Re: Is There Anywhere Info Regarging The New Remailers Appearing Lately?

[Anonymous]

In article <0d5d8b0768e8da41...@foto.nl1.torservers.net>
Anonymous <anon...@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>
> to...@wherever.its.invalid.net wrote:
> > I remember the days when there was a page telling us where each
> > remailer was based and some additional info on it. These days, The
> > Great Unlearned, such as myself, have no idea if a new remailer can be
> > trusted. Is There any such source for such info today? Are not some
> > of the older and trusted remops not privy to such about at least some
> > of the new remailers? It would be nice if some of this info could be
> > shared in this group. No one is asking for guarantees, but I'd like
> > have at least a slight idea as to the safety of using these new ones.
> > One example: kreti. Who runs it? Where is it?
> >
> > I doubt if the governments of the world are doing *nothing* about
> > unmasking the remailer system and its users.
> >
> > Lastly, which entry remailers are regarded as safe as far as the
> > integrity of the remop goes? These would be some of the older ones,
> > I'd imagine.
> >
> > I'm getting more paranoid about outfits like the U.S. Homeland
> > Security nazis. I cannot believe they are just sitting around having
> > U.S.A. citizens paying for their Starbucks while they play gin rummy.
> >
> > I just think this is a growing problem - trusting new remailers and
> > new remops, that is.
>
>
> I have all the sympathy in the world for your request. On the face of
> it, it really "seems" to make sense. In other words, who is
> trustworthy and who is not?
>
> There may be anecdotal evidence as to who might be, and who may not
> be, but of course there is no central repository for that
> information, even assuming that it does exist. And as you know, if
> you have doubts about a particular remailer, you can certainly bar
> that remailer in your chains.
>
> I assume you may use Tor.
>
> That said consider this: Mixmaster and Tor are NOT networks of trust.
> By their very design. In order for a Mixmaster message to be
> anonymous, or Tor traffic to be anonymous it is NOT required that all
> hops in the chain be trusted. That's important. The design assumes
> that hostile adversaries "might be" participating in the network.
>
> There is published information that some Tor exit nodes are evil, and
> indeed, they also can be blocked. I would grant you that. But the
> reality is, you can never with any certainty at all, ascertain what a
> Tor exit node is doing with your traffic. Thus, you make the
> assumption that an exit node may indeed, be snooping your traffic,
> and you take appropriate measures to guard against that. ie; PGP
> encryption, SSL etc.
>
> Mixmaster:
>
> Take a look at this document please:
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sassaman-mixmaster-03
>
> "Message transmission can be protected against traffic analysis by the
> mix-net protocol. A mix (remailer) is a service that forwards
> messages, using public key cryptography to hide the correlation
> between its inputs and outputs. If a message is sent through a
> sequence of mixes, one trusted mix is sufficient to provide anonymity
> and unobservability of communications against a powerful adversary.
> Mixmaster is a mix-net implementation for electronic mail."
>
> And for emphasis:
>
> ".........one trusted mix is sufficient to provide anonymity
> and unobservability of communications against a powerful adversary.
> Mixmaster is a mix-net implementation for electronic mail."
>
> I hope this helps.