Ike to Dulles and Taylor: use Castro mistake "to get rid of ... [him]" (June 23, 1961)
Peter Fokes
Interesting to note the "handwritten paragraph" General Taylor added
as Point 7
<quote on>
....
6. The entire discussion was most cordial. I received the impression
that General Eisenhower perceives the need of suppressing further
public debate of the Cuban operation. He expressed disapproval of the
recent TV appearance of Mr. Miller and Senator Clark in which the
Cuban operation was argued./1/
<quote off>
"/1/" refers to footnote below:
<quote on>
/1/Taylor added a final handwritten paragraph to the typed text that
reads:"7. General Eisenhower expressed the feeling that the U.S. would
have to get rid of Castro--preferably using as a reason for
intervention some Castro mistake. As the visitors left, he reiterated
his appreciation to President Kennedy for arranging the briefing." The
final sentence had been typed as the closing sentence of paragraph 6
before Taylor crossed it out and revised the text.
<quote off>
Entire document here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/policy/docs/frusX/236_255.html
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/policy/docs/frusX/236_255.html
Regards,
Peter Fokes,
Toronto
Coondog
Some interesting stuff Peter. I especially find Castro’s remarks
interesting. This is the first time I have seen them.
3. Castro himself was in the second or third tank that advanced from
Australia to Parite (which Castro said should be called "Palite") and
the tank in front of him was knocked out.
I’m betting the old war horse is telling a little war story here.
Perhaps not but the second tank is not where the top dog usually
rides.
7. The invasion had a "good plan, poorly executed". If the invaders
had had good air cover, sent the paratroopers farther inland, and cut
the causeways, the story would have been different.
I think Fidel is being a bit kind here and being damn macho when he
claims if he had been leading the invasion it would have succeeded.
The main failure was that the Cuban people didn’t rise to support the
invasion. There was no real and informed reason to think they would.
Plus the invasion force was under strength.
9. Castro knew the time but not the place of the invasion. At first he
thought it might be near Baracoa where the U.S. Navy was engaged in
simulated operations.
We don’t hear much about these “simulated operations” but they were
part of American harassment of Castro before and after the Bay of
Pigs. The world would probably have been better off without them.
This response by Ike is especially interesting I thought. In response
to questions, General Eisenhower emphasized that there never had been
an operational plan presented to him, hence no "Eisenhower plan" could
have existed. He does not believe that he ever knew of the proposal of
an amphibious operation, and certainly was not aware of any plan
approximating the Trinidad Plan.
Ike might have been covering his ass here. If he is telling the truth
you have to wonder how much attention he was paying to detail.
Bill Clarke
Peter Fokes
They were discussing an article in the Saturday Evening Post (June 24,
1961) written by ALSOP. Now, if IKE is correct then ALSOP was
misinformed by someone, or just made up a story. At any rate, the
effect of ALSOP's story is imply that IKE's plan DID call for
contingency support: "But the Eisenhower plan also envisaged American
intervention on a `contingency basis.' American aircraft would
intervene, either openly or in unmarked planes, if necessary to
maintain control over the beachhead and prevent destruction of the
anti-Castro forces."
It is fascinating to hear that IKE denied ever seeing such a plan! Of
course, we know that Kennedy took the heat for refusing to use air
support. He had approved the plan with the proviso there would be no
such support.
ALSOP's article makes Kennedy's plan look faulty compared to IKE's
alleged plan (which IKE claims he never saw!!)
Wouldn't you like to know what is contained in the three unclassified
lines in this segment:
<quote on>
Washington, July 26, 1961.
//Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials.
Confidential. Prepared by Admiral Burke.
SUBJ
Mtg at White House with the President on 26 Jul 61 prior to my
receiving DSM on retirement
1. The President talked about Cuba. He asked me if I thought we would
have to go into Cuba. I said yes. He asked would Castro get stronger.
I said yes. Castro would increase his power over his people. He asked
whether we could take Cuba easily. I said yes, but it was getting more
and more difficult. He asked what did I think would happen if we
attacked. I said all hell would break loose but that some day we would
have to do it. The danger would be that Castro would flee and go to
some other country--Russia or Brazil. [3 lines of source text not
declassified]
<quote off>
Isn't it likely Burke and Kennedy were discussing what to DO with
Castro?
Regards,
Peter Fokes,
Toronto
>
>Bill Clarke
Anthony Marsh
>> interesting. This is the first time I have seen them.
>>
>> 3. Castro himself was in the second or third tank that advanced from
>> Australia to Parite (which Castro said should be called "Palite") and
>> the tank in front of him was knocked out.
>>
>> Perhaps not but the second tank is not where the top dog usually
>> rides.
>>
>> 7. The invasion had a "good plan, poorly executed". If the invaders
>> had had good air cover, sent the paratroopers farther inland, and cut
>> the causeways, the story would have been different.
>>
>> I think Fidel is being a bit kind here and being damn macho when he
>> claims if he had been leading the invasion it would have succeeded.
>> invasion. There was no real and informed reason to think they would.
>> Plus the invasion force was under strength.
>>
>> 9. Castro knew the time but not the place of the invasion. At first he
>> thought it might be near Baracoa where the U.S. Navy was engaged in
>> simulated operations.
>>
>> part of American harassment of Castro before and after the Bay of
>> Pigs. The world would probably have been better off without them.
>>
>> This response by Ike is especially interesting I thought. In response
>> to questions, General Eisenhower emphasized that there never had been
>> an operational plan presented to him, hence no "Eisenhower plan" could
>> have existed. He does not believe that he ever knew of the proposal of
>> an amphibious operation, and certainly was not aware of any plan
>> approximating the Trinidad Plan.
>>
>> Ike might have been covering his ass here. If he is telling the truth
>> you have to wonder how much attention he was paying to detail.
>
> They were discussing an article in the Saturday Evening Post (June 24,
> 1961) written by ALSOP. Now, if IKE is correct then ALSOP was
> misinformed by someone, or just made up a story. At any rate, the
> effect of ALSOP's story is imply that IKE's plan DID call for
> contingency support: "But the Eisenhower plan also envisaged American
> intervention on a `contingency basis.' American aircraft would
> intervene, either openly or in unmarked planes, if necessary to
> maintain control over the beachhead and prevent destruction of the
> anti-Castro forces."
>
You tend to forget that JFK did send 4 unmarked Jets from the USS Essex
to protect the exile B-26 bombers. Do US aircraft carriers normally
carry unmarked jets? Could they unmark it in 5 minutes?
How legal is it under international law to put unmarked jets into combat?
> It is fascinating to hear that IKE denied ever seeing such a plan! Of
> course, we know that Kennedy took the heat for refusing to use air
> support. He had approved the plan with the proviso there would be no
> such support.
>
When you talk about air support here you mean only the exile B-26s which
were supposed to provide air cover over the beaches after they had
completed their mission of destroying Castro's planes. That was always
in the plan, but JFK scaled back the number to make it plausibly deniable.