IRAN AND THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST
Paul Liptz
June 28,2009
The recent unrest in Iran could well turn out to be a formative event in Middle Eastern history. The issues at hand are much larger than merely a national election and have important implications for the whole region.
Serious analysis is hindered by the government controlled media and one is this forced to depend on bloggers and external sources. However, even with these limitations, it is possible to indicate that the published results of the June elections have been rejected by significant sections of the Iranian population.
It seems that at this stage several comments can be made:-
1) THE USE OF FORCE
The Iranian government has vast internal security forces which can be employed against the local population. Besides the regular police, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij are pliable supporters of government violence. When Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in 1979, the role of a wide range of vigilante groups was significant. These are not necessarily marginal sectors who hope to gain from unrest but are ideologically committed to preserving Iran as a traditional conservative society which rejects modern western concepts. One recalls the horrendous role of the "Morals Police" ruthlessly removing make up from women's lips. Now, thirty years later, this section of society is still a willing partner in the suppression of alternative living styles and political views.
2) THE DEMONSTRATORS
One of the main factors hindering the demonstrators is their heterogeneous nature. They come from varying sections of society and demonstrate with differing goals and solutions. Some interpret their participation in street protests as part of a move to increase the role of centrist middle class activists while others are much more traditional, wanting a change of leadership but not the overall political system and philosophy. Mousavi may not be the opposition leader who can garner these various forces and move Iran in a new direction.
The outside observer must appreciate the bravery of the demonstrators as their lives and careers are at stake. The national soccer players who wore green wrist bands, the professors who openly supported Mousavi and the remarkable public statement by filmmaker Samira Makhmalbaf (Memri June 26, 2009), all indicate that Iran has a range of people committed to change.
In several capitals of the world, Iranians demonstrated against the reported election results but, by and large, these dissident communities are weak and their influence on the governments in the countries where they live is insignificant.
3) ARAB RESPONSES
The recent events in Iran have placed several Middle Eastern governments in a quandary. On the one hand, the leaders are delighted that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are facing serious problems as Iran has threatened them with nuclear force or persistent criticism of any government that appears to be pro-western or somewhat sympathetic to Israel. On the other hand, if Arab governments support the mass street demonstrations in Teheran, this might be perceived by their own internal opposition as an acceptance of this form of protest. In a part of the world that clearly lacks democratic mechanisms, there always exists a severe fear of street demonstrations getting out of control. Many Middle Eastern leaders may secretly support the recent protests though they are reluctant to openly state this. Some political leaders have already publicly supported the present Iranian regime, among them Qatar, Syria and Turkey.
4) ISRAEL'S STAND
I believe that Israeli leaders who have expressed their support for the Iranian opposition have not acted wisely. In the delicate Middle Eastern situation, Israeli interests are best served by subtle under-the-table diplomacy. The comments by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak can be easily manipulated in the region as indicating that the "Zionist enemy" is involved in the internal affairs of another country. The Iranian dissidents will thus too easily be blamed as collaborating with Israel and this can be of little help to their cause.
It is also important to remember that Mousavi himself was involved in the early stages of Iran's nuclear development and there is little to indicate that, if he ever came to power, there would be a substantive change in aggressive acts and language towards Israel.
Certain Israelis favor the continued rule of Ahmadinejad, maintaining that his policy is so blatantly aggressive, that Israel can legitimately emphasize the existence of a real threat. If there is a change of government and a supposedly "moderate" leadership takes over, it'll be harder to prove to the world that Israel is indeed in serious danger.
5) THE WESTERN WORLD
In Ephraim Kam's sophisticated article "The Internal Conflict in Iran" (INNS Insight June 25, 2009), he states: "The willingness of the Obama administration to achieve a strategy of dialogue with Iran will help Iran to repair the damage its image has suffered in the international arena". This comment deserves our attention.
It is clear to any observer of Middle Eastern affairs that there are several approaches in terms of how to deal with "rouge" states. Western society appears to be convinced that dialogue is the most effective mechanism to reduce conflict. However, another possibility is that the perceived weakness of the west has a negative effect as aggressive Middle Eastern states are not influenced by negotiation but rather by clear cut statements and, in certain cases, the threat of the use of force. Perhaps the Obama administration is attempting to distance itself from the Bush policy which incorporated the language of the "axis of evil".
Britain appears to be more supportive of the Iranian opposition and thus earned sharp criticism by Teheran's government.
The argument of how best to influence nuclear countries like North Korea, Pakistan and Iran will undoubtedly be an important issue of debate in the months and years to come.
6) CONCLUSION
While it is unclear how the drama in Iran will develop, one can surely suggest that it is an important event. Governmental power and external support to the regime can enable Khamenei and Ahmadinejad to continue ruling. However, the concerned observer will interpret the complex Iranian society in new ways. The nature of the heterogeneous opposition has to be taken into consideration.
One can only hope that intelligent commentary will be given to the global community. The March 2009 opinions expressed by the well-know columnist Roger Cohen have been proved to be remarkably incorrect and we all deserve something better.
Paul Liptz lectured at the Tel Aviv University for 35 years. He teaches graduate students at the Hebrew Union College in Jerusalem and is Director of Education at the Anita Saltz International Education Center of the WUPJ.