Troop Voting Bill used as Trojan Horse for Internet Voting

[Joyce McCloy]

The President recently signed the MOVE ACT, an election bill to help
troops vote - the bill was embedded in a Defense Authorization bill.
That bill is being used as a trojan horse for internet voting. Sadly,
a measure that would help troops vote, having the DOD act as a voter
registration agency, was rejected!

If we don't act, internet voting will be in all 50 states and we will
have selections, not elections. And that is soon. Massachusetts just
approved a pilot for military to vote by email, Colorado passed in
internet voting pilot to be funded by private organizations, and
Alabama has reintroduced an military/internet voting bill.

Everyone Counts, the internet voting company headed by former EAC
Chairman DeGregorio is pushing hard and declares that they have the
answer to FVAC's 50 state, 2010 Legislative Agenda. See their website
http://www.everyonecounts.com

On their home page a picture of a soldier smiling next to a computer
screen.

Across the picture:

"eLECT TODAY, THE ONLY PROVEN SOLUTION FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE MOVE ACT IN 2010.

Using experience, transparent technology and expert consulting,
Everyone Counts provides
secure election solutions that ensure universal access. Our team of
trustworthy election
and technology professionals thoroughly understands the election
process, and we
advocate a singular vision. We offer our customers and their
electorate affordable, reliable
multi-channel voting solutions that provide accuracy and ease of use
for voters, election officials,
and poll workers around the world.
http://www.everyonecounts.com/

Joyce McCloy
http://votingnews.blogspot.com/

[honest electionscow]

ok, now you're scaring me. This could be "game over." THe only hope I can see is some hacker exposing the whole thing.   Marj Creech

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www.recallvotingmachines.com

[SomeTh...@aol.com]

RE: Internet Voting

ok, now you're scaring me. This could be "game over." THe only hope I can see is some hacker exposing the whole thing.   Marj Creech

The Holt bill would ban Internet voting. It's the only bill submitted
in Congress that would.

Jim

[Lucius Chiaraviglio]

Last time I checked, it allowed various other forms of machinations.
If the Holt bill is the only possibility for stopping internet voting, we are
in real trouble (as if we weren't in enough already).

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Lucius Chiaraviglio | luc...@verizon.net (main)
| lchi...@gmail.com (photos)
| lchi...@yahoo.com (alternative)
| luc...@post.harvard.edu (fwd only)

[Joyce McCloy]

West Virginia has a paper ballot law, but the legislation for military
internet voting allows paperless voting

ENGROSSED

COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE

FOR

Senate Bill No. 4006

(By Senators Tomblin (Mr. President) and Caruth,

By Request of the Executive)
____________

[Originating in the Committee on the Judiciary; reported November 18,
2009.]
____________

A BILL to amend the Code of West Virginia, 1931, as amended, by
adding thereto a new article, designated §3-3B-1, §3-3B-2, §3-3B-3 and
§3-3B-4, all relating to voting by members of the military and
citizens residing outside the United States; creating a pilot program
for military and overseas voters held during the year 2010; allowing a
limited number of counties to participate in the pilot project;
setting participation requirements; providing for project selection by
the Secretary of State; and setting minimum voting system
requirements.


Be it enacted by the Legislature of West Virginia:
That the Code of West Virginia, 1931, as amended, be amended by
adding thereto a new article, designated §3-3B-1, §3-3B-2, §3-3B-3 and
§3-3B-4, all to read as follows:
ARTICLE 3B. UNIFORMED SERVICES AND OVERSEAS VOTER PILOT PROGRAM.
§3-3B-1. Short title.
This article shall be known as the Uniformed Services and
Overseas Voter Pilot Program.

§3-3B-2. Uniformed services members and overseas voter pilot
program.


This article authorizes pilot projects that will allow a limited
number of counties to use available voting technology for the purposes
of voting by absent uniformed services members and overseas citizens,
as defined by 42 U. S. C. §1973ff, et seq. Participation in pilot
programs will assist counties and the state in identifying areas for
potential modification as larger pilot projects of this type begin to
be authorized by the federal government under the Military and
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009). Pilot
programs authorized by this article are only applicable to the primary
and general elections to be held during the year 2010.

§3-3B-3. Process for selection by Secretary of State.


(a) On or before the close of business on January 8, 2010, any
county interested in participating in the pilot program must submit a
proposal to the Secretary of State. The proposal shall include:
(1) The name of the vendor or vendors, if any, whose voting
system will be implemented for voting by uniformed military and
overseas citizen voters;
(2) The anticipated cost to the county of implementing the
proposal;
(3) The manner in which the voting system complies with the
provisions of section four of this article; and
(4) An option for the voter to choose not to vote using the pilot
voting system, but rather by mail, fax or e-mail at the voter's
discretion as provided for in sections five and five-b, article three
of this chapter.
(b) The Secretary of State shall evaluate each proposal and may
approve those proposals which meet the criteria described in section
four of this article.
(c) On or before January 29, 2010, each county that has submitted
a proposal shall be notified by the Secretary of State that they have
either been approved or denied participation in the pilot program.
(d) Following the primary election, the secretary shall evaluate
the functional effectiveness of pilot programs conducted under this
article and shall terminate any program that fails to adequately and
securely ensure that absent uniformed services voters and overseas
voters have their absentee ballots cast and counted in the primary
election.
(e) Ninety days following the 2010 primary election and ninety
days following the 2010 general election, the secretary shall submit
to the Legislature reports on the progress and outcomes of any pilot
program conducted under this article, together with recommendations:
(1) For the conduct of additional pilot programs; and
(2) For such other legislation as the secretary determines
appropriate.
§3-3B-4. Minimum requirements for pilot program voting systems.
Provisions of sections eight and nine, article four-a of this
chapter notwithstanding, a voting system may be approved by the
Secretary of State for use in the pilot program authorized by this
article if it meets the following minimum requirements:
(1) Basic Operational Elements of the Online Voting System. --
(A) System is web-based.
(B) System has an intuitive, easy-to-navigate interface.
(C) System supports multiple major languages.
(D)System is localized (in terms of date, time and address
formats) to major areas in the world.
(E) System can handle five thousand voters over ten days, with
likely spikes in use at beginning and end of voting period.
(2) Accessability. --
(A) System interoperates with a wide variety of client-side
platforms, including:
(i) Microsoft Windows;
(ii)MacOS;
(iii) Other common operating systems (Linux, etc.);
(iv) Internet Explorer version 3 or higher;
(v) Firefox version 3 or higher;
(vi) Safari version 1 or higher;
(vii) Opera version 3 or higher;
(viii) Netscape version 3 or higher; and
(ix) Chrome version 1 or higher.
(B) System does not require use of Java/Javascripts (or detects
whether browser accepts Java/JavaScript) and provides alternate
interfaces.
(C) System detects whether browser accepts images and provides
alternate interfaces.
(D) System works for users who use screen readers.
(E) System works for users who access the Internet using a text-
only browser.
(F) System is sensitive to low-bandwidth/slow-modem environment
of some users.
(3) Verification of voters. --
(A) System verifies a voter's member number, password and PIN
number.
(B) System alerts administrator of suspected efforts at fraud
(including repeated guesses of passwords, excessive votes from a
single PC).
(4) Secret But Verifiable Ballots. -- System implements secret
balloting, while allowing independent third-party monitors to verify
that the ballots counted are the same as the ballots cast.
(5) Support for Ballot Marking Rules. -- System either:
(A) Does not allow mismarking of ballots; or
(B) Checks validity of ballots immediately upon submission, and
returns ballot to voter for resubmission if there is an error.
(6) Data Security. --
(A) System protects the security, integrity and confidentiality
of members' personal data.
(B) System protects the security, integrity and confidentiality
of ballots.
(C) Ideally, system provides no way for anyone (even vendor
employees) to determine how an individual voter voted; at a minimum,
system provides reasonable safeguards to prevent such data access.
(7) Verifiability of Software and Procedures. --
(A) System and vendor make it possible to verify that the
software performs according to specification.
(B) System and vendor make it possible to verify that the vendor
is running the software correctly.
(C) Vendor will allow independent third-party monitors to review:
(i) Software, before and during election; and
(ii) Procedures (how many people have access to what parts of the
system, how passwords are issued, how backups are done).
(D) System incorporates safeguards to assure that vendor
employees do not cast votes for users who do not vote.
(E) System provides mechanism for verifying that the system is
operating the way it is supposed to; this may involve mathematical
procedures or cryptographic protocols that will reveal if ballots have
been tampered with, audit trails or other mechanisms suggested by the
vendor.
(F) System automatically verifies the number of ballots sent in
and the size and consistency of the database(s) and warns the
administrator and stops the voting until the administrator manually
authorizes it to continue.
(8) Vendor Transparency and Openness. --
(A) Vendor will be sufficiently transparent and open about the
system's design and function so as to foster confidence among users.
(B) Vendor will allow independent third-party monitors to verify
that the voting system is working according to the specification and
proposal.
(9) Vendor Capability. --
(A) Vendor is committed to the success of the voting system.
(B) Vendor provides access to 24-hour technical support during
the ten-day voting period.
(C) Vendor has tested its voting systems in a production
environment.
(D) Vendor will test the voting system prior to the election.
(E) Vendor has, and provides reference for, prior experience with
similar systems.

On Nov 16, 11:00 pm, Lucius Chiaraviglio <luci...@verizon.net> wrote:

> Nov 16, 2009 06:37:02 PM, SomeThoug...@aol.com wrote:
>
> > > RE: Internet Voting
> > > ok, now you're scaring me. This could be "game over." THe only
> > > hope I can see is some hacker exposing the whole thing.   Marj Creech
>
> > The Holt bill would ban Internet voting. It's the only bill submitted
> > in Congress that would.
>
> Last time I checked, it allowed various other forms of machinations.
> If the Holt bill is the only possibility for stopping internet voting, we are
> in real trouble (as if we weren't in enough already).
>
> --

> Lucius Chiaraviglio | luci...@verizon.net (main)
>                     | lchia...@gmail.com (photos)
>                     | lchia...@yahoo.com (alternative)
>                     | luci...@post.harvard.edu (fwd only)