"I know historians and scholars hate the word "inevitable," but you
imply that sooner or later all great empires will fall. Is that right?
If there's any trend that keeps coming back, it's that great powers
come and go. No one stays at the top forever. Rome was a great empire
with a huge territory under its weight for probably 300 to 400 years,
which is a pretty long time. Some have come and gone much more
quickly.
One of the reasons that America's moment at the top will be short-
lived is that history is moving much more quickly than it used to. The
countries that get into the digital age go into fast-forward. If you
take a snapshot of the world today and say, "A-ha! This is what the
world's going to look like for the next century," it's very dangerous.
Tomorrow could look very different.
Which empire do we compare most to? Is it Rome?
Two analogies come to my mind as most insightful to the present.
First, the Roman case. The split that we're now seeing between Europe
and America reminds me of the split between Rome and Byzantium that
occurred in the end of the third century and into the fourth century.
You had a unitary imperial zone divided into two, and once you had two
separate capitals, Rome and Constantinople, you immediately had
rivalry rather than unity. The same thing is happening between
Washington and Brussels.
As far as the nature of our empire, I'd say the British probably comes
closer to ours. The Roman empire was more contiguous. We have a more
far-flung empire that relies on offshore balancing, which is what the
Brits did: Send troops abroad but more to keep the balance than to
occupy. You could almost call it Empire Lite. That's more or less how
we run the show. One of the benefits of that is that Empire Lite is
cheaper and it also provokes less resistance.
But one of the real dangers that we face at the moment is that Empire
Lite might become Empire Heavy and rather than reassure others, we'll
alienate them. Rather than appear as a benign hegemon, we appear
predatory. We appear to lose our legitimacy as a great power, which is
probably our most precious commodity. If that happens, then all bets
are off. Then you really see countries run for cover and join arms
against the United States.
What mistakes do historians and scholars make when they say that
America is different, that for some reason American primacy will last
indefinitely?
Part of it stems from looking at what I would say are the wrong
indicators. They look at the GDP and the military capability of the
United States vs. other countries. If you do that, it doesn't look
like anybody is going to come close for many decades. I agree with
that. But Europe is no longer a group of sovereign countries; it's
coming together just like [the United States] did [in the 18th
century]. That's why you have to talk about Europe as a collective
entity and its ability to serve as a counterweight to the United
States.
Also, oftentimes historians and particularly political scientists tend
to look at the world structurally. They say, "Forget about what's
going on inside states and just look at the relations among states."
The end of America's dominance will to some extent be made in America.
It will come from America's domestic politics, its own ambivalence
about empire and its own stiff-necked unilateralism, which alienates
others. In that sense, a lot of where we go as a country will come
from internal factors -- demographics, politics, political culture,
populism. Those are issues that lots of political scientists don't pay
attention to.
Now, is that a trend that you see happening regardless of what
political party is in power?
Yes. That's a debate that I have with my colleagues here because they
say, "Listen. Once the Bushies are gone everything will be fine. If
Gore had won, everything would be fine." I don't agree. If Gore had
won, the changes we are seeing now would have taken longer to come
about, but both parties face the same political pressures in the end.
If the Democrats win by 2015, it doesn't matter. We'll be in the same
place.
Still, you're basing a lot of your argument on what you've seen in the
last year, aren't you? The idea that American intervention and
multilateralism is on the wane ... that has a lot to do with what
happened in the last year. And that's just one year.
Interestingly enough, I wrote the first draft of the book before Bush
was elected. The core themes were all there. What I'm quite shocked by
is the speed with which all of this has happened. I thought that my
general analysis would take a good decade to play out. Once Bush came
to office it seemed like someone stepped on the gas. I had to rewrite
the book and I put much more emphasis on America's turning inward and
its ambivalence about running the world. After Sept. 11, the
unilateralists' angry lashing-out side came back. The emphasis in the
book on that was written after Bush came to office, and after Sept.
11.
So you think this trend might slow down with Democrats -- if they're
ever in power again -- but not halt.
Yes, and that's partly because when I was in the Clinton
administration in the early 1990s -- only a few years after the end of
the Cold War -- I already saw trends that were seeds for the book.
Congress was beginning to check out. The media was stopping its
coverage of foreign affairs. Even Clinton, who was a liberal
internationalist by inclination, wasn't so wild about the Kyoto
Protocol, the International Criminal Court and all this other stuff
that the Bush people said no to. When it all comes down to it, I see
the arrows all pointing in one direction, but the emphasis and the
speed changes from party to party."
Continued at: http://dir.salon.com/story/books/int/2002/12/02/kupchan/index.html
> Interesting interview, which highlights the primary difference between
> the democrats and republicans when it comes to foreign policy: the
> republicans (Imperialism Heavy) are openly imperialistic and want to
> step on the accelerator to drive the bus straight over the cliff. The
> democrats (Imperialism Lite) have the same goals as the republicans, but
> their means are a bit more subtle, and would prefer to drive the bus
> around the block slowly a few times before taking it over the cliff.
Heavy = Initiate
Light = Maintain
Why does analysis of the US not treat the military as having a self
serving and independent vested interest in war? Histories of Imperialism,
as with Rome, always do when the military is also a profession. A General
riding in a limo and a valet has vested interests.
War is the health of the State.