1. Terminology: Jokulhlaup refers to the "leaping" of a glacier due to
the lift of subglacial water which has reached a critical pressure due
to sustained accumulation or geothermal melting. It should not be
applied to the sort of event typical of the Himalayas, which involve
sudden breaking of ice and or moraine dams.
2. In the case of Tsho Rolpa, response to local pleas for help took
years. The government of Nepal got involved more than ten years after
the alarm had first been raised, and only after "donor organizations"
had taken the lead.
3. "Political" problems introduced significant and persistent
inefficiencies. The embroiled agencies included the Water and Energy
Commission Secretariat, Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ICIMOD, the Dutch, and the Japanese. The
fact that the entire project did not die was due only to the fortuitous
and unremunerated persistence of a private consultant. In other words,
the procedures for dealing with the problem were inadequate, and the
INGOs and national agencies were unable to collaborate effectively.
4. "Political" considerations led to reduction of the scope of the
mitigation project recommended by scientist and also to rejection of an
integrated management plan that would have provided benefits for the
local populace and also sustained maintenance of the infrastructure.
Unfortunately, Reynolds does not state unequivocally who did (or
didn't) do what why. What is clear is that the vaunted "fix" at Tsho
Rolpa has not adequately mitigated the GLOF hazard and has not provided
ancillary benefits for the local people.
5. The media frenzy surrounding GLOF predictions in 1997 was largely
due to the political disharmony alluded to above, with disgruntled
experts providing tendentious commentary to the press. The absence of
an "organization with the authority and scientific gravitas" to put a
lid on the situation at that time was partially due to the lack of hard
data; however, despite the fact that much more is now known, we still
lack such an authoritative agency, and the media still promotes and
exploits doomsday scenarios.
6. The Tsho Rolpa GLOF mitigation project lowered the lake water level
by about one-fifth of the amount recommended. The condition of the
overhanging glaciers and of the ice-cored moraine, both of which are
known to be unstable, has not been monitored. The situation therefore
must be considered dangerous.
7. The Arun III project nearly went forward on the basis of slipshod
hazard assessments. Specifically, no glacial hazards were studied
because old maps were used, and these maps showed no glacier lakes. A
belated study was derailed by largely irrelevant data from a
neighboring valley which raised the spectre of disastrous publicity --
not of an actual disaster. There may have been other reasons to oppose
the project, but the fact is that a decision of great economic
importance to Nepal was made on the basis of an irrelevancy.
8. As Jack Ives has argued, Reynolds states that there is no basis for
the claim that glacial hazards put millions of people and billions of
dollars at risk.
9. Predictions of disaster can be disastrous for tourism. The erroneous
prediction of an event at Huaraz, Peru, led to $20 million in losses,
and the offending press release remains accessible on the NASA Web
site.
10. ICIMOD's list of dangerous glacial lakes in Nepal and Bhutan is not
based on reliable data, and characterizations of Imja Tsho, in
particular, misrepresent the hazard.
11. Recent work by Reynolds has resulted in a Multi-Criteria Analysis
protocol for the assessment of glacial hazard; this has been accepted
by the Union Commission for the Cryospheric Sciences and should be
applied uniformly in all GLOF hazard determinations.
12. We now have the technical ability to assess GLOF hazards throughout
the Himalayan region.
13. Emotive and subjective views are not acceptable and should be
exposed for what they are. However, Reynolds believes that it will take
another large disaster before the complacent donor community is moved
to upgrade assessment procedures.
14. Tsho Rolpa remains a hazard. Funding is needed to reassess the
situation around the lake and also to implement a remote sensing
monitoring program for the larger catchment. Without reliable
information, we face the Scylla and Charybdis of panic (induced by
yellow journalism) and insouciance (induced by complacent authorities).