>On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition) Lane states:
>QUOTE ON:
>What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
>relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
>Corps friend.
>QUOTE OFF
>The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
>shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
>letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
>In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
>Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
>and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
>*considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
>citizen in his WC testimony:
> >On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition) Lane states:
> >QUOTE ON:
> >What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
> >relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
> >Corps friend.
> >QUOTE OFF
> >The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
> >shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
> >letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
> >In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
> >Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
> >and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
> >*considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
> >citizen in his WC testimony:
You need to re-read Folsom's letter. Lane is correct on this point.
The evidence proves that Oswald was not a good shot at the time of the
shooting, and that the WC deliberately deceived the public on this
issue.
From patspeer.com, chapter 3c:
On 6-2-64 Rankin writes a letter to Lt. Col. Allison G. Folsom
requesting an appraisal of Oswald’s shooting ability, based upon
Oswald’s test scores while in the Marines. On 6-8-64, he receives an
unexpected response. Folsom writes “In view of the lapse of time
since Mr. Oswald was separated from the Marine Corps, it would be
impossible to ascertain precisely the number of hours in which he
participated in weapons marksmanship practice or how many rounds of
ammunition he fired.” He then gives a breakdown of the training
received by Oswald and his subsequent tests scores. These show that
Oswald was tested on the M-1 rifle on December 21, 1956 and received a
score of 212, or sharpshooter ranking. This was the test discussed in
Folsom’s 5-1-64 testimony. The record shows that Oswald was tested on
the M-1 rifle a second time on May 6, 1959, however, and received a
score of 191, only 1 point above the bottom of the Marksman ranking.
These were the scores reported by the New York Times on 11-23-63. The
big surprise for Rankin comes in Folsom’s summary. He tells Rankin
“The Marine Corps considers that any reasonable application of the
instructions given to Marines should permit them to become qualified
as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine
Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of
adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified. Consequently,
a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor “shot” and a
sharpshooter qualification indicates a fairly good “shot.” Folsom was
thus telling Rankin that Oswald was a poor shot when he left the
Marines and would have been an even worse shot after 4 years without
practice.
From later in the chapter:
Elsewhere, on 7-24-64 the Warren Commission engages the Marine Corps
in a little self-protection. To counter Lt. Col. Folsom’s description
of Oswald’s marksmanship as “poor,” they take the testimony of Major
Eugene D. Anderson, an assistant head of the Marksmanship branch of
the Marines, and Master Sergeant James Zahm, an NCO of Marksmanship
Training. Arlen Specter takes their testimony. After being shown
Oswald's test scores, Anderson offers an explanation for Oswald's
lowly score in 1959, shortly before he left the Marines: "It may well
have been a bad day for firing a rifle, windy, rainy, dark. There is
little probability that he had a good, expert coach. and he probably
didn't have as high a motivation because he was no longer in recruit
training and under the care of the drill instructor. There is some
possibility that the rifle he was firing might not have been as good a
rifle as the rifle he was firing in his A course firing. because he
may well have carried this rifle around for some time, and it got
banged around in normal usage." Anderson summarizes Oswald's abilities
as follows: "I would say that as compared to other Marines receiving
the same kind of training, that Oswald was a good shot, somewhat
better than or equal to--better than average let us say. As compared
to a civilian who had not received this intensive training, he would
be considered as a good to excellent shot." Specter then shows
Anderson frames from the Zapruder film and asks him if hitting Kennedy
from the distances determined at the re-enactment would be within
Oswald's capabilities, and Anderson repeatedly says the shots were
within Oswald's capabilities. He then asks him if Oswald could fire
three shots in a time span between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds, and Anderson
once again replies in the affirmative. Specter fails to ask Anderson
the more pertinent question if Oswald could be expected to hit the 2
"not particularly difficult" shots within a 4.8-5.6 second time span
while firing at a moving target with a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.
Perhaps he already knew the answer. After finishing with Anderson,
Specter makes a point of asking Zahm about Oswald’s ability “based on
the tests.” This avoids that the most recent test was 4 years before
the shooting and that Oswald had failed to keep in practice. Zahm
tells Specter what he undoubtedly wants to hear: “I would say in the
Marine Corps he is a good shot, slightly above average, and as
compared to the average male of his age throughout the civilian,
throughout the United States, that he is an excellent shot.” Clearly,
this is the new company line.
From still later in the chapter:
From a 9-4 WC memo by Wesley Liebeler in which he critiqued the Warren
Report:
14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that
15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert
riflemen of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations
those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The
average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is
calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means
the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2
seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting
the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much.
I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse
between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set
of fast shots fired by Frazier of the FBI. The conclusion indicates
that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits in
from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above,
only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including
the three just mentioned were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The
conclusion at its most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster
than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in
any event he could fire faster than the experts did in 10 of their 15
tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we
should set forth some information on how much training and how much
shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then
have something on which to base their judgments concerning the
relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the
Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.
15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some
point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum
firing time for each shot used throughout chapter 3. The present
discussion of rifle capability shows that expert riflemen could not
fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts
managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI experts,
were high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the
experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever
be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my
recollection of the response of one of the experts to a question by
Mr. McCloy asking for a comparison of an NRA master marksman to a
Marine Corps sharpshooter.
16. The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth
material in the record tending to indicate that Oswald was not a good
shot and that he was not interested in his rifle while in the Marine
Corps. It does not set forth material indicating that a telescopic
sight must be tested and sighted in after a period of non-use before
it can be expected to be accurate. That problem is emphasized by the
fact that the FBI actually found that there was a defect in the scope
which caused the rifle to fire high and to the right. In spite of the
above the present section takes only part of the material in the
record to show that Oswald was a good shot and that he was interested
in rifles. I submit that the testimony of Delgado that Oswald was not
interested in his rifle while in the Marines is at least as probative
as Alba's testimony that Oswald came into his garage to read rifle--
and hunting--magazines. To put it bluntly that sort
...
> >On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition) Lane states:
> >QUOTE ON:
> >What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
> >relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
> >Corps friend.
> >QUOTE OFF
> >The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
> >shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
> >letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
> >In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
> >Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
> >and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
> >*considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
> >citizen in his WC testimony:
It's shooting fish in a barrel (although, if you think about it, that
probably would not be that easy), but it needs to be done. Regardless
of one's position on the conspiracy question, this is about history
and those who create and popularize distortions do not help anyone.
> > >On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition) Lane states:
> > >QUOTE ON:
> > >What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
> > >relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
> > >Corps friend.
> > >QUOTE OFF
> > >The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
> > >shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
> > >letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
> > >In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
> > >Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
> > >and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
> > >*considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
> > >citizen in his WC testimony:
> You need to re-read Folsom's letter. Lane is correct on this point.
> The evidence proves that Oswald was not a good shot at the time of the
> shooting, and that the WC deliberately deceived the public on this
> issue.
<snicker> The evidence proves that Oswald was a good enough shot on
the day of the assassination.
> On 6-2-64 Rankin writes a letter to Lt. Col. Allison G. Folsom
> requesting an appraisal of Oswald’s shooting ability, based upon
> Oswald’s test scores while in the Marines. On 6-8-64, he receives an
> unexpected response. Folsom writes “In view of the lapse of time
> since Mr. Oswald was separated from the Marine Corps, it would be
> impossible to ascertain precisely the number of hours in which he
> participated in weapons marksmanship practice or how many rounds of
> ammunition he fired.” He then gives a breakdown of the training
> received by Oswald and his subsequent tests scores. These show that
> Oswald was tested on the M-1 rifle on December 21, 1956 and received a
> score of 212, or sharpshooter ranking. This was the test discussed in
> Folsom’s 5-1-64 testimony. The record shows that Oswald was tested on
> the M-1 rifle a second time on May 6, 1959, however, and received a
> score of 191, only 1 point above the bottom of the Marksman ranking.
> These were the scores reported by the New York Times on 11-23-63. The
> big surprise for Rankin comes in Folsom’s summary. He tells Rankin
> “The Marine Corps considers that any reasonable application of the
> instructions given to Marines should permit them to become qualified
> as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine
> Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of
> adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified. Consequently,
> a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor “shot” and a
> sharpshooter qualification indicates a fairly good “shot.” Folsom was
> thus telling Rankin that Oswald was a poor shot when he left the
> Marines and would have been an even worse shot after 4 years without
> practice.
This assumes that Oswald was putting his best effort out when he
shot on May 6th, 1959. If he wasn`t then his score does not truly
reflect his true shooting ability. Rankin could not possibly attest to
whether Oswald was trying his best, and neither can anyone else. There
is evidence that Oswald was lax in many aspects of his military
functions at this point in time.
> Elsewhere, on 7-24-64 the Warren Commission engages the Marine Corps
> in a little self-protection. To counter Lt. Col. Folsom’s description
> of Oswald’s marksmanship as “poor,” they take the testimony of Major
> Eugene D. Anderson, an assistant head of the Marksmanship branch of
> the Marines, and Master Sergeant James Zahm, an NCO of Marksmanship
> Training. Arlen Specter takes their testimony. After being shown
> Oswald's test scores, Anderson offers an explanation for Oswald's
> lowly score in 1959, shortly before he left the Marines: "It may well
> have been a bad day for firing a rifle, windy, rainy, dark. There is
> little probability that he had a good, expert coach. and he probably
> didn't have as high a motivation because he was no longer in recruit
> training and under the care of the drill instructor. There is some
> possibility that the rifle he was firing might not have been as good a
> rifle as the rifle he was firing in his A course firing. because he
> may well have carried this rifle around for some time, and it got
> banged around in normal usage." Anderson summarizes Oswald's abilities
> as follows: "I would say that as compared to other Marines receiving
> the same kind of training, that Oswald was a good shot, somewhat
> better than or equal to--better than average let us say. As compared
> to a civilian who had not received this intensive training, he would
> be considered as a good to excellent shot." Specter then shows
> Anderson frames from the Zapruder film and asks him if hitting Kennedy
> from the distances determined at the re-enactment would be within
> Oswald's capabilities, and Anderson repeatedly says the shots were
> within Oswald's capabilities. He then asks him if Oswald could fire
> three shots in a time span between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds, and Anderson
> once again replies in the affirmative. Specter fails to ask Anderson
> the more pertinent question if Oswald could be expected to hit the 2
> "not particularly difficult" shots within a 4.8-5.6 second time span
> while firing at a moving target with a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.
> Perhaps he already knew the answer. After finishing with Anderson,
> Specter makes a point of asking Zahm about Oswald’s ability “based on
> the tests.” This avoids that the most recent test was 4 years before
> the shooting and that Oswald had failed to keep in practice. Zahm
> tells Specter what he undoubtedly wants to hear: “I would say in the
> Marine Corps he is a good shot, slightly above average, and as
> compared to the average male of his age throughout the civilian,
> throughout the United States, that he is an excellent shot.” Clearly,
> this is the new company line.
> From still later in the chapter:
> From a 9-4 WC memo by Wesley Liebeler in which he critiqued the Warren
> Report:
> 14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that
> 15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert
> riflemen of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations
> those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The
> average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is
> calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means
> the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2
> seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting
> the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much.
> I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse
> between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set
> of fast shots fired by Frazier of the FBI. The conclusion indicates
> that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits in
> from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above,
> only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including
> the three just mentioned were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The
> conclusion at its most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster
> than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in
> any event he could fire faster than the experts did in 10 of their 15
> tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we
> should set forth some information on how much training and how much
> shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then
> have something on which to base their judgments concerning the
> relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the
> Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.
> 15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some
> point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum
> firing time for each shot used throughout chapter 3. The present
> discussion of rifle capability shows that expert riflemen could not
> fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts
> managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI experts,
> were high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the
> experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever
> be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my
> recollection of the response of one of the experts to a question by
> Mr. McCloy asking for a comparison of an NRA master marksman to a
> Marine Corps sharpshooter.
> 16. The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth
> material in the record tending to indicate that Oswald was
>>> On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition) Lane states:
>>> QUOTE ON:
>>> What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
>>> relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
>>> Corps friend.
>>> QUOTE OFF
>>> The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
>>> shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
>>> letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
>>> In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
>>> Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
>>> and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
>>> *considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
>>> citizen in his WC testimony:
> You need to re-read Folsom's letter. Lane is correct on this point.
> The evidence proves that Oswald was not a good shot at the time of the
> shooting, and that the WC deliberately deceived the public on this
> issue.
> From patspeer.com, chapter 3c:
> On 6-2-64 Rankin writes a letter to Lt. Col. Allison G. Folsom
> requesting an appraisal of Oswald?s shooting ability, based upon
> Oswald?s test scores while in the Marines. On 6-8-64, he receives an
> unexpected response. Folsom writes ?In view of the lapse of time
> since Mr. Oswald was separated from the Marine Corps, it would be
> impossible to ascertain precisely the number of hours in which he
> participated in weapons marksmanship practice or how many rounds of
> ammunition he fired.? He then gives a breakdown of the training
> received by Oswald and his subsequent tests scores. These show that
> Oswald was tested on the M-1 rifle on December 21, 1956 and received a
> score of 212, or sharpshooter ranking. This was the test discussed in
> Folsom?s 5-1-64 testimony. The record shows that Oswald was tested on
> the M-1 rifle a second time on May 6, 1959, however, and received a
> score of 191, only 1 point above the bottom of the Marksman ranking.
> These were the scores reported by the New York Times on 11-23-63. The
> big surprise for Rankin comes in Folsom?s summary. He tells Rankin
> ?The Marine Corps considers that any reasonable application of the
> instructions given to Marines should permit them to become qualified
> as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine
> Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of
> adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified. Consequently,
> a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor ?shot? and a
> sharpshooter qualification indicates a fairly good ?shot.? Folsom was
> thus telling Rankin that Oswald was a poor shot when he left the
> Marines and would have been an even worse shot after 4 years without
> practice.
> From later in the chapter:
> Elsewhere, on 7-24-64 the Warren Commission engages the Marine Corps
> in a little self-protection. To counter Lt. Col. Folsom?s description
> of Oswald?s marksmanship as ?poor,? they take the testimony of Major
> Eugene D. Anderson, an assistant head of the Marksmanship branch of
> the Marines, and Master Sergeant James Zahm, an NCO of Marksmanship
> Training. Arlen Specter takes their testimony. After being shown
> Oswald's test scores, Anderson offers an explanation for Oswald's
> lowly score in 1959, shortly before he left the Marines: "It may well
> have been a bad day for firing a rifle, windy, rainy, dark. There is
> little probability that he had a good, expert coach. and he probably
> didn't have as high a motivation because he was no longer in recruit
> training and under the care of the drill instructor. There is some
> possibility that the rifle he was firing might not have been as good a
> rifle as the rifle he was firing in his A course firing. because he
> may well have carried this rifle around for some time, and it got
> banged around in normal usage." Anderson summarizes Oswald's abilities
> as follows: "I would say that as compared to other Marines receiving
> the same kind of training, that Oswald was a good shot, somewhat
> better than or equal to--better than average let us say. As compared
> to a civilian who had not received this intensive training, he would
> be considered as a good to excellent shot." Specter then shows
> Anderson frames from the Zapruder film and asks him if hitting Kennedy
> from the distances determined at the re-enactment would be within
> Oswald's capabilities, and Anderson repeatedly says the shots were
> within Oswald's capabilities. He then asks him if Oswald could fire
> three shots in a time span between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds, and Anderson
> once again replies in the affirmative. Specter fails to ask Anderson
> the more pertinent question if Oswald could be expected to hit the 2
> "not particularly difficult" shots within a 4.8-5.6 second time span
> while firing at a moving target with a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.
> Perhaps he already knew the answer. After finishing with Anderson,
> Specter makes a point of asking Zahm about Oswald?s ability ?based on
> the tests.? This avoids that the most recent test was 4 years before
> the shooting and that Oswald had failed to keep in practice. Zahm
> tells Specter what he undoubtedly wants to hear: ?I would say in the
> Marine Corps he is a good shot, slightly above average, and as
> compared to the average male of his age throughout the civilian,
> throughout the United States, that he is an excellent shot.? Clearly,
> this is the new company line.
> From still later in the chapter:
> From a 9-4 WC memo by Wesley Liebeler in which he critiqued the Warren
> Report:
> 14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that
> 15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert
> riflemen of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations
> those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The
> average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is
> calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means
> the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2
> seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting
> the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much.
> I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse
> between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set
> of fast shots fired by Frazier of the FBI. The conclusion indicates
> that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits in
> from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above,
> only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including
> the three just mentioned were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The
> conclusion at its most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster
> than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in
> any event he could fire faster than the experts did in 10 of their 15
> tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we
> should set forth some information on how much training and how much
> shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then
> have something on which to base their judgments concerning the
> relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the
> Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.
> 15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some
> point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum
> firing time for each shot used throughout chapter 3. The present
> discussion of rifle capability shows that expert riflemen could not
> fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts
> managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI experts,
> were high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the
> experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever
> be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my
> recollection of the response of one of the experts to a question by
> Mr. McCloy asking for a comparison of an NRA master marksman to a
> Marine Corps sharpshooter.
> 16. The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth
> material in the record tending to indicate that Oswald was not a good
> shot and that he was not interested in his rifle while in the Marine
> Corps. It does not set forth material indicating that a telescopic
> sight must be tested and sighted in after a period of non-use before
> it can be expected to be accurate. That problem is emphasized by the
> fact that the FBI actually found that there was a defect in the scope
> which caused the rifle to fire high and to the right. In spite of the
> above the present section takes only part of the material in the
> record to show
> >On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition) Lane states:
> >QUOTE ON:
> >What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
> >relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
> >Corps friend.
> >QUOTE OFF
> >The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
> >shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
> >letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
> >In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
> >Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
> >and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
> >*considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
> >citizen in his WC testimony:
Tim Brennan
Sydney, Australia
*Newsgroup(s) Commentator*
*...NOT ONE of the three experts was able to strike the head or the
neck of the target EVEN ONCE.* (Emphasis added).
Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment, page 129, footnoted as: XVII 261-262.
>On 5/29/2012 8:53 AM, pjspe...@AOL.COM wrote:
>> On May 28, 4:34 pm, John McAdams<john.mcad...@marquette.edu> wrote:
>>> On Sat, 26 May 2012 01:55:38 -0700 (PDT), timstter
>>>> On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition) Lane states:
>>>> QUOTE ON:
>>>> What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
>>>> relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
>>>> Corps friend.
>>>> QUOTE OFF
>>>> The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
>>>> shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
>>>> letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
>>>> In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
>>>> Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
>>>> and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
>>>> *considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
>>>> citizen in his WC testimony:
>> You need to re-read Folsom's letter. Lane is correct on this point.
>> The evidence proves that Oswald was not a good shot at the time of the
>> shooting, and that the WC deliberately deceived the public on this
>> issue.
>> From patspeer.com, chapter 3c:
>> On 6-2-64 Rankin writes a letter to Lt. Col. Allison G. Folsom
>> requesting an appraisal of Oswald?s shooting ability, based upon
>> Oswald?s test scores while in the Marines. On 6-8-64, he receives an
>> unexpected response. Folsom writes ?In view of the lapse of time
>> since Mr. Oswald was separated from the Marine Corps, it would be
>> impossible to ascertain precisely the number of hours in which he
>> participated in weapons marksmanship practice or how many rounds of
>> ammunition he fired.? He then gives a breakdown of the training
>> received by Oswald and his subsequent tests scores. These show that
>> Oswald was tested on the M-1 rifle on December 21, 1956 and received a
>> score of 212, or sharpshooter ranking. This was the test discussed in
>> Folsom?s 5-1-64 testimony. The record shows that Oswald was tested on
>> the M-1 rifle a second time on May 6, 1959, however, and received a
>> score of 191, only 1 point above the bottom of the Marksman ranking.
>> These were the scores reported by the New York Times on 11-23-63. The
>> big surprise for Rankin comes in Folsom?s summary. He tells Rankin
>> ?The Marine Corps considers that any reasonable application of the
>> instructions given to Marines should permit them to become qualified
>> as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine
>> Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of
>> adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified. Consequently,
>> a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor ?shot? and a
>> sharpshooter qualification indicates a fairly good ?shot.? Folsom was
>> thus telling Rankin that Oswald was a poor shot when he left the
>> Marines and would have been an even worse shot after 4 years without
>> practice.
>> From later in the chapter:
>> Elsewhere, on 7-24-64 the Warren Commission engages the Marine Corps
>> in a little self-protection. To counter Lt. Col. Folsom?s description
>> of Oswald?s marksmanship as ?poor,? they take the testimony of Major
>> Eugene D. Anderson, an assistant head of the Marksmanship branch of
>> the Marines, and Master Sergeant James Zahm, an NCO of Marksmanship
>> Training. Arlen Specter takes their testimony. After being shown
>> Oswald's test scores, Anderson offers an explanation for Oswald's
>> lowly score in 1959, shortly before he left the Marines: "It may well
>> have been a bad day for firing a rifle, windy, rainy, dark. There is
>> little probability that he had a good, expert coach. and he probably
>> didn't have as high a motivation because he was no longer in recruit
>> training and under the care of the drill instructor. There is some
>> possibility that the rifle he was firing might not have been as good a
>> rifle as the rifle he was firing in his A course firing. because he
>> may well have carried this rifle around for some time, and it got
>> banged around in normal usage." Anderson summarizes Oswald's abilities
>> as follows: "I would say that as compared to other Marines receiving
>> the same kind of training, that Oswald was a good shot, somewhat
>> better than or equal to--better than average let us say. As compared
>> to a civilian who had not received this intensive training, he would
>> be considered as a good to excellent shot." Specter then shows
>> Anderson frames from the Zapruder film and asks him if hitting Kennedy
>> from the distances determined at the re-enactment would be within
>> Oswald's capabilities, and Anderson repeatedly says the shots were
>> within Oswald's capabilities. He then asks him if Oswald could fire
>> three shots in a time span between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds, and Anderson
>> once again replies in the affirmative. Specter fails to ask Anderson
>> the more pertinent question if Oswald could be expected to hit the 2
>> "not particularly difficult" shots within a 4.8-5.6 second time span
>> while firing at a moving target with a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.
>> Perhaps he already knew the answer. After finishing with Anderson,
>> Specter makes a point of asking Zahm about Oswald?s ability ?based on
>> the tests.? This avoids that the most recent test was 4 years before
>> the shooting and that Oswald had failed to keep in practice. Zahm
>> tells Specter what he undoubtedly wants to hear: ?I would say in the
>> Marine Corps he is a good shot, slightly above average, and as
>> compared to the average male of his age throughout the civilian,
>> throughout the United States, that he is an excellent shot.? Clearly,
>> this is the new company line.
>> From still later in the chapter:
>> From a 9-4 WC memo by Wesley Liebeler in which he critiqued the Warren
>> Report:
>> 14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that
>> 15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert
>> riflemen of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations
>> those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The
>> average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is
>> calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means
>> the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2
>> seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting
>> the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much.
>> I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse
>> between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set
>> of fast shots fired by Frazier of the FBI. The conclusion indicates
>> that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits in
>> from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above,
>> only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including
>> the three just mentioned were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The
>> conclusion at its most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster
>> than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in
>> any event he could fire faster than the experts did in 10 of their 15
>> tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we
>> should set forth some information on how much training and how much
>> shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then
>> have something on which to base their judgments concerning the
>> relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the
>> Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.
>> 15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some
>> point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum
>> firing time for each shot used throughout chapter 3. The present
>> discussion of rifle capability shows that expert riflemen could not
>> fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts
>> managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI experts,
>> were high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the
>> experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever
>> be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact, according to my
>> recollection of the response of one of the experts to a question by
>> Mr. McCloy asking for a comparison of an NRA master marksman to a
>> Marine Corps sharpshooter.
>> 16. The present section on rifle capability fails to set forth
>> material in the record tending to indicate that Oswald was not a good
>> shot and that he was not interested in his rifle while in the Marine
>> Corps. It does not set forth material indicating that a telescopic
>> sight must be tested and sighted in after a period of non-use before
>> it can be expected to be accurate. That problem is
Pat, the thing you duck is that Oswald practiced his shooting in 1963
AND dry fired the murder weapon HUNDREDS of times on his front porch
during August and September of 1963 in New Orleans, mere weeks before
Kennedy's assassination.
You need to include stuff like THAT in your thinking. Your excuses for
Lane and/or Oswald are not convincing.
Regards,
Tim Brennan
Sydney, Australia
*Newsgroup(s) Commentator*
*...NOT ONE of the three experts was able to strike the head or the
neck of the target EVEN ONCE.* (Emphasis added).
Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment, page 129, footnoted as: XVII 261-262.
> > >On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition)Lanestates:
> > >QUOTE ON:
> > >What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
> > >relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
> > >Corps friend.
> > >QUOTE OFF
> > >The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
> > >shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
> > >letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
> > >In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
> > >Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
> > >and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
> > >*considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
> > >citizen in his WC testimony:
> You need to re-read Folsom's letter.Laneis correct on this point.
> The evidence proves that Oswald was not a good shot at the time of the
> shooting, and that the WC deliberately deceived the public on this
> issue.
> From patspeer.com, chapter 3c:
> On 6-2-64 Rankin writes a letter to Lt. Col. Allison G. Folsom
> requesting an appraisal of Oswald’s shooting ability, based upon
> Oswald’s test scores while in the Marines. On 6-8-64, he receives an
> unexpected response. Folsom writes “In view of the lapse of time
> since Mr. Oswald was separated from the Marine Corps, it would be
> impossible to ascertain precisely the number of hours in which he
> participated in weapons marksmanship practice or how many rounds of
> ammunition he fired.” He then gives a breakdown of the training
> received by Oswald and his subsequent tests scores. These show that
> Oswald was tested on the M-1 rifle on December 21, 1956 and received a
> score of 212, or sharpshooter ranking. This was the test discussed in
> Folsom’s 5-1-64 testimony. The record shows that Oswald was tested on
> the M-1 rifle a second time on May 6, 1959, however, and received a
> score of 191, only 1 point above the bottom of the Marksman ranking.
> These were the scores reported by the New York Times on 11-23-63. The
> big surprise for Rankin comes in Folsom’s summary. He tells Rankin
> “The Marine Corps considers that any reasonable application of the
> instructions given to Marines should permit them to become qualified
> as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine
> Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of
> adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified. Consequently,
> a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor “shot” and a
> sharpshooter qualification indicates a fairly good “shot.” Folsom was
> thus telling Rankin that Oswald was a poor shot when he left the
> Marines and would have been an even worse shot after 4 years without
> practice.
> From later in the chapter:
> Elsewhere, on 7-24-64 the Warren Commission engages the Marine Corps
> in a little self-protection. To counter Lt. Col. Folsom’s description
> of Oswald’s marksmanship as “poor,” they take the testimony of Major
> Eugene D. Anderson, an assistant head of the Marksmanship branch of
> the Marines, and Master Sergeant James Zahm, an NCO of Marksmanship
> Training. Arlen Specter takes their testimony. After being shown
> Oswald's test scores, Anderson offers an explanation for Oswald's
> lowly score in 1959, shortly before he left the Marines: "It may well
> have been a bad day for firing a rifle, windy, rainy, dark. There is
> little probability that he had a good, expert coach. and he probably
> didn't have as high a motivation because he was no longer in recruit
> training and under the care of the drill instructor. There is some
> possibility that the rifle he was firing might not have been as good a
> rifle as the rifle he was firing in his A course firing. because he
> may well have carried this rifle around for some time, and it got
> banged around in normal usage." Anderson summarizes Oswald's abilities
> as follows: "I would say that as compared to other Marines receiving
> the same kind of training, that Oswald was a good shot, somewhat
> better than or equal to--better than average let us say. As compared
> to a civilian who had not received this intensive training, he would
> be considered as a good to excellent shot." Specter then shows
> Anderson frames from the Zapruder film and asks him if hitting Kennedy
> from the distances determined at the re-enactment would be within
> Oswald's capabilities, and Anderson repeatedly says the shots were
> within Oswald's capabilities. He then asks him if Oswald could fire
> three shots in a time span between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds, and Anderson
> once again replies in the affirmative. Specter fails to ask Anderson
> the more pertinent question if Oswald could be expected to hit the 2
> "not particularly difficult" shots within a 4.8-5.6 second time span
> while firing at a moving target with a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.
> Perhaps he already knew the answer. After finishing with Anderson,
> Specter makes a point of asking Zahm about Oswald’s ability “based on
> the tests.” This avoids that the most recent test was 4 years before
> the shooting and that Oswald had failed to keep in practice. Zahm
> tells Specter what he undoubtedly wants to hear: “I would say in the
> Marine Corps he is a good shot, slightly above average, and as
> compared to the average male of his age throughout the civilian,
> throughout the United States, that he is an excellent shot.” Clearly,
> this is the new company line.
> From still later in the chapter:
> From a 9-4 WC memo by Wesley Liebeler in which he critiqued the Warren
> Report:
> 14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that
> 15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert
> riflemen of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations
> those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The
> average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is
> calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means
> the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2
> seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting
> the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much.
> I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse
> between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set
> of fast shots fired by Frazier of the FBI. The conclusion indicates
> that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits in
> from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above,
> only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including
> the three just mentioned were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The
> conclusion at its most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster
> than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in
> any event he could fire faster than the experts did in 10 of their 15
> tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we
> should set forth some information on how much training and how much
> shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then
> have something on which to base their judgments concerning the
> relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the
> Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.
> 15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some
> point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum
> firing time for each shot used throughout chapter 3. The present
> discussion of rifle capability shows that expert riflemen could not
> fire the assassination weapon that fast. Only one of the experts
> managed to do so, and his shots, like those of the other FBI experts,
> were high and to the right of the target. The fact is that most of the
> experts were much more proficient with a rifle than Oswald could ever
> be expected to be, and the record indicates that fact,
> Pat, the thing you duck is that Oswald practiced his shooting in 1963
> AND dry fired the murder weapon HUNDREDS of times on his front porch
> during August and September of 1963 in New Orleans, mere weeks before
> Kennedy's assassination.
FYI, dry firing does not tell him how inaccurate his rifle is or help him adjust the scope.
> You need to include stuff like THAT in your thinking. Your excuses for
> Lane and/or Oswald are not convincing.
> Regards,
> Tim Brennan
> Sydney, Australia
> *Newsgroup(s) Commentator*
> *...NOT ONE of the three experts was able to strike the head or the
> neck of the target EVEN ONCE.* (Emphasis added).
> Mark Lane, Rush to Judgment, page 129, footnoted as: XVII 261-262.
>>>> On page 108 of Rush To Judgment (Penguin edition)Lanestates:
>>>> QUOTE ON:
>>>> What do we know about Oswald's proficiency with a rifle? That he was a
>>>> relatively poor shot and betrayed a dislike of weapons to a Marine
>>>> Corps friend.
>>>> QUOTE OFF
>>>> The evidence, though, is that Oswald must have been a *fairly good
>>>> shot* to have qualified as a USMC Sharpshooter, per this three page
>>>> letter from the USMC's AG Folsom to the Warren Commission:
>>>> In fact, Major Eugene Anderson, the assistant head of the Marksmanship
>>>> Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps and himself a USMC shooting expert
>>>> and master rifleshot in the NRA, testified that Oswald would have been
>>>> *considered a good to excellent shot* in comparison to the average
>>>> citizen in his WC testimony:
>> You need to re-read Folsom's letter.Laneis correct on this point.
>> The evidence proves that Oswald was not a good shot at the time of the
>> shooting, and that the WC deliberately deceived the public on this
>> issue.
>> From patspeer.com, chapter 3c:
>> On 6-2-64 Rankin writes a letter to Lt. Col. Allison G. Folsom
>> requesting an appraisal of Oswald’s shooting ability, based upon
>> Oswald’s test scores while in the Marines. On 6-8-64, he receives an
>> unexpected response. Folsom writes “In view of the lapse of time
>> since Mr. Oswald was separated from the Marine Corps, it would be
>> impossible to ascertain precisely the number of hours in which he
>> participated in weapons marksmanship practice or how many rounds of
>> ammunition he fired.” He then gives a breakdown of the training
>> received by Oswald and his subsequent tests scores. These show that
>> Oswald was tested on the M-1 rifle on December 21, 1956 and received a
>> score of 212, or sharpshooter ranking. This was the test discussed in
>> Folsom’s 5-1-64 testimony. The record shows that Oswald was tested on
>> the M-1 rifle a second time on May 6, 1959, however, and received a
>> score of 191, only 1 point above the bottom of the Marksman ranking.
>> These were the scores reported by the New York Times on 11-23-63. The
>> big surprise for Rankin comes in Folsom’s summary. He tells Rankin
>> “The Marine Corps considers that any reasonable application of the
>> instructions given to Marines should permit them to become qualified
>> as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine
>> Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of
>> adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified. Consequently,
>> a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor “shot” and a
>> sharpshooter qualification indicates a fairly good “shot.” Folsom was
>> thus telling Rankin that Oswald was a poor shot when he left the
>> Marines and would have been an even worse shot after 4 years without
>> practice.
>> From later in the chapter:
>> Elsewhere, on 7-24-64 the Warren Commission engages the Marine Corps
>> in a little self-protection. To counter Lt. Col. Folsom’s description
>> of Oswald’s marksmanship as “poor,” they take the testimony of Major
>> Eugene D. Anderson, an assistant head of the Marksmanship branch of
>> the Marines, and Master Sergeant James Zahm, an NCO of Marksmanship
>> Training. Arlen Specter takes their testimony. After being shown
>> Oswald's test scores, Anderson offers an explanation for Oswald's
>> lowly score in 1959, shortly before he left the Marines: "It may well
>> have been a bad day for firing a rifle, windy, rainy, dark. There is
>> little probability that he had a good, expert coach. and he probably
>> didn't have as high a motivation because he was no longer in recruit
>> training and under the care of the drill instructor. There is some
>> possibility that the rifle he was firing might not have been as good a
>> rifle as the rifle he was firing in his A course firing. because he
>> may well have carried this rifle around for some time, and it got
>> banged around in normal usage." Anderson summarizes Oswald's abilities
>> as follows: "I would say that as compared to other Marines receiving
>> the same kind of training, that Oswald was a good shot, somewhat
>> better than or equal to--better than average let us say. As compared
>> to a civilian who had not received this intensive training, he would
>> be considered as a good to excellent shot." Specter then shows
>> Anderson frames from the Zapruder film and asks him if hitting Kennedy
>> from the distances determined at the re-enactment would be within
>> Oswald's capabilities, and Anderson repeatedly says the shots were
>> within Oswald's capabilities. He then asks him if Oswald could fire
>> three shots in a time span between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds, and Anderson
>> once again replies in the affirmative. Specter fails to ask Anderson
>> the more pertinent question if Oswald could be expected to hit the 2
>> "not particularly difficult" shots within a 4.8-5.6 second time span
>> while firing at a moving target with a Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.
>> Perhaps he already knew the answer. After finishing with Anderson,
>> Specter makes a point of asking Zahm about Oswald’s ability “based on
>> the tests.” This avoids that the most recent test was 4 years before
>> the shooting and that Oswald had failed to keep in practice. Zahm
>> tells Specter what he undoubtedly wants to hear: “I would say in the
>> Marine Corps he is a good shot, slightly above average, and as
>> compared to the average male of his age throughout the civilian,
>> throughout the United States, that he is an excellent shot.” Clearly,
>> this is the new company line.
>> From still later in the chapter:
>> From a 9-4 WC memo by Wesley Liebeler in which he critiqued the Warren
>> Report:
>> 14. As I read through the section on rifle capability it appears that
>> 15 different sets of three shots were fired by supposedly expert
>> riflemen of the FBI and other places. According to my calculations
>> those 15 sets of shots took a total of 93.8 seconds to be fired. The
>> average of all 15 is a little over 6.2 seconds. Assuming that time is
>> calculated commencing with the firing of the first shot, that means
>> the average time it took to fire the two remaining shots was about 6.2
>> seconds. That comes to about 3.1 seconds for each shot, not counting
>> the time consumed by the actual firing, which would not be very much.
>> I recall that chapter 3 said that the minimum time that had to elapse
>> between shots was 2.25 seconds, which is pretty close to the one set
>> of fast shots fired by Frazier of the FBI. The conclusion indicates
>> that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits in
>> from 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Of the 15 sets of 3 shots described above,
>> only 3 were fired within 4.8 seconds. A total of five sets, including
>> the three just mentioned were fired within a total of 5.6 seconds. The
>> conclusion at its most extreme states that Oswald could fire faster
>> than the Commission experts fired in 12 of their 15 tries and that in
>> any event he could fire faster than the experts did in 10 of their 15
>> tries. If we are going to set forth material such as this, I think we
>> should set forth some information on how much training and how much
>> shooting the experts had and did as a whole. The readers could then
>> have something on which to base their judgments concerning the
>> relative abilities of the apparently slow firing experts used by the
>> Commission and the ability of Lee Harvey Oswald.
>> 15. The problems raised by the above analyses should be met at some
>> point in the text of the report. The figure of 2.25 as a minimum
>> firing time for each shot used throughout chapter 3. The present
>> discussion of rifle capability shows that expert riflemen could not
>> fire the assassination weapon that fast.
In article <4fdf533...@mcadams.posc.mu.edu>, Anthony Marsh says...
>On 6/18/2012 11:04 AM, timstter wrote:
>> TOP POST
>> Pat, the thing you duck is that Oswald practiced his shooting in 1963
>> AND dry fired the murder weapon HUNDREDS of times on his front porch
>> during August and September of 1963 in New Orleans, mere weeks before
>> Kennedy's assassination.
>FYI, dry firing does not tell him how inaccurate his rifle is or help >him adjust the scope.
So where did the other 15 rounds of ammo go that was in the box? They don't sell them one round at a time you know. How do you know he used the scope?
> In article<4fdf533...@mcadams.posc.mu.edu>, Anthony Marsh says...
>> On 6/18/2012 11:04 AM, timstter wrote:
>>> TOP POST
>>> Pat, the thing you duck is that Oswald practiced his shooting in 1963
>>> AND dry fired the murder weapon HUNDREDS of times on his front porch
>>> during August and September of 1963 in New Orleans, mere weeks before
>>> Kennedy's assassination.
>> FYI, dry firing does not tell him how inaccurate his rifle is or help
>> him adjust the scope.
> So where did the other 15 rounds of ammo go that was in the box? They
> don't sell them one round at a time you know. How do you know he used the
> scope?
> Bill Clarke
Plinking out at Love Field. 3 fired at Kennedy. 1 left in the rifle. I think he used the scope to shoot at Walker because it was dark. I don't think he was firing in Dealey Plaza. Someone else using his rifle would not even have known if the scope was damaged and defective as the FBI found it.
