Malcolm Kilduff on JFK's Vietnam plan
Peter Fokes
him one day before the assassination:
<quote on>
�I�ve just been given a list of the most recent casualties in Vietnam.
We�re losing too damned many people over there. It�s time for us to
get out. The Vietnamese are not fighting for themselves. We�re the
ones who are doing the fighting.
�After I come back from Texas, that�s going to change. There is no
reason for us to lose another man over there. Vietnam is not worth
another American life.�
<quote off>
Regards,
Peter Fokes,
Toronto
jas
I think this shows Kennedy's personal views of the dilemma he was in.
Unfortunately in the real world personal views don't always get the
nasty work done.
Peter Fokes
>On Dec 15, 10:40�pm, Peter Fokes <pfo...@rogers.com> wrote:
>> Malcolm Kilduff told James �Douglass that JFK said the following to
>> him one day before the assassination:
>>
>> <quote on>
>>
>> I ve just been given a list of the most recent casualties in Vietnam.
>> We re losing too damned many people over there. It s time for us to
>> get out. The Vietnamese are not fighting for themselves. We re the
>> ones who are doing the fighting.
>>
>> After I come back from Texas, that s going to change. There is no
>> reason for us to lose another man over there. Vietnam is not worth
>> another American life.
>>
>> <quote off>
>>
>> Regards,
>> Peter Fokes,
>> Toronto
>
>I think this shows Kennedy's personal views of the dilemma he was in.
I see. Well, I would rather accept JFK's words at face value rather
than superimpose your opinion on them. I thought you were the guy who
didn't believe in creating fictions. Now you are creating fictions!
JFK SAID, according to his friend and press secretary,
"After I come back from Texas, that s going to change. There is no
reason for us to lose another man over there."
Well. my friend, the only way to avoid losing another man would be to
withdraw as soon as feasible.
>Unfortunately in the real world personal views don't always get the
>nasty work done.
In the real world, JFK could order his Defense Department to remove
troops. And, according to Kilduff, that was his intent.
And stomping your foot isn't going to change that fact.
Regards,
Peter Fokes,
Toronto
Coondog
>
> - Show quoted text -
This still remains one more of these, “he told me that Jack told him”
deals. Rather weak because we don’t know for sure what Kennedy really
said or if he even said anything about Vietnam.
Now I don’t doubt “Jack” would have loved to not have Vietnam as one
more problem and I’ll even give you the benefit of the doubt about
what Kennedy actually said, never a given with a politician. But
instead of depending on what someone claims JFK said why not look at
his actions regarding Vietnam. Nothing there, right up to his death,
to indicate he planned on a complete withdrawal.
Bill Clarke
Anthony Marsh
> deals. Rather weak because we don�t know for sure what Kennedy really
> said or if he even said anything about Vietnam.
>
Ever the denier.
> Now I don�t doubt �Jack� would have loved to not have Vietnam as one
> more problem and I�ll even give you the benefit of the doubt about
jas
> On 16 Dec 2009 16:04:07 -0500, jas <lle...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> >On Dec 15, 10:40 pm, Peter Fokes <pfo...@rogers.com> wrote:
> >> Malcolm Kilduff told James Douglass that JFK said the following to
> >> him one day before the assassination:
>
> >> <quote on>
>
> >> I ve just been given a list of the most recent casualties in Vietnam.
> >> We re losing too damned many people over there. It s time for us to
> >> get out. The Vietnamese are not fighting for themselves. We re the
> >> ones who are doing the fighting.
>
> >> After I come back from Texas, that s going to change. There is no
> >> reason for us to lose another man over there. Vietnam is not worth
> >> another American life.
>
> >> <quote off>
>
> >> Regards,
> >> Peter Fokes,
> >> Toronto
>
> >I think this shows Kennedy's personal views of the dilemma he was in.
>
> I see. Well, I would rather accept JFK's words at face value rather
> than superimpose your opinion on them. I thought you were the guy who
> didn't believe in creating fictions. Now you are creating fictions!
Man, you really get worked up for nothing. Relax, dude.
I was giving my opinions on JFK's words. You posted them, I opined.
What, I am not allowed to post my opinions on this forum?
>
> JFK SAID, according to his friend and press secretary,
>
> "After I come back from Texas, that s going to change. There is no
> reason for us to lose another man over there."
>
> Well. my friend, the only way to avoid losing another man would be to
> withdraw as soon as feasible.
>
> >Unfortunately in the real world personal views don't always get the
> >nasty work done.
>
> In the real world, JFK could order his Defense Department to remove
> troops. And, according to Kilduff, that was his intent.
>
> And stomping your foot isn't going to change that fact.
Jeez. Chill out man.
>
> Regards,
> Peter Fokes,
> Toronto
Coondog
> On 12/17/2009 11:31 AM, Coondog wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Dec 16, 1:13 pm, Peter Fokes<pfo...@rogers.com> wrote:
> >> On 16 Dec 2009 16:04:07 -0500, jas<lle...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >>> On Dec 15, 10:40 pm, Peter Fokes<pfo...@rogers.com> wrote:
> >>>> Malcolm Kilduff told James Douglass that JFK said the following to
> >>>> him one day before the assassination:
>
> >>>> <quote on>
>
> >>>> I ve just been given a list of the most recent casualties inVietnam.
> >>>> We re losing too damned many people over there. It s time for us to
> >>>> get out. The Vietnamese are not fighting for themselves. We re the
> >>>> ones who are doing the fighting.
>
> >>>> After I come back from Texas, that s going to change. There is no
> >>>> another American life.
>
> >>>> <quote off>
>
> >>>> Regards,
> >>>> Peter Fokes,
> >>>> Toronto
>
> >>> I think this shows Kennedy's personal views of the dilemma he was in.
>
> >> I see. Well, I would rather accept JFK's words at face value rather
> >> than superimpose your opinion on them. I thought you were the guy who
> >> didn't believe in creating fictions. Now you are creating fictions!
>
> >> JFK SAID, according to his friend and press secretary,
>
> >> "After I come back from Texas, that s going to change. There is no
> >> reason for us to lose another man over there."
>
> >> Well. my friend, the only way to avoid losing another man would be to
> >> withdraw as soon as feasible.
>
> >>> Unfortunately in the real world personal views don't always get the
> >>> nasty work done.
>
> >> In the real world, JFK could order his Defense Department to remove
> >> troops. And, according to Kilduff, that was his intent.
>
> >> And stomping your foot isn't going to change that fact.
>
> >> Regards,
> >> Peter Fokes,
> >> Toronto- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> > deals. Rather weak because we don’t know for sure what Kennedy really
> > said or if he even said anything aboutVietnam.
>
> Ever the denier.
Ah, Walter Mitty joins the fray. Try this on for size, Marsh.
Malcolm Kilduff tells James Douglass that JFK told him that when he
got back from Texas he was sending the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions,
the 1st, 101st and the 1st Cav to Vietnam.
You’d be whining to high heaven about hearsay (unfounded
information). Hearsay doesn’t mean much so get over it.
Bill Clarke
Peter Fokes
In other words, you are saying Malcolm Kilduff is a liar.
Malcolm Kilduff said JFK told HIM. That is not hearsay.
>>
>> Ever the denier.
>
>Ah, Walter Mitty joins the fray. Try this on for size, Marsh.
>
>Malcolm Kilduff tells James Douglass that JFK told him that when he
>got back from Texas he was sending the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions,
>the 1st, 101st and the 1st Cav to Vietnam.
Please provide the citation for that comment.
>You�d be whining to high heaven about hearsay (unfounded
>information). Hearsay doesn�t mean much so get over it.
JFK's comment to Kilduff is not hearsay.
If Kilduff said someone told him JFK said something, that would be
hearsay.
>
>Bill Clarke
Regards,
PF
Coondog
Not at all, Peter. I’m saying we don’t know for sure about what he
said or what he heard from JFK and I certainly don’t know enough about
Malcolm Kiduff to call him a liar or a prophet of truth. However, I
believe even you will admit that there has been a very long and
continuous line of false witnesses, publicity seekers and outright
nuts that have sought a ride on the Camelot carriage. Enough so that
I believe it very naive to accept these, “Jack told me so” at face
value. I also doubt any causality list JFK saw in 1963 was bad enough
for a politician to change policy and I wonder why we are just now
hearing of this startling statement of Kennedy’s. The statement is
pretty heavy stuff.
> Malcolm Kilduff said JFK told HIM. That is not hearsay.
Well Peter, you want to know what JFK told me about his plans for
Vietnam? Now that would be a lie on my part. How do you know Kilduff
isn’t lying? Getting to hear this straight from JFK is a biggie…if it
is true.
> >> Ever the denier.
>
> >Ah, Walter Mitty joins the fray. Try this on for size, Marsh.
>
> >Malcolm Kilduff tells James Douglass that JFK told him that when he
> >got back from Texas he was sending the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions,
> >the 1st, 101st and the 1st Cav toVietnam.
>
> Please provide the citation for that comment.
You see it, I pulled it out of somewhere to show Marsh how he would
react to Kilduff’s statement if it had not been a statement Marsh (or
you) liked. Had this imaginary statement I made up show up in
someone’s book as a true statement I’d have to have the same doubts I
do about Kilduff’s statement.
> >You’d be whining to high heaven about hearsay (unfounded
> >information). Hearsay doesn’t mean much so get over it.
>
> JFK's comment to Kilduff is not hearsay.
>
> If Kilduff said someone told him JFK said something, that would be
> hearsay.
The supposed statement remains unconfirmed, unproven and unverified.
A pity it didn’t show up on JFK’s taping system.
Bill Clarke
HistorianDetective
PF
>
> If Kilduff said someone told him JFK said something, that would be
> hearsay.
I tend to agree with what jas, coondog and Bill posted.
I'd like to add that the timing of Douglas' comment regarding Kilduff
couldn't have been better.
The hearsay is Douglas claiming Kilduff said what Kennedy said.
I'm not stating that Kilduff didn't make that comment, but where is
your proof
that Kilduff stated it in the first place and that is what Kennedy
really said.
I don't disagree that Kennedy didn't want to prolong the war.
But to utilize Kilduff's statement per Douglas is absurd, especially
when you
have a speech given by Kennedy the next day that doesn't support it.
Actions speak better than words.
Per Harry Golden in his book "Mr Kennedy and the Negroes"....
"Kennedy readily admitted that he was controlled by events."
Do you disagree with that?
There certainly is support in that regard.
Cuban Missile Crisis, Battle of Oxford and Birmingham, Alabama are
just a few examples.
Had events changed, so would JKF's thoughts and actions and intents
and whathaveyous.
If you utilize strictly verbal commentary as being a basis for fact,
then JFK has some
serious historical issues in regards to events in Iraq in 1963.
It's something that nobody here discusses or has discussed. Maybe it's
time we should?
JM
PS...
Here's an interesting piece written by
Theodore C. Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.
Published: Monday, December 5, 2005
Iraq: What would JFK have done?
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/05/opinion/05iht-edsoren.html?_r=2
Funny, they never mention what he did.
PS...BTW!
A "FACT" is nothing more than a statement that can be proved or
disproved.
How did Thalia put it? "And that's a fact, Jack."
>
>
>
> >Bill Clarke
>
> Regards,
> PF- Hide quoted text -
Anthony Marsh
>>>> deals. Rather weak because we don�t know for sure what Kennedy really
>>>> said or if he even said anything aboutVietnam.
>
> In other words, you are saying Malcolm Kilduff is a liar.
>
> Malcolm Kilduff said JFK told HIM. That is not hearsay.
>
>
>>>
>>> Ever the denier.
>>
>> Ah, Walter Mitty joins the fray. Try this on for size, Marsh.
>>
>> Malcolm Kilduff tells James Douglass that JFK told him that when he
>> got back from Texas he was sending the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions,
>> the 1st, 101st and the 1st Cav to Vietnam.
>
> Please provide the citation for that comment.
>
>
>> information). Hearsay doesn�t mean much so get over it.
>
> JFK's comment to Kilduff is not hearsay.
>
> If Kilduff said someone told him JFK said something, that would be
> hearsay.
You have to remember that you are dealing with professional deniers.
>
>>
>> Bill Clarke
>
>
> Regards,
> PF
Anthony Marsh
>>>>> deals. Rather weak because we don�t know for sure what Kennedy really
>>>>> said or if he even said anything aboutVietnam.
>>
>> In other words, you are saying Malcolm Kilduff is a liar.
>
> said or what he heard from JFK and I certainly don�t know enough about
> Malcolm Kiduff to call him a liar or a prophet of truth. However, I
> believe even you will admit that there has been a very long and
> continuous line of false witnesses, publicity seekers and outright
> nuts that have sought a ride on the Camelot carriage. Enough so that
> value. I also doubt any causality list JFK saw in 1963 was bad enough
> for a politician to change policy and I wonder why we are just now
> pretty heavy stuff.
>
Ever the denier. You ONLY deny what you don't like.
>> Malcolm Kilduff said JFK told HIM. That is not hearsay.
>
> Well Peter, you want to know what JFK told me about his plans for
> Vietnam? Now that would be a lie on my part. How do you know Kilduff
> isn�t lying? Getting to hear this straight from JFK is a biggie�if it
> is true.
>
You ONLY claim someone was lying when you don't like what he said.
>>>> Ever the denier.
>>
>>> Ah, Walter Mitty joins the fray. Try this on for size, Marsh.
>>
>>> Malcolm Kilduff tells James Douglass that JFK told him that when he
>>> got back from Texas he was sending the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions,
>>> the 1st, 101st and the 1st Cav toVietnam.
>>
>> Please provide the citation for that comment.
>
> You see it, I pulled it out of somewhere to show Marsh how he would
Somewhere? You mean your backside.
> react to Kilduff�s statement if it had not been a statement Marsh (or
> you) liked. Had this imaginary statement I made up show up in
> someone�s book as a true statement I�d have to have the same doubts I
> do about Kilduff�s statement.
>
We already know that you love to make up crap. You are a revisionist.
>
>>> You�d be whining to high heaven about hearsay (unfounded
>>> information). Hearsay doesn�t mean much so get over it.
>>
>> JFK's comment to Kilduff is not hearsay.
>>
>> If Kilduff said someone told him JFK said something, that would be
>> hearsay.
>
> The supposed statement remains unconfirmed, unproven and unverified.
> A pity it didn�t show up on JFK�s taping system.
>
Maybe it did. Maybe that's what scares you so much, like the recent
releases.
> Bill Clarke
>
Coondog
wrote:
>
> Funny, they never mention what he did.
>
> PS...BTW!
>
Thanks for the link. That crap has so many holes in it looks like someone
shot-gunned it. But what can we expect from two of the premier Camelot
shiners?
Bill Clarke
Coondog
I’m not the [censored] that thinks the CIA killed JFK. Chortle!
> >> Malcolm Kilduff said JFK told HIM. That is not hearsay.
>
> > Well Peter, you want to know what JFK told me about his plans for
> >Vietnam? Now that would be a lie on my part. How do you know Kilduff
> > isn�t lying? Getting to hear this straight from JFK is a biggie�if it
> > is true.
>
> You ONLY claim someone was lying when you don't like what he said.
Wrong again Marsh, as usual. A certain Vietnamese chap claims that after
the beating the communist took during TET 68 they were discussing seeking
peace. I like this but have to dismiss it as a lie because there is no
evidence to back it up. You got some more.
> >>>> Ever the denier.
>
> >>> Ah, Walter Mitty joins the fray. Try this on for size, Marsh.
>
> >>> Malcolm Kilduff tells James Douglass that JFK told him that when he
> >>> got back from Texas he was sending the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions,
> >>> the 1st, 101st and the 1st Cav toVietnam.
>
> >> Please provide the citation for that comment.
>
> > You see it, I pulled it out of somewhere to show Marsh how he would
>
> Somewhere? You mean your backside.
Yes, that seems to match your efforts here.
> > react to Kilduff�s statement if it had not been a statement Marsh (or
> > you) liked. Had this imaginary statement I made up show up in
> > someone�s book as a true statement I�d have to have the same doubts I
> > do about Kilduff�s statement.
>
> We already know that you love to make up crap. You are a revisionist.
I’m not the [censored] that thinks the CIA killed JFK. Chortle!
> >>> You�d be whining to high heaven about hearsay (unfounded
> >>> information). Hearsay doesn�t mean much so get over it.
>
> >> JFK's comment to Kilduff is not hearsay.
>
> >> If Kilduff said someone told him JFK said something, that would be
> >> hearsay.
>
> > The supposed statement remains unconfirmed, unproven and unverified.
> > A pity it didn�t show up on JFK�s taping system.
>
> Maybe it did. Maybe that's what scares you so much, like the recent
> releases.
This is mild crap, nothing to scare anyone. So, bring those tapes on
Marsh. I’ll be waiting. Until then beware the grassy knoll.
Bill Clarke
Anthony Marsh
>>>>>>> deals. Rather weak because we don???t know for sure what Kennedy really
>>>>>>> said or if he even said anything aboutVietnam.
>>
>>>> In other words, you are saying Malcolm Kilduff is a liar.
>>
>>> said or what he heard from JFK and I certainly don???t know enough about
>>> Malcolm Kiduff to call him a liar or a prophet of truth. However, I
>>> believe even you will admit that there has been a very long and
>>> continuous line of false witnesses, publicity seekers and outright
>>> nuts that have sought a ride on the Camelot carriage. Enough so that
>>> value. I also doubt any causality list JFK saw in 1963 was bad enough
>>> for a politician to change policy and I wonder why we are just now
>>> pretty heavy stuff.
>>
>> Ever the denier. You ONLY deny what you don't like.
>
>
Not what I said. Not an official project.
>>>> Malcolm Kilduff said JFK told HIM. That is not hearsay.
>>
>>> Well Peter, you want to know what JFK told me about his plans for
>>> Vietnam? Now that would be a lie on my part. How do you know Kilduff
>>> isn???t lying? Getting to hear this straight from JFK is a biggie???if it
>>> is true.
>>
>> You ONLY claim someone was lying when you don't like what he said.
>
> Wrong again Marsh, as usual. A certain Vietnamese chap claims that after
> the beating the communist took during TET 68 they were discussing seeking
> peace. I like this but have to dismiss it as a lie because there is no
> evidence to back it up. You got some more.
>
As usual when you are stuck you shift gears and bring up irrelevant things.
>>>>>> Ever the denier.
>>
>>>>> Ah, Walter Mitty joins the fray. Try this on for size, Marsh.
>>
>>>>> Malcolm Kilduff tells James Douglass that JFK told him that when he
>>>>> got back from Texas he was sending the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions,
>>>>> the 1st, 101st and the 1st Cav toVietnam.
>>
>>>> Please provide the citation for that comment.
>>
>>> You see it, I pulled it out of somewhere to show Marsh how he would
>>
>> Somewhere? You mean your backside.
>
> Yes, that seems to match your efforts here.
>
>>> react to Kilduff???s statement if it had not been a statement Marsh (or
>>> you) liked. Had this imaginary statement I made up show up in
>>> someone???s book as a true statement I???d have to have the same doubts I
>>> do about Kilduff???s statement.
>>
>> We already know that you love to make up crap. You are a revisionist.
>
> I?m not the [censored] that thinks the CIA killed JFK. Chortle!
>
You're the [censored] who misrepresents.
>>>>> You???d be whining to high heaven about hearsay (unfounded
>>>>> information). Hearsay doesn???t mean much so get over it.
>>
>>>> JFK's comment to Kilduff is not hearsay.
>>
>>>> If Kilduff said someone told him JFK said something, that would be
>>>> hearsay.
>>
>>> The supposed statement remains unconfirmed, unproven and unverified.
>>> A pity it didn???t show up on JFK???s taping system.
>>
>> Maybe it did. Maybe that's what scares you so much, like the recent
>> releases.
>
> This is mild crap, nothing to scare anyone. So, bring those tapes on
> Marsh. I?ll be waiting. Until then beware the grassy knoll.
>
> Bill Clarke
>
Chuck Schuyler
According to www.militaryfactory.com, there were 118 US deaths in
Vietnam in 1963.
American Vietnam War-Related Deaths by War Years and Post-War:
Year Recorded Deaths
1956-60 9
1961 16
1962 52
1963 118
1964 206
1965 1,863
1966 6,143
1967 11,153
1968 16, 592
1969 11,616
1970 6,081
1971 2,357
1972 641
1973 168
1974 178
1975 161
1976 77
1977 96
1978 447
1979 148
1980 26
1981-90 34
1991-98 11
Totals 58,193
Peter Fokes
wrote:
Very sad.
And to what end?
The dominoes are still standing.
McNamara: Vietnam was a mistake.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hDjvKF_X78&feature=related
Regards,
Peter Fokes,
Toronto
Coondog
> On Dec 15, 11:40 pm, Peter Fokes <pfo...@rogers.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Malcolm Kilduff told James Douglass that JFK said the following to
> > him one day before the assassination:
>
> > <quote on>
>
> > I ve just been given a list of the most recent casualties inVietnam.
> > We re losing too damned many people over there. It s time for us to
> > get out. The Vietnamese are not fighting for themselves. We re the
> > ones who are doing the fighting.
>
> > After I come back from Texas, that s going to change. There is no
> > another American life.
>
> > <quote off>
>
> > Regards,
> > Peter Fokes,
> > Toronto
>
>
> AmericanVietnamWar-Related Deaths by War Years and Post-War:
>
> Year Recorded Deaths
> 1956-60 9
> 1961 16
> 1962 52
> 1963 118
> 1964 206
> 1965 1,863
> 1966 6,143
> 1967 11,153
> 1968 16, 592
> 1969 11,616
> 1970 6,081
> 1971 2,357
> 1972 641
> 1973 168
> 1974 178
> 1975 161
> 1976 77
> 1977 96
> 1978 447
> 1979 148
> 1980 26
> 1981-90 34
> 1991-98 11
>
> - Show quoted text -
Thanks for the link, Chuck. I believe there are now over 58,200 plus
names on the wall so we see that, for crying out loud, they didn’t even
know for sure how many men were lost!
I don’t want to sound cold here but I think few would argue that 118
fallen soldiers, spread out over a year, would cause a major policy
change. So, did Kilduff really hear this from JFK? I doubt it.
Your link, with its cold stark numbers, tell the story of our involvement
in Vietnam as well as any 400 page book could. If I may for Marsh’s
benefit:
1956 to 1960 we lost 9. This is the period that Marsh claims Ike started
the war. Less than two men a year average! That was the true advisor
stage and was mostly at the higher echelons that are inherently safer than
being in the bush with the grunts.
1961 we lost 16, almost twice as many as we lost from 1956 to 1960. This
was JFK picking up the ante a bit.
1962 we lost 52. Over three times those lost in 1961. This reflects
Kennedy’s introduction of the helicopter units, the bombers and jet
fighters, the MACV command and another large increase in our number of
troops in Vietnam. It also shows our advisors moving down to the
battalion level, more dangerous than staying in Saigon or Danang. This was
a pivotal year.
1963 we lost 118, over twice what we lost in 62. Our numbers of troops in
SVN continue to increase. I should note that the communist had been
increasing their presence in Vietnam also. The communist decision was
made in 1959 and by the time they worked on the Trail and trained troops
it was sometime in late 1960 or early 1961 before this effort was felt in
SVN.
1964 we lost 206, almost twice that of 1963. A reflection of LBJ
continuing the program of increasing our presence in Vietnam, we now are
up to around 27,000 troops in SVN. This is most notable as the period of
time that Jack’s body never got cold according to Marsh.
1965, especially the last half after Johnson committed U.S. combat units,
to the end of 1968 we lost 35,751 men. This is of course a reflection of
Johnson sending in more U.S. combat units and the NVA units coming down in
1964. It is the period where our KIA ran over 500 men a week for a time
during TET 68. This is the pivotal period when LBJ and Westmoreland
squandered our blood, time and treasure chasing a guerrilla army around
the country side with brigade size units. I look upon this period with a
terrible sadness.
1969 we lost 11,616, down from 16,592 in 1968. This is a reflection of
the communist licking their wounds from TET 68 but still trying to prevail
(TET 69). It is also a reflection of Nixon beginning our withdrawal to
some extent. With our civil unrest at TET 68 and the beginning of our
withdrawal the communist now knew they had won. It was now only a matter
of time. The American public and their congress had had enough and with
no progress in all those years who could blame them.
From 1970 to the end of 1972 we lost 9,079, most of these in 1970 as the
communist keep up the pressure of American body bags going back to the
U.S. and saving themselves for their conventional attack to come on SVN.
Most all American combat troops were out of SVN by the end of 1972. It
was all over.
It is my sincere hope that Marsh will study this short work so he won’t
be so confused about our involvement in Vietnam.
Bill Clarke
Coondog
> On 19 Dec 2009 09:33:40 -0500, Chuck Schuyler <chu...@am-mtg.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> >On Dec 15, 11:40 pm, Peter Fokes <pfo...@rogers.com> wrote:
> >> Malcolm Kilduff told James Douglass that JFK said the following to
> >> him one day before the assassination:
>
> >> <quote on>
>
> >> I ve just been given a list of the most recent casualties inVietnam.
> >> We re losing too damned many people over there. It s time for us to
> >> get out. The Vietnamese are not fighting for themselves. We re the
> >> ones who are doing the fighting.
>
> >> After I come back from Texas, that s going to change. There is no
> >> another American life.
>
> >> <quote off>
>
> >> Regards,
> >> Peter Fokes,
> >> Toronto
>
> >Vietnamin 1963.
>
> >AmericanVietnamWar-Related Deaths by War Years and Post-War:
Terribly sad, Peter. A terrible thing, all those young men who remain
forever young. I’ll never get over it.
> And to what end?
>
> The dominoes are still standing.
Well, your man JFK believed in the domino theory so I can’t see you
criticizing others that felt the same way. Do you blame JFK? They had no
way of knowing that it was mostly a false theory and I think it unfair for
us to sit here in 2009 and down them for believing in something in the
early 1960s. We can see clearly now?
> McNamara:Vietnamwas a mistake.
>
The damn mistake, Peter, WAS the brilliant fool McNamara. That rotten
pile of arrogant horse manure has lied his ass off to make himself look
good about Vietnam. I hope he is burning in a very hot hell.
Bill Clarke
Chuck Schuyler
> The damn mistake, Peter, WAS the brilliant fool McNamara. That rotten
> pile of arrogant horse manure has lied his ass off to make himself look
> good about Vietnam. I hope he is burning in a very hot hell.
>
> Bill Clarke
Well put.
"Best and brightest" running the war--my ass.
Peter Fokes
HistorianDetective
>
> - Show quoted text -
Bill,
Thanks for postin' and givin' some insight into this political commentary
people can't seem to resist to post every chance they get.
> Terribly sad, Peter. A terrible thing, all those young men who remain
> forever young. I’ll never get over it.
Hard to when people post crap calling it a mistake via referencing
McNamara, of all people.
I knew very well two of those names on that wall in D.C. who didn't think
it was a mistake. From the sounds of it, I'm sure you knew a few as well.
MICHAEL JOHN COLEMAN
Marine Corps - LCPL - E3
Age: 20
Race: Caucasian
Sex: Male
Date of Birth Jan 4, 1948
From: BENSENVILLE, IL
Religion: ROMAN CATHOLIC
Marital Status: Single
LCPL - E3 - Marine Corps - Regular
Length of service 0 years
His tour began on Nov 26, 1967
Casualty was on Jan 27, 1968
In QUANG TRI, SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
ARTILLERY, ROCKET, or MORTAR
Body was recovered
Panel 35E - Line 44
MARTIN REINHOLD HUART
Army - SGT - E5
Age: 19
Race: Caucasian
Sex: Male
Date of Birth Jan 10, 1952
From: ADDISON, IL
Religion: LUTHERAN & MISSOURI SYNOD
Marital Status: Single
SGT - E5 - Army - Regular
Americal
His tour began on Sep 15, 1970
Casualty was on Mar 26, 1971
In QUANG TRI, SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
MISADVENTURE
Body was recovered
Panel 04W - Line 80
Mike was a seminarian in his 2nd year of college when he enlisted.
He got drafted, could have used a deferment, but chose to enlist in
the Marines instead.
Marty was, well, he was one if the toughest SOBs I've ever met and a
leader of the pack. He enlisted right after his HS graduation. It
didn't
surprise me to see he made E5 that quickly.
Both died in acton within a year after they enlisted.
Both had Hearts of Gold.
Both didn't think it a mistake.
Here's to Marty & Mike! They didn't die in vain.
And neither did the rest of the 58,200 plus.
(Last I read it was 58,195)
They all could have fled to Canada for safety
and eventually be pardoned by Carter not long after.
They all died serving their country.
That's one heck of a legacy.
JM
Sorry for ramblin' like that. Just certain type commentary sometimes
gets a little too close to home.
Here's a link to find more of those names.
http://thewall-usa.com/index.asp#search
Here's a link to the memorial.
http://thewall-usa.com/index.asp
Anthony Marsh
> know for sure how many men were lost!
>
Are you disputing the accuracy of that list? Do you think that Oliver
Stone made it up?
> I don?t want to sound cold here but I think few would argue that 118
> fallen soldiers, spread out over a year, would cause a major policy
> change. So, did Kilduff really hear this from JFK? I doubt it.
>
If you stipulate that the list is accurate then how do you explain the 9
deaths from 1956 to 1960? You said there was no combat in Vietnam until
Kennedy started it. Then in 1961 when Kennedy was in office there were
suddenly 16 deaths. So you call that a major escalation. Yet you don't
notice the bell curve of deaths from 1965 to 1971.
> Your link, with its cold stark numbers, tell the story of our involvement
> in Vietnam as well as any 400 page book could. If I may for Marsh?s
> benefit:
>
> 1956 to 1960 we lost 9. This is the period that Marsh claims Ike started
> the war. Less than two men a year average! That was the true advisor
I only claimed that to make fun of YOUR claim that JFK started it. The
North Vietnamese started it. But you give them a pass because you are a
Kennedy hater.
> stage and was mostly at the higher echelons that are inherently safer than
> being in the bush with the grunts.
>
So tell us where those 9 men were who died in COMBAT? Back in their
offices at the Pentagon?
> 1961 we lost 16, almost twice as many as we lost from 1956 to 1960. This
> was JFK picking up the ante a bit.
>
So, I guess you never figured out the simple equation that more troops
means more deaths.
> 1962 we lost 52. Over three times those lost in 1961. This reflects
> Kennedy?s introduction of the helicopter units, the bombers and jet
> fighters, the MACV command and another large increase in our number of
> troops in Vietnam. It also shows our advisors moving down to the
> battalion level, more dangerous than staying in Saigon or Danang. This was
> a pivotal year.
>
So your story, and you are sticking to it, is that all 9 deaths before
JFK took office happened in Saigon or Danang and they never left their
offices.
> 1963 we lost 118, over twice what we lost in 62. Our numbers of troops in
> SVN continue to increase. I should note that the communist had been
> increasing their presence in Vietnam also. The communist decision was
> made in 1959 and by the time they worked on the Trail and trained troops
> it was sometime in late 1960 or early 1961 before this effort was felt in
> SVN.
>
If they made the decision in 1959 how does that have anything to do with
Kennedy? Did they make that decision because they knew the Republican
President was weak?
> 1964 we lost 206, almost twice that of 1963. A reflection of LBJ
> continuing the program of increasing our presence in Vietnam, we now are
A reflection of LBJ REVERSING JFK's policy and sending in more troops
instead of taking them out as planned.
> up to around 27,000 troops in SVN. This is most notable as the period of
> time that Jack?s body never got cold according to Marsh.
>
The period of time when Jack's body did not get cold was when LBJ
rewrote NSAM 273 and changed Jack's policy of withdrawal.
> 1965, especially the last half after Johnson committed U.S. combat units,
> to the end of 1968 we lost 35,751 men. This is of course a reflection of
> Johnson sending in more U.S. combat units and the NVA units coming down in
More? You mean that the US had always been sending in US combat units,
since 1956? What do you try to imply by using the false word "more"?
That LBJ was not changing US policy and that JFK had sent in US combat
units. That is the heart of your revisionism and your attempt to defame
the memory of President Kennedy.
> 1964. It is the period where our KIA ran over 500 men a week for a time
> during TET 68. This is the pivotal period when LBJ and Westmoreland
> squandered our blood, time and treasure chasing a guerrilla army around
> the country side with brigade size units. I look upon this period with a
> terrible sadness.
>
Yet you never criticize your hero LBJ, and save all your criticism for
Kennedy because he was the Liberal who had nothing to do with those
losses.
> 1969 we lost 11,616, down from 16,592 in 1968. This is a reflection of
> the communist licking their wounds from TET 68 but still trying to prevail
> (TET 69). It is also a reflection of Nixon beginning our withdrawal to
> some extent. With our civil unrest at TET 68 and the beginning of our
> withdrawal the communist now knew they had won. It was now only a matter
> of time. The American public and their congress had had enough and with
> no progress in all those years who could blame them.
>
Ho knew in 1947 that it was only a matter of time.
> From 1970 to the end of 1972 we lost 9,079, most of these in 1970 as the
> communist keep up the pressure of American body bags going back to the
> U.S. and saving themselves for their conventional attack to come on SVN.
> Most all American combat troops were out of SVN by the end of 1972. It
> was all over.
>
> It is my sincere hope that Marsh will study this short work so he won?t
> be so confused about our involvement in Vietnam.
>
You won't even stipulate to the accuracy of this study because you know it
proves my points.
Kennedy was President from 1956 to 1960.
> Bill Clarke
>
Coondog
I think JFK deserves credit for trying to bring an exceptional group
into his administration. And they were certainly brilliant. David
Halberstam says their brilliance was surpassed only by their arrogance
and here lies one of the problems. An arrogant man has trouble
changing his course, admitting that he had been wrong or accepting the
ideas of others. The other problem is that none of them bought any
expertise of war to the table.
By late 1966 or 1967 one of these brilliant men needed to notice that
thing wasn’t working out and the need to adapt a new strategy. None
did with the exception of George Ball and no one listened to him.
Bill Clarke
Peter Fokes
McNamara admits the Gulf of Tonkin didn't happen:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HODxnUrFX6k
"Our judgement that we'd been attacked that day were wrong."
>
>Bill Clarke
PF
Coondog
wrote:
>
> > Bill Clarke- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> Bill,
>
> Thanks for postin' and givin' some insight into this political commentary
> people can't seem to resist to post every chance they get.
I appreciate it. It was so long I feared no one but Marsh would read
it and he not to have an exchange of ideas but to play his silly word
games.
> > Terribly sad, Peter. A terrible thing, all those young men who remain
> > forever young. I’ll never get over it.
>
> Hard to when people post crap calling it a mistake via referencing
> McNamara, of all people.
>
> I knew very well two of those names on that wall in D.C. who didn't think
> it was a mistake. From the sounds of it, I'm sure you knew a few as well.
Yes, I’m afraid I know too many on the wall. I served in the Americal
Division, the same Division as your friend Martin. From the date and
location of his death it shows that Martin was part of the Lam Son 719
operation when he was killed. That was the operation when ARVN went
into Laos and Abrams moved additional U.S. forces to Quang Tri to
support them. I was in country at the time but wasn’t part of the
Americal that went up to Quang Tri. From what my friends that went up
tell me it made what we had seen up to that time seem mild. Very bad
up there.
I wish that the civilians that know us only through B-grade Rambo type
movies and from the actions of a small number that disgraced us at
places such as My Lai could have known the average American kid in
Vietnam. Most had a big heart, uncommon courage and the ability to
lead even with little training.
> Here's to Marty & Mike! They didn't die in vain.
I salute your friends and those on the wall. God bless them.
I realize we have drifted off topic here but I hope the moderators
will allow us a little slack. This is my last one on this thread.
Soon as I get through with Marsh that is.
Bill Clarke
> And neither did the rest of the 58,200 plus.
> (Last I read it was 58,195)
>
> They all could have fled to Canada for safety
> and eventually be pardoned by Carter not long after.
>
> They all died serving their country.
>
> That's one heck of a legacy.
>
> JM
>
> Sorry for ramblin' like that. Just certain type commentary sometimes
> gets a little too close to home.
>
> Here's a link to find more of those names.http://thewall-usa.com/index.asp#search
>
> Here's a link to the memorial.http://thewall-usa.com/index.asp- Hide quoted text -
Coondog
The problem here is McNamara waited several decades too late to admit
this. He sure as hell wasn’t admitting it in 1964 and in fact he was a
major player in lying to America about the second incident in the Gulf.
You’ll never sheep dip McNamara; he was in too deep and too visible.
You’ll have better luck making JFK look good. He had redeeming
qualities. McNamara had none in regards to Vietnam.
Bill Clarke
Anthony Marsh
>>
>>>> And to what end?
>>
>>>> The dominoes are still standing.
>>
>>> criticizing others that felt the same way. Do you blame JFK? They had no
>>> way of knowing that it was mostly a false theory and I think it unfair for
>>> us to sit here in 2009 and down them for believing in something in the
>>> early 1960s. We can see clearly now?
>>
>>>> McNamara:Vietnamwas a mistake.
>>
>>> The damn mistake, Peter, WAS the brilliant fool McNamara. That rotten
>>> pile of arrogant horse manure has lied his ass off to make himself look
>>> good aboutVietnam. I hope he is burning in a very hot hell.
>>
>>> Bill Clarke- Hide quoted text -
>>
>>> - Show quoted text -
>>
>> Bill,
>>
>> Thanks for postin' and givin' some insight into this political commentary
>> people can't seem to resist to post every chance they get.
>
> I appreciate it. It was so long I feared no one but Marsh would read
> it and he not to have an exchange of ideas but to play his silly word
> games.
>
>>> Terribly sad, Peter. A terrible thing, all those young men who remain
>>
>> Hard to when people post crap calling it a mistake via referencing
>> McNamara, of all people.
>>
>> I knew very well two of those names on that wall in D.C. who didn't think
>> it was a mistake. From the sounds of it, I'm sure you knew a few as well.
>
> Division, the same Division as your friend Martin. From the date and
> location of his death it shows that Martin was part of the Lam Son 719
> operation when he was killed. That was the operation when ARVN went
> into Laos and Abrams moved additional U.S. forces to Quang Tri to
> Americal that went up to Quang Tri. From what my friends that went up
> tell me it made what we had seen up to that time seem mild. Very bad
> up there.
>
So here you confirm that you never actually saw any action yourself.
Never got out of the garage.
>> Religion: LUTHERAN& MISSOURI SYNOD
Previously you had denied that My Lai even happened.
Tell us more about the other atrocities you know about, preferrably from
first hand knowledge.
>> Here's to Marty& Mike! They didn't die in vain.
Anthony Marsh
>>
>>>> And to what end?
>>
>>>> The dominoes are still standing.
>>
>>> criticizing others that felt the same way. Do you blame JFK? They had no
>>> way of knowing that it was mostly a false theory and I think it unfair for
>>> us to sit here in 2009 and down them for believing in something in the
>>> early 1960s. We can see clearly now?
>>
>>>> McNamara:Vietnamwas a mistake.
>>
>>> The damn mistake, Peter, WAS the brilliant fool McNamara. That rotten
>>> pile of arrogant horse manure has lied his ass off to make himself look
>>> good aboutVietnam. I hope he is burning in a very hot hell.
>>
>> McNamara appointed by JFK:
>>
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=byXzhqL1as8
>
>
> I think JFK deserves credit for trying to bring an exceptional group
> into his administration. And they were certainly brilliant. David
> Halberstam says their brilliance was surpassed only by their arrogance
> and here lies one of the problems. An arrogant man has trouble
> changing his course, admitting that he had been wrong or accepting the
> ideas of others. The other problem is that none of them bought any
> expertise of war to the table.
>
So you're saying that Maxwell Taylor had no expertise of war, but you
do? Lay out your credentials to be in a position to criticize Maxwell
Taylor.
> By late 1966 or 1967 one of these brilliant men needed to notice that
> thing wasn�t working out and the need to adapt a new strategy. None
Coondog
>
> >>>> And to what end?
>
> >>>> The dominoes are still standing.
>
> >>> criticizing others that felt the same way. Do you blame JFK? They had no
> >>> way of knowing that it was mostly a false theory and I think it unfair for
> >>> us to sit here in 2009 and down them for believing in something in the
> >>> early 1960s. We can see clearly now?
>
> >>>> McNamara:Vietnamwas a mistake.
>
> >>> The damn mistake, Peter, WAS the brilliant fool McNamara. That rotten
> >>> pile of arrogant horse manure has lied his ass off to make himself look
> >>> good aboutVietnam. I hope he is burning in a very hot hell.
>
> >> McNamara appointed by JFK:
>
> >>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=byXzhqL1as8
>
> > I think JFK deserves credit for trying to bring an exceptional group
> > into his administration. And they were certainly brilliant. David
> > Halberstam says their brilliance was surpassed only by their arrogance
> > and here lies one of the problems. An arrogant man has trouble
> > changing his course, admitting that he had been wrong or accepting the
> > ideas of others. The other problem is that none of them bought any
> > expertise of war to the table.
>
> So you're saying that Maxwell Taylor had no expertise of war, but you
> do? Lay out your credentials to be in a position to criticize Maxwell
> Taylor.
First Marsh, I want you to know I replied to your crap in your previous
post. The moderators kicked it back. I don’t want you to think you
dazzled me with your word games.
Now to this crap of yours if the moderators post it. Since we were
discussing the Vietnam War I assumed when I said they had no expertise of
war everyone would know I was referring to the type war that was going on
in Vietnam, a guerrilla war. I forgot about you. Now if you have any
knowledge of Taylor having any guerrilla war experience before JFK called
him out of retirement you need to share it with us.
Taylor served exceptionally well in WW II and Korea. He was smarter than
the “we don’t need a military since we have the bomb” group and
worked to keep a standing infantry influence. He is certainly to be
saluted here. He should have stayed retired because Vietnam, as it did
with so many, didn’t help his reputation.
Bill Clarke
Chuck Schuyler
>
> So you're saying that Maxwell Taylor had no expertise of war, but you
> do? Lay out your credentials to be in a position to criticize Maxwell
> Taylor.
Silly.
Anthony Marsh
He was talking about Kennedy people having no expertise in war. Maxwell
Taylor as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was one of the people
he sent to South Vietnam to assess the situation and who reported back
that Kennedy should be able to withdraw the troops.
Anthony Marsh
>>
>>>>>> And to what end?
>>
>>>>>> The dominoes are still standing.
>>
>>>>> criticizing others that felt the same way. Do you blame JFK? They had no
>>>>> way of knowing that it was mostly a false theory and I think it unfair for
>>>>> us to sit here in 2009 and down them for believing in something in the
>>>>> early 1960s. We can see clearly now?
>>
>>>>>> McNamara:Vietnamwas a mistake.
>>
>>>>> The damn mistake, Peter, WAS the brilliant fool McNamara. That rotten
>>>>> pile of arrogant horse manure has lied his ass off to make himself look
>>>>> good aboutVietnam. I hope he is burning in a very hot hell.
>>
>>>> McNamara appointed by JFK:
>>
>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=byXzhqL1as8
>>
>>> I think JFK deserves credit for trying to bring an exceptional group
>>> into his administration. And they were certainly brilliant. David
>>> Halberstam says their brilliance was surpassed only by their arrogance
>>> and here lies one of the problems. An arrogant man has trouble
>>> changing his course, admitting that he had been wrong or accepting the
>>> ideas of others. The other problem is that none of them bought any
>>> expertise of war to the table.
>>
>> So you're saying that Maxwell Taylor had no expertise of war, but you
>> do? Lay out your credentials to be in a position to criticize Maxwell
>> Taylor.
>
>
> First Marsh, I want you to know I replied to your crap in your previous
> dazzled me with your word games.
>
> Now to this crap of yours if the moderators post it. Since we were
> discussing the Vietnam War I assumed when I said they had no expertise of
> war everyone would know I was referring to the type war that was going on
> in Vietnam, a guerrilla war. I forgot about you. Now if you have any
> knowledge of Taylor having any guerrilla war experience before JFK called
> him out of retirement you need to share it with us.
>
Oh great, so when you are proved wrong you just change the argument. Now
you claim that none of Kennedy's experts had any specific experience wit
guerrilla warfare and you narrow it even more to any experience fighting
in Vietnam. Well, I guess we'd have to include you in that also then. No
matter which person I might cite you can claim that he did not have any
experience in guerrilla warfare in Vietnam unless it was someone from
the OSS teams.
If you have a grudge against Maxwell Taylor, how about Ed Lansdale, who
was also an advisor to President Kennedy?
General Maxwell Taylor and President John F. Kennedy pose at the president
Taylor and Kennedy pose at the president�s office on June 28, 1961,
after Kennedy called the former Army chief of staff back to active duty
as his military adviser (National Archives).
Shortly after being sworn in as the 35th president of the United States,
John F. Kennedy held a routine Oval Office meeting with his national
security adviser, Walt Whitman Rostow. The two men were discussing the
important national security issues that faced the new administration.
Among the hot international topics that the Kennedy team inherited from
the outgoing Dwight D. Eisenhower administration were the
ever-deteriorating situation in Laos, the tensions in Berlin between the
Soviets and the United States, and the situation in Cuba. Kennedy then
turned to Rostow and said: �This is the worst one we�ve got. You know,
Eisenhower never mentioned it. He talked at length about Laos, but never
uttered the word Vietnam.�
What prompted the two men to discuss events in a country that not many
Americans had ever heard of was a report written by Edward Lansdale, a
veteran of the paramilitary wars of the 1950s, a specialist in
counterinsurgency warfare and a man whose word was not taken lightly
around Washington. Commenting on the report, the president told Rostow
that Lansdale�s narrative was �an extremely vivid and well-written
account of a place that was going to hell in a hack.�
Kennedy was describing events that were going on in Vietnam in 1961,
well before the major influx of troops that he, and later Lyndon B.
Johnson, would send to that beleaguered country.
Soon after Kennedy assumed the presidency, Lansdale returned from a
fact-finding trip to Vietnam. He described a situation where the
Communists were making impressive gains in their covert war against the
regime of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, who ruled that
country with an iron fist. Lansdale said that despite Diem�s control
over Saigon, the Viet Cong had effective command over the rest of the
country, �from the jungled foothills of the high plateau north of
Saigon, all the way down south to the Gulf of Siam.� He added that if
Vietnam fell, all of Southeast Asia would be �easy pickings for our
enemy,� and advised the new administration to beef up its military
presence in South Vietnam and make changes at the American Embassy in
Saigon.
Kennedy took Lansdale�s study under advisement and decided to remove the
U.S. envoy to Vietnam, Elbridge Durbrow. Even that early in the new
administration, the president�s advisers were deeply divided on what
position the United States should take in Vietnam.
For the next 10 months, the situation in Southeast Asia went from bad to
worse. With Laos at the center of his troubles, Kennedy set in motion a
series of events that would culminate in a fateful trip to South Vietnam
inOctober 1961, led by General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow. That
mission became one of the most decisive events of the Kennedy
administration.
Kennedy�s decision-making on Vietnam had evolved over many years. In the
late 1950s, he was a member of a group of influential Americans called
the Friends of Vietnam, a body that included journalists and
academicians. The Friends of Vietnam were mostly liberal in their
politics, and their basic objective was to ensure that the government of
South Vietnam would remain one, not reuniting with the Communist
government in the North as mandated by the Geneva Accords of 1954 that
had ended the First Indochina War. Kennedy traveled to Asia early in his
congressional career and met with many of the influential leaders as
well as dissident members of the various governments in the region. It
was then that he became convinced that the Viet Minh would ultimately
force the French to grant independence to Vietnam.
On April 6, 1954, Kennedy stated in a passionate speech before the
Senate: �To pour men, material and money into the jungles of Indo-China
without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously
futile�no amount of American military assistance in Indo-China can
conquer an enemy which is everywhere�which had the sympathy and the
covert support of the people.� Nevertheless, a majority of the Congress
sided with the current American position, and the United States refused
to back the provision in the Geneva Accords that called for new
elections in 1956.
When Kennedy entered the White House he began to mold America�s Vietnam
policy ever so slowly. The new commander in chief was a firm believer in
unconventional warfare tactics that could be used against the large
guerrilla bands then harassing the South Vietnamese military. In a
policy switch that rattled the most hardened bureaucrats in Washington,
Kennedy transferred responsibility for paramilitary actions from the CIA
to the Pentagon. He also reinstated the Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, with James Killian as its head and Maxwell Taylor as an adviser.
Under Kennedy�s guidelines, U.S. Army Special Forces trained in
counterinsurgency tactics at Fort Bragg, N.C., while the U.S. Air Force
initiated Operation Farm Gate to furnish air support for jun-gle
conflicts. In another new approach, �Jungle Jim� units of the 4400th
Combat Crew Training Squadron prepared highly trained commando teams for
intense jungle fighting. The U.S. Navy developed a plan using amphibious
and underwater demolition teams, along with Vietnamese fishing junks, to
attack VC supply lines.
As 1961 progressed, it became obvious to the Kennedy team that the VC in
South Vietnam were getting increasing amounts of war materiel from the
North, most of it coming over the jungle trails along the border with
Laos. Adding to this hot mix, many local villagers who lived in the
South were ardent Communist supporters who continually fought the ARVN
in a running guerrilla campaign.
Walt Rostow.
Kennedy�s national security adviser, Walt Rostow, accompanied Taylor to
Vietnam in October 1961 (Library of Congress).
Kennedy�s early Vietnam policy was neither retreat nor full-scale
commitment of American ground forces. He sought a middle ground while
the situation developed further. In the spring of 1961, a
Kennedy-directed task force of individuals from State, Defense, CIA,
U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the White House produced its report
on Vietnam policy. The recommendations it made to the president included
the introduction of American combat troops into South Vietnam. Kennedy
refused to commit combat troops, but he did increase the number of
American advisers to work with the South Vietnamese forces at both the
battalion and regimental levels. The advisers, however, would now be
allowed to train ARVN troops in conventional combat techniques, as well
an unconventional warfare. More training was also provided for the South
Vietnamese regional and self-defense forces.
Kennedy�s focus on Vietnam was temporarily sidetracked by the disastrous
Bay of Pigs invasion in April. The rout of the CIA-trained Cuban exiles
only hardened the president�s determination not to allow the same thing
to happen in South Vietnam. He therefore tasked his special adviser,
Roswell Gilpatrick, to develop new recommendations on Vietnam policy.
The president�s instructions were to �appraise the Communist drive to
dominate South Vietnam and recommend a series of actions (military,
political or economic, overt and or covert), which, in your opinion,
will prevent Communist domination of that country.�
Before Kennedy could study the Gilpatrick report, events in neighboring
Laos took center stage. With the war there threatening to spill over
into Vietnam, and the threat of an all-out Communist invasion of that
country, the United States began preparations to send combat forces into
Laos. A force of 250 American soldiers was considered for deployment
along the Vietnamese-Laotian border to discourage any Communist attack.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, concluded that the plan was not
feasible. The JCS also rejected a plan to position U.S. troops along the
17th parallel dividing North and South Vietnam.
The JCS came up with a much larger concept called Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) Plan 5, an ambitious operation that would cut the
supply lines in Laos, preventing North Vietnamese troops from entering
the South. When Kennedy rejected that plan, the chiefs went to work on a
proposal that recommended the deployment of up to 12,000 troops to the
Central Highlands of South Vietnam, adjacent to the Communist
infiltration routes. Another scheme designed by U. Alexis Johnson, the
deputy undersecretary of state, would have deployed up to 22,000 troops
in the Central Highlands.
The president rejected all these recommendations but initiated limited
steps to aid the South Vietnamese government. Along with an increase in
the MACV contingent, Operation Farm Gate and the commitment of Jungle
Jim units, the president introduced a large-scale American military aid
package: Project Beefup, which called for a big infusion of military aid
to save the government of President Diem, who was suffering not only
from the advance of the VC but also from the repressive measures he was
inflicting upon his own populace.
The initial military commitment called for the introduction into South
Vietnam of armored personnel carriers and up to 300 aircraft, including
helicopters. From a modest force of 3,205 U.S. military personnel in
Vietnam at the end of 1961, the number of troops and advisers swelled to
more than 9,000 by the end of 1962. By the time of Diem�s�and
Kennedy�s�assassinations in 1963, more than 16,000 U.S. personnel, many
of them going on combat missions alongside the ARVN, would be in-country.
The man in charge of the Beefup operation was General Paul D. Harkins,
commander of MACV. Harkins had served under General George S. Patton in
World War II. Harkins butted heads with Defense Secretary Robert S.
McNamara, who said he was �not worth a damn.� (On the other hand,
McNamara also described him as �an imaginative officer.�)
When Harkins arrived in South Vietnam, he was plunged right into the
middle of political intrigue in Saigon, greeted by an aerial attack on
President Diem�s palace by two dissident South Vietnamese pilots.
Harkins met with Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don, a future participant in coup
plans to overthrow Diem. Harkins knew the limitations of the ARVN, yet
tried with all his power to increase their fighting efficiency. He urged
harder ARVN attacks on VC strongholds, and exhorted ARVN officers to
take the fight into enemy-held territory. Speaking about the
trustworthiness of the ARVN soldiers, Harkins once said: �If they
captured an officer of the Viet Cong, they�d leave their post and bring
him back to Saigon. They wanted to show Diem and get a pat on the back
or maybe a promotion.�
In his meetings with Diem, Harkins stunned the South Vietnamese leader
by predicting that total American victory could be achieved in one year.
He dubbed his program �the explosion plan,� because he wanted to take
the war to all parts of the country. He also told Diem that there were
only 20,000 hardcore VC in the entire country, not the thousands upon
thousands who were actually hidden among the population.
By the middle of 1961, Kennedy took other steps to increase America�s
covert and overt roles in South Vietnam. He secretly ordered the
dispatch of covert agents to infiltrate into North Vietnam for
intelligence gathering, the infiltration of teams under civilian cover
to southeast Laos to locate and attack Vietnamese Communist bases and
lines of communications, the training of ARVN units in ranger tactics,
and the targeting of individual North Vietnamese units inside the South.
The president also used the services of a South Vietnamese unit called
the 1st Observation Group, which was made up of civilian aircrews,
including Americans, to take the war into both North and South Vietnam.
As a last effort to formulate Vietnam policy, in May Kennedy sent Vice
President Lyndon Johnson to Saigon to meet with President Diem. Johnson
did not want to make the trip, and only found out about the assignment
while listening to the radio during a speaking engagement trip to New
York. After a blustery talk with the president, Johnson reluctantly left
for Saigon, still bristling over how he had been treated.
General Paul D. Harkins, commander of Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam, during a visit to Thailand in June 1962 .
General Paul D. Harkins, commander of Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam, during a visit to Thailand in June 1962 (National Archives).
Upon landing, Johnson was given a copy of a secret memo from the JCS to
Defense Secretary McNamara recommending that Diem should be �encouraged
to request� U.S. combat troops. Johnson handed Diem a letter from
Kennedy that suggested an increase in the number of raids against
Communist forces, as well as an increase of the ARVN by 20,000. Diem
responded that he did not have the money to equip such a new force.
Johnson also discussed the Kennedy administration�s demand that Diem
allow more open dissent in the country and give more freedoms to the
people. But at no point in their conversation did Johnson mention the
commitment of American combat troops. He did give Diem assurances that
the administration would commit helicopters and the necessary equipment
for Diem�s projected 20,000-man force. Taken in by Johnson�s folksy
style, Diem agreed to Kennedy�s requests.
A few days later Diem and Johnson had a second, more contentious
meeting. Diem insisted that South Vietnam needed 120,000 more
troops�over and above the 150,000 he already had�and further stated that
he could not afford it. Johnson countered by asking if Diem would accept
U.S. combat troops. Diem said that he would only accept U.S. combat
troops if his country was attacked, but he did ask for more American
personnel to train the ARVN.
With Johnson in the meeting was Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, the Military
Assistance Advisory Group chief in Saigon. Unexpectedly, McGarr asked
Diem if he would accept American combat troops �for direct training
purposes.� Diem instantly agreed. Thus, Johnson and McGarr had
negotiated American policy without Kennedy�s authorization. Johnson�s
freelancing only hardened Kennedy�s resolve not to be stampeded into
formulating American policy toward Vietnam. As a direct result, Kennedy
sent General Taylor to Saigon in October as his personal representative.
Taylor, one of the rising stars in the Kennedy administration, had a
distinguished military career in World War II as commander of the 101st
Airborne Division. In the postwar years he served as commandant of West
Point and as Army chief of staff. He was a proponent of the doctrine
called the �New Look Strategy,� which emphasized nuclear weapons over
conventional forces. He was also an advocate of �flexible response,�
which incorporated the entire range of American military capabilities
based on the situation at hand. As a member of the Joint Chiefs,
Taylor�s various proposals often had been voted down, and he eventually
retired from the Army.
In 1959 Taylor wrote a book titled An Uncertain Trumpet, which attacked
the miliary priorities of the Eisenhower administration. The book caught
the attention of Kennedy, who was then running for the 1960 Democratic
presidential nomination. After Kennedy was elected, he asked Taylor to
become a staff member in the White House. Taylor reported for work in
April 1961 and was immediately given a heavy-duty assignment: write a
no-holds-barred report on the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion that had
just handed the Kennedy administration its first foreign policy setback.
The Taylor report exposed the military and political flaws that had
doomed the invasion even before it began. Taylor�s superb handling of
the report made him an instant hit with the Kennedy brothers. He was
rewarded with the new position of military adviser to the president.
President Kennedy had all but decided to send a personal representative
to Saigon to make a fact-finding trip to assess the military and
political situation on the ground. Needing a man he could trust as his
eyes and ears, he selected Taylor. Like the president, Taylor had
reservations about sending American combat troops to Vietnam, and that
was a factor in Kennedy�s decision to send him.
Throughout the summer of 1961, the administration made detailed
preparations for Taylor�s mission, giving him elaborate instructions. In
a letter to the general shortly before he left Washington, the president
wrote: �Bear in mind that the initial responsibility for the effective
maintenance of the independence of South Vietnam rests with the people
and government of that country�.While the military part of the problem
is of great importance in South Vietnam, its political, social, and
economic elements are equally significant, and I shall expect your
appraisal and your recommendations to take full account of them.�
The unstated theme of the president�s remarks was that he did not want
Taylor to come home with the recommendation that U.S. combat troops were
needed. In an additional bit of subterfuge, it has been suggested that
the president himself leaked a story to The New York Times, which read,
in part: ��military leaders at the Pentagon, no less than General
�Taylor himself, are understood to be reluctant to send organized U.S.
combat units into Southeast Asia. Pentagon plans for this area stress
the importance of countering Communist guerrillas with troops from the
affected countries, perhaps trained and equipped by the U.S., but not
supplanted by U.S. troops.�
On October 15, 1961, Taylor brought together the members of his team for
one last brainstorming session. He told them that it was his trip, that
he would write the final report, but that all dissenting views would be
noted. Among those going on the mission were Lansdale, Rostow, and
military and civilian experts such as political advisers Sterling
Cottrell and William Jorden, Maj. Gen. William Craig, Admiral Luther
Heinz and others. They left Washington on October 17 with a stop in
Honolulu for discussions with Admiral Harry D. Felt, the commander of
U.S. forces in the Pacific.
The issues that Taylor and his team intended to address included the
requirement for American combat troops, the rapid buildup of VC forces
in the South, the security of the peasants living in rural areas in the
South and Diem�s increasingly authoritarian style of government. The
mission got off to a rocky start when Lansdale left the party and had a
one-on-one meeting with his old friend, President Diem. Lansdale was
greeted with the news that Diem had recently declared a state of
national emergency, and that a series of incessant rains had caused
enormous floods in the Mekong Delta. The news of the floods would soon
play an unexpected role in Taylor�s mission.
The next day, Taylor and Rostow met with Diem in the presidential
palace. During a four-hour session, Diem discussed the entire range of
American-Vietnamese issues. He told his visitors that he could not
understand why the United States had not offered a formal commitment to
his country, saying that he feared that at some point the United States
would abandon South Vietnam. To the astonishment of Taylor and Rostow,
at no time during their talk did Diem ever bring up a request for
American combat troops. When Taylor asked Diem if he wanted the Kennedy
administration to send such forces, Diem hedged, but said that if that
happened, he expected the United States to remain in Vietnam for the
long haul.
Taylor also had a meeting with Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, an officer who
had no love for President Diem. (In 1963 �Big� Minh would be one of the
coup leaders who removed Diem from office.) Taylor and Rostow also took
a helicopter tour of the Mekong Delta to see firsthand the consequences
of flood damage.
Before departing, Taylor and Rostow had a final meeting with Diem. In a
bold move, Taylor asked Diem if he would accept a large force of
American troops to act as a �flood relief task force,� to be made up of
medical, communications and engineering personnel, as well as a certain
number of combat troops for their security. This was a way of fudging
any request on Diem�s part for combat troops. Taylor further said that
once their job was done the troops would leave.Taylor then sent a cable
to President Kennedy recommending 6,000 to 8,000 troops for such a
force. Diem, for his part, agreed to Taylor�s proposals. Taylor wrote
that the requested troops would assure �Diem of our readiness to join
him in a military showdown�.� Taylor also noted: �As the task is a
specific one, we can extricate our troops when it is done if we so
desire. Alternatively, we can phase them into other activities if we
wish to remain longer.� He concluded: �This kind of task force will
exercise little direct influence on the campaign against the VC. It
will, however, give a much needed shot in the arm to national morale.�
On November 1, on the way back home from his temporary base at Baguio in
the Philippines, Taylor wrote to the president urging a commitment of
American forces to Vietnam. He called for a �massive joint effort� with
the South Vietnamese to cope with the Mekong floods, as well as to stem
the flow of Communist aggression in the South. Taylor called American
troops �essential� to stop a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.
Taylor later sent a second message to the White House saying that
American troops would not get bogged down in a land war in Asia, but
should be allowed to protect themselves if fired upon. He also said that
a major American bombing campaign against the North should be considered.
The formal Taylor report, submitted to the president on November 3,
called for a significant increase in American participation in the war,
including a �hard commitment on the ground,� and an increase in the role
of MAAG. Commenting on Diem�s repressive regime, Taylor suggested that
he was the best the United States could hope for. Two members of the
mission, Cottrell and Jorden, dissented from the report and lambasted
the ARVN as sloppy and corrupt.
At about the same time that Taylor submitted his report, Kennedy
received a classified national intelligence estimate projecting that any
massive American combat aid to the South would be met with an increase
in overt military aid by Hanoi to the Viet Cong, thereby escalating the
conflict.
When Secretary of State Dean Rusk received Taylor�s report, he told the
president that the United States should make no military commitment
until President Diem instituted political reforms at home. Rusk said
that if Diem was not willing to settle his own house, no amount of
American troops could do the job. He didn�t want to see American
prestige committed to a �losing horse.�
Taylor�s report, however, was backed up by Defense Secretary McNamara,
Deputy Secretary Gilpatrick and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While
endorsing the report, the JCS warned that the 8,000-man force �probably
will not tip the scales decisively, and we would be almost certain to
get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle.�
Speaking with presidential adviser George Ball, who opposed a commitment
of U.S. troops, Kennedy reacted sharply when Ball said that if the Joint
Chiefs got their way, a total of 300,000 American troops would have to
be sent to Vietnam. The president responded by saying: �George, you�re
just crazier than hell. That just isn�t going to happen.�
Knowing that Kennedy would not approve combat troops, Secretaries Rusk
and McNamara wrote a second memorandum dated November 11. In this memo
they recommended that no decision be made on sending combat troops to
Vietnam, but called for a strong increase in American aid, including
helicopters, more advisers, equipment for the ARVN and reforms by the
Diem regime.
On November 11, 1961, President Kennedy made the following decisions:
(1) No U.S. combat troops would be sent to Vietnam; (2) the United
States and South Vietnam would establish a partnership in which the
decision-making would be shared equally; and (3) Washington would
recognize the importance of South Vietnam for the future of freedom in
Southeast Asia and would take more active measures if future conditions
warranted.
The tentative decisions made by President Kennedy in November 1961 were
to have larger consequences for the rest of his presidency. By allowing
the status quo to remain in place, the president did not take the strong
measures necessary to blunt the ever-growing Viet Cong gains in the
South. By 1963, U.S. forces totaled 16,000 and were taking casualties
daily. On November 2 of that same year, President Diem was ousted in a
coup and subsequently killed. President Kennedy�s own assassination on
November 22 handed the quagmire of Vietnam to his successors. It was up
to Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to greatly expand the scope of the
war throughout Southeast Asia, and eventually commit 500,000 U.S. troops
to the region.
Excerpts from memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Pentagon
expert on guerrilla warfare, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, President
Kennedy's military adviser, on "Resources for Unconventional Warfare,
SE. Asia," undated but apparently from July, 1961. Copies were sent to
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Roswell L. Gilpatric, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence, and Gen. C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence.
This memo is in response to your desire for early information on
unconventional-warfare resources in Southeast Asia. The information was
compiled within Defense and CIA.
A. SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Vietnamese
a. First Observation Group
This is a Special Forces type of unit, with the mission of operating in
denied (enemy) areas. It currently has some limited operations in North
Vietnam and some shallow penetrations into Laos. Most of the unit has
been committed to operations against Viet Cong guerillas in South Vietnam.
Strength, as of 6 July, was 340. The First Observation Group had an
authorized strength of 305 and now is being increased by 500, for a
total of 805, under the 20,000-man force increase. Personnel are
volunteers who have been carefully screened by security organizations.
Many are from North Vietnam. They have been trained for guerrilla
operations, at the Group's training center at Nha Trang. The unit is
MAP-supported, as a TO&E unit of the RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces). It receives special equipment and training from CIA and U.S
control is by CIA/MAAG.
The Group and its activities are highly classified by the Government of
Vietnam. Only a select few senior RVNMAF officers have access to it.
Operations require the approval of President Diem, on much the same
approval basis as certain U.S. special operations. The unit is separate
from normal RVNAF command channels.
The Group was organized in February, 1956, with the initial mission of
preparing stay-behind organizations in South Vietnam just below the 17th
Parallel, for guerrilla warfare in the event of an overt invasion by
North Vietnamese forces. It was given combat missions against Viet Cong
guerrillas in South Vietnam last year, when these Communist guerrillas
increased their activities. The plan is to relieve the Group from these
combat assignments, to ready its full strength for denied area missions,
as RVNAF force increases permit relief. It is currently being organized
into twenty teams of 15 men each, with two RS-1 radios per team, for
future operations.
b. Other RVNAF
MAAG-Vietnam has reported the formation of additional volunteer groups,
apart from the First Observation Group, for similar operations to
augment the missions of the Group. As of 6 July, the additional
volunteers were reported as:
1). 60 Mois (Montagnard tribesmen) recruited, being security
screened, to receive Special Forces training.
2). 400 military (RVNAF), to receive Special Forces training. 80
will be formed into small teams, to augment operations of the First
Operations Group. 320 will be formed into two Ranger (Airborne) companies.
3). 70 civilians, being organized and trained for stay-behind
operations, penetration teams, and communicators.
Other special units of the RVNAF, now committed to operations against
the Viet Cong and with Special Forces/Ranger training, are:
9,096 Rangers, in 65 companies.
2,772 more Rangers being activated, part of 20,000-man increase
4,786 Paratroopers
2,300 Marines
673 men in Psychological Warfare Bn.
In addition, cadres from all other combat elements of the RVNAF have
received Special Forces/Ranger training.
2. U.S.
a. Defense
1). There are approximately 6 officers and 6 enlisted men from the 1st
Special Group on Okinawa currently attached to the MAAG to assist with
Ranger-type training.
2). There are three 4-man intelligence training teams present-Combat
Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Photo-Interpretation and Foreign
Operations Intelligence (clandestine collection) in addition to eight
officers and two enlisted intelligence advisors on the MAAG staff.
3). There are two Psychological Warfare staff officers on the MAAG staff
and a 4-man Civil Affairs mobile training team (3 officers-i enlisted
man) advising the G-5 staff of the Vietnamese Army in the psy/ops-civic
action fields.
b. CIA
1). There are 9 CIA officers working with the First Observation Group in
addition to one MAAG advisor.
2). CIA also has five officers working with the Vietnamese Military
Intelligence Service and one officer working with the covert [one word
illegible] of the Army Psychological Warfare Directorate.
B. THAILAND
1. Thai
a. Royal Thai Army Ranger Battalion (Airborne)
A Special Forces type unit, its stated mission is to organize and
conduct guerrilla warfare in areas of Thailand overrun by the enemy in
case of an open invasion of Thailand. It currently has the mission of
supplying the Palace Guard for the Prime Minister.
Based at Lopburi, the Ranger Battalion has a MAP authorized strength of
580. It is organized into a Headquarters and Headquarters company, a
Service company, and four Ranger companies. The Battalion has 4 command
detachments and 26 operations detachments, trained and organized along
the lines of U.S. Special Forces in strength, equipment, and rank structure.
The Ranger Battalion is loosely attached to the 1st Division. In
reality, it is an independent unit of the Royal Thai Army, under the
direct control of Field Marshal Sarit, the Commander in Chief, and
receives preferential treatment.
Each ranger company has been assigned a region of Thailand, in which it
is to be prepared to undertake guerrilla warfare in case of enemy
occupation. Field training is conducted in these assigned regions, to
acquaint the detachments with the people, facilities and terrain.
b. Police Aerial Resupply Unit (PARU)
The PARU has a mission of undertaking clandestine operations in denied
areas. 99 PARU personnel have been introduced covertly to assist the
Meos in operations in Laos, where their combat performance has been
outstanding.
This is a special police unit, supported by CIA (CIA control in the Meo
operations has been reported as excellent), with a current strength of
300 being increased to 550 as rapidly as possible. All personnel are
specially selected and screened, and have been rated as of high quality.
Officers are selected from the ranks.
Training consists of 10 weeks' basic training, 3 weeks' jumping, 3
weeks' jungle operations, 4 weeks' police law and 3 months of refresher
training yearly. Forty individuals have been trained as W/T communicators.
All personnel have adequate personal gear to be self-sustaining in the
jungle. Weapons are M-1 rifles, M-3 submachine guns and BAR. In
addition, personnel are trained to use other automatic weapons, 2.34
rocket launchers, and 60-mm. mortars.
There are presently 13 PARU teams, totaling 99 men, operating with the
Meo guerrillas in Laos. Combat reports of these operations have included
exceptionally heroic and meritorious actions by PARU personnel. The PARU
teams have provided timely intelligence and have worked effectively with
local tribes.
c. Thai Border Patrol (BPP)
The mission of the BPP is to counter infiltration and subversion during
peacetime, in addition to normal police duties, in the event of an armed
invasion of Thailand, the BPP will operate as guerrilla forces in
enemy-held areas, in support of regular Thai armed forces.
The BPP has a current strength of 4,500. It was organized in 1955 as a
gendarmerie patrol force (name changed to BPP in 1959), composed of 71
active and 23 reserve platoons, from existing police units. It is an
element of the Thai National Police, subordinate to the Ministry of the
Interior.
Although technically a police organization, the BPP is armed with
infantry weapons, including light machine guns, rocket launchers and
light mortars. It is trained in small-unit infantry tactics and
counter-guerrilla operations. Training is currently being conducted by a
10-man U.S. Army Special Forces team from Okinawa, under ICA auspices.
This unusual police unit was created initially to cope with problems
posed by foreign guerrilla elements using Thailand as a safehaven: the
Vietminh in eastem Thailand and the Chinese Communists along the Malayan
border in the south. There has been some tactical liaison with Burmese
Army units.
2. U.S.
a. Defense
1). A special Forces qualified officers is assigned to advise the RTA
Ranger Battalion.
2). A ten-man Special Forces team from the 1st Special Forces Group in
Okinawa is currently conducting training for the Thai Border Patrol
Police under ICA auspices.
3). There are 5 officers and 1 enlisted man attached to MAAG as advisers
to J-2 and the Thai Armed Forces Security Center.
b. CIA
1). 2 advisers with PARU.
2). 3 officers who work with the Border Patrol Police providing advice,
guidance and limited training in the collection and processing of
intelligence in addition to management of their communications system.
C. LAOS
1. Lao
a. Commandos
According to CINCPAC, there are two special commando companies in the
Lao Armed Forces (FAL), with a total strength of 256. These commandos
have received Special Forces training.
b. Meo Guerrillas
About 9,000 Meo tribesmen have been equipped for guerrilla operations,
which they are now conducting with considerable effectiveness in
Communist-dominated territory in Laos. They have been organized into
Auto-Defense Choc units of the FAL, of varying sizes. Estimates on how
many more of these splendid fighting men could be recruited vary, but a
realistic figure would be around 4,000 more, although the total manpower
pool is larger.
Political leadership of the Meos is in the hands of Touby Lyfoung, who
now operates mostly out of Vientiane. The military leader is Lt-Col yang
Pao, who is the field commander. Command control of Meo operations is
exercised by the Chief CIA Vientiane with the advice of Chief MAAG Laos.
The same CIA paramilitary and U.S. military teamwork is in existence for
advisory activities (9 CIA operations officers, 9 LTAGArmy Special
Forces personnel, in addition to the 99 Thai PARU under CIA control) and
aerial resupply.
As Meo village are over-run by Communist forces and as men leave
food-raising duties to serve as guerrillas, a problem is growing over
the care and feeding of non-combat Meos. CIA has given some rice and
clothing to relieve this problem. Consideration needs to be given to
organized relief, a mission of an ICA nature, to the handling of Meo
refugees and their rehabilitation.
c. National Directorate of Coordination
This is the Intelligence arm of the RLG. Its operations are mainly in
the Vientiane area at present. It has an armed unit consisting of two
battalions and is under the command of Lt-Col Siho, a FAL officer. In
addition to intelligence operations this force has a capability for
sabotage, kidnapping, commando-type raids, etc.
d. There is also a local veteran's organization and a grass-roots
political organization in Laos, both of which are subject to CIA
direction and control and are capable of carrying out propaganda,
sabotage and harassment operations. Both are located (in varying degrees
of strength and reliability) throughout
Laos.
2. U.S.
a. Defense
1). There are 154 Special Forces personnel (12 teams) from the 7th
Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, N. C., attached to the MAAG and
providing tactical advice to FAL commanders and conducting basic
training when the situation permits.
2). A 10-man intelligence training team is assisting the FAL in
establishing a military intelligence system.
3). An 8-man psychological warfare team is assisting the FAL with psy
war operations and operation of its radio transmitters.
b. CIA
1). Nine CIA officers are working in the field with the Meo guerrillas,
back-stopped by two additional officers in Vientiane.
2). Three CIA officers plus 2-3 Vietnamese are working with the National
Directorate of Coordination.
D. OTHERS
1. Asian
a. Eastern Construction Company [Filipinos]
This is a private, Filipino-run public service organization, similar to
an employment agency, with an almost untapped potential for
unconventional warfare (which was its original mission). It now
furnishes about 500 trained, experienced Filipino technicians to the
Governments of Vietnam and Laos, under the auspices of MAAGs (MAP) and
USOMs (CIA activities). Most of these Filipinos are currently augmenting
U.S. military logistics programs with the Vietnamese Army and Lao Army.
They instruct local military personnel in ordnance, quartermaster, etc.,
maintenance, storage, and supply procedures. MAAG Chiefs in both Vietnam
and Laos have rated this service as highly effective. CIA has influence
and some continuing interest with individuals.
The head of Eastern Construction is "Frisco" Johnny San Juan, former
National Commander, Philippines Veterans Legion, and former close staff
assistant to President Magsaysay of the Philippines (serving as
Presidential Complaints and Action Commissioner directly under the
President). Its cadre are mostly either former guerrillas against the
Japanese in WW II or former Philippine Army personnel. Most of the cadre
had extensive combat experience against the Communist Huk guerrillas in
the Philippines. This cadre can be expanded into a wide range of
counter-Communist activities, having sufficient stature in the
Philippines to be able to draw on a very large segment of its trained,
experienced, and well-motivated manpower pool.
Eastern Construction was started in 1954 as Freedom Company of the
Philippines, a non-profit organization, with President Magsaysay as its
honorary president. Its charter stated plainly that it was "to serve the
cause of freedom." It actually was a mechanism to permit the deployment
of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries, for unconventional
operations, under cover of a public service organization having a
contract with the host government. Philippine Armed Forces and
government personnel were "sheep-dipped" and served abroad. Its
personnel helped write the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam,
trained Vietnam's Presidential Guard Battalion, and were instrumental in
founding and organizing the Vietnamese Veterans Legion.
When U.S. personnel instrumental in the organization and operational use
of Freedom Company departed from the Asian area, direct U.S. support of
the organization (on a clandestine basis) was largely terminated. The
Filipino leaders in it then decided to carry on its mission privately,
as a commercial undertaking. They changed the name to Eastern
Construction Company. The organization survived some months of very hard
times financially. Its leaders remain as a highly-motivated,
experienced, anti-Communist "hard core."
b. Operation Brotherhood (Filipino)
There is another private Filipino public-service organization, capable
of considerable expansion in socio-economic-medical operations to
support counterguerilla actions. It is now operating teams in Laos,
under ICA auspices. It has a measure of CIA control.
Operation Brotherhood (OB) was started in 1954 by the International
Jaycees, under the inspiration and guidance of Oscar Arellano, a
Filipino architect who was Vice President for Asia of the International
Jaycees. The concept was to provide medical service to refugees and
provincial farmers in South Vietnam, as part of the 1955 pacification
and refugee program. Initially Filipino teams, later other Asian and
European teams, served in OB in Vietnam. Their work was closely
coordinated with Vietnamese Army operations which cleaned up Vietminh
stay-behinds and started stabilizing rural areas.
c. The Security Training Center (STC)
This is a counter-subversion, counter-guerrilla and psychological
warfare school overtly operated by the Philippine Government and
covertly sponsored by the U.S. Government through CIA as the instrument
of the Country Team. It is located at Fort McKinley on the outskirts of
Manila. Its stated mission is: "To counter the forces of subversion in
Southeast Asia through more adequate training of security personnel,
greater cooperation, better understanding and maximum initiative among
the countries of the area."
The training capability of the STC includes a staff of approximately 12
instructors in the subjects of unconventional and counter-guerrilla
warfare.....
d. CAT. Civil Air Transport (Chinese Nationalist)
CAT is a commercial air line engaged in scheduled and non-scheduled air
operations throughout the Far East, with headquarters and large
maintenance facilities located in Taiwan. CAT, a CIA proprietary,
provides air logistical support under commercial cover to most CIA and
other U.S. Government agencies' requirements. CAT supports covert and
clandestine air operations by providing trained and experienced
personnel, procurement of supplies and equipment through overt
commercial channels, and the maintenance of a fairly large inventory of
transport and other type aircraft under both Chinat and U.S. registry.
CAT has demonstrated its capability on numerous occasions to meet all
types of contingency or long-term covert air requirements in support of
U.S. objectives. During the past ten years, it has had some notable
achievements, including support of the Chinese Nationalist withdrawal
from the mainland, air drop support to the French at Dien Bien Phu,
complete logistical and tactical air support for the Indonesian
operation, air lifts of refugees from North Vietnam, more than 200
overflights of Mainland China and Tibet, and extensive air support in
Laos during the current crisis.
2. U.S.
b. CIA
1). Okinawa-Support Base
Okinawa Station is in itself a paramilitary support asset and, in
critical situations calling for extensive support of UW activity in the
Far East, could be devoted in its entirety to this mission. Located at
Camp Chinen, it comprises a self-contained base under Army cover with
facilities of all types necessary to the storage, testing, packaging,
procurement and delivery of supplies-ranging from weapons and explosives
to medical and clothing. Because of its being a controlled area, it can
accommodate admirably the holding of black bodies in singletons or small
groups, as well as small groups of trainees....
4). Saipan Training Station.
CIA maintains a field training station on the island of Saipan located
approximately 160 miles northeast of Guam in the Marianas Islands. The
installation is under Navy cover and is known as the Naval Technical
Training Unit. The primary mission of the Saipan Training Station is to
provide physical facilities and competent instructor personnel to
fulfill a variety of training requirements including intelligence
tradecraft, communications, counter-intelligence and psychological
warfare techniques. Training is performed in support of CIA activities
conducted throughout the Far East area.
In addition to the facilities described above, CIA maintains a small
ship of approximately 500 tons' displacement and 140 feet in length.
This vessel is used presently to provide surface transportation between
Guam and Saipan. It has an American Captain and First Mate and a
Philippine crew, and is operated under the cover of a commercial
corporation with home offices in Baltimore, Maryland. Both the ship and
the corporation have a potentially wider paramilitary application both
in the Far East area and elsewhere.
> Taylor served exceptionally well in WW II and Korea. He was smarter than
> the �we don�t need a military since we have the bomb� group and
> worked to keep a standing infantry influence. He is certainly to be
> saluted here. He should have stayed retired because Vietnam, as it did
> with so many, didn�t help his reputation.
>
> Bill Clarke
>
Coondog
> On 12/20/2009 11:27 AM, Coondog wrote:
>
>
> >> I knew very well two of those names on that wall in D.C. who didn't think
> >> it was a mistake. From the sounds of it, I'm sure you knew a few as well.
>
> > Division, the same Division as your friend Martin. From the date and
> > location of his death it shows that Martin was part of the Lam Son 719
> > operation when he was killed. That was the operation when ARVN went
> > into Laos and Abrams moved additional U.S. forces to Quang Tri to
> > Americal that went up to Quang Tri. From what my friends that went up
> > tell me it made what we had seen up to that time seem mild. Very bad
> > up there.
>
> So here you confirm that you never actually saw any action yourself.
> Never got out of the garage.
I really don’t see it that way Marsh but you do live in your own
little word. Are you under the impression that there was no combat in
Vietnam before Lam Son 719 or that all combat in Vietnam stopped for
Lam Son 719? How did you ever make general? At the time I had my
Troop in the Que Son Valley southwest of DaNang running operations.
I’ve given you the link to my Troop website with the causality page if
you want to check for combat before and after Lam Son 719. General
Nemi, who tried to persuade Bush not to invade Iraq, was wounded in
the Que Son Valley. So were General Clark and General Tommy Franks.
You might want to ask them if any “action” went on there. I have a
Purple Heart for, unlike your buddy John Kerry, wounds received in
action against a hostile force. Oh dear, I’d better make this clear
for you. The three generals were lieutenants when wounded in the
Valley.
> > I wish that the civilians that know us only through B-grade Rambo type
> > movies and from the actions of a small number that disgraced us at
> > places such as My Lai could have known the average American kid in
> >Vietnam. Most had a big heart, uncommon courage and the ability to
> > lead even with little training.
>
> Previously you had denied that My Lai even happened.
This is simply not true. You might have me confused with someone else
or you are probably…..well, you know. It would be easy for you to run
a search and prove your false statement but you can’t do so.
> Tell us more about the other atrocities you know about, preferrably from
> first hand knowledge.
I don’t like to tell war stories, especially to someone who doesn’t
understand what I’m saying. But since you asked I have two firsthand
accounts for you. The first the communist had come into a village
near Tam Ky one night and assassinated several village leaders. The
dead were still there when they moved us there to secure the village.
The second is at another village near Tam Ky and as we approached a
group of kids were running to us to beg for food. They ran into a
communist bouncing Betty and little torn up kids lay all over the
place. Then there is the 2,500 to 5,000 found in the mass graves at
Hue the communist put there. There is the long history of the four to
seven thousand Vietnamese the communist assassinated every year for
many years. That enough for you?
Bill Clarke
HistorianDetective
Bill,
> Taylor served exceptionally well in WW II and Korea. He was smarter than
> the “we don’t need a military since we have the bomb” group and
> worked to keep a standing infantry influence. He is certainly to be
> saluted here. He should have stayed retired because Vietnam, as it did
> with so many, didn’t help his reputation.
>
Guess I could consider Taylor to be a fellow military alumnus, as I also
served with the 101st Airborne.
He has quite the military history. He commanded the Screaming Eagles
during WWll and in 1957 when Ike sent troops from the 101st to Little
Rock.
His one regret during WWll was that he was not at Bastogne. I don't think
he would have surrended either. Not sure if he would have come up with the
same "NUTS" reply as did MacAuliffe, but I think he would have come up
with something similar.
Ditto regarding Taylor's lack of guerilla war experience. He was out of
his realm in that regard.
Still, I don't think his overall reputation suffered based on his overall
career.
And speaking of guerilla warfare, that's what the British thought of the
Revolutionary War. In many ways, they were right and the reason why we
won.
JM
PS...Do you have a list of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the JFK admin
handy that you could pass on?
Would be interesting to see if any of them had any South Pacific jungle
warfare experience.
ShutterBun
> Kennedy was President from 1956 to 1960.
President of what?
Coondog
> On 12/20/2009 10:33 PM, Chuck Schuyler wrote:
>
> > On Dec 20, 5:06 pm, Anthony Marsh<anthony_ma...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
> >> So you're saying that Maxwell Taylor had no expertise of war, but you
> >> do? Lay out your credentials to be in a position to criticize Maxwell
> >> Taylor.
>
> > Silly.
>
> He was talking about Kennedy people having no expertise in war. Maxwell
> Taylor as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was one of the people
> that Kennedy should be able to withdraw the troops.
Well Marsh, if that doesn’t prove his lack of expertise in guerrilla
warfare in general and guerrilla warfare in Vietnam in particular I
don’t know what it would take for you.
The McNamara Taylor report was based on false assumptions and reached a
flawed conclusion. At that time no way in hell NSAM 263 was going to come
true without some drastic changes being made. To be very sure you
understand this, Taylor was very wrong in Vietnam. So were McNamara and
many more.
Bill Clarke
Coondog
> On 12/20/2009 10:31 PM, Coondog wrote:
>
>
> >> So you're saying that Maxwell Taylor had no expertise of war, but you
> >> do? Lay out your credentials to be in a position to criticize Maxwell
> >> Taylor.
>
> > First Marsh, I want you to know I replied to your crap in your previous
> > dazzled me with your word games.
>
> > Now to this crap of yours if the moderators post it. Since we were
> > war everyone would know I was referring to the type war that was going on
> > knowledge of Taylor having any guerrilla war experience before JFK called
> > him out of retirement you need to share it with us.
So you have no evidence of Taylor having any guerrilla warfare experience.
Glad you finally got that straight.
> Oh great, so when you are proved wrong you just change the argument. Now
> you claim that none of Kennedy's experts had any specific experience wit
> guerrilla warfare and you narrow it even more to any experience fighting
> inVietnam.
You are expert in doing that so you speak from experience and you are far
from proving me wrong. I apologize for not making clear I was referring
to a guerrilla type war. I didn’t restrict it to Vietnam but since that
is what we were discussing I assumed you were keeping up. No one else
seems to have missed the boat here so what is your problem.
> Well, I guess we'd have to include you in that also then.
And I guess we would have to include you in that group also. Right? As
for me it is an iffy situation. Pike makes the point that after TET 68
the guerrilla never bounced back, their northern brothers had fed them to
the meat grinder in 68. From then on it was varying stages of
conventional war to guerrilla war with stages in-between. He says after
1968 in I Corps (my AO) in the north (the DMZ) it was conventional, in the
south around the Pinkville area of My Lai it remained a guerrilla effort
and in the middle it was a flow between the two. I lived in the middle,
Marsh.
> No matter which person I might cite you can claim that he did not have any
> experience in guerrilla warfare inVietnamunless it was someone from
> the OSS teams.
I didn’t restrict it to Vietnam and am sorry about your confusion. Now,
if you know of anyone in JFKs inner circle that had guerrilla war
experience anywhere at any time please post their names ricky tick or
stand down here. Now would be a good time for you to mention Lansdale who
did have much experience in guerrilla strategy and tactics but he wasn’t
a member of the inner circle, he wasn’t one of McNamara’s whiz kids
and in the final analysis he didn’t carry much influence.
> If you have a grudge against Maxwell Taylor, how about Ed Lansdale, who
> was also an advisor to President Kennedy?
My lord, I have no “grudge” against Taylor. He was one of the best
when he retired and he should have stayed retired. Vietnam took the
shine off many a good reputation including Taylor’s.
I like Lansdale too. He and Taylor both served their country and I have
much respect for those that do. Lansdale is probably singularly
responsible for the Philippines not going communist after WW II. He tried
and failed in Vietnam. But it is not the man sitting on his ass in the
stadium Marsh but the man in the arena that counts. Taylor and Lansdale
spent their adult lives in the arena for their country.
> General Maxwell Taylor and President John F. Kennedy pose at the president
> Taylor and Kennedy pose at the president’s office on June 28, 1961,
> after Kennedy called the former Army chief of staff back to active duty
> as his military adviser (National Archives).
Much stuff snipped heere for space. Boy, you really posted a biggie here.
I pulled out a couple you should be interested in if you didn’t bother
to read your own post.
Marsh post; By the middle of 1961, Kennedy took other steps to increase
America’s covert and overt roles in South Vietnam. He secretly ordered
the dispatch of covert agents to infiltrate into North Vietnam for
intelligence gathering, Marsh post off.
And here we have the embryonic stage of OPLAN 34A. LBJ beefed up a pin
prick (pin prick a Dr. Moise quote) that was a failure to a slightly
larger pin prick that was also a failure and you run around yelling about
Jack’s body not being cold. I chortle as do most.
Marsh post; Kennedy was describing events that were going on in Vietnam in
1961, well before the major influx of troops that he, and later Lyndon B.
Johnson, would send to that beleaguered country. , Marsh post off.
Wow! Jack sent a major influx of troops to Vietnam. I’m glad you
begin to see the light.
Bill Clarke
Coondog
wrote:
> > war everyone would know I was referring to the type war that was going on
> > knowledge of Taylor having any guerrilla war experience before JFK called
> > him out of retirement you need to share it with us.
>
> Bill,
>
> > Taylor served exceptionally well in WW II and Korea. He was smarter than
> > the “we don’t need a military since we have the bomb” group and
> > worked to keep a standing infantry influence. He is certainly to be
> > with so many, didn’t help his reputation.
>
> Guess I could consider Taylor to be a fellow military alumnus, as I also
> served with the 101st Airborne.
>
> He has quite the military history. He commanded the Screaming Eagles
> during WWll and in 1957 when Ike sent troops from the 101st to Little
> Rock.
>
> His one regret during WWll was that he was not at Bastogne. I don't think
> he would have surrended either. Not sure if he would have come up with the
> same "NUTS" reply as did MacAuliffe, but I think he would have come up
> with something similar.
>
> Ditto regarding Taylor's lack of guerilla war experience. He was out of
> his realm in that regard.
>
> Still, I don't think his overall reputation suffered based on his overall
> career.
>
> And speaking of guerilla warfare, that's what the British thought of the
> Revolutionary War. In many ways, they were right and the reason why we
> won.
>
> JM
>
> PS...Do you have a list of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the JFK admin
> handy that you could pass on?
>
> Would be interesting to see if any of them had any South Pacific jungle
>
> - Show quoted text -
Here you go;
Past Chairmen of the JCS
• General of the Army, Omar N. Bradley, 1949–1953
• Adm. Arthur W. Radford, U.S. Navy, 1953–1957
• Gen. Nathan F. Twining, U.S. Air Force, 1957–1960
• Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army, 1960–1962
• Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army, 1962–1964
• Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, U.S. Army, 1964–1970
• Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy, 1970–1974
• Gen. George S. Brown, U.S. Air Force, 1974–1978
• Gen. David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force, 1978–1982
• Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., U.S. Army, 1982–1985
• Adm. William J. Crowe, U.S. Navy, 1985–1989
• Gen. Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, 1989–1993
• Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. Army, 1993–1997
• Gen. Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, 1997–2001
• Gen. Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, 2001–2005
• Gen. Peter Pace, U.S. Marine Corps, 2005–2007
Gen. Twining was an air crapper. So much for guerrilla warfare here. He
did have a brother that was a Marine General. Not a lot of American
involvement in Vietnam at this time.
Gen. Lemnitzer is a bit more interesting. He was on Ike’s staff during
WW II and later served in Korea. (No guerrilla experience here). He
“weathered” the Bay of Pigs and our early involvement in Vietnam.
Was required to testify before congress about the activities of Gen. Edwin
Walker who had been kicked out of the Army for his political crap.
Lemnitzer approved the plans for operation Northwoods which JFK refused to
approve. Shortly after this he was refused a second term as Chairman of
the JSC. In 1975 President Ford appointed Lemnitzer to the Rockefeller
Commission investigating the CIA. He had a Silver Star so he probably
wasn’t a cream puff.
You are familiar with Gen. Maxwell Taylor.
Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, poor fellow, caught the brute of our involvement in
Vietnam. He did his early service in Europe, again no guerrilla
experience. He was considered a “hawk” regards Vietnam.
The skinny I get is that Ike came home from WW II and promoted his guys,
all from Europe and none with guerrilla experience. As you know, in the
military especially it is more who you know than what you know.
MacArthur failed to maintain his relationship with Washington, even
refusing to return to the United States and so his boys that had much
jungle experience fell by the wayside. We paid the price in Vietnam. God
bless the Marines that had served so well in the Pacific jungles were put
under the command of another of Ike’s (and Taylor’s) European boys and
poor Westmoreland never did understand what the hell was happening in
Vietnam. The 2nd and 3rd Marine Division in I Corps ran a program of
medical teams and security forces actually living in the villages. This
would have gone a long way in winning the war. Westmoreland shut them down
so they could run his foolish large unit sweeps.
I salute your service as a Screaming Eagle. And I think you are right
about Taylor’s reputation.
Bill Clarke
Coondog
I started to ask Marsh about that one but let it slide for
humanitarian reasons. Marsh seems to be having a rough go of it here
lately.
Bill Clarke
Doug Reese
>
> >>>> And to what end?
>
> >>>> The dominoes are still standing.
>
> >>> criticizing others that felt the same way. Do you blame JFK? They had no
> >>> way of knowing that it was mostly a false theory and I think it unfair for
> >>> us to sit here in 2009 and down them for believing in something in the
> >>> early 1960s. We can see clearly now?
>
> >>>> McNamara:Vietnamwas a mistake.
>
> >>> The damn mistake, Peter, WAS the brilliant fool McNamara. That rotten
> >>> pile of arrogant horse manure has lied his ass off to make himself look
> >>> good aboutVietnam. I hope he is burning in a very hot hell.
>
> >>> Bill Clarke- Hide quoted text -
>
> >>> - Show quoted text -
>
> >> Bill,
>
> >> Thanks for postin' and givin' some insight into this political commentary
> >> people can't seem to resist to post every chance they get.
>
> > I appreciate it. It was so long I feared no one but Marsh would read
> > it and he not to have an exchange of ideas but to play his silly word
> > games.
>
> >>> Terribly sad, Peter. A terrible thing, all those young men who remain
>
> >> Hard to when people post crap calling it a mistake via referencing
> >> McNamara, of all people.
>
> >> I knew very well two of those names on that wall in D.C. who didn't think
> >> it was a mistake. From the sounds of it, I'm sure you knew a few as well.
>
> > Division, the same Division as your friend Martin. From the date and
> > location of his death it shows that Martin was part of the Lam Son 719
> > operation when he was killed. That was the operation when ARVN went
> > into Laos and Abrams moved additional U.S. forces to Quang Tri to
> > Americal that went up to Quang Tri. From what my friends that went up
> > tell me it made what we had seen up to that time seem mild. Very bad
> > up there.
>
> So here you confirm that you never actually saw any action yourself.
> Never got out of the garage.
Are you really this stupid?
He is confirming no such thing.
Doug Reese
> >> Here's a link to the memorial.http://thewall-usa.com/index.asp-Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -