You are postulating things without understanding how the work technically.
The U-2 did not use radar with scrambling. It was equipped with radar
jamming which would confuse the Soviets radar.
The story behind the shootdown of the U-2, and how it played into Oswald's
decision to return to the USA
An NSA agent named Jack Dunlap now enters our story in a most dramatic
fashion. "An extremely sensitive and reliable source" is quoted in an FBI
letterhead memo that "Dunlap gave the Soviets important information
regarding the U-2 flights over the USSR and that Dunlap's information
provided the Soviet Union with the capability of shooting down the Powers
U-2 aircraft...as a result of Dunlap's information, the Soviets were well
aware of when the U-2 planes crossed over the Soviet Union. The Soviets
always had their anti-aircraft guns trained on those planes." This source
was known as TOPHAT. TOPHAT was Lt. General Dmitri Fedorovich Polyakov,
exposed by Aldrich Ames - a real mole inside the CIA - whose motivation
was money and not ideology.
The FBI memo that recounts TOPHAT's story then adds that "Khrushchev held
back from allowing them to shoot down the planes, waiting for an
appropriate political time to do this. Khrushchev eventually "gave the
okay" to shoot down the Powers U-2 aircraft at a time when he thought it
would do the most good for Soviet prestige and at a time when he was being
pressed by China to show their hand." From the wording of the memo, it's
unclear if TOPHAT was the source referring to Khrushchev's actions.
Dunlap succeeded in his mission even though CI chief James Angleton
realized that Dunlap was a mole in 1959, a year before what is known as
the U-2 affair. After Dunlap committed suicide in July 1963, and numerous
classified documents turned up in his possession, his widow admitted to
the FBI on August 20, 1963 that Dunlap told her before his suicide that he
had been selling secrets to the Soviets.
Another piece of the puzzle is that Moscow had just recently obtained the
ability to shoot down the U-2 with the development of the SA-2 Guideline
surface-to-air missiles. By 1960, these missiles were installed around big
cities and sensitive locations. All of the sites on Francis Gary Powers'
flight path were protected by SA-2 missile sites.
When a U-2 flight was conducted on April 9, 1960, the plane's electronic
intelligence (ELINT) collection unit indicated that the Soviets were
tracking them early on. The CIA's Deputy Director of Plans Bissell was
warned that "penetration without detection" was now a problem. When Powers
went on that fateful flight on May 1, 1960, the CIA knew that he was in
danger. There is no record that the CIA warned Eisenhower that the peace
summit might blow up in his face.
DDP Bissell has said that the photographic capabilities of the U-2s
provided "more than ninety percent of all its hard intelligence about the
Soviet Union." during that era. During the early "60s, military
surveillance satellites were in their infancy. Until the first satellite
launch in August, 1960, the U-2 was the only way to obtain overhead photos
of military test sites and similar sensitive installations.
Throughout the 1950s, the U-2 was able to defeat Soviet air defenses for
two reasons: It could fly beyond the range of their missiles to an
altitude of 90,000 feet, and it had ultra-secret radar-jamming equipment.
Kelly Johnson, the legendary research engineer for Lockheed, designed the
U-2 and many key US military planes at the largely autonomous "Lockheed
Advanced Development Projects" (better known as the "Skunk Works") in
Burbank, California, delivering the first U-2 in 1955 to the infamous
top-secret base Area 51. Johnson said that the Soviets were "somehow able
to isolate the (U-2's) radar-jamming signals and use their beams to guide
the anti-aircraft missile...(this meant) either a penetration by Soviet
intelligence of United States radar countermeasures or, by some other
means, the ability to take precise measurements of the U-2's radar
signals."
The U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, wrote in his book Operation Overflight
that he believed Oswald's defection was related to his being shot down:
"Oswald's familiarity with MPS 16 height-finding radar gear and radio
codes...are mentioned in the testimony of John E. Donovan, a former first
lieutenant assigned to the same El Toro radar unit as OSWALD."
Lt. John Emmett Donovan had been Oswald's commanding officer in 1959, and
had discussed more than radar gear and codes: "OSWALD has access to the
location of all bases in the west coast area, all radio frequencies for
all squadrons, all tactical call signs, and the relative strength of all
squadrons, number and type of aircraft in each squadron, who was the
commanding officer, the authentification code of entering and exiting the
ADIZ, which stands for Air Defense Identification Zone. He knew the range
of our radar. He knew the range of our radio. And he knew the range of the
surrounding unit's radio and radar."
Donovan was an FBI agent from 1953-1956, and was a recent graduate from
Georgetown University's Foreign Service school when interviewed by the
Secret Service during December 1963. On the same day as this Secret
Service interview, Donovan was contacted by Evening Star reporter Jeremiah
O'Leary who was "also a Marine reservist". Donovan told the Warren
Commission that the Marines spent thousands of hours changing all the
tactical frequencies and verifying the destruction of codes.
No question that Oswald made the US government's security much more
vulnerable by his threat to talk to the Soviets. But whether or not he did
it, Oswald didn't know anything about how to unjam the U-2's radar-jamming
signals, which was the Soviets' core problem as it made it very difficult
for the Soviets to even find an overflying U-2. Nor was Oswald's knowledge
of the height-finding radar gear all that helpful, if the U-2 could fly
higher than the Soviet air defenses could reach and simultaneously jam
Soviet radar.
What is fascinating is that there is no investigation in the CIA or FBI
files dedicated to whether Oswald was handing U-2 information over to the
Soviets. Nor is there anything in the military files that I am aware of,
other than this complaint by his own lieutenant John Donovan. Incredibly,
the Warren Commission did not ask Donovan or any of Oswald's military
colleagues a single question about the U-2, even though the shootdown
incident happened on the second overflight after Oswald's arrival to the
USSR. Donovan said that "he did not know whether Oswald had actually
turned over secrets to the Russians. But for security's sake it had to be
assumed that he did".
Eight days after Donovan testified to the Warren Commission, Richard Helms
wrote a memo to the Warren Commission entitled, "Oswald's Access to
Information About the U-2", which was classified as "Commission Document
931" and not released for thirty years. Francis Gary Powers discussed it
at length in his book, as he really wanted to know what it said. Powers
died in 1978. When Helms' memo was released in 1993, this was its
conclusion:
"To summarize: There is no evidence or indication that OSWALD had any
association with, or access to, the JTAG (Joint Technical Advisors Group)
operation or its program in Japan. This applies also to information
regarding the U-2 or its mission."
The gap between Helms' version and Donovan's version is vast. Donovan
talks about how his unit provided U-2 support at Cubi Point in the
Philippines, where Oswald once tracked a U-2 flying over China and showed
it to him.
Whether or not Oswald actually provided U-2 secrets to the Soviets, it was
certainly part of the legend created on his behalf. The best tip-off is
right in Oswald's own diary, where he says that Don Alejandro advised him
to go back to the USA on the night of May 1, 1960, the night that the
Soviets shot down Powers' U-2.
>> Explain exactly how scrambling radar would help the Russians
>> track the U-2 and determine exact altitudes.
>
> Scrambling the radar would make the U-2 more impervious to tracking by the
> Russians and/or determining exact altitude. It is well known they were
> unable to track the U-2 over cities right from the start. This gave
It is well known from CIA memos that the Soviets were able to track the
U-2, but did not yet have any weapon which could shoot it down.
> additional protection from Russian radar. If the Russians were given
> information by LHO, for example, that scrambling of signals was taking
> place, they might have been able to use that.
>
The Russians knew that the U-2 had a jamming device and they could see
on their radar that they could not get highly accurate readings when it
was being used. Dunlap told them all about it in 1959.
>>
>>
>>
>>>> The US did not make any substantial changes to the U-2 beforeOswalddefected.
>>
>>> Of course they were making changes all the time.It makes no sense to
>>> think their design and process were stagnated.
>>
>> Look at the qualifier I used. I said "substanial." They could change the
>> color of the trailers or the size of the screens. Those are cosmetic
>> changes not substantial changes.
>
> Translation: you are left with nothing to do but make excuses that
> don't even make sense. Every advantage was given to the U-2
> program.
You falsely assume that the Soviets were ill-equipped.
>
>>
>>>> The US did not make any substantial changes to the U-2
>>>> before Powers took off in May 1960.
>>
>>> They gave him additional help in evading detection. LHO was a radar
>>> operator. Why not connect the dots?
>>
>> They told him to fly higher if he was detected. He did not. Dulles
>> thought that he should have.
>
> It didn't matter because the U-2 came apart because of the vibration
> of the missile(s) in its viscinity.
>
The metal in the tail is fragile enough to break from the shock wave of
an explosion.
>>
>>
>>
>>>> The only significant change for the Powers flight was the new flightplan
>>>> and new sites to be photographed.
>>
>>> Your opinion. You don't know that.
>>
>> The CIA's official history covers that. The new flightplan was very
>> ambitious and would spend a lot more time directly over Soviet Airspace.[...]
>
> If the Russians couldn't interpret the scrambled signals from the U-2
> they couldn't shoot it down no matter where it was.
>
Nothing to interpret. They knew the U-2 had radar jamming. They also had
it under visual tracking by MIGs flying underneath. As it turned out they
did not have to be precise when they fired their missiles. At least 16
missiles fired in a shotgun approach and only one has to be close and not
right on the target. It's like winging a quail.