE MOTORCADE
ROUTE
(52) One function Moyers performed, as a representative of the
President,
was to insist that the motorcade route be published. (168) Moyers
coordinated
the President's visit to Texas from Austin. He
520
worked the Dallas situation by phone through his Dallas representative, Ms.
Elizabeth Harris.(169) He had chosen Ms. Harris because she was a Dallas
native,
had been married to a prominent Dallas person, and had been an associate of
Moyers in the Peace Corps. (170)
(53) Moyers stated that the only "major decision" he made with
respect
to Dallas was that:
... some 24 hours before the President arrived, there was a
dispute
as to whether or not to print in the newspapers the route, Betty
Harris
called me... and said they were not going to print the route of the ...
[motorcade] procession and I said, "Oh, yes they are. He's not coming
down here
to hide. He's coming down here to get a public reaction, and the
decision is to
print the route of the President's procession," and I don't know what
Betty did
after that, but the route was printed. (171)
Moyers later amended his recollection of when this decision occurred.
I think it was the second night before his--preceding his
arrival... and we were printing the route in the other papers, and I
couldn't see why an exception should be made in Dallas. (172)
(54) Moyers was in contact with the Secret Service at this time,
and was
aware of the security implications of printing the motorcade route.
He recalled asking the Secret Service agent stationed with him
Austin, whom
Moyers characterized as having been "in charge of Dallas trip," whether
there
was any reason why the route should be printed. Moyers believed the
agent agreed
with him that the route should be published. (173)
(55) In Dallas, Ms. Harris was working directly with the Connally
representatives and the Secret Service. Her conception of the "basic
problem",
as she defined it for Moyers over the telephone, was that the
conservative city
fathers of Dallas did not want to do anything,: for the liberal
Democrats, who
were led by Senator Ralph Yarborough. The two groups were fighting both
about
the distribution tickets for the luncheon and also about the publicity to be
given about the motorcade. The conservative faction wanted it to look like
Kennedy was not popular in Dallas, and hence frowned upon publication of the
route because that would draw crowds. (172) The matter of popularity was of
special significance because at that time the polls reflected a decline
in the
President's popularity on the national political scene. (175)
(56) Ms. Harris distinctly recalled a meeting that occurred on
either
the Monday or Tuesday prior to the assassination. She described as a
"confrontation meeting" that was artended by Governor Connally Robert
Strauss (a
Connally associate), Sam Bloom, a Dallas advertising man in charge of
publicity
for Connally, and Winston Lawson of the Secret Service, whom she
described as
"totally neutral". (176) She recalled that she took one side of the argument
regarding publication of the motorcade route and that Sam Bloom Strauss
took the
other.(177) During this meeting, she used "pressure"--an appeal for the
status
and prestige of the office of the Presidency--to persuade Bloom to
publish the
route not on Friday morning, November 22, but a few days earlier. (178) Her
purpose in having
521
it published ahead of time was to help "get the crowd out."(179) Hence, the
route was published in the Dallas Times Herald on Wednesday afternoon
and the
Dallas Morning News on Thursday morning. (180)
(57) Ms. Harris' perception of the role of Secret Service Agent
Lawson
during the controversy was that he seemed concerned primarily about route
selection because of the time factor and only secondarily about the security
factors. (181) Lawson did not seem to "get too much into the political
aspect;"
"he was a nuts and bolts man" who worked closely with the local police
"to make
sure that all of the arrangements were as his superiors in Washington
wanted to
have them. (182)
(58) Ms. Harris and Lawson were not oblivious to the threat of
right-wing
extremism. They did not consider it when planning the publicity and
motorcede
route. Ms. Harris stated that, in the case of the Adlai Stevenson
incident, "he
had been spat upon ... I was aware of that. We knew that." (183) As to
the Edwin
Walker assassination attempt, "We did know he had been shot at;"
"Lawson and I
were very well aware of it because I saw Lawson quite often and we
worked late
..... I knew that he was working with Curry on getting a fix ou the known
troublemakers." (184) But nothing Ms. Harris learned about right-wing
extremism
caused her to reduce the pressure she put on Bloom to publish the route
earlier
than November 22:
You got (sic) to remember that in 1963, it was very hard
for
anybody to recognize that anything worse than a spitting incident would
occur. I
was extremely anxious and Moyers and I frequently discussed this. We
wanted to
bend over backwards to avoid another Stevenson episode because it had gotten
tremendous publicity, and we felt it would not at all be in the
interests--in
Kennedy's interests for a thing like that to happen. Except for the
kooks that
might go out with a gun, I can't say that it ever occurred to any of us that
there was-that death would occur. We were worried about appearances.(185)
(59) Before the Warren Commission, Lawson stated that at a
meeting in
Dallas on November 18, he announced that the routes had been finalized
"unless it was changed later." (186) This remark implied that he did not
have
control over the final determination of the route, and that such a decision
might well be made by civilian political persons. (187) He recalled (from
reading the paper the following day) that the route was published on
November
19; but at the time he did not know who announced it. (188) It thus
seems clear
that communication with the Secret Service about publication of routes was
minimal.
VII. THE RESIDUAL ROLE OF THE SECRET SERVICE IN MOTORCADE
PLANNING
(A) THE MAIN STREET-HOUSTON-ELM TURN
(60) As the Dallas SAIC, Forrest Sorrels told the Warren
Commission, he
selected the Main-Houston-Elm turn through Dealey Plaza because it was
the "most
direct" route to the Trade Mart. (189) Sor-
522
rels' questioning by Warren Commission staff counsel Samuel M. Stern,
however, prevented a total picture of motorcade route logistics from
emerging.
Stern asked Sorrels why the expressway was proached from the Elm Street ramp
instead of from Main Street just beyond the triple overpass at the westen
boundary of Dealey Plaza. Sorrels explained that he size and
cumbersomeness of
the motorcade, along with the presence of a raised divider separating
the Elm
Street lane from the Elm Street lane at the foot of the ramp up to the
expressway, deterred him from trying to route the motorcade under and
through
the overpass on Main Street. Such a route would have assigned the
drivers in the
motorcade the almost impossible task of making a reverse S-turn in order to
cross over the raised divider to get from the Main Street lane into the Elm
Street lane. (190) However, this question-and-answer process failed to make
clear that the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond the triple overpass
in
such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the
expressway. The motorcade could have progressed westward through Dealey
Plaza
on Main Street, passed under the overpass, and then proceeded on Industrial
Boulevard to the Trade Mart. (191)
(61) George L. Lumpkin, assistant police chief in Dallas in 1963,
was
consulted by the Secret Service about the motorcade aspect of security
planning. (192) Lumpkin explained that the alternate route, continuing
straight
on Main through and beyond Dealey Plaza and thereby reaching the Trade
Mart on
Industrial Boulevard, was rejected because the neighborhood surrounding
Industrial Boulevard was "filled with winos and broken pavement." (193)
Additionally, Lumpkin stated that Kennedy wanted exposure and that there
would
have been no crowds on Industrial Boulevard. (194)
(62) Advance Agent Lawson informed committee investigators that
he had
nothing to do with the selection of the Main-Houston-Elm turn before
November
14, since only Main Street, not Dealey Plaza, had been selected for the
motorcade at that time. He did not specify the exact date on which the
turn was
selected nor did he identify the person selecting the turn.(195) Sorrels
stated
that he and Lawson did drive the entire route together, but did not
specify when
this occurred. (196)
(63) Sorrels' Warren Commission exhibit No. 4 suggested that both
men
drove the entire route on November 18. (197) It is not certain that both men
knew about the turn earlier than this date.
(B) THE PROTECTIVE RESEARCH SECTION
(64) In making a determination as to whether the advance agents
for the
Texas trip, as well as local field agents, were duly informed of any
potential
problems that might occur, a thorough review of the function of the Secret
Service Protective Research Section was conducted. The Protective Research
Service (PRS) was meant to function both as repository of information about
threats to the security of Secret Service protectees and as a provider
of such
information to agents in all types of assignments. It acquired and made
available information received from its own agents and from other
sources. (198)
(65) In 1963, information acquired from any source external to the
523
Secret Service, when presented informally to a local Secret Service
office, was
relayed by the local office of PRS headquarters in Washington. (199)
What was
not set forth in the Warren Commission report was a description of how
threat
information was processed and analyzed by PRS and of how the results of its
analysis were communicated to local field offices. Lawson's Warren
Commission
testimony suggested that the Washington, D.C. office would ordinarily
provide
agents with information about Presidential trips within that city, and
that PRS
seldom provided advance agents with threat information before their
departure.
But nothing more specific was given.
(66) Roy Kellerman was the special agent in charge of the Texas
trip.
Since that assignment required him to travel with Kennedy, (201) he was
removed from active investigation in Dallas concerning evidence that
suggested
danger to the President. Nevertheless, his testimony is important due to his
account of breakdowns in Presidential security during the Texas visit.
(67) Secret Service procedure required an inquiry to be made of
the PRS
about one week before a trip was assigned. Kellerman testified that he
received the assignment to coordinate the Texas trip on November 17,
1963, and
that by custom the check with PRS was made a week ahead of that date (on or
about November 10). (202) Kellerman was not sure who made the check but
believed
it was either Gerald Behn, Chief of the Secret Service White House
Detail, Floyd
Boring, Assistant Chief, or one other agent whose name he could not recall.
(203) He further stated that he received no information, and that he
considered
this "unusual." (204) By comparison, Winston Lawson, advance agent for
Dallas,
knew of his role in the Dallas trip no later than November 8, (205) 9 days
before Kellerman, his supervisor who ostensibly had the overall
responsibility,
(206) began to undertake basic trip planning.
(68) On November 8, Lawson checked with PRS at the Executive Office
Building, learning that there were no active subjects in the Dallas area and
that no JFK file existed. (207) Further comparison discloses that by
November
13, Lawson was in Dallas and in contact with local Secret Service Agents'
Sorrels and John Joe How]ett, with whom he met concerning protective
investigations of local anti-JFK suspects. (208)
(69) Kellerman also testified about an inquiry in Dallas which was
conducted prior to November 22, in order to locate anti-JFK subjects.
When asked
specifically about right-wing individuals, scurrilous literature, and
extremist
groups known to be in Dallas, he claimed virtually total ignorance. (209) He
insisted that no one told him anything about an investigation of threat
information submitted to the Secret Service in Dallas on November 21 and
22 by
the FBI. (210) Additionally, Kellerman observed that it was strange that
among
five cities in one State and despite the anti-Adlai Stevenson
demonstration in
Dallas on October 1963, no information about suspects was forthcoming and
nothing had been given him. (211)
(70) The Secret Service final report for the November 21 trip to
Houston
mentioned two active subjects. (212) Both individuals had made specific
threats in Houston. (213) Nevertheless, Kellerman was not questioned about
Houston. (214)
524
(71) However, without being questioned about the San Antonio leg
of the
Texas strip, Kellerman did recall the receipt of PRS information prior to
November 21 regarding anti-Presidential picketing that did in fact occur
in San
Antonio on that date. (215)
(72) The importance of Kellerman's testimony is that, as the one
agent
who was in direct contact with Kennedy and his innermost circle of
advisers, and
who was therefore ideally placed to relay information: that provided
cause for
alarm, he was effectively sealed off from the information that he needed to
perform with maximum protective effort.
(73) As regards SAIC Sorrels' role, both Sorrels and Howlett
cooperated
with the special services bureau of the Dallas Police Department, the
police in Denton, Tex., Felix McKnight of the Dallas Times-Herald, and the
FBI.(216) The FBI was interested in a Ku Klux Klan suspect from a
neighboring area. (217) Additionally on November 21, Dallas field
office FBI
agent James Hosty informed the local Secret Service office of a handbill
accusing Kennedy of being a traitor. (218)
(74) The results of these investigations indicated that there
were no.
known, periodically checked PRS subjects; that no formerly institutionalized
persons were out on release; and that neither the-DPD nor the Secret
Service
could link anyone with the "traitor" handbill. (219)
(75) White House Detail agent Lawson's position was that, the
responsibility for any investigation was that of the PRS or Sorrels, and
was not
his.(220) Although Secret Service procedure allowed him to investigate
or not,
on the basis of discretion, he did not because he knew that the Service
preferred to have the local agents, who have to work with the police on
a daily
basis, maintain liaison and conduct investigations.(221) Secret Service
procedure would not, necessarily require him to receive information
solely from
the local office. It could come from Washington PRS as well. In his
opinion, the
handbill presented no "direct threat" to John Kennedy. (222)
(76) When interviewed by the committee, Sorrels stated that in
November
1963 all known PRS subjects within the jurisdiction of the Dallas field
office were in mental hospitals. Hence, he was surprised when he heard
about the
circulation of the "JFK--Wanted for Treason" handbills. His reaction was to
determine who the printer was, bring him in and interview him. (223) Sorrels
stated that the standard procedure for the White House Detail advance
agents and
the field office SAIC was to become familiar with the entire threat profile
before endeavoring to contact the local police department. (224)
(77) When interviewed by the committee, Lawson said that as White
House
Detail agent, his duties were limited to shift work and advances, and
that in
effect, he was not encouraged to participate in the process of investigating
threats at the local level and referring them back to PRS. (225)
Lawson's only
recollection concerning PRS procedures was that when PRS received
information
about a threat subject from a local agent or a White House detail agent
making
an advance. the subject was given a file number. "In the old days." files
consisted of a folder containing 3 by 5 cards and PRS had the job of
coordinating a what were called "collateral" investigations in the same
or an
adjacent district. (226) At no time while he was in Dallas did
525
Lawson receive information about threats to the President made in other
regions. (227)
(78) White House Detail SAIC Gerald Behn described to the
committee the
procedures in use in PRS at tiffs time. He disclosed the great extent to
which
the PRS was the central focus of protective operations. Information from the
field about, active or potential threats to the President were referred
to PRS
directly from the local office before they were referred to the Chief of
the,
White House Detail. The SAIC of the White House Detail (Behn) would receive
reports from the field only from White House Detail advance agents. He
and the
SAIC of the PRS (Robert I. Bouck) would then discuss the matter with the
overall
Chief of the Secret Service, Mr. James Rowley. (228)
(79) Behn did not recall whether PRS distributed information to
Winston
Lawson the October 1963 heckling and harassment of Adlai Stevenson in
Dallas, Tex. Nor could he recall whether any information was distributed
prior
to the, November 21 Texas trip about Dallas area right-wing extremist Edwin
Walker. Behn specifically stated, as to the availibility to him of
information
about both Walker and Stevenson, that "no one in PRS passed it on."
(229) When
asked if he himself warned any agents about either one of those subjects, he
said that he did "not remember any discussion with any agent". (230)
(C) PHYSICAL PROTECTION ALONG THE MOTORCADE ROUTE
(80) In reviewing the performance of the Secret Service,
consideration
must be given io the Dallas Police Department also, since the agency
defined and
supervised the functions of the police during Kennedy's visit. The
activities of
the Secret Service, in collaboration with the DPD, covered many areas of
security apart from PRS activities.
(81) Arrangements made by the Dallas police included provisions for
traffic control to contain the crowd; followup assignments for each officer
directing him, to subsequent stations after the motorcede has passed his
post;
assigning at least two officers to each intersection, one to cover traffic
primarily the other to control the crowd: and the stationing of officers
at all
over-and underpasses. (231) The Secret Service notified the DPD
frequently about
their joint responsibility for crowd control and crowd observation, but no
followup instructions were made in writing nor did Lawson as the Dallas
advance
agent, make any written checklist of such instructions. Lawson indicated
that it
was not normal for there to be such written directions. (232)
(82) At Love Field, the DPD put men on the roofs of buildings
surrounding the landing area. Detectives mingled with the crowd, while
officers patrolled both sides of a chain-link barricade fence. One of
the two
service roads linking two general public areas were closed off for motorcade
use. The danger from rooftops was not great, since no building faced the
side of
the plane where the President disembarked. The next most adjacent
building was
only one story and was blanketed by crowds. Nevertheless, officers were
placed
on top of this building as well as on the ones adjacent, but there was
no check
made of offices providing vantage points overlooking the area where the
President's plane would land.
526
(83) Advance agent Lawson testified in 1964 that the Secret
Service did
not check buildings along a motorcade route except under three
circumstances:
Presidential inaugurations, visits by a king or a president of a foreign
country, or when the motorcade route has been known for years. (234)
(84) Some question remains concerning the conduct of Sorrels and
Lawson
as to possible violation of the guideline compelling inspection of buildings
when a mororeade route has been standard for years. (235) Sorrels stated
categorically to the Warren Commission that Main Street was the best
choice for
parades in that it went through the heart of the city, flanked on either
side by
tall buildings which maximized the opportunity for large numbers of
people to
see the parade. He added that this route was used for a Presidential
motorcade
in 1936, when President Roosevelt traversed Main Street from east to
west, just
as Kennedy's motorcade would have done had the Women's Building been
selected.
(236)
(85) Lawson testified that standard Secret Service operating
procedure
required agents to watch all windows, but he could not recall giving the
instructions to watch them.(237) He stated that Sorrels' obligation to watch
windows was greater than his own. His duties, while stationed in the
lead car
immeditely in front of the Presidential limousine, included looking
directly to
the rear at the President in order to coordinate the motorcade's speed and
maintain radio contact with Dallas Chief of Police Jesse Curry about
adherence
to schedule. (238) Although Lawson may have looked at the Depository
Building,
he was doing too many things at once to notice it.(239)
(86) Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did not have the same
supervisory
duties as Lawson and was in fact free to observe windows. He recalled
observing the facade of the Depository, but recalled nothing unusual;
hence, he
did not study it intently. (240)
(87) Lawson readily admitted that windows posed an added danger
in a
narrowing area that required the motorcade to slow down, especially
given the
President's "usual" action of standing up to wave.(241)
(88) Lawson further testified that on the morning of November 22,
he
received a call from Kellerman in Fort Worth asking about weather
conditions in
Dallas and whether the bubble-top on the President's car would be used
or not.
During that call, Dawson was told the bubble-top was to be on if it was
raining,
and off if it was not.
(89) The final decision in this matter was made by Bill Moyers.
Moyers
had been on the phone to Ms. Harris, informing her that the President
did not
want the bubble. He told Harris to "get that Goddamned bubble off unless
it's
pouring rain."(243) Shortly thereafter the weather began to clear. Ms.
Harris
approached Sorrels about the bubble-top and together they had the
special agents
remove the glass top.(244)
(90) Dallas Police Department Capt. Perdue W. Lawrence was
assigned, on
the basis of his familiarity with escort security, to be in charge of
traffic control for the motorcade. (245) He recalled that he received this
assignment on November 19. (246) His immediate superior was Deputy Chief
Lunday,
head of the traffic division, who was in turn commanded by Assistant Chief
Char]es Batchelor.(247) Law-
527
rence testified that approximately 2 days before the President's arrival, he
discussed with Lunday and Batchelor the stationing of motorcycle escorts. At
this meeting, no Secret Service agents were present. They agreed to use 18
motorcycles. Some of these were to be positioned "alongside" the
Presidential
limousine. (248)
(91) Dallas Police Department documents indicate that at a meeting
between Chief Curry, Deputy Chief R.H. Lunday, and Captain Lawrence on
November 19, it was agreed that a motorcycle escort should be used,
"with men on
either side of the motorcade [sic], with five at the rear, four motorcycles
immediately ahead, and three motorcycles to precede the motorcade by
about two
blocks."
(92) Lawrence was subsequently invited to a DPD/SS coordinating
meeting
held on November 21. At 5 p.m. he was told to report to the meeting.
(250) It
was here that a change in motorcycle escort plans occurred. The coordination
meeting, according to DPD documents, was attended by Curry, Batchelor,
Deputy
Chiefs Lumpkin, Stevenson, Lunday, and Fisher, Captains Souter,
Lawrence, and
King, Inspector Sawyer, and Secret Service agents Sorrels, Lawson, and David
Grant. The meeting touched on various topics, however, particular
emphasis was
given to the use of motorcycles as Presidential escorts. (251)
(93) Lawrence's account of the change that was introduced by the
Secret
Service is as follows:
...I heard one of the Secret Service men say that President
Kennedy did not desire any motorcycle officer directly on each side of him,
between him and the crowd, but he would want the officers to the rear. (252)
... when it was mentioned about these motorcycle officers
alongside
the President's car, he (the S.S. agent) said, "No, these officers
should be back and if any people started a rush toward the car, if there
was any
movement at all where the President was endangered in any way, these
officers
would be in a position to gun their motors and get between them and the
Presidential car . . . (253)
(94) Comparison reveals that the DPD document that describes the
November 21 meeting is vague in contrast to Lawrence's explicit
assertion that
the Secret Service changed the "alongside" distribution of motorcycles to a
rearward distribution. The DPD document for November 21 stated:
Lawrence then said there would be four motorcycles on
either side
of the motorcede immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle. Mr.
Lawson
stated that this was too many. that he thought two motorcycles on either
side
would be sufficient, about even with the rear fender of the President's car.
Lawrence was instructed to disperse the other two along each side of the
motorcade to the rear. (254)
(95) In contrast to Lawrence's testimony, this document indicated
that the alteration by the Secret Service of motorcycle distribution
concerned the number of motorcycles, not their physical locations in
relation to
the Presidential limousine. Still, the DPD and Lawrence
528
versions do corroborate one another in that they indicate a reduction of
security protection in terms of number and placement of officers.
(96) Lawson's testimony in 1964 was that it was his understanding
that the
President had personally stated that he did not like a lot of motorcycles
surrounding his limousine because their loud noise interfered with
conversations
taking place within the limousine. For this reason the four motorcycles were
positioned "just back" of the limousine. (255) Lawson stated to the
committee
that he had "no recall of, changing plans" (i.e. for motorcycles) at the
Dallas
Police Department/Secret Service organizational meeting of November 21.
(256)
(97) There are several instances of failure by the motorcycle officers to
adhere to Lawson's final plan involving two cycles on each side and to
the rear
of the Presidential limousine. (257)
(98) Officer Marion L. Baker confirms the original Lawrence
testimony as
to the alteration by the Secret Service of a prior DPD plan. Baker had
originally been instructed to ride right beside Kennedy. He was later
informed
by his sergeant that nobody was to ride beside the car, but instead the
officers
were to fall in beyond it. They received these instructions about 5 or 10
minutes before the motorcade left Love Field.(258)
(99) As to actual deployment of the cycles, DPD officers Billy Joe
Martin and Bobby W. Harris were assigned to ride immediately to the left and
rear of Kennedy's limousine.* (259) Martin stated that he rode 5 feet to the
left and 6 to 8 feet to the rear of the back bumper. (260) He indicated
that he
saw Hargis to his right as he left Houston for Elm.(261)
(100) Hargis, too, rode to the rear left side of the limousine and
remained even with its bumper rather than move "past" the President's
car. He
testified that as he turned left onto Elm Street, he was staying right
up with
Kennedy's car though crowd density prevented him from staying right up
next to
it. Nevertheless, because of the thinning out of the crowd by the triple
overpass. Hargis stated that he was right next to Mrs. Kennedy when he
heard the
first shot. (262)
(101) Officers M.L. Baker and Clyde A. Haygood were assigned to
the right
rear of the Presidential limousine. (263) The activity of both indicated
again a
departure from standard maximum security protection. Haygood, for example,
admitted that although he was stationed to the right rear of Kennedy's
car, he
was generally riding several cars back (264) and offered no explanation for
this. Haygood testified before the Warren Commission that he was on Main
Street
at the time of the shooting. (265)
(102) Baker stated that in addition to being instructed by his
sergeant
not to ride beside the President's car, he was also instructed by him to
fall in
beyond the press car. (266) Baker interpreted this assignment as an order to
place himself about six or seven cars behind Kennedy.(267) Baker was on
Houston
Street at the time of the first shot.(268) Haygood and Baker were too
far from
the presidential limousine to afford Kennedy any protection. They were in no
position
--------------------------------
*Both Baker and Martin stated to the committee that it was at the
President's request that they made no effort to stay in close formation
immediately to the rear of the Presidential limousine. See footnotes 259 and
266, infra.
529
to rush forward to intercept danger had there been a street-level
incident, yet
the forward interception capability of the motorcycles was the basic
rationale
for Lawson's November 21 rearward deployment of the motorcycles. (269)
(103) Kellerman who rode in the right front seat of the Presidential
limousine testified before the Warren Commission that there were two
motorcycles on each side of the rear wheel of the President's car. (270)
Nevertheless, he was not asked either about the reason for that
positioning or whether the two motorcycles on the right side were there
at the
time of the shooting.
(104) The Secret Service`s alteration of the original Dallas Police
Department motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible
security precautions. The straggling of Haygood and Baker, on the right rear
area of the limousine, weakened security that was already reduced due to the
rearward deployment of the motorcycles and to the reduction of the number of
motorcycles originally intended for use.
(105) Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motorcades
during the same Texas visit show that the deployment of motorcycles in
Dallas by
the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure.
The Secret Service Final Survey Report for the November 21 visit
to Houston
stated that in all motorcade movements, "six motorcycles flanked the
Presidential limousine and an additional 33 motorcycles were used to
flank the
motorcede and cover the intersections."(271)
There is no mention in the Fort Worth Secret Service Final Report
about the
deployment of motorcycles in the vicinity of the Presidential limousine.
(272)
(106) The Secret Service knew more than a day before November
that the
President did not want motorcycles riding alongside or parallel to the
Presidential vehicle. (273) If the word "flank"' denotes parallel
deployment,
and if in fact such deployment was effected in Houston, then it may well
be that
by altering Dallas Police Department Captain Lawrence's original
motorcycle plan
the Secret Service deprived Kennedy of security in Dallas that it had
provided a
mere day before in Houston. (274)
(107) Besides limiting motorcycle protection, Lawson prevented
the Dallas
Police Department from inserting into the motorcade, behind the
Vice-Presidential car, a Dallas Police Department squad car containing
homicide
detectives. For the Secret Service, the rejection of this Dallas Police
Department suggestion was not unusual in itself.
Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that-with the
exception of
New York City motorcades, it was not the Secret Service's standard
practice to
insert a police homicide car into a motorcade. (275) He did not remember who
recommended either its insertion, its proposed placement, or its
cancellation.
(276)
(108) On November 14, 1963, Lawson met with Dallas SAIC Sorrels
and Dallas
Police Department Chief Jesse Curry and "laid out the tentative number of
vehicles that would be in the parade and the order in which they would
be."(277)
Curry stated at the organizational meeting on November 21 that he
"thought we
had planned that Captain Fritz [Chief of DPD Homicide] would be in the
motorcade
behind the Vice President's car."(278) Sorrels spoke up at that point
530
and stated that "nothing was discussed on that."(279) Lawson explained
that a
car with Secret Service agents would follow the Vice President's car and
added
that the protective detail would like to have a police car bring up the
rear of
the motorcade. (280) Curry then structed Deputy Chief Lunday to take
care of the
matter. (281)
(109) Lawson was asked by the committee why, in his preliminary
survey
report of November 19,(282) he made no mention in the sequenced list of
motorcade vehicles of the DPD homicide car that Curry believed on
November 14 to
have been included and whose absence Curry protested at the meeting of
November
21. He answered that "the DPD could have put it [a DPD car] in on their
own";
that "he could not recall who took it out"; that he was "not sure it was
scheduled to be there"; and that "he didn't know who canceled the DPD car
because he didn't know who decided to include it."(283)
Submitted by:
G. ROBERT BLAKEY,
Chief counsel and Staff Director.
GARY T. CORNWELL,
Deputy Chief Counsel.
BELFORD V. LAWSON III,
Staff Counsel.
REFERENCES
(1) Scott, Peter Dale, Government Documents and the Kennedy
Assassination (unpublished draft), House Select Committee on Assassinations,
chapter I, page 12 (JFK document No. 000814).
(2) Ibid.; chapter III, page 32 (Secret Service); chapter II,
pages
1-12 (rightwing businessmen); chapter III, pages 28, 31, 34, 35
(Governor John
B. Connally). See also outside contact (with anonymous phone caller),
August 17,
1978, pages 1-2 (JFK document No. 010827).
(3) Deposition of Jerry Bruno, August 18, 1978. House Select
Committee
on Assassinations, pages 27-28 (JFK document No. 014025).
(4) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, hearings
before the
President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964) (hereinafter
referred
to as Warren Commission Hearings); volume 7, page 443.
(5) Staff Interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select
Committee
on Assassinations, page 13 (JFK document 010696). See also testimony of
John B.
Connally, September 6, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on
Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1979), volume I, page 28 (hereinafter referred to as
Connally
testimony), September 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 28.
(6) Ibid., HSCA-JFK hearings. 29.
(7) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, page 10 (JFK document No. 010696).
(8) Id. at p. 10.
(9) Id. at p. 10. See also testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May
]8, 1964,
Warren Commission hearings, volume VII, page 444.
(10) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 13 (JFK document 014025). See also deposition of J.
Eric
Jonsson, July 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page
17 (JFK
document No. 014022).
(11) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, :1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, page 10 (JFK document No. 010696).
(12) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, volume VII, page 443.
(13) Id. at p. 443.
(14) Map of Dallas, Tex., copyright by Rand McNally, House Select
Committee on Assassinations JFK document No. 014976).
531
(15) Ibid.
(16) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations, page 9 (JFK document No. 010696). See also
deposition of Jerry Bruno, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, pages 34-35 (JFK document No. 014025). See also,
testimony of
Dallas Field Office SAIC Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, volume VII, page 335.
(17) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, page 31 (JFK document No. 014025). See also testimony of
Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, volume VII,
page
443.
(18) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee
on As-
sassinations, page 41 (JFK document No. 014025).
(19) Id. at pp. 40-41.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 51.
(22) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 443. See also Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978,
HSCA, p.
48 (JFK Document No. 014025).
(23) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 11.
(24) Id. at pp. 11, 12, 13.
(25) Id. at p. 11.
(26) Id. at p. 12.
(27) Id. at p. 12.
(28) Id. at pp. 12-13.
(29) Id. at pp. 11, 12, 13.
(30) Id. at p. 13.
(31) Id. at p. 13.
(32) Id. at p. 13.
(33) Id. at p. 14.
(34) Id. at p. 13.
(35) Id. at pp. 13, 16.
(36) Id. at p. 13.
(37) Id. at p. 14.
(38) Id. at p. 16.
(39) Id. at p. 16.
(40) Id. at p. 15.
(41) Id. at p. 15.
(42) Id. at pp. 15, 16. See also affidavit of Clifford Carter,
May 20,
1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 475.
(43) Id. at p. 16.
(44) Id. at p. 16.
(45) Id. at pp. 16, 17.
(46) Id. at pp. 16-17.
(47) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 4-5 (J.F.K.
Document
No. 014025). See also notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK
Document No. 004074).
(48) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 5, 6 (JFK
Document No.
014025).
(49) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings,
19-20. See
also JFK Exhibit No. F-17.
(50) Id. at p. 24.
(51) Id. at p. 24.
(52) Id. at p. 18.
(53) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. III, pp. 441-442.
(54) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 18.
(55) Id. at p. 18.
(56) Id. at p. 25.
(57) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(58) Id. at p. 26.
(59) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No.
014025). See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, p. 1 (JFK
document No. 004074).
(60) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, p.
11. See
also handwritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978, p. 1 (JFK document No.
011337).
532
(61) Connally testimony, July 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(62) Id. at p. 26.
(63) Ibid.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document
No.
014025).
(67) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, pp.
1, 2
(JFK document No. 004074).
(68) Id. at p. 4.
(69) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(70) Id. at p. 26.
(71) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8
(JFK
document No. 004074).
(72) Id. at p. 8. See also Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I
HSCA-JFK hearings; 26.
(73) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(74) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 12 (JFK document
No.
014025).
(75) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8
(JFK
Document No. G04074). See also Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK
heatings, 26.
(76) Connally testimony, Sept. 16, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(77) Ibid.
(78) Ibid. See also testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964,
Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 442.
(79) Connally testimony, I HSCA-JFK hearings,
(80) Id. at p. 29. See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno,
Dec. 13.
1977, HSCA, p. S (JFK document No. 004074); Connally testimony, I HSCA-JFK
hearings, 26, 29, 32.
(81) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings,
24-25, 26.
(82) Id at p. 25.
(83) Id. at p. 26.
(84) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document
No.
014025). See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA,
p. 1
(JFK document No. 004074).
(85) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 15 (JFK document
No.
14025).
(86) Id. at p. 15.
(87) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, pp.
1, 3,
7, 8 (JFK document No. 004074).
(88) Minutes of the Board of Trustees of Texas Christian
University,
June 1, 1978, HSCA, p. 208 (JFK document No. 008813).
(89) Id. at pp. 6, 8.
(90) Staff interview of Sam P. Woodson, Jr., May 10, 1978, HSCA,
p. 5
(JFK document No. 013381).
(91) Id. at p. 5.
(92) Id. at p. 6.
(93) Id. at p. 6.
(94) Ibid.
(95) Ibid.
(96) Ibid. See also staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29,
1978, HSCA,
p. (JFK document No. 010696).
(97) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 22 (JFK document
No.
014025).
(98) Testimony of Buell W. Frazier, Mar. 11, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings. vol. II, p. 233. See also Warren Commission Exhibit 698; JFK
exhibit F-13.
(99) Connally testimony, Sept. 6. 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 49.
(100) Ibid. See also JFK exhibit F-17.
(101) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 49-50.
(102) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno. Sept. 7, 1978, HSCA, p.
9 (JFK
document No. 011337).
(103) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p.
5 (JFK
document No. 007066).
533
(104) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
(105) Deposition of J. Eric Jonsson, July 26, 1978, HSCA, pp.
443 (JFK
document No. 014022).
(106) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978. I HSCA-JFK hearings, 27
(statement of the basic plan), 28 (objection to a lengthy downtown
motorcade).
(106A) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, pp.
2-7, 9
(JFK document No. 010696).
(107) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, p. 5
(JFK
document No. 010696).
(108) Connally testimony, Sept. 6. 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 51.
(109) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, p. 7
(JFK
document No. 010696).
(110) Ibid.
(111) Id. at p. 9.
(112) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 31 (JFK document
No.
014025).
(113) Id. at p. 32.
(114) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 39-40 (JFK
document
No. 014025).
(115) Id. at p. 39.
(116) Id. at pp. 41-42.
(117) Id. at pp. 41-42.
(118) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1969, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 334.
(119) Ibid.
(120) Id. at p. 335.
(121) Ibid.
(122) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA,
p. 2
(JFK document No. 007062).
(123) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 35 (JFK document
No.
014025).
(124) Id. at p. 30.
(125) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16,
1978, HSCA,
p. 25 (JFK document No. 013152).
(126) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978. HSCA, p. 30 (JFK document
No.
014025).
(127) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p.
8 (JFK
document No. 004074). See also Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 197S, HSCA,
pp. 34-35
(JFK document No. 014025).
(128) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p- 35 (JFK document No.
014025).
(129) Executive session testimony of Gerald Behn, Mar. 15, 1978,
HSCA,
pp. 73, 74 (JFK document No. 014670).
(130) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA. p. 35 (JFK document No.
014025). See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, p. 8 (JFK
document No. 004074).
(131) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 36 (JFK document No.
014025).
(132) Id. at pp. 34, 35.
(133) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. IV, pp. 318, 319. See also staff interview of Winston
Lawson,
Jan. 31, 1978. HSCA, pp. 1-5 (JFK document No. 007066).
(134) Ibid.
(135) Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol.
IV, p. 319.
(136) Id. at pp. 322, 336.
(137) Lawson testimony, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p.
337.
(138) Id. at p. 337.
(139) For the basis of Bruno's belief that the Women's Building
was
initially selected as the final choice, see footnotes 127, 128, 130,
supra. The
omission of the Warren Commission to obtain exhibits or to take testimony
either from Behn or from Bruno is documented at Warren Commission
hearings, vol.
XV, pp. 755, 757, 815.
(140) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 36, 37 (JFK
document
No. 014025).
534
(141) Id. at p. 36.
(142) Id. at p. 37.
(143) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. VII, pp. 335-341. See also staff interview of Forrest
Sorrels,
Mar. 1978, HSCA, pp. 2-3 (JFK document No. 007062).
(144) See footnotes 127-131, supra.
(145) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol IV, p. 337.
(146) Id. at p. 337.
(147) Id. at pp. 337, 338.
(148) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p.
5 (JFK
document No. 007066).
(149) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978, IlSCA, p.
9 (JFK
document No. 011337).
(150) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, IlSCA, p. 49 (JFK
document No.
014025).
(151) Deposition of Bill Moyers, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 26 (JFK
document No. 014018).
(152) Id. at p. 26.
(153) Id. at p. 28.
(154) Id. at p. 28.
(155) Id. at pp. 25, 29.
(156) Id. at p. 32.
(157) Id. at p. 33.
(158) Ibid.
(159) Ibid.
(160) See footnote 149, supra.
(161) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, p. 49.
(162) Id. at p. 51.
(163) Ibid.
(164) Ibid.
(165) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978. IlSCA, p.
9 (JFK
document No. 011337). See also Moyers deposition, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA,
D. (JFK
document No. 014018).
(166) Moyers deposition, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 6 (JFK document
No.
014018).
(167) Ibid.
(168) Id. at pp. 22-23.
(169) Id. at p. 22.
(170) Id. at pp. 22, 23.
(171) Id. at p. 23.
(172) Id. at p. 23.
(173) Id. at p. 24.
(174) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16,
1978, HSCA,
p. 11 (JFK document No. 013152).
(175) Connally testimony, Jan. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 13.
(176) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16,
1978, HSCA,
p. 13 (JFK document No. 013152).
(177) Id. at p. 13.
(178) Id. at p. 14.
(179) Ibid.
(180) Id. at pp. 21-22.
(181) Id. at p. 22.
(182) Ibid.
(183) Id. at p. 25.
(184) Id. at p. 26.
(185) Id. at p. 25.
(186) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 341.
(187) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA. p.
7 (JFK
document No. 007066).
(188) Id. at p. 7. See also Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964.
Warren
Commission hearings, vol. VII, pp. 340, 341; staff interview of Jack
Puterbaugh, Apr. 14, 1978, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK document No. 008580).
535
(189) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964. Warren Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 337.
(190) Id. at pp. 337, 338.
(191) Staff interview of George L. Lumpkin, Nov. 3, 1977, HSCA,
p. 1
(JFK document No. 003087).
(192) Id. at p. 1.
(193) Id. at p. 2.
(194) Id. at p. 2.
(195) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA p.
3 (JFK
document No. 007066).
(196) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA,
p. 4
(JFK document No. 007062).
(197) Sorrels Exhibit No. 4, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission
hearings,
p. 2, vol. XXI, p. 547.
(198) Executive session testimony of Robert I. Bouck, Nov. 17,
1977,
HSCA, pp. 7-31 (JFK document No. 014609).
(199) Ibid. See also deposition (book II) of 1963 Secret Service
Chief
James Rowley, Aug. 24, 1978, HSCA, pp. 8, 64 (JFK document No. 014026). A
report from a field office, if addressed to the office of the chief,
would be
delivered either to PRS or to the office 0œ the head of protective
operations.
(200) Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol.
IV, p. 343.
(201) testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. II, pp. 63, 105.
(202) Id. at pp. 106, 107.
(203) Id. at p. 107.
(204) Id. at p. 108.
(205) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 319.
(206) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. Vl, p. 105.
(207) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. IV, p. 321.
(208) Id. at pp. 322, 323.
(209) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. II, pp. 108, 109.
(210) Id. at p. 109.
(211) Ibid.
(212) Id. at pp. 109-111.
(213) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of
Nov.
21, 1963 to Houston, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 7 (JFK document No.
014979).
(214) Id. at p. 7.
(215) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. II, pp. 108--112.
(216) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol VII, pp. 338, 339.
(217) Id. at p. 339.
(218) Id. at p. 339.
(219) Ibid. See also Warren Commission Exhibit No. CE 770.
(220) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. IV, p. 345.
(221) Id. at pp. 323, 345.
(222) Id. at pp. 323, 344, 345.
(223) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1979, HSCA,
p. 3
(JFK document No. 007062).
(224) Id. at p. 3.
(225) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p.
11
(JFK document No. 007066).
(226) Id. at p. 11.
(227) Id. at p. 9.
(228) Staff interview of Gerald Behn, Jan. 30, 1978, HSCA, p. 4 (JFK
document No. 012998).
(229) Id. at p. 4.
(230) Id. at p. 5.
(231) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. IV, p. 326.
536
(232) Id. at pp. 326, 327.
(233) Id. at pp. 339, 340.
(234) Id. at p. 333.
(235) Id. at p. 333.
(236) Testimony 0œ Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 337.
(237) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 2.3, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. IV, pp. 328, 329.
(238) Id. at p. 331.
(239) Id. at p. 330.
(240) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 343.
(241) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. IV, p. 330.
(242) Id. at p. 349.
(243) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16,
1978, HSCA,
p. 28 (JFK document No. 013152).
(244) Id. at p. 28.
(245) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearIngs, vol. VII, p. 581.
(246) Id. at p. 378.
(247) Id. at p. 579.
(248) Id. at p. 579.
(249) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission
hearings, vol XXI, p. 567.
(250) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 580.
(251) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. XXI, pp. 589-571.
(252) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VII, p. 580.
(253) Id. at p. 581.
(254) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. XXI, p. 571.
(255) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964. Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VII, pp. 338, 339.
(256) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p.
8 (JFK
document No. 007066).
(257) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren
Commission,
vol. IV, p. 338. See also footnote 257, supra,
(258) Testimony of Marion L. Baker, Mar. 25, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. 111, p. 244.
(259) Staff interview of Billy Joe Martin, Sept. 27, 1977, HSCA,
p. 1
(JFK document No. 002393). See also staff interview of Billy Joe Martin,
Jan.
17, 1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 014372). Martin confirms the
Presidential objection to the close positioning of motorcycles.
(260) Testimony of Billy Joe Martin, Apr. 3, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VI, p. 290.
(261) Id. at p. 290.
(262) Testimony of Bobby W. Hargis, Apr. 8, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VI, p. 294. See also staff interview of Bobby Weldon
Hargis, Jan.
17, 1979, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 14362). Crowd pressure removed Hargis
from his position and pushed him rearward. See also staff interview of
Robert W.
Hargis, Oct. 26, 1977, Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (JFK
document
No. 003300).
(263) Testimony of Clyde A. Haygood, Apr. 9, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. VI, p. 297. Cf. staff interview of Clyde A. Haygood,
HSCA, p. 1
(JFK Document No. 002392).
(264) Testimony of Clyde Haygood, Apr. 9, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. Vl, p. 297.
(265) Id. at p. 297.
(266) Testimony of Marion L. Baker, Mar. 25, 1964, Warren
Commission
hearings, vol. III, p. 244. See also staff interview of Marion L. Baker,
Jan.
17, 1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 014899). Baker corroborated Martin's
account (see footnote 259, supra) of the President's objection to close
positioning of
537
motorcycles and asserted that the President was responsible for Baker's
position near the press bus.
(267) Id. at p. 245.
(268) Id. at p. 245.
(269) See footnote 253, supra.
(270) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 5964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. II, p. 70.
(271) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of
Nov. 21,
1963, to Houston, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA p. 6 (JFK document No. 014979).
(272) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of
Nov. 22,
1963, to Fort Worth, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK document No.
014980).
(273) Testimony of Clinton J. Hill, Mar. 7, 1964, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. II, pp. 136-137. See also testimony of Winston G. Lawson,
Apr.
23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 338.
(274) See footnote 271, supra.
(275) Warren Commission testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23,
1964,
Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 334.
(276) Id. at p. 334.
(277) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission
hearings, vol. XXI, p. 563.
(278) Id. at p. 570.
(279) Id. at p. 570.
(280) Id. at p. 570.
(281) Id. at p. 571.
(282) Warren Commission Exhibit No. 767, Warren Commission
hearings,
vol. XVII, p. 596.
(283) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA,
pp. 7, 8
(JFK document No. 007066).
gwmcc...@earthlink.net
> Who Killed JFK? - An Interview With Lamar Waldronhttp://calitreview.com/2007/04/03/who-killed-jfk-an-interview-with-la...
>
> QUESTION:
> Oswald had been looking for work in Dallas in October of '63 and found
> the job at the School Book Depository through a friend of his wife's. He
> started work there October 16th. It doesn't sound like an active plot to
> kill the President is in place at that time (Kennedy's motorcade route had
> not yet been planned) and it also wouldn't give much time for anyone to
> set him up as a patsy - creating a bogus snipers nest, etc.
>
> ANSWER:
> That's a common misconception. JFK's long-rumored Dallas visit had
> finally been announced on Sept. 26-right before Oswald tried to go to Cuba
> via Mexico City. It was well known by Jack Ruby and others in Dallas that
> any major motorcade would go through Dealy Plaza along Main Street. It's
> not generally known, but 11-22-63 wasn't the first time JFK had been
> through Dealy Plaza in a motorcade-JFK had been there in 1960, during the
> campaign.
The motorcade route for the 1963 visit was not finalized until the
Trade Mart (Connally's choice) was decided upon as the motorcade's
destination.
I.e., November 15. Guess I'll just repost this:
WC (http://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/
chapter-2.html#planning):
"The original plan called for the President to spend only 1 day in the
State, making whirlwind visits to Dallas, Fort Worth, San Antonio, and
Houston. In September, the White House decided to permit further visits by
the President and extended the trip to run from the afternoon of November
21 through the evening of Friday, November 22. When Governor Connally
called at the White House on October 4 to discuss the details of the
visit, it was agreed that the planning of events in Texas would be left
largely to the Governor. At the White House, Kenneth O'Donnell, special
assistant to the President, acted as coordinator for the trip.
"Everyone agreed that, if there was sufficient time, a motorcade through
downtown Dallas would be the best way for the people to see their
President. When the trip was planned for only 1 day, Governor Connally had
opposed the motorcade because there was not enough time. The Governor
stated, however, that 'once we got San Antonio moved from Friday to
Thursday afternoon, where that was his initial stop in Texas, then we had
the time, and I withdrew my objections to a motorcade.' "
Some conspiracy theorists put forth that the site of Kennedy's Dallas
visit was decided in the October 4 White House meeting at which
arrangements were delegated to Connally, but there doesn't seem to be any
indication in the WC or HSCA reports that this was the case. Bugliosi
cites JFK advance man Jerry Bruno's diary of November 15: "The White House
announced that the Trade Mart had been approved. I met with O'Donnell and
[Press Secretary Bill] Moyers who said that Connally was unbearable and on
the verge of canceling the trip." For political reasons, Connally had been
arguing strongly for this, the mecca of local businesspeople, over the
other option, the Women's Building. (Some have even alleged that the Texas
governor insisted on the Trade Mart because he was part of the plot!)
Bugliosi writes, "However, just because the Trade Mart was chosen, didn't
mean there was going to be a motorcade to get to it." (pg. 1241) But in
the section of the HSCA report on the role of the Secret Service that day,
one finds, "Once the motorcade decision had been made, the choice for a
route was dependent more upon the selection of a site for the President's
luncheon speech than upon security concerns." If the motorcade decision
was resolved, as far as Connally was concerned, by the expansion of the
visit to more than one day, that would have been settled since September.
However, if the motorcade had gone to the Women's Building it would not
have passed by the TSBD, and that fatal decision seems not to predate
November 15. That was the verdict of the HSCA: "Word of the trip to Texas
first appeared in the Dallas newspapers on September 13, and Kennedy's
itinerary for Texas was announced by Governor Connally on November 1....
The final motorcade route through Dealey Plaza in downtown Dallas was
selected on November 15."
/sandy
Anthony Marsh
> Actually the trade route was changed. And the limo would *not* have had
> to jump the curb. Look at google maps satellite version of dealey plaza
> to see this:
>
> http://i48.photobucket.com/albums/f218/e_ray/DP.jpg
>
>
No, the motorcade route was not changed. The Women's Building was
considered and rejected.
Anthony Marsh
> robc...@netscape.com wrote:
>> Does anyone know who had the original route changed (straight down
>> Main) at the last minute? I'm wondering why they took the Houston/Elm
>> route when it violated Secret Service regulations.
>>
>
> high curb the motorcade would have to go over to get on to Stemmons
> where the Trade Mart was. They would have needed a ramp to cross it; not
> too Presidential or dignified if you ask me. And to my knowledge they
> never changed the motorcade's route once they choose the Trade Mart as
> opposed to the Women's Building. Connnally wanted it at the Trade Mart.
>
Again, they CONSIDERED other routes to the Trade Mart and rejected them.
> Russ
>
>
r2bz...@sbcglobal.net
> r2bzju...@sbcglobal.net wrote:
> > On Oct 7, 10:13 am, robcap...@netscape.com wrote:
> >> Does anyone know who had the original route changed (straight down
> >> Main) at the last minute? I'm wondering why they took the Houston/Elm
> >> route when it violated Secret Service regulations.
>
> > onto the Stemmons freeway, the only entrance was from Elm Street, thus
> > a one block zig, zag was required.
>
> That was not the only possible route. They considered and rejected going
> down Main to Industrial Boulevard.
>
***Stemmons was not the only possible route to the Trade Mart, but the
entrance to Stemmons, from Main, was on Elm Street.
***Ron Judge
Martin Shackelford
November 19.
Martin
"tomnln" <tom...@cox.net> wrote in message
news:WNPOi.13023$Bq3...@newsfe18.lga...
tomnln
Tell us how many S S Agents you've interviewed Marsh?
"Anthony Marsh" <anthon...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:Nr6dnbsuP_JnnZHa...@comcast.com...
tomnln
from the TSBD OR the Grrassy Knoll.
Further Distance.
Faster Travelling.
"Anthony Marsh" <anthon...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:X_adnSKK57fxCZba...@comcast.com...
Martin Shackelford
presumably it had to have been vetted sometime prior to that.
Martin
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1191913558....@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...
robc...@netscape.com
> On 7 Oct 2007 13:13:29 -0400, robcap...@netscape.com wrote:
>
> Probably against several regulations to hump the limo up over curbs
> too. <g> Elm St was the route to the Stemmons on ramp.
>
> Barb :-)
>
> RDC wrote: Not as against a turn that made them slow to 10 miles an hour. This was against all that was stated in the SS manual. It was changed by the mayor of Dallas (Richard Cabell) who just happened to be the brother of fired Charles Cabell (deputy dir. of CIA) after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. I'm sure he had no motive. :-)
>
> - Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Martin Shackelford
deteriorated Industrial Blvd. route.
Martin
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1191872772....@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...
> Is Vince correct?
>
> ----QUOTE ON----
>
> MOTORCADE ROUTE -- The route of the presidential parade violated Secret
> Service protocol by involving turns of 90 and 120 degrees. During
> interviews with this correspondent, the route was strongly criticized by
> former DNC advance man Underwood and former uniformed Secret Service agent
> Norris. In addition, Jerry Behn, the # 1 agent in JFK's detail, told me
> that the Dallas route was changed from another, as yet unknown route -- a
> fact he offered, under oath and in executive session, to the House Select
robc...@netscape.com
> robcap...@netscape.com wrote:
> > Does anyone know who had the original route changed (straight down
> > Main) at the last minute? I'm wondering why they took the Houston/Elm
> > route when it violated Secret Service regulations.
>
> It was the best compromise.
RDC wrote: By who? This was an illegal turn and driver didn't help
by hitting the brakes during all the shots until the final one. The
limo would have cleared the curb with no problem.
robc...@netscape.com
> On Oct 7, 1:13 pm, robcap...@netscape.com wrote:
>
> > I'm wondering why they took the Houston/Elm
> > route when it violated Secret Service regulations.
>
> The route was not changed.
>
RDC wrote: The ones that said:
1) No turn greater than 90 degrees is allowed, and
2) the one that said the car should never slow to less than 44 mph
during a motorcade.
eric_r_carlson
wrote:
> But apparently he ignored the published route in the papers, Tuesday,
> November 19.
>
> Martin
Palamara posits that the dogleg was cemented on Nov. 18th.
-Eric
eric_r_carlson
being the luncheon site. But he was acquiescing to the "conservative
business element" in Texas. If there was a conspiracy involving
getting the motorcade to go past the TSBD wouldn't the pressure from
the unnamed "conservative business element" be behind it? H. L. Hunt
or others? Why not? There seemed to be a lot of consternation about
it, maybe there was more than a "political" reason for it... But the
HSCA felt the need to put the blame squarely on Connally, ignoring
their own testimony"
HSCA quote:
"On one hand, Governor Connally, who was asked by the President to
arrange the trip as a means of broadening and strengthening his
support among conservatives in Texas, selected the Dallas Trade
Mart..."
HSCA quote further down:
# ...the moderate and conservative business and financial interests--
led him to conceive of the Dallas visit in limited terms. The
President would arrive in Dallas, proceed directly to the Trade Mart,
the city's prime commercial center, deliver a speech to the leadership
of Dallas' business community, and leave the city. (106A) Frank Erwin,
the executive secretary of the Texas State Democratic Committee,
believed that Connally's introduction might well convince that
leadership that the President was "OK" and "could be trusted" with the
Presidency. (107) For Connally, the Trade Mart was the appropriate
setting for the Presidential speech. Architecturally it had the style
and flair of the Kennedys themselves. The building was new, convenient
to reach from the Stemmons Expressway, and generally impressive. (108)
# Frank Erwin, who assisted Connally through the process of planning
the Presidential visit, commented on Connally's relationship with big
business and financial interests in Texas. In Erwin's opinion there
was no possibility that the conservative, affluent supporters of
Connally would have wanted to mix at a public occasion of any kind
with the various elements in the liberal wing of the party. (109)
Erwin stated his belief that even such high-ranking persons as the
liberal Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas and the president of the AFL-
CIO were not welcome at social and political functions sponsored by
Connelly's conservative supporters.(110) The appearance of such
liberals would have led to a walkout by the conservative Connally
associates. Hence, the State democratic committee, of which Erwin was
Executive Secretary, insisted that the luncheon be held at the Trade
Mart. (111)
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/jfkinfo4/jfk11/hscv11c.htm
HCSA:
Second Session
March 1979
------------------------------START QUOTES---------------------------
With respect to the problem of choosing a speech site, Connally stated
that he was largely ignorant of any controversy.
Mr. CORNWELL. Your basic plan of meeting with various citizens groups
and the representatives of the business community, did that meet any
stiff resistance and, if so, from what area?
Mr. CONNALLY. No, I don't think it met any stiff resistance.
------------------------------------------------------------
Connally claimed he did not put up a fight, but other local Dallas
agents may have:
--------------------------------------------------------
Mr. CORNWELL. Who did the conversations occur with where there were
disagreements as to, at least, the emphasis that should be placed on
various aspects?
Mr. CONNALLY. Very few of them with me.
Mr. CORNWELL. Who were your people meeting with?
Mr. CONNALLY. They were meeting with Hal [sic] (1) Bruno the
President's advance man. We were getting information from all kinds of
sources. We were getting direct calls from the top labor leaders in
the
State, and others. You know, we were getting a considerable feedback
and frankly, considerable differences developed between the
President's
advance men and the people I had working on the trip and to the point
where it got a bit testy.
-----------------------------END QUOTES---------------------------
Martin Shackelford
November 19, mentions the Main-Houston-Elm route.
Martin
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1191951939.4...@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...
robc...@netscape.com
> But it wasn't changed "at the last minute," if at all. There was no change
> after Tuesday.
>
> Martin
>
> "eric_r_carlson" <alive...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>
> news:1191799530.2...@r29g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
> > Actually the trade route was changed. And the limo would *not* have had
> > to jump the curb. Look at google maps satellite version of dealey plaza
> > to see this:
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
RDC wrote: The reason CTers have long said the route was changed is
because the SS manuals stated that no turns greater than 90 degrees and
the no speed should be less than 44 mph - both make perfect sense if you
want to keep a president alive. Those two turns put the president in
danger, far more than jumping a curb. That is why it is not believed to
have been planned that way originally, but maybe you are right - it was
planned to go this way from the beginning - it suited the plotters
perfectly.
John McAdams
>On Oct 8, 1:52 pm, "Martin Shackelford" <msha...@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>> But it wasn't changed "at the last minute," if at all. There was no change
>> after Tuesday.
>>
>> Martin
>>
>> "eric_r_carlson" <alive...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>>
>> news:1191799530.2...@r29g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
>>
>>
>>
>> > Actually the trade route was changed. And the limo would *not* have had
>> > to jump the curb. Look at google maps satellite version of dealey plaza
>> > to see this:
>>
>> >http://i48.photobucket.com/albums/f218/e_ray/DP.jpg- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
>
>RDC wrote: The reason CTers have long said the route was changed is
>because the SS manuals stated that no turns greater than 90 degrees and
>the no speed should be less than 44 mph - both make perfect sense if you
>want to keep a president alive.
OK, post a cite for this.
And I don't mean a secondary cite to some conspiracy book.
I want to see the actual "SS manual."
.John
The Kennedy Assassination Home Page
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/home.htm
robc...@netscape.com
> tomnln wrote:
> > Can you prove him Wrong?
>
> >> Is Vince correct?
>
> >> ----QUOTE ON----
>
> >> MOTORCADE ROUTE -- The route of the presidential parade violated Secret
> >> Service protocol by involving turns of 90 and 120 degrees. During
> >> interviews with this correspondent, the route was strongly criticized by
> >> former DNC advance man Underwood and former uniformed Secret Service
> >> agent
> >> Norris. In addition, Jerry Behn, the # 1 agent in JFK's detail, told me
> >> that the Dallas route was changed from another, as yet unknown route -- a
> >> fact he offered, under oath and in executive session, to the House Select
> >> Committee on Assassinations. That testimony remains, as of the date of
> >> this publication, unpublished. Former agents Lawson and Kinney confirmed
> >> to me that alternate routes (two, according to Kinney) were available.
>
> >> Vincent M. Palamara
> >>http://www.jfklancer.com/LNE/limo.html
>
> degrees. You have to have some in order to change streets along a route.
> There was no rule against making a turn of 120 degrees.
> Other routes were considered and rejected. The existing route was a
>
> - Show quoted text -
RDC wrote: Of course it was, it made shooting him much easier. How about
all those open windows? THAT was also against SS regs but there were a
bunch of open windows. How come? There was a rule against a 120 degree
turn because it causes the limo to slow down too much, thus making a shot
much easier. It is common sense.
robc...@netscape.com
> eric_r_carlson wrote:
> > It seems the motorcade route was indeed changed based on this report
> > from Vince Palamara:
>
> > --------------START QUOTES-------------------
> > "When I asked Jerry [Behn] what the HSCA
> > asked of him in Executive Session [not the staff
> > interviews just released], Behn told me he was
> > asked two things: they wanted to know
> > about the Florida trip (manned by ASAIC Boring)
> > and why the route was changed for Dallas.
>
> > Behn told me "I know it was changed, but why...I've forgotten
> > completely- I don't know".
>
> > -------------END QUOTES-------------------
>
> Nonsense. Never rely on eyewitness statements.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
RDC wrote: Then why did the WC practically exclusively rely on
eyewitnesses to build their case (changed or prevented full testimony
in the process, but what the hey?)? What other proof is their against
LHO without these so called witnesses?
tomnln
A map printed in The Dallas Times Herald of 11/22/63 shows the motorcade
going straight down Main Street.
"Martin Shackelford" <msh...@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
news:MD1Pi.4889$oA2....@nlpi068.nbdc.sbc.com...
Anthony Marsh
> One question. Everyone wants to blame Connally for the Trade Mart
> being the luncheon site. But he was acquiescing to the "conservative
> business element" in Texas. If there was a conspiracy involving
> getting the motorcade to go past the TSBD wouldn't the pressure from
> the unnamed "conservative business element" be behind it? H. L. Hunt
> or others? Why not? There seemed to be a lot of consternation about
> it, maybe there was more than a "political" reason for it... But the
> HSCA felt the need to put the blame squarely on Connally, ignoring
> their own testimony"
>
It is a red herring?
If there were conspirators strong enough to manipulate the choice of the
hall and the motorcade route, they could have planted their assassins
anywhere they wished, not just the TSBD.
Anthony Marsh
There were no such regulations.
Anthony Marsh
Therefore?
> -Eric
>
>
Anthony Marsh
By Sorrels and the DPD. They considered other routes and rejected them.
The driver made an honest, but incompetent mistake. There is no proof that
he hit the brakes.
The limo could have cleared the curb by going over special ramps. Not
without them. The buses would be a problem.
tomnln
"Martin Shackelford" <msh...@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
news:Rh1Pi.4883$oA2...@nlpi068.nbdc.sbc.com...
Anthony Marsh
> Straight down Main St. would have made the shooting Much More Difficult
> from the TSBD OR the Grrassy Knoll.
>
Not difficult at all.
> Further Distance.
> Faster Travelling.
>
Not much further. Get a map.
How much faster? 20 MPH instead of 12 MPH?
Anthony Marsh
> Marsh Saves the Lies of the WCR Again.
>
> Tell us how many S S Agents you've interviewed Marsh?
>
I said that I knew one a long time ago.
wig...@xit.net
> One question. Everyone wants to blame Connally for the Trade Mart
> being the luncheon site. But he was acquiescing to the "conservative
> business element" in Texas. If there was a conspiracy involving
> getting the motorcade to go past the TSBD wouldn't the pressure from
> the unnamed "conservative business element" be behind it? H. L. Hunt
> or others? Why not? There seemed to be a lot of consternation about
> it, maybe there was more than a "political" reason for it... But the
> HSCA felt the need to put the blame squarely on Connally, ignoring
> their own testimony"
The Trade Mart was obviously something that Dallasites & for that matter
all Texans were proud of at that time. Constructed in 1959 it was a
relatively new concept in wholesale marketing under one roof for various
industries. The idea was cutting edge for the time & rightly so, it was
to be showcased in the best light possible with a presidential visit.
The Women's Building at Fair Park, I believe had been constructed in 1910
& remodeled in 1936 for the Texas Centennial celebration. Can't blame
Connally for choosing a new facility for the luncheon that would bring
publicity to the Trade Mart. Personally I'm scratching my head on this
topic. You'd think that in the event of a conspiracy, the assassin's feet
were cemented in DP with no chance of movement what so ever. Does the
prey have to come to the hunter?
> Mart. (111)http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/jfkinfo4/jfk11/hscv11c.htm
eric_r_carlson
wrote:
> This is utterly ridiculous. An article in the newspaper on Tuesday,
> November 19, mentions the Main-Houston-Elm route.
>
> Martin
And how does that contradict the statement exactly? In the quote there is
no date specified about when the route was changed. Only that they were
going over the changed route the night before...
-Eric
tomnln
Would you like me to scan the DTH of 11/22/63 & post it?
Map showing the motorcade going straight down Main St.
"Martin Shackelford" <msh...@sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
news:BZ1Pi.4892$oA2....@nlpi068.nbdc.sbc.com...
eric_r_carlson
Records Review Board.
I asked him about the "original plan to jump the curb" and he will be
getting back to me about it soon, (so his secretary says).
I asked him because he told me in no uncertain terms the route *was*
changed because they were originally going to jump the curb. If he
did find this out during the ARRB investigations, I'm guessing he got
it from Jerry Behn's testimony which is still classified.
Behn told Palamara the route was changed and that he testified to this
effect in his testimony. Palamara also reports:
"Steuart, who was stationed at the Trade Mart on November 22, 1963,
told the author that he knew Behn long before 1963 and that there were
many things about that day he'd like to talk about, but that he felt
he couldn't.34"
I hope Tunheim can confirm or retract his statement to me about the
curb.
----------------Palamara ON--------------
The HSCA determined that Agent Lawson "did not have control over the final
determination of the route."64 As reported in a recent book, "No one in
Dallas or Washington has accepted responsibility for altering the
route."65
While several authors have used conjecture to deduce a change in plans,
this author has obtained new evidence to establish this conclusion. During
the au-thor's three interviews with SAIC Jerry Behn, the subject of his
unpublished, still-unavailable executive session testimony before the HSCA
came up. Behn told the author that he was asked two things: First, the
details about the Flor-ida trip of November 18, 1963. Second, why the
motorcade route was changed for the Dallas trip! When the author inquired
about the second point, since it is another crucial matter of security,
Behn responded: "I know it was changed but why-I've forgotten completely-I
don't know."66 The author asked Behn if Agent Grant could have been
involved with the changing of the route in Dallas, to which Behn said:
"Grant wouldn't have the authority to change the route." For his part,
Agent Kinney said: "I know Dave Grant and I don't know what you're talking
about."67
---------------QUOTE OFF--------------
Anthony Marsh
>
> A map printed in The Dallas Times Herald of 11/22/63 shows the motorcade
> going straight down Main Street.
>
So what? The scale was not big enough to show the turn onto Houston.
Anthony Marsh
Not much easier at all.
> all those open windows? THAT was also against SS regs but there were a
> bunch of open windows. How come? There was a rule against a 120 degree
There was no SS reg against open windows along the motorcade route in US
cities. There were dozens of previous motorcades with Kennedy and previous
Presidents and there were always open windows. Fletcher Prouty was
thinking about some foreign trips where those countries did have regs
against open windows. He knew nothing about SS regs. Nor do you.
> turn because it causes the limo to slow down too much, thus making a shot
> much easier. It is common sense.
>
Of course the limo slowed down. It was also going very slowly in other
motorcades. I have looked at the photos of all the other motorcades and
sometimes you can see the SS agents walk alongside the limo. The limo was
going very slowly out at the airport. And it also stopped early after
leaving the airport for JFK to greet some spectators. Are you going to
claim that was against SS regs also?
Anthony Marsh
> On Oct 8, 1:52 pm, "Martin Shackelford" <msha...@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
>> But it wasn't changed "at the last minute," if at all. There was no change
>> after Tuesday.
>>
>> Martin
>>
>> "eric_r_carlson" <alive...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>>
>> news:1191799530.2...@r29g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
>>
>>
>>
>>> Actually the trade route was changed. And the limo would *not* have had
>>> to jump the curb. Look at google maps satellite version of dealey plaza
>>> to see this:
>>> http://i48.photobucket.com/albums/f218/e_ray/DP.jpg- Hide quoted text -
>> - Show quoted text -
>
> RDC wrote: The reason CTers have long said the route was changed is
> because the SS manuals stated that no turns greater than 90 degrees and
> the no speed should be less than 44 mph - both make perfect sense if you
There were no such regs. You are believing some BS from someone who
doesn't know.
tomnln
Does THAT remind you of the question?
"Anthony Marsh" <anthon...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:cJadnRqYRcBy1ZDa...@comcast.com...
Martin Shackelford
Second, Charles Cabell wasn't fired by JFK, but resigned when Allen Dulles
did. Part of the reason was that Cabell had declined to call JFK to report
appeals to reinstate the canceled air strikes during the Bay of Pigs
invasion. As a result, many assumed that JFK had made the final decision,
not Cabell.
Martin
<robc...@netscape.com> wrote in message
news:1192033386.6...@v3g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
> On Oct 7, 2:06 pm, Barb Junkkarinen <barbREMOVE...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> On 7 Oct 2007 13:13:29 -0400, robcap...@netscape.com wrote:
>>
>
>> Probably against several regulations to hump the limo up over curbs
>> too. <g> Elm St was the route to the Stemmons on ramp.
>>
>> Barb :-)
>>
>> RDC wrote: Not as against a turn that made them slow to 10 miles an
>> hour. This was against all that was stated in the SS manual. It was
>> changed by the mayor of Dallas (Richard Cabell) who just happened to be
>> the brother of fired Charles Cabell (deputy dir. of CIA) after the Bay of
>> Pigs fiasco. I'm sure he had no motive. :-)
Martin Shackelford
plans that month.
Martin
<robc...@netscape.com> wrote in message
news:1192033554.5...@v3g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
Martin Shackelford
Martin
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1192035800.2...@o3g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...
Martin Shackelford
which determined the site of the luncheon and, as a result, the motorcade
route.
Martin
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1192038124.5...@22g2000hsm.googlegroups.com...
Martin Shackelford
Tampa?
Martin
<robc...@netscape.com> wrote in message
news:1192033825.7...@o3g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...
Martin Shackelford
every open window in the downtown Dallas area?
Please provide a copy of the specific Secret Service regulations from 1963
to which you refer--or are you simply repeating claims initially made in
some of the older books?
Martin
<robc...@netscape.com> wrote in message
news:1192034088.5...@v3g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
Martin Shackelford
Considerations include the reliability of the individual, his or her
location at the time, obstructions (people, trees, etc.), the amount of time
available to observe what is being described, and whether what they are
saying is supported or contradicted by other available evidence.
Martin
<robc...@netscape.com> wrote in message
news:1192034218....@y42g2000hsy.googlegroups.com...
Martin Shackelford
An ARTICLE printed on Tuesday, November 19, detailing the route included the
turn onto Houston and then onto Elm. The map has long been known to have
been in error, and I think even there you have the date wrong.
Why are you playing this game, Tom?
Martin
"tomnln" <tom...@cox.net> wrote in message
news:uZ8Pi.12848$bM6....@newsfe20.lga...
Martin Shackelford
briefly came on.
Where there is confusion is in the claim that the limo came to a complete
stop. There is no question that it slowed considerably, and from the
perspective of some witnesses, it appeared to have momentarily stopped. It
is useful to compare what those witnesses said to where they were located.
Those ahead and behind the limo were more likely to report a stop, while
those on the sides were more likely not to. This, of course, is all mixed in
with the attempts to prove that parts of the Z film were deleted to "remove
the stop."
Martin
"Anthony Marsh" <anthon...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:LN2dnV2JRdkOo5Da...@comcast.com...
Martin Shackelford
wasn't considered a suitable route for a presidential motorcade. The Dallas
elite preferred the president to see Dallas at its best--the downtown area
and the area along Stemmons.
Martin
"tomnln" <tom...@cox.net> wrote in message news:IebPi.7$Bu...@newsfe17.lga...
Martin Shackelford
if the route had been solid no later than November 18, as it had to be to
be described in a news article published November 19.
Martin
"eric_r_carlson" <aliv...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1192073348.9...@d55g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...
Martin Shackelford
years. As for the article, you don't trust me, look it up yourself. I gave
you the date.
Martin
"tomnln" <tom...@cox.net> wrote in message
news:m3hPi.31$uI4...@newsfe14.lga...
Martin Shackelford
published earlier in the week.
Martin
"Anthony Marsh" <anthon...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:7-WdnZU7ce8oAJDa...@comcast.com...
Anthony Marsh
> There is, in fact, evidence that Greer hit the brakes--the brake lights
> briefly came on.
I don't think so. I think people are seeing sunlight coming through the
right rear brake lens which makes it look lit, but I never see the left
rear brake light lit. Can you find a frame showing the left rear light
lit?
> Where there is confusion is in the claim that the limo came to a complete
> stop. There is no question that it slowed considerably, and from the
> perspective of some witnesses, it appeared to have momentarily stopped. It
> is useful to compare what those witnesses said to where they were located.
> Those ahead and behind the limo were more likely to report a stop, while
> those on the sides were more likely not to. This, of course, is all mixed in
> with the attempts to prove that parts of the Z film were deleted to "remove
> the stop."
>
Certain researchers who want to support pet theories have misquoted
witnesses by leaving out their qualifiers such as "practically", "almost",
and "nearly."
Anthony Marsh
> Exactly how do you think the Secret Service would have gone about policing
> every open window in the downtown Dallas area?
By doing what they refused to do, and call in MI to supplement security.
Anthony Marsh
> Why don't you scan that newspaper & post it for us Martin?
>
Someone else posted it a long time ago.
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/dthmap.gif
> Would you like me to scan the DTH of 11/22/63 & post it?
> Map showing the motorcade going straight down Main St.
>
So freaking what? "Dewey defeats Truman" headline. Wake up!
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/at0069_4s.jpg
Anthony Marsh
The route was not changed. They had several possibilities and chose one.
> -Eric